ML19208B125
| ML19208B125 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1979 |
| From: | Jackson L, Potts E Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region II) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190080 | |
| Download: ML19208B125 (17) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION l
In the Matter of:
2' IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of Mr. Edward Potts, Superintandent of Technical Support for Unit 1 41 5;
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7l ai Trailer #203 9?
NRC Investigation Sita i
TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsylvania ll!
June 12,1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13; July 7,1979 (Date Transcript Typea)
- 309 15i (Tape.1u.moer(s))
16i 17:
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201 21!
NRC PERSONNEL:
22i Mr. Larry Jackson Mr. Mark E. Resner 3
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RESNEk:
This is an ir.;erview of Mr. William E. as in Edward Potts, f
POTTS.
Mr. Pctts is employed with Metropolitan Edison Company at the g
l Three Mile Isl3nd facility. His job title is superintendent of Technical 3
4 Support for Unit 1.
Present time is 5:04 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time.
5 Today's date is June 12,'1979.
This interview it being conducted in 6i Trailer 203 which is located just outside of the South Security gate 7l to the Three Mile Island.*acility.
Individuals present representing i
gj the NRC are Larry Jackson.
Mr. Jackson is a radiation specialist employed with Region II of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
gg M derating this interview is Mark E. Resner, RESNER.
I am an investigator 10,1 with the Office of Inspector and Auditor, Headquarters, of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Mr. Potts ha:: been interviewed twice i
previous to this date, excuse me...that would be once and that was one 13l 14,'
May 18, 1979.
And at that time he was given a two page document which explained the authority, purpose and scope of this investigation.
And j
it also apprised Mr. Potts that he was entitled to a representative of lot his choice to be present during this interview should he want one.
17' And that in no way is he compslied to talk with us if he does not want to.
On the second page of the document Mr. Potts answered three 19!
questions.
One of those questions was do we have your permission to tape this interview.
Mr. 'otts answered that in the affirmative, does 21i that still stand for this interview, Mr. Potts?
221 23!
POTTS:
Yes, it does.
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!lj RESNER:
Alright. On that document he also indicated that he would 2j like a copy of the tape.
Is that true for this interview, Mr. Pottr'.
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4 POTTS:
Yes, it i.s.
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6; RESNER: Allright. We'll provide you with a copy of the tape at the 7!
conclusion of the interview.
Mr. Potts has given us his jeb experience g
and education on the previous interview so we'll forego that and at g,
this tims we'll turn the interview over to Mr. Jackson who has some 10i questions for you.
11!
JACKSON:
Ok, Bill, just to get started would you state when you came on to the site here.
I know you were off the first day, on the 28th.
When you came in and started taking over some duties as the ECS coordinator.
f 15 16:
I can't be precise.
I left Oyster Creek in the afternoon and drove 17!
straight to the Island.
18f 191 1
JACKSON:
On this...when you came in...came in and started your duties 20!
in the ECS were you aware of the pr0blem in the makeup tank pressure i
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at that time?
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23l POTTS:
Shortly after arriving I learned of the difficulty there.
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can't say exactly what time, however.
It was the first few hours 25i i
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r lj perhaps five or six hours were spent by me becoming familiar with what 2
had transpired on the day...what the situation was in Unit 2 at that 3
time.
41 Si JACKSON:
Ok, then after several hours were...is it fair to say that Si y u were aware then that they were venting the makeup tank and the 7{
makeup tank was causing some release offsite or at least outside the l
plant when they did vent?
8 9!
10l POTTS:
I was aware that apparently the...each time the makeup tank was vented the release occurred.
I have to say apparently because the indications I was getting from the onsite and offsite teams indicated I
that an increase in radiation each time the event occurred.
One can 13) assume that was coupled.
15; JACKSON:
Ok.
When...whenever there was a vent taking place...whenever they were going to open MUV 13 did you as the coordinator of the ECS, 17!
did you have some idea of what magnitude of release to expect?
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19i POTTS:
Yes, I was called prior to the vents from the Unit 2 Control 20 Room and advised when to expect it and the approximate size.
And also 21:
requested to have the helicopter in position and the team monitoring 22; teams in their correct positions.
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JtCKSON: When you say approximate size, do you recall hcw they were 2
getting you this information, is it going to be so many seconds or so l
31 many minutes or how?
4l POTTS: We discussed the duration of the vent as well as the magnituce Si 6
of the release and as to when in the sequence of the several events 7j that occurred in the first couple of days that we got a good feel for g
the expected release, I don't know but some tim' during the first e
g, couple of days we got a feel for magnitude of expected release versus 10 the amount of time that we were going to be venting and the amount of i
pressure that was in the makeup tank at the time the event occurred.
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JACKSON: O k.
When operations in Unit 2 would call this information
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over were you talking to them directly or were some of your nuclear engineers talking?
15 IS!
POTTS:
There were occasions when other people talked to the Unit 2 17!
Control Roem, primarily I talked to the Unit 2 Control Ro"
.#cugh the hotline directly.
19I 20!
JACKSON:
Ok. On Friday morning and I believe you were on that morning about midnight till noon the next day or noon the 30th about 4:30 a.m.
221 on the 30th they had the makeup tank apparent relief valve lifted and 231 the level in the makeup tank dropped to zero, dropped crastically and i
24:
this was apparently due to accumulation of gases in the makeup tank or 25t
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5 1l so I've been told and this generated a lot of concern about what they 2
were going to have to do to get water back in that makeup tank for one 3
thing and to quit putting the borated water storage tank through the makeup tank, you know, oleed tanks for another.
So they started 3j discussing making a release.
Oc you recall getting involved in that Si discussion or were you included in the discussion as to how long or what they were going to have to do as far as venting that makeup tank?
8:
POTTS:
I don't know how much of the discussion I was involved with.
I would assume there Was Considerable amount of discussion before I 11 got involved. It's my belief that I was informed that thGy WEre going to take corrective action prior to what happened.
And I say it's my belief now because my best recollection of that morning was that we 131 got information from the state that the NRC had advised the governor that evacuation was ir. order.
I talked a few minutes with the State 15' through my telephone talker to understand what information they had.
At that time there were perhaps a half do::en NRC inspectors in the i
Unit 1 shift supervisor's office.
If you recall that has a glass-18:
partition.
At the time I got the information that the evacuation was recommended those people were in the shift supervisor's all of them.
20l I looked at the past few hours of offsite and onsite dose rate readings, 21 the wind direction and could not understand why the recommendations so 22l I went into the shift supervisor's office and I asked the senior man 23 I
there if he had some concerns that I was not aw ne o'.
.was he being 24j informed by either me or the people who were working for me.
And he 2Si k
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Ilj did not have any concerns nor did he feel that ha was not getting the 2
information he needed nor had he advised the 1RC management in Washingten i
2j that the problem existed it would require evacuation, in fact, he was 4
I guess I'll use the word confused as to why a recommendation like 5
that ame out.
Then I called the Unit 2 Control Room and asked to
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I 6i speak to Mr. Miller.
I talked to Mr. Miller for a few minutes and f
told him what I had heard and asked if he would call the Unit 2 NRC g
people who were with the NRC in the Unit 2 Control Room and shortly g
after that I got an answer back from someone over there I believe it 101 was shift supervisor but I can't be certain of that.
The light condition if in Unit 2 Control Room existed there was not a concern on the part of
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the NRC personnel in the Control Room.
And subsequent to that conversation y
the gentlemen in the Unit 1 Control Room, the NRC gentlemen came back to me and informed me that it had been Commissioner Hendrie who had 14, l
advised the governor based on what we felt at that time was not based im,,
on any recommendation from the site personnel and, in fact, I believe he checked in what we called Trailer City and could not find a level IT of concern there.
So I guess I'm thats really about how much I can remember now the real details of who discussed it with me and how much 19i involvement I had in the discussions.
I just can't recall after a 20t couple of months.
I can't say I don't recall of any incident when a 21:
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sharp increase or a release occurred and an increase in the dose rates l
in which I was not advised beforehand.
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7 lj JACKSON:
Do you recall how early you might have got in...I think that 2
releas took place some time around 7:10 that morning that when they 3l started ok.
But probably had been discussed somewhat earlier than i
p that because the makeup tank level according to the chart about 4:35 5l is when that makeup tank level bottomed out.
And it stayed out stayed 6
n bot:om to ch, about 7:30.
So obviously they were discussing it 7
cometime before then, do you recall getting involved in the discussions g
going into a long term release to get that pressure down where you can...
g; 101 POTTS:
I can't help you much on time at all, Larry.
One n# the very strange things about the few weeks I spent in the Control Room is the 12!y last interview they asked me if I was present and I knew I was present when the release occurred and when the recommendation of evacuating occured and I thought was the middle of the afternoon.
Nights and days did not do not now mean a great deal and I just don't have a good time frame for...I believe that I was involved for some period of time with the at least have the knowledge for some period of time that there was going to be a vent for the makeup tank.
20; JACKSON:
DId you have any idea that the event was going to be different 21 from the other events.
Now there had been several events during the 22l l
course of that night shorter duration and according to Greg Hit; wnen 23!
they started this vent he told the operator who I believe was Craig 241 Faust, who actually opened the vent, according to Greg, said he told 25:
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lj him to open that vent and leave it open until he told him to close it.
2 Now, do you recall anything of this nature being informed of this type 3
of information?
41 gj POTTS:
It's very hard to be certain.
My recollection now and I don't 6
whether its had has been contaminated by discussions after the incident p
or having listened to some parts of the radio broadcast of the President's Commission.
g, My recollection as I thought it was going to be a longer vent but...
g 101
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JACKSON:
Let me ask you this while you're hanging on the end of that
,2l, statement did you think it was going to be a larger magnitude did you 1
any idea you were going to see something like 1200 mR per hour over i
131 that vent stack?
14i Lc, POTTS:
Two things I'll say about that.
First I did not have a high level of concern on the 1200 mR stack reading.
Which indicates to me I must have had expected it.
That's logic.
The second thing is, I 181 seem to recall a discussion of how the vent would be open to add water 195 and what immediately comes to my mind when you add water to a tank as 201 radioactive gas is you're going to force out more gas volume than you 21!
22l.
would if you just vented.
The fact that you' re adding water just naturally displaces the gas.
I feel I knew it in advance, yes, but I 231 I
can't be certain.
You know, I couldn't swear on a stallion but that 2 41 was the case and I can remember some conversations that Greg Hit: and 25!
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lj I had and I believe it was that day about the vent something to the gj effect that a certain amount of vulgarity involved but for me to Greg, 3l do you really want to do this to me again, you know, I've had a 4l couple of these and I don't know if I want another and he would come g
back and say, heh, you know, we need water in that tank.
And it was g
in jest that we were making these kind of comments kind of comic 7
relief if you will for a time of strength, i
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JACKSON:
O k.
g Greg indicated earlier in...what I was trying to lead int there was a whether or not you expected a r9 lease which I knew 10j g
you already expected a release or they wouldn't be calling you and telling you to get the teams but whether or not the release was planned but the magnitude was a little surprising or at least that number was...of 1200 mR per hour over that stack was a little surprising.
Greg had indicated earlier that he was listening to the radio when the helicopter called in the 1200 mR per hour and he says his explanation was something like "where in the hell is that helicopter," or something to that'effect.
And he indicated that, you know, he had directed the valve to reopen and informed I believe he used you by name.
I'm not He was fixing to open the valve but he himself was not expecting sure.
to hear that large a number of the vent stacks.
I was just trying to 22!.
watch to see if there was general consensus.
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POTTS:
I think that we could check the records and check my memory 24i but I think that that's the larger number recorded during my time in 25i i
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lj the watch.
There may well have been some the first few hours of the i
2l day...
I 3i 4j JACKSON:
I think there was only one other number larger than that and 5
that was the day before that there was a 3000 mR per hour and for soma i
g reason that didn't attract at much attention as the 1200.
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JACKSON:
g It was closer to the stack but that's still a rather large gj number for something going up the stack.
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POTTS:
I've got to assume that I knew in advance for another reason g
g also, Larry.
The helicopter was above the stack the aux building I
stack and I normally positioned the helicopter above the stack at the 131 start of the vent with the idea being you'd catch the worse reading for use with the source term with Sid Porter and then we'd send the helicopter down the plume traversing left and right on the plume to l
discover how discover the width of the plume I guess.
And the fact 175 that he was above the plume and some haz::y recollection I think I knew in advance I think I must have known well in advance because scme of 19{
the things which you worked out logistically before a vent was you had to be careful about choppers gas load.
One of the things you didn't 21;.
want to happen was for him to run out of gas in the middle of the time 22!
we needed him. You always check the gas, you had concerns about how 231 many people were going to be looking for a relief rignt in the middle 241 of an action and those kind of mundane details.
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JACKSON:
I'm not questioning whether or not you knew the release...all 2]
I was digging for was whether or not you expected that magnitude I i
think...
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POTTS: Of course talking with Howard Crawford and Senson I came in 5
l worked with Howard, Mike Benson I believe.
They pretty well established g
that they were aware of it that they told NRC there was going to be o
l one when it started and came back later and said that it's going to go g
g on longer than we indicated initially or something to that effect.
10!
JACKSON: What I'm trying to do is pin down...there's a discrepancy I
between tastimonies and I'm trying to determine wnether or not it's just a matter of semantics you know whether or not it was the release 131 control from the standpoint that you expected it to be that large or 14:
was it not?
15; 16:
FOTTS: Well it controlled the release to me playing the semantics 17!
game would be one that we could terminate at will.
And I think we were able to terminate that and we also predicted when it was going to 19!
start.
That's control, predictiig its start and stop.
Making judgements 20!
based on one number doesn't seem to me to be very wise and I'm getting 21!
a little filled of your investigation I think it needs to be said.
22l Anybody who made a judgement based on a single reading and not being 23i concerned with the real concern what the ground level was... dose rate 24i l
in tiie populated zones would be.
That to me would be more interesting 25j
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lj and those were the numbers I paid a great deal more attention to.
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Perimeter... site perimeter, ground level release and then the release 3
out in the offsite area, those teams were the ones...even those readings 4
g t high then I would have been concerned that it was the 1?00 mR 5l above the stack I expected anytime that helicopter flew above the i
6.
stack he was going to see a whole lot more than anybody else saw.
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JACKSON:
8 When that 1200 mR per hour reading was called it I believe you said earlier that you notified the State is that true?
g 101 POTTS:
I didn't personally but my phone talker did, notified the State and the NRC.
t 13l JACXSON: O k.
14' 15:
16' POTTS:
The State, in fact, I didn't say ear. lier, but in my conversations with the State I determined that they had no concerns and were aware 17l that 1200 mR was above the stack at the site and offsito readings were whatever they were, 2 mR I don't recall exactly.
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JACKSON:
Do you know if any other notification were made by the State 2 11 that morning or involved in that particular reading other than you or 22',
your phone talk?
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1 POTTS:
I'm confident there were other contacts mace because after 2
talking to Mr. Miller and I had said that earlier in Unit 2 Control Room.
He had told me I had best get ahold of the Observation Center 3
4 and find out who was manager in charge was make certain he was aware c
that the State had received such a recommendation.
And also get those A
d people working with the State to solve whatever the confusion or
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problem communication wherever it was.
And I believe I talked to
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g Sandy Lawyer, I believe that was the manager who was on at that time.
But I more or less passed that problem on so...I think Knorr also g
01 asked me to request that Blaine Fabian get involved, who happens to be in Met Ed's communication department.
So that at this time there was a lot of radio stations involved with first advising to evacuate and I
13l second advising to stay in house and then the change in the evacuation from ten miles to I think with 8 miles at one time and then it got to be five.
I went through various stages of confusion but I tried to get our support team over on the Observation Center working on that so we could go back to the our problems.
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JACKSON:
Did y'all talk to any other agencies such as Civil Defensa you or your phone talker?
20i 21:
POTTS:
Yes.
Civil Defense was included in that, yes.
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JACKSON:
But then your phone talker made that call.
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lj POTTS: Yes.
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3 JACKSON:
Do you recall who was...would that have been Crawford or 4{
were they...
6i POTTS:
Howie was the nuclear engineer but he also did some of the 7!
phone talking and I believe Charlie Benson was the real phone talker g
at that time, who talked to BRH, and Civil Defense but there may well 9
have been occasions when Howie helped Charlie out on communications.
10!
At the same time we had usually two radio talkers, really it was a gf requirement for one so long as one didn't need the relief for one ig reason or another. And that second individual helped a lot with the offsite phone communications.
And that could have been either Dennis g
McGettrick or Beverly Good.
Most of those days happene' *o run together anymore and it's difficult to remember who was on what with you.
Particularly whenever their shift changed at different times than mine 16!
l did.
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JACXSON:
To you knowledge was anyone in Unit 2 making any of these
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calls direct to the State?
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POTTS: I have no direct knowledge of that.
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JACKSON:
By Bill Zewe or Greg Hitz or Jim Floyd?
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1; POTTS:
To my knowledge I just had no knowledge of that.
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3j JACKSON: O k.
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POTTS:
Could or could not have happened I don't know.
1 6l JACKSON: Ok, then, do you...one or two quick onas just for the record.
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Do you remember discussing the release with Greg Hit:? Did you discuss g
it with anyone else?
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POTTS:
I remember discussing with Greg Hit: and subsequent to the
,j incident I discussed it with some other people both with Met Ed and some outsken do had some interest in why the recommendation to 13 evacuate.
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9 16' that morning.
Greg or Bill Zewe or Floyd those are the...I named those three because those are the three supervisor pecple I can pin 18t down as being in there at one time or another tiat morning.
20t POTTS:
I know I talked to Greg Hit: that day and on many occasions I talked to Floyd but whether it was that day or some other day I can't 22]
say.
Perhaps once or twice with Zewe but I don't recall.
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l JACKSON:
Ok.
Ok, Mark, I believe that's wound all of questions up.
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i 3j RESNER: Thank you Mr. Potts for coming over and this concludes the 4j interview.
Time now is 5:30 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time.
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