ML19210C630
| ML19210C630 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/24/1979 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1667, NUDOCS 7911190256 | |
| Download: ML19210C630 (20) | |
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NZ MINUTES OF THE AD HOC. SUBCOMMITTEE ON THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS August 8, 1979 Washington, D. C.
A meeting,hf the Ad Hoc Subconnittee on the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Accident Implications Regarding Nuclear Power Plant Design was held in Washington, D.C.
at 1717 k St., N.W. on August 8,1979.. The purpos~e' of the meeting was to dis-6 cuss the underlying causes contributing to the accident. Notice of the meeting appeared in the Federal Register, Vol. 44, No.143 Tuesday, July 24,1979 (attached). The outline for discussion and list of attendees are attached.
Information was received front Mr. R. Szalay of the Atomic Industrial Forum concerning industry activity as a result of Three Mile Island. Copies are available at the ACRS office. No requests to make oral statements were received from menbers of the public.
Introduction - M. Carbon, Chaiman Dr. Carbon began the meeting by noting the purpose of the meeting was to consi-der the underlying causes whichmay have contributed to the accident which occurred at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station on March 28, 1979.
Items to be discussed at the meeting included several aspects of the NRC regulatory re-view process, its structure and organization as well as NRC's role in several related aspects of nuclear power plant operation, such as operator training, qualification, and response to accident situations.
Role of the NRC in the Licensing Precess - Roger Mattson, NRR Dr. Mattson began his presentation by describing the role of NRC in the licensing
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- process. NRR safety reviews consist of a detailed review of the information provided by. applicants in safety analysis reports. The required minimum scope of information is described in general terms in the Commission's regulations in 10CFR50.34. The nature of the Staff's review is indicated in part by the required.f,indings for issuance of a construction permit in 10CFRSO.35.
The actual scope and depth of the Staff's technical reviews have evolved over the years as the Staff's experience a.nd, expertise have increased, as operating experience has accumulated. The current scope of the review is best described in the Standard Review Plan.
Each of the sections of the plan spell out the areas to be reviewed, the acceptance criteria to be applied, and guidance as to the procedures used to conduct the review. There is a wide variation be-tween and among the sections regarding the scope and depth of review and methods used.
The NRC review is basically an audit of the applicant's design and design me-thods, intended to provide reasonable assurance that the Commission's criteria and regulations are met. The. Staff does not track e'/ery element of the design.
Every item in the Standard Review Plan is not necessarily checked on every re-view.
Dr. Mattson noted that the Staff reviews treat only those cosponents and systens directly related to safety.
In general, systems and components whose functions are not relied upon in the analysis of design basis events and anticipated transients in the safety analysis report are not reviewed, except to assure they are sufficiently separate from and independent of cafety-related systems so that failures in the nonsafety-related equipment do not prevent the oper-ation of safety related equipment.
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.. There is considerable. variation in the extent to which the Staff independently checks the' designers calculations.
In some cases, designer calculations are checked against the Staff's own calculations as in the case of ECCS perform-ance calculations.
In other areas, reliance has been placed on applicants' sta'.ements that designs have been perfonned in compliance with ASME and other code requirements. More use is being made of benchmark problems in the engi-neering 'a$ea to gain more assurance that the applicants' methods are acceptable.
It was also noted that the amount of actual site kisits by NRR to inspect hardware has increased.
In response to a question by Dr. Carbon, Dr. Mattson noted that there is very
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little review of operating aniimaintenance procedures. There is some review of operator training in the context of the operator licensing program, but the technical and design reviewers make no review of procedures.
Ultimately, reliance is placed on the licensee, the vendor, and the architect engineer, and their quality assurance programs to adequately and consistently implement the design of the plant. The NRC concept of regulation presumes that
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a large percentage of the design detail will never be checked by the regulating u
body. A conscientious industry with good guality assurance is needed for this concept of regulation to succeed. The Staff believes that a criteria-based audit review is basically a workable system.
It was noted that several areat are in need of upgrading including identifi-cation of operating experience, more definitive consideration of operator actions, the r'efiew of operating procedures, and more definitive considerations of non-r3fety equipment. Recommendations concerning these O eas will be forthcoming in September.
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l In response to questions, Dr. Mattson noted that the review process will under-go a nunter. of change ~. He believes that the review process will be supplemented s
in the cours.g of the next several years by a dedicated, retrospective review of designs already in operation and designs already under construction. At the end of this, period of retrospective review, new review requirements will be appli-ed to fu'ture designs and will define an acceptable audit review for the future.
This retrospective review could take two to four years, two years being the approximate time scale it will take to. implement.the short-term lessons learned, four years being the time scale it will take to implement some of the longer term items.
nronni1'atinna) Rtructure Dr. Mattson noted several areas where the organizational structure that imple-ments the review could be imnroved. He noted reviews are split along technical and project lines. This leads to compartmentalization and specialization of technical review into discrete areas. He noted this approach has not worked as-well as it should.
He noted a number of deficiences resulting from a compart-mentalized review including:
a lack of unifonnity acEoss cases inconsistency in depth and technical content of reviews between branches inadequate integration of cross-system interfaces an insuffic'ient awareness by technical reviewers of the relationship of their part of the review to the overall safety of the plant.
Several other operational weaknesses were also noted. Better transition needs to be,qstablished between those staff reviewers who perform the operating license reviews and those responsible for the plant during power oppration. The TMI-2 accident has also highlighted the important interface between plant operations
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. and plant design and analysis. Control room layout, operator training, and operating procedures should all have significant cross-fertilization with the design and analysis of plant system Dr. Mattson noted that for a new design, the audit review takes on a somewhat different ' haracter. The entire standard review plan can be applied for such c
a design.
Emergency Planning Dr. Mattson discussed NRC's role in emergency situations. The NRC's role during and following an accident and the capabilities needed to carry out the activities to implement that role have be_en under accelerated review since TMI-2. The Task Force on Emergency Planning was established by the Comission on June 7th to critique the NRC's current emergency planning process and to dsvelop a compre-hensive action plan. A draft Task Force report has beer issued and will be finalized in the near future.
The Emergency Preparedness Task Force report indicated the NRC has not adequately defined its role in emergency response. NRC's response during the accident was an ad hoc response.
Emergency planning cuts across several NRC office lines during the process of generating guidance to licensees, however, there are no effective NRC-wide, procedures in place or organizational arrangements established to assure that adequate guidance results.
This lack is particularly important in view of the many interfaces involved, including the licensee, the state, local authorities and other federal agencies.
The e,mergency plans of all power reactor. licensees have been reviewed by the licensing staff in the past for confomance to the general provisions of 7
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, Appendix E to 10CFR50. Recently, additional guidance has been developed, primarily in Regulatory Guide 1.101. This guidance has not been fully imple-mented. The_NRR Staff plans to undertake an intensive effort over the next year to improve the preparedness by licensees at all operating power reactors, and those reactors scheduled for operating license decisions within the next This effort will be closely coordinated with the parallel effort by year.
the Office of State Programs to improve state and local response plans.
The Staff effort wi'll include upgrading emergency plans to satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.101 and the implementation of the related recommendations of the Lessons Learned Task Force.
Similar action plans are undef development by each of the affected offices within NRC.
Through these plans there needs to be much better definition of accident response roles and better training of the technical and management staff of the NRC for crisis situations like TMI-2.
Operator Training and Oualifications Modifications to the existing training program and examination process for re-actor operators will incorporate the lessons learned from TMI-2.
Emphasis will be placed on the use of simulators, both as a training dev4e and an exam-ination tool.
In the future, each applicant for an operator's license will undergo training on a simulator representative of his facility. The operating portion of the NRC license examination will be conducted on a simulator, an evaluation will be made of an individual's ability to manipulate the controls and to diagnose and respond to abnonnal emergency situations.
An applicant for a senior operator's license will have his ability to direct the
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e 7-activities of reactor operators evaluated during a simulator exercise. Annually, individuals, will be required to return to the simulator for training in routine and non-routjne operation and for recertification of their ability to carry out the responsibilities of their license.
The curriedla for training programs will require greater emphasis on thermo-dynamics, hydraulic, fluid flow, and heat transfer. Question relating to these subjects Yill be incorporated into the NRC written examination.
Experience requirements for applicants for senior operator licenses will be in-creased *through further guidance as to what is acceptable power plant experience.
In addition, once a plant is operating, an applicant for a senior operator's license must have, at least, three months continous on-the-job training as an extra man on-shift.
The Lessons Learned Task Force has recommended the addition of a shift techni advisor to the control room operating staff. The role of the shift technical advisor will be to supply additional analytical capability on-shift to support the shift suaervisor's comand and control functions. The shift technical ad-visor will have a bachelor's degree or equivalent in a science or engineering discipline supplemented by specific training in the response and analysis of the particular plant for transients and accidents. The shift technical adviser is also to perfonn a routine engineering function as part of the plant operations organization, including the feedback of operating experiencc.
It was noted that for a person with no previous nuclear experience prior to obtai[ing an operators license, several requirements must be fulfilled.
This person would be required to go through a twelve week fundamentals course and a three month
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~ design lecture course to familiarize the person with the NSSS design. Also regi!%d would be a four month simulator course combined with an observation
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course at artoperating power plant. A one year on-the-job training program is also required. An equivalent of approximately two years of training prior to obtaining a license in the power plant is required.
Licensee Technical Support Current practice is for the NRC to review at the.0L stage of licensing each applicant's technical resources available to provide back up support for the operating. organization. The final safety analysis report is required to pro-vide an organizational chart showing the management of technical support and headquarters structure.
It'also identifies qualification requirements for head-quarters staff personnel. However, once a plant goes into operation there is ro further rereview of technical support provisions by the NRC. There is no regulatory guidance that consistently covers the capabilities or role of techni-cal or management personnel during an emergency. As a follow-up to the TNI-2 accident, the Staff is conducting an overall review and evaluation of the manage-ment and technical resources available to utilities who own and operate nuclear power plants to handle unusual events or accidents. As a start, the NRC re-quested all power reactor licensees to provide, specific and detailed infonnation that describes the capability of their management and technical staffs. The information was requested in a June 29 letter from Mr. Denton to all power re-actor licensees.,The deadline for response was July 30th. On the basis of a cursory examination of this infonnation, the Staff is concluding that there will'be changes in the requirements for this kind of support personnel.
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. Comand and Control Function This item was addressed 'in the Short-tem Lessons Learned Task Force report in Section 2.2.2a on control room access. Only a licensed senior operator may direct the activities of licensed operators, hence the shift supervisor is in charge unless relieved by a senior licensed management representative or another shift supervisor. The Staff's position in this regard is for licensees to develop and implement procedures that establisn a clear line of authority and responsibility in the control room in the event; of an emergency. The line of succession for the person in charge khall be established and limited to persons, possessing a current senior reactor operator's license. The plan shall clearly define the lines of comunication and authority for plant
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management personnel not in direct comand of operations, including those who report to stations outside the control room.
Studies to Correlate Plant perfomance with Manaaement Capabilities Following the completion of a survey to review management and technical resources currently available, it may be possible to derive a correlation between manage-ment and technical capabilities, on the one hand, and plant perfomance on the other. There is some history of NRC evaluating ' licensee perfomance. These include an effort in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement designed to develop techniques for evaluating regulatory perfomance of licensees (or the ability of the licensee to meet regulatory requirements and to avoid the reportable events that appear to be directly under the control of the licensee). Another I&E effort which may be related to this concern is the perfomance appraisal inspection, Such,i,nspections provide a perspective for evaluating management perfomance.
Perfomance appraisal inspections are thorough Nitical reviews of licensee s
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facilities by a select group of NRC inspectors. Inspections are aimed pri-i marily at the licensee's tot?1 control of plant activities. As of the meeting date,, only four suen inspections had been perfonned.
Role of NRC Inspector, His Effectiveness, and Can His Effectiveness Be Increased?
Mr. Jordan of I&E noted that the role of the NRC inspection program is pro-viding regsonable assurance that the public health and safety are protected by '
monitoring licensing activities throughout the faci.lity's lifetime.
At facilities under construction, the role is satisfied by an inspection program which verifies that the facility is constructed in accordance with the construct-ion pemit and SAR.
Virification is done through an auditing program, only a small fraction of what the licensee does is checked.
For operating facilities, the inspection program detemines that the facility is operated.in accordance with the licensing conditions, the technical specifications, and NRC rules and regulations.
The inspection programs for both facilities under con struction and for operating facilities are complemented by vendor inspection programs which examine quality assurance measures employed by the nuclear steam system supplie:s, architect engineers, and major contractors and suppliers. The I&E program is small in tems of the manpower devoted to it compared to the size of the organizations examined.
All NRC inspections are an overlay on the licensee's effort.
The licensee has the responsibility for safe operation and safe construction of the plant.
The inspector checks the licensee, but does not assume the licensee's primar.y responsibility.
The NRC inspection efforts are both planned and reactive.
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implemented throvgh detailed pmcedures which provide a consistent inspection effort.
.ne reactive program responds to a licensee event report, or a parti-cular problem at a facility.
i Inspectors are instructed to examine licensees' activities for apparent un-reviewed safety questions when no regulatory requirement has been violated.
Individual inspectors who conduct inspections include the specialities of re-actor operation, quality assurance, nondestructive examination, safeguards and security, radiation protection, and environmental monitoring. Specific plant problems may require inspection specialists in electrical instrumentation, metallurgy, mechanical engineering or other engineering skills. Approximately twgman years of inspection eff. ort are spent on each operating reacter facility.
Mr. Jordan noted that an inspector spends approximately 30% of his available time in the field inspecting. An inspector spends 60% of his time reviewing records in his office and approximatley 10% of his time preparing for the next inspection and writing up the results of previous inspections and reviewing items of noncompliance.
Mr. Jordan described how an inspector is able to give attention to safety rather than enforcement of regulations. One way is through an independent inspection effort, where the inspector is not constrained by his detailed procedures.
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of the inspectors effort is under his own direction where he uses his personnel skills to look into areas where a problem might be. During the independent inspection, he is free to look beyond the regulations.
Inspectors:. are also trained in a program that stresses safety as opposed to stressing the regulatory requirements.
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Mr. Jordan noted the performance appraisal team is an additional inspection effort on top of the regular program The team conducts special inspections at selected _ facilities whici? provides an evaluation of the licensee perfom-ance and also reviews the impleentation of the inspection program on the national scale. This team is limited in size.
Only a few facilities are inspected on an annual basis.
In recen[ years, there havebeen two major areas for increasing inspector effectiveness.
The first is the devel' pment of a' femalized inspector training o
program to improve technical and inspection skills. The second area is the adoption of a revised inspection program which places a resident inspector at each operating site and ay-construction sites in the later stages of con-struction.
A unit inspection program has been submitted'to Congress as a supplement to the 1980 budget. This program will increase the number of tests of the licensee's program by NRC inspectors. Under the unit inspection program, for the first time, some elements of licensees' activities will receive 100% inspection. Areas which will receive 100% inspection ovhr a given time interval include line-up of safety equipment, changes to emergency operating procedures, direct observations of control room activities. Surveillance testing and maintenance inspection will also be substantia-11y increased.
Dr. Lawroski noted that I&E may have to broaden its thinking and start to moni-
, tor nuclear suppliers such as NSSS vendors.
Inspectocs would look at designs and m.opitor areas where possible technical problems are described to assure they.
receive proper attention.
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Depth of Knowledge of NRC Inspectors Inspectors.must attend and successfully complete technical courses in their specialty ar,ea, or complete an equivalency exam in the course of being assigned responsibility for performing inspections in that ea. Qualification of an inspector for a given area is performed by regional evaluation, in addition, to the train'ing program. There is an on-the-job type training program where one inspector, accompanies other inspectors in a specialty area.
Typically, a qualified reactor operations inspect'or will have reactor operating experience. Such experience would be considered a necessary part of his job skills b'efore being hired for a particular job.
Inspectors attend a reactor systems course, a simulator course, and then an advanced systems course.
Inspectors also attend an effectiveness-type training course on inspection skills.
Inspectors are typically graduate engineers with five to ten years industry experience. The same level of qualification and training is required for other inspectors.
Response to Accident Situations Changes have already been made in the comunications area of the incident response as a result of the Three Mile Island experience. These include manning the Incident Response Center by a duty roster from the I&E headquarters technical staff. A hotline has been installed from each reactor facility to the I&E head-quarts. office with a branch back to the regional office. Significant incidents are reported directly to headquarters. The headquarters duty officers would then comunicate back to the regional duty officer.
A second separate telephone system is being installed. This second line will be used for comunicating radiation detection and health physics infomation in the event cf an accident.
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Final Questions Dr. Mattson was asked 'about whether he thought in terms of technical support groups for both nonnal and abnonnal situations, there is any minimum size user organization. Too small an organization may not have the resource capabilities necessary to run a plant.
Dr. Mattson noted that in the past, technical capa-bilities are looked at more for nonnal operation than for accidents. A study by the quality assurance branch may state minimum acceptance criteria for technical capabilities. Such direction may take.t.he fann of a regulatory guide.
Dr. Mattson made a very general statement in response to questions that it was his opinion that the highest level of utility management seems to be of higher conviction that constructive _ change needs to occur and that larger utilities with larger corporate resources seem to be more convinced that constructive change needs to occur. He noted this may be an oversimplification and t'here are prob-ably many exceptions to the rule.
There have been dissenting viewpoints within NRC. The question was resolved some time ago. There have also been dissenting viewpoints in vendor organizations such as the difference in opinion is.B&W about the significance of the Davis-Besse incident. Dr. Mattson was asked whether the Staff was taking any steps that would require users or venders to call differences of opinion to the Staff's attention.
Dr. Mattson responded by saying as a general matter 10CFR21 was designed to accomplish some of these things that appear necessary. However, Part 21 may not have been sufficiently well stated or explained to accomplish that function.
It may be concluded that part 21 (Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance) isn't a good vehicle for assuring the identification of differences of opinion,.,,0 3 5 6 The meeting adjourned at 5:00 P. M.
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Copies of all visual aids and handouts provided during this meeting are on file in the ACRS office. A complete transcript of the open portions of the meeting is on file at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N.W.,
Washington, D. C., or can be obtained from ACE Federal Reporters. Inc., 444 N. Capitol, St., Washington, D. C. (202-347-3700).
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Federal Rehr / Vol. 44. No.143 / Tuesday, July Rky 433n
- 24. 1979 / Notices
, (iii) he failure to en=p!y with the terms of any representation made by the collateral,inc!wding the reasonab'Is 4 l credit union to the central credit union attomeys' fees and legal expenses NUCLEAR REGULATORY or the Facility in any application.
incurred, and (B} then, to the payment of COMMISSION certification or other mmmunication: oramounts dee on allrepayment Advisory Committee on Reactor (iv) he insolvency of, obppointment obligations created hereunder. Ary safeguards Ad Hoc Subcommittee on
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of a trustee or receiver for, the credit surplus then remaining shall be paid or the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Accident union; or returned to the credit union. If there is aimp!! cations Re Nuclear Power Plant (v) An assignment for the benefit of deficiency, the credit union shall be Design; Meeting creditors of the credit union: or
!!able for the deficiency. lf the central ne ACRS Ad Hoc Subcommittee on f
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(vi) The closing or suspension or credit union is indebted to the credit the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Accident-revocation of the charter of the M union, the centralcredit union shall Implications Re Nuclear Power Plant
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union, or the taking possession ofits have the right to set-off such Design, will hold a meeting on August B.
business. by any governmental indebtedness against all amounta due 1m in Room 1M 1717 H St.. W.
authority; or
& M1 M udon m au Washington, DC 20555.
(vii) The,aedit union's use of the proceeds of any advance for a purpose
{ pay t obligati d
in accordance with the procedures svithout to when such outlined in the Federal Register on i
other than the purpose for which the ladebtedness may be due and payable.
October 4.1978 {43 FR 45926). oral er advance was raade: or (viii) The withdrawal of the credit Credit Reporting written statements may be presented by members of the public, recordings will union from ' membership in the central (11) he credit union shall file such be permitted ont during those portions credit union.10 The occurrence of any of reports and provide such information as of the meeting w en a transcript is being the avents described in subparagrphs may be mquired from time to time b kept, and questions may be asked only (9)(i) through (9)(viii) hereof shan Y
consititute a default under this the Facility or by the central credit by members of the Subcommittee,its i
agreement. ne term " insolvency"in union with approval of the Facility.
consultants. and Staff. Persons desiring subparagraph (9)[iv) has the same Construction and Modification to make oral statements should notify meaning as it is given in 12 CFR 700.1 the Designated Federal Employee as far (k). The central credit union with the (12) %is agreement shall be construed in advance as practicable so that approval of the Facility may waive a under and governed by the law of the appropriate arrangements can be made District of Cohmuibia. including the to allow the necessary time during the reinstate the maturity date on anydefault under this agreeement and may AJniform C meeting for such statements.
The agenda for subject meeting skall repayment obligation created hereunder and amended from time to time by the which becomes immediately due and District of Columbia, and the terms used be as follows: Wednesday. August 8 197R J:00p.ar untdthe conclusion of payable as a result of any such default.
in such Code shall have the same business.
tio) Upon the occurrence of a default meaning when used in this agreement.
under this agreement, or at any time All references to the Uniform ne Subcomm'ittee may meet in thereafter, the central credit union shall Commercial Code in this agretment am Executive Session. with any ofits have all the rights and remedies to such Code as adopted and amended consultants who may be present, to provided under the Uniform Commercial from time to time by the District of explore and exchange their preliminary Code and under this agreement.
Colunmbia. Unles the Uniform opinions regarding matters which should including but not limited to the Commerical Code or the context of this be considered during the meeting and to following: the central credit union agreement otherwise requires, the terms formulate a report and recommendation to the full committee.
may-defined in thb rules and regulations At the conclusion of the Executive (i) Take or retain possession of the prescribed by the NCUA Board on Session, the Subcommittee will discuss collaterst, or any part thereof, behalf of the Facility shall have the with representatives of the NRC Staff, (ii) Collect the proceeds of the collateral.
same meaning when used in this the n.:dearindustry, various util: ties.
agreement.
and their consultants, state and local (iii) Notify obligots on the collateral to (13) This agreeesmt may be modified officials. and other interested penons.
make payments to the central credit from time to time by the NCUA Board.
union.
the impfications of the Bree Mile (iv) Sell or otherwise dispose of any Any such modifications shall be Island. Unit 2 Accident, including the part or all of the collateral at public or published in the Federal Registar and underlying causes contributing to the priva te proceedings.
shall become a part of this agreement as accident.
(v) Bay the co!!ateral or any part of the effective date specified in the in addition. It may be necessary for thereof. and Federal Registae. The modiScation shall the Subcommittee to hold one or more (vi) Retain the collateral, or any part apply to all advances of Facility funds closed sessions for the purpose of thereof. in satisfaction of any part or all after sudi effective date. All such exploring mstters involving proprietary of the obligations secured by the modificadoca are a part of this information. I hava determined,in collateral. to The proceeds of the agreement, including modiScations that accordance with Subsection 10(d collateral. including the proceeds of sale occurred prior to the signing of this Pub. L S2-463, that, should such ) of or other disposition thereof, shall be agreement-sessions be required. It is necessary to close these sessions to protect apphed by the central credit smion (A) ww.m a u..
first, to th reasonable expenses of sam cooc rsas.ews proprietary information (5 U.S.C.
3 collecting such proceeds and money and
$52b(c)(4)).
of taking, bolding. and selling the Further information regarding toples V
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x Federal Register / Vol. 44. No.143 / Ttiestfay.Ju 1999'f)WSees 43375 3
j to be discussed, whether the meeting operation or licensing activttfes may be th==ISink has made appropriate has been cancelled or rescheduled, the discussed following this session.
finAngs as required by the Act and the Chairman's ruling on requests for the Persons wishing to submit written Commission's rules and regulations in 10 opportunity to present oral statements statements may do so by providing a CFR Chapter I. which are set forth in the 1
p and the time allotted therefor can be readily reproducible copy to the bcense amendment. Prior public notice obtained by a prepaid telephone call to Subcommittee at the beginning of the of ttd; onendment was not required
- the Designated Federal Employee for meeting. However, to insure that since the amendment does not involve a c.
this meeting. Mr. Richard K. Major, adequate time is available for full significant hazards consideration.
J-(telephone 202/634-1414) between 8.15 consideration of these comments at the ne Commission has determined that s.m. and 520 p.m EDT.
meeting, it is desirable to send a readily the issuance of this amendment will not Background information concerning reproducible copy of the comments as result in any significant environmental this nuclear station can be found in farin advance of the meeting as impact and that pursuant to to CFR E documents on file and available for practicable to Mr. Gary R.
l 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact
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public inspection at the NRC Public Quittschreiber, the Designated Federal statement or negative declaration and
, Document Room.1717 H Street. NW, Employee for the meeting,in care of environmental impact appraisal need Washington, DC 20555 and at the ACRS. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
not be prepared in connection with Government Publica tions Section. State Washington. DC 20555 or telecopy them issuance of this amendment.
Ubrary of Pennsylvania, Education to the Designated Federal Employee
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Building. Commonwealth and Walnut (202-634-3319] as far in advance of the For further details with respect to this Street. Harrisburg, PA 17126 meeting as practicable. Such comments action, see (1) the application for Dated. July. 17.1979.
shall be based upon documents on file amendment dated May 14,1979 (2) l g
and available for public inspection at Amendment No. 67 to Ucense No. DPR-r Advisory Committee. Monogement @cen the NRC Public Document Room.1717 H 57, and (3) the Commission's related Street. NW Washington.DC 20555.
Safety Evaluation All of these items are available for public inspection at the
} *P D"*8"** * '" *" "3 Further information regardmg topics Commission's Public Document Room.
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to be discussed, whether the meeting
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has been cancelled or rescheduled, the 1717 H Street NW., Washington. D.C.
and at the Appling County Public Advisory Committee on Reactor Chairman's ruling on requesta for the Ubrary. Parker Street. Baxley. Georgia Safeguards. Subcommittee on opportunity to present oral statements Regulatory Activities; Meeting and the time allotted there#or can be 31513. A copy ofitems (2) and (3) may He ACRS Subcommittee on obtamed by a prepaid telephone call to be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Regulatory Activities will hold an open the Designated Federal Employee for Commission. Wa shington, D.C. 20555.
this meeting. Mr. Gary R. Quittschreiber. Attention: Director. Division of meeting on August 8.1979 in Room 1048 (telephone 202/834-3267) between 8:15 Operating Reactors.
1717 H St., N.W., Washington. DC 20555.
a.m. and 500 p.m EDT.
Notice of this meeting was published in Da ted at Bethesda. Maryland. this 17th day 8'
Fe ral Register on June 27.1979 (44 g
In accordance with the procedures Advisory Committee Management Offcier.
Vernoo 1. Rooney, outlined in the Federal Register on M D" **"*8 N ' " *" "I AC'i"# Chi'/ O ereting Recetors Bmnch No.
P October 4,1978 (43 FR 45926) oral or 860 208 "C*ew A ansion ofOperatingReactors.
written statements may be presented by members of the public, recordings will IDocket No. 5Nt2tl -
PD*82* N'M ""al arasso coos rsesei-u be permitted only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being Georgia Power Co., et al.; Notice of kept, and questions may be asked only issuance of Amendment to Facility by members of the Subcommittee. its Operating Ucense OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring ne U.S. Nuclear Regulatory to make oral statements should notify Commission (the Commission! has Privacy Act of 1974; Proposed New the Designated Federal Employee as far issued Amendment No. 67 to Facility Routine Use in advance as practicable so that Operating Ucense No. DPR-57, issued to appropriate arrangements can be made Georgia Power Company. Oglethorpe aoswcv: Office of Personnel to allow the necessary time during the Electric Membership Corporation, yanagemeng, meeting for such statements.
Municipal Electric Association of Acnoac Proposal for a new routine use The agenda for subject meeting shall Georgia and City of Dalton. Georgia, for an existing system of records.
be as follows: Wednesday. August s.
which revised Technical Specifications 1979. The meeting willcommence at M5 for operatica of the Edwin L Hatch suuuAsm %e purpose of this document i
c.m.
Nuclear Plant. Unit No.1 (the facility) is to give notice, grsuant to 5 U.S.C.
The subcommittee will hear located in Appling County, Georgia. De 552a[e)(11) of the Privacy Act of1974, of presentations from the NRC Sta!Iand amendment is effective as ofits date of intent to establish a new routine use, for will hold discussions with this group issuance.
limited duration, covering the disclosure pertinent to the following-(1) Proposed
%e amendment revises the Turbine ofinformation to the Department of Regulatory Cnide 1.136. Revision 2.
Control Valve Fast Closure setpoint Health. Education. and Welfare (DHEW)
" Materials. Construction and Testing of from >1000 psig to >000 psig on low from the Central Personnel Data File 4
4 Concrete Containments."(Pre electohydraulic control oil pressure.
(CPDF) for current Federal employees.
Comment)(2) Proposed Umited Revision
%e application for the amendment coMuENT DATE:Any interested party of Appendix ! to 10 CFR Part 50
- Air complies with the standards and may submit written comments regarding locks."(Pro Comment) requirements of the Atomic Energy Act the proposal.To be considered.
Other matters which may be of a of1954, as amended (the Act), and the commenta must be recei predecisional nature relevant to reactor Commission's rules and regulations. He August 23,1979.
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- n..
I OUTLINE FOR DISCUSSION
- MEETING OF ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE TO DISCUSS UNDERLYING CAUSES CONTRIBUTING TO THE THI-2 ACCIDENT August 8, 1979 1:00 PM - 6:30 PM 1717 H Street, Wash., DC - Rm. 1046 I) 1:00 P.M. - NRC Regulatory Review (R. Mattson/V. Stello) a.
. Scope of NRC review 1.
How detailed is the NRR review in the areas of design, operations, operations procedures, in maintenance, etc.
For example, does the staff review the significance of measuring pressure vessel level by pressure gages?
2.
What design areas are not looked at?
3.
Is the scope of.4his review too broad or too narrow?
Is the depth too extreme or too shallow?
4.
If the review is considered inadequate because of breadth or depth; what are the deficiencies; how serious are they; what should be done to correct them; what would the cost be, etc.?
b.
Philosophically, is the system of placing reliance for safety on the user a good one?
Is it adequate? How does it compare with other nations?
c.
There has been a series of errors in seismic design re-cently.
Does this mean that the system has broken down in this area? If so, why?
In what other areas may there be deficiencies and what other areas may be receiving in-adequate attention?
d.
What is the role of the NRC Inspector? Is he effective?
Can his effectiveness be increased?
e.
What depth of knowledge should the NRC Staff have in such areas as construction, hardware, plant behavior, operations, maintenance.
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II. Technical Qualifications and Management Structure of User Organiza-tions (R. Mattson/b. Lee)
What is the latest thinking regarding reactor operator training a.
and qualifications including the role and qualifications of the shift supervisor and the shift safety engineer?
b.
What kind of technical support groups are needed by user organi-zations for normal and abnormal operations? Where should they be
. located? How large should they be? In what broad technical areas should they have competence, etc? How much should a utility rely upon a reactor vendor or architect engineer for technical support in abnormal situations?
c.
What are the role, authority and responsibility of people above the shift supervisor in providing technical direction for the handling or recovery of a reactor in the case of a serious ac-cident? What qualifications should these people (plant super-intendent, site manager, vice-president for power production) have?
d.
Have studies been cade to correlate plant perforrance with management capabilities (however, they might be defined)?
Would such studies merit consideration, if they have not al-ready been made?
e.
What is the current thinking of industrial groups on the above topics?
III.
What is NRC's Role Regarding Item II above? (R. Mattson)
What should NRC's role be regarding the training and testing of a.
utility personnel?
b.
What is the NRC role and what capability should the NRC have to respond to accident situations?
c.
How will this role De meshed with that of utility and industrial groups?
d.
Are new laws / rules needed to provide for suitable coordination?
IV. 2:30 PM - General Discussion
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TMI-2 ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS August 8,1979 Washington, D. C.
ATTENDEES LIST:
ACRS NRC M. Carbon,' 'Chaiman W. Minners Ml Bend" g rr
- MII W. Mathis G. Holahan C. Siess R._ Tedesco S. Lawroski R. Mattson H. Etherington E. Jordan W. Lipinski, ACRS Consultant R. Cudlin R. Fraley, DFE, ACRS Staff J. Conran R. Major, ACRS Staff J. Hesner Washington Public Power Supply. System A. Kimmins J. Holder The News World T. Azrs F. Christofferson AIF F. traham R. Szalay ITNA M. Tillotson J. Schneider R. Pierce Others Others K. Layer, BBR Jill A. MacNerce, UPI R. Leyse, EPRI Richard E. Gallagher, BPC R. Sunta, Nucleonics Week /Inside N'1C George White, MSU W. House II, Eechtel Donald F. Knuth, KMC D. Kmith, fez W. Wade Larson, Boston Edison Co.
R. Borsum, E&..
Noel Shirley, GE L. Shuloc, UL3' Jane Gurin, Oak Ridge D. Berick, Envir. Policy Inst.
George White, Middle South T. Martin, NUTECA Douglas R. Jaquette, Stone & Webster Donald N. Rasch, EPA
O 362 Steve Wywkoys, McGraw-Hii, Alan J. Weisbard, SPP&T