ML19208B165
| ML19208B165 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1979 |
| From: | Lentz R, Marsh R GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190169 | |
| Download: ML19208B165 (24) | |
Text
'
2 i
t UNITED STATFS OF *E?.ICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
l i
I In the Matter of:
2l IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 2;
of 4:
Richard R. Lent::
Cesign Engineer i
5i 6
7l 8!
(
Trailer #203 91 NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 1Cj Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
Juna 1 1979 12'.
(Date of Interv1ew) 131 Julv 6, 1979 (Date Transcript Typec)
I'c (Tape.1umoerts))
16i 17l 18i 19; 20!
21:
NRC PERSONNEL:
22' Robert Marsn, Investigater 23i Anthony ?!. Fasano, Inspecticn Scecialist 24; CQR.
') 3 6 25,:
q909190/b
t t
(
1!
MARSH:
The date is June 1, 1979.
The time is 2:27 p.m. and my name is 2:
Bob Marsh and I am an Investigator with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 31 Commission assigned to the Region III Offices in Chicago, Illinois.
4i This afternoon we are at Corporate Headquarters of GPU Service Corporation a
which are located at'260 Cherry Hill Road in Mountain Lakes, New Jersey.
Si At this time we will-be conducting an interview of Richard R. Lent: who I
7l is a Design Engineer with GPU and prior to starting, I would like to 0
have each individual in the room identify himself, spell his last name 9I and indicate what his position is.
Tony if we could start with you and 10t just go around the table.
11!
FASANO:
Anthony N. Fasano, Inspection Specialist, NRC.
131 14-LENTZ:
Richard R. Lentz, Control Systems Engineer.
15 16-HOVER :
J. G. Haver, Manager, Generation Division Support.
Ih 181 MARSH:
Thank you.
Prior to starting, Mr. Lent: we have a short dis-19i cussion regarding the two page memo which you have in front of you.
20:
Without going into detail, the memo basically puts out the purpose for 2i!
the investigation by the NRC, the scope of this investigation, the 22!
authority under which its being conducted.
It also addresses the i
23l rights of the individual being interviewed and on the second page are 24i 25i c u p,
I
~
l l
l 2
i 1:
several questions that I would like to get your response to at this 2
time, if I might.
The first question reads, do you understand the 31
{
above making reference to the two page memo?
4:
1 c:
1 LENTZ:
Yes, I do.
6i 7!
MARSH:
The second question reads.
Do we have your permission to tape 8I this interview?
9l 10l LENTZ:
Yes, you do.
11:
12!
MARSH:
And thirdly, do you want a copy of this tape and transcript?
s 131 14 LENTZ:
Yes.
15; 16:
MARSH:
Fine.
There is a fourth question that is not called out speci-17!
fically on the second page, but it :5 included in the body of the first 18f page and that addresses your right, if you so desire, to have a company 19I representative present with you during the interview and it is my 20:
understanding that this is Mr. Hover's capacity in the rocm at this 21t time.
22!
l 23t LENTZ:
Okay.
2 41 25; I
,C
)
g y
3 i
1'
~
)
MARSH:
Mr. Lentz, to start with, if we could, could you provide us 2
with a brief resume of your experience in the nuclear field then go 31 into a description of your duties with GPU and then finally, we'd like 4'l you, in your own words, to give us your recollections of your association m;
]
with the event of March 28 involving Three Mile Island, starting with 6i the manner and time which you first found out about it and then more or 7f less the sequence of events that took place that you were involved in 8'
during the first couple of days.
9' 10!
LENT 2:
Okay.
Essentially, my experience in the nuclear field starts 11!
with my naval experience back in 1965.
I began training as a Reactor 12!
Operator in the Naval Nuclear Power Program, served as a Reactor Operator 13; on the submarine " Benjamin Franklin" for three years and then after a 14' period of shore duty in the Naval Submarine School, served for two 15 years as the Reactor Control Division Chief Petty Officer on the submarine 16:
" Thomas Edison" which I was, not only a Reactor Operator, but also the 17l Engineering Watch Supervisor and started to receive some training 18r towards the Engineering-Officer of the Watch on the submarine.
After 19I that I... after my discharge from the Navy I was a startup test engineer 20:
with Three Mile Island Unit 1 and there I was the cognizant engineer 21l for the reactor protection systems, the integrated control systems, 22l several other minor control systems, such as the nuclear detectors and 2
other systems.
Most of my time was spent on the reactor protection 2
equipment and integrated control system and I was a startup test engineer 25!
( k)
l
.t i
e.
l 4
i l]'
for Unit 2 and again it was the reactor protection systems, irtegrated 2
control syst3m and had a little bit more involvement with the control 3!
rod drive system and more balance of plant, meaning the secondary 41 support type irr,trumentation.
After the startup of Unit 2 about May-June C
of last year,1978, I was trans'ferred up here, I received my transfer 6i before we had realized that we weren't going to get it started in June 7
of last year and served, here as... kind of back and forth to the OI island until we get ic started up, and also in the electrical and 9I instrumentation department.. After we got the Unit started up, I was 10i transferred again over into the Control and Saf ety Analysis Sr: tion ard 11:
there my duties consisted of analyzing trantients such as this incident 12f that happened and other lesser events so that we could find out exact.ly 13I what happened, what we could do to prevent them and in essence, using 14 my experience as a startup engineer and knowledge of the reactor pro-15; tection system, the control systems and so on to get a, you know, a 16{
on-hands type experience of the equipment rather than a designer's idea 17l of the equipment. When this event occurred... that morning we received ISj worc that it happened and it was kind of sketchy.
The impression I had 19!
that it was just a typical reactor trip but that somehow during the 20 recovery or in shutting the plant down that the emergency feedwater had 21:
not initiated properly and that when they did initiate it, that they 22l had ruptured one of the tubes in the steam generator and this had i
23!
caused some contamination in the secondary plant and it was this con-24j tamination that they were sorried about that was being released.
25;
)d t %,
i
I
[
5 I
li Initially we were going to go down there to find out what caused the 2;
accident and to basically have sort of a short term recovery.
It 3t looked,... you know, from what I recall at the time that it was only i
4!
going to be two to three weeks to clean up the problem and get the Unit e
t.
back oa the line.
Then it did not appear that bad.
I would say the first recollection I had of anything being abnormal was on the way down 7t i
listening to the radio in the car they had cordoned off the area and 81 were not letting people in and around Three Mile Island and were con-9!
sidering evacuating and that to me made me think that, hey, something 10 happened there a lot more worse than a ruptured tube in a steam generator.
11; When wa arrived at the site and I'd say that that really drove home 12 that something was bad in that they would not let us enter the site, 13t they had the security guards at the north gate, directed us on up to 14 the Observation Center and there we went in and tried to find out what 15' had haopened but the Cbservation Center was used as a control center 16i for the,... what is it,...
17f 18f MARSH: The environmental survey teams?
191 20f LENTZ:
And that, and the majority of people there that you could talk 21l to didn't have an idea of exactly what was going on.
It wasn't that, 22l you know, not that people didn't know what was going on, the people 23t that I could get free to talk to that I knew and so on I knew would 241 talk to me just had no more of an idea of what was going on then I did.
25i
,j s
6 1!
Eventually,... it was about 6:00, 6:30 or so, George Kunder came out 2;'
and gave Gary Broughton and I, Jim Moore, and George Leman, and Julian 31 Abromovitch a brief run down and said that you knew he would be glad to 4j those of us that wanted to go in to help collect data and any of us c '
that wanted to go in and help them with the problem onto the site and I felt that it was rather important for me to get in there and get some i
of the data so that Gary Broughton and I can analyze it and start 8
trying to get an idea of what happened.
The rest of the men, not being
'3 that familiar with plant operations, or so on, felt that they would 10!
Just be in the way in there ard declined.
They stayed there at the 11 Observation Center waiting for my return.
Once I got in on the site 12:
into the Control Room, things looked under control.
I could see that 13!
things were a lot worse than even that George had relayed to me when I 141 could see that the control console T indicators were pegged high and h
15' the T indicators were pegged low and that the pumps weren't running c
16:
and they were trying to get a pump started.
I stayed back out of the 17i way waiting for personnel that I knew would knew where information was 18!
that I could get a hold of to get it out.
It was after they had gotten 15i the reactor coolant pumps started, I'm not sure exactly what time it 20:
was sometine around 8:00, 8:30 or so after they gotten the coolant 21; pumps started that I finally got a hold of scmeone and had learned that 22:
... I forget his name, but :2ne of the Unit 2 engineers had gotten...
23l had gathered all the data during the early portion of the transient 2I
, that came off of the computer, the alarm summary reviews, sequence of 25!
., g '
- Q
(-
{
7 l
~
li events and the other data that I knew, would be readily available and 2l easy to interpret and to give us an idea of what happened.
Seeing that 31 this data was not available and trying to find him and he wasn't available 4l and wouldn't be available until the next morning, I made xerox copies Si i
of the alarm summary reviews and information that was there in the Si storage area behind the printers on the plant computer, feeling that if 71 I didn't get a copy of it now it might get lost and that we wouldn't Si have any record of it.
91 10!
MARSH: What was the volume of the records that were there behind the 11, computer in the storage compartment?
12:
i 13!
LENTZ:
It was your 8 x 10 inch printout computer paper fanfolded and 14 then a pile of it was at least 3/4 of an inch high.
It took me about 2
' 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of standing at the xerox machine copying it.
One sheet at a 16 time.
17!
18f MARSH: What time span would that have covered? Six hour period, one 19!
hour period, two hour period?
20!
21!
LENTZ:
It was from about... I think it was from about 0 or 8:30 in 22l the morning until right after they started the cooling pump at 2000.
2 So it was about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of data.
24i 25i 0;I CfO l
{
8
[
^]
MARSH:
And your saying that the remainder for the time of the event, 4 21 a.m. up till they had been removed by one of the operators who was 3l consolidating a package?
4!
Si LENTZ:
Right.
Now I did find this package the next morning with all r
61 of the data that he had.
7l i
8' i
MARSH: Who is he?
9!
10!
LENTZ:
I'm trying to remember his name.
11, 12!
MARSH:
I'm going down the list: Miller, Zewe, Scheimann, Faust, 13l Frederick.
14' 15 LENTZ:
No, it was a Unit 1, I believe, electrical engineer, or excuse 16:
me, Unit 2 Electrical Engineer, Mike Benson, it's not Bensel, it's 17l Benson.
1St 19' FASANO:
Benzel is electrical; Senson is nuclear.
20 21i LENTZ:
Yea.
Mike Benson, Nuclear Engineer.
t 22' 23l MARSH:
Okay fine.
24:
25j
.~
ccn l
- t i
l 9
i l'
LENTZ:
After I got the xerox copies of the data that were there that 2]'
had printed off on the computer, I put the data back there in the 31 baskets behind the printers and took the xerox copies that I had on out 41 to the Observation Center.
5?
MARSH:
About what time was this?
7!
8I LENTZ:
Pretty close to midnight.
11, 11:30.
I don't remember what 9!
time I got back there, but I remember I got back to the motel right 10!
arouno midnight. And we didn't stay there very long after I got back.
11:
12!
FASANO: When you were xeroxing the data, did you xerox any of the 13'l analog output?
14) 15i LENTZ:
No.
16i 17l FASANO:
Was any of the analog data taken off the charts at that time ISI do you know of?
19!
20' LENTZ:
I'm fairly sure that all the data, at least the data during the 21!
significant portion of the event, from the time of the trip until about 22l the time of the coolant pump was restarted was taken off the folicwing 231 day which would be the 29th, sometime in the morning.
Now I kind of 241 get to it by hearsay or whatever, my recollection that it was Ivan 25i
.. s
-u%
t
I i
i
[
10 l!
Porter that directed to have just this portion of the data taken off 2'
and this was all put in a manila folders and... your standard inter-company 3!
routine envelopes and once I found that this data had been taken off I 4:
got xerox copies of that hoping that that would also help because we 5:
i discovered that due to a problem on the computer there was a portion of Si data that was missing from the alarm summary review typer and it left 7ii out some data which would have been helpful as to when high pressure 8I injection pumps were started or stopped basically left a hole from I
about 5:00 to 5:53 or so. We were looking for some way to fill in that
'O!
^
hole.
11!
12l FASANO:
You did find information to fill in that hole?
131 14)
LENTZ:
Not computer data.
Over the period of the next week or so I
.,3 searched everywnere I could and finally came to the conclusion that it 16:
just never got printed out.
I 17l 181 FASANO:
Go back a little bit here. What time were you informeo that 19!
the event had taken place, say when you first came in to your office 20f you say you heard things but you didn't fix a time?
21:
22l LENTZ:
It was somewhere between 8:30 and 9:00 in the morning of the i
23!
28th.
24; 25!
~} Eg1 c uw
f I
i l
11 li FASANO:
How were you informed?
2; 31 LENTZ:
My Supervisor, Gary Broughton came in and said that, you know, 4:
looks like we'll be making, or that you may have to make a trip to c~i Three Mile Island to collect some data on the transient.
At the time 6i it looked like it was, like I said, just a normal trip, normal transient and we would need the information for analysis.
Si QI FASANO:
Did you know there was a gen'eral emergen::y decleared?
10l LENTZ:
No I didn't.
Not at that time.
12l 13!
FASANO:
You learned this over the radio then in your car radio?
14!
15' LENTZ:
Even though I had heard that the police had cordoned off the 16' area the first time I knew there was a general emergency was when I 17 went to the Observation Center sometime talking to people then.
18i 191 FASANO:
So that information was not transmitted to G?U apparently, or 20:
at least to you?
21; 22l LENTZ:
Well at least not to me.
23!
24l 25i 1['J op, s
c
l I
i 12 i
1:
FASANO:
You were to look at the emergency feedwater not initiating 2:
}
properly you said?
31 4i LENTZ:
Just basically into the whole problem.
El Gi FASANO:
Okay, but when did you find out the emergency feecwater had 7i l
not initiated properly? It sounded like you knew the first day.
Is 8!
that correct?
91 10 LENTZ:
I knew something had happened... that something happened that
~^:
caused a leak in the steam generator.
12' i
13!
FASANO: A potential leak or a leak.
Do you today that there is a 14!
leak?
' 5..
16; LENTZ: They said that the secondary system was contaminated and they 17!
were worried about how they were going to decontaminate it and it's 18(
hard to separate what I know now as compared to what I knew then.
19!
20i FASANO:
I understand.
21:
22!
LENTZ:
But I do know that we knew that the secondary system was con-23i taminated and was going to have to be cleaned up.
2ai 25i i
's b c is
{
13 l
1!
FASANO:
Okay.
2' 3t LENTZ:
It didn't look like a major problem.
4:
}l FASANO: Well then at this time, to your best recollection did you know Gi that once-through steam generators had lacked water in the first eight 71 l
minutes.
81 9!
LENTZ:
No, that I didn't know.
10i v;
FASANO:
Okay.
So it was an improper action thet caused the potential 12!
of having something happen to your steam generators.
That was the 13 information you had?
141 15i LENTZ:
Right.
M 17l FASANO:
Subsequently, what is the results on your data c::llection as 18!
far as the performance of your involvement? What I'm getting at is 191 have you, you say all data, now when you say all that's kind of encem-20j passing.
Was there-any sequence of things that you had to evaluate or 21!
look at or were you just collecting the data?
22l 23; 24l 25; l
I S\\
( uo
{
14 LENTZ:
I was just collecting data and I did this for about the first 2!
three days.
That was my responsibility to gather the data to ensure 31 l
that the tape from the reactimeter which is basically a sort of transient 4:'
type monitor that is connected to some analog points, that this tape c
l got saved and that we got a printout of this tape so that we could us Si it in aiding our analysis of the problem and ensuring that these analog 7
recording charts and so on, all got saved and that nobody walked off with them.
9!
10!
FASANO: So the first day of activity was mainly to maka contacts, to n
~
assure that you had copies of information of both analog and digital, 2
in particular the digital data.
13l 14' LENTZ:
Right.
15:
16; FASAN0: And for future review and analysis.
During the first day did 17!
you do any analysis, did you give any advice, did you get involved to 18t any degree in the operations?
19f 20i LENTZ:
The first day we plotted, we did a plot of pressure and temper-21!
ature and we took temperature and did a saturation, you know, look up 22j in the steam tables to find saturation pressure and basically discovered 1
2 31 that they depressuri:ed to the point that they got below the saturation 24i 25i i
s o
o co
l 1
i i
15 1:
curves.
It caused possibly a bubble in the vessel and so on and this 2:
is about the extent of my actual analysis and involvement that first 3;
day.
4!
=i
~
FASANO: What time was that that you came up with these findings?
Si 7i j
LENTZ:
This was late that evening.
8I 9!
FASANO: 8:00, 9:00.
You were xeroxing around 8:00?
10j 11 LENTZ:
Right.
It was after I'd come back to the Observation Center 12;l and before we had gone, before we had left that evening.
131 14:
FASANO: Midnight?
.li 16' LENTZ:
Yea.
17!
181 FASANO:
You really had information after'6 or 6:30, I guess Mr. Kunder 19!
came out and briefed you then you went to the Control Room, about wnat 20l time did you arrive in the Control Roem?
21; 22!
LENTZ:
It was before they started the pump, I'd say about 7:00 or so, 2dl 1900.
24!
25i jb o,r,,
c
i l
1 i
l 16 l!
FASANO: Okay.
And at that time you had a chance to look and you saw 2!
l that the T, that the hot leg temperature pegged?
h 3:
4I' LENTZ:
Right.
Si 6i FASANO:
And at that time I guess you were concerned about... did you 7'
j look at pressure at that time also?
8i 9
LENTZ:
No, I just rememoer seeing Th pegged high and T d wn at the c
10!
bottom of the instrument.
I couldn't even tell you the temperature l l that it read, that it was down at the bottom of its range on the wide 12 range.
13l 14 FASANO:
Do you have any questions?
.15i 16; MARSH:
I've got one question.
The xerox copies of these documents 17!
that you made for your own use, what was the disposition of those, are 18l they still available?
19' 20!
LENTZ:
They were gathered together and put in files and it was during 21; the course of the next two or three days that I starttd gathering up 22l this data and organizing a file.
It was on about the second or third 23{
24!
25!
1B o 9.
~~
c
[
17 f
i 1:
day that they moved me over into a data analysis section trying to 2!
analyze exactly what caused the problem and coming up with, at that 3:
stage of the game basically nothing more than a sequence of events of 4I what had happened and what may have triggered the event.
Not exactly i
how it had happened but when each thing had happened because it was, 6i the magnitude of it was just to great to find out how each event had 7I l
happened and whether an operator had initiated it or whether some other 8 '
plant parameter or some other plant condition had initiated the event.
9 And there, you know, we gathered the xerox copies together in files and 10l put them under a heading of duplicate data or xerox copy data and had p^.'
^;
the original data also there in the file.
And then about three or four 12 days later, maybe a week later, the rest of the trena recorder lors, 13!
the rolls of trend recorder data were included in this file and was 14' transferred over, I believe it was Jerry Wiser.
15i 16 MARSH:
Bob Long?
17l 18i LENTZ:
Bob Long and Jerry Wiser and so on in that group.
They took 19!
control of it, cataloging it and so on because this, we were getting so 20!
much that you couldn't put it into a manila folder and file in that way 21!
anymore.
Just too much information and too hard to find what you need 2'
and too hard to make sure that you didn't lose anything.
23!
24l 25i
-(
3 a
s
i 18 i
l 1'
MARSH:
Sy the way, that does bring out a point, which Id11 address to 2:
you, Mr. Hover that you might want to ensure that all your people here 31 are aware of, that there has been an ordered issued by NRC that the 41 preservation of all records...
Si i
6i HOVER:
Yes, that's been sent out to everybody.
/
81 MARSH:
I know that scme people today referring to personal notes and ou they should be cautioned to preserve those.
I don't see any need to 10!
collect them at this time, but as long as they are preserving them if 11 anything should come up.
~
131 HOVER:
Yes.
14l 15i FASANO:
In your capacity at GPU, do you look at transients, other 16 transients, or previous transients, other than this particular event, 17!
are you familiar with previous transients at TMI-2?
18f 191 LEN7:
Yes, I was deeply involved in the main steam safety valve 20:
problem where the main' steam safety valves failed to reseat and this 21!
caused a depressuri::ation and safety injection into the system and 22l tried to find out exactly what had happened and why it happened and 22!
through this analysis and my input we were able to determine that the 24l main steam safety valve had stayed open longer than they should have.
25i e
I
i i
l i
l 19 i
l{'
MARSH:
I'm going to interrupt for a minute and creak the tape at this 2:
point.
3l 4'
MARSH:
Resuming now, the time being 2:58, reading 480 on the meter.
Si FASANO:
During previous reviews of data I guess it wouldn't be on an 7'
l emergency call on that day basis, or would it, I mean, such as the one you mentioned, the April transient when you had the problem with the QI
~
10!
LENTZ:
Usually it was the same day.
I'd get called and I'd be told 12f I'd have to go down there either that evening or the next morning and 13!
try and gather the data the react *-tr printouts and I usually got 14 called because of my familiarity with the plant and the fact that I had 15 worked there at the plant, I knew where the control rooms were, I knew i
16; the people themselves individually, so they basically do things for me 17!
easier and quicker and I knew who to ask, wnere their offices are, 18f because it's not one building.
You've got trailers spread all over and 19f you got electrical in one area and instrumentation somewhere else...
20!
unless you've worked down there for awhile it gets rather difficult, 21!
especially if you want to go down there and in four or five hours 22!
gather all the necessary information that you need so that you can do 23i an indepth study on the transient.
l 241 25l
. C n
('
s
l
.l '
20 1!
FASANO:
Did you get involved in any other transients during 1978?
3[
LENT 2:
Yes, it was just... very similar, it was a loss of feedwater 4!
... I'm trying to think... it was... I don't remember the initiating
,c; event, but it was again a loss of feedwater trip.
It ended up being a Si reactor trip.
Several of the other trips that we had, even the normal 7\\
plant power escalation systam, power escalation testing, some of those 81 trips, we looked at because we were looking at using this data to make ci
~;
corrections to the Retran.
10j 17:
FASANO:
Retran?
~'
12!
13 LENT 2:
Retran Program, it's a computer printout program that can 14i stimulate what would happen if you lost the condensate pump of feed 15 pump.
We were analyzing this data and using it to insure that the 10 Retran Program predicted things the way the plant actually behaved.
17l 18' FASANO:
Would this then be used by B&W?
19!
20r LENTZ: We were using it for our own information.
I assume that eventually 21:
some of the information gets passed on to B&W.
They work together with 22; us, but I was specifically doing it for our own company.
23l 24!
25l t
t U*O
f 21 i
6 1
FASANO:
Do you have any questions?
2!
3{
MARSH:
No, I have no other questions.
4!
c; j
FASANO: Well, maybe at this point you might want to express anything
~
6i you learned that might be helpful for someone coping with a similar 7
situation in the future.
If you want to, you can speak out now.
8l 1
b LENTZ:
Basically, like you've heard, my problems with collecting the 10!
data... I would think that on a transient, any transient, reactor 11; trip, there should be a specific outlined procedure of exactly what 12f happens to the data, who gets it, who is routed to, and so on, because 131 the data that I was looking for the first day... it... this is another 14' normal trip, it goes into this routing basket, and this engineer picks 15' it up and so on, and'when your trying to find out, because we were 16i pressed for information, what had happened, what had caused it... it 17 was hard for us to find out what hapoened and what caused it, because 18!
we couldn't find the data or the information that would tell us what 19!
had happened.
And if there was a specific -'ethod, I think at all 20j plants, all nuclear power plants, the data on the computar, or wnatever 21 the printoffs are taken off and collected and put in this file and I'd 25j say preferably a fireproof file or something like that so that somecocy 231 knows where it is and its under controlled access from the very first 2d moment.
By my looking for the data during that half hour or so that 25i G);
a(s
(
~)
?
t i
22 i
- l!
was missing from the computer, I came to the conclusion that it never 2
got printed out, but I'd hate to think that somewhere floating around 31 that island is 15 to 20 feet of computer tape with that dtata on there 4 '
because it sure would make things easier for us.
.ike I said, I looked
~R for about a week for it and finally came up with che conclusion, from Si my experience and knowledge of how that computer works, it could of not got printed out, because a technician went in to repair the computer.
8l If you look at the data, you'll note that both the sequence of events, 9I and the alarm summary are both printing off of one typewriter and not 10f that I'm accusing the technician of something, but the technician could 1
of disconnected the typewriter incorrectly and made the computer think 12f t'iat it had both typewriters there and it printed out information on a 131 non-existent typewtitar.
And then when he plugged the typewriter back 14!
in or did whatever he did, the data started printing out again, but 15:
it's nothing more than a software type information thats looking to see 16:
if a typewriter is out there.
If if thinks the typewriter is out 1
t' tere, it's going to print that data.
And since it's not stored in 18i memory anywhere, once it thinks it's printed out, it's lost.
As long 19!
as it doesn't print it out, it will save it, but once it prints out, 20!
it's gone.
So a control procedure of data acquisition and control 21i should be instituted essentially at the same time you have any type of 22l emergency condition like that.
23l i
25i cd
I l
t r
23 i
1:
FASANO:
That's all I have.
2:
4
~
MARSH:
If no one has anything else, then we'll close.
The time being M'
3:06 PM with about 652 on the meter and Rich we would just like to say
- t l
thank you for your time and your comments were appreciated very much.
~
6i So I'll terminate the interview at the time of 3:07.
7l 8:
9!
10l 11!
13!
14' 15 16i 17; IS!
191 20t 21!
22,'
23j 24!
2Si
.r
), 3 >
V fl, P
t g