Text

Transcript of 790606 Briefing Re NMSS Role in Intl Safeguards & Physical Security Determinations,In Washington, Dc.Pp 1-91.Portions Withheld (Ref 10CFR9.104)
	ML19208D249
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/06/1979
From:	Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R; NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	;
References
	REF-10CFR9.7 SECY-78-035, SECY-78-035A, SECY-78-35, SECY-78-35A, NUDOCS 7909280157
	Download: ML19208D249 (94)
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UNITED STATES E *'

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n

2 W ASHIN GTON. D.C. 20555 o

,o August 20, 1979 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY COMMISSION DETERMINATION REGARDING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT OF:

Transcript of Briefing on SECY-78-35/35A NMSS Role in International Safeguards and Physical Security Determinations June 6, 1978 Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.108 (c), the Commission has determined that the attached portions of the subject transcript should be releasad to the public.

The remaining portions of the transcripc have been withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 9.104 as noted below:

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] 9072S @/ $

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. Page/Line through Page/Line Exemption 53/1 53/2 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 53/10 53/10 10 0FR 9.104 (a) (1) 53/14 53/18 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 54/10 54/12 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 54/17 54/25 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 55/1 55/1 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 57/1 57/3 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 57/17 57/21 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 58/17 58/24 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 60/10 60/17 10 CFR 9.10 4 (a) (.'

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a k?Y[/ NUCLEAP. REGULATORY C.OMMISSION BRIEFING ON SECY-78-35/35A - - IGIS3 ROLZ IN INTE?liATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL SECURITY DETEP31INA1' IONS e

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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION' 3

4 BRIEFING ON SECY-78-35/35A -- NMSS ROLE IN 5

INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND 6

PHYSICAL SECURITY DETERMINATIONS 7

8 (Closed To Public Attendance) 9 Commissioners' Conference Room 10

[i Room 1130 11 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, D.

C.

12 Tuesday, June 6, 1978 13 4

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2:25 p.m.,

Joseph Hendrie, Chairman, presiding.

g 16 Chairman Hendrie 17 Commissioner 611insky Commissioner Kennedy 18 Commissioner Bradford 19 ALSO PRESENT:

20 S.

Chilk L.

Gossick 21 C. Smith J.

Kelley 22 K. Pederson J.

Shea 23 J.

Partlow R.

Burnett 24 G.

Page D.

Kasun 25 I.

Williams 1L,IJO C.

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3 CRAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Could we come to order, please.

4 The Commission had the pleasure of signing an 5

agreement with the Government of Belgian today and that set 6

int set of events that set Ya little bit late.

7 This afternoon's subject is a briefing on NMSG's 8

role in International Safeguards and Physical Security 9

Determinations and discussion of those matters.

10 Lee, welcome and the staff.

It is nice to see you 11 all, please go ahead.

12 MR. GOSSICK:

Let me just start off, Mr. Chairman, 13 by saying that in connection with our discussion last 14 Thursday on the NMSS,IP role what is not involved here is la-a matter of whether it should be IP or NMSS 's function, this lo, is a far as the 35-A paper that is before you; we are talking strictly cbout the kind of things as possible ways NMSS might 7

18 be able to help provide tne technical evaluation, the assessment that would advise the Commission as to the adequacy of the material control and accounting measures tnat are in existence in the countries where we are exporting material.

I might add that as the result of our meeting last Thursday that I have kicked off the effort to try to bring back to the Commission clarifying or further amplification 24 of those matters that we discussed giving a deadline of a week 25

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from this coming Friday to have it back to me, and I would 2

hope that by a week following we could have it back to the 3

Commission for your consideration.

4 I think with - daat, I.-411 ask Dr. Smith if he would 5

like to give a,little bit of background as to just how we 5

got to where we are on this particular issue.

7 MR. SMITH:

The Commission will remember, back in 8

January 20, I think it was, 1978 there was OECY 78-35.

We 9

sent you a paper in which we discussed in a general way our 10 role in international safeguards and physical security li determinations.

12 We reviewed with you at tha t time how we participsted 13 with respect to the physical security reviews of export 14 license applications and our visits to those countries.

We 15 also discussed with you in that paper our material control 16 and accounting program reviews.

We indicated that in this 17 particular area we had a problem because we really had no 4/

18 mechanism for us, n*

1aac' to receive country specific 19 information which would enable us to make an independent 20 evaluation o_ the effectiveness of international material 21 control and accounting procedures.

22 We went on in the paper to discuss a little bit O*'

23 about the SSIR Report and some of the concerns that that h>>V C? p i

q,; 24 gave us and we ended up-that paper with a request for some 25 guidance from the Commission as to whechar or not we should lUJo na s

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conduct reviews aimed at reaching independent conclusions 2

on 'the effectiveness of international material

)ntrol and 3

accounting safeguards in individual cuuntries.

4 What we were basically saying is we needed some 5

guidance from the Commission as to what they felt our proper 6

role was with respect to material control and accounting and 7

to what extent they wanted us to be able to say that based 8

on our independent review, we felt happy with the situatim..

9 As the result of that paper and subsequent discussion 10 of it, initially in terms of a request from Commissioner l~'

Kennedy and then ultimately resulting in SECY 78-35A;we tried 12 to scope out a whole range of different things that one might 3

1 do or different approaches that one might follow in terms 14 of getting the kind of information we were talking about.

--ic As you have seen in the paper, SECY 78-35A,it ranges from the 16 status quo, basically acceptance of the fact that it is an 17 IAEA entry period, all the way up to perhaps including actual 18 inspections.

19 I want to make it clear that those were just -- we 20 were not recommending any of those procedures, but just 21 saying that depending on the degree of assurance that one 22 wanted to have when he made the statement that the safeguards 23 situation was adequate, these are the different steps we could 24 take.

25 With me today is Jim Partlow, I don't know how many of 033

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you have met Jim before.

He is currently the Branch Chief 2

in our. Safeguards Division for material control and accounting 3

licenscs and prior.to coming with us, Jim was in Region I of 4

NRC where he was the inspector and,section chief for material 5

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control and acenunting.

I think he is --

you hate to count (d,

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-r-the times he spend in B&W and other places on material and 7

control,and accounting procedures.

8 So Jim has a presentation that he is going to make ---

9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Before we get too far along 10 could you help me with one minor thing.

11 I have a bunch of papers here, including SECY 78-35-A 12 and these briefing charts which are classified CONFIDENTIAL 13 National Security Information.

Could you tell me where 14 National Security Information is in this paper?

15 MR. BURNETT:

We dssu ued i.het we would get in to - --

16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

ho, no.

I am talking about 17 these papers.

10 MR. BURNETT:

He raises a good point, but if you 19 go to the findings, the third paper, the third sheet in yours

'20 which has the 3IR overview.

The third view graph, sir.

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Let's see.

g' 22 MR. BURNE,6 :

There is still some confusion as to 23 the exact classification of the SIR.

24 MR. SMITH:

Commissioner, I think the answer to it is 25 that we weren't really sure how to handle candid discussion of

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'that was in the SSIR and the new SIR that we have received.

2 It was because of that, and that is discussed to some eatent 3

in all three of these papers, and because of that we classified it that way.

MR. PARTLOW:

These Safeguards Implementation 6

Reports issued by the IAEA are marked " Restricted Distribution, 7

Official Use Only."

8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Have they been officially 9

classified here?

10 MR. SMITH:

Jim?

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MR. SHEA:

On that, I think perhaps Shelley could (tJ[

12 perhaps elaborate on that.

13 MR. WILLIAMS:

Well, there is a long history in this 14 and my recollection is that it is stamped " Restricted 15 i

is an IAEA ---

Distribution" whicu 16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I know, but is there any 17 copy that is stamped " CONFIDENT 7 with somebody's name 18 signed to it saying who the classifying officer was?

19 MR. WILLIAMS:

No, sir, there isn't.

20 MS. BECKER:

As a former IAZA employee, I cea tell 21 you about the IAEA s tamp.

Restricted Distribution is oo intended to keep it from reaching the Press before it reaches

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23 the Board of Governors.

24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But that has b4en to the 25 Board of Governors.

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MS. BECKER:

Well, but they put it on before.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

So what is the significance now?

MS. BECKER: They don't usually take it.off.

(Laughter)

MS. BECKER:

But in practical effect ---

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What are you trying to tell 8

us?

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MS. BECKER:

After the Board of Governors have seen 11 it any member state can go in and look at it.

12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But what is the status within 13 the United States. Are you saying it is unclassified?

14 MS. BECKER:

Well, that would depend upon the 15 classifying officer.

16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, that's what I am 17 asking.

18 MR. WILLIAMS:

We have had several contacts with 9

1 the State Department and frankly we don't have any thing in Writing, but from two of their offices we were told to treat it 21 as CONFIDENTIAL.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, it sounds as though 23 no one is going to take the rer.ansibility of signing their 24 name and classifying the thing, in which case I would think it

,5 is not classified.

You know, if it is properly classifiable,

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then they ought to classify it.ard sign their name to it.

2 MR. WILLIAMS:

There are additional problems.

3 They think if they can classify all of the

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Restricted Distribu' tion, that they would have a great number 5

of documents that would have to be reclassified and put away 6

and filed and whatnot.

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, are we obeying the 8

law if we treat this mat'erial as classified and it is not 9

classified?

10 MR. PAGE:

Commissioner Gilinsky, I was the 11 classifying officer on the basic document that came in.

I did l'~

it on the basis of information that was given to us from the 1^3 State Department as confirmed through International Programs.

We were told that both the SSIR, the SIR and the action 15 g7 ap / Itself are claccified docwuents, but I have not gutten n

fST 16 it in writing.

It is all oral.

But my name is shown here 17 and I'm the one that ---

18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

So you are the one that 19 has classified this.

20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Oh, we have discovered the 21 classifying officer.

22 MR. PAGE:

Yes.

7g 23 Unghted -

24 MR. PAGE:

I would just as soon get rid of the 25 classification.

I am going on the basis of what the State I

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guidance has been.

2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

When you said this was 3

oral, this is what, transmitted by Jim or?

4 MR. PAGE:

Yes.

5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

So in other words, you did 6

it on the basis of Jim's say so and you did it on the basis 7

of?

8 MR. SHEA:

Sta'te's say so, including the issue 9

being raised here in State meetings with the Camtission. So 10 that is in the transcripts.

11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY.

I mean, are their copies 12 stamped CONFIDENTIAL?

13 MR. SHEA:

I guess I don't know.

I have not seen their 14 copies.

5 1

MR. BURNETT:

Jim, did we not go to tnem in 16 writing and ask them for a determination though, and wu have 17 not ---

18 MR. WILLIAMS:

I asked them for -- I have asked them 19 several times for something in writing, frankly.

I have also 20 asked them for a copy of their response for the FOIA request 21 for the SSIR to see on what grounds they denied release of the 22 document.

23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And what was the grounds for 24 that?

25 MR. WILLIAMS:

I haven't received that.

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MR. GOSSICK:

I guess you had better make an FOIA reques'..

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, it is reference to the 4

SSIR and I was just going though this document,78-35A and 5

the specific references to the SSIR are very sparse indeed.

6 I guess I.have some difficulty myself on ascertaining where 7

the National Security Information was in these papers and 8

that's their grounds for classification.

It says:

" National 9

Security Information," and I don't know where it is and I 10 would like someone to find out so I don't make a mistake.

11 I think we are going to review this transcript j

12 promptly, I hope, as we have agreed in the past to do for 13 release.

If we don't know the grounds of which the stuff j s classified, I don't know how we are going to do that.

la, MR. GOSRTCF*

May I Suggest that perhaps I send a 16 letter over to Mr. Tarnoff.

Would that be the proper level 17 to ask what their views are on this;if we don't get some

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substantive grounds for classifying it we are going to have 14 to treat it as unclassified.

20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, that will be helpful 21 with respect to the SSIR, but that isn't going to help me 22 with respect to this document.

23 I am referring to the particular paper that I have 24 in my hand which we are discussing today,78-35A.

On page 2, 25 it says: "The program consists of general knowledge of IAEA A

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activities, the participation of the IAEA, discussion of the 2

IAEA staff of a review of programmatic documents such as 3

information circulars, technical manuals and the periodic 4

SSIR."

5 Now, surely nobody is implying that that statement 6

has any classified National Security Information in it, are 7

they?

8 MR. BURNETT:

No, sir, but Alternative 3 is classified 9

in toto.

10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

You have to read between the 11 lines.

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I guess.

Alternative 3?

13 MR. BURNETT:

Yes, sir.

That's the Implementation 1^

of the Current Action Plan.

The State Department has 10

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classified that.

16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

It doesn't say what the 17 Action Plan is.

' 8 It says we would implement the current interagency 19 action plan, but it doesn't say what that plan is, does it?

20 MR. BURNETT:

Yes, sir.

It continues A, B,

C, 21 D and E.

22 MR. PAGE:

I certainly agree with what is being said 23 at the table that if we can possible get rid of the 24 classification I think we should.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

There are two issues now.

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Be sure there. isn' t any misunderstanding about what I'm saying.

2 I am not talking about whether the classification 3

l exists on the SSIR.

I am talking about what the classification 4

of this paper is, and I don' t think, I have not been shown yet 5

at least a connection between the two.

That's my point.

6 MR. PAGE:

The action plan is also classified, 7

Commissioner Kennedy.

8 CHAIPJ1AN HENDRIE:

Hang on.

What's being said here 9

is that Alternative 3, the Current Action Plan, has been 10 classified by the State Department.

Am I right?

11 MR. PAGE:

That's correct.

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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE So if I read lower case a, b,

13 c,

d, e, and so on on page 4 I am in fact reading material 14 which has been specifically labeled CONFIDENTIAL by the State

,e Department.

16 MR. PAGE:

Yes, sir.

17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

So this piece ~would be a 18 classified addendum or could have been a classified addendum 19 to a perhaps otherwise ---

20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That answers my question.

21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I guess once you have got to 22 deal with it on a classified basis, in some ways it is easier 23 to have it all in one package than have parts that are in and 24 out.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

You can't just classify every 1033

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page in the document because one page is classified..

2 MR. KELLEY:

That's the problem, because then you 3

have got to make a judgment that your discrssion is likely 4

to be permeated with classified information before you close 5

the whole thing.

When you see a whole document classified, 6

that's one segment, and you find out it is one page, you may 7

reach the same conclusion but the question is a least different.

8 MR. SHEA:

You-have to see how tightly it is inter-9 woven with the rest and whether it is separable and so on.

10 MR. KELLEY:

Well, that's a judgment call.

l' MR. SHEA:

When we reviewed the transcripts of earlier l'

discussions on the subject with State Department, I recall a 17 i

gcod deal of those transcripts were ultimately made available 14 for public release and selected portions remained classified.

15 So that may well be the case here as well.

16 MR. PARTLOW:

May I have the next slide, please.

17 l

(Slide) 18 Mr. Chairman, before going in to the specifics of 19 the various alternatives to gain independent information about 20 fcreign material control and accounting, I would like to just 21 briefly run over our overall sys tem of international assurances 22 that is part of our program to insure the safeguarding of our 23 exports over seas.

24 We have a basic system of assurances which gives us 25 these assurances that this material will be used for its stated i

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1 end use; that it will not be used for any explosive use; that 2

the United States will maintain the approval for any retransfer 3

or reprocessing of. the material; that IAEA safeguards will 4

be accepted for the material being sent over seas and in some 5

ptff fe cjyWWh q) two years full safeguards for all material withi~.1 the receiving p/

6 country.

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What do you mean by "we 8

have assurances".

Do you mean in various places?

9 MR. PARTLOW:

Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

We don't have those in all 11 cases do we?

12 MR. PARTLON:

No, I think that's correct.

In general 13 this is our generai system of international assurances.for 14 safeguarding material over seas.

15 Another portion of this program is an assurance that 16 there is adequate physical protection of th'e material over seas 17 through a program of visits and evaluations with NRC 18 participa~ tion administered by DOE.

19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let's see, you say IAEA seeks 20 to verify that the assurances are honored.

21 MR. PARTLOW:

Yes, sir.

I wanted to lead in and then 22 say that we can view the IAEA, which is a program of material 23 control and accounting over seas, as a program which seeks to 24 verify, for the United States, that the written system of 25 international assurances are in fact honored.

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Ckay, but these vary 2

at least a little bit from place-to-place?

3 MR. PARTLOW:

From country-to-country.

Yes, sir.

4 MR. SHEA:

In what way would they verify the 5

assurance on physical protection ---

6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

No, no.

I think he means 7

just materials.

Not that they have to verify that whole set 8

of assurances, but assurances that the materials vill not be 9

used for explosives, although even that is noncomparative.

10 MR. PARTLON:

We look at the IAEA somewhat in the 11 same way that we might look at our own inspection team l~'

domestically as the feedback to give us that additional

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confidence that this system of assurances, the promises made i

by foreign countries, have in fact been carried out and the 15 materici has not been dive:ted fruta its end use to some other 16 use.

17 Now, about a year ago, thi.c time last year, the 18 IAEA issued its first report, reporting the implementation of 19 IAEA safeguards.

It was called the "Special Safeguards 20 Implementation Report" issued about this time-last year.

21 That report showed us that 22 23 24 25 iG'?

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This past May 8th, rhe IAEA issued its second 4

implementation report.

It is not -- the "Special" has been 5

dropped and it is now called the " Safeguards Implementation 6

Report".

It is to be issued in two parts and so far only 7

Part I has been issued.

It is an overview report with a more 8

detailed technical section to be forthcoming.

9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Is that being reviewed here?

10 MR. PARTLON:

Yes, it is.

11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And we have got a requirement?

12 MR. PARTLOW:

I understand a paper is forthcoming 3

1 on the analysis of this SIR.

1 Next slide, please.

15 (Slide) 16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Where is it being reviewed, 17 in NMSS?

18 MR. PARTLOW:

Within NMSS and within IP.

19 MR. SHEA:

We would work together on this with 20 NMSS drafting.

I would be commenting on it.

21 MR. PARTLOW:

In advance of that, I would like to 22 present just a few of the ---

23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Is anybody else in the 24 Government doing this or are we doing it by ourselves?

25 MR. PARTLOW:

Later on, Commissioner, we will talk j g,.3 IUJU

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about the U.S.

action plan for IAEA.

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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

No, I'm talking about this ---

3 MR. P3RTLOW: Yes, sir.

Within the action plan.

4 I would like to go over some of the key findings which 5

are in this Part I of the Safeguards Implementation Report.

6 One of the findings was that bulk handling facilities, 7

which is an IAEA term for the equivalent of our fuel facilities 8

other than power reactors ---

9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

This is the new report?

10 MR. PARTLON:

Yes, this is the latest report, 11 yes sir.

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

And is this Part 1 of this 1^3 report, this overview also stamped to be ---

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MR. PARTLOW:

This report is " Restricted Distribution, 15 I

vitAclar use unty.

16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

And has it been to the Board 17 of Governors?

18 MR. PARTLON:

My understanding is that the Board of 19 Governors have a meeting this June and it was on the agenda.

20 MR. SHEA:

It is on right now.

In fact, it started 21 today, the 6th, and this paper is before them.

22 MR. WILLIAMS:

But according to what we understand 23 there will not be a detailed discussion on the SIR and generally 24 it will be deferred until -- the detailed discussion will be 25 deferred until the September meeting.

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COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

But Joanne, your point 2

was that it was to protect it until it got in to the Governors' 3

hands?

4 MS. BECKER:

That's the purpose of that stamp.

5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Not until they took some 6

action on it?

7 MS. BECKER:

No.

8 MR. PARTLOW:

Some of the major fildings from this 9 I report, so far in our analysis, are these findings listed on this slide.

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l la The IAEA seeks so make their conclusions concerning 3e no diversion on a quantitative basis in which they, with

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16 inspectors, g6 in ard verify the physical inventory holdings.

17 This statement basically says tha t --

12 19 20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What does it mean to do 21 material accounting on'a nonquantitative basis?

22 MR. PARTLOW' Audit. Paperwork audit as opposed to 23 independent taking of samples, use of NDA equipment to

.4 independently verify holdings.

25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I thought their point was

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in some of these systems it was impossible to close the 2

talance and they could deny that they had implemented all of 3

the s teps, I don't think they would do that at all, but 4

that the sys tem didn' t lend itself to quantitative 5

determination.

6 MR. PARTLOW:

I have not read that in the SIR.

7 MR. PAGE:

They have said, Commissioner Gilinsky, 8

certainly they cannot verify 100 percent of the inventory 9

taking, 10 11 12 3

but I think in almost every instance we 14 can never say that there will be a 100 percent inventory 15 verification.

We don't do it domestically and it probably 16 is not practical abroad or any place.

17 MR. PARTLOW:

The third major topic that was 18 spoken to in this Part 1 of the SIR was the fact that these 19 20 21 SSAC's are basically the set o'f requirements which 22 individual states lay down and implement which allows the IAEA 23 t.o do its verification job.

It would be essentially the same 24 an our 10 CFR Part 70 for domestic material control and 25 accounting.

In fact, our 10 CFR Part 70 now forms the basis for l o', s u g

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our implementation cf the U.S.

IAEA agreement in this 2

country.

3 The Report stated that concerning these individual 4s {

SSA%s and the 45 states which were inspected in 1977 that a

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10 11 12 13 Given these recent findings in the safeguards 14 implementation ---

15 CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Is it likely that there is a 16 high percentage in which all three are true?

17 MR. PARTLOW:

Commissioner, it would only be my guess 18 that if a country' appeared on one of them they would probably 19 appear on the other two lists also.

20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY; Thank you.

21 MR. PARTLOW:

Given these type of findings in the 22 safeguards implementation report and 23 24 we need to ask 25 ourselves whether or not the NRC should independently assess the 0bU J

t

21 1

adequacy of material control and accounting in thore countries 2

receiving our exports.

3 Next slide, please.

4 (Slide) 5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Before we go on discussing 6

the alternatives for doing it, what does doing it entail?

7 Nhat do we mean by " assessing the adequacy of safeguards?"

8 COMMISSIOt'R GILINSKY:

Before we address that, I 5

wonder if you could tell us just what you do now?

Why 10 don't you go ahead and answer Commissioner Kennedy's question.

11

~~

COMMISSIONER KE'W]DY:

No, your question even ccmes 19

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first.

^3 1

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Right.

What do we do now?

MR. PARTLOW:

On the international scene?

15 cg,,MISSIONER GILINSKY: Yes.

16 MR. PARTLOW:

-Yes, sir, that's really the subject 17 of the status quo and what we do now is to review the 18 information on the export which is supplied by the Executive 19 Branch via IP to us.

We review the latest safeguards 20 implementation report.

Part of this ---

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

When you sc you review 22 the material provided by the Executive Branch in safeguards, 23 what does that mean specifically?

What is provided?

24 MR. Pt.RTLOW:

Yes, there is a section in the 25 standard format for the Executive Branch to provide for usione 1G33 I.

I 22 3

I 1

of the sec~tions which is to speak to any significant deficiencies:

2 known in the Executive Branch dealing with the implementation 3

of IAEA safeguards.

4 That is a section which were it to have-infornation 5

in it, we would review, but we have not to date received such 6

information.

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

There has never been anything 8

in that box?

9 MR. PARTLOW:

That's correct.

10 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: So you have had nothing in 11 there to review?

12 MR. PARTLOW:

That's correct.

In terms of the 13 adequacy of material control and accounting overseas, yes, sir.

1 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Up to now you haven't done

^S unything in the way of assessing effectiveness of safeguards 16 of material accounting safeguards in connection with an export.

17 MR. PARTLOW:

Yes, sir.

18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, now wait.

I'n not sure 19 that that follows.

20 Now we are getting to my question:

What does 21 assessing the adequacy of safecuards entail?

22 MR. PARTLOW:

I believe.he assessing of adequacy 23 involves the setting of goals or performance criteria for the 24 establishment of these rules for ---

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Isn't that what the IAEA does?

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1 MR. PARTLON:

To an extent that is what the IAEA 2

does, yes, although the goals and objectives are still under 3

major development and are not clear-cut.

4 But I was going to go on to say that the evaluation 5

of adequacy in our domestic system has to do with what we know 6

about the requirements, has to do with our knowledge of the 7

operators, industry and who they are and how they operate.

8 It has to do with our licensing process in which we solicite 9

plans from the licensee on how he is going to incorporate our 1~0 requirements, and it has to do with feedback from our 11 verirication force or our IE inspection force that our set 12 ii of requirements are being complied with.

I 1

So it is no one thing, but it is from all of this l

14 information that we gain confidence that we have an adequate s

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material and accounting system; $bv-safeguards system, or

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r 16 regularory system.

17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, I suppose you 18 could ask whether the standards set up by the IAEA are being 19 met?

They have standards of effectiveness and I think the 20 point of some of-the conclusions in the reports, as I say, 21 are is that they have been met in many of the countries and 22 since they don't tell us which ones the obvious question would 23 be for you to address yourself is, are they being met in 24 connection with any particular export.

25 MR. PARTLON:

That's right.

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24 1

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Now, there is another 2

question as to whether the IAEA have got the right standards, 3

but that's another matter.

4 MR. PARTLOW: This next slide lays out the ---

5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Now, wait before we go, I 6

want to be sure I understand this.

7 When you talk about safeguards here, you are talking 8

about two different things.

One you are talking about safeguards 9

which the agency presumably inspects and that is, material 10 control and accounting and after all, either a material control l 11 and accounting system exists and is good or it isn't.

12 Now, there may be degrees of goodness or badness as the case may be and if it is less good than you might 12 like it to be you would then, I suppose, take into account 15 a number of those things you were talking into account on the 16 domestic scene, that is your knowledge of the operater, right?

17 Otherwise you wouldn't care about it would you?

What difference 18 would it be what you knew about this fellow, he is a nice guy, 19 good at the country club and plays a great round of golf, but 20 other than that, what difference does it make unless you are 21 going to use that qualitative concern and apply it against 22 whatever else it is you know.

Am I right or am I wrong?

23 MR. PARTLOW:

Yes, you are right, but again, that is 24 just a part of the evaluation.

We also have quantitative 25 indicators and quantitative evaluations that are a part of our

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domestic system.

2 MR. SMITH:

But even if he is a great guy, you 3

don't make a tradeoff with respect to the level of protection 4

that you want for material control and accounting?

5 MR. PARTLCW:

No.

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, then what difference 7

would it make if he is a great guy or not?

8 MR. SMITH:

It'doesn't matter really.

9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, that is one af the 10 factors.

I'm trying to find out what it is we do when we 11 assess safeguards, see, that's what I'm getting at.

Tnat is

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exactly what I'm trying to get to.

What do we do, precisely 1~

what is in that we take into account when we make these 14 assessments?

Then what is the relevance of what we do domestically to the international picture?

That's what I'm 16 trying to get to.

MR. SMITH: When you say "when we make these 18 assessments," you are talking domestically or internationally,?

19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

First, you said something about 20 how we do this domestically.

There are a number of factors 21 taken into account, only one of which was the actual state 22 of the accounting system itself and the material control system.

23 And they are different things.

24 MR. PARTLOW; Commissioner, to answer that ques tion, 25 I can't do it on a policy level, but I can answer it on an 1

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1 in plant level.

2 In terms of the operator, I don't mean how good 3

a guy he is, but our perception of how good he runs the 4

material control and accounting program.

And even though g

every operator wants to comply with the regulations and 6

wants to do a good job, some are better than others.

7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

But the measure in that is 8

how well it works.

9 MR. PARTLOW:

Yes, it is.

And, the measure of that 10 MI'd "

also, as a matter of routine sne would't our inspection work,

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safeguards our inspectors may take more samples, may do more 3,

d measurements in that plant in order to gain confidence th%n is they would in another plant.

16 So that's what I mean by this feeling for the 17 competence of an individual operator or a country being used 18 as part of the overall judgment of adequacy of the material 19 control and accounting.

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I think you don't want to 21 push the analyses too far, in that our relationship to 22 domestic licensees is much closer, our. police powers are 23 greater and so forth.

So that I think there really are two 24 significantly different situations.

In both cases you have 25 got material accounting, but in the international case you are 1e m

0 l

l 27 1

in a sense relying a good deal more on that.

You really or 2

at least we certainly have very little to do with the actual 3

operator.

4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: So we don't license.

5 MR.

SMITH:

I was going to say, here in the U.S.,

6 as you know, we establish regulations, we enforce those 7

regulations, we inspect those facilities, we get feedback from 8

the inspections and change the license conditions to reflect 9

whatever degree'of assurance we want to have there. So that 10 we have our fingers, if you will, on the pulse of the whole 12 picture.

1~7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: And even then they are 13 uncertain.

14 MR. SMITH:

And even then there are uncertainties, 15 right.

16 Just for example, the difficulties we have had, 17 as you know, in the comprehensive evaluations being able to 18 say whether or not we have high assurance or fair ascurance.

19 When you shift to the international scene, at least 20 from our position, NRC and NMSS, we basically -- we don't really 21 for an individual country have any of those, because you don't 22 know: one, whether or not they have an adequate code of 23 regulations or state material control plan.

Two, you don't 24 know -- if they did have it you don't know to what extent it is 25 being implemented; and three, you don't get any feedback Jb

23 1

from any inspections.

2 So you in effect have very little.

3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That's what the IAEA, of 4

course, is for.

5 MR. SMITH:

Yes, I'm just saying NRC -- us in our 6

own little window when we look at something.

7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

One could say -- I recognize 8

the vast differences, but at leas t one could say that in this 9

vary narrow set, the IAEA is the NRC with its responsibilitie.

10 here, somewhat like NRC's responsibilities.

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MR. BURNETT:

It is like the I and E arm of NRC.

l~?

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, it is a little more 17 than that, see, they negotiate the safegurds standards that 14 will be applied.

So they are sort of setting the license 15 conditions, if you will.

16 MR. BURNETT:

But doesn't that get it right to where 17 we are, we have a report put out by that arm.

18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Let's not get to that yet.

19 Okay, I just want to be sure we are all on the same 20 page.

21 MR. PARTLOW:

The chart that is on now is just 22 a resume of those possible alternatives which we presented 23 in our SECY 78-35A paper, on possible programs for gaining 24 increased information about the quality of material control 25 and accounting programs overe.aas.

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..Thi.T] array of possible programs, starting with 2

1 and working through number 7 is a building block program.

3 When we talk about. number 4 it is implicit that we need to 4

adopt programs 1 thru 3 in order to get to that level of 5

l assurance.

6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Let me ask about Program 3 7

for a minute.

8 Why is it that we don't currently review the State 9

Department program descriptions?

10 MR. PARTLON:

By state, I mean a foreign state.

11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Oh, all right.

12 MR. PARTLON:

Japan, equivalent of 10 CFR Part 70.

13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Okay, and where do they s ubmit those descriptions?

15 MR. PARTLOW:

To the bes t of my knowledge those 16 programs _are not submitted to any one.

17 MR. PAGE:

They are sugxsed to be, but by the IAEA's 18 own admissions, Commissioner Bradford, 19 l

20 So on the one hand ---

21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

22 23 MR. BURNETT:

24 MR. PAGE:

This document here, Informarion Circular d

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25 153 set forth the contents of agreements between countries and 4

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the IAEA for safeguarding materials.

A condition of this 2

is that there be a state system of accounting and control 3

l for nuclear materials, 4

5 6

7 MR. WILLIA'4S :

Jerry, is that 153?

8 MR. PAGE:

Yes.

9 MR. WILLIAMS:

Well, the states under 66 are not 1 0 under the same obligation where the IAEA was trying to upgrade 1~1 all the systems.

MR. PAGE:

I'm talking about the ones in the 13 nonproliferaticr[, W a

y 14 MR. WILLIAMS:

Only the on,es under the NPT,

,p 15

,at &'.w MR. PACE:

,- p t But there are socsos-t+.er requirements i

u 16 in Information Circular 66.

I believe there is a commitment 17 there also that there be a state system of accounting ---

18 MR. WILLIAMS:

In some of the others there is not.

L, '9 't 19 7

MR. PAGE:

There is not.

20 MR. BURNETT:

21 MR. WILLIAMS:

No.

22 MR. PAGE:

But the state systems are supposed to go 23 to the IAEA and be reviewed before the agreement comes in to 24 force, before safeguards are applied within a country.

25 COMMISSIONER BRADF0FD:

Now, are there different l

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1 safeguards regimens that apply to non-NPT countries?

2 MS. BECKER:

Yes.

3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

But doesn't the Non-prolifer-4 at ion Act require NPT safeguards to be applied to U.S..

exports?

5 MR. WILLIAMS:

After 18 and 24 months either NPT 6

time ---

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

No, no.

I think you are 8

missing the point here.

9 MR. SHEA:

Well, it is put in the criterion for

~0 1

g)k IAEA as required by Article GT of the Treaty, I think.

11

~~

The State Department has taken the view that in 12 forwarding exports to us and the staff has been forwarding

^3 1

cases to the Commission that having non-NPT type safeguards 1 4 as in Information Circular 66, amounts to the equivalent of 10 this criterion.

16 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, what is the "as required" 17 by the NPT mean?

3 2* -

()

18 MR. SHEA:

Well, it is required by Article ?f of f

19 the Treaty.

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And what does thht mean?

21 MR. SHEA:

This is the treaty on ---

22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But I mean, what does that 23 add to the requirement of IAEA safeguards?

You are saying 24 that it doesn't add anything.

It is superfluous language.

25 MR. SETA:

Yes, in a sense it does.

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Is that your view Carl?

2 MR. SHEA:

I don't know whether Carl agrees.

3 MR. STOIBER:

I believe the inte. t, when that language was completed was to include safeguards under both

,y5 Tf}fCIEC 71F Information Circular 66, Draft 2, and.i c

-t 153.

You have C. Z-6 to read the Article JKt fairly closely.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, how does that answer 8

Commissioner Gilinsky's question?

9 MR. STOIBER:

Of whether or not that is su erfluous 10 language?

^l i

I think that it may well be superfluous.

12 MR. PARTLON:

Before going in to these individual 3

1 alternatives, I want to point ou: that 'bould the Connission l

adopt any one of these, we are presenting them just as 15

. programs which we feel could give us additonal inf.ormation 16 about the adequacy of material control and accounting.

17 There is a lot of mechanics invol'ved in international 18 agreements, conditic us of export which we don' t have the 19 answers to.

We are cresenting them as programs, which if 20 implemented, would give us better inf.ormation about the 21 adequacy overseas.

22 Next chart.

23 (Slide) 24 MR. PEDERSON: Before you go, could you go back to 25 just that one?

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..b You said those were building-block approaches, 2

haven't you reversed 2 and 3 there?

3 MR. PARTLON:

Oh, excuse me.

Yes.

4 MR. PEDORSON:

Because it clearly looks to me like 5

the 3 that is there is less than the 2.

They have got them 6

reversed.

7 MR. SHEA: Alternative 2 was review the state 8

programs, and 3 was the action policy.

9 MR. PEDERSON: So these are no longer, what I would 10 call the building block ---

11 MR. BURNETT:

Two, in fact is already being 12 pursued by NRC.

13

- MR. PARTLON:

Options,2 and 3 are in fact i

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14 interchanged f-rc$ "h e cnt the action plan.

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13 Next chart.

16 (Chart) 17 This chart reviews the status quo and,. Commissioner 18 Gilinsky, I already went over basically what we do in the way of reviewirY'\\ adequacy material ccounting n ro 3f 19 (L

.1 20 We don't have any tools to do it with, so we look at the fact 21 that the country has accepted IAEA rafeguards, we review the 22 SIR and we review any other information supplied by the 2

23 Executive Branch.

24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

And what does the SIR tell l

25 you about the treatment of countries?

U.> 0 1

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MR. PARTLOW:

It tells us nothing about the 2

particular countries.

3 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Then why review it?

4 MR. PARTLOW:

Well, in that regard we have been 5

looking at the 1976 Implementation Report 6

7 i

8 And I beli' eve the Commission has gotten a paper on that subject.

10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I know, with all due respect, 11 12 but it can't possibly be assumed to have any stature.

13 I am simply saying you can't convey to it any stature.

We 14 can say this is the best judgment of these fellows, I think 15 that is great, but I won't know how much until I see the 16 judgment of other fellows.

17 COMMISSIONER GILiNSKY: Nobody will give us any 18 judgments.

19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Then I guess I would have 20 to say, again, with all due respect and however effective and 21 efficient they really are and I know they are, I can't give_

22 it any stature because I have no grounds or base against which 23 to measure the results, and it is, after all, a whole series 24 of hypothesis and it can' t be anything else.

25 Well, any way, excuse me.

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1 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

So that in -- I don't mean 2

to press this, but if their judgment is the only one we have, 3

it has no stature, but if someone else ccmes along with a 4

contrary judgment then their judgment would have some stature.

5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

No, no.

Then I guess I 6

apply -- perhaps we might be getting some place where we might 7

be able to determine something more about what the real 8

factual situation was, because when we begin to test the 1,

9 hypothesis of the two different views to ascertain which one 10 would seem to be the one that would hold up.

Otherwise we 11 would have only one set of hypothesis now.

12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Well, it attempts to read between l

13 the lines of the agancy's report or it may be more helpful in l

14 some circumstances than others if the report can say un-15 ambigiously there were no deficiencies found in some particular 16 aspect and so on, why good.

That is a help with regard to that 17 aspect.

If they say two countries out of 20 were deficient in 18 this aspect, well, you have a 10 percent chance that the case 19 in hand, other things being equal, that the case in hand is 20 going to comply.

~

21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, what if they say that 22 5 countries have had problems with material accounting and 23 there are only five countries.

24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

That's suggestive too.

That's 25 ther one of those circumstances where the interpretation has an 0

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more stature than in other cases.

2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let me take another attack 3

here.

You say that the reviews are limited to country 4

acceptance of IAEA safeguards -- IAEA Safeguards Implementation 5

.leport which doesn't name any countries and report on the 6

side, and other information supplied by the Executive Branch 7

which up to now has been nothing, why does that take more 8

than 5 minutes?

9 MR. PARTLOW:

Well, I guess that doesn't take more 10 than five minutes.

11 In connection with an import or an export, we do 12 look at our own domestic facility from which it is going or 13 which it is coming to in terms of their ability to handle 14 that material, the packaging of the material and so forth.

So 15 that does take more than five minutes.

16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, that's tha physical 17 security side.

18 MR. PARTLOW:

Yes.

19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But as far as 20 MR. PARTLON:

No, excuse me.

Material control p

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-and accounting side.

22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: You are saying that either an exp' ort 23 or an import has a foreign country involved, but it also has 24 and origin or a destination in the U.S.,

and he looks at the 25 arrangements.

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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Have you looked at 2

transportation considerations?

3 MR. SMITH: Yes.

4 MR. PARTLOW:

As part of the physical security.

5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Right now we are talking 6

about the problems abroad, but what you are basically saying 7

is we essentially do nothing on that right now.

8 MR. PARTLOW:

That's right.

I guess in the newspaper 9

l it would appear that I'm a high priced executive with a 10 responsibility for something and I don' t have anything to do.

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11

. (Lau gh te r )

12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Unless the Executive Branch 13 in fact comes through with some material.

14 MR. - ~EA:

And that has happened on occasion.

15 They have held up this inforntation in certain cases and 16 it was n. de available, but not too often.

I 17 l

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Why don't you plunge ahead.

M. PARTLON:

The secoad bullet on this char la i

19 s ys that part of the status quo also is the fact that we re heavily involved in it, almost on a day-to-day basis with I

20 the IAEA through our program of technical assistance, and --

just throughourgeneralparticipationinIAEAactivities.~]

l So to some extent we do gain information about

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how the IAEA works.

24 I

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Obviously there is no additional implementation costs involved 2

with staying at the status quo, but it gives us no country 3

specific information.

4 It does show that we have reliance in the IAEA and 5

I think we all agree that that's where we want to be, to where 6

we can have this program with reliance upon~.the IAEA.

7 wext slide, please.

8 (Slide) 9 Alternative 2 is for us to implement the U.S.

10 action plan.

A year ago when the 1976 SSIR came out the NRC 11 initiative -- an interagency working group was formed with 12 members of ACDA, DOE, State and the NRC which was really born 13 of the SIR and its major preliminary goal was to find ways out 14 to correct the deficiencies noted in the SIR and to i:aplement cny recommendations that came out of the SIR. COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I think it is the weight l

17 l' cf limitations, you are not able to go out and implement the 1 8 U.S.

actions.

To MR. PARTLOW:

No, the action plan is under way.

l 20 This alternative,. should it be adopted says we wait 21 for the results of this action plan.

22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

How is this different frod 9,

the status quo?

'~

24 MR. PARTLOW:

As I said before, we.put it right next 25 to the status quo because it is an extension of the statuc quo.

1 1

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Since we wrote our paper, we are really starting to do this 2

now.

3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

So you do nothing and wait 4

for its implementation?

5 MR. PARTLOW:

Yes.

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Whether we decide to do any-

~

7 thing or not, that's what's going to happen.

You don't make 8

any decision at this point.

9 MR. PARTLOW:

No.

10 The U.S. Action Plan does have specific objectives 11 set out which I can get in to here, but to a large extent it is 12 a set of goals 13 14 15 16 17 Listed here are some of the action objectives which are. pertinent to this business of' gaining increased information 18 yg about material control and accounting.

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MR. SHEA:

One other element of the action plan 2

that I think is particularly relevant to discussion here today and the subject is what I guess you might call the information gathering focus of the action plan.

5 6

7

'and perhaps somebody could tick those off and' 8

maybe you would be interested.

9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Information collection on 10 who?

11 MR. WILLIAMS:

On the. agencies that have 12 Jim referred to it partially with the fact that Article 12 of 13 I

the stanute calls for a report to the Board of Governors 14 of deficiencies, but this has never been resorted to or else 8

but-there have never been deficiencies.

W' lo, 17 18 19 20 21 22

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I wouldn't want this " await irmlementeion" 25

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Neither to imply that the Commission need U>J o

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take no action with regard to this action plan.

In fact, that 2

action plan is up for quite a while now asking for 3

Commission approval.

The Commission has not acted on it.

4 Secondly, several of the action steps in there are 5

NRC responsibility.

So this is not NRC independent by any 6

means.

7 COMS1ISSIONER KENNEDY:

The Commission has not acted 8

on it?

9 MR. PEDERSON: That's my impression.

It has been up 10 for a number of months asking for Commission comment and 11 approval and I'm not aware of any action.

12 So I wouldn't want this " await" to be read that we 13 are waiting for the Executive Branch or something.

We have l

14 got some responsibility in this regard too.

15 MR. WILLIAMS:

One of which is to define the 16 information needs we have by September 1978.

17 CHAIPJ1AN HENDRIE:

Who knows the SECY number?

13 MR. WILLIAMS:

78-292.

MR. PEDERSON:

And there are several prior to that, 19 "l

20 CHAIPJ1AN HENDRIE:

But the 292 is the las t go round.

21 thedateonthatShell[y?

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MR. BURNETT:

What's g

t MR. WILLIAMS:

The original?

. 23 MR. BURNETT:

No, the latest one, 292.

MR. WILLIAMS:

Oh, no.

That is jus t recently. June ls 22 o: n

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That is asking for guidance with 2

respect to specific tasks they have to do, but the Commission 3

has never formally. spoken on the overall action plan. So they 4

are going ahead in spite of the Commission rather ---

5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, what's that paper?

6 CHAIP31AN HENDRIE:

Yes, what's the overall number.

7 MR. WILLIAMS:

Ah,77-614.

8 MR. PEDERSON: -It was an information report. I gave 9

up calling it to the Commission's attention.

MR. SHEA:

It was a December 13th information 11 report, which ---

12 MR. PEDERSON: It was followed up by one in March 13 with an OPE 'ack-up meno saying this is important and we think o

you ought to speak on it.

in

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MR. WILLIAMS:

What's the number on that, Ken?

16 MR. PEDERSON:

I don' t have it with me in the 17 package here, but it had an OPE memo saying we think you ought 18 to act on tnis because we ddmk it is important, and nothing 19 just ever happened.

70 MR. WILLIAMS:

We have been going on ---

91 MR. PEDERSON:

I know you have been going on in spite 9 'e of that.

Perhaps it is to yCar credit.

23-CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Is Sam around?

24 MR. CHILK: I'm around, but I can't get to you.

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MR. PEDERSON:

I could get it in a matter of a few 2

minutes, Mr. Chilk.

3 MR. PARTLON:

Next slide,please.

4 (Slide) 4 This slide gives some of the pros and cons in i? f-U' 5

implementation question.

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSRY:

I don't understand what the 8

pros and cons mean.

Presumably this is going to go forward 9

any way.

Does that mean stopping at this point?

Pros and 10 cons of stopping here and not doing any more?

1~1 MR. PARTLOW:

Yes, these would be the pros and cons 1?

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of stopping at this level and it is saying that this program L3 will eventually -- could eventually if successful, 14 15 16 i

17 18 MR. WILLIAMS:

Well, it also has a provision in it 19 for other information that we can't get through that 20 mechanism.

21 22 23 So it would go beyond that 24 if we proceed.

25 MR. PARTLON:

Next slide.

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Alternative 3 says that we could go a step further 3

4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

How could we go about doing 5

that?

I'm not saying we could, but how do we do it?

6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I presume you are asking how 7

do we get out hands on it?

8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yes.

9 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

That's a good question.

10 MR. PARTLOW:

As I mentioned, we are not ready to 11 supply the mechanical answers --

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: In order to say that we could, 13 there must be some mechanism by which we would be able to 14 do so, otherwise, it is an academic exercise.

l 15 MR. SMITH:

Well, to a large extent, Commissioner, 16 a lot of these others in the sense of difficulties or 17 complexities of how you go about it are academic.

We were

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just trying to say taking the constraints off j

y 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

It is not shown here as a 20 con, I guess.

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MR. B,ARNETT :

Jim could this not be done bilaterally?

?2 MR. SMITH:

It could be done, but assuming that y.on' 23 had those, we weren't trying to lay out ---

24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

What I'm trying to get is 25 hcw do you go about it.

It is one thing to assume that you J

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1 could do all of these wonderful things if you just had 2

thase things, but that is the same as saying, if only I knew 3

how, I could fly and that would be great, you know.

And I'm 4

sure it would.

But I don't know how to fly, so what point 5

is there in saying it, how do you go about doing that.

{f Somebodymusthavethough[about that, what is entailed?

What 7

do you do?

8 MR. PAGE:

Well, I would think the Commission would --

9 once the Commission decides, that we would have to refuse stat;e 10 systems on accounting and control and announce that we will not 11

, issue an export license before it would be forthcoming.

12 C'JMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Ah, there is the clue.

Say 13 that again.

14 MR. PAGE:

Apparently it would require a policy 15 decision on the part of the Commission.

1^6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: All we do is we simply say, 17 unless you give us your system of accounting and controls so 18 that we can examine them and decide whether we like it or not, l

19 i

I we won't export any.

That's all we have to do, right?

20 MR. PAGE:

That effectively was done two years 21 ago for physical security and that was all that was done.

~

22 The agreements for coogeration were not ne.g,otiated.

It was 23 implemented right then and there.

24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That's all I wanted to know.

25 That's all we have to do.

.)

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47 1

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, are these alternatives 2

set out for the Commission to pick from?

In other words is 3

this a menu for us?

4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I notice there are na cons 5

to that, by the way.

6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It goes to Commissionar 7

Kennedy's question.

In other words if we are being asked to 8

give guidance by choosin~g.one of these alternatives, then I 9

think the way implemented needs to be spelled out.

It seems 10 one possibility for this alternative is to do it or at least 11 12

. propose to do it on a voluntary basis.

It would not cover the id.

13 i

I think it would be useful to consider steps which 14 are partially affected, since we are doing absolutely nothing 3:

right now.

And it may be that there are countries that are 16 quite prepared to exchange information with us on the matter.

~7 1

For example, we could offer them our state system of accounting 18 aac ---

1' COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

If they are, there is a plus

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there.

If they aren't then we have a different kind of 9,

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decision to make.

oo COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Rignt.

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23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

What are re going to do about 24 that?

Are we going to say, well, okay, if you won't, then 25 sorry and it becomes. mandatory.

Or do we say, if you won't, r

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then that's life.

We need to think that through and make 2

it a viable option. Right now I don't consider it an option 3

or alternative at all.

4 MR. SMITH:

Well, I think the pape - itself says 5

that these represent simply our initial thinking on the various 6

alternatives which could be pursued and we welcoma any comments 7

by the Commissioners or any suggestions or other alcernatives.

8 So it wasn't anant to be ~a total conclusive paper.

9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, oi:ay, but I think it 10 is important to know which of these are feasible and which would 11

,bc very hard to implement.

12 MR. SMITH:

Yet. but to some extent how feasible

, 13 1'*

gr someofthemaredependsno'.gtheUnitedStarasGovernment, NRC, u/

~~la and the State Department want to go in getting that information.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Feasibility isn't measured 16 caly by how far you want to go, but also by the likely results.

17 MR. SMITH:

No argument about that, I understand that.

18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let me ask you another question.

19 Suppose you have the state system of accounting, could you tell.

20 whether certain standards were being met at timeliness'and 21 all that sort of thing, whether IAEA standards are being met.

22 MR. P.:JCTD7: Partially.

We would have a descriptio$

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of the prograr*that would give us that.

We could say,yes, 24 no, maybe that this program appears to be adequate to allow 25 the country to account for material and to allow the IAEA to i

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verify the accountancy of the material.

The program would 2

not give us any information on whether or not the state had 3

actually implemented those rules.

4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I see, that's what you mean 5

by saying it doesn't provide limitations.

6 MR. PMELCi: That's right.

The con means that we 7

have the program, again to put it domestically,~.a would publish 8

our regulations, we don't have the feedback from the regional 9

offices on whether or not the program has been implemented.

10 MR. SMITH:

It would be nothing more than looking 11 at how adequate our own regulations are.

12 CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Could it be said that what 13 we were doing is stepping into the very role that the IAEA 14 had reated in the treaty and through the statute ot which we

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areJa supporter?

16 COlMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, act necessarily.

They

7 1

have a much more inclusive role.

They actucli.y get into the 18 facilities,.they get to these matters which countries are 19 protecting for proprietary reasons.

One wouldn't be doing that 20 here.

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

If I understand the t h e.. _

2' bilaterals between the IAEA and countries, it is one of thal.-

23 things which those bilaterals orovide is that IAEA will review and ascertain the adequacy of as a basis for its 25 own inspection.

The material control and accounting system of

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the country.

2 I am just arguing, sort of devils advocate, if you 3

were to approach this and say, let's us now do this on a a

bilateral basis of trying to approach this thing, you know, 5

volunteer early or could it be argued by some for a variety 6

of reasons that what we are now doing is trying to supplant 7

either because we don't trust or accept the IAEA or because 8

we don'* -- well, I guess that would be the reason.

We don't 9

accept what they are doing or we don't trust the results so 10 ue have to do it ourselves.

11 Couldn't some one argue it that way?

If so, what 12 would bu.he possible damage that it would cause,?

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, if an i

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would.

1S COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Then don't we have to have 16 somebody pick through what the possible damage might be?

17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Except that I think this stuff 18 is a very small part of what the lAEA does.

I mean,.really 19 checking the implementation is a large part of it.

So ---

20 COMMISSION 7R KENNEDY:

You see, the argument migh_t 21 run if'you don't trust them on this very simple level, my-Gcd, 2

where are you on the more difficult problem.

23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, you have a problem if 24 you can't see these things.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I am jus t trying to thi nk of i

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51 1

the kinds of things that I think need to be analyzed here 2

before we come to some conclusions.

3 COMM.ISSIONER GILINSKY:

You know, if you look at 4

the domestic program here, almost everything NRC does is open.

5 Anyoody can take a look at it including foreign countries.

6 Somebody can come over here and go down to our document room 7

and find out a great deal not only about our accounting 8

procedures, but about the implementation of them.

You know, 9

we release MUF data.

Now, if everybody else did that we would 10 have a lot less of a problem.

11 MR. SHEN:

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 l

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I know was put in at the urging of NRC.

It seems to me that the two of those together would provide an interaction that could well give one a better knowledge of what is going on

, j in various countries around the world and the various systems.

a It wouldn't be quite the same as you have here, I don't think.

MR. PARTLOW:

I agree with that, but I think it I

is basically a question of time.

The action plan is going to

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9 I believe what we will say as a possible alternative 10 here is that if we as a nuclear supplier begin to review these f 11 o

lu j, programs as part of our system of assurances of nondiversiorpd2f' f

12 material overseas, that this would be an incentive for faster 13 l

upgrading of programs to implement the IAEA.

14 MR. WILLTAMC-J) 1-

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16 an. SMEA:

Then the question would be, I guess, i

17 is how rapidly this approach could be implemented as well.

18 I'm not sure I'm clear on what timely considerations would 9

1 be involved here if one were to make it obligatory, especially.

20 I would think.that would take some negotiation if one were to

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a fair amount of time to develop.

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23 MR. PEDERSON:

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MR. PARTLON:

2 MR. BURNETT:

3 MR. PEDERSON:

I by no means see this is something that is going to be easily implemented. I mean, if you start a

immediately to say SSAG is a condition of being able to get 6

An ex' port from the U.S.

7 MR. PARTLOW:

I don't think that the SIR said that 8

some states don' t have SSAGs it said in areas or reporting, 9

inventory taking and so forth there are so many of them that 10 11 MR. SMITH: The key words was timely and they have 12 one which allows for timely and adequate reporting to the 13 IAEA.

They may have, but the system is such that it doesn't 14 allow for that, 15 16 b1M. PEDERSO":

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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, from what I heard Cliff 20 just say, that's not necessarily what that means either.

91 Hesaidfortimelyandaccuratereportingtheyjy

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have a wholly adequate SSAG except that it doesn't provide _;.

23 for adequate and timely reporting to the IAEA.

Is that what 24 you are saying?

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MR. SMITH:

That's the way I'm reading that.

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COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yes, which is different from 2

saying it is not an adequate accounting and control system.

3 MR. SMITH:

But until we get to the second part of 4

the SIR which goes in to a lot of the technical details, this 5

is just a summary.

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You j us t don' t knJw.

7 MR. SMITH:

So we really don't know at this point.

8 MR. PEDERSON:

It is not something that might well 9

be able to be done over night.

10 MR. SMITH: All you can say is if 11 12 ll 13 i!

';cw, where that carries you from enere, you have got 14 to wait until you get the other information.

You can read 15 wonderful Litings into that.

We are not trying to read any more 16 in to it than the fact that they have got a problem.

17 MR. PAGE:

18 19 20 21 22 6%

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MR. SMITH:

One thing I would like to say as we go 3

on is I hope you understand that when we put these building 4

blocks ---

5 COMMISSIONER F.ES:T2DY:

That, I suppose is the results 6

of the careful handling of the material you got the last time.

7 And there is always a prica to be paid for thar.

8 MR. SMITH:

I was going to say, when we put this 9

together we were trying to approach it from the standpoint that 10 if what you wanted from us was an independent assessment or an 11 independent assurance that this is the kind of information you 17

~ ~ ~

could lead to build on, not that it isn't fraught with all

^3 1

sorts of difficulties and problems in terms of how it impacts IAEA in relationships between this country, we know that is 15 there, particularly,cbviously when you get up to the last one 16 which talks about actual inspections.

We are just saying that 27 these are the steps that would lead one to get the kind of 13 information that would enable us to respond to you in a certain 19 way, depending on what the Commission's desires are in this 20 area.

21 MR. PARTLOW:

Next chart.

22 (slide)

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23 The next alternative, now given that we say that 24 through the review of state programs we can get programmatic 23 information, but we still don't necessarily know whether the

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programs were implemented or not, this next possible alternative 2

says that we could review the results of IAEA inspections.

3 If the IAEA system works correctly when deficiencies are 4

found, IAEA corresponds with that state setting out what the 5

deficiencies are and hopefully the state institutes corrective 6

actions.

7 We are saying, in order to get some feedback on the 8

inplementation of programs in foreign countries, and to get 9

the feeling for whether or not deficiencies are, in our view 10 serious or not serious ---

11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Wait a minute.

Again, you 12 are assuming what, that IAEA will voluntarily turn this over j

or that we would require this or ---

14 MR. PARTLON:

Again, our discussions so far have 15 centered around the idea that it would probably be better to l

s tates -l -

16 approach this on an individual states basis to solicit 17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

The state will have agreed?

1 8 MR. PARTLOW:

-- To supply us with this information 14 when received from the IAEA.

0 9

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let's see, the state will have 21 agreed that that IAEA will supply us with information.

~

22 MR. PARTLOW:

No.

That the state would supply.

If

'3 the state receives a letter of deficiency from the IAEA then 24 they would ---

25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Does the IAEA send letters of deficiency?

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MR. BURNETT:

Commissioner Gilinsky, however, I 5

think that the IAEA is impowered to turn this over to us with 6

the concurrence of the state involved.

So it could be either 7

cr.

8 COMMISSIO"ER GILINSKY:

The one possiblilty is ask 9

for the state to concur.

10 Let me ask you this:

suppose right nov NRC sent 1

1 a group of people to the IAEA to discuss safeguards problems.

19

~~

Would they be told anything beyond what is in the SSIR?

l

CCMMISSIONER hi...iDY:

Do you mean in terms of 1 4 country specific?

I COMMISSIONER GIL1:4 S/,Y : I think in tenn of country 16 specific or otherwise.

17 MR. PAGE:

18 19 20 21 22 COM.MISSIONER GILINSKY:

I. don't mean surreptitiounly, 23 but I mean suppose you went there ---

l 24 MR. PAGE:

I think probably the answer would be no.

I 25 They would not give it to you.

That would be my answer.

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1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Isn't that the commitment to 2

all their parties?

3 MR. BURNETT:

Yes, sir.

4 i

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

All this, of course, with 5

the agreement of the State Department.

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

You know, which has the ef fect 7

of reading it, doesn't it.

8 MR. PEDERSON:

This is a guarantee of confidentiality 9

of the stare.

10 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Now is that based originally 11 and historically on a concern for protecting proprietary 12 i j

information?

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Yes.

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And what is it that is proprietary about kinds of information you are talking about 1 6 here?

'17 MR. WILLIAMS:

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But if you found a particular I l

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item that wasn' t proprietary, what would that mean?

Would 2

that mean that it didn't belong in that category?

3 MR. PAGE:

It is'my understanding, Commissioner 4

Bradford, that all findings on inspection are considered 5

proprietary and confidential by the agency.

Even within the 6

agency itself, the individual inspection sections do not talk 7

to one another.

They are instructed not to be discussing the 8

results of inspections in one country to people who work 9

j other countries.

So even within the same section the information 10 is withheld from inspectors that do not go to a particular 11 country.

They hold it very tight.

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But, Jerry., is that within i

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Not in this country.

15 MR. PAGE:

It's -- I think it grew out of that.

16 I think one reason why it grew out of it was to protect II proprietary information found during inspections, but that 18 concept has been extended to any finding during inspection, 19

~

but it basically started that waj.

20 MR. SMITH:

The other problem was a concern that 21 some compe.titor may learn from your deficiencies or your 22 MUFs or w;1at have you, a lot more about your process and.i ht 23 put him in a competitive advantage.

24 But it you take that away in terms of a lot of these 25 things, it is not there.

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COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, it is also used to 2

keep down the level of IAEA ef fort and so on and to keep ---

3 MR. SHEA:

And I think the standards and sort of 4

frequency of inspections that they use the IAEA in that 5

category and it is not clear to me why ---

6 i

MR. SMITH:

We have had that same argument here 7

with our licensees.

3 MR. PEDERSON:

Before we leave this alternative, 9

let me ask, perhaps Jim you would be a good person to tell 10 the Commission a little bit about this.

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MR. SHEA:

Maybe Shellp'y could elaborate more on p

13 that point.

20 21 MR. WILLIAMS:

I didn't hear the question.

I was-22 talking.

I 23 MR. PEDERSON:

Shell y, the question was:

we talked 4

24 here about getting the states to commit themselves or to 1

25 agree to let us have IAEA information.

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14 15 MR. PEDERSON: Well, I mean since the model would be 16 the base from which you would renegotiate.

17 gn, 31LLragg, 18 19 20 21 MR. PARTLON:

Next slide.

22 (glide) 23 Alternative d suggests tha t another level might 24 involve a visitation program as opposed to an inspection 25 program.

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Currently we have a visitation program for our 2

adequacy of physical security reviews.

The program is run

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by DOE,id' participation.

The idea would be that given i

4 we can review state programs, we can review the result of 5

IAEA inspections, their deficiencies and so forth, the idea 6

is that a further step would be to enhance this stay-home 7

document review through a program of visits to individual 8

states to discuss their program, to understand it better, to 9

understand the people who are responsibile for the program in 10 individual states and to learn more about how it is 11 implemented in individual facil_ ties.

12 The pros are basically that it would enhan;e ctr 13 ability to do an intelligent job of s taying here ar.d reviewing 14 paperwork.

8

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4 is that 16 th?.s type of effort could be perceived as undermining 17 the total charter and responsibilities of the IAEA.

73 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: This would only be in cases g

where an individual state would agree, and suppose they did "U

20 MR. PARTLOW: Did not agree?

Well, I believe we -

,1 4

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have a preceden/e of states not agreeing to our visits in. _

physical security.

Is that correct, Don?

MR. KASUN:

so far.

24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: And what haocened?

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There has been no recommendation for the

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2 Executive Branch to support the export.

MR. SHEA:

Is this really in terms of the information to be achieved, rather similar to the reviewing of state program descriptions in Alternative 3?

I was trying to see 6

if you thought it went beyond that.

It seems generally similar.

7 MR. PARTLOW:

I believe it is generally similar, 3

i except ttat in my view it makes more intelligent the respon-9 sibility to review the programs and make a determination of 10 that through developing contacts with people in foreign 11 countries who write the programs, who implement the progams.

12 MP. SMITH:

Jim, it is like someone looking at our 13 Code of Federal Regulations and trying to understand it, and 14 then one step further would be to come in and sit down with 15 Jim to talk about what it really meant, how he does it.

16 MR. SHEA:

Iow, I notice that Alternative 3 has 17 a comment that says, ".. provide no State specific actual 18 implementation information."

And that dicn't show up in 5.

19 Would that column also apply in 5?

20 MR. PARTLOW:

Yes it would.

Given that we adopted e

21 4,

we would already have that.

22 Next s lic'.e.

' }

~~

23 (Slide) l 24 In this last slide, Alternative 6 and 7 are put 75 together.

We are saying that they are really at the u_ncer i

O esu i

64 lL l

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1 1

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end of the array of p.:ngrams.

There are two types of inspection programs, a partial inspection program which is 3

really by paper audit or a full inspection program involving 4

the NRC or the United States going in and verifying material holdings, material flows and so forth.

6 The program will be very lengthy and implementation 7

would involve 7e resources.

This would be a clear case in (d

which we would be duplicating rhe ma.-;ority ef fort of the IAEA.

9 Bur it is added.as an upper end of tae possible programs which 10 could help us in gaining informaticn and confidence that i

11 material control and accounting overseas is being carried out 12 to insure that our exports are used for their stated end purpose (

13 i That's rhe end of our presentation.

14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I wanted to ask you a question 15 and people can ccament 'a s they see fit.

16 You asked here what does the Commission want NMSS 17 to do?

And let me ask you a counter-question.

Where along 18 this array from zero to 7 do you have to provide TO staff in NMSS concurrence, for instance, in a proposed 20 export which would be supported by your views with whatever i

21 independent analysis and backing that you think is appropria e 22 so that you can support or concur in the export?

Tha t is, _2 23 how far up the line are you going to have to go?

24 I

MR. 521T2:

Well, Mr. Chairman, I can answer that 25 but the problem is that it depends on what dagree of assurance i

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I 65 I

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that you want us to give you.

2 If you want the kind of assurance that we feel we

.h, 3 can give you with respect to our domestic facilities, 7j,,-

end

+

obviously that is pretty far up the line.

For example, 5

we could stop at No.

3, which is to review the state program 6

descriptions and so that in effect we would be reviewing the 7

equivalent of our own Code of Federal Regulations, if you w ll.

i C?"9 8

C

-amd let's say they look pretty good to us at the same tinte 9 l we have the 3IR out there with other things in it, all we know 1 0 is that for that particular country it appears that on the 11 books I have a good set of regulations but no knowledge as to 12 i

how well they are being implemented or whether there are-3 1

deficiencies.

So I'm not sure what we could say, except to 14 say that we could sign off and say we reviewed the s tate

,e program for this particular country and it looks good. But 16 we are in a box if someone wants us to sign off and say we 17 reviewed it, we concur in the export because from a safeguards 18 srandpoint it looks good to us and it does not appear to be 19 inimical to the common defense and security.

20 So it means, how far does one go up the ladder in 21 terms of assurance that things are right.

Depending on where 22 we want to go up rhe ladder we will make it.

Wewillmake}he 23 etatement to fit what the Commission's desires are.

24 CO.GIISSIONER BRAL 'ORD :

Where would you have to go 25 on the ladder, Cliff, to have an equivalent assurance to what i

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I 66

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you have on physical security now?

2 MR. SMITH:

In terms of physical security, we would 3

have to go to 5, correct me if I'm wrong, the visitation 4

program.

5 MR. PARTLOW:

Except that Program 4 calls for reviewing 6

inspection results and I guess there are no equivalents in the 7

area of international security.

c MR. SMITH: Right, but in effect you would go to 5, 9

in whien we would look at the physical control plan the state 10 or the facility has, the fellows would go over, they would 19 visit and talk about it.

lo

~~

If you back down from the visitation program, you

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begin to give dif f erent degrees cf concurrence or dif ferent

, 1 c\\

degrees of level of assurance.

Our only concern emwr when we 1"4 initially wrote the paper back in January was that we wanted 16 to be sure that the Commission understood that if we were Y

17 0

tp concurring, what the concurrAnce really meant.

It has oeen lo a problem r.or us.

13 MR. GOSSICK:

When the Executive Branch comes back 20 to us on this -- you know -- not inimical to the commen 21 defense and so forth, what are they basing that on?

~

' ~

22 MR. SMITH:

I don't know.

23 MR. SHEA: It isanoveralldeterminationthattheh 24 make.

Members may have information, but they don't purport to 1

l 25 factor anything more in than they tell us about.

They make t

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67 f

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an overall determination based on the criteria and overall 2

assurances, the political considerations at times.

3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It seems to me what we ought 4

to be heading for is not so much a concurrence, but to try 5

to make it possible for. them to provide us with as much 6

information as possible to allow us to make a reasonable 7

decision.

That might suggest a number of approaches each one 8

of them not entirely covering the field, but I think we ought 9

I to try ways to try to get a good deal more information.

10 I would much rather have their views on the 11 12

. accounting system and safeguards system than any particular concurrence or nonconcurrence.

^3 I

MR. SMITH:

I 'think to a large extent we would feel I

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^'

more confortable with that too, based on the kinds of information 1:

^"

'we could have.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, is that a quesrion of what we say then?

18

(

MR. SMITH:

But if something were to be able to be 19 worked out along one of these particular alternatives,'for 20 instance, in terms of a state program description, we could v

review it and say that NNISS has thoroughly reviewed 'the 22 s tate program description for "X",bcountry and it appears ta _'.

4 23 isasoundprogramand,[irisadequatelyimplemented us that it Up l

and-that would probably do

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the job.

We could say that, and i

25 there is not much else we could say.

The:t we could go up the I

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line that we have no other information that it isn't.

2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Other comments and contributions 3

to this discussion?

4 COMMISSIONER BRADEORD:

Clif f, what stanc's between 5

us in implementing, at least up to your Alternative 4 at 6

this point, would be the absence of concurrence from the 7

effected states in our receiving the correspondence on their 8

program with the IAEA?

9 MR. SMITH:

Between 3 and 4.

Three was to get the

' O srate program, and 4 was the review of the correspondence with 11

^^

the states, in other words, the states would agree to provide 19 us with any copies or letters of deficiencies that they would

~

13 re s i"ed from the IAEA.

1 4 Now, as I said just a little earlier, on some of 15 these building blocks we recognize that there are a lot of 16 difficulties, that some of them indeed may not be feasible.

17 What we were trying to structure is simply moving from 18 a level of completely no assurance up to a level where we would 19 have very high assurance.

But some of these are probably 20 not practical.

21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What, for example, would-22 happen if we asked the State Department routinely as part of

~

n.

23 the questions we ask them, has the recipient state been 24 notified of -- I don't know what the right term would be --

25 safeguards violations, deficiency notice ---

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uJ MR. SMITH:

Have they received any deficiency notice?

They probably -- well, they wouldn't know and if we asked them to go get it, then you have heard Lou Nosenzo 4

on that.

5 MR. SHEA:

They would probably say they had no 6

information since nothing is reported to them.

I think they 7

would just answer in the negative.

8 MR. PARTLOW:

But our physical security review 9

program does not utilize feedback and expect compliance 10 results.

It is based upon program review or Alternative 3 S

11 ca (4

and then jumping to a visit program to gainspecspective about c'

12 that program.

13 l

MR. WILLIAMS:

It doesn't involve the international 14 agency that has got the responsibility for material control.

15 MR. PaRTLOW:

That's right, it is different.

16 That's the problem.

~7 1

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

18 19

'O

~

MR. SMITH:

21

~

22 MR. BURNETT:

23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

25 i

7 ILsu

70 M

I 1

MR. PAGE:

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 MR. WILLIAMS: There may be two more parts to come.

9 MR. BURNETT:

' Shelley makes a good point, with 10 what we have got, Part 1.

11 CFAIRMAN HENDRIE:

And what are the Part 1 and 12 Part 2 -- what's the nominal division there?

'3 w'

1 MR. PAGE:

Part 2 is statistical type of inforn a.

,i

^'

In last year's report the Part 2 listed numbers of facil-5 under mandate, frequency of inspection, things of that r

'6 I do not recall the e:: tent to what~ they had informati-on 1,/

i specific positions.

That was in Part 1 last year.

But I a i 18 led to believe that ---

t 19 l

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

The question was that the

'7 6

20 Part 2, while interesting from the standpoint of pro fi-.

21 an overall quantitative measure of the agency insp.-*;

3 22 effort and so on, wasn't especially helpful, the el

i. ; n c p_-

l 23 of the country specific detail at all.

24 MR. SHEA:

There are actually three parts involved 25 this year, just to be clear.

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71

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Last year we had two parts.

We have Part A, 2

Part B would be somewhat more detailed but apparently 3

somewhat like the information we had last year.

4 MR. SMITH: Well, what we have say; two parts.

5 It says:

".. the Safeguards Implementation Report analyzing 6

the trends and the result of_the agency's operation in 7

'77 is being submitted to the Board in two parts.

The 8

first part contains an introduction, the main conclusions 9

and recommendations which emerge from the analysis of the 10 safeguards operation and certain information relevant to 11 categories of states.

The second part of the report

^2

' containing mora detail, statistical and technical material is 13 I

I still under prepara:ica and

,ull be issued later."

1^4 MR. WILLIAMS:

and we understand such safeguards 15 confidential information covering 1977 will be available to 16 the Governors."

That's in addition to that.

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

You read that to make an 18 additional ---

19 MR. WILLIAMS:

That's what we have heard -- that's

'O in P.he reporting cable.

91 MR. FARTLOW:

I think in all fairness we have to- -

22 hold off our final review until all parts are in, nomattEr$

23 which they are, but I agree with the Chairman's ---

24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I was getting ready to comment 4 25 that I don't chinP you are going to get much out of the GJU J

I 8

72

{ ca.,,

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1 statistical stuff with regard to country specific information 2

or deficiency sort of information.

3 Secondly., I must say the sequence of events follows 4

exactly as one could consider.

One presses the agency to 5

produce a candid report.

If it appears in the newspapers, good.

6 6

g3 The next time around(yog/Ir3, going to get as candid a report?

7 I wouldn't be surprised.

8 I

MR. SMITH:

And that's what we are saying.

I 9

CHAIPJGN HENDRIE:

But the third year, why, we ought

'^O to be watered down so that we would be back asking for a l~'

candid report again.

And I don't know what to do about it.

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MR. PAGE:

13 y I

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l 16 17 13 i

19 20 21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, in fact, it was the ~

22

~~'

23 MR. PAGE:

Yes.

24 MR. SHEA:

I think the key place to get action is the,l 25 through the Board of Governors so they can give directions to i

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73 y;

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agency that othewise feels it is unable to move because of 2

the many conflicting views, I guess, from the states.

3 I think that is not surprising.

4 l

Now, this portion of the report came out just before 5

the June Board, this week, 6-7 8

9 10 11 12 13 That is the concrete action, I think

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^'

we can take in the next couple of months and work toward that 16 I

action.

17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: There probably is another

'^S syndrome that tends to dilute the value of the report or 19 at least tended toward increasing generality as time goes by.

20 You may or may not have some impact flowing from the publicity, 21 but the other fact that it will work on that if the o ",

countries who might be interested in the reports go to greatl.

23 lengths to assume the postures studied, ignorance of the 24 givings and conclusions, then the people within the cgency 25 l may be pusning to get the reports to be more specific and more i

l'

74

[,'

1

't 1

3 useful eventually become a little demoralized and a little 2

less motivated.

That will also be inclined toward more 3

general and usless. documents just as f ast as publicity for 4

the first one would.

5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

What would happen if we suggested b

to the community interested in exports that it would be 7

I helpful to Commission consideration if some of this material 8

were available on a voluntary basis.

Would that get to sound 9

too much like blackmail?

10 I wouldn't be surprised, as Dick says, if there 11

^^

aren't at least a few exporting or importing countries would 12 shrug and say, sure we'll be glad to tell you, we got a letter last year fror the IAE6 here is our state pian and ccme on over i

1

^

and. talk about the things.

I suppose as soon as we say it, 15 the implication would be if people don't come through t.itth at, l "'

j, we could threaten to hold up things.

I don't know.

17 MR. BURNETT: You know, the physical security thing, 13 as I understand, is voluntary.

But as you heard earlier, I

lo one country didn't volunteer.

'O CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Yes, but material accounting and e,

control is a much more difficult thing.

There is in place',

?

2*'

an international agency.

There is a treaty to which we

}

23 are a party and that treaty is part of the laws of the 24 United States and we are the body whose function was set out I

25 i to look at these safeguards.

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1 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

But only as long as it is 2

done right.

3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I'm sorry, I don't think the 4

treaty says as long as it is done right.

The U.S.

could 5

withdraw, I presume, if the President moves that way and the 6

Senate concludes, but I doubt that it would free an 7

agency of the Government to declare that the treaty doesn't 8

apply to us in some fashion because we don't think it is 9

being adequately complied with.

1^0 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

I think all the bilateral 11 agreements say that the safeguards under the bilaterals do 12 have to be exercised to our satisfaction.

I 3

1 i

M2. WILLIAM 5:

There are two different formulations.

la One says that we suspend our bilateral safeguards 15 rights for the time and to the extent that these are being 1 5 satisfied by implementation by the IAEA.

17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIZ:

What does that mean?

18 MR. WILLIAMS:

Well, we have to make a determination 19 whether or not we are satisfied.

20 CHAIRMAN HEMDRIE:

All right, now who is "we"?

21 MR. NILLIAMS:

The U.S.

Government.

~

22 Others do not say for the time and to the exten hat 23 we are satisfied, but only for the period in which they are 24 being applied.

25 In fact, most of them put it in that way.

The l

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1 new model agreement says for the time and tu the extent, I 2

think, that we are satisfied.

3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What provision has this i

4 government made whether in fact we are satisfied?

Who does 5

that?

6 MR. WILLIAMS:

Well, I would say -- I would have to 7

respond that the S tate Department, I think, would be the 3

action party. There is not a vigorous effort on a country-by-9 country basis for making that accommodation.

10 CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:

It is sort of the nature of the 11 problem, the physical security area you could go ahead and 12

-lean a little on the whole process, and in doing so you didn't 13 have the appearance that you were undercuttL".g or violating i

14 agreements that you had signed with regard to an international lbodytodothesamething.

If physical security had been 13 16 up to the agency and they are not happy with it, then this 17 is precisely the same problem.

I 18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I think the thing cuts the yg other way, actually.

HAIN4A.N HENDRIE: How do you mean?

20 COMMISSIONER GILIN1KY:

Well, all of a sudden, out 21 of the blue we said that we are going to require physical;. -.

security s tandards and that is not a part of any agreemenr- -

2a.

that we have, we just decided ourselves ---

4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

It is also not part of any l

2a_

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77

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international agreement.

2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

That's right.

3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Nor the IAEA.

4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: That's right.

5 CHAIR}BN HENDRIE:

But carry on now and finish the 6

thought so I can catch the other end of it.

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, the thought is that 3

everybody has agreed that we ought to have an effective -- I'm l

throwing in the word " effective" -- material and control 9 i i

10 system, that everyone has an interest in it and it is 11 prefectly reasonable for us to have an interest in it and 12

' to inquire about it and desire to know that in fact, our 13 exports are 2dequately protected.

And I think that is i

14 consistent with the spirit of the agreements.

Certainly if 15 there are indications that they aren't it is our responsibility I

16 to look in to it.

I don't see how it can be interpreted any 17 other way.

18 And these are agreements in which a large number of countries have agreed and they have all said that it is a 19 good 2a t have an accounting system and it is an effective 20 system.

21 CHAIRMAN lie'iDRIE:

What do you do about the p~-

g Pr Position that we have all agreed to, this monitoring of~~

23 these systems in an international agency to avoid one nation j

24 i

among all of us having the preferential position of being the 2>_

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possesser of everybody's papers.

2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, I think you have to 3

have a common-sense approach.

You can ' t -- you know -- a 4

country like the United States cannot cede to a couple of 5

inspectors, its respcnsibilities for the protection of this 6

material, particularly when it doesn't know a thing about what 7

they are doing.

8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

But it did so in a treaty.

9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I don't think we went that 10 far.

11

^^

MR. PARTLOW:

Mr. Chairman, l

12 13 I

l

suppose someone like the 15 I

Uu1 Led States or more hopefully the community of nuclear 16 i

suppliers went to the IAEA with a proposition that they would 17 adopt a policy of review of these programs.

And given tha:

S 7

this would upgrade the value of state promncs, there is a 19 possibility that the IAEA might welcome this program as 20 enhancing the ability for them to do their verification job 21 as opposed to rejecting the program as being in violation ob

~

22 the treaty.

23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I must say, my impression is 24 that from the agency safeguards staff side, at least the 25 few working-level people that I have talked to is that they l

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want to do a good job, they want to do a much better job 2

than they are doing and they would like to see more resources 3

in it and more muscle to get agreements from countries to allow 4

fully adecuate inspection system to be in their appropriate 5

place.

6 Now, we are apart of the suppliers involved and 7

there have been initiatives in that last agreement out.of that 8

I

[

suppli ers ' group had f ai'rly strong language along the line, a 9

i I

part of which was supporting of upgrading IAEA activities, 10 as best I can recall, but I don't make the connection back to 11

~^

this subject in all that fair a view.

19~

t COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I would, at a minimum l

~'

try this voluntary approach, discuss that with the other i

1^4 governments and see how far that would go.

15 MR. WILLIA'4S :

16 17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

18 MR. ti1LLIAMs :

19 20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

21 Ma, WILLIAMS:

1 7 22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

23 MR. SHEA:

24 25 MR. WILLIAMS:

And that's why the physical security

}Us0 4

80 l

I ii i-1 is sq x: sed' to be in exchange of the visitations played at 2

a very low level in terms of politics.

3 MR. PARTLOW:

4 5

The next Alternative 3 says, that in the interim 6

while that is going on we would review the programs ourselves, 7

difference in timeliness and probability of success, I guess.

8 MR. WILLIAMS:

9 10 11 12 l

MR. PEDERSON:

Let's not get ourselves cross-wise 13 i

though.

Let's not ask " hem to give us theirplan saying give 14 it to us so we can look at it and help you.

And then when 15

e get it, use it against them in terms of saying, weil, 16 now that we see your plan, we clearly can't be sending anything 17 more to you.

18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What does it mean to have 19 a voluntary program.

Supose the guy says, no, I don't think 70 you need to know that, I'm doing what the law requires and I

~

21 am working directly with the IAEA, ti,.t's what the charter says, now what are you going to g"g-72 you are a party to it, as am I; 23 about that?

How voluntary is it?

7a COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

The voluntary is gone.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Is it?

Or does that all of a I

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sudden turn out to be a presumption of guilt?

2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

What do you do if you get a plan 3

that is lousy?

Are you going to have to stand up and say,

" Boy, this is a lousy plan.

I wished they hadn't given it to me 5

That would be a good encouragement for the next guy 6

l not to. turn the plan over.

7 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

It might be a good encourage-8 ment for him to fix up the safeguards.

9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Well, one would hope that would 1 0 be the long term thing.

17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

It might be both.

i 12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

But he might regard it as --

13 l'

his vie > might be that he sees no reason to accommcdate to 14 a paranoid crew.

We could then not ship him any uranium.

I 15 cumilSSIONER BimDFOnu:

But if we are going to look 16 at ourselves as a paranoid crew then obviously there is no 17 point in looking any further. If we take our own definitions 18 of adequate safeguards as having any meaning, then we would 19 expect to see a low cloud.

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, a basic question is-21 whether the Commission feels any obligation to go beyond ~

22 the mere fact of the existance of IAEA safeguards to assure; 23 itself that the material that we are taking over is being 24 effectively safeguarded, or have we discharged our obligation i

25 by the mere fact that */e hate exported differently than the IAE).

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safeguards.

Do you need to do any more?

2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

What does the law say?

3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I think the law says -- you 4

know when the law talks about IAEA safeguards

-- well, what 5

a does the law say?

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

What does the law say?

7 MR. STOIBER:

Let me suggest one other aspect and 8

that is that at least our bilateral agreements require, as 9

Commissioner Bradford suggests, a continuing judgment by the 10 1

United States Government.

11 I think in most cases that there is a certain level l'

~

of adequacy in the arrangement between IAEA and that particular l'

spectric governm=c.

It seems to me that at least that calls upon the government under control to make some kind of l

I

,e judgment.

What the NRC's role in th'at combined judgment is, 16 is a different question.

As far as the statute is cc acc zned 17 the Congress runs resolutely neutral on that precise thing.

18 That came down to the wire on the floor and they included the 19 precise language saying they didn't come out one way or the 20 other.

~

21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

One way or the other on; hyt'

-t 22 MR. STOIBER:

On the specific visitation.

'._ I l

23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, that's the matter of 24 specific visits abroad.

But it seems to me that this 23 Commission is expected to make a judgment on safeguarda.

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MR. BURNETT:

If we are to accept IAEA, I guesc 2

I have to ask as gently as possible, what is it that NRC 3

should do if we do. accept that across-the-board even in light 4

of the SSIR and the SIR?

I don't know what role we do at that 5

point.

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, what do you think it 7

should be?

8

.M 0 BURNETT:

I don't know, Mr. Commissioner.

That is 9

what we are here to discuss.

If the treaty ---

10 l

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Clearly, to participate -- since 11

~^

, e are all not that happy with the sweep of those safeguards w

12 activities certainly one aspect might be to participate in the 13 action plan and approve it.

14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Are you saying that no matter

,=

what deficiencies were found there that it is not a cause 6

1 for this Commission to take notice and act on it?

17 CHAIRFAN HENDRIE:

Vic, if we got a letter tomorrow

' S from the agency saying, I have been spoofing you all this time, 19 I don't have any inspectors, I don't have any plans, nobody 20

~

goes anywhere, I haven't got the faintest idea, there is no El such thing as an IAEA safeguards staff, okay?

Stamped, verified

= -

'2 and signed by Rudy,- I guess he is still there.

I guess I _'_

23 would have to say, gee, that puts a new light on assurances 24 about safeguarding U.S. materials under IAEA standards.

25 Is that the case?

I'm sorry, that's not the case.

There are Y

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1 a couple of divisions of people over there who,indeed there 2

could be more of them and indeed the programs could be better 3

and we hope they will be and will come along pretty quick.

I l

4 But it ain't zero.

I 5

In answer to your question:

Is there any level 6

of degraded safeguards which could result in a no answer? the 7

answer is" "Yes" there is such a level.

8 Now, are we there?

Well, I guess that's the question 9 l everybody will have to decide for himself.

What we are I

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struggling with is the difficulty within the international Iy I'

11 system that has been established developing in as clear a 12 view as each of us might like.

l CO32IISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, is there anything i

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Short of that that you would act on or is that it?

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l CHAIR'4AN HENDRIE:

Sure. The State Department comes g

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16 through and sends us an intelliger/ cable that says, well, we have just found out that Safeguards Section 6 in the IAEA g

has been inspecdag 9.e whatnot cour.uy over here, evegdme 18 they go to whatnot, why they go into a bar and get drunk.

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2 CHAIP31AN HENDRIE:

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MR. SMITH:

Mr. Chairman, could I add something on.

5 that.

6 It jus t seems to me that it raises another issue.

7 8

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COMiISSIONER G1LINSKY:

This

.3 from the latest one?

I 16 MR. SMITH:

Yes.

So it seems to me, once.they say,,

that even when you have the SIR, it al,;ays seeme'd to me wh"" " !

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beyond that point.and,that's where it gets unclear to me.

20 COMMISSIONER GILISSKY: First of all, (a) it is after 91 the fact.

An effective safeguards system is one that is cjoing i

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to warn you of trouble before it happens.

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2 MR. SMITH:

No, I'm not arguing that.

I'm just 3

saying that there is the IAEA going on record and making that 4

kind of a statement and we have agreements with then, then 5

the question is beyond that how f ar does NRC go in order to 6

dig in to this.

7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

How far does the audit go.

MR. SMITH:

How far does the audit go.

9 CHAIR'G_N HENDRIE :

You know, in reading that and 10 verifying indeed they did say that.

You know, you can call 11 Vienna and say, listen, did you fellows really say that?

Let 12 me read this back to you or have I got a phony copy here?

13 Beyond verifying that how far does the audit go.

At the momont 14 you get what you can get through S ta te Department or through i

--15 1i Executive Branch information, intelligence reports and what have 16 you and not a great deal more.

17 MR. GOSSICK:

Commissioner Gilinsky's point is, 18 assuming that's a true statement, it can be verified by audit lo and everything else is enough.

Isn' t that your points?

20 CHAIR'-1AN HENDRIE:

No't quite, I don't think.

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l MR. GCSSICK: What would we be willing to live with_

27 if they could make such a statement.

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,3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

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4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: My view would be that it encourages 5

us to go forward with the action plan which we don't seem to 6

have gotten out of the Commission yet, concurrence, even as 7

a sort of reduceable minimum.

Beyond that I don't know.

I 8

have some trouble seeing how we proceed without pulling the 9

house down around our ears.

10 You can take the statement you just quoted and say 11 i

good, I d&clare that fdr myself the international safeguards 12 measures are inadequate, you know, zilch on exports.

13 COMMISSIONER GILI:iSKY:

Well, but what you are saying is-that this Commission h,as no international safeguards 15 responsibilities other than checking a box that says IAEA 16 safeguards.

17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

On the contrary, on the contrary.

I0 MR. SHEA:

Besides having checked the criteria.

lo we do have the non-inimicallity finding and we could view it' 20 as f actored into that along with others as State does.

1 7

I suppose that's what we could say we intended 'to do on the 2

adequacy point and factor that in along with the other 23 considerations to that particular finding.

I guess we 24 i could continue to do and that would be one option while 25 working to improve safeguards and that could be done through i

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the action plan.

2 MR. WILLIAMS:

Well, the State Department has offered 3

and agreed to bring specific information to the Commission, 4

but they have on!y been here once.

They might need a general 5

reminder about this request.

That might be an alternative.

6 MR. SMITH:

I don't think, Shelley, they have 7

anything do they?

8 MR. WILLIAMS:

They say they do, I don' t know.

9 It was a general offer to share what they might have.

1~0 MR. BURMETT:

Are you talking about this l^'

intelligence briefing you all went to?

12 MR. SHEA:

Yes.

13 MR. WILLIAMS:

14 15 16 If you are talking about 1~/

l minimal actions, that might be effective in the short run.

18 MR, pEDERSON:

Have any elements of the action plan i

19 formally or informally been brought to the attention of the 20 IAEA?

Are they aware ---

21 MR. WILLIAMS:

Generally aware of it, yes I would,

22 say so.

They are aware of the action plan.

23 MR. PEDERSON: Do we expect some support there?

24 MR. PAGE:

I don' t know if they cre aware of it 25 or not.

That I don't know.

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MR. SHEA:

I think a number of the plans are at the 2

point of being implemented, specific work plans and I think 3

there will probably be more of a focus on those. So far, 4

I think it is fair to say that the action plans have achieved 5

a pret:y broad interagency consensus on taking a number 6

of steps.

That has been the focus up to now, getting the 7

ideas lined up and getting people to agree that that's what 8

should be done and now working out specific programs for 9

doing it. I ddak it is a significant accomplishment, really, 10 in the last six months or so.

Now, the question is to pursue 11 all of thoce in concrete terms and we will see more action in 12 the IAEA and through the U.S. mission in the course of the 13 next few months than we have up until now while the government in'effect has been getting its act together on this issue.

14

~~

I think even in that cable I distributed today, one 16 sees -- and the cable from Vienna, the cable from the mission a short while back attached to the Commission paper there, I la sense a new focus on the importanc 3 of safeguards, a new 19 determination to take on this protlem.

20 CHAIRMAN hENDRIE:

Let n e ask a question.

Jim, 21 I guess this heads mainly in your lirec~ tion, but Cliff and 22 his safeguards people are certaic.ly involved too.

23 What about some discussion, I guess notably with

'l 24 l State about what might be practical, taasonable and that would i

25 not upset international' apple carts, be generally moral and

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i-non-fattening in a way of probing out what is possible in the 2

way of acquisition on a " voluntary basis" information 3

stretching up this. line from zero on up.

I guess as a part of that some consideration and views in discussion with State 5

and then pr6sumably views back from them about what we mean 6

and how we would keep the " voluntary" aspects from getting 7

to be compulsory.

8 There is an ol-d theorem in physics which has to do 9

with transitions, that is that all transitions or transactions 10 which are not forbidden are compulsory.

And I would hope that 11 would not be the way 12 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

In fact, I guess I would like ;l

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to have that inquiry include the possibi_ity, thougn, of g

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including the furnishing of such safeguards requirements we

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might require from time-to-tirne in the new agreements for I

16 coeperation.

I would like for State to tell us what the 1

possibilities are of getting a provision like that and what 1 0 the disadvantages would be to it.

19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:.

20 21 MR. SHEA:

22 23 MR. STOIBER:

That sort of requirement was included 24 in an earlier version of the Nonproliferation legislation, 25 a requirement for the Section 123 and was dropped at one stage lbsd J

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because of the State Department's objection to it.

I think 2

that signals the kind of response you are likely to get.

3 One can always try..

1 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

I guess I would just like 5

to know the basis.

I wouldn't expect them to change their 6

minds, but I would like to know a little more about the basis.

7 I I

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I certainly don't object.

il 8 I With regard to talking to our own government, I 9

don't see why we shouldn't discuss and see vhat people think

'~O is practical and what they think their reasons are for it or i

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i against it or whatever.

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Ne could certainly undertake to do that

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and get back to you.

14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

If the Commis.sion has no objection,

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why I'm going to say 'pmtse do it and le t us know.

(M 16 The basic question, Cliff, which you came up to ask

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[d remains unanswered.

I can't tell you how far erf that chain 18 zero through 7 the Commission wants you to go and I don't 19 cee that the Ccamission is quite ready to try to impose it.

,l 20 Thank you very much.

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I 21 f

COM:iISSICNER KENNEDY:

Before we leave, did.anybody 22 find the number of that paper?

23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Oh,.yes.

i 24 MR. CHILK:

73-124.

l 25 (Wh e r eupo n, the maating was adjourned at 4: 00 2.n.)

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ML19208D249

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