ML19208B963
| ML19208B963 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1979 |
| From: | Houston R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Jay Collins Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B956 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7909240223 | |
| Download: ML19208B963 (13) | |
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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ts, JUL 2 71979 MEMORANDUM FOR: John Collins, Chief, Effluent Treatment Systems Branch, DSE
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FROM:
R. Wayne Houston, Chief, Accident Analysis Branch, DSE l
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SUBJECT:
AAB INPUT TO TICKET ITEM RE LETTER DATED MAY 13, 1979
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FROM DR. WISH TO PRESIDENT CARTER
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The enclosure contains our proposed response to the four questions in the letter from Dr. Wish dated May 13, 1979, for which you requested our assistance.
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R. Wayne Houston, Chief Accident Analysis Branch Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis
Enclosure:
As Stated cc:
W. Kreger L. Soffer R. Priebe J. Lee 790924 0 ]p 3 y
1005 OII
1.
What are the fission products of a nuclear meltdown?
We have enclosed T'ble 3-1 from Appendix VI to the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, which identifies the radionuclides in the reactor core and their initial activity at the time of a hypothetical accident. As you may realize, there are several hundred different radionuclides in. the core in addition to the 54 listed in the table. However, in s. der to make the effort conduct-ed in WASH-1400 manageable, the remaining nuclides were eliminated with very 4
little sacrifice in the accuracy of the calculated consequences. A discussion of the method used to eliminate the additional radionuclides is provided in Section 8.2.1 of the aforementioned appendix.
We have also enclosed Table 2-1 from Appendix VI which identifies the magnitude of the radioactivity release to the atmosphere for each of the release cate-gories. A detailed discussinn of the accident sequence associated with each release category is provided in Section 5.2 of Appendix VI.
1005 012
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TABLE VI 3-1 INITIAh ACTIVITY OF RADIONUCL! DES IN THE NUCLEAR REACTOR CORE AT THE TIME OF THE HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT Radioactive Invento No.
Radionuclide Source (curies x 10' )
Half-Life (days) 1 Cabalt-58 0.0078 71.0 2
C balt-60 0.0029 1,920 3
Krypton-85 0.0056 3,950 4
Kryp ton-85m 0.24 0.183 5
Kryp ton-87 0.47 0.0528 6
Krypton-88 0.68 0.117 7
Rubidium-86 0.00026.
18.7 8
S trontium-89 0.94 52.1 9
S trontium-90 0.037 11,030 10 S trontium-91 1.1 0.4C3 11 Yttrium-90 0.039 2.67 12 Yttriumr91 1.2 59.0 13 Zirconium-95 1.5 65.2 14 Zirconium-97 1.5 0.71 15 Niobium-95 1.5 35.0' 16 Molybdenum-99 1.6 2.8 17 Technstium-99m 1.4.
- 0. 2.5 18 Ruthenium-103 1.
39.5 19 Ruthenium-105 O.* 2 0.1e5 20 Ruthenium-106 0.25 366 21 Rhodius-105 d.49 1.50 22 Tellurium-127 0.059 0.391 23 Tellurium-127m 0.011 109 24 Tellurium-129 0.31 0.048 25 Tellurium-129m 0.053 0.340 26 Tellurium-131m 0.13 1.25 27 Tellurium-137 1.2 3.25 28 Antiaony-127 0.061 3.88 29 Antimony-129 0.33 0.179 30 Iodine-131 0.85 8.05 31 Iodine-132 1.2 0.0958 32 Iodine-133 1.7 0.875 33 Iodine-134 1.9 0.0366 34 Iodine-135 1.5 0.280 35 Xenon-133 1.7 g
5.28 36 Xenon-135 0.34 0.384 37 Cesium-134 0.075 750 38 Cesium-136 0.030 13.0 39 Cesium-137 0.047 11,000 40 Barium-140 1.6 12.8 41 Lanthanum-140 1.6 1.67 42 Cerium-141 1.5 32.3 43 Cerium-143 1.3 1.38 44 Cerium-144 0.85 284 45 Praseodymium-143 1.3 13.7 46 Neodymium-147 0.60 11.1 47 Neptunium-239 16.4 2.35 48 Plutonium-238 0.00057 32,500 49 Plutoniun-239 0.00021 8.9 x 106 50 Plutonium-240 0.00021 2.4 x 106 51 Plutonium-241 0.034 5,350 52 Americium-241 0.000017 1.5 x 10' 53 Curium-242 0.0050 I63 54 Curium-244 0.00023 6,630 1005'013 2-2
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4.
In the hearings prior to, licensing TMI, the NRC accepted 4.8 miles as the maximum hypothetical accident area. What are these boundaries based upon?
During the staff's review of the TMI case, we requested the applicant to provide plots showing the project $d ground-level doses, for 'Joth whole body and thyroid, resulting from the most serious design basis accident conser-vatively analyzed in the Safety Analysis Report. Of paiticular interest are the plots for the 5 rem whole body dose.and the 25 rem thyroid dose since these values correspond to the proposed Protective Action Guides values at which EPA recommends mandatory evacuation. These plots represent an estimate of the elasped time to reach the specified dose level as a func-tion of distance from the release peint under the conditions postulated.
In the case of TMI, the postulated conditions included the fission product inven-tory specified in Regulatory Guide 1.4, an initial containment leak' rate of 0.2% per day, and worst-case meterological conditions actually encountered less than 5% of the time at the TMI site (i.e. atmosphere dispersica corres-ponding to Pasquill F stability and one meter per second wind speed). Using the more conservative of the whole body and thyroid dose plots (i.e. the one that results in the greater distance from the plant), it is found that a thyroid dose greater than 25 rem does not occur beyond 4.8 miles from the plant. Hence, for planning purposes, the above analysis used in conjunction with EPA Protective Action Guides, establishes the area having a 4.8 mile radius around TMI as sufficient for the planned protective meas,ure.of evacuation.
1005 015
5.
Do 'you have confidence that 18,000 persons could be evacuated in less than two hours as accepted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of NRC7 We have, reviewed 'the decision set forth by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board dated December 19, 1977 and we are unable to identify that the ASLB accepted the premise stated in the question. Furthermore, we have reviewed the testimony presented at the TMI-2 hearing by the NRC staff, the Metro-politan Edison staff, and the Director of Dauphin County Civil Defense.
t'one of the testimony indicates that 18,000 persons could be evacuated in less than two hours. Rather, the hearing testimony indicates the following:
(a) Metrenolital Edison had estimated that the environs out to four miles from the plant could be evacuated in less than two hours. Ho' wever, this estimate did not include the time required for warning the public which would add 1 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> as documented in the Safety Analysis Report.
(b) The NRC staff analysis estimated that the time to warn and evacuate the populace in any 45 degree sector out to five miles might vary from three to six hours depend-ing on'the sector chosen.
(c) The Civil Defense Director of Dauphin County implied that the 18,000 persons in the,six localities of Lon-donberry Township, Royalton Borough, Middletown Bor-rough, and portions of Lower Swatara, Highspire, and' Derry Townships could be evacuated in a couple more hours than five.
Based on the above, we consider that our original evaluation is still valid, and we are confident that our estimate of six hours is a reasonable time in 1005 016
which to warn and remove people from the most densely populated 45 deyee sector out to a distance of 5 miles from the plant.
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6.
The taxpayers have paid for stockpiled potassium iodide as protection from iodine-131. Why has it lot been made availt.le to the public in the TMI a; ea who received glanc.ed and unplanned iodii.e-131 caissions?
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The decision to withold distribution of potassium iodide during the TMI event is probabily best de' scribed by the individual responsible for the decision namely Dr. Gordon MacLead,' Secretary of Health for the Commonwealth of Penn-sylvdnia. We have enclosed a copy of his letter dated April 13, 1979 to the
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Editor of the Washington Post which discusses the basis for not administering 4
the drug to the public.
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April 13, 1979 4
Editor-Washington Post Washington, D.C'.
Daar Editor:
As Secretary of Health for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, I wish to comment on your April ti article about the Health, Education and Welfaru Secretary recommending the administration of potassium iodide to those' in the immoc. ace vi'cinity of the Thrcc Mile Island (':"4I) Plant.
At the time we received'the
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Secretary's recor:mendation, it seemed 'inappropriato to ad:ainister the drug uhen there was no scientific
- indication of any signifi-cant radiation.
According to Secretary Califano's own testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Health and. Scientific Research on April 7, the maximum exposure to any person was no more than 05 millirouts-a level considered by authorities in the field tr be insignificant.
As p"otassium iodide was shipped into Pennsylvania, the Department of Health was in a constant state of readineus to distributo it to all people in the area, nog only those at the site.
For the first six days after the incident, we contin-tously sought advice frcm the National Council on. Radiation Protection, hcl.ts Dureau of Radiation Health in the Food and Drug Adminictration (FDA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NCR), the Department of Energy, and some of the count.ty's leading medical accialists in radiation health.
All agreed that we hold the drug in readiness and not administer it unless there was an expoctation of i=ninent exposure to at least 10,000 millirems of radiation.
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Editor l
Page 2 U
April 13, 1979 We had expert assurances that notice of any such likelihood would be sufficierit to distribute and administer the drug.
Other considerations which influenced our decision:
1)
The possibility of a se ere skin rash, plus side effects to those with thyroid diseases, to unborn children, and to the e3 der 3.y with cardiac problems; 4
2)
The possib_lity of precipitating unnecesaary panic among the populace simply by announcing the distributioq; and 3)
The possibility that premature ingestion of the drug would diminish its effectiveness further into the incident, if prolonr5cd, when the protection might actually be needed.
Each of these factors militated against distribation; consequently I felt obliged to advise Governor Thornburgh that the public's health and safety would best be served by with-holding the potassium iodide.
Sincerely, Gordon K.'MacL6cd, M.D.,
F.A.C.P.
Secretary of' Health Cor=onwealth of Pennsylvania GEM:crm t
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ACTION CONTROL DATES CONTROL NO06740 FROM:
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=h risks gased by tt.u Till acclJait and urges closting of all nuclear power plants CLASSIF IED DAT A CLA SSIF IC A T SON OOCUMEN1/ COPY NO.
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CATEGOHY NUMHLH OF PAGES i
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EdCUTIVE DallECTOR Fod5tAflONS DO NOT REMOVE THIS COPV NHC i >HPA 23' PRINCIPAL CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL N
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t Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 WN 2 9 1879.
Dr. Joel R. Wish RD 4, Box 444 Elizabethtown, PA 17022
Dear Dr. Wish:
Your letter of May 13, 1979 to President Carter expressing concerns about the safety of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant has been referred to this office for reply.
Inasmuch as matters pertaining to the Three Mile Island plant are under the cognizance of the Nuclear Regulatory Connission, we are forwarding your letter to them for appropriate action by copy of this letter.
Sincerel y,
/ S/
John P. Thereault Acting Deputy Director Plans and Analysis Division Office of Nuclear Energy Programs cc:
,,<. Gossick, NRC 1005 022
6740 7-18-79 EDO LJNTROL NO.
DUE:
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HIS EDO CONTROL SHOULD RECEIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY IN HANDLING AND REPARATION OF RESPONSE.
PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR PREPARING REPLY SHOULD CALL M. GROFF, EXT. 27750, IhNEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT.
ASSIGNED TO:
R. Volmer, 00R DATE:
7-6-79 TI.'IE : 9:26 am 4
TIME AND D TE ASSIGNED Received Dispatched Division Director [1b; f,p?
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Assistant Director
[4/2het Branch Chief
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Other OEI.D TIME AND DATE FOR'.fARDED FOR CONCURRENCE Received Dispatched OELD Other Branch Chief Assistant Director Division Director THIS SLIP SHOULD STAY WITH THE PACKAGE AT ALL TIMES AND BE RETURNED NHEN COMPLETED.
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Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation I
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I RD 4. Box 444 l
Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania 17022 1
May.13,~1979 President Jimmy Carter The White House Washington, D.C.
20500 Dear Mr. Presidents I am writing as a concerned citizen living and working within five miles of Three Mile Island in Penn:glvania to express my concerns and attitudes relat@to the isstie~oF"
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Tnrcitrat%eE~inleds'rlil*~a'n'd EM.I. in specific. I have suffered considerable physical and psychological distress as a result of recent events at T.M.I.
First and foremost, I urge that you take a firm stand against the construction of new nuclear power plants and support the immediate closing of all existing nu. lear power cites throughout the nation. Nuclear power is unsafe; T.M.I. should not be pegged as a scapegoat for a system which is terribly dangerous and morally unsound. If nuclear energy is the only way that we as a nation can continue to exist as we are, then my vote is to re-evaluate the CHANGES we citizens must make so that we will NCyr be dependent upon nuclear power.
I urge that you act in the best interests of all persons living in the T.M.I. locale.
Specifically, I understand that the " cryogenic trap" process is the best and safest way to immobilize the radioactive gases which.otherwise are tc
.e released during the cleanup of waste from TMI. I know that you too are concerned about the health aid safety of tax-payers and citi= ens in the T.M.I. area and I urge that you lobby on our behalf for the SAFEST possible means of cleanup; cost should NOT be a factor when lu.unan health and lives are at stake. Similarly, dumping radioactive waste water into the Susquehanna river (with. Baltimore, Wahington, D.C., and Lancaster all less than 100 miles downstream) is dangerous and morally reprehensible.
Finally, I ask that you help me to obtain honest answers to the following questions. I be-lieve 2 Th. answers are vitally important in determining the health risks posed by the TMI facility: 1) What are the fission products of a nuclear meltdown? Which ones have the NRC found at TMI? Which ones were tested for? How much Strontium 90 and Strontium 89 have escaped? These ara known products of a nuclear meltdown. Do you think the testing is adequate? 2) What are the maximum, amo,,unts of radj,3,tjpn recordoa e any t ire at_TMI-on site and in the nearby ~~c'oi:ciu'Kitf? 3T How can the containmenty.ter at TE hqJeTi cd.and disposed of without further incre_als,e_d rrv11nAggiypgm,issions? Isn't the cryogenic trap the Wrf te i mobtitrrtMtr1lf.fses which filters cannot stop? 4) In the hearings prior to licensing TMI, the NRC accepted 4.8 miles as the maximum hypothetical accident area. What are these boundaries based upon? 5) Do you have confidence that 18,000 persons could be evacuated in less than two hous as accepted by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Bureau of NRC7 6) The taxpayers have paid for stockpiled potassium iodide as protection from iodine 131. Why has it not been made available to the public in the TMI area who re-ceive. planned and unplanned iodine 131 emiss' ens? 7) Are there any more radioactive emis-sions coming out of TMI? What are they? How much has there been, is there, and will there be? Where are they blowing and settling? 8) What is the estimate you have. received of the maximum number of lives that will be lost as a result of this accident-at worst? Can you give assurance that no loss of ' life from TMI radiation emissions will occur this year?
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1005 02 W " C
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