ML19208C646
| ML19208C646 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1979 |
| From: | Matsui R HOUSE OF REP. |
| To: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208C638 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7909270178 | |
| Download: ML19208C646 (1) | |
Text
o RDBERT T. MATSUI waans eTase erres.
Ses DisTacT, CAuronMA SC2 h H w Orret h m WaanemeTos,D.C. 20515 CouurrTse on tus JunctAny (202) 22 % 71 0 Congregg of tije THnitch states C_.ms.
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.e Elasifngton, D.C. 20515 June 27, 1979 Mr. Joseph M.
Hendrie Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N. h'.
Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Hendrie:
1 On April
.2, of this year, I wrote to you urging the temporary clos ng of the Rancho Seco 'Juclear Power Plant.
It was my feeling at the time that there existed too many uncertainties as to the reliability of the plant's safety system to allow the facility to continue operation.
Since that time, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has issued a series of direct _ves to the operators of Rancho Seco, which are intended to improve safety at the plant.
5 In light of the commission's announcement that Rancho Seco will be allowed to reopen, I am confident that you and your colleagues are satisfied that the changes recom-mended by the NRR have been implernented and are in and of themselves sufficient to warrant this action.
It is now incumbent upon the NRC to ensure that optimum standards of safety be adhered to in the future.
A policy of prudent monitoring by the URC and mutual cooperation between all parties, may best assure Sacramentans that Rancho Seco will remain a vital source of safe, efficient and uninter--
rupted energy in the years to come.
Very truly yours, f&AO
/c M'
i ROBERT T.
MATSUI Member of Congress RTM:erk 0
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ElsbIngton, DE. 20515 April 1, 1979 Mr. Joseph M.
Hendrie Chairman r
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, NW Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Hendrie:
On February 14, 1979, I contacted your of fice in writing expressing my concern for alleged safety defects with the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant operated by the Sacramento Municipal Utilities District.
As of this date I have not re-ceived a formal response to this inquiry, a copy attached here-to.
Given the current emergency crisis at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, I can no longer tolerate delay in determining whether the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant is safe.
The citizens of Sacramento are entitled to your inune-diate attention to this critical matter.
As you well know, Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant was designed by Babcock-Wilcox based on the same theoretical models utilized for the construction of Three Mile Island.
Any system f ailure experienced by Three Mile Island therefore may poten-tially occur at Rancho Seco.
The similarities in design in-crease this possibility.
This potential, coupled with past difficulties with the Rancho Seco cooling system, justify the intervention of your agency in the safety review of Rancho Seco.
At this time, the primary concern must be a definitive determination of the exact cause of the f ailure in the Three Mile Island cooling system.
It is alleged that either a generic defect with the Babcock-Wilcox reactor or human error was principally responsible for the breakdown.
Both the mechanical system and the training procedures must be subjected to an immediate evaluation to ascertain whether the deficiencies leading to the Three Mile Island disaster are present in other Babcock-Wilcox systems.
Rancho Seco of ficials must be advised as to interim emergency measures necessary to prevent any further nuclear mishaps with the cooling system.
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Mr. Joseph M.
Hendrie April 1, 1979 Prudent policy decisions on this issue demand additional informatiori.
I request detailed responses to the following questions:
1)
In the Rancho Seco plant, what is the possibility of voids being formed in the primary coolant system large enough to compromise the core cooling capability?
Can operator action QIEg be depended upon to ensure continued core cooling in the event that such voids are formed?
Furthermore, what assurances can be made that operators do not override automatic actions i-of engineered safety features without sufficient cause for doing so?
2)
The incident at Three Mile River conclusively demon-strated the possibility of a Class 9 accident--the release of h g radioactive material into the environment.
What steps are being taken by the NRC to include in the licensing process a review of the conrequences of a Class 9 accident?
3)
How can we be assured that undesired pumping of radio-active liquids and gasses will not occur inadvertently in the transfer of potentially radioactive gases and liquids out of gpA containment?
In light of Three Mile Island, what protective
/sM* modifications must be made to existing operating modes and
~
procedures for all systems designed to transfer potentially radioactive gases and liquids out of containment?
What is the NRC's time frame for developing these modifications?
3db What alteration of plant reporting procedures for
,,g NRC notification is necessary to assur' very early notification
,L.J-of serious events?
5)
The incident at Three Mile Island has raised serious questions as to the adequacy and availability of its emergency storage capability of nuclear wastes.
Three Mile Island re-quired the importation of lead bricks and holding tanks for hh)
N surplus contaminated water.
If a similar accident occurred at Rancho Seco, is there safety equipment on site to meet all reasonable emergencies?
If not, can the emergency equipment be made available within the appropriate response time?
Ph Given the projected difficulties moder]ately populated region of Three Mile Island, in evacuating the can a re-alistic plan of evacuation be developed for the dense area
./p surrounding thc Rancho Seco plant?
Are state and local author-g ities prepared for a Three Mile Island type accident?
What should be the role of the federal government should local resources be inadequate?
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4 Mr. Joseph M.
Hendrie April 1, 1979 We will not be served by a precipitous panic reaction.
Official response during this crisis period must ta reasoned and responsive to known information.
As the federal agency charged with the responsibility to advise federal policymakers on nuclear safety questions, I appeal on behalf of my con-stituents and those who live within the shadows of the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant for your guidance.
Very truly yours, ROBERT T.
MATSUI Member of Congress RTM:fe
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