ML19210C768
| ML19210C768 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/25/1979 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1643, NUDOCS 7911200079 | |
| Download: ML19210C768 (20) | |
Text
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ISSUE DATE:
6/25/79 J
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b TES OF THE ACRS SUSC0fiMITTEE MEETING ON p /b 4/3 fhh RELIABILITY AND PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT WASHINGTON, DC JUNE 2,1979 On June 2,1979, the ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability and Probabilistic Assess-ment met in Washington, DC to discuss procedures being developed to ensure the proper and effective use of risk assessment theory, methods, data development, and statistical analysis by the Staff, to discuss the 1979 review and evaluation of the NRC safety research program, and to discuss the reliability of BWR piping with regards to the frequency of appearance.of stress corrosion cracking. Notice of this meeting appeared in the Federal Register on Friday, May 18,1979 (Attach-ment A). There were no requests for oral or written statements from members of the public. A copy of Nuclear Power and Safety (Norway) was given to che Sub-committee by ULF TVETEN, I.F.A., who was responsible for Chapter 5, " Accident Risk," and is on file in the ACRS Office. A complete set of slides and hand-outs is attached to the Office Copy of these minutes. The meeting schedule is Attachment B, and the list of attendees is Attachment C.
Mr. Serpan of the NRC's Metallurgy and Materials Research Branch gave a brief overview of piping Reliability Research Programs Related to BWR Stress Corrosion Cracking. He reviewed the FY 1979 programs which are underway or soon will be. These programs included a program to explore incioient IGSCC detection in SWR piping underway at Dresden 2.
In FY 1980, a program is planned to begin deveicoment of improved, real-time UT flaw detection aimed at stress corrosion cracking. Plans for FY 1981 call for the initiation of confimatory research on SCC in SWR piping.
Mr. Serpan noted that the focus of research has been on PWR piping, since the study group report of 1975 indicated that stress corrosion cracks were not a serious safety problem. He noted fracture mechanics stability evaluations of cracked 23-inch pipe which indicated tnat there will be a leak before a break. He felt it was unlikely that a catastrophic rupture would occur in large diameter piping.
Mr. Serpan again noted that programs dealing with the reliability of piping systems are 'very pWR oriented. They include studies on the mechanism and prob-ability of pipe failures and on large LOCAs induced by seismic crack growth.
Mr. Sercan discussed the cold leg integrity evaluation, its purpose is to ceternine if the safety margin against a large break in a PWR cold leg, i
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2 during the 40-year plant life, is large enough to make the postulation of a break overly conse'rvative.
Confirmatory Research on SCC in BWR Piping is scheduled to begin in FY 80 or 81.
These studies will include:
.Effect of actual BWR stresses and thermal loading on IGSCC.
. Study of Service Piping for Residual Stresses and Low Temperature Sensitization.
. Validation of GE Stress Rule.
. Validation of Improvement Practices as IHSI (Induction Heating Stress Improvement).
. Improvement and Validaticn. of NDE for IGSCC.
Dr. Okrent noted that he cid not agree with the conclusions reached in NUREG-0531 (the pipe crack study group report).
He expressed the thought that the introduction of cracks into piping inevitably introduces some hazard.
Procedures to Ensure the Procer and Effective Use of Risk Assessment Theory, Methods, Data Cevelocment and Statistical Analysis by the Staff Mr. Riehm of the Program Support Staff of NRR begin with a presentation on the use of risk assessment. He noted that a response on the use of risk assessment was due to the Commission by the end of June. However, due to the incident at Three Mile Island and the shut dcwn of some plants due to their niping seismic design, the effort was several weeks behind. At the present time there was not a~ representative draft of the NRR Staff's position available.
The purpose of the task was described.
First it is to develop procedures to ensure expanded use of risk assessment theory is proper and effective. He s
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- stated that this task was a result of the Commission policy statement of January 13, 1979. The policy statement was precipitated by the Risk Assessment Review Group Report which in turn was a result of WASH-1400.
Mr. Riehm noted that guidance was needed by the Staff in the use of event /
fault trees, the data base and statistical methods, consequence models, the use of relative vs. absolute probabilities, methodology development and peer review.
Mr. Levine noted that since 1974 when the draft of WASH-1400 was released there has been a growing want on the part of the Staff to use the techniques of risk assessment. However, until there is wide spread and adequate training the use of risk assessment should not be encouraged.
There are many subtleties involved in its use. Mr. Levine noted that when making predictions both relative and absolute probabilities studies should be done. However, the limitations associated with both predictions should be clearly understood.
The best judgment would take into account both relative and absolute prob-ability predictions. Mr. Riehm also noted that the Staff is very concerned that the procedures for use of risk assessment by the Staff have a proper peer review to avoid :ne need of an elaborate defense later.
Mr. Riehm noted that the Staff must strike a balance between too much control over the use of risk assessment which may inhibit the expanded use and too little control which may lead to inadvertant misuse and loss of credibility. Such as system needs to be accomplished in such a way that the Staff does not have to spend resources continually defending their actions.
Currently there have been discussions between NRR, RES, OSD, and MPA to exchange views on this subject. There has not been a document developed which represents a combined position, yet the schedule is still to develop procedures by June 30, 1979.
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- Dr. Okrent suggested that the Staff consider how the review process could be hurt by not using probabilistic methodology at all.
Even a limited use of risk assessment may be preferable to no use at all.
Discussion of Draft Document from RES, " Detailed Guidance for the NRC Staff on use of Guantitative Risk Assessment Tecnnioues in Regulatory Cecisir n-e making."
Dr. Budnitz discussed the draft document he wrote on the use of quantitative risk assessment techniques. He noted the document does not have input fro m NRR or I&E which would be desirable in the finished product.
Mr. Levine noted that more sophisticated models are required to analyze phenomena such as earthquakes and floods where the data base is small. The sophistication is required to extrapolate beycnd the data base in a meaningful way.
It is realized that their use involves some risk of error, but their use also increases the amount of knowledge available in the decision making pro ces s.
Mr. Sudnit: noted that without guidance on the use of risk assessment there may be cases where the Staff is reluctant to use these techniques to the extent the Lewis Comittee thought they should.
In response to questions, Mr. Levine thought that the Staff was not yet to the point of setting a particular criterion for reliability of a specific pl ant system. The examples of the kinds of applications which are possible are discussed in the draft ree !rt (, cages 6-3),
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. Dr. Budnitz again noted that the Lewis Report stated the techniques are of greatest value in their application where the data base is strong. When the data base is weat, the methodology can still be used if used with wisdom recognizing limitations. Where there is no data base it can still be used to deliniate areas of investigation.
Dr. Budnitz spoke to the importance of peer review.
He noted that the final responsibility for a peer review of a contractor's piece of work rests with the contractor.
Dr. Okrent questioned why the methodology hadn't been used to identify situations of potential interest. He suggested the path of degraded situations be followed to learn where improvements can be made.
Improvements may be desirable based on either a high probability of the event occurring or because the consequences of the event appeared awkward.
A conclusion could be reached to take some action even though the single failure criterion was met.
Dr. Ckrent said that the subcormiittee report to the full ACRS would note the incomplete state of the Staff's development of an opinion. He suggested the Committee note its interest in this subject when they meet with the Com-mission during the June ACRS meeting.
Finally as more inform.ation or posi-tions are developed on this topic he requested the Comittee have an opportunity to look at the information, and perhaps comment on it.
W1SH-1400 Insichts on Critical Contributors To Risk - W. Vesely Dr. Vesely presented a few slides on using some of the WASH-1400 insights and risk analyses techniques. He offered insights to widen the extent of the single failure criterion.
He noted the importance of any event to risk is determined by three basic factors:
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. 1.
The probability of' occurrence of the event 2.
The Safety System (or Systems) affected by the event, and 3.
The event t'ree ser"ance (or sequences) associated with the event.
Dr. Vesely noted there were numerous contributors, in WASH-1400, not covered by the single failure criterion which add risk contributions as high or higher than single active component failures.
Some of these include human errors, common cause failures, test and maintenance downtimes, nontestable components, and certain passive compcnents.
Dr. Vesely noted that for licensing, the results and insights from the risk analyses can be translated into deterministic criteria and guidelines.
Contributors to System downtime due to test and maintenance can t'e translated into maximum allowable component downtimes for tech. specs. Contributions due to human error can be translated into procedural or dosign requirements.
Contributions due to other factors can be translated into specific require-ments depending on the originating cases.
To identify significant risk contributors in plants event trees can be constructed to determine key accident sequences and key systems for a set of similar plants. System logic models can be constructed to consider specific factors contributing to system failures within accident sequences. Signi ficant risk contributors can be identified utilizing failure rate data system logic models, and defined accident sequences.
Dr. Vesely noted that in some sases it may be unnecessary to construct large detailed fault trees.
System logic models which are constructed to consider component failure can be of various forms and relatively simple, such as system schematics, and simplified block diagrams.
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. Afternoon Session Dr. McGrath of-the Probabilistic Analysis Staff presented his groups' FY-81 plans to the Subcommittee.
Dr. McGrath listed three items which had a large influence over the direction of the FY 81 budget. First there was an increase in the support given to licensing.
The example of ranking generic safety items was cited.
The issuance of the Risk Assessment Review Group Report and the Commission's Policy statement guided the 1981 budget planning.
The final item which will be reflected in the FY-81 budget will be the implications resulting from the Three Mile Island incident.
The FY-81 work management structure is broken down into nine areas. The total budget requested for FY-81 is $10.4M. The nine areas of work manage-ment structure are:
1.
Methodology and Software development which includes the development of flood methodology for accident risk, and fire risk.
2.
Reactor systems and accident process analysis includes core melt sensitivity work.
3.
Licensing support and methodology application includes the PAS review of the standard review plan, and transportation accidents.
4 The nuclear fuel cycle risk program is primarily devoted to high-level waste management.
5.
Reliability and human error data analysis is the work which is being done to improve the PAS data base, such as cormion cause failure, human error data, and component failure rate data.
6.
Acceptable risk criteria is an exploratory program that is investigating the area of acceptable risk and trying to determine whether there are ways to establish quantitative risk policy.
7.
Improvements to the reactor safety study will deal with studies on the implications of the RSS.
8.
The training program deals with promoting a fimiliarity with risk assessment techniques and there use among the Staff.
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Operational safety data analysis will look into evaluations primarily using LER data and the NPDRS.
This current budget.is based on supporting ongoing programs, and funding new projects which are required. The FY-81 budget is now set at $10.1M which almost doubles the $5.7M budget for FY-80.
Program Areas in Fuel Cycle Risk Assessment - M. Cullingford The programs in this area are broken down into waste management and operational and facility risk assessment. The funding is predominately in the waste management area for FY-81. The operational and facility risk assessment budget is hal f of that proposed for waste management. He noted the projects are designed to look at the important contributors to risk, to identify data voids, the ranking of data needs, and provide models use-ful in the licensing process.
The major program in this area is methodology develo:rnent for risk assess-ment of radioactive waste isolation. The FY 81 cost is expected to be 345CK.
The objectives are to examine the long-term risk from radioactive waste iso-lation in deep geologic formations. This program will attempt to demonscrate the methodology by apolication to a hypothetical reference repository in bedded salt. A third objective is to provide insights on the important pro-cesses and mechanisms wnich govern transfer of radionuclides to humans and thus guide the formation of licensing decision:. The first phase of this program is nearly complete and defined a reference repository system. The work was per-formed by the 'JSGS.
A second phase of this program will identify system properties important to long-term safety, identify data deficiencies, and identify sources and magnitudes of uncertainities.
In a later pnase the program will be extended 1372 254
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9-to consider emplacement media other than bedded salt. The last phase of study will develop model improvements and site specific licensing tools.
Products expected from this program include NUREG reports on model develop-ment, sensitivity analyses, a transport model, and statistical methods for treating uncertainties.
It is also hoped that models with user manuals can be produced as standard calculational and licensing tools.
It is hoped to be able to demonstrate the risk methodology by application to the reference site.
A risk methodology for spent fuel isolation alternatives program is underway, FY-81 costs are projected at $355K. The program began this year and is currently exploring fuel spacing, and possible disruptive features that would have to be addressed.
Products expected from this program include: a report on a reference spent fuel repository, identifying data research needs, identification of properties important to long-term safety, and attempting to do some risk assessment.
A scenario assessment for the waste repository program is estimated to require $260K in FY-81.
The aim of tnis program is to screen various scenarios as to their relative importance, efficiently, and not use a lot of computer time, which could result in man-years of effort.
A dynamic simulation of waste / rock processes will cost $100K in FY-81.
It will attempt to examine mechanisms such as heat increasing the fracturing rate of rock, and increasing the intrusion of water and sucsequent solutioning of waste. This is being perforned by the USGS.
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..._ A radioactive waste gas program is estimated to cost $140K in FY-81.
Its objective is to identify the least risk alternative for mangement of 14 gaseous C
,1129, and Kr85 from fuel cycle facilities.
A program on decontamination alternatives is expected to cost $150K in FY-81. This program is a result of the recent TMI-2 accident.
Its objective will be to develop a method of choosing optimal decontamination pl an s.
R. Blond (PAS) - Consecuence Modeling For Reactor Accidents The objective of this work is to extend the methodologies and techniques used in the reactor safety study to make them more site specific. The funding level is expected to be $132K in FY-79, $200K in FY-80, and $240K in FY-81.
Goals include the development of a preliminary site specific dispersion mdel for radioactive material. Then an evaluation of the preliminary model will be performed, along with a peer review. The following year (1980) will include refinements to the model. Plume rise and building wake models will be developed and evaluated.
In 1981 using sensitivity infctmation, and response modeling techniques PAS will attempt to bound the uncertainty in the model. Risk calculation comparisons will also be done in 1981 to study the impact of the model on specific sites.
An improved health effects models program will reevaluate and update consequence model health effects for early fatalities and latent cancer fatalities.
Funding will be $100K in FY 1980 and $200K in FY 1981.
The program will establish an advisory health effects grouo to recommend short-term confirmatory research needs and determine appropriate health effects improvements for RSS models.
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.. _. _ - Reactor and Licensing Acolications of Probabilistic Analysis - FY-81 Plan-ning: G. Edison, Systems Engineerina Section The work is bniken down into four areas: the application of reactor safety methods, systems analysis of reactor operating experience, providing direct licensing support, and mixtures of other items. The funding totals for this program include 1,907K in FY-79,1,590K in FY-80, and 3,080K in FY-81.
The objectives of the application of reactor safety study methods, the largest of the program areas, will identify potential accident sequences and provide engineering insights for risk contributors such as core melt, severe nonmelt damage, and Class 3 through 5 accidents. A second objective is to provide risk-based guidance in the areas of operation, testing, inspection and accident recovery.
Dr. Okrent noted that his personal opinion was that less emphasis should be given to Class 3 through 8 accidents and more emphasis be given to Class 9 accidents. He suggested some re-thinking of this program ascect with NRR. Mr. Edison noted the basis for the program area was the TMI interim letters of the ACRS and the Risk Assessment Review Group recommendations.
Program area benefits include:
dominant risk contributors identified to NRR in LWR designs, development of personnel trained in probabilistic analysis of reactor systems, and provides basis to NRR/OSD for consistency in NEPA and safety reviews.
Program areas nhich have not begun yet include:
-identify operations actions to NRR and I1E for mitigaticn of various accidents
-identify plant conditions and potential inadvertant operator / main-tenance adverse actions to NRR and ISE 1372 257
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- - - - -provide success path options for NRR (or others) in Recovery from Serious Accidents.
-identify insp6ction activities of highest risk significance for use by I&E.
'ir. Edison mentioned that follow-on programs at four plants regarding the methods applications program are becoming available.
Dr. Okrent requested copies of even preliminary results of these programs as soon as possible. He also requested infomation on studies concerning floods.
The second program area, systems analysis of reactor operating experience has two objectives. One is to provide generic safety infomation for operating, reactors. The second is to identify accident sequence precursors in operating reactors. The first area will be an ovarview of essential safety features infomation from operating plants. The second area would actively analyze the reactor experience from a systems perspective to try to categorize events, and develop frequencies of precursors.
It is expected these programs will provide a design overview.
It is also hoped this program will provide a greatly improved basis for identifying potential safety proolems to.'!RR.
It is envisioned that this system will catalogue basic design features of operating reactors so that the number of reactors effected by a particular decision would be easily at hand. When a work scope is available, it was requested that it be provided to the ACRS.
Dr. Okrent noted that he was interested in hearing about the Staff's investigation of the incidence of pipe cracking in SWRs and its possible significance to the reliability of systems that would be required if cracks were to progress into leaks of various sizes. He noted that the Subcommittee was interested in a probabilistic look at this subject.
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... _... _ _ _... Mr. Hazelton of NRR noted that there has never been a case of BWR pipe cracking that has required any action from an ESF system. He noted that, in general, NRR concurred with the conclusion of the pipe crack study group (NUREG-0531) which concluded there was no safety significance from stress corrosion cracking.
Dr. Hanauer mentioned that he was the task manager for the Task Action plan A 42 which will deal with BWR pipe cracks.
Dr. Okrent said it would be of interest to get data which gives the probability of flaws of different sizes per reactor year. Mr. Hazel ton noted there was some information which might relate to Dr. Okrent's request and there was some EpRI data was well, but was unsure if it would be of any use.
A third phase to the reactor licensing application of probabilistic ana}ysis, is to provide direct licensing support to NRR, I&E, and other o ffices. The objectives are to rank, evaluate, and resolve safety issues on the basis of risk. This program will also determine relative values of regulatory review units on a risk basis and compare it with resource impacts.
Finally, the assistance provided to NRR is aimed at reviewing selected safety systems, providing basis for licensing review, and reducing the amendment backlog.
Finally, Mr. Edison noted a small dollar amount will be spent on studies to balance risk to public vs. risk to plant persoonel from changes in inspection, testing, and maintenance, and on reactor safety study improvements.
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. program Areas in Cata and Methodolocy - W. Yesely This program deals with component failure rate analysis, human error rate analysis, and common cause analysis. The methodology will deal with fire and flood modeling, systems reliability modeling, risk evaluations of data, variability and uncertainty analyses, and evaluation of operational safety da ta.
He noted the objective of the component. failure rate analyses is to estimate component failure rates for risk and reliability utilizations.
Data will be from three sources: LERs, NpRDS, and plant logs. The funding will be $500K in FY 80 and $525K in FY S1.
The human error rate analysis has as its objective to estimate and evaluate human error rates in normal operation.
Funding for FY 80 is 5425K and for FY 81 is $525K. The data sources are LERs and inplant records.
Common cause analysis will estimate connon cause failure probabilities and analyze behaviors. The funding in FY 30 is $150K and in FY Sl is $225K.
Models will be developed te statistically and formally analyze common cause failures based on LER-type descriptions.
Fire and flood modeling will evaluate impacts of fires and floods on nuclear power plant risks.
Funding for FY 30 is $390K and $390K for FY 81.
Dr. Okrent noted it would be of interest to have the appropriate Subcomittee review NRC contract awarding procedures.
Systems reliability modeling's objective is to extend system reliabi' ity models to handle operational contributions and time-dependencies.
FY 30 funding is $3CCK. The funding for FY 31 will be $5:0K. Areas of investigation include evaluations of limiting conditions for operation, which will address 1372 260
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. allowed downtime for a given component. Also to be considered are failures of components to continue operation and the reliability of software developed.
A program for the risk evaluation of data will construct models and perform analyses to evaluate risk implications of LERs and NpRDS.
Funding levels for FY 80 and FY 81 are both set at $500K.
A variability and uncertainty analysis,.will describe data variabilities and uncertainties and relation to causes.
Funding for FY 80 and FY 81 will be respectively $150K and $225K. It will look into whether plant-to-plant variabi'ities or manufacturing variabilities dominate.
In more variation is being observed in LERs and NPRDS than WASH-1400 predicted.
The evaluation of operational safety data is being funded at $675K in FY 80 and $900K in FY 81. The program will extend the construction of event trees for plants having the highest failure frequencies and fault trees for critical systems for plants having highest failure frequencies.
Actual evaluation would be performed under this task and not be limited to just developing the methodology.
Simulators to Study Human Factors - M. Cullingford Tne objective of this program is to try and get useful information from the recording ar.d continual repetition capabilities of the simulator.
Mr. Cullingford noted that such a program may generate some predictive powers for a simulator.
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Follow-Vo Items A number of items requested by the Subcommittee have been provided by Dr. '/esely. These " items are listed in Attachment D to these minutes. Copies of the listed reports are available at the ACRS Office.
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NOTE: For ' additional details, a ccmplete transcript of the meeting is available in the NRC Public Document Rocm,1717 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20555, or from Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.,
444 North Capitol Street, NW, Washington, DC.
, A j
29182 Federal Register / Vol. 44. No. 98 / Friday. May 18;19~9 / Notices Signed at Washington. D.C. this 4th day of Subcommittee on Neurobiology; be permitted only during those portions
- n May 1979.
Meeting of the meeting when a transcript is being no e s Pu L 2-63 a
1 e ce
' "8 Ira ow.msets md wsn tas =I Foundation announces the following e
t y
the Designated Feder'al Employee as 'ar meeting:
In advance as practicable so that Name: Subcommittee on Neurobiology of the appropriate arrangements can be made Advisory Committee for Behavioral and NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION Neural Sciences.
to allow the necessary time during the Date and time: June 4,5. and s,1979: 9 as to meeting for such statements.
Ad Hoc Oversight Subcommittee for 5 pan. each day.
The agenda for subject meeting sha11 Low Temperature Phys!cs; Meeting Place: Room 338. National Science be as follows:
In accordance with the Federal Foundation. taco G Street. NW.
Washington. D.C.
Satunfay, June 2.19tS-c.30 o.nu. until de Advisory Committee Act. Pub. I.92-453 Type of meeting Closed.
oocclusion ofbusiness.
as amended, the National Science Contact person: Dr. Janett Trubatch Program De Subcommittee wCI meet in Executive Foundation announces the following
' Director Neurobiology Program. Room 3:0, Senion with any ofits consultants who may meeting.*
National Science Foundation. Washington, be present, and with representatives of the Name: Ad Hoc Oversight Subcommittee for D.C. :osso, telephone :02/s34-4036.
NRC Staff and their consultants. to explore Iow Temperature physics. Condensed Parpose of subcommittee:To provide advice and exchange their preliminary ocinions reg.rding matters which should be and recommendations concerning support Matter Advisory Subcommittee. Advisory foe reseanh ta Neurobielegy.
considered during the meeting and to Committee for Ma:erials Research.
Deto and time: June 7 and 8.1979-0 aa-3 Agenda:To review and evaluate research formulate a report and recommendadon to the full Committee.
pa uch day.
proposals as part of the selection procesa At the conclusion of the Executive Session.
.t for awards.
Place: Room 421. National Science Foundation.180o C Street. N.W.
Reason for closins: ne propeaals being the Subcommittee will hear presentations by Washirgton. D C. :oS50.
reviewed include information of a and hold discussions with representadves of s
proprietary or confidential nature, the NRC Staff and their consultants, pertinent Type of meeting Closed both days 9 as-g including technical Information: financial to this review.The Subcommittee may then Contact person: Dr. Herbert S. Bennett.
, data, such as salartes: and personal caucus'to determine whether the matters pan.
Directer. Division of Materials Research.
Information coocerning individuals ide infled in the initial session have been Room 40s. National Science Founda tion.
associated with the proposals.These adequately covered and whether the project matters are within exemptions (4) and (6) is ready for review by the full Committee.
Washiraton. D.C. Telephone (202) 833-
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of 5 U.S.C. 552b(c). Covernment in the Further information regarding topics 7412.
Smh Act.,
to be discussed, whether the meeting Purpose of subcommittee: To provide advice Anthority to close meeting: This for research in Low Temperature Physics.
determination was made by the Committe*
has been cancelled or rescheduled. the and recosmmendations concerning support chairmen's ruling on requests for the Management Officer unnt to provisions i
Agenda: Thursday, June 7.19 9-0 as to 5 -
of Section to(d) of Pu L 97a83.The opPCrtunity to present oral statements pa--closed. Review and cociparison of Committee Management Oscar was and the time allotted therefor can be dec!!ned proposals (and supporting delegated the authority to make such obtained by a prepaid telephone call to documentation) with successful awaads determinations by the Acting Director.
the Designated Federal Employee for including review of peer review materials NSF. on February ta, this meeting. Mr. Richard K. Mafor.
and other privileged materials.
Friday. June s.1979-4 as to 5 pa-closed.
R Rabocca WWer.
(telephone 202/834-1414) between 8:15 9 sa-Further discussions of declined Comm#ree Manegement Coortfirsator.
a.m. and 5.00 p.m, EDT.
r;roposals and awards.
May15.in.
g 12 non-Lunch.
Items to be considered at this meetira pn o.a re-tssu ru.e s.tr-nt a s mi ~
[bco can be found in documents on file and
~
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te gs an recommenda tions.
available for public inspection at the Reasons for closing De Subcommittee will p NRC Pub!!c Document Room.1717 H St, be reviewing grants and declination Jackets Nt.Ct. EAR REGut.ATORY NW. Washingto:2. DC 20555.
which contain the names of appI! cant COMMISSION Deed Map.1sts.
institutions and pnncipalinvestigstors and John C Hoyle, privtleged irformation contained in Advfsory Committee on Reactor declined proposals. His session will also Safeguards, Subcommittee on Adv:sory Committee. Management Officer.
7 documentation pertaining to appIlcants. - -
Rellabmty and Probabillstle pit nes.tsus md s.tr-ra mes I include e review of the peer review sa Dese matters are within exemptions (4)
Assessment; Meeting
- " m o coca isso.es-as and (6) of 5 U.S.C. 552(c). Government in The ACRS Subcommittee on the Sunshine Act.
Reliability and Probabilistic Assessment
[ Docket No. 50-353 OLI Authonty to clon muting: nid willhold an open meeting on June 2, determinatica was made by the Director.
1979 in Room IM8.1717 H St NW.
C!ncinnatl Gas & Electric Co. et al.;
NSF. pursuant to provisions of Section Washington. DC 2055 to discuss the Evidentiary Hearing to(d) of Pab. I.92-483.
1979 Review and Evaluation of the NRC Before the Atomic Safety and K Rebecca Winkler.
~
Safety Research Progra:n.
I.! censing Board;in the matter of Committee Mancgement Coordbrator.
In accordance with the procedures Cincinnati Cas and Electric Co, et al, May 15,1979.
outlined in the Federal Register on (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station). -
ya oCo tssts 7u.4 s.tr-se aos am; October 4.1978 (43 FR 45928). oral or P! ease take notice that. In accordance enAmso coos rias.4was written statements may be presented by with the IJcensing Bo:.ed's Orders of
, members of the public, recordings will April 6 and May 11.1979, an evident!ary z
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AITAChMENT A -
8 ACRS SUBCCMMITTEE CN RELIABILITY & PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT June 2, 1979 8:30 A. M.
I.
Discussion of Detailed Procedures to Ensure the Proper and Effective Use of Risk Assessment teory, Methods, Data Develognent and Statistical Analysis by the Staff.
12:00 Noon WNCH 1:00 II. W e 1979 Review and Evaluation of the NRC Safety Research Program.
1.
PAS: '81 Budget Information 2.
Related Technical Assistance Programs 3.
Supplemental research budget for the added research followirx3 the T4I Accident.
4:00 III. Discuss the Reliability of BWR piping with regards to the frequency of Appearc4ce of Stress Corrosion cracking.
Examples: - Pipe Crack Experience at Duane Arnold Frequency of challenges to E. S. F. &
estimate of the reliability of require-ments on E. S. F.
Can operator error aggrevate stress corrosion cracking problem.
5:00 P. M.
AILTOURN ATTACHMENT B
.377 264
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ATTENDANCE LIST ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON RELIABILITY AND PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT WASHINGTON, DC JUNE 2,1979 ACRS NRC STAFF D. Okrent, Chainnan P. Riehm W. Kerr G. Edison J. C. Mark W. Vesely R. Major, Designated Federal Employee M. Cullingford S. Levine S. Hanauer EPRI R. Budnitz P. McGrath R. Leyse R. DiSalvo R. Blond BECHTEL CORP.
PUBLIC PUBLIC F. Rowsome U. Tveten, IFA/ Norway ATTACHMENT C 1372 265
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JUN 7 1979 MEMORANDUM FORi Richard K. :'iajor Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards FROM:
William E. Vesely Probabilistic Analysis Staff Office of ituelear Regulatcry Research
SUBJECT:
TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENTATI0:1 The following documents are being forwarded to supplement my presentatier.
given to the ACRS RPA Subcommittee on June 3,1979:
1.
Discussion of NPRDS problems and why data is to be re-analyzed, 2.
System analyses accomplished for NRR by PAS Methodology Section, 3.
Draft reports of component failure analyses using LER's, 4.
Flood program status reports, 5.
In-plant data collection program and progress report, 6.
SAI reports used as exhibits for LC0 RFP, 7.
Progress Report on Fire Risk Systems Analysis project, and 8.
Paper on Nuclear Plant Fire Incident Data submitted for publication in Nuclear Tafety.
William E. Ves y Probabilistic nalysis Staff Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Attachments: As Stated cc w/o attachments:
P. McGrath ATTACHMENT D 1372 266