ML19207B753
| ML19207B753 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1979 |
| From: | PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0553, RTR-NUREG-553 NUDOCS 7909050212 | |
| Download: ML19207B753 (5) | |
Text
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, STATEMENT BY WILLIAM H. WILCOX, ADMINISTRATOR FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATICN BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND APRIL 26, 1979 0.
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A public T.V.
program on Three-Mile Island Monday night reported that there are now known to be underway nine different investigations of one aspect or another of the TMI incident.
There will come from these investigations and the specialized studies to follow a mass of findings and recommendations covering sociological, scientific, legal, economic and mental and physical health aspects of TMI.
Within a few years," the people of metro-politan Harrisburg, Pennsyvlania, may be the most studied people in the world.
No doubt they will have long since tired of it!
A Presidential Commission has an opportunity to stand above this and review the overall policy perspective.
I hope you will present to President Carter no more than a half dozen clear and simple major policy findings and recommendations, supported by such extensive documentation as may be required.
In fact, the six functions assigned to the Commission by President Carter provides primarily the foundation needed for addressing the broad issues the March - April radiological incident at TMI raises.
This testimony deals largely with the issue of preparedness raised by (C) in the Ccamission's charter.
Governor Thornbargh has said he's now ready for the second guessers.
Let me say that I was not present at ihree Mile Island like my two companions and advisors here this morning -- Mr. Robert Adamcik, Regional Director U]-
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2 of P.egion III, Philadelphia, Federal Disaster Assistance Administration and Mr. John McConnell of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency of the Department of Defense.
I have, however, had considerable experience with emergency management both as Secretary of Community Affairs in Pennsylvania for six an? one-half years and as Admin-istrator of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration for the last 15 months..During the.TMI crisis days I personally directed the FDAA Operation Center which, at the direction of the White House, served as a bridge between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and most of the other Federal agencies providing support.
For 10 days we provided a daily report on Federal activities to Jack Watson.
Mr. Adamcik ccordinated non-scientific Federal operations in Harrisburg.
.Mr. McConnell provided critical technical assistance to the State and counties in planning for possible evacuation.
While we propose to avoid the invidious implications of second guessers, some preparedness lessons, perhaps also applicable to other places and times, now appear evident from the TMI emergency.
I respectfully suggest the following initial Sindings which can be subject to later verification.
I certainly would be prepared to defend them here under questioning:
1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Cocmission lacks both the carrot (dollars) or the stick (authority) to encourage adequate state and local governmental preparedness for 9l' l00 3
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3 radiological accidents?
2.
Many of the assurances provided by public agencies to the Metropolitan Edison as to available resources in the case of a radiological incident at TMI were so much bureaucratic boilerplate and were not always relevant to actual capability.
3.
Annex E, Nuclear Incidents (Fixed Facility) of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Disaster Operations Plan is so vague as to be of little value.
4.
The pre-emergency coordination between county civil defense organizations was weak and inadequate.
5.
The area and population contemplated for evacuation was much greater in actuality than that provided for in the pre-emergency plans.
6.
Responsible Federal agencies have not given sufficient priority to the prompt review of State Radiological Emergency Response Plans.
I respectfully suggest that pre-emergency planning and readiness requires coordination, cooperation and communication.
The need for these 3 C's in other types of community and area planning, such as highway planning, economic development and health and hospital planning,has been demonstrated by experience decades ago and TMI may well have demonstrated the need for this type of planning and readiness structure in emergency cperations, too.
While the Federal Govermment must be sensitive to state and local laws and customs, it should in my view, set the framework requirements for a
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4 specialized, regionalized coordinated emergency response structure, designed in the detail by the state's governor or legislature.
The creation and effective planning by such a governmental or quasi-governmental agency should be a prerequisite for a licensee to operate a new nuclear power plant and should be required, after a reasonable time span, of existing plants as a condition for continued operation.
Among the agencies which would be represented on the policy-making body would be the NRC and/or the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the State Bureau of Radiological Health, the State emergency officer, the county, city or town executives on governing bodies and the licensee.
With respect to either emergency planning or operations no advisory commission can'ccmpel effective plans and readiness.
The Commission, however, can suggest a structure that will encourace coordination, cooperation, and communi-cation.
What I have proposed here will, in my view, do just that.
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