ML19208B809
| ML19208B809 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109134 |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1979 |
| From: | Macdonald C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19208B804 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7909210440 | |
| Download: ML19208B809 (3) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE TRANSPORTATION BRANCH OF THE MODEL NO. ETR PACKAGE USA /9134/AF Encl to ltr dtd MG 2 41979 Summary By application dated August 8, 1979, the U.S. Department of Energy requested approval for the Model No. ETR packaging to be used for shipment of unitradiated ETR or GETR fuel elements or control rod follower pieces.
Based on statements and representations contained in the application, the staff has concluded that the Model No. ETR packaging and its contents as described meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71.
References
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1.
EG&G Idaho, Inc., Report No. PR-T-79-012, ETR Fuel Element Shipping Containers - Addendum to PR-T-79-Oll (TR-466), August 7, 1979.
2.
Aerojet Nuclear Company Report No. TR-466, ATR Fuel Element Shioping Container Safety Analysis, June 30, 1975.
NOTE: This document was reissued as:
EG&G Idaho, Inc., Report No. PR-T-79-Oll (TR-466).
3.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Safety Evaluation Report for the Model No. ATR Shipping Container, November 14, 1977 (available from NRC, Docket No. 71-9099).
4.
U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, Summary Evaluation ETR Fuel Element Shipping Containers, USA /5705/AF (DOE-lD), August 1979 (enclosure to application dated August 8,1979).
Drawing The packaging is fabricated in accordance with Idaho Nuclear Corporation ETR Orawing E-1012 - Rev. E (532-0642-47-400-021712).
Packaging Description The inner container is a right parallelepiped 56-3/4-inch x 16-1/2-inch x 10-13/16 inch, constructed of 3/4-inch plywood, covered with 16 gage steel.
The top and bottom are lir.ed with 1/4-inch of high density polyethylene with 0.020-inch cadmium plate.
The spacer separating the two layers of the three fuel assemblies each consist of a 1-inch high density polyethylene, St% 2 11 T909210 g 6
2 1-inch of latex foam rubber, and 0.040-inch cadmium plate.
Positive closure is provided by a continuous Singe and two wire sealed hinge pins provide access.
The inner container is enclosed with an overpack, 71-inch x 21-1/4-inch x 15"3/8-inch, constructed of 1-inch plywood, framed by steel angle members and covered with 18 gage steel.
Aluminum impact limiters (3-1/2-inch) are fixed to the ends of the overpack.
Positive closure of the overpack is provided by four hinge pins which are secured in place using 1/16-inch diameter cotter pins.
The package weight is approximately 690 pounds.
Contents The contents are solid unieradiated miterials, as ETR or GETR fuel elements or control rod follower pieces (one in each of six (6) compartments) provided they contain no more than 520 grams of U-235 per element or follower piece.
The maximum quantity of material per package is not to exceed a Type A quantity, and the total U-235 content shall not exceed 3,120 grams per package.
Shipment is as Fissile Class I.
Structural / Thermal Evaluation The SAR (Reference 1) relies on the physical similarity between this container and the ATR shipping container which is described in Aerojet Nuclear Company Report No. TR-466, June 30, i975, (Reference 2), to demonstrate the adequacy of the packaging to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71.
The staff has previously reviewed the ATR shipping container and issued Certificate of Com-pliance No. 9099. The results of that review are described in the staff's safety evaluation report (Reference 3).
The packaging is also similar to the MTR shipping container approved by the NRC staff under Certificate of Comp iance No. 5705. The staff has compared the designs and find them to be similar in construction and size.
The staff is in agreement with the DOE Idaho Operations Office (Reference 4) acceptance of a comparative analysis as used by EG&G (Reference 1).
The adequacy of the ATR container was demonstrated by analysis (Reference 2).
The analytic methods were then verified by performing tests on cimilar packaging and comparing the analytic and test results.
The evaluation showed that there will be no reduction in package effectiveness for nornal conditions of transport. The accident damage conditions for fissile Type A shipments are considered only with respect to criticality as required by 10 CFR Part 71.
The significant results are:
- 1) The inner container is essentially undamaged, and the outer container only slightly damaged for the 30 foot free drop and the puncture tests; and 2) the fire test will not melt the cadmium plates or otherwise damage the inner container. Water tightness of the packaging is not demonstrated, but optimum water moderation is assumed in the criticality analysis.
Containment The packaging is us-d for shipment of fissile Type A material, and therefore, must satisfy containment requirements for normal conditions of transport.
Containment is provided by the fuel cladding.
The structural / thermal evaluation b%$Q
.-.-- z -
3 demonstrates that there is no reduction of packaging effectiveness for normal conditions, and therefore, the containment requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 are satisfied for normal conditions of transport.
Criticality The applicant performed two sets of criticality analyses for the ETR package.
The first analysis using a density analog method to determine the relative reactivity for dry and flooded arrays, demonstrated that the dry array was not the most reactive.
Tw? (2) flooded cases were considered in the second analysis, both assumed an infinite array of fuel elements.
In the first case al'. spaces in the model were assumed to be water filled.
In the second case, only the fuel element contained water.
The values calculated for k f r cases 1 and 2 were 0.69 and 0.66, eff respectively.
Since the cadmium plates are significant to criticality safety, it is necessary to ensure that the fuel be maintained within the compartments and completely covered by the cadmium plates. This requirement should be included as a condition of approval.
Charles E. MacDonald, Chief Transportation Certification Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety Date:
3 N, D i.'.
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