ML19209C777
| ML19209C777 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/1979 |
| From: | Trowbridge G METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910180284 | |
| Download: ML19209C777 (21) | |
Text
..
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
?'
4 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
9 Chs3se.i\\ g (Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit No.1)
)
LICENSEE'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE BY MARVIN I. LEWIS Metropolitan Edison Company (Licensee) hereby submits its answer to the Petition for Leave to Intervene filed by Mr. Marvin I. Lewis (Petitioner), dated August 21, 1979, and received by Licensee's counsel on September 4, 1979.
In accordance with the Board's Memorandum and Order dated August 31, 1979, Licensee's answer is confined to the adequacy of the petition from the standpoint of Petitioner's showing of interest and identification of the aspect or aspects of the proceeding as to which intervention is sought.
Section 2.714 (d) of the Commission's Rules of Practice sets forth the factors to be considered in assessing the merits of a petition for intervention.
They are:
(1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the pro-ceeding.
(2) The nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding.
1178 390 7 010180 2 F 94
a
. (3) The possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest.
In an attempt to satisfy these factors, Petitioner asserts four bases for standing to intervene in this proceeding: (1) his status as a consumer of milk produced in the Harrisburg area; (2) his status as a consumer of power from the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) grid; (3) his status as a taxpayer of Philadelphia; ar.d (4) his general philosophical opposition to nuclear power.
- However, i
none of Petitioner's asserted bases demonstrates the personal interest required for standing to intervene.
- Moreover, Petitioner has failed to adequately respond to the requirements, included both in the Commission's Order and Notice of Hearing dated August 9, 1979, and in Section 2.714 (a) (2) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, that the petition set forth the specific aspect or aspects of the proceeding as to which Petitioner wishes to intervene.
Further, Petitioner is apparently being represented in this proceeding by the Environmental Coalition On Nuclear Power, whose Petition For Leave To Intervene Licensee has not opposed (as to the requirements of a showing of interest as a basis for standing, and as to the identification of aspects of the proceeding as to which the organization wishes to intervene).
Petitioner's interests can thus be represented in this proceeding even if his Petition For Leave To Intervene in an individual capacity is denied.
Finally, Petitioner does not meet the 1178
]91
. criteria set forth in the Rules of Practice for intervention as a matter of discretion.
Accordingly, Licensee opposes Petitioner's request for leave to intervene in this proceeding, and asks that it be denied.
I.
PETITIONER LACKS STANDING TO INTERVENE IN THIS PROCEEDING.
Under Section 109(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C.
S 223 9 (a), and Saction 2.714 (a) of the Rules of Practice, 10 CFR S 2.714 (a), a petitioner seeking to intervene as a matter of right in a domestic licensing proceeding must assert an " interest [whichl may be affected by" that proceeding.
The Commission has ruled that' in determining whether such an interest has been sufficiently alleged, the adjudicatory boards are to apply contemporaneous judicial concepts of standing.
Specifically, a petitioner for intervention must allege both (1) an " injury that has occurred or will probably result from the action involved" and (2) an interest " arguably within the Zone of interests" to be protected or regulated by the statute invoked.
Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nucle ="
Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI 76-27, 4 NRC 610, 613-14 (1976);
Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-397, 5 NRC 1143, 1144-45 (1977); Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Ill. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALiB-473, 7 NRC 737, 739-40 (1978).
In the instant case, Petitioner's allegations do not meet these tests.
1178 J92
. A.
Petitioner's Status As A Consumer Of Harrisburg Milk Does Not Confer Upon Him Standing To Intervene.
An interested person, for purposes of intervention, is one "who lives or conducts substantial activities in reasonab'.
proximity to the facility site and whose interest may be affected by the proceeding."
Ducuesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-109, 6 AEC 243, 244 n.2 (1973),
cited in Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-76-10, 3 NRC 209, 213 (1976).
In the instant case, Petitioner's alleged interest as a consumer of milk from the Harrisburg area, even coupled with his residence in Philadelphia, is both too remote and too insubstantial to constitute a basis for standing to intervene in these proceedings.
Petitioner implicitly relies upon the proximity of his Philadelphia residence to the Three Mile Island plant (TMI) in alleging his interest as a consumer of Harrisburg milk as a basis for standing.
While the Commission and the Appeal Board have declined to " lay down any inflexible standard" with respect to residence as a basis for standing, Northern States 1178 J93
-5 Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-107, 6 AEC 188, 190 (1973), the Commission and the Board have required that a petitioner's allegations of personal inquiry increase in specificity and substantiality the farther from the plant a petitioner lives.
For example, in Tennessee Valley Authority, 3 NRC 209, supra, the Licensing Board examined assertions of eleven different types of interests alleged by a petitioner living 65 miles from the plant, and concluded that a number of them, considered together, constituted a basis for standing.
The crucial allegations included ownership of a second residence only 25 miles from the plant; ownership of other property even closer to the plant; use of shopping, commercial, medical and social facilities only 35 miles from the plant; petitioner's employment as an attorney which necessitated his attendance in courts from 10 to 40 miles from the plant; and petitioner's recreational fishing in the lake upon which the plant was situated.
3 NRC at 214.
The Board then limited the finding of standing to the particular facts of the case, stressing that it was not "saying that a residence distance of 65 miles from the plant site is in any way automatical i ' qualifying'."
3 NRC at 215.
More recently, the Appeal Board has ruled that residence-more than 75 miles from a facility is insufficient as a basis for standing.
Dairyland Power Cooperative (LaCross B9iling 1178 294
~
. Water Reactor),ALAB-497, 8 NRC 312, 313 (1978).
See also Duquesne Light Co.,
6 AEC 243, supra (allegations of concarr about effects of facility operation on food, milk, water supply and air insufficient to confer standing where individual resides "more than 100 miles from the plant site").
According to the 1979 edition of the Rand McNally Road Atlas, TMI is located approximately 85 miles west of Philadelphia.
Petitioner's residence in Philadelphia is thus too geographically remote frcm TMI to constitute a basis for standing to intervene in these proceedings, perticularly considering the relative insubstantiality of the incerest asserted.
- See, e.a.,
Cities of Statesville
- v. AEC, 441 F.2d 962, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1969, en banc), cited in Lona Irland Lichtine Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-292, 2 NRC 631, 651-52 (1975) (opinion of Dr. Buck); see also Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, 5 NRC 1143, 1150, supra.
The cases in which petitioners' asserting interests in the quality of their food, water, and milk have been found to have standing to intervene have involved allegations of concern about the effects of normal, day to day plant operations on the food, water, and milk supplies of petitioners residing in close 11/8 295
. proximity to a plant.
- See, e.g.,
Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Fuel Receiving and Storage Station), ALAB-328, 3 NRC 420, 423-24 (1976} (health food store organization sponsoring restaurant concerned thsc regular movement of spent fuel along established transportation routes in closa proximity to the sites of the organization's organic gardens might harm produce);-1/
Duquesne Light Co.,
6 AEC 243, 244, supra (petitioners residing 12 to 15 miles from plant concerned about effects of normal plant operation on "their food, milk, water supply, and the I'
air they breathe"); and Northern States Power Co.,
6 AEC 188, 191, supra (petitioner residing 40 miles from plant concerned that normal " operation of the facility would affect both his water cupply and food sources").
The interests asserted by these petitioners, based upon their concerns about the normal operations of the plant, were thus substant,ial and pervasive, considering the drastic nature of the other means available to them to protect their interests (such as the permanent and complete elimination of locally produced food, water, and milk from thei5 diets).
In contrast, in the instant case, Petitionar is apparently unconcerned about any effects of the normal operations of TMI 1/ It is interesting to note that, evan though the petitioners In Allied-General were asserting an interest which was more substantial and immediate than that asserted by Petitioner here, the Appeal Bcard considered the standing of the Allied-General petitioners to be a "close question."
3 NRC at 424.
1178
)96
.- - on his milk supply, since he alleges that he drinks milk without regard to where it was produced.
Instead, he alleges that he is concerned that, in the event of an accident at TMI, he will ingest " radioactive iodine" by drinking milk produced in the Harrisburg area.
Compared to the drastic nature of the means available to protect the interests of the other petitioners, described above, Petitioner here has available to him a number of practical, relatively easy means by which he himself can protect his interests, involving -
at most - temporary minor inconvenience.
For example, in the event of an accident at TMI, Petitioner could temporarily abstain from milk completely, or temporarily substitute powdered or canned milk.
Alternatively, he could ascertain which dairies used milk produced in the Harrisburg area, and temporarily avoid the products of those dairies.
Thus, the interest which Petitioner here asserts is relatively insubstantial and remote -
compared to those interests described above which were found to constitute a basis for standing - and cannot confer upon Petitioner standing to intervene in this proceeding.
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's status as a consumer of milk produced in the Harrisburg area, even considered with allegations of his Philadelphia residence, does not constitute the personal interest required for intervention by the Act and the Rules of Practice.
Petitioner's claim of standing on that basis must therefore be rejected.
1178 297
... - ---. -. -- B.
Petitioner's Status As A Censumer Of PJM Grid Power Does Not Confer Upon Him Standing To Intervene.
Petitioner also asserts, as a basis for standing to intervene in thi.a proceeding, his status as a consumer of power from the PJM grid, and alleget an interest in the reliability of grid power.
The Commission has squarely held that status as a consumer / ratepayer of a utility does not bring one within the " zone of interests" protected by the Atomic Energy Act for purposes of assessing intervenor standing in proceedings involving that utility (except perhaps in the antitrust s chere).
Portland General Electric Co.
(Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-75-27, 4 NRC 610, 614 (1976).
See also Detroit Edison Co.
(Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-470, 7 NRC 473, 475 (1978); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB -4 24, 6 NRC 122, 128 n.7 (1977); Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-397, 5 NRC 1143, 1147 (1977); Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-376, 5 NRC 426 (1977).
Further, although the Commission did not explicitly address the question whether consumer / ratepayer status is sufficient to entitle one to raise National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) issues in a licensing proceeding in its Portland decision, supra, the Appeal Board answered that 1178 298
. question in the negative in its earlier cpinion in that case, ALAB-333, 3 NRC 804, 806 (1976), and has since adhered to that view.
- See, e.g.,
Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), 7 NRC 473, 475, supra; Tennessee r lley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2),
a ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418, 1420-21 (1977).
In Portland, 4 NRC 610, supra, as in the instant case, the petitioners asserted in their affidavits that, as consumers of electricity, they were "cencerned with the reliability" of their power supply.
4 NRC at 612 n.l.
After pointing out that the petitioners' interests as consumers and ratepayers were not within the " zone of interests" of the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission further stated that the petitioners' allegations of concern abet.t the reliability of their power supply were "not sufficiently particularized to afford a basis for judicial standing."
4 NFC at 614. Since the allegations of Petitioner here are no more particularized (and arguably less so) than those of the petitioners in Portland, Petitioner's allegations afford him no basis for intervenor standing.
This is particularly true since the petitioners in Portland were customers of the utility there involved.
In the instant case, Petitioner does not allege that he is a customer of Metropolitan Edison.
Instead, he bases his 1178 299
~
. allegations o f interest on his status as a consumer of PJM, grid power and on his concern that an abnormal occurrence at TMI could affect the PJM grid adversely, thereby reducing the reliability of his electric supply.
The injury which Petitioner here alleges is thus even more remote than that alleged as a basis for standing in Portland, and is too remote to constitute a basis for standing in this proceeding.
See also Tennessee Valley Authority, 5 NRC 1418, 1420 n.3, supra, where the Appeal Board rejected a consumer / ratepayer claim of intervenor standing, noting, "(T]he petitioner here is allegedly served by a utility which acquired power from TVA, rather than by TVA directly.
That consideration does not, of course, enhance her claim of standing as a ratepayer."
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's status es a consumer of PJM grid power does not constitute the personal interest required for intervention by the Act and the Rules of Practice.
Petitioner's claim of intervenor standing on that basis must therefore be rejected.
C.
Petitioner's Status As A Philadelphia Taxpayer Does Not Confer Upon Him Standinc To Intervene.
Petitioner asserts his status as a taxpayer of Philadelphia as a third basis for standing, and alleges concern that "[ainother major accident in the Harrisburg 1178 100
. area would adversely effect (sic] the PA tax base and require funding from other first class cities in PA such as Phila."
However, allegations of interest as a taxpayer are not personal interests which confer standing to intervene.
Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418, 1421 (1977).
In Tennessee Valley Authority, like the instant case, petitioner asserted both ratepayer / consumer status and taxpayer status as bases for intervenor standing.
After holding that ratepayer / consumer status does not bring a petitioner within the " zone of interests," protected by either the Atomic Energy Act or NEPA, the Appeal Board continued:
For standing purposes, taxpayer status rests on no better footing.
Just as neither the Atomic Energy Act nor NEPA was intended to protect a person's interest in the rates charged by a utility for the electricity which it supplies, so too neither enactment can be said to be concerned to any extent with the rate of taxation which is imposed by governmental entities upon their citizens.
Beyond that, as the Licensing Board noted, the Supreme Court had held that "'a generalized grievance' shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens" is normally not cognizable.
Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499 (197s).
5 NRC at 1421.
Thus, in the instant case, Petitioner's claim of intervenor standing on the basis of his status as a Philadelphia taxpayer must be rejected.
1178 101
- - - - D.
Petitioner's General Philosophical Opposition To Nuclear Power Does Not Confer Upon Him Standing To Intervene.
Petitioner'c final alleged interest in intervening in this proceeding is his assertion that "it is a matter of conscience to protest the nukes wherever they be."
This bare, generalized assertion of philosophical opposition to nuclear power also fails as a basis for intervenor standing, since Petitioner has not alleged the requisite personal " injury in fact."
As the Supreme Court noted in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972),
The requirement.that a party seeking review must allege facts showing that he is himself adversely affected serve [s] as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome.
That goal would be undermined were we
. to authorize
. review at the behest of organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than vindicate their own value preferences through the judicial process.
405 U.S.
at 740, cited in Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Fuel Receiving and Storage Station), ALAB-328, 3 NRC 420, 422 (1976).
In the instant case, rather than asserting some particularized harm personal to himself, Petitioner admittedly seeks intervention in order to vindicate a broad public interest.
However, such an interest cannot serve as a basis for intervenor standing.
Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive 1178 102
. Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-473, 7 NRC 737, 741 (1978).
- Vague, generalized assertions, such as Petiticner's, drawn without any particularized reference to the details of the challenged facility and its particularized impact on Petitioner, are not appropriate for the adjudicatory process.
Cf. Duquesne Light Co.
(Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-109, 6 AEC 243, 245 n.4 (1973).
Petitioner's claim of intervenor standing based upon his general philosophical opposition to nuclear power, like his other claims of standing, must therefore be rejected.
II.
PETITIONER EAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY IDENTIFY THE ASPECT (S)
OF THE PROCEEDING AS TO WHICH HE WISHES TO INTERVENE.
Not only has Petitioner failed to demonstrate the personal interest required for standing to intervene in this proceeding, but Petitioner also has failed to adequately respond to the requirement, included both in the Commission's Order and Notice of Hearing dated August 9, 1979, and in Section 2.714 (a) (2) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, that the petition set forth the specific aspect or aspects of the proceeding as to which Petitioner wishes to intervene.
The right to require such specificity is now authoritatively settled.
- See, e.g.,
Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-279, 1 NRC 559, 574 (1975), citing BPI v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
A prospective intervenor must therefore " articulate the basis 1178 103
. of his interest clearly and, moreover, specify the focus of the desired hearing with particularity before he is entitled to be admitted to the proceeding."
Kansas Gas and Electric Co., 1 NRC at 574, supra.
The four broadly drawn statements of interest set forth by Petitioner do not meet these requirements of specificity.
III.
PETITIONER'S VIEWS CAN BE REPRESENTED EVEN IF HIS INDIVIDUAL PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE IS DENIED.
The case for denying Petitioner's request for leave to intervene, on the grounds of his failure to allege standing and his failure to adequately, identify the aspects of the proceedings in which he wishes to participate, is particularly.
strong since Petitioner's views can be represented in this proceeding even if his Petition For Leave To Intervene in an individual capacity is denied.
Petitioner is apparently being represented in this proceeding by tr.) EnviroEmental Coalition on Nuclear Power (ECNP), whose Petition For Leave To Intervene Licensee has not opposed (as to the showing of interest required for standing and identification of aspects of the proceeding in which ECNP wishes to participate).
See Petition of the Environmental Coalition On Nuclear Power For Leave To Intervene In Evidentiary Hearings On Reopening, Revocation of Operating License, and Other Matters, p. 5 n.3, I178 104
. where "Mr. Marvin Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa." is identified as one of the " members and nominees of the Executive Board" of ECNP.
Therefore, particularly since Petitioner's views can be represented in this proceeding evo,n if his individual Petition For Leave To Intervene is denied, his Petition should be dismissed on the grounds of his failure to allege standing and his failure to adequately identify the aspects of the proceeding in which he wishes to participate, as required both by the Commission's Order and Notice of Hearing dated August 9, 1979, and by Section 2.714 (a) (2) of the Rules of Practice.
Cf. Virginia Electric and Power Co.
(North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-536, 9 NRC (April 5, 1979) (denying organization's Petition For Leave To Intervene, noting, inter alia, an intervenor's
([
apparent willingness to present the testimony of the
.,J-organization's proposed witness in the proceeding).
- p. '.
-g.
IV.
PETITIONER DOES NOT MEET THE CRITERIA SET FORTH FOR INTERVENTION AS A MATTER OF DISCRETION.
C f Where, as here, standing to intervene as a matter of
~~',
1 right is lacking, participation in the proceeding may nonethelesa i..
N 1178 105 i
9
._ be allowed as matter of discretion.
Portland General Electric Co.
(Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610, 614-17 (1976); Virginia Electric and Power Co.
(North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-363, 4 NRC 631 (1976); Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-397, 5 NRC 1143 (1977); Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418 (1977).
In Portland General Electric Co., 4 NRC 610, supra, the Commission noted the relevant factors, set forth at 10 CFR SS 2.714 (a) and (d), to be considered in determining whether to allow intervention as a matter of discretion:
(a)
Weighing in favor of allowing intervention -
(1) The extent to which the petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record.
(2) The nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding.
(3) The possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest.
1i78 106 S
. (b) Weighing against allowing intervention -
(4) The availability of othe. means whereby petitioner's interest will be protected.
(5) The extent to which the petitioner's interest.will be represented by existing parties.
(6) The extent to which petitioner's participation will inappropriately I
broaden or delay the proceeding.
I 4 NRC at 616.
Foremost among these factors is the extent of the contribution to the proceeding which might be expected of the pe titioner.
Nuclear Engineering Co.,
Inc. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-473, 7 NRC 737, 743-44 (1978); Portland General Electric Co., 4 NRC 610, 612-617, supra; Virginia Electric and Power Co.,
4 NRC 631, supra; Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, 5 NRC 1143, 1145, supra; Tennessee Valley Authority, 5 NRC 1418, 1422, supra.
Generally, "[plermission to intervene should prove more readily available where petitioners show significant ability to contribute on substantial issues of law or fact which will not otherwise be properly raised or presented, set forth these matters with suitable specificity to allow evaluation, and demonstrate their importance and immediacy, 1178 107
-- justifying '.ne time necessary to consider them."
Portland General Electric Co.,
4 NRC 610, 617, supra.
Petitioner here has not made such a showing.
Although Petitioner's interest in public affairs is commendable, his petition suggests no "significant ability to contribute on substantial issues of law or fact," and his broadly drawn allegations of interests and concerns defy
" evaluation."
Nor has he attempted to demonstrate the importance and immediacy of his alleged interests and concerns, or to indicate in some other way how he might contribute significantly to this proceeding.
Further, without considering in detail each of the factors set forth in Portland General Electric Co.,
4 NRC 610, 616, supra, Licensee notes that, as discussed in section I above, the extent of Petitioner's property, financial or other interest in this proceeding is both insubstantial and remote.
Indeed, Petitioner has readily available to him other means whereby his alleged health interests can be protected.
See section I.A., supra).
And as discussed in section III, Petitioner's views can be represented in this proceeding by the Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power, even if his individual Petition For Leave To Intervene is denied.
I178 108
. Accordingly, Petitioner should not be granted leave to intervene as a matter of discretion in this proceeding.
V.
CONCLUSION.
Petitioner here has failed to demonstrate the personal interest required for intervenor standing and has not adequately identified the aspects of this proceeding as to which he wishes to intervene, and therefore is not entitled to intervene in the proceeding as a matter of right.
Nor can Petitioner meet the criteria set forth for int arvention as a matter of discretion.
Moreover, Petitioner's views can be represented in this proceeding by the Environmental l
Coalition On Nuclear Power, of which he is apparently a
" member" and " nominee of the Executive Board."
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's Petition For Leave To Intervene in this proceeding should be dismissed, and he should be denied leave to intervene as a matter of discretion.
Respectfully submitted,
- SHAW, I TMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE E./
LM J
porgfF. Trdwbridge
[
1178 109 m
~.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-289
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, )
Unit No. 1)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Answer to Petition for Leave to Intervene by Marvin I. Lewis" dated September 12, 1979, were served upon the following persons by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this 12th day of September, 1979.
Ivan W.
Smith, Esquire Marvin I.
Lewis Chairman 6504 Bradford Terrace
~
Atomic Safety and Licensing Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19149 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission James A. Tourtellote, Esqaire (4)
Washington, D.C.
20555 Office of Executive Legal Director U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission I
Dr. Walter H. Jordan
?!a shington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Docketing and Service Section (21) 881 West Outer Drive Office of the Secretary Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissi7n Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Linda W.
Little Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 5000 Hermitage Drive Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 J
'. imbL m
Dated:
September 12, 1979 1178 110
.-