ML19207C464
| ML19207C464 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/19/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19207C460 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7909110655 | |
| Download: ML19207C464 (12) | |
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TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, CHAIRMAN NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ON S. 535 BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, U.S. SENATE JULY 19, 1979 Chairman Stevenson, members of the Subcommittee, it is my pleasure to appear before you today to testify for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Senate Bill S. 535, the Nuclear Waste Transportation Act of 1979.
As you know, jurisdiction over the transpcrtation of raciioactive materials is shared over a broad area Dy tne C:mmission and by the Department of Transportation under the Atomic Energy Act and the Hazardous Materials T.nsportation Act. As we understand the Bill, S.
535, one of its primary pt rposes is t$ more clearly define responsibilities of the agencies.
The provisions of the Bill that would most affect Commission activities are those which allocate responsibilities between NRC and the Department of Transpcrtation, particularly Section 2 and pro osed Section iiS(a).
Together, they assign to DOT the ' primary responsibility for regulating the transportation of nuclear wastes, including connercial spent fuel, except that " primary responsibility f:r regulating and certifying tne safety of shipping casks and packages shall remain with the Nuclear Re-gulatory Cc:~ni s s i c n. "
In order to explain the Crissien's concerns accut :ne Bill, I will set cut briefly tne curren ar-angemen: ce: ween NRC and DOT and how it is evolving.
The two agencies nave al'.cca:ec :neir responsibilities
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under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which was just recently renegotiated.
The division of responsibilities set out in the Bill for the most part reflects the arrangements under the MOU.
Under that arrangement, the safety of radioactive materials transport has rested for the most part with packaging.
Packages have generally been designed so that they could be carried in ordinary transportation without special controls in transit.
The Commission has taken responsibility for regulating the packaging of fissile materials and the larger quantities of radioactive materials; COT has regulated packaging of the smaller quantities and low specific activity materials.
Working arrangements between the two agencies under the MOV have been good.
Our respective staffs know their assignments, lines of communication at all leveis in the agencies 'are well established and work, and there has been little duplication of effort.
The MOU, and the ability of the agencies to modify the MOU, has permitted an important degree cf flexibility to deal with problems as they arise.
For example, under a previous MOU, NRC investigated incidents that occurred at NRC licensed facilities while DOT investigated incidents occurring in transit.
Under the current MOU, NRC is to be the lead agency for investigating all nuclear transport incidents because of the nuclear technology involved and because many such incidents in transit hav e their origins at licensee sites.
By assigning primary respcnsibility over the transportation of nuclear wastes and scent fuel to DOT, the bill a ppears to nc row the Commissicn's autnority anc rescensibility.
We belietve, on the contrary, tha: the Commission snould retain strong responsi:bility n
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- for the transportation of nuclear wastes and other radioacti7 materials, and that the present administrative flexibility is desirable.
Some recent developments indicate the need for continuing flexibility.
Last May, the Conmission adopted interim rules for safeguarding spent fuel during carriage.
The rules will remain in effect until studies of the safeguards risks from transporting spent fuel can be completed, in about two years, and permanent measures can be evaluated and implemented.
This step was taken after consultation with DOT, and DOT indicated that NRC's assumotion of security responsibilitie's connected with routing would sub-stantially ease DOT's job in establishing a routing rule confined to censideration of routine exposure in normal transport and radiological effects of transportation accidents.
Had S. 535 been law at that time, the Cennission's authority to implement those regulations wottid have been in some doubt.
Similarly, just last week, in response to waste packaging problems as illustrated by complaints from the Governors of Nevada, South Carolina, and n'ashington, the Commission's staff has begun efforts which would lead to NRC enforcement of DOT's regulations concerning the packaging of low-level wastes against NRC licensees--a matter the MOU assigns chiefly to DOT.
This too is being done in consultation with DOT, and with its cooperation.
This will bring the combined forces of NRC and DOT to bear on an important issue.
Here
- c, the :c=.ission's enforcement authority would be unclear under S. 535.
inally, NRC has undertaken the major studies of the impacts of n c' ear raterials transportation which have forred the basis not only
- r the C:mmission's actions but also to a substantial extent for COT's Mi 28 pending rulemaking on tt e routing of trucks shipments of radioactive materials.
In short, then, the recent trend has largely been for the NRC to participate more actively with DOT in the area of nuclear materials transportation. We think that there are sound reasons for continuing to do so.
In the case of many hazardous materials, there is no particular government agency with special expertise in handling those materials, and if they are to be transpor:ed safely, 00T must develop the requisite expertise and the appropriate body of regulations.
But for nuclear materials, the Commission has long-standing experience in their use and handling.
It is unnecessary for DOT to duplicate NRC's expertise in those areas.
In a broad sense, it can be said that DOT is the appropriate agency to be responsible for collecting shipment data, for reccmmending federal routing guidelines, and for administering state grants.
However, the NRC is the appropriate ager.cy to be responsible for reviewing safety require-ments for shipping radioactive materials, for emergency response planning, and for recommending safety related research.
In sum, we do not think the Commission's responsibilities should be restricted in the manner proposed by S. 535.
Events have developed too rapidly in the last few months for anyone to say'with confidence precisely sna: the relative roles cf NRC and DOT should be for ne long term anc we believe that accinistrative flexibility is preferable to amencment cf
- ne coverning sta:L:es.
here are other questions which were asked in your invitation to testify and c:her sections of the bill :na: I wouic like to comment en mig 90 o
briefly; an attachment to my written testimony provides more detailed comments.
In answer to the first question -- that is, what categories of radioactive materials should or should act be encompassed by S. 535 --
I would just like to say that my previous remarks apply to the trans-portation of all radioactive materials.
It would be confusing to have institutional arrangements and responsibilities for waste shipments that are different fl om those for other types of radioactive material shipments.
I think my testimeny has answered question 2 concerning the responsibilities of DOT and NRC.
On Question 3, I can only say that DOE and its contractors are not subject to Commission transportation regulations.
I think you would have to ask DOE about whether any of its transporta. tion activities need legislative clarification.
Question 4 asks which States should be included in the State crant program in proposed section 116.
Here I think the important point is that transportation is only one part of the broader question of nuclear waste disposal generally, and that State study of transportation imoacts is only one aspect of State participation in nuclear waste disposal decisions.
There will almost certainly be broader bills concerninc waste disocsal, and : think the grant program prooosed here couic be more profitably be consicered in such a bill.
The IR3 ecert, fcr example, proposes a State Plannine Counci' ::
facilita:e State participation in waste management decisions, and we tnink the State Grants proposed in the bill would better serve State 7.10 G l;.\\
I interests if they were coordinated with a such a council.
The IRG also envisions that transportation matters would be studied as part of the site selection process with the participation of all interested States, and the grant program in proposed section 116 should be coordinated with this procedure.
Questions 5, 6, and 7 pertain to the Commission's new interim regulations for the physical protection of spent fuel in transit, and ask why after the decades of good experience in the safe transportation of nuclear materials, the rules were promulgated so quickly without opportunity for prior comment; whether there was any cocrdination with DOT; and why the regulations do not specify security provisions for shipments by water.
An attachment to my written testi;;cny provides detailed answers to these questions, which I shall go cver briefly here.
Both the Commission's staff and Sandia Laboratories, under a contract with the Commission, have estimated the health effects that might result from the sabotage of a spent fuel cask with high explosives in a densely populated area.
The Sandia study calculated effects that were high enough to suggest that extra security measures against sabotage were needed.
The staff noted, and Sandia agreed, that the assumptions used were quite speculative because of the lack of experimental data regarding the effects of exolosive attacks on the casks presently being used or on the contained s:ent fuel.
The staff irially concluded that such speculative calculations dic not warrant taking security precautions.
Eut, s;eculative as it was, it was the cnly information the Commissicr had t: go on, anc wnen it becare apparent that it would take two years to comolete the researcn needed to provice better data, the Ccmmission oj
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o eg,,i agreed with the staff's revised view that this was too long for such a potential risk to be accepted.
The staff comunicated informally with the industry and determined that its proposed safeguards would increase the annual cost of transporting spent fuel by $200,000.
Since there were ongoing shipments, the Commission believed they should be covered by the staff's proposal, and thus the rule was made imediately effective.
The requirements can be modified if information obtained during or after tne coment period suggest there is a need to do so.
When the ongoing researen is completed, the Commission will determine what permanent security measures, if any, are required.
Adoption of the rules was carefully coordinated with DOT.
The NRC staff sen DOT a draft of the proposals, solicited and received D0T's written coments, and met with DOT staff.
The D0T staff"was of the opinion that the NRC routing restrictions for safeguards would enable DOT to limit the scope of its pending rulemaking to normal transportation and transocrt accidents, thus substantially simplifying DOT's rulemaking.
The general requirements of the NRC rule, whic.n are contained in section 73.37(a), apply to all modes of transportation, including shipments by water.
Since all domestic shipments are by truck or rail, those shipments were the staff's primary concern in drafting the rule, and sne:i'i:
equirements for truck and rail shipments were included in se::icn %.37:5 and (c).
The specific rules also acoly to the land
- rti:n :# im::r: and excort shipments.
After the staff has worked out s:ne :f :ne ce:1-is for implementing the rules for truck and rail snipments, i: c': :;rn i:s a tention to whether specific requirements should be
- a:e: Or ne stri:tly water-corne portions of sni;:ments witnin the
- risci
- i:9 cf :ne United States.
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~ think my general comments on the division of responsibilities between NRC and DOT also apply to the emergency planning section of the bil', proposed section 115(b), which would provide no role for NRC.
NRC nas a sucstantial program for radiological emergency response planning cenr.ected with nuclear facilities, and assists states in handling radiological emergencies in transportation.
In addition, the President nas pro:osed that the new Federal Emergency Managemen+ Agency assume the
- en:ral coordinating role in federal response to civil neclear emergencies.
- EMA.a3 have a role in emergency planning for nuclear transportation acciden:s as well.
~ hat finishes my prepared remarks for this morning, Mr. Chainnan.
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entior.ed earlier, an attachment to my written statement provides mere ce: ailed answers to some of the Subcommittee's questions.
It also rovices sace technical comments on the language of, the bill wnich we
- elie'.e are ir, order if the Subcommittee determines to proceed with the Oil'.
It tr.is.coint I would be pleased to answer any questions the 3Lbconmittee may have.
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ATTACHMENT TO TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, CHAIRMAN NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ON S. 535 BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION, U.S. SENATE JULY 19, 1979 The Commission's staff has prepared the following detailed answ#ers to the Subcommittee's questions numbered 5, 6 and'7 in its invitation to testify.
Question 5.
In view of the decades of good experience in the safe transpor-tation of nuclear materials,what were the considerations which prompted the NRC's somewhat hasty issuance on July 15 of interim and proposed rules involving routing and security provisions applicable to such shipments effective July 16, with no more than 30 additional days for comment on those rules?
Comment:
In previous NRC staff documents, (NUREG-0194, Calculations of Radiological Consequences from Sabotage of Shipping Casks for Spent Fuel and Higb-Level Waste, zebruary 1977; NUREG-0170, FES on the Transportation of Radioactive Materials by Air and Other Modes, December 1977), the staff estimated the health effects of a radiological release in a non-urban area resulting from a high-explosive assault on a spent fuel cask.
In June of 1978, Sandia completed and tublished a study
" Transport of Radionuclides in Urban Environs:
A Working Draf t Assessment" (SAND-77-1927) which included a chapter on sabotage of spent fuel in urban transport.
The chapter included estimations of the health effects crf successful spent fuel sabotage in urban areas.
Both the staff and Sandia postu lated essen-tially the same release fractions - 100 percent noble gasses,1 percent solids as respirable material and about 1 percent cesium - resulting from 2. nigh-ex:losive creach of the cask.
Although tne numcer cf fatalities estimated by Sar. cia fcr areas of. ery large topulation densities would normally call into question the neec for tne application n
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2 of safeguards, NMSS originally concluded that without additional substantiation of how both the fuel and the casks would respond to breaching explosives, immediate regulatory action could not be supported.
However, the extended time frame of the confirmatory research program initiated by the staff in 1978 raised the question of whether the potential risk, as presented by the Sandia study, could be accepted over such a long period.
Even though the likelihood of a sabotage attack on a spent fuel shipment is considered to be low and the difficulty of breaching a cask and dispersir.g radioactive material is considered to be great, NMSS believed that, in order to protect.
health and to minimize danger to life and property (Sections 161b and 161i(3) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended), it was prudent and desirable to require certain interim safeguards measures for spent fuel shipments until the results of the research program are available.
The primary objective of these measures is the avoidance of sabotage in areas of high population density.
Since there were ongoing shipments, the Commission believed the interim require-ments should be issued immediately, while noting that the ru?e would be subject to reconsideration or revision based on public comments received subsequent to its publication.
Accordingly, the public was invited to submit its view during a 60 day comment period ending August 16, 1979.
Ques: ion 5.
In what way and witn whom were the routing crovisions cf tnose rules coordinatec with the DOT on August 17, 1978, pertaining to routing guidelines?
Carment:
Tne NRC staff forwarced draft materials certaining to the proposec rule and the related justification to tne DOT Office of Hazardous Materials Regulations during April 1979.
In addition to soliciting tneir written ccmments, oLJ L'
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3 a request was made to meet with them regarding possible impacts of the proposed NRC action upon the D0T rulemaking activity regarding highway routing of radio-active materials (Docket HM-164). To this end, a meeting was held with DOT on May 3,1979 and written comments were provided in a DOT letter dated May 15, 1979.
In short, the D0T staff is of the opinion that the application of routing restrictions by the NRC for safeguards purposes will enable the scope of any DOT rule to be limited to normal and accident conditions, thereby reducing difficulties they may face in further rulemaking proceedings under Docket HH-164.
Question 7 Why do these newly issued rules not specify security provisions for shipments by water--whether barge canai, river, or sea?
Comment:
The general requirements in Section 73.37(a) apply to all movements of irradiated reactor fuel by NRC licensees within U.S. jurisdictf on regardless of the particular mode of transport. Additionally, specific security measures wera set forth in Sections 73.37(b) and (c) for shipments by read, or rail.
Since no domestic shipments of NRC licensed irradiated-reactor fuel are currently being made or planned by sea or inland naterway, specific security provisicns directly applicable to this mode of transport were not included in the riew regulation.
Export and import shipments of spent fuel, however, may involve movement by sea within U.S. jurisdiction.
When such shipments involve transfer to or from other modes, the NRC staff reviews the transfer arrangements and locations as part of tne route epproval process conducted in accorcance with Sectic n 73.37:a;(1).
Strictly with regard to the sea portion of spent fuel shipments mace witnin :ne 0.5. jurisdiction (during export and import accivities cr duri ng..,li:er. sed transient movements), the NRC staff has not yet determinec whether specific snia-board security measures are needed.
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4 The Comission is also providing the following detailed comraents on the language of the bill, should the Subcommittee determine to proceed with the bill.
1.
Consistent with the principles of tne IAEA regulations, to which the U.S.
subscribes, the Memorandum of Understanding allows the DOT discretion in deciding whether te request a detailed review by NRC of a foreign package that has been certified by the Competent Authority of a foreign country as meeting IAEA regulations.
Section ll7(c) or its legislative history should clearly indicate that this discretion is not disturbed by the bill.
2.
The definitions in sections 103(2) (commercial spent fuel) and (5) (nuclear waste) should be clarified to indicate whether or not they cover spent fuel from research reactors, such as those at institutions like tne Brookhaven National Laboratories, spent fuel from national defense-related reactors, and other defense wastes.
3.
The definition of " emergency situation", section 103(3), includes diversion and sabotage attempts.
Section 115(b) requires the Secretary, DOT to form-ulate a plan to deal with emergency situations that may occur in transport-ing nuclear waste, spent fuel, or other radioactive material.
With regard to diversion and sabotage attempts, this responsibility wouid appear to be more appropriate for the NRC, which has an extensive program and expertise in these areas.
4.
The definition of " shipment", section 103(9), should also exclude facilities licensed by NRC Agreement States as well as those licensed by the NRC.
5.
The definition of " transports" or " transportation", section 103(11), should excluce activities within the boundaries of a licensed facility as is done in :ne cefinition of " shipment".
6.
With regard to section ll5(b)(2), consultation should be based instead on the State desires, ard.should have a consistency provision such that the transportation emergency response plan is ~"' grated with other nuclear or ncn-nuclear emergency planning by States.
7.
In section 109(e)(6), the portion of the annual report dealing with review of safety recuirements and recommended action for safety-related research wculd accear to be more appropriate for NRC than for DOT, or at least to be a join; function of the two agencies.
Such an amendment wculd reccgnize tre NRC's current responsibility for confirmatory research.
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