ML19209A064
| ML19209A064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1978 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19209A063 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910010835 | |
| Download: ML19209A064 (8) | |
Text
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MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATING REACTORS The NRC has established requirenunts for personnel at operating reactors for purposes of plant operation, industrial security, and fire fighting. The following discussion considers the extent to which plant personnel assigned to either plant operation or security may also be temporarily allowed to man a fire brigade in the event of a fire for a single unit facility and sets forth an acceptable sharing scheme for operating n2 actors.
Summary of Manpower Requiremants 1.
Fire Brigade:
The staff has concluded that the minimum size of the fire brigade shift should be five persons unless a specific site evaluation has been completed and some other number justified.
The five-man team would consist ;f one leader and four fire fighters and would be expected to provide defense against the fire for an initial 30-minute period.
See Attachment A for the basis for the need 4r a five-man fire brigade.
2.
Plant Operation:
Standard Review Plan Section 13.1.2 requires that for a station having one licensed unit, each shift crew should have at least three persons at all times, plus two additional persons when the unit is operating.
For ease of reference, Attachment B contains a copy of this SRP.
3.
Plant Security:
The requirements for a guard force are outlined in 10 CFR Part 73.55.
In the course of the staff's review of proposed security plans, a required minimum security response force will be established for each specific site.
In addition to the response team, two additional members of the security force will be required to continuously man the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS).
It is expected that many facilities will have a security organization with greater number', of personnei than the minimum number assumed for purposes of discussion in this paper.
The NRC staff has given consideration to the appropriateness of per-mitting a limited degree of sharing to satisfy the requirements of plant operation, security and fire protection and has concluded that.
(1) subject to certain site and plant specific conditions, the fire brigade staffing could generally be provided through operaticns and security personnel, and (2) the requirements for operators and the security force should remain uncompromised. Until a site specific review is completed, the following indicates the interim distribution and justification for these dual assignments, and therefore our interim minimum requirements for a typical presently operating ccmmercial' single unit facility.
The staff believes that m.
power for the fire brigade for multi-unit facilities is not now a problem because of the larger numbers of people generally preser.t at the sites.
Situations which do pose problems will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
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P00R 3RIGIM 1.
Plant Operation:
The staff has concluded that for most events at a single unit nuclear facility, a minimum of three operators should be available to place the reactor in a safe condition.
The two additional operators required to be available at the nuclear facility are generally required to be present to perform routine jobs which can be interrupted to accomodate unusual situations that may arise.
That is, there is the potential for the remaining two members of the operating crew to assume other short-term duties such as fire fighting.
In light of the original rationale for providing extra plant operators to cope with off-normal ccnditions, it appears justified to rely on these personnel for this function.
The staff recomends that one of the two operators assigned to the fire brigade should be designated as leader of the fire brigade in view of his background in plant operations and overall familiarity with the plant.
In this regard, the shift supervisor should not be the fire brigade leader a
because his presence is necessary elsewhere if fires occur in certain critical areas of the plant.
2.
Plant Security:
In the event of a fire, a contingency plan and procedures will be used in deploying the security organization to assure that i appropriate level of physical protection is maintained dur.ag the event.
The staff has determined that it is possible in the planning for site response to a fire, to assign a maximum of three members of the security organization to serve on the fire brigade and still provide an acceptable level of physical protection.
While certain security posts must be manned continucusly (e.g., CAS, SAS), the personnel in other assignments, including the response force, could be temporarily (i.e., 30 minutes) assigned to the fire brigade.
In judging the merits of this allowance the underlying question is whether the minimum security force strength must be maintained continuously in the event of a plant emergency such as a fire.
Further examination of this issue leads to two potential rationales for reaching an affirmative decision.
- First, could there be a causal connection between a fire and the security threat?
Second, are there compelling policy reasons to postulate a simultaneous threat and fire?
The first potential rationale would only be credible if, (1) the insider (posed as part of the threat definition) was an active participant in an assault and started a fire coincident with the attack on the plant or, (2) a diversionary fire was started by an attack force somewhere external to the plant itself where no equipment required for :,afe shutdcwn is located.
The role of the insider will be discussed first. While 73.55 assigns an active status to the insider, the rule also requires that measures be implemented to contain his activities and thereby reduce his 1033 J
. ef fectivene s s. At present, these measures include background checks on plant employees, limited access to vital plant areas, badging systems and the two-man rule.
Here, limited access means that only designated employees are allowed in vital areas and that their entry is controlled by either conventional locks or card-key systems.
Also, if separate trains of safety equip-ment are inenived,than either compartmentalization or the two-man rule is required.
These measures to contain the insider are present.y being imp 1tmented and t;ill provide assurance that people of questionable reliability would not be able to gain employee status at a nuclear plant and should they become an employee with unescorted access, significant restraints would be inter-posed on the ability of such a person to carry out extensive damage to plant vital areas.
Recognizing that additional safeguards may still be appropriate, the staff has reccrrmended to the Ccnmission that plant personnel also be required to obtain an NRC security clearance.
The staff believes that the attendant background investigation associated with a clearance, in con-junction with the other 73.55 measures, will provide a high degree of assurance that plant personnel will not attempt to take an active sabotage role.
If the clearance rule is adopted the staff believes some of the measures, such as the two-man rule, designed to contain the insider can be relaxed.
- Thus, there does not new appear to be a reascnably credible causative ellatienship between a fire intentionally set by in insider aid the postulated external security threat.
h;r the case of diversionary fires set external to the plant itself, adequate security forces can still be maintained by allowing only part of the fire brigade to respond while both fire fighters and security force armed responders maintain a high degree of alertness for a possible real attack somewhere else on the plant.
Thus, the effective numbe. of armed responders required by 73.55 can be maintained for external di w sionary fires.
The second potential rationale concerns whether a serious, spontaneous fire should be postulated coincident with an external security threat as a design basis.
In evaluating such a require-ment it is useful to consider the likelihood of occurrence cf this combination of events.
While it is difficult to quantify the probability of the 73.55 threat, it is generally accepted that it is small, comparable probably to other design basis type events.
The probability of a fire which is spontaneous and located in or in close proximity to a vital area of the plant and is serious encugh to pose a significant safety concern is also small.
It would appear, therefora, that the random coincidence of these two unlikely events would be sufficiently small to not 1033
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1,
require protection against their simultaneous occurrence.
In addition, it should be noted that the short time period (30 minutes) for which several members of the security force would be dedicated to the fire brf oade would further reduce the likelihood of coincidence.
As neither of the two potential rationales appear to preclude the use of members of the security force in the event of a fire the staff has concluded that the short assignment of security personnel from the amed response force or other available security personnel to the fire brigade under these conditions would be acceptable.
To ensure a timely and effective response to a fire, while still preserving a flexible security response, the staff believes that the fire brigade should operate in the folicwing manner.
In the event of an internal fire, all five members of the fire brigade should be dispatched to the scene of the fire to assess the nature and seriousness of the fire.
Simultaneously, the plant security force should be actively evaluating the possibility of any security threat to the plant and taking any actions which are necessary to co iter that threat.
For external fires, a lesser number than the five-man brigade should respond for assessment and fire figh'.ing.
As the overall plant situation becomes apparent it would be expected that the most effective distribution of manpower between plaret operations, security and fire protection would be made, allcwing a balanced utilization of manpower resources until offsite assistance becomes available.
The manpower pool provided by the plant operaticns pe sonnel and security force are adequate to respond to the occurrence of a design basis fire or a security threat equivalent to the 73.55 performance requirements.
It is also recognized that other, more likely combinations of postulated fires and security threats of a lesser magnitude than the design basis, could be considered.
While the probabilities of these higher likelihood events may be sufficient to warrant protecting against them in combination, the manpower requirements required to cope with each event would be similarly reduced thereby allcwing adequate coverage by plant personnel.
Conclusion The staff believes that it would be reasonable to allow a limited amount of sharing of plant personnel in satisfying the requirements of plant operation, security, and fire protection.
An acceptable sharing scheme wculd entail reliance on two plant operators and three members of the security organization to constitute the fire brigade.
Since availability of the full fire brigade would only 1033
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. be required for fires with potential for serious damage, actual distribution of plant personnel during a plant emergency would be governed by the exigencies of the situation.
Of course, all personnel assigned to the fire brigade would have to fulfill all applicable training requirements.
It should also be recognized that the diversion of personnel to the fire brigade would be of short duration and that substantial additional offsite assistance would be forthccaing in accordance with the emergency and contingency plan developed for each facility.
In evaluating licensee proposals for manpower sharing due coas:deration will also have to be made of unique facility characteristics, such as terrain and plant lay-out, as well as the overall strengths of the licensee's fire and security plans. Minimum protection levels in either area could preclude the sharing of manpower.
1033 i
Attachment A P00R D E M.
Staf f 'Posi tion Minimum Fire Grigade Shift Size _
IllTRODt$ TION d
_l'uclear pcwer plants depend en the response of an onsite fire briga e for d.fense cgainst the ef fects of fire on plant safe shutdown capcbilities.
In other areas, that are protected
,only neans of fire suppression.by correctly designed autenatic d (1) fires too manual fire fighting efforts are used i.o extinguish:(2) well developed fires if the small to actuate the automatic syster ;autonatic system f ails to fun l
Thus, an adequate fire brigade is controlled by the autcmatic system.
essential to fulfill the def ense in depth requiremants which protect safe shutdcwn systens frcm the effects of fires and.their related 1
combur.tien by-products.
DISCUSSICN There are a nur. der of f actors that should be considered in establishin They include:
the minircum fire brigcde shif t size.
- 1) plcnt oecmetry and size;2) quantity and quality of detection and s
- 3) fire fighting strategics for postulatea fires;
- 4) firt brigade training;
- 5) fire brigade equipment; and6) fire brigade supplements by plant depart:nent( s).
In all plants, the majority of postulated fires are in enclos created by the heat and smcke buildup within the less structures.
i t
and a personnel replacement capability.
Certain functions must be performed for all fires l
Until a site provide extra equipment, and account for possible of five persons has been established.
a minimum working number of personnel to deal I
8 1033 7
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P00RORGIM 2-
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if the brigade is composed of a smaller number of personnel, the fire attcck may be stopped whenever new equipment is needed or a person is injured or f atigued. 1:e note that in the career fire service, the aininun engine company manning considered to be ef fective for an initial attack on.a fire is also five, including one officer and four teag members.
It is assumed for the purposes of this position that brigade training and equipment i.s adequate and that a backup capability of trained individuals exist whether through plant personnel call back or from the local fire department.
POSIT 10M 1.
The nin; rum fire brigade shif t size should be justified by an analysis of the plant specific f actors stated above f.or the plant, after rodificatioas are coa.plGte.
2.
In the interin, tha minimum fire brigade shif t size 'shall be five pernoas.
These persens shall be fully qualified to perform their assigned responsibility, and shall include:
One Su 2cr.isor - This individual must have fire tactics training.
lie will assua.e all command responsibilities for fighting the fire.
During plant euergencies, the brigade supervisor should not have cther rescensibilities that would detract f Om his full attention being devoted to the fire.
This supervisor should not be actively engac7d in the fighting of the fire.
His total function should be to survey the fire area, ccmmand the brigade, and keep the upper levels of plant management infcrmed.
Two licse Men - A 1.5 inch fire hose being handled within a window-less enclosure would require two trained individuals.
The two team asabers are required to physically handle the active hose line and to protect each other while in the adverse environment of the fire.
Two Additional T2am " embers - One of these individuals would be reouir:0 to supply filled air cylinders to the fire fighting mecbers of the brigade and the second to' establish,smcke ventilation and aid in filling the air cylinder.
These two individuals would also act as the first backup to the engaged team.
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/ ' T/t C H YA C-M T 6, Assigv.ents of personnel eetino us] N18.1-1971 qualificatiCns. Section 4.3.1 or 4
a.
Secticn 4.5.1, should be mde to cnsite shif t operatino crews in reders not less than the follcwing:
r for a station having one licecsed init, each shift crew should have at least three persons at all tiries, plus tw: add':1cnal persers. hen the unit is operating.
For a rulti-unit station, each shif t crew should Pave at least three persons per licensed unit at all tires, plus one additional persen per Operating unit.
I Operator license ;ualifications of persons assigned to operating snif t crews b.
should be as foll ws:
A licensed senior o; erat:r.ho is also a member of the station supervisory (1) staf f shculd be onsite at all times **en at least cne unit is Icaded witn fuel.
(2) For any station wite r. re than one reactor containing fuel, (1) the nyter of litersed senior operators crsite at all times should not te less than the nu-ter of centrol rcoms f rot.hich the fueled units are monitored, and (2) the nurter of licensed senior operators should not be less than the l
number of reacters ;erating.
(3) For each reactor containing fuel, there shculd te at least cne licensed operator in the controi r00+ at all tires. Shift cre. c: positions should be specified sucr tha* tais c;ncition car te sa*15'ied inde;enhntly of licersed senice ; erat:rs assigned to shift creas t: neet the criteria of (1) and (2) at:ve.
(4) For este control roce fr:.nich cae or more restte-s are in c;eration, an additicnat :cerator should te ensite ard available t: serve as relief operator for that control rc:..
Shi't crew com;csttions snould be 5:ecified such that this condition can be satisfied inde;endently of (1), (2), and (3), and f:r eacr such contrcl room.
C.
Radiation ;rotectice cuali'ications Of at least cre ;e-son Cn each c: erat'ng shift should be as (Ollcas!
The manage ent of eac* staticn havirg cre or r:re ueits c;ntaining fuel sbO;ld either, (1) cuali'y and desig* ate at least One me :er of eacn snif* c;eratirg cren to ir;1e wnt radiation pectectice ;rocedwres, includin; r:utine or s;ecial rap ati;r 5.rveys using porta:le radiation detectors, use O' pr:te:-
tivt tarriers and sisns. use of ;retec*ive clotning and treathing e::aratus, perfCreance of c:ntaminaticn surveys, checks on radiattor mcr.it0rs, and lirits I h ;*)5ics tethrician of esposwre rates and accurulated d:St. or (2) assig* a re4 t
to each shift, such assigorent t; te in addition to those assigrec 10 shift o;erating cre.s in accgrdance.ith (a) and (b) abeve.
))]. GEviEW FCXE cRES
. Selecticn and e..,hasis of saricus as;e. ts pf the arets c vered y this revie. ;1ar.111 te Thefud,eet.cn t'E areas tc te gi.en 3 ertier 1,. r ;
made by the revie.er on eatn case.
13.1.2-3 P00RBRIGaRbI 1933 nmos
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