ML19208B151
| ML19208B151 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1979 |
| From: | Lehmann G, Marsh B GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190136 | |
| Download: ML19208B151 (34) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULA7ORY COMMISSION i
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1!
In the Matter of:
1 2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW i
31 of George L. Lehmann Senior Engineer, Generation 41 GPU i
Si 6I 7!
Sl Trailer #203 9i NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Pcwcr Plant 10j Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
June 1, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13j July 6, 1979 (Date Transcript Typec) 14i 294 15!
(Tape Nu=cer(s))
161 17!
ISf 19i 201 21i NRC PERSONNEL:
22!
Sob Marsh Anthony N. Fasano 23!
J. G. Hover (GPU) i 24 CR~R 2Sr
,7909,90 126 7,
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lj MARSH: The date is June 1, 1979.
The time is 10:24 a.m. This is Bob Marsh 2j and I am an !nvestigator with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3
assigned to the R2gion III Office, Chicago, Illinois.
This morning we are 4;
in the facilities of the GPU Service in their Corporate Headquarters 5l located at 250 Cherry Hill Road, Parsippany, New Jersey I'm sorry that's Si Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. We are here to conduct interviews with some of 7'
GPU Service Corporation's personnel and at this time have present with us g
Mr. George L. Lehmann, who is a Senior Engineer in the Generation Section.
gj Before we start I'd like the other individuals in the room to identify 10 themselves, spell their last name and indicate their position.
11!
FASANO:
12 Anthony N. Fasano, Inspection Specialist, NRC, last name F A 5 A N 13 141 ANN:
s s eorge e m nn, H M A N., Senior Engineer, GPU 15 Service Corporation, Generation Division.
.6:
17!
1 HOVER:
18t J. G. Haver, H 0 V E R, Manager, Generation Division Support.
191 MARSH:
Mr. Lehmann before the tapa on I made reference to a two page memo which you have in front of you, without going into detail, I will just 21;,
generally say that this memo as we discussed covers the purpose of NRC's investigation...goes into a scope of the investigation and NRC's authority 231 to conduct it and also addresses the rights of the individual being inter-24}
viewed... included on there are three questions on the second page that I'd n
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1.l like to get your response to at this time.
The first question reads:
Do you understand the above, indicating the two page memo?
2 '
3!
LEHMANN:
Yes I do.
4; Si MARSH:
6 And secondly, do we have your permission to tape this interview?
i 7!
l LEHMANN:
Yes you do.
8 91 MARSH:
10:l And thirdly, do you request a copy of the tape and or transcript?
Ui LEHMANN:
I'd like a transcript if I can.
i e
.vARSH:
Fine. We will provide both for you.
There is a fourth question 14 that is not specifically called out covering the body of the letter and 151 that addressed your right to have a company representative present and it's my understanding that that is Mr. Hover's position at this time.
17,;
ISt LEHMANN:
That's acceptable to me.
19!
20t MARSH: Okay thank you. If you would could I get you to fill out that 22l.
second page? While you are doing that what we'd like to begin with Mr. Lehmann is if you would give us a brief resume of your background, your experience 2 31 in the nuclear industry and your job duties, decision duties with GPU.
241 Following that we would like to have you in your own words however you best 25i 9
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wai't to say it, give us your involvement with the TMI incident of March 28 1;
from your initial notification to how you became inco1ved, arrived on site 2
and what was accomplished during the first three days.
3 4!
5; LEHMANN:
Okay.
My background is that I've been working for ESASCO Services fcr the for approximately twelve years with a two year break in between for 6
7j service in the armed forces.
Since graduation from high school, I started l
working at ESASCO on nuclear excuse me, on power plant designs, first g
g fossils.
When I returned from the service in 1970, it was more fossil till about 1972 where I started becoming involved in nuclear power plant design 10i as a mechanical engineer and when I left EBASCO I was : Senior Engineer in
]
the Mechanical Department as the Lead Systems Engineer for a four unit PWR f r Carolina Power and Light, Sharon-Harris Project.
13 14!g MARSH:
Mr. Lehmann if you would could you spell E3ASCO just for the sake of the transcription.
17l LEHMANN:
18 ESASCO is spelled E P A S C 0.
191 MARSH:
Thank you.
21:
LEHMANN:
Two years service in the armed forces.
One year was with the Nuclear Reactor Group at Fort Belvar where I taught mechanical engineering 23 to the future operators of their power plants for Tri-Service Nuclear Power 241 System.
25!
I joined GPU in August,1978, and started off on the modification
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41
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lj project to a coal fired facility and also became involved in any problems that arose at TMI such as heater drain pump problems and in January the 2
l rupture of the atmospheric dump bellows.
Do you want me to go on into the 3
incident now?
4i i
Si MARSH:
Yes if you would.
6 i
7l LEHMANN:
Okay.
On March 28th I arrived a little later in the moiaing g
gj approximately 9:00 because I had a nose bleed in the morning, and about 15 minutes later Jim Moore came around told my boss Gary Kafadano who was 0
]
standing beside me to get his fears on and I knew at that point that there was a problem probably at TMI. About a half hour or an hour later we had a
]
meeting which was attended by several people, Don Cromberg, Gary Capadano, Bob Keeton, Gary Groton... let's see who else was there...I think John Thorpe...
14!
I think that's it...where we had a very rough sketch af problems that existed at TMI as far as we knew at that time.
We knew a transient occurred, 17l we knew that the reac:or coolant pumps had stopped, we knew that there was
)
an instrument air system failure, we knew that there was a leak in one of the steam generators. We made an Action Item List and dispatched five 19!
people to the site at that time.
My item was to determine wnat in the 20l instrument air system failed to...that could have possibly caused the 21:
transient to occur in the first place. Since I had a nose bleed in the 22l morning I started to get it coiteri:ed and I went over to St. Claire's to 23f l
get that done and didn't get out of there till about 12:00 and right after 24j that joined Julian Nabromavich and myself took the company car and left for 25j l
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q TMI arrived approximately 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />. When...couldn't get in the north 2{
gate and were directed to the Observation Centar where many of the Met Ed i
3j personnel were waiting around and where they had set up headquarters.
We 1
4j tried to find out what happened at that time. We knew...we realized at Si that time the situation was bad...in the control center we heard the reports g
that were coming over the radios about the radiation levels about the 7
perimeter...at the perimeter of the island and also they started to take g
the surveys around the towns. Gary Groton had Rich Lence arrived later Jim Moore arrived before us.
Those were the five that went out to the g
10j island that day.
11!
MARSH:
Your approximate time here is late afternoon.
131 LEHMANN:
My approximate arrival time was 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />. Jim Moore had gotten 14,!
there approximately two hours before us and Gary Groton, Rich Lence arrived together approximately an hour after we did. We just stayed around and observed what was happening much more than the radiation level reports are coming over we weren't privy to that information at that time.
We started looking at the flow diagrams that we had brought with us to try to determine what in the air system could have failed that essentially was the first 20!
time that I had looked at the instrument and station air system that existed 21!
at TMI.
Later that evening Gary Groton and Rich Lence went back to the 22!
motel and they intended to come back later or early morning to try to 231 retrieve scme of the computer outputs and they reactimeter data to determine 24!
what the transient actually was. Jim Moore and myself and Julian stayed in 25i g
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6 the Observation Center with myself and Julian staying until approximately gj 4:00 a.m. at which time we had started interviewing some of the operators 3j that were on the site at the time of the incident.
I don't remember what i
the names were...one of them was Bubba Marshall... Walter Butler Ma 4
...I know what the others look like I don't remember specifically their names.
Si We had a tape recorder which Jim Moore had brought with him and we started 6
l recording their con...their grcup debriefing which they had started on 7
gj their own to try to determine what they did or what they should have done gj and so forth.
At 4:00 in the morning, Julian Nabromavitch and I left to go t
the hotel to get some sleep and Jim Moore had stayed on at that time to 10 g
continue on the debriefing.
Julian and myself returned to the island to the Observation Center approximately 10:00 or 11:00 in the morning again
]
and again stayed in the Observation Center.
I don't recall whether I tried 14!
al ing n Crcmberg and or Gary Capadano the previous evening or that morning.
The information that I had wasn't much more than I had when I arrived other than we had a bad situation with the radiation being released.
16!
By approximately 1:00 on the 29th.. 1:00 in the afternoon on the 29th, Gary Groton came off the island and shortly thereafter Rich Lence'came off IS!
and they had some data with them.
They had the computer printouts...I think it was the long printout...I don't know if they use long...I think it c01 l
was sequence of events printout that they brought with them which we started 21!
22f going through and Gary Groton started plotting pressures and steam generator and feed flow to the steam generators.
231 24l 25i gi, 1~i >
6 7
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_ Marsh speaking.
Can I ask you a question on that sequence of MARSH:
i gj events printout did you find that relatively complete or where there large 3j gaps in some data or what was the adequacy of that printout?
l 4!
Si LEHMANN:
At that time we were just locking at the period around 4:00 to 6
determine what the pressures were and what the flows were so that Groton 7
could plot them.
Si MARSH:
Okay.
Did you find it an adequate document to work from at that g,
I**
10i 11!
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LEHMANN:
It showed that the feedwater flow had dropped off quite rapidly the pressure had gone up and I don't remember what Gary Groton's comment was about the the NSSS system at that time.
~15 MARSH: Would you recall the length of time-you had available to look at?
,6, 1
171 LEHMANN: We started looking at it about I'd say aoout 1:00-2:00 in the afternoon.
191 20!
MARSH:
No I'm looking more for the document itself what was the span of 21; that document covered?
22!
231 LEHMANN:
Oh.
The document I think started prior to 4:00 and I think it 24!
went...I think it went for two or three hours into the incident. Again we 25i g 'l 3 c, 9, c
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stayed around the Observation Center just hanging around looking at 1!
2l flow diagrams and went home and made some suggestions based on ersations 3j we're hearing people being qualified on respirators and so forth an i
think I suggested to somebody that people who aren't qualified if 4{
you need gj to get them in there one of the qualifications was a physical i
examination 6l they could get a doctor from the area who will examine them and give them 7j training right at the Observation Center.
Another concern was the iodine release from the water that was spilled in the auxiliary building and g
e of the comments was how can we stop the release and someone s g
putting oil on top of it and the next question was where do you get o 10 said you've got a lot of oil in the sux boiler fuel oil storage tanks th you can use.
I don't think that they ever put oil on there.
I think they considered that too much of a cleanup problem at that time. Other tha
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that, the second day I don't remember much more than that The third g
day...
16i MARSH:
Excuse me, before you start the third day let me adcress o 17!
you've mentioned...a taped interview of Subba Marshall...who was ng completed by? Who was doing the interviewing?
201 LEHMANN:
They were debriefing themselves.
The operators that were on shift at the time.
They started debriefing themselves...I noticed up there 22'
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and I knew that Jim Moore had a tape recorder so we took it upstairs 23l sitting on a platform on the upstairs portion of the Observation Cent e
2 41 and we just started taping it.
I don't know how clear that tape finally came 25i out whether you are concerned who was talking or what they were f{ U S
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lj MARSH:
Do you know the location of that tape?
i 2l t
3l LEHMANN:
Uh no I don't.
I think it's probably in the data reduction center.
4 51' MARSH:
Thank you.
Gi i
7!
LEHMANN:
g The third day we were allowed to go on the island and we went to gj the processing center north side of the island... north side of Unit 1 and 10(
we started wohg on procedures at dat dme condngency procedures for various items...one of them hat I recall was creating a LOCA if we need to and we were going to do th.t by rupturing the seals on one of the reactor coolant pumps. We were also working on a procedure for starting another reactor coolant pump if the pump that was running at that time which was the "A" pump tripped on us and there were some other procedures...I don't recall what they were specifically...they were all listed I think as "Z" procedures...and a record of those was maintained and is being maintained i
17!
by the Met Ed Engineering Group. After that we started getting assistance from people outside the Met Ed-GPU system in terms of writing procedures 191 who came from Combustion Engineering, people came from Jersey Central, 20!
which is part of GPU and we were working on various procedures at that time 21!
and we had two shifts going by that time day and night shift writing these 22!
procedures.
One of the problems we had was in turnover of procedures getting procedures reviewed and getting people knowledgeable of the plant i
24j systems to work with us and finally we were able to get...with each shift 25, 1
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10 If we were able to get a control room operator type to work with us and we 2j were also fortunate to be able to get some of the plant startup people to l
31 work with us who were called in by that time.
That carrys us through th'e 4
third day.
Si MARSH:
Okay Tony do you want to?
6i i
7!
FASANO:
Yes Fasano speaking.
I'd like to go back to the first day.
8 g,
Apparently you were informed somewhere about 9:00 or so when you came to 10l w rk.
Apparently you had information on thi instrument error, the steam generator and let's see one other system problem in the reactor coolant pumps.
131 LEHMANN:
Correct.
14i 151 FASANO:
Would you...then you were told to go to the site and you arrived at the site about 1600.
17!
18i LEHMANN:
That's correct.
19t 20:
FASANO:
In looking at the instrument air and service air did you come up with any conclusions as to cause of initiation?
22l t
231' LEHMANN:
Not at that time no. At that time I wasn't allowed to investigate 24)'
that we were working on other things in terms of bringing the unit down and 25j c :,y
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j 11 1l working on procedures.
I didn't get to investigate the cause of the 1
2 accident till last week.
I 3!
FASANO:
Well now that you have investigated can you give us your results?
Si Sj LEHMANN:
I'm writing a report now can I release the results?
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_ Has the report been completed now or is it in a preliminary HOVER:
...are 91 you in the middle of it?
10I I
_LEHMANN:
I am in the middle of writing it.
i 12!
HOVER:
131 Yah Bob Arnold had requested that if we are in the middle of ing something we'd racner not give the, you know, half way conclu i s ons that we might not have solidified at this point in time we can give yo 15!
u a copy 16i as soon as it's comolete.
17,'
HOVER:
Okay when would you expect it to be complete?
18l 19!
_LEHMANN:
l It should be completed by the middle of next week.
20 1
21:
HOVER:
Okay we will see that you get a copy.
22' 23)f FASANO: Alright.
I'd like to ask some specific questions on the secondary 24!
system in particular the instrument air, service air, my understandin 25i l
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service air is you have a cross-connect so that you can actually provide 2
some air from the service air to boost the instrument air.
Is that correct?
I 3:
41 LEHMANN:
The station and instrument air systems the compressors and receivers 5
are essentially one system as they are cperating now.
The instrument 6i air... consider instrument air the dry air which is being taken off down-7 stream of dryers and tne other portion which goes out to the surface air g
stations as service air but it's all open to each other.
Si FASANO:
So it's a common system.
10 11:
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LEHMANN:
It's a common system now, i
131 l
FASANO: Now, I don't understand that, was it before?
141 15 LEHMANN:
All of... initially it was designed to be separate systems with a manual isolation valve between the two and comments that I received was that the instrument air system didn't have enough capacity and therefore they keep that cross-connection valve open all the time.
There's another automatic operated valve in the station air line which feeds the plant 21(l which is supposed to close when the compressor discharge header pressure goes below a certain setpoint.
That valve is open all the time.
22!
i 23l FASANO:- Ah 25i (2,
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13
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LEHMANN:
I don't know whether that valve is operable or not I think it's 2:
pegged just hand-cranked open.
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4 FASANO:
So there's no check valve in that system.
Si LEHMANN:
At that point there's no check valve in the system.
71 i
gj FASAH0: Was there ever a check valve in that system?
r 9!
g LEHMANN:
Not there.
There's a check valve in the air line to the polishing 11!
in the statien air line to tne polishing demineralizers.
12:
FASANO:
13 Okay so for water to get from the polishers to the instrum3nt air it had to pass the check valve...the crossover valve...is it an automatic valve...the dryers?
16; LEHMANN:
Or the receivers?
17!
ISI FASANO:
You bypassed the dryers?
20i LEHMANN:
21, No at first you have the receivers and the dryers downstream then the receivers.
22; 23l FASANO:
Fine okay so you would then go directly to the receivers from the 24i condensate system.
The...what's the pressure difference on the station air 25i
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v" c,o i
14 Ilj as it enters the condansate tank...I'm sorry polisher tank and is there a 2
difference between the wate.r pressure and air pressure at tha't point?
35 4
LEHMANN:
Yes there is. The station air system for the compressed air Sj system runs anywhere from 80-100 pounds.
The condensate should run approxi-6 mately 115-120 pounds at that point.
The...should I go into it...we might y
as well go into it...
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s FASANO:
Yah you can discuss any aspects...
a,
-t 101 LEHMANN:
g They also had two demineralized water pumps running at that time, okay, and that discharge pressure...the TDH of those pumps is 265 feet y
which is approximately 115 pounds so both the condensate and the deminer-alized water system pressure is higher than the air pressure.
'15i FASANO:
So you were getting something like 120 pounds of water.
Now to actually get a backflow you have to pass the valve...
18!
LEHMANN:
To pass through a check valve.
20!
FASANO:
Also a hand-operated valve?
21!
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f 22l LEHMANN:
Well there are two hand-operated.
There's a hand operated valve..
23!
the station air is used for flocking the resins in the demincralizer pits 24!
and you do that with a demineralizer that is out of service.
On the...and 25!
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li that's tied in directly to the outlet connection of the demineralizer bed.
2 On the other side of that catlet connection which I think is a twelve inch 3i connection twelve inch pipe is demineralized water which is 120 115 pounds 4
as I saia before.
There is a valve right at the demineralizer for each...
Si the demineralized water and for the station air for the flocking service.
i 6l At that time the outlet valve and the inlet valve condensate inlet and the
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condensate outlet... twelve inch valves are both closed and you are attempting to do with the air and the water is to fluff up to the resins so that you get more surface area. When you have...if you have the demineralizer bed g
full 10 f water and unvented you pressuri:e the vessel and you pressurize it up through the demineralized water pressure cause that's the pressure that you have on it.
If you have the air flocking valve open at that time, there you have a valve at each one of the polisher beds plus you have a 131 common supply valve.
If you have the common supply valve open and the valve at the demineralizer bed open then you are relying on the three-quarter inch check valve to stop water flow from going into the station air 16t line.
That valve I tested and it allowed reverse flow of approximately 5 gpm with zero pressure on the air side and about 140 pounds of condensate pressure at the demineralizer.
The water since the demineralizer is located 191 in the basement and the compressed air system or the compressor room is 20t located at a slightly lower elevation water would have run down the station 21!
air lines filled the station air line filled the instrument air lines 22$
compressed the air in the receivers flooded the dryers and come right back 23f up on the instrument air line at the lower elevation where it did enter 24!
i many of the air sets especially at the polisher and what I suspected is 25{
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16 that water got to the outlet valve positioner and the positioner caused the 2j valve-the catlet valves of the running pciishers to close.
3l 4j FASANO:
Okay and condansata polisher is designed to close at the loss of f
air and affected loss of air in this case.
g 6I l
LEHMANN:
The positioner is designed ca decreasing air signal... decreasing 7
i gj control air signal to close the valves.
9f FASANO:
10 This is the...have you looked at the design description of the condensate...
11 12!
LEHMANN:
Polisher?
14:
FASANO:
Polisher.
16i LEHMANN:
Yes.
17!
18r FASANO:
Is this how it is described as you recall?
191 20t LEHMANN:
It doesn't get to that detail on it.
22l FASANO:
Does it speak of loss of air, loss of electrical power and what 231 I
happens on your intake and outlet?
2 41 25i
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LEHMANN: Yes it does.
It speaks on loss of electrical power, there are 2i solenoid valves in the air lines to the valve piston operators which are l
3; supposed to go closed both of them at both the inlet and the...rather on 4
both sides of the cylinder air going to both sides of the cylinder...if you 5
close the air on both air lines then you are essentially locking up the Si valve.
That would occur both on loss of power and loss of air sense by 7j pressure switch which would in turn send a signal to the solenoid valves to g
close them. With water in the air line that pressure switch would not have g
picked up.
10l f
FASANO:
So that the description does call for the valves to go closed.
l 12!
13j LEHMANN: No it calls for the valves to lock up.
j 14 FASANO:
Okay lock up meaning...
3, 16:
gl FASANO & LEHMANN:
Stay as is.
1Si FASANO:
Now that's electrical and...
20!
LEHMANN:
It's electrical and air.
22' FASANO:
Yet it didn't seem to function that way I gather.
23!
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LEHMANN:
Well the assumption of that design is that if you have a line 2},
break your air line breaks then you have no air pressure, but if you have water pushing the air you still have some air in the pressure switch it'll 31 4,!
just compress that air to show that you have no high air pressure.
Si Si FASANO:
And then it would tend to close because of the higher...
71 8
LEHMANN:
No it would still say that there's air pressure available there-gj fore don't close the solenoid valves.
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10 FASANO: Why did they close?
LEHMANN:
yl The solenoid valves didn't close.
The positioner which controls the position of the outlet valves on the polishing demineralizer that's the I
14!
only valve that has a positioner on it...
16l FASANO: Okay.
18i LEHMANN:
Okay that's the device which takes control air signal 3-15 pounds 19!
signal and when the signal goes to 15 pounds it coens the valve... if it goes to 3 pounds it will close the valve, okay, now that device continuously bleeds air through it but if water was in that air if water got to the 23!
upper chamber of the positioner it would give it an er sneous indication and would uncalance the positioner.
That w;..a allow the pilot valve and 241/
the positioner to move down and cause the bottom chamber of the valve 25i
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operator to vent and pressure to be applied to the top chamber of that i
2l cylinder which would close the valve.
31 1
4; FASANO:
Okay I think then that explains a lot to me.
Okay then you appar-Sj ently have come to a conclusion as to the initiation of the closing of the i
Gl isolation of the condensate polishers.
7' LEHMANN: Yes.
g.
9l FASANO:
101 Now one of the things you mentioned you did get a sequence of events printout...
uiy LEHMANN:
Yes.
141 FASANO:
And I guess there you would have found that the condensate pump 1A 15 16;.'
I believe tripped what...did you investigate why the that pump would trip y!
the logic there?
18!
LEHMANN:
Yes.
i 19I 20t FASANO:
Did you come to an answer on that... I mean...yes 21.'
22f LEHMANN:
Yes.
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20 llj FASANO:
I mean yes no?
2:
r 3j LEHMANN: O kay. The...after the polisher valves closed we lost suction on y
the condensate booster pumps.
Actually the booster pumps were the first 5;
ones to trip.
Si f
FASANO:
How do you know that?
l at.
LEHMANN:
g Well I know that...I'm Sherlock Holmes...the....it goes back into 10l the control wiring diagram for the condensate booster pumps and the control switch for the condensate booster pumps. The control switch that was installed t
gi for the condensate booster pump is not a pump control switch but rather it's a valve control switch and it's still presently marked open-closed and does not have ary after close or after open contacts when you release the switch.
The switch springs back to the neutral position there are no 12 contacts.
There's a time delay, drop out relay which acts which drops out after five seconds after releasing of that switch and that relay or contact 17,;
from is energized by the relay when the relay is energized but if the relay is not energized but dropped out and that particular contact will never close.
That contact needs to be closed in order for the 30T relay which is the relay which becomes energized if the pump trips and which then sends a signal to the computer to printout that the pump is tripped.
l 231 FASANO:
So based on the condition of the valve...
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!lj LEHMANN:
Based on the control switch and the control wiring diagram the 2
computer will not print out that the condensate booster pumps have tripped i
3h if that trip occurs more than five seconds after releasing the control switch from the breaker closed position.
4 5I Si FASANO:
So then the initiation of...was at the condensate booster pump to 7j trip which then initiated the feedwater loss of suction. Is that correct?
8 g
LEHMANN:
The feedwater pumps tripped on icw suction pressure also.
There 10l is a design feature in the control wiring diagna which is supposed t o trip the feed pumps automatically when booster pumps tt;n.
But again, due to
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that control switch not having an after start position contact that circuit f
is also disarmed.
141 FASANO: Okav.
16i LEHMANN:
Okay now the next question is going to be why the "A" condensate
,7) pump tripped.
19f FASANO:
Yes.
21!
LEHMANN:
Alright.
The control circuit of the wiring diagram and the plant 2
design has a feature in it which is an automatic manual select-a switch 23I which when placed in the automatic mode lines up the "A" condensate pump with the "A" booster pump and they operate as one pump and the same thing 25; e
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d with the "B" and the "C" pump series.
That switch is always maintained in 2!
the manual position by the plant. One can determine that it was in the 3
manual position at the time of the incident because if that switch were in 4;
the auto position then we would have gotten a printout on the computer that Sj the condensate booster pump tripped. With it in the manual position and 6i just relying on the contact from the booster pump control switch you won't 7;
get that printout. Therefore, based on the operators telling me that it i
gj was in the manual position, that they always maintain it in the manual position, based on the computer printouts, it seems that it was in the g,
mapa p s W on.
In the manual position, excuse me, going back to de 10!
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automatic position, in the automatic position, if the booster pump trips it will automatically trip it's associated condensate pump.
In the manual y
position it's not supposed to do that. The next step that we did we started checking the control wiring to determine if the contact on that control switch which is supposed to be open in the manual position was indeed open.
Lo,, s And what we found was that the switch that the contact at the switc.5 was 16i open and we checked the wiring and the wiring showed that that switch was 17!
being bypassed, in other words, that switch was being shunted out under all conditions only for the "A" condensate condensate booster pump.
So there-fore when the "A" condensate booster pump tripped, the "A" condensate pump 20; tripped automatically with it.
22l FASANO:
00 you know why it was shunted? Why the "A" booster and condensate?
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Ilj LEHMANN:
I'm not certain of it and rather not speculate at this time what 2
it was.
3 4
FASANO: Was it a jumper-type of...?
5!
I Gi LEHMANN:
No it wasn't an intentioral type jumper that was put on it at t
7; least I don't think it was.
8 FASANO:
gj Okay...it was at a wiring...hard wiring situation.
10 LEHMANN:
It think it was a hard wiring error yes.
ni FASANO:
13 Did you look at all data to see if this was evident in past trips?
14!
LEHMANN:
No I didn't.
16i FASANO: Would it be possible?
17j 18f LEHMANN:
191 Well first of all in the past trips I don't think that they lost condensate condensate booster pumps.
In the January trip they lost feed pumps and the reason they lost feed pumos there is because the condensate 21!
condensate booster pumps just ran out when they lost flow from the heater t
22' drain system.
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24 lj FASANO:
Okay that would be feeding upstream...
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3j LEHMANN:
Upstream of the feed pumps but downstream of the booster pumps.
4l 5
FASANO:
Right so that would not effect directly...so that would be a 6
direct effect on your feedwater.
I 7l LEHMANN:
Yes.
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10l FASANO:
Did you get a...okay...as far as the condensate polishers then I
g; they operate off the instrument air and the water that got in was via the i
g; station air backward and then up and through the system apparently of which you've got a good description of. We would appreciate your report.
It g
sounds like you've got some of the answers here.
Do you get involved...or did you get involved in trip analyses, apparently you've...from what you've just said now you did look at previous trips at TMI-2. What involve-ment do you get in?
184 LEHMANN:
The only other involvement tnat I had at TMI-2 before were two previous instances relating to the unit drain system and the second one being the rupture of the atmospheric dump bellows...
21t I
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FASANO:
Okay.
231 24l 25i i
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li LEHMANN:
And both of those can be attributed to heater drain pump problems.
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3l FASANO:
Both the rupture of the bellows as well...that's interesting.
i 4l 5
LEHMANN: Well that was part of it.
I think Jim Moore had written up a 6l scenario explaining what happened on that.
7!
I 8l FASANO:
Is there a water-hammer effect or a...just I don' t... I'm just interested in...
g 10l LEHMANN:
yg Are you referring to questions that the that Walt Spinsky has tg been asking of the ACRS?
131 FASANO:
No.
g 15:
LEHMANN:
Okay.
He's asked the same question or some of the same questions g
regarding the water-hammer and the condensate piping.
ISf FASANO:
Yah there was in this instance apparently someone...one of the auxiliary operators that mentioned a water-hammer or a vibration of one of the larger pipes coming to the booster pump.
I don't recall if that was the "A" pump or not that he mentioned.
23l i
LEHMANN:
I think it was the "A" pumo.
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FASANO:
It was the "A" pump and I guess when he came back he saw a leak i
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there and then there's kind of I guess people relating these events...did i
3j you get involved in this aspect at all?
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5l LEHMANN:
I didn't get involved in that aspect...it was brought to my i
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attention again this morning and I can on'y conjecture what happened there.
7j I don't know if you want me to conjecture at this point or...
I a!
FASANO:
gj You can do whatever you want here.
101 HOVER:
11 No I don't think you should conjecture.
12' I
LEHMANN: Okay.
13l 14' 9
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should stick to the facts basically as we've been involved in.
17 FASANO: Well just let me ask you does it sound reasonable to expect that 18!
you might have gotten a large vibration in that particular 1A line ine pump condensate booster pump?
21!
LEHMANN:
Under this transient probably, yes.
Under normal conditions and 221 l
normal shutdowns, no, I don't think you would get that.
I don't think on 231 any plant I've ever worked on did we ever analyze water-hammer in the 24!
condensate system pipir.g.
We've analyzed water-hammer based on closure of 2Si feedwater isolation valves, that's about it.
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FASANO:
Okay in this case we had a rapid closure of the condensate polishers 2
as I had seen at least the traces indicated..did you see any traces on 3j your...
4!
Sj LEHMANN:
I haven't been able to find the delta P recorder chart for the Gi p lishar.
7i l
FASANO:
The delta P I haven't seen that either.
I did get a trace of gg the...
g 10l LEHMANN:
The flow trace...that charts kind of slow.
12!
FASALO:
Have you seen...
14!
LEHMANN:
That's the feedwater... that's vessel five.
16i FASANO:
Okay. That's the only one they had a ccpy of but I understand 1,r, there's one for heat shutdown...but i' looked it was quite rapid here...of 18r course these times don't seem to match but I was told that this...
191 20:
LEHMANN:
Oh.
You can' t... that's not... that can be a couple of :ninutes in there.
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23 FgANO:
Okay...you haven't seen those?
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LEHMANN:
I wouldn't expect any water-hammer to occur in the pipe unless 2
you're closing within milliseconds.
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4; FASANO: Okay.
I 6j MARSH:
Gentlemen before we go any further I'm going to break for a roment 7
and turn this tape over if I may.
The time being 11:09, reading 691 on the 8L meter.
9f f'
MARSH:
The time nr 4 lO 11:09, reading 692 on the meter.
n:
FASANO: We'll go back to the event.
Is there anything further that you can recall on the first day as far as making any decisions, giving any advice or, in particular, who you were communicating wita?
14,:
15' 16i.
LEHMANN:
I don't recall as far as giving advice...I didn't give any the first day I didn't make any major decisions...as far as communicating w 17!
people I believe I tried to call Don Cromberger or Gary Capodanno
, who were my bosses.
I don't recall whether it was that evening or the following afternoon.
2 01 21)
FASANO:
22;,
Well as...now as a your design...you' re oriented toward design mechanical engineering...at this time if you'd like if you could express i
23l i
any knowledge you gained or some insight into reactor design or second 24l design, in particular, that might be helpful for considerations at similar
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29 1
plants in the future if you like you can take some time here and express 2j what you would consider useful and also possibly in communications for i
3 immediate analysis of an event similar to the one we just experienced.
4i 4
gj LEHMANN:
This being general or specifically related...or how it nelates to TMI.
6 7l FASANO:
g I think general would be more appropriate but you can go anyway you like.
g 101 LEHMANN: Okay.
Notice you've got to take it system by system and as I said before, I come from ESASCO this plant was designed by Burns and Roe other plants designed by other AEs and each one has its own design philoso-l phies and its own design guides as to how systems are sized and separated features that you have in them and also the interface that occurs between the various disciplines within the AE house-so as since my experience has been mainly with ESASCO even there design philosophies from plant to plant 17!
based on client druthers, based on duplicate design, based on the order 1 81 that you have for the plant and what you're telling the client that you 191 will provide him with.
As far as general plant trips, there are certain features that plants should have...I think should have like a runback 21:
features on the turbine, condensate feedwater system design should be able 22!
to take a single failure such as loss of all hedur drain pumps which would occur or...you may not loose them but you may get a sufficient decrease in 24j flow out of them when the pressure in the receivers or in their heated or 25!
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go, b
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.in their respective heaters from which they take suction drops proportionally l
2; to load, condensate... if you have a condensate booster pump the capacity 9
3j in the head of the condensate pump should be high enough to carry you i
4 through a transient of flow increase due to loss of heated drains which is gj '
about a thirty or thirty percent ~ncrease in flow in most plants and you Si get pressure drop goes up as a,quare of the flow so you. have a sizable
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pressure drop there.
I don't know the air systems I think you should have I
gj two separate systems one instrument and one station.
As far as the event i
gj that took place here about the check valve not holding having sat in the 10 design office I would rely on the check valve...I might have relied on the check valve to hold also.
I would not have gotten into the detail of the positioner orientation things like that what it does.
The interface S
between mechanical and I&C...in most plants that I had worked on has been 131 in the form of...now it's in the form of system design descriptions and 15:
logic diagrams.
Prior to that most plants were designed with a mechanical
,y engineer wno lays out the systems and the I&C engineer does his thing and 1.,l designs the controls many times without interfacing with the mechanical.
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don't know how the NRC can force someone to do that I think that's up to 18i the AE house.
I don't know...I think you gotta break down system by system to look at it.
I don't think you can break it down here.
21i FASANO:
Yah I gather that you might have had difficulty in unraveling this situation because of the way Burns and Roe sets up its logic sets up its 23!
method of interfacing between the I&C and the mechanical...I gather that I 2 41 don't know if that's true..
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lj LEHMANN: Well i
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3 FASANO:
Is that true that...
41 Sf LEHMANN:
The difficulty that I had was only not being familiar with the 6
way Burns and Roe lays out their drawings their drawing sequence knowing f
what drawings they have produced.
EBASCO lays it out differently I'm sure g
Gilbert and Stone and Webster and the others, Gibson Hill all lay it out differently also.
I don't think the NRC should get into the pants of the g
10f AE and tell him these are tne drawings that you will produce, this is the numbering system you shall use and so forth.
12!
FASANO:
How about IEEE or ASME I mean you being a mechanical engineer, do g,
you think this is an appropriate area to be approached?
15; LEHMANN:
No because these same numbers are also used for various other functions other than to just identify the drawing.
They are used for charts numbering system in many instances whereby you charge your time to a particular drawing or system by that number and... I don' t... I think each 191 AE house has their own method of doing it which is satisfactory to them.
The problem is when you try to get someone unfamiliar with that system to need to go into that system becomes difficult.
22!
t 231 FASANO:
You mentioned that on the AMS...I guess the AMS switch where you 24!
had a possibly a hot wire problem of course this is in a system that's non-25:
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lj safety-related again.
In the preop phase and I understand that this service 2i group here is involved in the preop phase would you think that there should 3!
be a more intensified preop checkout of the balance of plant as there is on 4l the NSSS as on the nuclear systems?
51 LEHMANN:
6 Actually there are two preop checks on the system.
One was conducted by UE&C on the turnover of the system and the other one was 8{
conducted by GPU Startup Engineers and there is a test procedure for the functional testing of the systems.
g 10lg FASANO:
How did the hard wire get by then... the a... I mean... it's a good point I don't know?
121 13l LEHMANN:
Functionals, well, functional check checked to insure that the system functions the way it's supposed to does not check to insure that the system doesn't do something when its not supposed to, okay.
The control switch, the procedure for the test of the system was to place the AMS switch in the automatic position have the condensate and condensate booster 18f pump running, trip the booster pump and observe that the condensate pump tripped, which it did.
But the reverse was not done, in other words, the 20t check with the AMS switch in the manual position and have both pumps running 21!
and tripping the booster pump to see if the condensate pump stays on line that wasn't done.
23!
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1 FASANO:
Okay so the wiring logic was not really checked indirectly in that 2
way.
3l 4j LEHMANN:
That's correct.
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6j FASANO: Well I have no further questions at this.
l 7'
MARSH:
I have none so we will draw to a close'then.
The time being 11:19 8
9 a.m., reading 895 on the meter we'll shut this thing down with just a word f thanks and appreciate your time.
10l 11; FASANO: George.
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