ML19208B104
| ML19208B104 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1979 |
| From: | Michael Benson, Crawford H, Essig T Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190056 | |
| Download: ML19208B104 (37) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
2 In the Matter of:
T.'
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3i of Mr. Michael L. 8enson, thc'. ear Engineer III, Unit 2 Mr. Howard C. Crawford, gineer Nuclear I i
Si 6i 7i 8:
Trailer #203 9!
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10:
Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
June 6, 1979 12l (Date of Interview) 13i July 6, 1979 (Date Transcript Typea)
- 302 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
16i 17' 18l 19i 20!
21!
NRC PERSJNNEL:
22!
Mr. Thcmas H. Essig Mr. Larry L. Jackson 23!
Mr. Jonn Sinclair 24!
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SINCLAIR:
The following interview is being conducted jointly of Mr.
2 Michael L. Benson.
Mr. Benson is a Nuclear Engineer III, Metropolitan 3
Edison, Unit 2.
Mr. Crawford is Howard C. Crawford.
Mr. Crawford is 4j an Engineer Nuclear I, Metropolitan Edison at Three Mile Island.
The 5
present time is 3:14 PM Eastern Daylight Time, today's date is June 6, t
1979.
The place of the interview is Trailer #203 which is located 6i 7
immediately outside the South Gate of the Three Mile Island site.
{
Also present for the interview is Mr. Thomas H. Essig.
Mr. Essig is 8
g the Chief', Environmental and Special Projects Section, Region III, U.
10 S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Also interviewing is Mr. Larry J.
ig' Jackson.
Excuse me, the middle initial L. last name Jackson.
He is a Radiation Specialist, Region II, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Prior to this interview, Mr. Benson was interviewed on May 3,1979, was provided a copy of the advisement document which explains the scope, and the purpose of the NRC investigation.
The responses to the questions and the interview were recorded at that time and will now be receated for this interview.
Mr. Benson, did you understand the 17!
document?
18i 19l SENSON:
Yes sir.
20!
21l SINCLAIR:
Do we have your permission to tape the interview?
22j 231 8ENSON:
Yes sir.
24l 25!
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l SINCLAIR:
And do you want a copy of the tape?
1 25 3
BENSON:
Yes sir.
4l Si SINCLAIR:
Okay thank you.
Mr. Crawford did you understand the document?
i 6i 7j CRAWFORD:
Yes sir.
81 i
SINCLAIR: Okay.
Do we have your pr..wission to tape the interview?
g, 10f h
CRAWFORD:
Yes sir.
12'
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- SINCLAIR: Allright and do you want a copy of the tape?
i 14i CRAWFORD:
Yes sir.
16i SINCLAIR: Okay thank you very much.
At this time we will turn the 17, interview and questioning over to Mr. Jackson.
18!
19i JACXSON:
Okay. Howard probably the first question might apply to you more than Mike, we're trying to pin down the events on the morning of th: 30th, Friday morning and in particular the release that was related r
22l to the 1200 mR per hour.
Can you go back and into the night there, I
23{
there had been a couple of other releases in the morning early and 24!
relate the kind of the sequence of events, like what you were told as 25i
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t lj far as what they were going to do, I'm gonna make a, I'm venting the 2j Makeup Tank and whether or not the vent was going to be a short one or i
31 a long one, information of this type?
4!.
CRAWFORD:
Do you have the records there?
5,i 6i 7f JACKSON:
Sure.
f 8!
i CRAWFORD:
gg Mike, help me a little bit, with records, you know.
Okay.
n t e, I e g tten a couple of calls from the Unit 2 Control Room, I 10 g
guess it was just one of the CRO's I don't exactly remember who but they did inform us that they were going to vent the Makeup Tank at a
]
couple of times and it was my understanding they were going to be short vents so that they were going to try to relieve pressure to the Makeup Tank to increase the letdown flow and try to let them makeup to la,, i the Makeup Tank better than what they were.
So they notified me and I wrote them down in a log when they were gonna do the venting and we'd 17j get the helicopter and our own site and offsite teams downwind before they did the venting to try to see if there was any release at all while they were venting.
And I guess they vented 3 or 4 times that evening before the vents at 0800 in the morning or when it the vent 21!
had crossed the 1200 mR reading and so all through the night it was 22!
t pretty much a standard practice when they said they were going to vent 23!
we were ready when we hadn't really seen that much up until that 24i point.
25!
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JACKSON:
Do you recall when you first became aware that there was 2
potentially a problem with that Makeup Tank and that operations was 3
going to have to vent it for a long period of time?
4; CRAWFORD:
They did inform me at the 0800 vent that they did have a gg 6
problem and that they were going to vent, have to vent, for an unknown 7
amount of time longer than what they have before and they weren't sure gj exactly how long they'd have to vent for.
So with that information I informed the NRC personnel in the Unit 1 Shift Superviscr's Office and g;
als inf rmed the person on the other end of our open ccmmunication Ot lines with the BRH, Bureau of Rad Health I guess it's Bureau of Radiological y
Safety you know, whatever.
But I informed both of them that we were i
going to, before that vent I did inform both of them that we were 131 going to vent the Makeup Tank again, and then after I was told that we were going to vent it for longer than what we thought I went back and told both agencies again that we were going to have to vent longer 17; than we had originally planned.
18f JACKSON:
Do you know th problem?
191 20t CRAWFORD:
They didn't tall me exactly what the problem was.
21:
22!
JACKSON:
Okay.
Were you aware of any conversations then or were you 23l directly involved in any conversations between the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor, 2 41 I believe it was Hit:: at that time, and the ECS or was someone else 25!
doing the talking on the phone?
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CRAWFORD:
I don't remember who told me, it could of been Greg, it 2
could of been somebody else.
l 3l JACXSON:
Okay.
4j I
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6i CRAWFORO:
I'm not sure of who told me that we were venting and that 7j we had the problem.
i 8I JACXSON:
Okay.
Do you recall being instructed specifically to inform g,
10l to get Maggie Reilly on the phone at the State?
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CRAWFORD:
No sir I wasn't instructed to do that.
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JACKSON:
Do you happen to know whether or not that she was on the phone?
16i CRAWFORD:
I don't know who was on the other end, I don't think it was 17!
l lSi Maggie Reilly but I couldn't say for sure.
I just, whoever was at the other end of the phone at the time I don't.
20:
21:l JACXSON:
Okay.
Now what time do your logs show notification for this release, the one where we get the 1200 mR per hour? And for the 22 record Mr. Crawford is looking at his notes from the ECS Log.
23l 24:
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CRAWFORD:
0710.
I wrote it dcwn as they started the Makeup Tank.
I believed they notified me sometime earlier than that and they had a, 2
3 they had something that you know usually they notified me that it would take an hour until they actually did and they'd :alled me again 4;
Sj when they actually started.
i Si 7l JACXSON:
Okay. When they first notified you did you send out your l
survey teams then or did you wait for confirmation that they were g
gj actually fixing to vent from the makeup tank?
10l CRAWFORD:
The first time they notified me I sent the teams to the 11:
yg locations to wait. We'd put the helicopter in the air and he'd hover d wnwind until we were notified that they were definitely venting and 13 141 then we send him over the stack.
15i JACKSON: Okay.
Do you recall once they started that vent at 0710 6!
whether or not that vent was interrupted or was it continuous for the next several hours?
19r CRAWFORD:
I couldn't say.
As ftr as I knew it was continuous for the
,c0, next several hours.
As far as I know it it was going when I left in 22!
the morning, which I guess I left around 11 o' clock that morning when Mike came on earlier and as far as I know it was still going on when I left.
211 25i
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1:
JACXSON: Okay.
Let me tell you why I asked that question.
The 2:
Control Room operators log shows an entry around 9 o' clock a little i
f after that says " Venting Makeup Tank" and I was trying to confirm 3
4; whether or not that might of been the vent might of been secured g
earlier and they were reinitiating the vent or whether or not that was 6i just the plant status.
They were in the process of venting the tank 7
and they were continuing to vent the tank.
81 CRAWFORD:
I'd say it was a plant status because on my notes I had, g,
101 when they started the Makeup Tank I put a start time and said " Start g
Makeup Tank" and then afterwards I'd put " Stopped" and then leave a space for our stopped time and I didn't write a stop time in for that ne.
S if they did stop I wasn't informed that they had stopped 3
14l:
venting the Makeup Tank.
15!
JACKSON:
Okay.
Let me back up to the 2Sth.
Now, you were in the 16i 1., !
Unit 2 Control Room initially?
/!
18t CRAWFORD:
Yes sir.
191 20!
JACKSON:
It's correct on the 28th.
Do you recall when they first 21:
started venting the Makeup Tank? I understand that they may not have realized when they first started venting the Makeup Tank that that was 2 31 going to create a release but the log, the Control Room operators log 24!
is blank from about 5 in the morning until 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />.
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CRAWFORD:
On the 28th?
2l r
JACKSON: On the 28th.
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3 41 f
CRAWFORD:
I don' t know.
I had no word if they were venting the g
t 6i Makeup Tank or not on the 28th.
7!
gj JACKSON:
Okay, fine.
Tom, do you want to take over for a little bit here and let me look at some notes?
g, 10f yg:
ESSIG: What I'd like to do with both of you gentlemen is that we.'ve established from previous interviews that both of you were... reported y
in at the Control Room approximately at the same, the Control Room, the Unit 2 Control Room approximately at 0700 on the morning of the
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- P' "9
15; I.think you beat Mike by 5 minutes or so.
16:
17!
CRAWFORD:
5 to 10 minutes, yes.
19!
ESSIG:
Okay. What I'd like to do is according to the Offsite Oose Assessment Procedure 1670.4, there are certain pieces of information that you need to go through that procedure and come up with an assessment 22; 3
of the offsite consequences of the release and what I'd like to do is 23{
to sort of layout for you what I think those details are, the types of 2 41 information that you needed and can the two of you if you were working 25i 9\\l A
L.
CS'
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i lj together coming up, if each one maybe had a separate piece of the 2
action so to speak, could you give me your best recollection as to 3
when each particular piece of information might have been available?
4; So I'd like to start with if the reading of the monitors was the first 5l thing that you did, HPR-214 and 219, could we establish the time that 6i you read those?
I think Howard you previously stated that you had f
read them at about 7 o' clock, both of them.
7 8!
CRAWFORD:
That is correct.
g 10I ESSIG:
Okay.
And Mike you did not read those, that was left up to n,
g Howard or had he read them before you actually got in the Control Room?
73 14 15; BENSCN:
He was already, he had already performed the calculation.
So he had already done all of that, the checking of the monitors, I went over and looked at them again and also I remember going back to the ventilation flow on the panels and looking at if we had stopped all the fans, all the exhaust fans at that time.
20j ESSIG:
Okay.
So then the fans, wnich fans were operating, the monitor 21:
readings, the wind direction and the speed, determining which isopleths to use, that was all done within the first few minutes of your arrival in the Control Room?
24!
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Ilj CRAWFORD:
The first 10 minutes I think of my arrival.
2; 3j ESSIG:
The first 10 minutes.
4!
3 CRAWFORD:
I think that was all completed by the time Mike arrived.
t 6i 7!
ESSIG: Okay.
So you actually had the completed then the calculations l
of the 40 R per hour at the time that Mike got there?
g 10l CRAWFORD:
I remember it that way yes.
11!
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ESSIG:
Okay.
And once you finished that first calculation, let's say 13j based on what you just said, that the calculation was comoleted roughly g
at oh 7 o' clock or 7:05 perhaps, if you were there at say 6:55 and we'll allow 10 minutes for this calculation to have been done.
Did you then take the calculation and take it over to Dubiel and go over it with him? Was he immediately available at that time?
18:
CRAWFORD:
First I didn't like the answer so I rechecked the calculation.
20:
ESSIG:
Okay.
21!
l 22l CRAWFORD:
And then I had Mike check the calculation also.
He looked 23 at it and then I took it to Mr. Dubiel which probably might of been 241 another 5 or 10 minutes.
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i ESSIG:
Okay.
And when you say rechecked the calculation, does that 1{
2; include going right back to the monitor and reading it again to make 3i sure that what you read at whatever time it was 7 o' clock or 5 of 7 that you read the monitor correctly and the range, the expanded scale 4:
5 switch was in the proper position?
Si 7
CRAWFORD:
I went back and reread the monitor yes, I didn't check the 8
expanded scale switch.
9t ESSIG: Okay.
So do you know or do you recall if it might of been on 10j y
one of the expanded scales, if you were...
12' CRAWFORD:
I don't recall.
141 ESSIG:
Okay.
I guess what I'm trying to establish is you said in a 16i previous interview that the monitor read initially 300 R per hour, in other words the monitor would of, the scale reading would of, actually been 3 times 10 to the fifth mR per hour?
19' CRAWFORD:
3 times 10 to the fifth, that correct.
21:
ESSIG:
And all I was trying to establish is I believe that if the 22l l
expanded scale switch might have been on one of the lower scales as it 23l might of been say prior to the incident, I assumed you operated that 24i HPR-214 on one of the lower scales typically.
Somebody would have..
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probably had to gone and throw the switch over to the, so that you 2
were looking at the full 7 decades of the monitor... and neither one i
3t of you did that?
4!
5l BENSON:
No sir.
Si
-. l CRAWFORD:
No sir.
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8!
ESSIG:
Okay.
I guess what we're trying to establish here is if you g,
10i indeed mace an overestimate of the dose rate, was it because the y
containment leak rate. wasn't wnat... because you weren't at full g{
pressure following the LOCA in containment, we've said before as you 73 were only about a couple of psi versus the 50 plus that you have frca the LOCA.
Just trying to establish if there reason for the overprediction was... might of been due in part to perhaps the monitor be read incorrectly...
and in fact it might of been...
16; 17f CRAWFORD:
On a lower scale.
181 19' ESSIG:
On a lower scale.
20; 21:
CRAWFORD:
That's possible.
I didn't, I don't think I was aware really that there was two scales staying on.
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1l ESSIG: Okay.
2!
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CRAWCORD:
I don't know if you remember Mike?
4!
Sj BENSON:
I went back to this, it wasn't pegged out and it was reading 6
nscale and I just looked at the reading and I and I had already gone 7;
back and figuring it was in the several hundred, it didn't surprise me t
81 I never checked to see what scale it was on.
9!
ESSIG:
Okay.
Now the...
10 ui BENSON:
y Again I'm like Howard I had to see the monitor in front of u)
=-
14' ESSIG:
The several hundred now put you out of little table that's in 16l that procedure because it only goes up to 12.
i 17 CRAWFORD: We were out of the table.
181 19i ESSIG:
Yeh.
20j 21:
CRAWFORD:
And we just used a linear calculation on that.
23!
ESSIG:
Right.
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JACXSON:
Now what time of frame are we talking when you read that I
monitor?
2l 3
i 4j CRAWFORD:
I read it the first thing that I came into the Control Room g;
0700 and probably again at 0710.
It hadn't changed much between the 6
two readings.
7!
i 8j JACKSON:
I think we have a corrected scale which we have got, I&C has g
developed a scale for the chart paper which was pretty much useless on e m ming e nckent because ne range on de insuument is 10;
.much greater than the range on the chart paper and I believe the...
we'd looked at the paper now and use the I&C scale that's been developed
]
since the incident where they actually gotten 9 decades on the paper because the recorder had never been calibrated to fit on the paper but they've since done that and I believe about 7:20, is when the 8R 16,'
reading comes up when the general emergency was called... declared and so that was what was stated in an earlier I believe maybe I think Mr.
Dubiel stated that, that's probably in a log or two, that at 7:24 18!
they declared an emergency based on greater than 8 R per hcur.
20, CRAWFORD:
I heard that in the testimony.
21:
I 22' JACXSON:
And the chart that I&C has developed shows the recordar 23!
trace passing through 8 R per hour at about 7:19.
So it's quite i
24) possible then what's your saying is that that monitor was in one of 25!
the other 3 decade ranges when you read the chart is that rignt?
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CRAWFCRD: What ranges are on the monitor?
I 2:
3l JACKSON:
The monitor, the full scale on the monitor when the control 4;
knob is in all is from point 1 to 10 to the seventh mR per hour and gj you can select any three decades, alright if you select 10 to the Si fifth there's a blace scale right under the red scale that has, that's y
divid9d into three sectiers and the last number on that scale would be g'
10 to the fifth, if you'd had the knob in the 10 to the fifth position.
g And you can turn that knob to 10 to the fifth,10 to the fourth any of 10 those positions, and it automatically places the reading on the black 17 scale at whatever you have the control knob set on, it places the last g
increment on the black scale on that reading, so if you had it on 10 3]
co the fifth during normal operation and didn't switch it then the black scale would start off 10 to the second, I believe, and then that g
.15i to the fourth and the last mark on the black scale would be 10 to the fifth.
So it definitely throws the monitor off if you're reading the red scale.
191 ESSIG; Coming back to after, Howard, you completed your first calculation
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Y and then you rechecked and then Mike came in the Control Room, and 21!
then you had asked hin to check the calculation, and I think Mike that 22l l
you stated that you pretty much agreed with what Howard had done, you 23i didn't find any errors at the time is that correct?
25i
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llj BENSON:
Correct.
2; I
31 ESSIG:
Then the, let's go back then to discussing this with Dick 4
Oubiel.
Howard did you proceed then right at about let's say 7:10 or 5;
so when Mike came in and he had finished looking at the calculation, 6
did you then sort of walk over, was Dubiel in the Control Room at that 7i time and did you walk over and discuss it with him right away?
8) gl CRAWFORD: Yes he was in the Control Room at that time and I did go 10; ver and discuss it with him right away.
ni gj ESSIG:
Okay.
And then he proceeded to go through you* calculations and...
?
141 CRAWFORD:
He didn't check the monitor, he just looked at my calculations, 16,'
came over and looked at the map and the X/Q that I used and said it 17; looked like I've done everything.
18{
l ESSIG:
Okay.
191 20i CRAWFORO: And we went and talked to Jim Seelinger.
I guess he says 21l that he wasn't in the Control Rocm until 8 c' clock.
I rememb2r talking 22 to him when I thought, right after I talkea to Dubiel.
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i ESSIG:
Okay. Was there.. on the calculation sheet that you gave us, 2
for the record I have in my hand completed calculation sheets which 3{
are enclosures 2, 3 and 4 to Procedure i670.4 and on enclosure 4 it 4;
shows here that the calculations, there's a time written in of 0746 for the, you previously testified Howard that GE-8 this was actually 5,
l 6i G idsboro, they put in GE-8 because the onsite measurement that you 7j made, the confirmacion of the predicted level was actually made onsite i
g in the general direction of Goldsboro, but that the actual X/Q value '
aj that used and the prediction were for Goldsboro, was that correct?
10!
CRAWFORD:
That is correct.
And the time is the time that I received g
the actual reading.
13\\
ESSIG:
Okay okay.
It's not the time of the calculation then is it?
g; 15i CRAWFORD:
No it's the not the time, the time of the calculation would of been put over here or is normally put on the calculation and the sheet is lost I can't find it.
IS!
1Si ESSIG:
Okay. When you then completed that calculation and as you
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said, I believe you said it was stated that Dubiel very quickly looked 22!.
at it and determined that you hadn't made any...
it didn't aopear to be any errors as far as he was concerned.
Oc you know what haopened i
231 then as far as the actions that were taken either by yourself or by 24l other individuals?
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you
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lj CRAWFORD:
Like I said as I remember Jim Seelinger was in the Control 2{
Room at that time and he was told and then he wanted to verify that h
number and so we went back and waited till we got the onsite team 4;
ready and I did also did a LPZ calculation which you do have a sheet gi for.
I Si ESSIG:
Yes.
7!
I 8!
gj CRAWFORD:
Went back and did that one then the aext onsite reading 10l came in and I went back and recalculated based on the onsite reading g,;
and just went on from there. What they did with the number I don't h
know.
i 13l l
ESSIG:
Okay.
Let me look at this sheet just for a second here.
I think the... see is we have a time for the LPZ calculation... that was g
7:44.
Okay, so just to sort of summarize this then, you completed your calculation about 7:10 roughly.
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18!
CRAWFORD:
7:10 to 7:15.
191 20t ESSIG:
7:10 to 7:15 and it was apparent then from the calculation 21:
anyway whether it was right or wrong at that time you assumed it was right since you couldn't find any errors in it that there was an 23 apparently a dose rate of 40 R per hour in Goldsboro and that was 24!
perceived to be confirmed by dispatching the onsite teams survey at f
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a 6
I 19
!lj point GE-8 which is in the general direction of the predicted value of 2
Goldsboro and then that measurement came back in at 0746 according to 3{
your sheet there.
l 4l Si CRAWFORD:
Right and between the time that I told Dick Dubiel and I i
6l guess I came back and there was a lot of conversation between Dubiel, 7{
myself, and Jim Seelinger mostly between Dubiel and Seelinger that I 8j was kind of standing there listening to you know what reasons there gj could be that the Dome Monitor was so high,that this calculation was 10j so high could that in fact be an actual number or could it be a bad number.
I don't know how long that conversation went on.
m ESSIG:
Okay. Mike were you involved in any of those conversations 13 between Dubiel and Seelinger? Were you asked for any input on this f
monitor as to whether or not it was reading?
16i SENSON:
I don't correctly remember any.
I may have to talked with 17!
Howard.
I remember talking about the possibility of steam damage to it.
I'm not sure if Howard got that from conversation with Dick and Jim or how it come about.
I don't remember directly talking to Dubiel.
21!
i ESSIG: Okay.
2 21 i
231 BENSON:
And from looking at the notes here, it looks like,... when I 24l came in, I looked..
I'm pratty sure Howard's paper didn't have anything 25i on the vent...
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li 20 lj CRAWFORD:
That's correct.
l 2l 3
BENSON:
... Stack so on this sheet, I just took a blank sheet with me t
4 went over and recorded the flows out the exhaust.
And then the wind Si speed here and the direction, I remember I, I'm pretty sure I came i
61 back, I had some ouestions on some of these exhaust flows.
I talked 7l to an operator.
I remember coming back to Howard at that point, 1
8 king at the, just the dome monitor reading... 'how it was insignificant, g,
whatever the vent was saying.
And I don't have anything written down 10!
here for going out, back, and actually looking at the monitors and I do remember going back there at looking at it just to see it reading
]
very high.
But I can't off the top of my head without that sheet even f
remember what the reading was.
I 14!
ESSIG:
And you?
16i CRAWFORD: On the dome monitors?
i 17; i
i 18!
ESSIG:
Yes.
191 20:
CRAWFORD:
Yeh it was 3 times 10 to the fifth, right off the red 21!
scale.
2l ESSIG:
This must have been one of the ones that you did first here 2di scmewhere.
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lj CRAWFORD:
Yes that's the first one I wrote down.
And I didn't check 2l the vent flows, he did that.
I saw them, how slow the noble gas 3
release was compared to HPR-214 and decided to go do my calculations 4
based on HPR-214 and ignore the stack.
5; 6
ESSIG: Okay. You're saying the 6 times 10 to the fifth counts for a 7j minute that you have recorded there on that sheet on the HPR-219 would f
give your release rate on that monitor or on that... via that path way g
gj which would be much smaller than the 300 R per hour that the dome m nitor would indicte.
Is that...
lot i
11i CRAWFORD:
That's correct.
My source term came out to like 1325 for 3l the HPR-214 and my source term for the HPR-219 would come out to out 14l to.06 or something based on the 6 times 10 to the fifth reading on g
that monitor which just by looking at it I knew it was going to be insignificant and so I didn't check the flows at that time, I figured I'd do the first calculations since that was important to get them information first and then I'd have time to go back and check the 18!
flows or if somebody else came in and they could check the flows.
,9 1
20i ESSIG:
Okay.
21:
22l BENSON:
And the reason that the first indication here on the back..
23l it was for the onsite location... that was the first actual numcer we 2 41 got back.
That the first one we had to actually go back and try to 25i
'? Y Cy' i
l l!
22 i
i lj update the original source term.
That would of been the next calculation.
gj I'm pretty sure we used the LPZ here as that.
J, 3!
4 CRAWFORD: No, this was an actual reading.
3I 6
BENSON:
I don't know if it's predicted.
7i I
8l CRAWFORD:
It's predicted, we used Goldsboro.
9!
BENSON: Goldsboro okay.
10 11:
CRAWFORD:
Yeh, that sheets been lost.
131 ESSIG: Okay.
I think probably I don't have any additional questions g
n that.
15, 16; CRAWFORD:
Just let me you know, I guess I can flip with Jim Seelingers testimony 18l as far as he didn't get to the Unit 2 Control Room until 8 o' clock.
19:.
Things went awfully fast and looking at this I know I had Goldsboro reading before 0746 I thought I... I know I talked to Jim before that.
I don't know whether it was rignt at that time and he had just come in or what I, time is very vague, it seems like the 22' i
first five hours was the first 10 minutes.
Times are vague.
23!
24l 25i r)
\\
.1 C Y. t i
23 1
i 1
ESSIG:
Okay. And I think other records substantiate the fact that 2
the onsite survey, the first one was made at the Screen House.
3l 4j CRAWFORD:
At GE-8.
Si l
ESSIG: Yeh.
At about 0746 or 7:48 or something on that order we've 6
/
got a entry in somebody elses log that substantiate that time so don't 8J have any problems with that.
9!
BENSON:
10i Because using our GE-8 reading our next t.pdate for Goldsboro is less than 1 mR an hour.
n 12I ESSIG:
Right.
Okay. Just getting back to the 40 R per hour did, 73j i
when you mentioned that, Howard, to Jim Seelinger do you recall what p
his reaction was, or Dubiel's reaction for that matter?
16!
CRAWFORD:
They both thought it was, it appeared too high, and they immediately talked, that is where I heard about it, you know, possible
.W steam damage to the dome monitor something like that from Dick you know they started talking those two.
Possible reasons why it couldn't c.b be a good number, or if it was indeed a good number, and they wanted 21, to get a very good feel to see if they wanted to believe that number, if they didn't want to believe that number before they went telling 231 24l everybody that number since it was so high and they wanted to, they didn't want to have it, say it was 40 R and find out that it's 1 mR or 25i I
(C i
i
24 f
I 1!
say it's not 40 R and find out that it is 40 R, so they talked I don't 2
know how long but they talked just to the ins and outs of why that, 3
you know, we could again be right.
4!
Sj ESSIG:
As near as you recall Dubiel, when he checked your calculation, 6j did not go and actually verify that the HPR-214 was reading the 300 R 7
per hour that you would use in a calculation.
I sj CRAWFORD:
No.
9, 10l ESSIG:
Do you know if Seelinger did that? Of course he came in later 3
so...
l 131 CRAWFORD:
I don't think Jim did either.
15i ESSIG:
Okay. One thing that I'd like to, other thing that I'd like to cover with you, which is a little different nature relates to training.
And one of things that, there's a procedure that I have in front of me and I just want to ask you 1 or 2 questions on the training.
Procedure 1670.9, details training that will be given to various people in plant and at the corporate level depending on what their 21.
emergency assignment will be and you, both of you I, as I interprete this would fit under the training program for Accident Assessment 23t Personnel because it does speak to the, specifically here, Group 2 24k Radiation Protection Personnel, Nuclear Engineer, and under this 25i g})
ul e,e
25 l
lj training program the program for Group 2, it lists that you are to 2
receive training in the meterological and radiation monitoring instrumentation, i
31 use of isopleths, offsite dose calculations, protective action guides, 4j and onsite and offsite radiological controls.
Have both of you received I
S; training in all of those areas or is there one area where, or two 6l areas, where you maybe you don't feel that you been training or would 7
you say you received training in all of those particularly in the last g
item there, onsite and offsite radiological controls?
9I 1gl CRAWFORD:
I'd say most of the t" ining I've had is emphasized is, use 11 f isopleths, offsite dose calci ations, I'd say 90% of the training
,j was placed at that.
Most of the meteorological and radiation monitoring I
training was just during the drills themselves.
33!
14!
15:!
ESSIG: Okay.
And how about the protective action guides and the onsite and offsite radiological controls?
17' CRAWFORD:
I read the plan, didn't really get them, a whole lot of formal training or anything.
19i 20!
ESSIG:
Okay. When you say read the plan do you mean, which plan now, 21(
the, emergency plan, or?
23l CRAWFORD:
The emergency plan, right, sections of the emergency plan.
2 41 25i
<) 'b,
c 9. '
i l
26 1
1!
ESSIG:
Okay. And anything with respect to onsite and offsite radiological i
2 controls?
i 31 4j CRAWFORD: Not really.
St 6;
ESSIG:
Okay. Mike would you answer the same questions?
7l BFNSON:
I'd say the main emphasis has been on reading of *he isopleths, g
g; the RMS, and I'd usually do calculations for onsite and affsite doses.
10 As to limits I don't think any formal training other '.han what's in
]
the emergency plan.
I guess we depend mainly on our Supervisor of g
Radiation Protection in Chemistry to be the head of the group and as a y
Nuclear Engineer we function for him and our main function is just the calculation and to supply him with that that number and then he will
,41 A
do what he wants and that is probably the reason that the protection action guides and the ont.ite and offsite radiological controls are ma.cly emphasized for to him and we take it up through the instrumentation, the isopleths and the calculations and then although we know there are lSi limits and from our chart in the back of the calculations it gives the iodine to your thyroid and also the whole bocy dose, we know the limit and the stay time, and by that we should be able to use that as a 21, protection action guide.
Now as to the actual, each individual isotope 22' and their limit to the environment, that we weren't aware of until the 231 accident.
And then we became aware of that as we were pushed more 21 into the managing of the whole, doing group, instead of just doing 25i r
( h,
(
i i
27
{
i lj calculations.
During most of the drills we were pretty pressed just 2j to keep up the calculations and we let the other people make the t
31 decisions as to what to be done with them, with the numbers we provided.
i 4l Sj ESSIG:
Okay. And I believe there is one other area that I would like i
6j to cover and that's with you Mike since I, this is my second interview 7j with you and I've talk with Howard twice before and this is my third time with him.
I'd like to get from you as best you can recall it, 8
the times that you were onsite.
Alright, we've already established g,
y u came onshe at 0700 rougMy ONO somewhere h Mat oMer, a
10!
that you were actually in the Unit 2 Control Room.
And then when the Unit 2 Control Room, the SCS was moved over to the Unit 1 Control 12!
I Room, you and Howard functioned over in the Unit 1 Control Room I 13!
14' believe for some time.
Could you piece together how long you were onsite, well I guess you probably went over to the Observation Center I think you said at one time to get some sleep.
17!
BENSON:
I'd say I started the 28th at about 7 AM in the morning, stayed onsita until...
20l CRAWFORD:
It was midnight.
21!
22!
AENSON:
About 2 o' clock in the morning of the 29th.
After that time 23!
I went over to the Observation Center and I stayed there.
Subba Marsh 24{
was doing a interview with the two operators on-duty, Craig Faust and 25; e) "/
C
,-( )d
I i
28 t
i r
1 Ed Fredericks, I listened in on that and fell asleep.
And I guess 2
around 7 o' clock 8 o' clock that morning I went back up to the Unit 1 3j Control Room.
And I got there, there's more that just Howard,... PP&L i
4; l
Si 6
CRAWFORD:
People from Susquehanna.
7l BENSON:
Health physics the blonde hair.
I have his card at home.
g 9!
CRAWFORD:
I don't know I forget his name.
10!
11:
g; BENSON:
But he was there...
l 131 l
CRAWFORD:
... with a crew of his people...
15i BENSON:
You were outside.
17j f
CRAWFORD:
I was outside...
13l 19!
BENSON:
He was doing the readings here, Howard came back.
21:
ESSIG:
When you came, this was at like oh 7 o'cicck or 8 o' clock in 22l the morning on the 29th when you came back up to the Control Room frem 231 having been at the Observation Canter.
24c 25I t
l' 29 I
i l
1.
BENSON:
Yes.
l 2:
i 3j ESSIG:
The individuals whose name you can't recall from PP&L...
41 gj BENSON:
Correct.
Si p
ESSIG: Was in the ECS at that time?
i 8!
BENSON:
Right.
He was writing the logs and Howard was out, out on a g
10!
su ney te m 11:
CRAWFORD:
Yeh and I have trained him and he had been in for a couple
]
of hours.
He had a group of 5 people and he'd been there for a couple I had trained him and they wanted somebody outside to take some readings around the Reactor Building and Aux Building areas that were around the fence so I took one of his people and guided him.
IIl BENSON:
Sometime during that morning Howard left and I remember I was 1 81 still there and he, the other guy, I am pretty sure he even took a
, 91 1
break and left and I took over the logs and then I was questioned about another Nuclear Engineer, the status of his beard if he was a
going to come in to help us and from the records here it looks like 22!
sometime around 5 o' clock that afternoon, Wilt, Scott Wilkerson c::me 23i l
in and I probably left shortly after probaoly by 6 o' clock I'd say I 24!
probably left that evening. And I called Howard that day and we set 25!
07m
.) N
I I
i l
30 t
1:
up our shift coverage for the three of us, as how we going to operate 2
it.
I'm pretty sure that we told Howard to stay home as long as he i
3{
could, Scott would stay there as long as possible and I'm not sure 4l when Howard come in.
4 Si ESSIG:
That someone came in about 11 o' clock or so he had said on the 6
7j 29th 11 o' clock PM.
I i
8l gj BENSON:
That night.
And so then I must not of come in until 7 o' clock j
or 8 o' Clock the next day and then I would of been acting on the days,
- g Scott, mids, and Howard would have had the swing shift when we started the thing out.
Let me see the first number here, it was Howard keeping g
notes.
I saw a line down here for about 8:15, so I'd say 8 o' clock was my free time on the 30th.
And the way the shifts were set up early would of been me from 8 till 4 with the overlap with the other shifts, Scott from 4 to 12 and Howard from 12 to 8, something like that was how it was set up for the first so many days.
I think it was like for the first 4 or 5 days and then we swung arourd to give people 18i a break, to see their wives I guess.
191 20' SINCLAIR:
The present time is 3:59 PM. We're break briefly at this point to change the tape.
22) i 23!
SINCLAIR:
The time is 4: 11 PM Eastern Dhylight Tira.
We're continuing i
24!
the interview with Mr. Benson and Mr. Crawford.
25!
c03 f'
,e
I 31 i
f l
JACKSON:
Howard on the night of the 29th and the morning of the 30th 1l 2!
there was several ventings of the Makeup Tank varying in times some of I
3j them 20 minutes, 23 minutes according to the start and stop times, t
4 what kind of response were the emergency teams making to each one of 5!
these ventings? Were you, every time they called to tell you they 61 were going to vent the Makeup Tank, did you put the helicopter up and 7{
the teams out?
8!
CP%WFORD:
Yes sir.
I guess they I guess there's one here that I g;
10 didn't get the helicopter up, at 1:53.
I did have the onsite teams downwind and I got readings from the helicopter just as they stopped
]
the Makeup Tank.
So every time I did vent I did try to get helicopter readings up, and also I had my teams downwind.
14!
JACKSON:
Okay.
16:
CRAWFORD:
I see the next one here I got, when you s srted I had people onsite going around the fence, and I also have helicopter readings from that one also, that's the 270 reading on this.
So everytime they notified me of the Makeup Tank I got the helicopter up
,c0 right away and got him over the vent a couple of times while they were venting.
22' 23 JACKSON:
Okay.
Now, you might correct me if I'm wrong on this but in 24j an earlier interview didn't you say that you were notified of a vent 25!
Cu/
2kY c
32 1
lj that morning, or expected vent, and that you put the teams in place 2l and they had to wait something like a couple of hours before the vent 3
started.
I 4i f
CRAWFORD:
That is correct.
5 Si 7!
JACKSON:
Is that the, do you recall when you were notified of that?
I 8!
CRAWFORD: What time they notified me or what time did they...
9; 10!
JACXSON:
11:
Right, what time did you get the notification that made you g,!
put your teams out and then sit for and wait for a couple of hours?
l 13i CRAWFORD:
It was somewhere around 5 o' clock.
l 15!
JACKSON:
Somewhere around 5 o' clock.
17f CRAWFORD:
That I got the notification but the one that I think actually 1SI started at 7:10.
191 20!
JACKSON:
Okay.
22l CRAWFORD:
Let me take a look here?
23, 24l 25!
') L \\
c u, I
\\
I 33 i
r llj JACXSON:
Allright.
2!
l 3t.
CRAWFORD:
Yeh because I had the helicopter up in the air around 5:13 4j and he kind of stayed up in the air for a long time there just sitting around.
5i Si J AC.GC."-
They were having trouble with the Makeup Tank that started 7
8l about 4:35 which sould correspond pretty close to the time that you g
are talking about getting your team airborne there, did they indicate O!
to you when they or anyone there in the ECS to your knowledge, that g
they were having trouble with the Makeup Tank and that they were going f
to have to go into a prolonged vent?
131 CRAWFORD:
Yeh, I started I guess around 5 o' clock putting the helicopter up in the air and of course he started to run out of fuel and they hadn't started so we asked them how long it was going to be and we
,6, 1
tried to get either a second helicopter up or get this one refueled 1,/
before they would start and stuff and so I did have communications.
Every once in a while they were saying they were having problems getting it started and they did inform me when they did get it started there at 0710.
21;,
They infermed me when they did open it and I guess it was only a few minutes thereafter that they called me back and said that they were having problems and it would longer than the past ones 231 i
had been.
2 41 25!
I c 93 J
d i
i 34 I
lj JACKSON: Okay. Were you talking directly with the Unit 1 yourself or 2j would this vf been relayed through someone on the telephone to you?
l 31 4l CRAWFORD:
I was talking directly a the hot line to Unit 2 from the 5
Unit 1 Control Room.
Si JACKSON:
Did you tell me earlier that you did or did not recall who 7
8 y u were talking to you?
9l AWORD:
I do not recall who I was talking to.
It was sometimes it 10i was the CRO, sometimes it was Greg Hit::, sometimes it was some other
!g people.
It was just who they had free at free at the time to have us
" *I#i'd-3 14!
JACKSON:
Do you know if the Unit 2 had any direct contacts with the
.15:
State? Did they have a line to the State at this time?
17!
l CRAWFORD:
I do not know.
ISI 19l
' JACKSON:
Okay.
And you don't know if anyone in Unit 2 might have made a duplicate notification to the State at 7:10 maybe or around that timeframe?
I 23!
l CRAWFORD:
No I don't know.
24j 25j C, U /-
') (#
L oi e
i e
~
i h
35
{
l
!lj JACKSON:
Okay.
When they stated that release at 7:10 did anyone 2l indicate the potential magnitude of it?
31 4;
CRAWFORO:
No sir.
When they started at 7:10 it was my understanding Sj that it was just going to be like the other Makeup Tank vents they had 6
done earlier until they called me back again and told me that they 7!
were having problems.
i 81 JACXSON: Okay. When you got the 1200 mR reading in did you call that g;
reading to the Unit 2 Control Room?
10J 11; CRAWFORD:
I did not personally, but it was relayec to the Unit 2 Control Room.
3 14' JACXSON:
Okay.
So you wouldn't know what their response to that 5'.
reading would be, would you?
17l CRAWFORD:
No I don't.
19f JACXSON:
Okay. Was Mr. Potts the CS Director that morning?
21:
CRAWFORD:
Yes sir.
221 23i JACKSON:
Okay.
I think that answers my questions.
25i
\\; "
cv1
,o s
l 36 i
1 1!
SINCLAIR:
The time is 4:17 PM and this will conclude the interview 2:
with Mr. Benson and Mr. Crawford.
i 31 l
41 Si Si 7!
8!
9!
10f 11.
12:
t 131 14!
15:
16i 17l 1st 19t 20i 21!
22!
P 231 24i 25i c 1 ;, 7 9kJ i
.