ML19208A030

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Forwards Info Re Various SEP Structural Topics in Response to NRC 790801 Request
ML19208A030
Person / Time
Site: Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date: 07/09/1979
From: Counsil W
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To: Ziemann D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-03-02, TASK-03-03.A, TASK-03-07.A, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7909120439
Download: ML19208A030 (31)
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{{#Wiki_filter:. C37 CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY ( BERLIN. CONNECTICUT P O BOK 270 H A RTFOND, CON N ECTIC UT 06101 m.. n, 203 666-6911 September 7, 1979 Docket No. 50-213 Director of Nuclear Reactor Pegulation Attn: Mr. D. L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference:

(1) D. L. Ziemann letter to W. G. Counsil dated August 1, 1979. Gentlemen: Haddam Neck Plant SEP Structural Topics In Reference (1), Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) was requested to provide information on various structural topics. In response to that request, is provided. As noted in the Attachment, several items are not addressed in their entirety at this time. It is currently estimated that the attached material will be supplemented on or about October 30, 1979. Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY 0 ( 4 f')L s, W. G. Counsil Vice President Attachment LWe .L .~ 7909120 jIt39

e DOCKET No. 50-213 ATTACHMENT 1 HADDAM NECK PLANT STRUCTURAL TOPICS r .) G _ J SEPTEMBER, 1979 3 % 110

HADDAM NECK PLANT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION STRUCTURAL TOPICS III-2 Wf-id and Tornado toads For each safety-r elated structure, provide 1. The procedures to transform wind velocity into design pressure and gust factc. - 2. original design basis for tornado loading including: a. maximum rotational wind speed b. translational wind speed c. pressure drop d. radius of maxirum rotational wind speed e. procedures to transform tornado data into design pressure III-3.A Effects of High Water Level on Structures For each safety-related structure, 1. Describe the water loads considered in the original design and the extent to which dynamic effects due to flooding were considered. 2. Clarify the water level for each load combination described in Topic III-7.B. III-7.B Design Codes, Design Criteria and Load Combinations For each safety-related structure, 1. List the codes and standards (including edition date) used for design and construction of concrete and steel elements (containment shell, containment internal structures, primary auxiliary building, control room, etc.). 2. Provide the loads, load combinations and acceptance criteria employed for the design. 3. Provide the design and/or actual material properties (fg and fi) used for steel and concrete elements. For concrete, provide the age specified and any admixtures used. 4. Provide a copy of the specifications used for design and construction. 5. Provide representative stress levels (compression, tension and shear) at the critical location of each structure (e.g., at base of contain-ment internal structures) for each of the load combination provided in response to (2) above. 3dfo.111 M 'MJ August 1,1979

lil-2 WIND AND TORNADO LOADS 1. Procedures to Transform Wind Velocity into Design Pressure and Gust Factors All safety-related structures were designed for a wind velocity of 100 mph. This was performed by designing exterior walls to take average wind loads of 28 psf as specified by applicable codes (reference FDS A Section 8-12). The new diesel generator building was designed to withstand a wind loading of 360 mph. Transformation of this velocity into a design loading is not known (reference FTOL Section 5). 2. Original Design Basis for Tornado Loading it is apparent that no tornado loadings were considered in the design basis of the original buildings. Tne new diesel generator building was designed to withstand the impact of missile 12 inch diameter, 3/4 ton, 40 feet long traveling 150 mnh end on in either the vertical or horizontal direction. 3 % 112 r

Ill-3A Ef fects of High Water Level on Structures The design flood level was based on the maximum recorded elevation of 19 5 feet MSL. The plant was constructed on yard grade 21 feet MSL. The level actually used in design was 20 feet MSL. It is apparent tha t na consideration of dynamic effects due to flooding were considered. b smu1a

lil-7B Design Codes, Design Criteria, and Load Combinations Containment (Shell and internal Structures) 1. Codes and standards: (see table 3.3-1, attachment No. 1) 2. Loads, load combinations, and acceptance criteria: (see section 3.2.2, attachment No. 1) 3 Material properties: (see attachment No. 2) 4. Copies of specifications used for design and construction: not available at this time 5 Representative stress loads: (see section 3 2.5, attachment No. 1) Other Structures Required For Safe Shutdown (Screenwall, Primary Auxi l ia ry Bu il ding, Con t rol Room, Diesel Generator Building, and Auxiliary Feedwater Building) 1. Codes and standards: (see attachment No. 3) 2. Load, load combinations, and acceptance criteria: (see attachment No. 3) 3 Material properties: (see attachment No. 3) 4. Copies of specifications used for design and construction: not available at this time 5. Representative stress levels: not available at this time [$0 f51_I.d-Wl

ATTACHMENT l CY FDSA SECTION 3.2 (CONTAINMENT DESIGN CRITERIA) DAU 3 % 115

3.2-1 10/70 3.2 DESIGN CRITERIA 3.2.1 Internal Pressure The principal design load on the containment structure is the in te rnal pressure that could be created by a loss of coolant incident. The reactor coolant system contains 366,700 lb. of water at a weighted average enthalpy of 594. 5 Btu per lb., for a total energy content of 214,450,000 Btu. In the loss of coolant incident, which forms the basis for the containment dcsign, this water is released through a double-ended break in the largest reactor coolant pipe, causing a rapid pressure rise in the containment. Additional energy is available for release from the following sources: Stored heat in the core Stored heat in the reactor vessel, piping and other coolant system components Fission product decay There are several heat sinks available in the containment to absorb a part of this energy and limit the pressure rise. They are as follows: Containment structure Eauipment inside the containment The high pressure safety injection system The low pressure safety injection (core deluge) system The residual heat removal system The air recirculation system The containment spray system All of these sources and sinks, with the exception of the manually operated containment spray system, are considered in the calculation of the containment pressure transient. The results of the preliminary pressure transient calculations are shown on Figure 3.2-1. The pressure transients are essentially the same regardless of the assumptions made with respect to safeguard system operation. Even with no outside power source, four air recirculation units and two residus2 heat removal pumps could be supplied from the plant diesel generators, and the containment pressure could be held to 30 psi gage. This is a substantial margin below the reactor containment design pressure of 40 psi gage. No energy contribution from the secondary coolant system is included in the pressure transient calculation. The steam generator supports are so designed that the reaction caused by complete severance of any reactor coolant line will not result in failure of steam or feedwater piping. In addition, a detailed analysis of the ability of misailes to penetrate the steam generator l' \\ kh.

3.2-2 P00R OR M L shell or associateo piping has been performed. This analysis, which is su.marized in Section ;.2 4, indicates that such components are invulnerable to missiles of tne cite and shape that could be generated within the reactor containment. Nevertheless, all items such as thermocouple wells and other fittings, which could be considered as potential missiles, will be restrained or locally shielded. 3.2.2 .Stre ss Cri te_ria.. Reinf orcing steel used in the reactor contain.aent structure confore.s to ASE A408 with a minimum guaranteed yield stren; th of 50,000 psi. The following table lists the liar.its on pria.ary and prinary-plus-cecondary stresses for the reinforcing steel.

utrecc, Prit..ary-Plu s-Second ary' rgig
Stresc,

..ne Gor.ci t on: cci ) oi' Yle]c 1 s; % of Yield Operating plus incident 26,700 53 1/3 33,300 66 2/3 Operating plus 0.0) g 25,000 50 26,700 53 1/3 horizontal earthquake Operating plus incident 33,300 66 2/3 33,300 66 2/3 plus 0.0J g horizonte,- carthquake Operating plus incident 40,000 60 40,000 80 plus 0.17 g horizontal carthouake me w nry av e. : e, tre anni me r n. roiLaua: 4er tint; te .-cr;. tare Erndient ,>t. uc. .. a. t w m cra n..... 1 ircjuc of con,'in enr. to o.;tm ue rLt :a:, here Stresses reculting from the incident temperature effect T: '/8 in. steel liner confonas to ASE A442 with a minimum guaranteed _ strength of 32,000 pai. Under the combination of incident plus earthqu w loadings, the internal precuure pluc temperature effect causes tension streca. jn the concrete wall. F o, uesign purposes, it is con-servatively nuca.ed thnc tne walJ 1.,c li tt,Je ar no cr acicy to reciat the e tanceatial sLeurini, ro2 ees resultiru rro; the hor;;ontal earthquake loads. The liner alone is designed to resist this tangential shear. Insulation has been vadeu to the lower 17 f t of liner so that the contination of co..;>reuuive stre.;aea resultinr; fro:a incident temperature and tangential chcNing stresses reculting froa horizontal earthouake loading will result in liner acrecscs not exceeding the yield strength of the material. gj r:'1 1 W s. ... t) > n i

3.2-3 5/66 3.2.3 Thennal Loads In the hypotheticel accident, the containment structure is exposed to steam at approximately 260 F within a matter of seconds. The liner reaches the full accident ambient temperature within a few minutes, while the cencrete structure, due to its large mass, is still at near-normal temperatures. The concrete then gracually heats up until a thermal gradient exists across the wall. Containment pressure is reduced by the engineered safeguards during this heat-up. The initial temperature rise in the liner causes it to expand relative to tne concrete. The resulting longitudinal and circumferential compressive stresses in the liner are shown in Table 3.2-1. The liner is studded to the concrete on 24 in. centers to prevent elastic buckling under these stresses. The innermost and outermost circumferential reinforcing bars in the thick walled concrete reactor containment are separated by approximately 3 ft-8 in. Temperature gradients occur between these two sets of reinforcing bars during both normal operation and accident conditions. To calculate the stress levels induced by these gradients, temperature profiles were determined for both normal atmospheric conditions and transient conditions induced by accidents. The no=al maximum gradient between the innemost and outemost reinforcing bars is approximately 40 F. This temperature differential across the reinforcing bars is used as the basic gradient when calculating the tem-perature differentiel during accident conditions. Accident conditions in the reactor containment cause rapid a increase in containment temperature. In making stress calculations, it is assumed that the temperature in the exposed liner nes 260 F. No tam-perature increase is felt by the innermost reinf _.g bars for approximately one hour after the accicent. With three fans operating in the reactor con-tainment, the inner reinforcing bars reach a maxt wn temperature of approx-imately 145 F, eight hours after the accident. A temperature differential of approximately 90 F then exists between the innermost and outermost rein-forcing bars. Stress calculations on the containment structure during accident conditions show that the reinforcing bar stresses, including an allowance for the nonnal 40 F temperature differential, remain within the maximum allowed. When the highest thermal gradient occurs between the rein-forcing bars, the containment pressure is 10 psi or less. The maximum stress, including thermal stresses, is less thun allowable at all times following the accident. 3.2.4 Impact Loads The only impact loeds that might act on the containment are those created by a flying missile. Generation of such a missile is considered incredible. Mcut 2.igh preasure em:1pment is located within the 3 ft thick chC31 D W Cs e. 14 3 C3 F]T F f .o'l'O L 1 j _,1 a m.

3.2-4 5/66 crane support wall below the 2 ft thick charging floor, or beneath the refueling cavity missile shield. These reinforced concrete structures will terminate the flight of any conceivable missile. Openings in the charging floor required for ventilation or access are covered by steel grating, which provides adequate missile protection. However, since it is impossible to completely eliminate the possibility of some form of missile striking the containment structure, an analysis or the missile hazard has tee.r performed. Two types of missiles could be generated: concrete and steel. Because of its lower density and lower strength, a concrete missile must be an order of magnitude heavier than a steel missile of comparable diameter and velocity in order for it to cause the same damage on impact with a steel shell. Also, in the context of the hypothetical accident, steel missiles are more likely. Therefore, only steel missiles have been studied in detail. The most hazarcous missile for a given mass and velocity is rod shaped, i:pacting end-on. Rods of various diameters and weights have been investigated. Missile velocities ac high as WD rus r.icht be gencrated by rupture of a high precsun coolant loop. This conservative value (See "r enetration of neactor Contcirc.ent Shells," Donala E. Uavenport; Nuclear Safety,12/o3, Volume 2, Number 2) for missile velocity has teen used in the analysis. Formulations and penetration ecuations developed by the U. S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratories forn the basis for the studies. Table 3.2-2 summarizes the results of the analysis. Inspection of these results indicates that, even at 100 fps, the required weight and dimensions for penetration of the plate thicknesses of interest are absurdly high for missile sizes which can logically be postulated in the reactor con tainment. The plate thicknesses shown in the table bracket the thick-nesses of interest for the containment liner and piping systems. Maj or components, such as the steam generater, have greater shell thicknesses and, therefore, are immune to penetration by the postulated missiles. 3.2 5 Seismic Loads The nuclear plant is designed on the basis of an earthquake havir.g a maximum horizontal ground acceleration of 0.17 g at zero period. Average acceleration spectra curves, which have been nornalized to the zero period acceleration of 0.17 g, have been developed and are included in Section 2.5 These curves cover structural pericas between.01 and 2.2 seconds with damping factors from 0 to 10 per cent of critical. The camping factors used with the seismic response c ve are related to the type of structure and are expressed in per cent of critical damping. For the reinforced concrete containment structure, a value of 7 per cent is used. rp rm 0 D ce cv r% 3r ~ D _ [1 3 g vub-2, r;., m,

3 2-5 5/66 The procedure for calculating the reactor containnent earthouake response is benec on the dayleigh method (dee "sesign of Multictory Reinforced Concrete buildingc for Earshouake Motions" - Portland Cement Association, Page 21). The containment structure is designed for the equivalent static loads resulting froa tnc aLove aynamic analysic. For cesign purposec, only the horizontal accelerntions are assumed to be act!n *. Valuen calculn. tea froc. the hayleigh analycis used in the contain-n.ent decign are as followc: Frequency = 30.4 radians per cecond Perica 0.21 cecondc Conversion coefficient = 1.64 Acceleration at crown = 0.37 g for 7 per cent damping, varying linearly to zero at the center of the base Maximu.. deflection at croun : 0.0120 ft v.axia.u.:. unear - 7,6% kipc Maxinum moment = 940,000 ft kips The maximum shr ar anc uoment act at the base of the containment s t ru c ture. For the calculations, the center line of the mat thickness wac used. 3.,'. O lai cCt'a l t n(' 7U. uO t.L.. The containment structure is capable of withstanding wind loacs up to 150 miles per hour, during normal operation. A loSd of 30 isf is concidered for snow and ice. HowcVer, no snow or ice losuc arc ine '.uded in combination with internal pressure and ceis'..ic loads, because the snow enu we woulc reduce tne tension in the walls. The containa.cnt will withstand a negative pressure approximatel;- 7.5 psi below the outsice atnosphere. However, it is inconceivable that such a pressure differential could occur. The containment is nonaally at a positive pressure of 32 to 35 in. Hg abs, for the parposes of continuous leak :.onitoring. Liurnal teiperature fluctuations are not expected to affect materially the containment atnocchere becauce of the thick concrete walls. g C3 CN ' D es eu Jl cr) g 1 y-jll n] _1_ _a S4G120

Table 3 2-1 5/66 CC17fAIIMEVT LINER CO@RESSIVE STRESSES FOLLO'41?iG HYPOHTTICAL ACCILE.T FACILITY DESCRIPTION AND S/JPTY A';ALYSIS CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATQ4IC POWER CO@ANY Containment

Pressure, Liner Circumferential Longitudinal Psi
Temp, Ccupressive Ccepressive Gage F

Stress, Psi Stress, Psi 32 248 -15,459 -11,9 W 31 245 -15,493 -11,966 26 236 -16,738 -13,161 16 5 210 -17,504 max -14,082 max lo 185 -16,733 -13,637 4.8 149 -13,242 -10,886 35 138 -12,olo -9,899 3 133 -11,398 -9,404 W1'41

Table 3 2-2 5/66 MISSILE DIME';SIO:;S AIU) b' EIGHTS R$,UIPID TO PE!ETRA"'E PLATE OF VARYI iG THICK'! ESSES FACILITY DESCRIPTIC:; A';D SAFEIT A';ALYSIS CO:I?!EN'ICUT YA'iKFE ATCMIC POWER COMPA'iY Missile Diameter, In. Material 1 2 _,1, 4 5 Reactor Containment Plate. 3/8In. Weight, Lb 25 8 73 134 206 288 Length, In. 116 82 67 58 52 4 In. Sch. 160 Pipe or 0 531 Wall Thickness Weight, Lb 43 3 123 226 346 485 Length. In. 194 138 113 97 87 6 In. Sch.160 Pipe or 0 718 Wall Thickness Weicht, Lb 68.2 193 354 545 762 Length, In. 306 216 177 153 136 8 In. Sch. 160 Pipe or 0 906 Wall Thickness We1 ht, Lb 96.' 273 502 772 1,080 6 Length, In. 4 32 306 250 216 193 10 In. Sch. 160 Pipe er 1.125 Wall Thickness Weight, Lb 133 7 378 695 1,070 1,495 Length, In. 600 424 346 300 268 3 % 122,

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3.3-1 5/66 3.3 DESIGN DESCRIPTION 3.3.1 General There are no codes directly applicable to the design of the rein-forced concrete containment structure Accepted ACI building and ASME pms-sure vessel codes, as well as state and national codes are used as a guide 3 in arriving at a sale criteria for design p urposes. Table 3.3-1 lists the materials used in the construction of the reactor containment. 3.3.2 Reinforcing Steel The reinforcing bars we re obtsined under a special order calling for higher than nomal yield while maintaining ductility. They have a guaranteed yield point of 50,000 psi; the carbon content is limited to 0.35 per cent; the minimum elongation per 2 in. is 16 per cent. A check analysis is made on each heat. Physical property tests are also made on ench heat, one at the mill and one by Stone & Webster. Certified test reports are submitted on all material. Each bar is visually checked for inclusions prior to erection. Connections between reinfcrcing bars are made either by are welding or by the Cadweld process. This process is based on a specially designed sleeve which is filled with a molten bronze alloy. When cooled this results in a connection that will develop, through shearing resistance of the filler metal, a minimum of 125 per cent of the yield strength of the reinforcing bar. To insure the integrity of the Cadweld connections as actually installed on the containment reinforcing, a quality control program has been undertaken which uses a random sampling procedure. The Cadwelds randomly selected in the field are removed and tested to destruction. A plot of the test results to date is shown on Fig. 3 3-1. From this information, the average (X) and the standard deviation (c) have been computed. Calculation of the statistical tolerance limit based on present infomation indicates a 99 per cent confidence level that 99 per cent of all of the Cadwelds, if tested to destruction, would have a minimum ultimate strength of 65,000 psi (code requirement: 62,500 psi). In addition, a continuing statistical sampling procedure will be used throughout construction to insure that the process is not deviating from the originally established distribution data. 3.3.3 Concrete All concrete materials are required to confom to ACI and ASDI specifications. Low alkali Portland cement is used with fly ash and a water reducing agent. Periodic compression tests are made on the concrete as placed at the construction site to insure compliance with specifications. O oWI 9%1m =nxy u 10. 5L L &

3.3-2 10/70 3.3.4 Liner Shop fabricated liner components are dimensionally checked and shop welding is spot radiographed at least to the requirements of paragraph UW-52 of the ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vensels. All other welds are dye checked. Inspections are carried out by the fabricater's inspection personnel as well as by Engineers. During erection, continued dimensional checks are made and all welding above El. 21 is spot radiographed at least to the requirements of paragraph UW-52 of the ASME Code for Unfired Pressure Vessels. All other welds are dye checked. Inspections are carried out by both the erector and the Engineers. All weld operators' qualification tests and welding procedures are reviewed and approved by the Engineers. All welding and the qualification of welding procedures and welding operators is in accordance with Section IX of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Acceptance standards and procedures for radiographic inspections are in accordance with Section I, paragraph p-102-H of the ASME Boiler Code. Acceptance standards and procedures for liquid penetrant inspection are in accordance with ASTM standard E-165-60T. With the exception of the equipment and personnel hatches, none of the liner components are subject to low ambient temperatures. Normal internal temperatures will be maintained between a minimum of 50 F and a maximum of 120 F. The liner material is ASTM-A442, Cr. 60, which has a yield point of 32,000 psi and is a low carbon /high manganese steel made to fine grain practice that exhibits an NDTT lower than minus 20 F without heat treatment in thicknesses less than 1 in. This material is specified primarily to insure ductility during winter fabrication and during the free-standing pressure and leak tests that are performed on the liner before the reinforced concrete structure is poured around it. Since the equipment and personnel hatches can be exposed to low ambient temperatures, thev are constructed of ASTM-A201, Gr. B, Fbx steel normalized by heating to 1,i00 F and cooled in still air and Charpy tested to a minimum of 15 foot-lb. at minus 50 F. No specific corrosion allowance has been included in the design of the liner. The inside surface of the liner is covered with a three-coat system of sprayed vinyl plastic paint to a total thickness of 6 to 8 mils. This type of paint is particularly effective for resisting atmospheric corrosion. The outer surface of the steel liner is in direct contact with concrete which, due to its alkaline nature, provides adequate corrosion protection for the steel in contact with it. 3.3.5 Tr*a r l Structures The 9 feet thic k reinforced concrete mat which forms the base of the containment structure is fully drained by a 6 in layer of porous Or D l O ~T {J%1Td O B - @fj1 L 3 a JO

3.3-3 5/66 concrete. In some areas, excavation was continued below the cesired level in orde; to fino f; n. ro ck. In trmcc .ro J. l ' c e re tc wu:: uscd to entablish the corroel elevation for the act. all in Lcinal nt ru c ton nrc n : ported by the mat, which trcn:r.j to the lonun to the rock. Jci e; l n n un, lor. cic < Nu nre Arn ted 'r! t hin the contain:.ent. I rimary shielcing consists of a water-filled neut: on slaeJ c Lank :.co' rsi the reactor vessel, surro;nded by e 4 ft-6 in. thick concretc armulus. The-annular cinension of the shield took is non..nally 28 in. It is designed to prevent overheating and dehydration of the concrete primnry shield wc11 which surrounds i t. A 3 ft thick concrete ring wall surrounds the reactor coolant system components and supports the reactor containment crane. An 18 in. concrete division wall separates the two steam generators in the north quadrants of the containment. The two steam generators in the south quadrants are separated by a partial shield wall, 16 in, tlink, and by the nressurizer. A 2 ft thick concrete charging floor covers the reactor coolant systen compartments. Renovable concrete slabs are provided to pemit crane access to the reactor coolant pumps. Penetrating the charging floor are the four steam generators, the pressurizer and vnd o,. pipes. Spiral stairs provide access to each of the four compart'uente. Three major radiation shields are also provided external to the ring wall (See Fig. 3.1-3). A 3 ft thick by 20 1/2 ft high concrete wall is located in front of the main steam and feed-water piping penetrations. A 3 1/2 ft thick by 18 ft high concrete wall with supplementary wings surrounds the two contain:..ent ventilation duct penetratinns. The main access hatch is shielded by a labyrinth arrangement assembled from plecast concrete slabs. Most of the high pressure piping is run within the ring wall. The annuias below El. 22, between the ring wall and the containnent outside wall, is used as a pipe chase. A 12 in. thick floor shields the piping from the areas accessible for inspection at power. Certain additional enuipment, located ebove Cl. 22, such cs the regenerative heat exchengers, is indivicually shielded. The refueling canal connects the reactor cavity with the fuel transport tube to the spent fuel pit. The floor and walls of the canal are concrete, the walls being 5 ft-9 in. thick and the floor, 4 ft thick. The concrcte walla cre lined with 3/6 in. caroon steel plate and the floor with 1/4 in. stainless steel plate. The primary function of the linings is to provide a leakproof membrane that is resistant to abrasion and damage during fuel handling operations. 3.3.6 Auxiliary Facilities Intraplant communications will utilize Bell syste:. equipment with several specia L fontures. Jtation to station calls can be originated from ~l 90 D dJA -o 3 % 126 i _ I_7Ala n.

3.3-4 10/70 any location. In addition, loudspeakers and unitized amplifiers will be coupled to the telephone system so that paged messages may be broadcast from any telephone. Loudspeakers are installed throughout the containment as well as the rest of the plant to insure the hearing of messages and alarms in all locations. Two other independent communications systems are provided for uninterrupted direction of fuel handling and for instrument calibration. The fuel handling communication system permits transmittal of information between the main control room, the containment at the charging floor level, the refueling cavity manipulator and the fuel storage building. The other system permits communication between control points in the containment and the control room for instrument calibration and testing. A 2,500 lb. capacity freight elevator is provided in the reactor containment. The elevator platform is 5 feet-0 inch wide by 7 feet-3 inch deep and has a travel span of 42 feet-6 inches with stops at El. 6, 23 and 48.5. The elevator will be used primarily for moving tools and equipment from El. 22, where the equipment and personnel hatches are located, to El. 48.5, thus reducing use of the reactor containment crane. In addition, access is gainej to the lower elevation for storage of larg,e equipment which can be moved by the elevator. The usual facilities required for maintenance are installed in the containment. These include a reactor containment crane for handling major pieces of equipment. Monorails are located over vital equipment. A fuel manipulator and associated tools are provided for underwater refueling and maintenance of the reactor vessel internals. Underwater inspection facilities are also included. Service water, demineralized water and electricity are available in the containment at all tines. Compressed air and steam are supplied during

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Table 3. -1 5 66 REACTOR CC:: TAI?:'E::T - MATERIAL 3 0F 00 :STRUCTICI; FACILITY DE3CRIPTIO:! A :D SAFETY A!;ALY3IS CO:!: ECTICU"' YA7hTi ATORIC POWER CQiG7."Y Ite Specification Liner Shell, Bottcx:, and Dome Plates ASTM-A442, Gr. 60 Piping Penetration Sleeves ASD4-A333, Gr. O Piping Penetration Reinforcing Rings ASm -A442, Gr. 60 Piping Penetration Sleeve Ecinforcing Bar Anchoring Rings and Plates ASD4-A442, Gr. 60 Rolled Shapes ASD4-A131, Gr. C Reinforcing Bar Bridging Rings ASD4 -A204, Gr. C, Fbx. nor=alized Reinforcing Bar Anchoring Ring and Plates ASD4-A201, Gr. B, Fbx-A300 Equipment Hatch Insert ASD4-A201, Gr. P, Fbx-A300 Equip =ent Hatch Flanges ASD4-A201, Gr. A, Fbx-A300 Equipnent Hatch Head ASD4-A201, Gr. B, Fbx-A300 Personnel Hatch ASD4-A201, Gr. B, Fbx-A300 Welding Electrodes Carbon Steel to Carbon Steel ASD4-E7018 Stainless Steel to Stainless Steel ASD4-E308 Carbon Steel to Stainless Steel AS'IM-E310 Concrete Shell and Interior Structure Reinforcing Steel A408 Ce=ent ASD4-C150, Type II lov alkali Concrete Stone &. Webster Specifica-tion CYS-384 (Mixing and Delivering Ccncrete) and CrS-614 (Placing Concrete and Reinforced Concrete) Structural Steel A36 P003 DRGINAL

FIG. 3.3-1 5/66 CADWELD TEST RESULTS (HORIZONTAL WELOS) w E 8 U $ 1 g o, M S 8 g E S a i eg m d i h " N

8

< a w xxx .8 $ / X x f >> Kn > u 65 75 go 90 100 110 TElBILE STRI?CTH (KIPS) 90 U LW - = 8/.,100 PSI ] d = 3,900 FSI SAMPLES TO DATE -13 TOTAL SAMPLES FOR COMPLETION -17 3451150 5

ATTACHMENT II REACTOR CONTAINMENT DESIGN SYNOPSIS (SOURCE: STONE AND WEBSTER JOB FILE) S4.b.!30

57 REACTOR CONTAINMEf7T General Outside dicseter of contai:::nent Ft-in. 1M-0 Inside diameter of contairutent Ft-in. 134-11 1/h Incide heicht of containment Ft-in. 188-11 1/2 Elevations Ground Ft-in. 21-0 Top of reactor containment Ft-in. 191-0 Inside bottom of contairmnt Ft-in. (-) 0-6 Inside bottom of reactor pit Ft-in. (-) 20 6 Tallest projection from ;cp of containment Ft -i n. 213-0 Volumeo 6 Gross inside of steellir.n Ft3 2 374 x :.0 6 Net free inside Ft3 2.232 x 10 Concrete Out side disneter Ft-in. 14-0 Outside radius of rphericM dc=e Ft in. 70-0 a Thickness Side vsll Ft-in. 4-6 Spherical do=e Ft-in. 2-6 Bottom mat I"t-i n. 9-0 Access Openings Personnel Hatch Inside diameter Ft-in. 7-2 Headroom Ft-in. 6-10 Length Ft-in. 15-0 Equipment Ihtch Insido dirmeter Ft-in. 23-0 Headroom Ft-in. 21-5 OO D D col A o JO . O _ i hd k .h

58. REACTOR COtEAlta4EIC iCC40'DI Steel Liner Outside Dia=eter Ft-in. 135-0 Outside radius of opherical dome Pt -in. 67-6 Thicknesses Side wall In. 38 Opherical do=e In. 12 Bottom In. 14 Inside Liner Surface Area Side cylinder Ft2 51,360 Spherical dome Ft2 28,590 Material ASIF.-Akk2, Gr. 60 Design Conditieng Pressure Operating Psia 15 5 Design Pci6 40.0 Pc.xism fouoving an incident Paig 39 1 Pneu=2 tic test Paig 46.0 Temperature Operating F 12 0 Decign F 260 14aximum following an incident F 257 Wind velocity Eph 100 Maximum permissible air leakage rate %/ dry 0.1 D OO'D oo ~ q w 10 . 5 k.rd a e%132

ATTACHMENT Ii1 STRUCTURAL DESIGN (SOURCE: "

SUMMARY

OF DESIGN CONDITIONS. STONE AND WEBSTER: MAY 20, 1966) 341bYd

  • 94.

. STRUCTURAL DESIGN Enacto-Centnim ent Drainage concrete allovable stress, f'e in psi (28 days} 1,000 Leveling concrote allowable stress, f'o in psi (28 days) 2,000 in psi (28 days) 3,000 All other coneroto, int. and ext., f8e Structural steel - 136, psi allevable stress for normal loads 22,000 Reinforcint nten1 - S14 and S18 (40,000 Y.P.) =at and exterior vall connections Oricinni Desir n Stressen All load conditions except.17g earthquako, psi 27,000 All load conditions including.17g earthquake, psi 40,000 Reinforcirr steel - S11+ and S18 (50,000 Y.P.) exterior valls to i gr. 10 ft Resia Strosses Under Increased Y.F. All load corditions except.17g earthquake, psi 27,000 All load conditions including.17g earthquako, psi 40,000 Reinforcinn nteel - S14 and S18 and No. 11 (50,000 I.P.), exterior valls abovo gr.10 ft and done Finn 1 Revised Dec.irn Stresses Prirarv Prinarv & Seeendery Operating + Incident, psi 26,700 33,300 Operating +.03g Earthquako, 25,000 26,700 poi Operating +. Incident +.03g Earthquake, psi 33,300 33,300 Operating + Incident +.17g Earthquake, psi 40,000 40,000 Reinforcine steel - sites other than S14 and S18 (40,000 Y.P.), internal concrete throughout, pai normal stresses 20,000 Reinforcine steel - sizes other than S14 and S18 (40,000 Y.P.), internal concrote throughout, psi normal strecces plus.17g earthquake 27,000 Normal operating terperaturo drop through exterior valls, F 60 D[ D i e dt mWWTi f g ' A u l " La g61.34

94a. STRUCTURG, DESIGN (C0!TP'D) Reactor contair.ont (Cont'd) 120 Operating terperature, F Maritras incident liner ter:perature, F 260 Earthouako - exterior valls designed on basis of corputed period of vibration by Rayleigh and use ~ of normaliced spectra curves Earthquako - critical dcaping, % - concroto 7 Earthquake - critical darping, % - bolted steel 2.5 Earthquake - actual value used, g - internal concrote 23 Earthquako - actual value uced, g - bolted steel .36 Modulus of elasticity - concreto, psi 3 x 1066 Modulus of clacticity - steel, psi 30 x 10 Concrote voight, per 150 Steel weight, pcf 49C Internal pressure during test, psi 46 Internal pressure during incident, psi 40 Foundatien conditions - rock Concreto in shell is assumed as cracked. Liner is assumed as taking tangential shear only, Snov load - Ascu=ed zero to produce worst design uplift conditicn otherwiso 30 psf (projected area) Mat thickness cbovo drair,are bed, ft 9.0 Straight exterior vall thicknees, ft 4.5 Dono concrete vall thickness, ft 2.5 Poicson 0 rctio,, 0.2 5 Bearing value on solid rock, tons per sq ft 10. Bearing value on loose rock, tons per sq ft 6. When the 3/8 in. thick steel liner is used as a concrete form, it is backed up by steel trusces around the perimeter of the straight vertical valls. Steel studs velded to the steel liner of the demo are connected to cantilevered concreto fo:=3 in a manner to transfer the voight of the vet concrete from the liner to the previously set concrete and thus prevent any buckling of the stoel plate. The hatch opening is designed as a reinforced concrete ring in space,' espable of taking all tho stresses due to incident temperaturo, presouro, earthquake und doud loads, cc well as eccentricities. Tbc reinforcing steel is distributed in a manner to avoid any sudden changes in stress or deforma-tion. , Am-l 9 0 D _e 9D' 3 a JL La 3. L

STRUCTURAL DESIGN (CONT'D) Screenvoll fionre Substructure - Reinforced concrote supported on and anchored to rock Assumed rock elevation, ft-in. (varies) 48-0 to 30-0 Sizo of 3.0 ft thick reinforcod concreto nat, ft 66 x 58 Elevation of top of nat, ft-in. 48r0 Reinforced concroto pump floor elovation, ft-in. S. 0 Roinforced concreto working floor c1cvation, ft-in. 21,6 Concrete compression strength at 28 days, psi 3,000 Earthquake factor - (peak of curve), g .26 Reinforcing steel - guaranteed yield point, psi 40,000 . Elevation at center line of 66 in. intake lines, ft-in. 12.0 Two purps may be shut down for repairs at sano tino. Stop logs can isolato a single pier. Purp veight, lb 60,000 Pi=p motor weight, Ib 10,000 Traveling screen veight, lb 34,000 A11ovable concrete stresses, ACI 318-63 Roinforcing steel - naterial, ASTM A15 & A305 Bearing value on solid rock, tons per sq ft 10 Bearing value on loose rock, tons per sq ft 6 Mnrimm vcter level with 2 units devatered, ft 12 Pr_i=un flood level, ft 20 Superstructure - Structural steel fraco, Galbestos valls, concrete roof Roof elevation, ft-in. 36-2 Roof live load, psf 40. Wind live load, psf 28 Earthquake factor (peak of curve), g .36 Insulated Galbestos siding manufacturer H. R. Robertson Concreto strength at 28 days, psi 3,000 Reinforcing steel - Guaranteed yield point, psi 40,000 Structural steel, ASIM A36 Roinforcing steel', ASTM A15 & A305 111ov 1/3 increase in concrete and reinforcing steel design strooses for earthquake of.17g ground acceleration Check all structural steel against any permanent deformation during maximen earthquake conditions. Floor live load execpt where equipment prevails, psf 250 A11ovable concreto stresses, ACI 318-63 ib9O D s 6 b 1I m W 'Q 1 T d 'L' e 'ajhk g4613G o

96. aqDf STRUCTURAL DESIG!! (CO:FliD) D 6 1 ul '} [ Turbine Pulldint.__rgd Timbine Suonort q n l. b db; O i 1' La Substructure - Reinforced concrete piers ard mat to rock Elevation top of rock for fdns., ft-in. (v: ries) +15-0 to 0 Elevatjon top of 4 ft thick concrete turbino support mat,, ft-in. 20-0 & 16-9 Elevation of finished floor, ft-in. 21-6 Bearing value of rock, tsf 10.0 Concrote design strength at 28 days, psi 3,000 Reinforcing stcel - gua anteed yield point, psi 40,000 Reinforcing stcol, AS"U A15 & A305 Superstructura - 104 ft x 265 ft Rigid frano - structural steel, ASTM A441 & A36 Porcelain enamel en aluminun siding H. H. Robertson Metc1 roof deck with built-up roofing Plasteel Elevation of low point on roof 1151-2" Vind used as design force, psf 28 avg. Roof livo load, psf 30 Supported floor, live plus dead load, psf 150, 250 & 500 Concreto floors arc r.onolithic except granolithic for operating floor Structure 1c not designed for -N'- earthquake except the colu=s between 8 and 12 lines on "C" line only, up to El. 59'-67, but a portion of the unos in added to the mess of the control roon an.1 is calcu]ated to act with it under maxim n earthquake conditions. Corbined_Servico DuQd.ino cri An:dliary Ben Includinn Contro'l Tc rz _ Sui + c,h ryr P e.n, Wrchouw Service Boiler f Room nnd Inntret SMn Subetructu n - Elevction top of rock for fdns. and .aon.o spread footinCs Elevation top of rock for fdns., ft-in. +10-0 to 6 Top of first floor - Elevation, ft-in. 21-6 Bearing value of broken 2 ock, tsf 6 Boaring value of solid rock, tsf 10 Boaring velte of compacted fill, psf 5,000 Computed carthquiko forces used based upon dynmic analysis. .aam:- Concrote comprecsive strength at 28 days, psi 3,000 Reinforaina teel - guaranteed yield point, psi 40,000 Reinforcing steel norm 1 design strength, psi 20,000 Roinforcing a t. col - carthqunko denign strength, poi 27,000 Roinforcing steel - material, ASTl! A15 & A305 S4.61 7/

97 STRUCTURAL DFT,IGN (CONT'D) mO D D Conbined Servico Buildinc and Aurillary Bay Including L. OW Control lioon, Svitchrear Poo Warehouse. Serrien Boiler O 'g-Room and Instrurent Shop (Contid) f OIb_ Jij a Hasses of the northernmost 100 ft of the Service Building are designed for earthquake. Also, masses of the Turbine Building are added to thoso ar_d the resultant carthquake forces carried by structural steel and heavy reinforced concrete valls to solid rock. Stresses in structural steel are checked under extrc=e earthquake conditions when operating under combined masses of adjoining structures to be stu e they vill not produce per:r.anent deformation. Superstructure control Room - Fallout shelter Concrete thickness - roof, in, 22 Concrote thickness - valls, exterior, in. 20 Concrete thickness - valls, interior, in. 16 Concrete thickness - floor, in. 14 Protect door openings with stec1, in. 5 Concuted earthouake forces used br,scd upon a dynsnic anslysis. . Structural steel support framing, ASTM A36 Concrete conpressive strenCth at 28 days, psi 3,000 Reinforcing steel - guaranteed yield point, psi 40,000 Reinforcing steel - normal design strength, psi 20,000 Reinforcing steel - earthquake design strength, psi 27,000 Reinforcing material, ASTM A15 & A305 Roor elevation - low point, ft-in. at "C" line 76-10 Roofing - material T&G Structures Other Than Control Poon Roof deck - t:sterial Metal Roofing - insulated T&G Roof live loads, psf 40 Siding (insulated except on varehouse), Galbeston H. H. Robertson Structural steel support franing, ASTM A36 Concreto compressive strength at 28 days, psi 3,000 Reinforcing steel - guaranteed yield point, psi 40,000 Reinforcing steel - normal design strength, psi 20,000 Reinforcing steel - vind design strength, psi 27,000 Reinforcing steel - material, ASTM A15 & A305 SdE138

~Df7O D hjg Wc. STRUCTURAL DESTCN (C0hT'D) n' -) , 9 w [

[, [T D

C S Co. bipod Servico BuDf._ina cryl Auxiliary Bay Ine)udina Control Poe. Sw$tchrent Room. Unrnhause. Servico Boiler Roon end Irntrtw.nt Shqp (Cont 8d) Roof elevation - low point T of S - Boiler Service Area, ft-$n. 45-4 Roof c'lovation - lou peint T of S - Servico Building, ft-in. 40-21/2&4061/2 Roof elevation.- low point T of S - Auxiliary Bay, ft-in. 58-101/2 Spent Puol Pit (498 x 488) Substructure Elevation of botton fdn. on solid rock, ft -in. +7,6 Elevation of top of pit, ft-in. 47e0 Thickness of concreto bottom mat, ft 6.0 Thickness of concreto side valls, ft 6.0 Soistic coefficient (concrete), g 0.26 Concreto compressive strength at 28 days, psi 3,000 Reinforcing steel, ASTM A15 & A305 Reinforcing stoel - earthquake design strength, poi 27,000 Sunerntructurn Elevation of roof slab, low point, ft-in. 75 6 Roofing on insulated concroto slab T&G Insulated Gn1bestos siding manufacturer H. H. Rohc rtoon Soismic coefficient (bolted steel), g 0.36 Structural stcol franing, ASTl! A36 Check structural steel strescos under.17g earthquake to provent permanent deforration New Fuel Buildine (48' x 66') Substructure Elevation - top of rock for foundation, ft-in. ,10-0 to +13-0 Elevation - top of concreto slab, ft-in. 21-6 Concrete corression strength at 28 days, psi 3,000 ReinforcinC ctoel, ASTl! A15 & A305 Dosign for normal loading with vind or.03g carthquako ACI C@i.100}}

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