ML19208B128
| ML19208B128 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1979 |
| From: | Abramovici J, Mark Resner GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190086 | |
| Download: ML19208B128 (35) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSICN l
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In the Matter of:
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IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 21 of Mr. Julien D. Abramovici l
Mechanical Engineer II - GPU t
Si Oi 7!
Si 9;j Trailer #203 NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10:
Middletown, Pennsylvania 11:
June 11, 1979 12 (Date of Interview; 12; July 10,'1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 308 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
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NRC PERSONNEL:
2'v' Mr. Mark E. Resner 23,i Mr. Anthony Fasano 24, 25:
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RESNER:
Interview with Mr. JuMen D. Abramovici. Mr. Abramovici is a 2j Mechanical Engineer II employed with the General Public Utilities 3
Service Corporation.
The present time is 11:25 A.M.
Today's date is 4,
June 11, 1979.
This interview is being conducted in room 203 just 5
1 cated.in one of the Mountain Lakes facilities of GPU for which the 6
mailing address is 250 Cherry Hill Road, Parsippany, New Jersey 07054.
7!
Prior to taping this interview, Mr. Abramovici was given a two page 8
document which explained the purpose, the scope and the authority by gj which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission conducts this investigation.
na n,
ap sed iMr. hamoM 2at he is enWed to a 10!
representative of his choice to be present during the interview should he desire one, and also that in no way is he compelled to talk with us should he not want to. Mr. Abrrtaavici has chosen Mr. Alsti S. Brown who 131 is a Sucervisor of Generation Administration with GPU to be present as 15:
his representative during this interview.
On the second page of this dccument Mr. Abramovici has answered three questions which I will state for the record.
Number 1:
Do you understand the above? Mr.
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Abramovivi has checked yes.
Is that correct Mr. Abramovici?
18i 191
_ABRAM0VICI:
It is correct.
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21f RESNER:
Question two, do we have your permission to tape this interview?
22l Mr. Abramovici has checked yes.
Is that correct Mr. Abramovici?
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ABRAM0VICI: That is correct.
I 2:
RESNER:
Question three, do you want a copy of the tape? Mr. Abramovici 3
has checked 'yes'.
Is that correct, Mr. Abramovici?
l Si ABRAM0VICI:
Yes, I do want a copy.
Of i
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RESNER: We will provide you with a copy of the tape in the near g
future through Mr. William Burle." of Metropolitan Edison Company.
g Ir.Jividuals present representing the NRC at this interview are Mr.
101 Anthony Fasano.
Mr. Fasano is an Inspection Specialist employed at I
Region I Sith the U.S. Nuclear Regulatorf Commission. Speaking and 12!
moderating this interview is Mark E. Resner.
I am an investigator 13!
l with the Office of Inspector and Auditor, Headquarters of the U.S.
14i Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
At this time I'll ask Mr. Abramovici if you will give a brief resume of his educational and jcb experience 16:
related to the nuclear industry.
17:;
i ISj ABRAM0VICI:
I've.. I'll start my educational background..I'm a 19l Mechanical Engineer.
I've graduated frem City College in New York 20j which was part of the city university with a mechanical engineering 21!
degree.
I have started working at Electric Boat, part of General 22!
l Oynamics in Groton, Connecticut.. nuclear submarines were I work in 23l l
the stress analysis and design review....
During that time i got my 241 l
Master of Science in systems management from the University of Southern 25i Y <
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I have joined General Public Utilities in January of 1978 i
2j as an engineer II, tra position I'm presently in as a component 3
engineer working on various systems, Forked River basically. During 41 the reorganization that we had here last November I've been transferred Si to the systems group which I'm part of now being responsible for i
6i various systems including steam generator olowdown and also still 7
keeping my steam generator as components under my guidances.
This what I am today.
8 91 RESNER:
OK.
Thank you very much Mr. Abramovici.
This time Mr.
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Fasano has some questions he'd like to pose to you.
lZ FASANO:
Today we'd like you to describe in your own words your knowledge of the events of March 28, 1979 and in particular your 14,.
notification and subsequent involvement with the events of that day.
So, can you start, in particular what time you were notified.
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17 ABRAM0VICI:
About nine thirty ten o' clock the day of the accident, my ISI manager Gary Copadano, came to my office and told me about the transient 19t that has happened at TMI II and the fact that there was a general emergency and he briefed me, basically, of what he knew that had 21i happened. At that time I was told that they thought there was an 22l instrument, one of the instrument airlines tL sused the condensate 23i polishers valve to close which, in turn, was a trip of the turbine 20 which, based on the sequence of events, caused a trip of the reactor.
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Also, that the relief valve electromatic relief valve from the pressurizer 2l lifted and it stayed open for..it didn't close when it was supposed to
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close and water was dumped to the drain tank was pressurized and heat 4
capacity and the ruptured disks ruptured and water..there was, I gl don't remember the exact figure but there was few.. ten thousand of 6
gallons in the building. The reason I was sent to the site is because 7j steam generators are under my cognizance and we knew from preliminary 1
8j n tificatien that there was a loss of feedwater and the auxilliary g
feedwater pumps came on but the steam generator boiled dry.
Concern 0
was with a possible primary to secondary leakage and primary pressure on one side of the tubes and from all intensive purposes zero pressure 12l on the secondary there could be a tube rupture.
I was not really concerned about a tube rupture because it just happened about a month 131 ago I obtained a report from Sabcock and Wilcox.
An analysis that was
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supposed to be NRC as a topical report for all the B&W reactors and 15; they had run tasts in their lab at pressures which too severe which i
world be much higher than the 2500 psi that you could across the tubes.
17l There was not really a concern. I have left with George Lehman, I 18i think he's one of the engineers you also have interviewed previously, around noon one o' clock from Mountain Lakes, we had to go home and get 20!
clothes and we arrived, I think, around three thirty, four o' clock at 21; the observation center since we could not get on site.
At the observation 22!
center we met Jim Ward who was already there and later on Gary Broughton 23l and Rich Lance.
At that time we tried to get an indication of what 2M has happened and we interviewed an electrical operator, I think his 25i
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name was Dick Benson, who tried to brief us in what he thought that 2
has happened.
I have some notes here I took that day if I can refer 3
to them I guess.
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FASANO:
Definitely.
t 6i ABRAM0VICI:
He indicated that the reactor coolant pump tripped under the accident and it never started again and he felt that the core was g
g was for a period of time without cooling and he also indicated that the B steam generator vacuum had been broken.
He also felt that two bands of the pressurizer heaters were lost due to steam in the packing. The pressuri:er heater is so many banks of pressurizer heater banks and loops te keep the temperature, to maintain the bubble in the pressurizer, that's how you maintain pressure in the 141 He also felt that the reactor cooling system went critical for about two hours, being electrical he didn't express any other opinion as far as the balance of the system, and he had to go back in the control room so he left. Later on that evening, we interviewed 18t George Kunder wno is the engineer for the TMI and he indicated that he 19!
was in the control room shortly after the accident happened.
I will 20!
not try to go through, if your interested I can go though everything
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that has, that he told us but basically its a repeat of what we heard in the morning, that there was water in the service areas from airlines, 231 and that, that caused the trip to condensate polishers which again, 2 41' you know basic sequence of events that happened before, trip the 25i P
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y pumps, trip the turbine and trip the reactor.
He did indicate that 2
they realized the level of the pressurizer went down and they, high, I
3l high preessure injection was initiated about two minutes after that 4l event, however, oressurizer level went up and they secured the high Sj pressure injection.
At that time the levels still went up, the electromatic t
6j relief valve opened, it didn't close based on these feelings when it 7l was suppose to close, later they did close and the pressure start decreasing.
The pumps were secure, the reactant coolant pumps were g
secured according to his recollection between six thirty and six fourty in the marr.ing. The pressure in the system was decaying and the I
flow in the primary was slightly dropping. At that time he felt that 11!
a steam bubble has formed in the primary, he indicated the, he calculated the safety valve leakage was approximately 5 gpm about that time.
131 And also that the pressurizer went solid. The pressurizer solid means 141 it was all filled with water, no, in other words they had lost the steam bubble that normally you operate with.
He also indicated that probably because of the development of steam bubble in the primary, i
17!
the there was high probably of failed fuel in the reactor.
When we i
181 talked to him the reactant coolant temperature has cropped, they were 191 like, think approximately 250 degrees F when we talked to him.
The 20!
number.
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FASANO: Excuse me.
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I yl ABRAM0VICI:
I don't remember that's all I have is RC at 250, that 2
number seems low to me for that time, I think it should have been a 3
little bit higher but it's... he also indicated that according to Jack Herbein who is the Vice President of Met Ed no transfer would be y
made to and from Unit 1 of any any water transfer could not be made.
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He did indicate also that we also knew that when water was in the et t
basement of the reactor building, the reactor building sump pumps
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y started and dumped water into the auxiliary building.
I didn't know exactly which tank they were lined up to but apparently the tank overflowed and the overflow goes to the auxiliary building sump.
101 Radiation levels at that time were indicated at being very high, in 11!
the auxiliary building.
The pressure, the primary we found out stablized at 1100 psi and there was cold, an imbalance between the cold and hot 13) legs as far as flow and that was probably attributed as developing 14i also a bubble in one of the hot, one of the hot legs, I mean one of the cold legs also developed a bubble.
Not, not the other, so therefore 1Si they couldn't get flow through one of the pumps.
The building pressure, 17!
reactor building pressure was high which was to be expected as a reult l
18t of this accident, I think the the building was close to 400 psi, 19i poundt per square inch.
Discussion as far as possible operator error 20:
by shutting down the reactant coolant pumps was discussed but was not, 21; not considered an error at that time. He also at other method by which I
22l he was able to determine that a steam bubble had formed is he took a 231 boron sample from the steam and he was much lower than the... well i
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he took a samole and the fact that he was much lower than a primary 25i I
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sample that indicated that the bubble has formed.
That was the end of 2{
the interview with George Kunder he agained had to go back to the 3i control room, it was indicated that Rich Lance probably would go with y
him as soon as the reactimeter data would be available to start analyzing 3;
the sequence of events.
From that time we tried as a group, me, Jim M
6 re, Ge rge Lehm.n, Rich Lance and Gary Broughton try and put some kind of a scenario report as happened but we realize that we're missing a lot of parameters which we didn't have available.
Temperatures, g
g, pressures, sequence of events, exact sequence of events, wnich we needed from the Control Room, from the teletype which prints the 101 sequence of events and again the reactimeter, which gives basic information
,,w of all critical parameters.
We stayed at the Observation Center through the night.
Early in the morning, Jim Moore and George Lehman went upstairs at the Observation Center and they interviewed two of 141 the Control Room operators, that were on duty that night, Craig Faust and Ken Frede:ick.
Later on, I joined them.
They had taped at that time an interview for them, and both also promised they would try jot their source down when they get a little bit of time, as far as what they feit has hacpened.
Later that day, we got that information from them.
About 6:30 in the morning, I went to the hotel.
About an hour 20i and a half. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> later, I... please keep in mind, I just about 21l lost track of time through the whole period.
You know, who was there 22!
at night.
We came back, and... let me back off a bit, and also 23' before I left, we get had some sequence of events, but from about 24i 8 o' clock on that day.
As far as the accident, it did not by that 25i i;b u t70
9 If time, I cons % all the damage has been done, but we have some of that data. We also had a sequence of the tripping events.
And wnile 2,
i 3i the same, I realize looking at that, is the condensate pump was the i
first event that occurred. Which in my opinion, the original assumption 41 that the air in the instrument line occur was not a vilable reason for 5
l 6j the trip.
In other words, the condensate pump does trip, that automatically 7l records the feedwater pump to trip.
I don't think you can have the polishers trip before, and then you have the condensate.
That would g
also be indicated on the Control Log.
Again, first entry at 4 o' clock, g
I remember was the condensate pumps trips.
I think it was in lA pump 10 11:i that tripped.
I 12I FASANO: Why did you think this was not logical?
13) 14!
ABRAMOVICI:
Again, based on my knowledge of how the system operates, the condensate pump... that's what I... I was reading the sequence of events, and the first entry at 4 o' clock, which according to Control 17l i
Room operator, that's when the accident happened, was the condensate 18!
pump trip.
And I know if the condensate pump trips, the feedwater 19i pump will trip also on low suction, again because of the same secuence 20!
of events will trip tne the...
Gray Broughton and Rich Lent: state 21:
also, the night of the 28th, they stayed at the Observation Center.
Me, Jim Moore and George Lehman went out to eat.
Came back.
Rich i
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l Lent: and Gary Broughton went home and were told whenever the Control 24 Room tells us that the reactimeter data is available, to give a call 25!
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tlj back to the hotel and they'll come back, and start analyzing the data.
2 Rich Lentz did go to the Control Room when he brought the sequence of 3
events, and he also brought some preliminary data.
At that time, me, 4j Jim Moore, and I think everybody there was, then they started plotting 5!
the data, the pressure, versus the temperature. And it was pretty
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6i bvious that the problem has formed inside the reactor, because the i
7 pressure was below saturation for the temperature.
Now the 29th, we g;
came back early in the morning, once again to the Observation Center.
Found out that Gary Broughton and Jim Moore were inside the island.
g 10I And Gary Miller the Station Superintendent for a couple of hours, we were just sitting in the Observation Center.
We had heard that Dick Wilson was Director of Technical Functions, and a whole group of people were supposed to be coming down frcm Mountain Lakes to help as much as they can... the accident. We had gotten clearance, later that afternoon, to go inside the island. We have... we went to the security building, and again we started to look at the accident, and try to analyze what has happened. Around noon, or 1 o' clock, Dick 17!
Wilson came in with a group of people.
One of them was Bill Lowe frcm Pickalow and Garrett, one of the consulting firms that we use, evaluating 19l various accident analyses.
And we were told as far as the plan, what 20!
the corporate officers thought of the accident, and how much money we 21:
have alloted for this.
I don't have those figures.
I didn't mark 22 them down.
But, at that time, we considered the core as being lost, 23!
completely damaged. And we cecided it would be better to interview 24:
all the Control Room operators, and all the people that on were on 25i j i. ; i
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shift during the ac::ident.
Particularly, from four o' clock at least 2
for the next 6 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. A group of people were set up to do the l
interviews that night.
Ed Wallace, Bob Long and Don Reppert were 3
4 supposed to do the interviews that night.
And we were supposed to 5l continue doing the analyses, me and Rich Lent: and George Lehman. We 6
have left the island, the day of the 29th, I think about 6 or 7 o' clock.
7 Went to the hotel, FASANO:
Did anyone tell you when that was found gf out?
9i ABRAM0VICI:
1g, Later on, we found out by looking at the strip charts, that this occurred.
I think around one or two o' clock.
I don't know g
exactly what the strip charts did show.
We have a low... we ha.e a narrow range and a wide range.
And they both meet at the same time.
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14:
FASANO:
Did you see that chart?
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ABRAM0VICI:
Yes, I did.
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181 FASANO:
What day did you see it?
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A8 RAM 0VICI:
I saw that chart, either late on the 30th, or early on the 31st.
We already set out and got another trailer.
That is where 22!
l the General Public Utilities tech support setup.
We were working out 23!
of that trailer.
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FASANO:
So, on the 28th, no one really was looking at that aspect?
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ABRAMOVICI:
No.
George Kunder... when we interview him... not the 4i first time, the second day, Dick Wilson wanted him, he had a feeling 3l that the hyorogen in the containment was getting hot, but, didn't know 6[
how much it was.
At that time, obviously later, we found out the 7
detonation already has occurred by that time.
All the damage that could have been done, has been done.
I indicated at that time to him, g
that it would be wise during the hookup to recombine the return line.
g 10,j I also, and I wasn't controlling engineer, here at GPU.
I have worked on turbine hydrogen recombiners.
So, I was very familiar with the operation, 1 because at Forked River, we also had the same type of 121 recombiners that we have at Three Mile Island.
According to Regulatory Guides, we can use the spare recombiner to share on two sides.
So, we 14 have to buy only one for Forked River.
That's the reason, I was familiar with the system, and its operation.
17' FASANO:
Did you get involved with the setting up of the recombiner?
191 ABRAM0VICI:
Yes, I did.
Later on we tried to put the recombiners on 201 a line.
They are portable by definition.
They were in a warehouse, they were brought in...they had to be hooked up.
We had people from 22' Atomics International, who came and explained to us, Kunder and other 23t people, the operation, the way it's really supposed to work.
In other 24]
words, we have manuals, and we have instruction books, and I'm sure 25i
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everybody's briefed on this operation.
But, since the recombiners are 2
designed to work around 4% hydrogen, and there was a good possibility I
3 that there was more than 4% hydrogen, obviously, we had to get more 4:
technical information from people who design, so we know if we are Sj creating more or a problem than we have.
The concern was, since you 6i more than 4% hydrogen, you could once you hook up the recombinea, you 7{
have to open the containment isolation valve, so that was the recombiner i
gj takes suction of the purge line, and thr.t's a big line coming out of gj containment from inside the 0-ring, sends the radiation level to high 10(
should that line fail, containment, integrity would be broken. So, f
there was a lot to consider before turning the system on.
We... l i ke g
I said, we have support of two people from Atomic International.
One of them was Jim Henry.
In my opinion, the most foremost authority on 73 hydrogen.
15:
FASANO:
Did you hook ep both of them, or they were alreacy...
17l FASANO:
Did you get involved with the setting up of the recombiner?
191 ABRAM0VICI:
Yes, I did.
Later on we tried to put the recomoiners on a line.
They are portable by definiticn.
ihey were in a warenouse, they were brought in...they had to be booked up.
We had people from Atomics International, who came and explained to us, Kunder and other 23l people, the operation, the way it's really supposed to work.
In other 24!
words, we have manuels, and we have instruction books, and I'm sure 25i
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1; everybody's briefed on this operation.
But, since the recombiners are 2;
designed to work around 4% hydrogen, and there was a good possibility 3l that there was more than 4% hydrogen, obviously, we had to get more 4:
technical information from pecple who design, so we know if we are g
creating more or a problem than we have.
The concern was, since you more than 4.5 hydrogen, you could onca you hook up the recombiner, you 6
y have to open the containment isolation valve, so that was the recombiner gj takes suction of the purge line, and that's a big line coming out of gj containment from inside the 0-ring, sends the radiation level to high should that line fail, containment, integrity woald be broken. So, 0
there was a lot to consider before turning the system on.
We... like I said, we have support of two people from Atomic International.
One i
of them was Jim Henry.
In my opinion, the most t'oremost authority on 131 hydrogen.
15; FASAf@:
Did you hook up both of them, or they were already...
17!
ABRAM0VICI:
They were both being hooked up as far as I know.
They 131 were both in a storage warehouse, and they were both being nocked up.
One other concern that w^ had, that is we knew that once we turned the 20 recombiners on, the area is going to be very hot, because of the 21!
radiation through the pipes.
So, we... the recombiners aren' t if you 221 haven't And we dicn't want... we wanted to minimize exposure 23i to people... had some adjustement... we had to make some other 24j adjustment to try to put the shield around.
I had called back Mountain 25;
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Lakes office and talked to a structure expert, and I tried to consider 2
the flow loads. We wanted to put lead shield... lead bricks around f
the recombiner if we could find them.
He called me back, said his 3
4 calculation showed that the flow loads will take the weight of the g
recombiner, obviously,that it was designed for, plus the weight of the lead shield.
One modification that we have made in the system, was to g
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put nitrogen line, such that if the hydrogen was high from the containment, nitrogen would dilute it, and keep the concentration low.
So, when it goes into the reaction chamber, the chances of tremendous detonation al which could destroy the system, were minimi;:ed.
As it turned out, the system was tested and there was no... we took a sample from the recombiner, and there was no... no indication of high concentration 12',
i of the... it was higher than normal, but scmething in the flammable 13) 14l r:nge.
The... as far as I know, hydrogen becomes flammable about 7%,
i and becomes explosive around 13%.
I don't remember the exact number, 15 but I think it was higher than A%.
But, not anywhere close to 7.
I lo_i think the recombiners worked beautifully for the wnole period of time.
al; They had reduced and performed...better...
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19t FASANO: When were they first started to do their function? Do you 20!
recall the time and the date?
21, 22!
eBRAMOVICI:
I'm not sure whether it was the first
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f 16 lj FASANO:
April?
2!
l ABRAM0VICI:
April 1st or March 31st.
I know that we tried to put 3;
4 them on a line as fast as we could given the present plotting conditions, Si and people were minimizing so much exposure...
and Gi 7
Did you see the... I think you have an in-line analyzer on FASANO:
y ur...
n the containment air environment.
Did you see any analyzes 8
of that, prior to you starting?
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ABRAM0VICI:
No, I had not seen the analyses.
I also heard at that 12li time, that the analyzer became very hat.
They couldn't.. they had to go through a high radiation area % get samples.
There was one other problem that we had during the whole time.
We tried to get air samples, so that we know where the hydrogen concentration was in the containment, but you had to burn people, expose them to radiation, and we tried to minimize that as much as we could under the circumstances.
17!
Tried to minimize our samples.
Once we started the recombiner, the lSt recombiner has a nice feature in it, that you can measure the temperatures 19i across the reactor chamber, and by dividing that number by 125, that 20 gives you a rairly accurate ec cimate of the hydrogen that's incoming hydrogen in the line.
And that agreed very close to what the sample 22; l
we took from the containment dome.
They varied, I don' t remember...
23J 3/10 of a percent, but that's normal, because hydrogen is normally 24!
would be higher in the containment dome, because hydrogen rises inside 25i the dcme
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1 FASANO:
Did you look at the Reactor Building pressure at that time, prior to starting your recombiner?
2 '
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4:
ABRAM0VICI:
That's true but once we started the recombiner, than the Si pressure already was negative, because the containment coolers came g
on, with the emergency procedures.
We had five coolers, containment 7
coolers on, when we dropped the pressure.
The pressure was negative.
After...
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FASANO:
10 What tempertaure was your Reactor Building?
11.
ABRAM0VICI:
12!
I have not looked at that, but a couple of days, I would i
say 31st, or the 1st, I did look on the panel, the auxiliary panel, in 131 the Control Room, and the temperature was around 100..
90 to 100.
14i So,...
15 16; FASANO:
So, if you had athmospheric pressure outside and 90 - 100 inside containment, do you still have negative pressure?
19!
ABRAM0VICI: We had negative pressure, as a matter of fact, we still 20i l
had negative pressure... we held negative pressure ever since.
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FASANO:
Did that...
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ABRAM0VICI:
The cooler condensed the steam to create negative.
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l FASANO:
I see.
3 4;
ABRAM0VICI:
5!
Negative pressure... your trying to keep everything in.
I You can't have any leakage.
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FASANO:
8!
But, if that inner gases that were being put in the containment, would you raise your pressure, or...
g 10!
ABRAMOVICI:
If you keep the pressure negative, there's no way the gases will get out.
It shows that it's possible for the partial 12:
l pressure to be higher, and they could sift through about four feet of 13i concrete, and steel liner... and making it impossible.
As a matter of fact, just before I left the island, last week, I was involved in the containment cooler leak testing.
And we were trying to find out 16i
... we thought the coolers were leaking in the containment.
There was 17' one reason that they 18t 191 FASANO: Well, if you had 4% or 5% of hydrogen in the containment, 20:
would you expect the pressure to be negative?
21!
22!
r ABRAM0VICI:
Yes.
There would be no reason not to be negative.
23i Because hydrogen is only... you know, even if it's 5%..
that is 5%
24; I
of the volume.
It would only be the partial pressure Of hydrogen with 25i respect to the total pressure.
c o 9, I j '!
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19 FASANO:
- 0. K.
I was just wondering.
You had worked on the recombiners, 1
and you knew them...
2l 3!
f ABRAMOVICI: Also, we... it was the 31st.. or the 29th.
No, the 3;
30th or the 31st, we went into the Control Room.
We had a meeting 6l with George Kunder, and me and Jim Moore got assigned a job of writing 7
the emergency procedures.
One that we were involved in particular was g
what would happen if the pump that they had running would trip.
We had started writing the procedure. What would happen if that pump g
- 101, trips, which pump should we start to be able to pump in the same loop.
And then at that point, if it failed, we started to wonder if other locos.
12',
We had written that procd.ure.
Jim has left.
I continued to i
write that procedure and then they somehow got a procedures group i
13; going.
At that time, I went home, and the next day I was back in 14i trailer trying the do the analysis.
And I was running back and forth between tne Control Room, trying to take the data that was available, that was needed for the analysis.
the 31st.
If you've got any other question, I may have missed, or that you would 18t like to know?
19t 20, FASANO:
Well, yeah.
So, you knew prior to leaving Mountain Lakes 21I that there was a general emergency at the site?
23 ABRAM0VICI:
Yes.
I also talked to Scb Sprage, who lives around the 24:'
Met area.
He lives in Phillipsburg.
Right cn the border of Pennsyl/ania 25!
O) t
l 20 1
1j and New Jersey, and he indicated that he heard coming here in the car, 2;'
that there was a general emergency.
I 3!
FASANO:
So, you said someone else on his way to work actually had heard it over the radio?
51 f
6 ABRAM0VICI:
That's correct.
7 I
8l FASANO:
You mentioned the instrument here as being a problem g
would main system the steam generator... well let's talk a little 10l 11l about the instrument air and the service air, instrument air and sequence.
Do you know anything about the condensate polishers? The condensate system? You did mention that if you lost the condensate pump, you would get a check on the feedwater pumps.
If you shut your valve on the polisher, would you also get a trip, on your feedwater pump?
16i 17l ABRAM0VICI:
It's possible.
I do not know.
ISr i
19l FASANO:
Your not that familiar with that system?
20!
21!
ABRAM0VICI:
No.
22 23 FASANO:
- 0. K.
When were you informed that the electromatic valve was 24) opened, and it looks like it was early in the morning, while your 25i still at Mountain Lakes?
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ABRAM0VICI: Yes.
That's the preliminary indication we had, we knew, 2
we knew for sure when we got there and interviewed the Geroge Kunder, i
3j later and once scenario was put together that it became even more obvious that the electromatic stuck open, and Si i
FASANO: You were mainly involved to start out with... cause there's Si a loss of feedwater.
I 81 ABRAM0VICI: Well, that's is the reason I got sent there.
g 10:
FASANO:
And did you look at the steam generators to any extent, 11!
subsequent?
13t ABRAM0VICI:
1 45 No.
I did not work on the steam generators at all, because there were bigger problems that we had to consider.
IS:
FASANO:
Has anyone looked at them subsequently? Have you?
18i ABRAM0VICI: We had looked at them.
By the time we got here we knew 13i they were.. you know... we found out it boiled dry, and we finally 20i stopped filling them.
And, they got back to a normal level.
So, when 21!
we... when I personally got to the Control Room, they were at normal 22!
operating level, back on line.
We had the feecwater going through.
23i Well, the one thing, I don't know if I mentioned or not, there was 2 41 some indication that probably the BC steam generator, there was a 25!
i d'J t, y,
f
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22 i
1, primary to secondary leakage.
And it was because of the high activity.
2!
And they bottled the steam generator off.
i 31 RESNER: The time now is 12:09 PM. And we are going to break to change the tape.
Mr. Abramovici also we would like to get a copy of g
6 y ur notes or the original notes if possible.
7l ABRAMOVICI:
g You can have a copy I would like to keep this, obviously for the record.
91 101 RESNER:
Thank you.
11.
12',
ABRAM0VICI:
I'll make a copy.
14!
RESNER:
Thank you, we'll break now.
15.
16; RESNER:
The time now is 12:11 PM.
This is a continuation of the 17j interview with Mr. Abramovici.
18:
191 FASANO:
- 0. K.
You mentioned that the steam generator had boiled dry.
20j l
Did you know the cause of why it had gone dry that first cay?
21!
22lI ABRAM0VICI: Yes.
'de knew that the steam generator had boiled dry, 2 31 i
because the feed pumps tripped, as I indicated before.
And the auxiliary 24!
feed pumps should have come on.
They did come on, but later they 25!
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23 i
l f und out that they had scme manual valves closed, which later they 2l sent somebody to open.
i 3i FASANO:
4; When did you know that those 12 valves, the isolation valves 5.
n the emergency feedwater, were closed?
6; ABRAM0VICI: We knew they were closed the night of the accident.
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8!
- FASANO
Kunder informed you.
g 101 ABRAM0VICI: Yes. Kunder yes. To the best of my recollection, yes.
12l I
RESNER:
Did he indicate how they may have been closed?
131 14!
ABRAM0VICI:
No.
Well, later on we found out from the Control Room 15:
that they have weekly testing, and one of the tests they were running, I don't recall, those valves had to be shut, and later be re-opened.
17!
Apparently it didn't happen that way.
181 191 RESNER:
Who related that information to you?
20!
21:
ABRAM0VICI:
I think it was in the Control Room.
I'm trying to think 22l i
... oh, Jim Floyd.
He is the C'pertions Superintendent for TMI.
23!
24i
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24 i
f FASANO: Now, you mentioned that you had a report from B&W, and that i
i f
you had good confidence that 2,;00 pounds of differential max would 2
3{
n t be sufficient to give you a tube rupture?
4!
l ABRAM0VICI:
That is correct.
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61 g
FASAN0:
Did you feel that you have no steam generator damage, or do
" * * *"Y
" *
- 9* **
8t there or not at this time.
101 ABRAM0VICI:
I do not know the actual situation, I mean the actual condition of the steam generator right now.
But I feel that no damage 12!
i has been done. When you have a higher pressure on the primary, obviously 13!
you always have a higher pressure on the primary, than on the secondary.
But if you get a higher than designed pressure, if you do have a crack, you will open, that would cause a primary to secondary leakage.
16:
Those tubes have been tested and the first pressure was much, much 17!
higher than you can achieve on an accident c::ndition.
Also, every 18!
electric power research institute work, which I follow on steam generators, 19i obviously there are a of problems with venting, and thining and nicks 20-that I have followed. And they also have indicated that much higher 21.
pressures on the various types of subcalled faults would not cause a 22!
tube rupture.
As a matter of fact, I think NRC is also responsive.
231' Some were by... I'm not sure whether it's Battle... but they have 241 also done some work, and they showned that under accident condition 25!
t e
! {
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25 1
1 tube rupture is not a real likely event given the higher pressure and 2
zero on the secondary.
3!,
FASANO:
4!
Well, based on your knowledge of the systems, then how would 5!
y u explain the activity in the secondary side, which was recorded?
i 6i ABRAM0VICI:
Under normal mode of operation, up to the tach spec I
, y u can operate wM de primary to seccMan leakage, Wch 8
is, I think 1 gallon per minute, or gmi.
It's possible again, that 91 ee e
ma r maybe wasn't even there, a primary to 10 11:!
secondary leakage. However, when you've got the higher differential 12f pressure in c1e of the cracks, either in the tube or tube to tube sheet well, would have opened up.
And cause some primary to go into 131 the secondary.
Primary to secondary leakage is normal... is not 14:
something to be expected every day.
It's a part of, you know, the every day routine, once you reach that stage.
17j i
FASANO:
Did you... were you informed of a water hammer problem 18!
relating the condensata system?
19!
201 i
ABRAM0VICI:
I have heard of other people working on the problem.
21l Yes.
22l 231 l
FASANO:
You were not involved in that area? And you didn't get 2 41' involved in the condensate sequence of events, condensate polisher, 25!
prior to the initiation of the trip?
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26 i
ABRAM0VICI:
No, I did not.
Gary Broughton, I think was involved.
1 i
2!
FASANO: So your main involve 8ent was the gathering of information and 3
the recombiner, recombiner
?
Si ABRAM0VICI:
Oh, yes, one thing I would like to talk about.
Another 6
7{
big problem that we hao... the waste gas decay tanks pressure was going up, and we couldn't process the gas.
There was a bottled air.
g And we figured the whole accident was bottled in the one tank, the two g
decay tanks and we had to find some means to get the pressure down, because two things could have happened with the relief valve opened, l
and dumped to the Auxiliary Building, making the situation much worse 12,'
i than it already was.
So we were trying to put a bypass line frcm the 13) tanks, back to the containment.
I have written the prccedure together with Jim Henry... how to do this operation. We have hooked up from 1%
one of the radiation monitors, downstream of the waste gas decay tankc. We have hooked up half inch line coming back from the containment.
17 There were scme problems to be resolved. We di n't know whether we 18i were going to get the flame going back to the containment.
We used 19i the pressure switch connection on the building spray system. We 20r didn't know.. we were really afraid.
We had a sample... we definitely 21:
wanted a sample of the gas in the tank, before we dumped to the containment.
22l Because even... we knew there was high hydrogen concentration, wnica 231 is normal under the accident condition.
tit we did not know the e
2 41 oxygen.
Hydrogen is not flammaole unless you've got oxygen present.
25i
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27 i
And I wanted to make sure there was no oxygen.
We... a sample was 1,
2 taken at that time and there was no doubt that there was no trace of 3
oxygen, in the tank.
So there was no problem dumping it to the con-4 tainment. We start... like I say, we wrote the procedure, me and Jim Sj Henry.
I d n't remember the exact day. We worked through the night.
Gj We had presented it to the NRC group that was in the Control Room.
7 And it was accepted, and we proceeded with the venting of the tank f
back to the containment. We did put a flame arrester on the line, g
g just to make sure, that should we get a detonation, small kind.
Even ug, a ng m Hen n aga n, he & not feel dere was any 10l danger, but, just to make sure, we did put a flame arrester on the line, should the hydrogen go into containment ignite, protect the system, so the flame would not go back into the tank.
131 i
14:
FASANO:
So you tied it in with the Reactor Building... a pressure transmitter line?
16i 17l ABRAM0VICI:
Yes.
181 19l FASANO:
I guess you had a double valve on that, too, coming in?
21l ABRAMOVICI:
No, I don't think it's a double va've.
I know there is 22!
obviously an isolation valve outside the containment.
There was valve 23l i
I think it was DS 149, if I recall correctly.
24!
2 55 (b\\
cf
i 28 l
FASANO: Were there three transmitters there?
,9 i
2!
ABRAM0VICI: There was only one that I know of through a half inch 3t 4j line, I think, began with one inch penetration.
And there was the fuses inside the containment.
But there was no valve inside the tank.
g i
6l J
FASANO: ns far as your involvement on the first day for suggestions,
/l I
or advice to the people in the Control Rocm, they were nonexistent.
81 Is that correct?
g 10i ABRAM0VICI:
That is correct.
11 l
12l l
FASANO:
Do you have any more questions you would like to ask?
13) 14' RESNER:
Not at this time.
15; 16i FASANO: As far as the steam generator, you did go back.
Scmeone else 17!
looking at the steam generator now? As far as its situation... final 18!
conclusions? Or are you the one that's..
151 20' ABRAM0VICI:
I'm not working on it at this particular time.
I'm 21i reviewing now... I'm in the process of writing the failure modes and 22!
l analysis of the steam generator 8 going to the coolant, but continuous 23J plans... nothing to do with the actual steam generator to satisfy it 24l is integrity.
I'm almost sure that Babccck and Wilcox will be involved 25i in the analysis... if they alreacy are not.
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29 1
FASANO:
Just one point.
You mentioned that the B steam generator 2
vacuum was broken.
Can you explain what you meant when you said that?
i 3!
4 ABRAMOVICI: Well, when the condensor creates a negative pressure, Sj that's how the steam is being... condensing steam in the concenser, 6j y u create a negative pressure.
When you break... or you lose your q
vacuum in the condenser, then you lose your capability for extracting.
l In ther words, there was no pressure, you know, under normal conditions 8
g the steam generators are pressuri::ed on the secondary side.
Feedwater c mes in ar und 900 pounds. After the accident has happened, by 101 g
losing vacu.n, we have isolated the steam generator... data isolated control have isolated the steam generator because they didn't want to l
get the activity there was in the generator into the condenser.
131 Therefore, so called contaminated the.< hole condensate feedwater 14t train.
16!
FASANO:
But, then the A steam generator could still go to condenser or not?
lSi 191 ABRAM0VICI:
Yes.
The A still went to the condenser.
201 21:
FASANO:
So, as far as you know, the vacuum was still in existence.
22l It was an isolation of B steam generator.
23l 24!
25!
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30 n.
ABRAMOVIC*:
I think it was a temporary loss of vacuum for both A and 2j B.
But eiey have regained the vacuum.
They started the vacuum pumps, 3
and they had regained.
I am really not familiar with that sequence of 4j events, so I cannot Si gf FASANO:
Alright, I have no further questions at this time.
71 RESNER:
Julian, as we said at the outset of the interview, if you have any commert; that you'd like to make, that you feel would t;a g
pe e
e ana sis of Ws uansiet,' or any recomendadons 10:
that you would make to avoid such an event in the future.
12:
ABRAMOVICI: One definite suggestion that I,would like to make is that 13t dn engineer be present during all hourt'in the Control Room.
It is my feeling, cnd I don't know who's to be blamed in c say, but I think, my personal feeling again, the operators a6e trained for certain accidents.
And they're not trained to know what goes behind it in one quarters.
Each accident, frca an analytical standpoint, physically yes.
Thi",
accident accurrec because we had a pipe rupture or ws~had a steam ling break.
And that causes this accident.
Anc dat's what you do given
- 20; 21;j this accident.
I'm sure they know how to handle it.
But th;= was an accident,out of the ordinaEy. 'And if somebody had realized, again 22!
this is ay personal opinion, that the pressure was belcw saturati6a i
A 22{
for the given temperature, precably the accident would have been 24:
miniai:ed.
I think an engineer present would hase been able to make 25i uG'
- c4tt,
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s
i l
31 lj that determination.
Second suggestion I would make, is that... I I
2 know it's very hard to go against people, but to train the operators.
3{
I know that they go to simulators, but if there is any way possible to I
4 expose them on their everyday routine, maybe doing night time.
You know the demand for electricity is low, but somehow simulate accidents if possible.
Incorporate some kind of a simulator into the Control 06 t.
Room, which you know, I feel that I know pilots also use a simulator, y
but you feel differently wnen you know to expect, and when you don't know what to expect.
Alright, and obviously this accident was not ore g
it was considered tc be credible.
Obviously, it was the sequence of i
10!
events.
I guess you are aware, GPU is in a process... I know we already have made modifications to Unit 2.
We are in the process of l
submitting modifications for Unit 1, so we can start that unit up.
131 There's a list available.
I don't know if you had seen it.
It will be submitted to NRC, I heard before June 15th, of all the modifications that we feel are necessary to be done.
I think all our thinking has gone into that list.
I think that instead of me trying to elaborate on it, you can obtain a copy of that list.
It's broken off into the 18i type of modifications that must be done, so that an accident like this 19I will not happen.
And various types of studies, of what other things 20:
we should do, so as to prevent such accidents.
Another thing, again 21!
is my personal opinion, is that the:.4 is so much instrumentation J
22' I
available in the Control Room, that we can really confuse somebody in 24 a critical situation.
There is a lot of instrumentation : tat I feel, 24j yes the data is needed, but I don't think that it has to be on the 25i i,b-Il I
{ ;;
I e
(
i i
32 t
1!
c ntrol panel.
I think only basic data that gives you important 2
parameters for the primary, or the steam generator, or the turbine generator.
Maybe your various cooling systems.
But there is only a 3,
g limited, I feel, only a ifmited number of data that any person can gj look at, and you know, make a quick decision, if he has to.
That he can assimilate and correlate.
I think there is an lot of, lot of 01 information there that can be conflicting due to instruments error and it its failure.
8L 91 FASANO:
Do you think then, an engineer wculd have been able to cope with all that instrumentation better than the operator?
lb I
ABRAM0VICI:
I'm not saying cope with the instrumentation, but being 13; able to correlate pressure and temperature.
And realize that tne lo situation you are in would eventually draw a bucble, you know, and 15i make the bubble go larger and larger, that's what I'm covering more of 16 the core, and more and more damage to the fuel.
I think that could 17!
have been... I think an angineer could have made that determination.
IS!
So, you would not shut the safety a high pressure infection, for 191 example.
An operator saw the pressurizer level go up.
And he says I 20e don't want to put any more pressure, because otherwise I'm going to 21, pop the relief, so he shut it down, you know.
Based on what he 22!
j knows, that's right.
But, an engineer would be able to determine it's 23!
not really what has hapoened.
I really don't know which is better, 24:'
whether to trust your instruments, or to trust your judgment.
I 25i b
C l ^
l
I I
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33 I
lj guess, it's up to the individual preference.
I would have to trust 2
some instruments, up to a certain extent.
But, if something doesn't 3!
make sense, I would question it.
l 4:
FASANO:
Yeah.
You have instrumentation technicians on duty all 5
night, and I'm sure they could be asked to confirm instrumentation.
ei i
71 j
A8 RAM 0VICI:
Most of it is redundant.
Another thing that I last g
mentioned, it is on the restart, but adding redundant the instrumentation g
10l f the particular primary loop was pressure level indication temperature.
11:
FASANO:
So in this case, pressure level was not critical, because your saturation temperature and your pressure.
Is that what your 136 saying?
.15, ABRAM0VICI:
That's my opinion, yes.
I think let me clarify a little bit, I think it's... I would be less worried about dumping water to containments with relief valve.
I rather have that than a ISI 19!
FASANO:
And you mentioned that this was not an analyzed accident?
20!
21; ABRAM0VICI:
No as far as I know.
It is my understanding that I found 22!
later that, I guess, somebody named Mendelson from TVA, that has 231 analysis an accident like this, submitted it to S&W, NRC... I really 24!
don't know the whole story of this, it is a story that I heard when I 25!
cy
I i
i 34 i
1 was there. And I think I've seen a report on... I'm sorry I don't 2
have a copy, but, I wish I could get a hold of one. Which he analy::ed 3
this type of an accident, which is considered a small break loca.
I 4!
don't think is not one of the accident that he operator has...
g{
again, I'm not an operator.
I don't know the training he goes through, the actual questions and routine.
.,ei l '
FASANO:
g This is your best judgement.
I have no fu:ther questions.
9!
RESNER:
This concludes the interview of Mr. Abramovici.
The time is 10 12:32 p.m.
u.
t 12!
13l 14; 15 16!
17I 181 1
19:
20!
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23!
24i 25;
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.