ML19207B472
| ML19207B472 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1979 |
| From: | Neely D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290692 | |
| Download: ML19207B472 (46) | |
Text
.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0riMISSION In the Matter of:
2; IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3
of 4
Donald R. Neely Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5
Region I 6
7 8
Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11 l
hay 2, 1979 12 (Date of Interview) 13 June 30, 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 14 98 15I (Tape Number (s))
I 16l 17 18l 19 i
20l o /;/
Q )p c
21j 9
NRC PERSONNEL:
)
,22j b
Owen C. Shackleton 4 )D John R. Sinclair C
23 Gregory P. Yuhas Mark E. Resner 24j i
25l PPS 1760 033
1, SHACKLETCN:
This is an interview of Mr. Donald R. Neely.
Mr. Neely 2
is a Radiation Specialist assigned to Region I of the U. S. Nuclear 3
Regulatory Commission.
The time is now 5:06 p.m., EDT, May 2, 1979.
4 This interview is being conducted in Trailer 203, which is parked just 5
utside the south security gate of the Three Mile Island nulcear power 6
plant.
Present to conduct this interview is Mr. Gregory P. Yuhas.
7 Mr. Yuhas is a Radiation Specialist in Region I of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Also present, for this interview, is Mr. John 8
R. Sinclair.
Mr. Sinclair is an investigator in the Office of Inspector g
10 and Auditor, Headquarters, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
In addition, present, is Mr. Mark E. Rasner.
Mr. Resner is an investigator 3
in the Office of Inspector and Auditor, Headquarters, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
My name is Owen C. Shackleton.
I'm an investi-g I
14{
gator in Region V of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Mr.
i Neely, for the benefit of those persons who will be listening to this 15 tape, would you please give us a brief resume of your background in 16, the nuclear field.
17 18l NEELY:
I graduated from Livermore High School in 1956. Went to work 191 for General Electric Valicetos Nuclear Center in 3962.
Worked for 20!
General Electric as a technician and went to the position of specialist i
over a period of 12 years.
Job function was to provide health physics 22l
[
services to customers being Boiling Water Reactors utilities.
- 1974, 23 went to work for Chem Nuclear Systems as a field supervisor and consul-24 tant in supplying services for all nuclear utilities.
November 1975, I
t 1760 034' I
2 1
I joined the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a radiation 2
specialist in Region 1 and moved to senior inspector in the Radiation 3
Support Section.
Training with Nuclear Regulatory Commission, I have 4
gone through all the required PWR/BWR training programs and other 5
administrative type programs with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
6 YUHAS:
Don, the purpose of this interview is to get your impression 7
of the licensee's action during the first critical period from the g
times you got involved with this incident through, but not exceeding, g
midnight of the 30th, which would have been Friday night.
I'd like 10 you to just to go ahead and briefly talk about how you were informed g
of the incident and pick it up from there and after you just relate then I will come back later and will talk about the specifics just to g
jog your memory.
15!
NEELY:
16l On the morning of March 28, I was debriefing with my Section Chief, Mr. Bud Crocker, at approximately 8:15 on the assignments for the upcoming week.
George Smith, the Branch Chief fer Fuel Facility l
and Material Safety, came into our office about that time and informed 19l Mr. Crocker to get a emergency team together.
That was the first information we had received that there was a problem.
At that time we 21.
moved into Mr. Smith's office, when the licensee was on the phone in 22 the conference call, and various people from the Rad Support Section 23 were in there including Mr. Yuhas, Mr. Plumlee, and that's all I can 24 remember at this time.
After talking to the licensee and asking 1760 035 t
3 1
questions for a few minutes, we began to assemble an emergency team 1
2!
and getting the necessary equipment to head for Three Mile Island.
At 3
somewhere between 8:30 and 8:40 we left in the emergency vehicle.
4 Persons in attendance were myself,. Chick Gallina, investigator with 5
Region 1, Karl Plumlee a radiation specialist with the Rad Support 6
Section, Ron Nimitz, an intern with the Rad Support Section, and Jim 7
Higgins, an Operations Inspector from Region 1.
With the sirens going g
we did we were we headed down the turnpike and about 10 minutes after g
10 we arrived at the North gate of the Three Mile Island facility.
It took us approximately 10 to 15 minutes to get security clearance to 10 get through the North gate.
Informed the licensee that we were the 11 emergency team and could they please hurry up and get us through the g
gate. We reported to the Unit 1 control room and reported to Mr. Jim g
Seelinger, who was coordinating the emergency control center located in Unit 1.
There was a lot of confusion in the control room and Mr.
Seelinger asked that the NRC inspectors stand in the background and that he would get with them as soon as he could.
We had no information at that time what the status of the plant was.
About 30 minutes later, after he told us what his function was, myself and Jim Higgins went over to the Unit 2 control room and left Nimitz, Gallina, and Plumlee in Unit 1 control room.
That was aoout 11:15.
We arrived at 21, the Unit 2 control room and I checked in myself with Mr. Dubiel, who is the Radiation Protection Manager for Units 1 and 2.
We were brought up to date on what was happening and at that point I began to inquire 24 as to what the licensee was doing as far as the Radiation Protection 25l l
I t
l 1760 036
4 1.
Program implementation.
During that period there was a lot of con-2.
fusion in the control room We were on mask respiratory protection 3
during various times.
Communication was hard in the control room.
4 People would have to frequently take their masks off to communicate.
5 About 4 o' clock we started getting calls from the Governor's office 6
wanting to talk to inspectors on site, right to the control room.
I f
got a call from Gallina about 4:30, who had been informed from George g
Smith that the Governor wanted to interview myself, Gcllina and Higgins at the Governor's mansion. We were instructed to make that interview g
by Region I.
Approximately Leven o' clock, we left the island, went to 10 the observation center where the highway patrol was to pick us up at 1 11 eight o' clock and take us to the Governor's mansion for that inter-view.
14 YUHAS:
We're gonna start going back.
Could you describe some of the equipment that was available to you to bring to the site in your emergency resoonse?
18 NEELY:
The equipment available was the emergency equipment that is i
normally stored in our emergency kits consisting of survey meters, air samplers, various decontamination protective clothing, this type of thing.
The air samplers that were available fo? use were of no use to us because they were not battery operated.
They were called for AC power and were unable to provide air sampling off site due to the 24 problem that we couldn't hook up to AC power.
We did have survey 25 i
1760 037
5 1,
meters for ourselves to check dose rater arounJ 1e building and..
2 3
4 YUHAS:
Were you briefed in route to the plant? Were you in radio 5
communication with Region I so that they could give you an update of 6
what to expect when you arrived?
7 NEELY:
No we were not.
8 9
YUHAS:
Does Region I have the capability to brief you when you're in 10 route to an emergency?
3 12 NEELY:
Not in that vehicle that I know of.
3 14
_YUHAS:
Can you describe the conditions at the North Gate on your arrival?
17 NEELY:
There was very few cars there.
Not much activity when we arrived.
19, i
20 YUHAS:
Did the guard provide you with a TLD (thermoluminscent dosimeter) or a pocket dosimeter or log you in and out on a muster sheet or 22 anything of that nature going on?
23 24 25 l
l j
1760 038 l
6 1
NEELY:
They did take our names and checked our ID's.
I can't recall 2
whether we had dosimetcy provided by them.
3 4,
YUHAS:
To the best of your knowledge you don't remember being provided 5
with TLO's.
6 7
NEELY:
No I don't.
8 9
YUHAS:
As you came in did someone escort you to Unit l?
10 11; NEELY:
No.
We drove up ourselves and we were told to report to the I
12{
process center.
13 YUHAS:
Can you describe the conditions in the process center?
14, 15 16j NEELY:
I don't remember anybody in there at all.
We were, then moved 17l right up to the Unit 1 control room.
l 18{
YUHAS:
gj Sotheprocesscentertherewa{notaguarothereorandHP 20f tech.
Were the metal detectors in operation?
21 NEELY:
No.
23 YUHAS:
Were the key card doors in operation?
25l l
i 1760 039
I 7
1.
NEELY:
No.
I 2
3 YUHAS:
Was there any licensee representative controlling access at 4
that point?
5 3
NEELY:
No.
7 8
YUHAS:
Did you see anyone in the process center other than yourself, g
your own team?
10 NEELY:
No.
11 12 YUHAS:
13 As you went through the service building, did you know if the security consoles were manned as you walked through the service building?
14 15 NEELY:
I did not observe that.
16 17 YUHAS:
Was the key controlled door between the service building and g
I the Unit 1 turbine building disarmed at that time?
191 20 NEELY:
Yes.
21, i
22 YUHAS:
When you arrived in the Unit 1 control room, the five of you, did you go directly in the control room or did you go to the shift supervisors office which looks on the control room?
i 1760 040
'8 1
NEELY:
We went right into the control room.
2 3
YUHAS:
Can you describe roughly the number of people in the control 4-room and who was there?
5 6
NEELY:
I would estimate somewhere in excess of twenty people.
7 8
YUHAS:
Can yoO describe basically anybody you might have recognized g
and what their postion responsibility was in the control room?
10 NEELY:
Not being at the facility before, I did not recognize anybody 11 but the people in our party.
12 13 YUHAS:
Could you tell who was in control of the situation in the Unit 14 1 control room?
15 16l NEELY:
No, I could not.
18I (UHAS:
Had you been informed that a general radiaticn emergency had 191 1
been declared?
20 21 NEELY:
No.
23 YUHAS:
Did you see people on the radio in communcation with field 24l survey teams from the Unit 1 control room?
25{
i i
i 1760 04) i i
t
9 1
NEELY:
Yes.
2 3
YUHAS:
Did you overhear what they were saying in terms of the kind of 4
levels?
5 6
NEELY:
No.
That's the point where the shift supervisor asked us, the 7
inspectors, to move back from the plotting board.
8 YUHAS:
Specifically, where did he ask you to stand?
g 10' NEELY:
Approximately ten to twelve feet off to the side and to the 11 rear f the plotting board.
12 :
13 YUHAS:
Did Seelinger announce to you that he was the emergency director g
15 16 NEELY:
He indicated he was the Unit 1 plant manager.
18{
YUHAS:
Was Unit 1 critical at that time?
19 20 NEELY:
At that time I did not know what the status of Unit 1 was.
21t i
22 YUHAS:
How long did it take before a licensee representative appraised you of the condition of the plant? By the plant I mean Unit 2?
24 25l l
1760 042 t
i
10 1
NEEL/:
At least twenty minutes.
2 3
YUHAS: Who gave you that initial briefing?
4 5
NEELY:
Seelinger.
61 7
YUHAS:
Do you remember briefly what i.e said?
8 g
NEELY:
That is when he told us that Unit 1 was the ECS center, Emergency Control Center.
He did not get specific as what the condition of Unit 10 2 was.
He said they were experiencing off site releases.
11 12 YUHAS:
Did he appear to know what the condition of Unit 2 was?
13 14 NEELY:
I could not say.
15 16 YUHAS:
Where, from the point of arrival in the Unit 1 ECS, at what g
p int did you reestablish telephone communications with NRC Region I?
18 19 NEEQ:
I estatlished communications in the the Supervisors office to the rear of the control room within ten minutes of arrival.
21 22 YUHAS:
Can you describe, once you established communications with Region I, what type of thing was going on between yourself and Region 24 I?
25!
1760 043 l
o
e 11 1
NEELY:
Region I was trying to establish what the conditions were at 2
the facility and who was in charge.
3 4;
YUHAS:
Were you in a position to answer those questions?
5 6i NEELY:
No, I was not.
7 8
YUHAS:
What did you have to do to get answers to those questions?
9 10 NEELY:
We had to go ask the licensee.
11 YUHAS:
And this is the comment you made about Seelinger telling you 12 13l twenty minutes afterwards.
14 NEELY:
Yes.
ISj l
li,f YUHAS:
Were you aware that there was also another p %ne established y7 between the Unit 2 control room and NRC Region I at that time?
g 19!
20,L
- 211, YUHAS:
What prompted your decision to proceed to Unit 1 or Unit 2?
22l 23 NEELY:
To find out what was happening on the Unit 2 side.
25l 1
i i
I
12 1
YUHAS:
In other words, you felt the only way you could get decent 2j answers to respond to Region I inquiries was to go to the Unit 2 3
control room.
4 5
NEELY:
That's correct.
6 7
YUHAS: What instructions were left with the remainder of the team 8
when you and Mr. Higgins proceeded to Unit 2?
I 9
NEELY:
The instructions I left with the team were to find out what 10 11 the radiation levels were off site and around the buildings and to g
keep contact with Region I.
13 YUHAS:
Did you note the ARM or effluent release control panels in the 14 rea radiation monitors in Unit 1 control room, could you see these 15 from your location?
17 NEELY:
No I could not.
g 191 YUHAS:
Were you permitted to go into the operating area of the Unit 1 cC control room so that you could read those instruments?
22' NEELY:
No, we were not.
24l t
25l i
l 1760 045 I
13 1;
YUHAS:
When you decided to proceed from Unit 1 to Unit 2 were you 2-given special precautions or an escort or did you have to dress up, or 3
what were the conditions?
4 5l NEELY: We were given a full face respirator and we were escorted by 6
licensee representatives.
7 8
YUHAS:
What type of cartridge on the full face respirator? NEELY:
Particulate canister.
g 10 YUHAS: Was this the sole particulato or was it also a non-approved 11 i dine canister?
12, i
13 NEELY:
It was sole particulate.
g I
15i YUHAS: What was the reason for having you wear a particulate canister?
16 17 NEELY:
Because the licensee had expected airborne problems on the Unit 2 side.
g I
20l YUHAS: Was this based on previous measurement or alarms or what?
22 l
NEELY:
They had measurements in the aux (auxiliary) building, fuel building, alarms were alarming, they knew they had airborne problems.
2 41 25f i
l 1
l 1760 046 I
f
14 1
YUHAS:
Had they counted any samples and were they able to give you a 2
number in terms of microcuries per cc at that point?
3 4
NEELY:
Not at that point, no.
5 6
YUHAS:
Was there an explanation given why the samples hadn't been 7
counted?
8 g
NEELY:
As far as the capabilities on Unit 2 in the control roo:a, they 10 were only pulling particulate samples.
They did not have the capability 11 to collect for iodine.
12 YUHAS:
Can you describe the conditions in the Unit 2 control room 13 14 when you and Mr. Higgins arrived?
I 15 NEELY:
Unit 2 control room was very busy.
A lot of people in and 16i ut.
People in protective clothing standing around.
The door was 17 continucusly being opened and left open.
18l 1Si 1
YUHAS:
About how many people were in the Unit 2 control room at the 20 time of your arrival?
g 22 NEELY:
I would say roughly between ten and twenty.
g 24 25 I,
1760 047
15 l
1.
YUHAS:
Was someone clearly in charge of the situation in the Unit 2 2
control room?
3 4
NEELY:
Yes.
5 YUHAS:
Who was that?
6 7
NEELY:
Mr. Logan was in the Unit 2 control room.
8 9
YUHAS:
Can you go into more detail? You arrived in the control room 10 did you immediatly confront Mr. Logan as to the conditicn of the plant 3
or....?
g 13 NEELY:
We talked with Logan and he briefed us.
We also met with, if 14 recalling from my memory, I think Mr. Gary Miller was also there in 15l l
the Unit 2 control room to give us a status of the plant.
B&W personnel were there who were technical reps and I met with Dick DuBiel, the Radiation Protection Manager, who brought me up to date as far as conditions in the aux building, the fuel building and in the control room.
20 21 SHACKLETON:
Don, when you said 8&W are you referring to representatives 22 from Babcock and Wilcox?
23 24 25 i
l 1760 048
16 1
NEELY:
Yes.
2 SHa0KLETON:
Thank you.
4 5
YUHAS:
Can you relate to us the description that trese individuals 6
provided to you as to the plant status at that time? Did they tell 7
you that they had a bubble in the core at that time? That they were 8
experiencing problems with the reactor coolant pumps?
9 NEELY:
No, it was indicated that the building containment was isolated, 10 11 a that water had been pumped over into the aux building, and the vent m nitor was off-scale and they had gaseous air problems in the aux 12 building.
73 14; 15l YUHAS:
Did they tell you anything about the containment dome tr,cnitor?
I 16l NEELY:
Yes.
Dubiel indicated that the dome monitor was reading 60 R per hour.
l 19l YUHAS:
Did they did they say that they doubted the reading or did they believe the readina or what was the context of Mr. Dubiel's comment
~
21 with respect to the dome moriitor?
23 NEELY:
He didn't deny or agree with the reading.
25 t
l 1760 049 1
.I 17 1
YUHAS:
Can you give us a brief rundown of the health physics conditions 2
that Mr. Dubiel presented to you?
3 4
NEELY:
The conditions were levels were being found in excess of a 5
1000 R per hour on associated piping in the aux building around the 6
tank areas.
Air concentrations were excessive.
People were entering 7
the aux building on supplied Scott Air Packs.
No air samples were 8
being taken.
I asked him if he would change the vent monitor samples 9
for the aux building and he indicated that the dose rates were a man 10 would receive approximately 700 millirem per hour to change the cartridges 11 so they could be counted.
12 YUHAS:
Was someone in clear control over each entry to the auxiliary 13 14 building at this time?
I 15!
NEELY:
No, there was not.
16 17 YUHAS:
Was there a control point or a guard or someone stationed to 18 restrict access to the Unit 2 auxiliary building at this point?
g i
20 NEELY:
No, there was not.
22 YUHAS:
Were they using RWPs for these entries?
24 25 i
i 1760 050
18 1
NEELY:
No, they were not.
2 3
YUHAS:
Were they logging people when ' hey left the control room to 4
head down to the aux building and there logging them out when they 5
returned?
6 7
NEELY:
No, they were not.
8 g
YUHAS: Were they providing an adequate supply of high range pocket 10 dosimeters or instruments to these individuals entering the auxiliary 11 building?
12 NEELY:
That I cannot determine.
We cannot keep up with who was going 13 14 out and who was coming back in and also concentrate on the problem within the plant.
15 16!
YUHAS: When you say we you mean the NRC.
17 18L NEELY:
NRC 7g 20 YUHAS:
But was the licensee keeping up these people that he was permitting to enter very high radiation areas?
23 NEELY:
Not that I can determine.
25 l
l 1760 051
.s.
19 1
YUHAS:
Was the licensee making an effort to document survey results?
~
2 3
NEELY:
No, they were not.
4 5
YUHAS:
What was the licensee doing?
6 7
NEELY:
The licensee, being the Radiation Protection Manager, was 8
instructing or consulting with the operations people as far as changing g
valve lineups and what systems it would affect.
10' 11 YUHA3:
Do you infer by that that the Radiation Protection Manager was 12 involved more in the operations of the pl6nt rather than in the safeguard-13 ing f the health and safety of the workers who were going in to take 74, measures to perhaps prevent releases to unrestricted areas?
i 15j i
16j NEELY:
That is correct.
17 YUHAS:
About what percentage of the time was Mr. Dubiel on the telephone 18f'
^
gj during this period?
20 NEELY:
He was on the telephone to Unit 1 quite a bit of the time.
22 YUHAS:
Had Mr. Dubiel designated his responsibilities to his subordinate to coordinate these entries to the auxiliary building and various other parts of the plant?
i 1760 052 I
t
20 1,
NEELY-No, he did not.
The technicians were making the surveys and 2
were taking direction from him when they were to go in, t.o my knowledge.
3 4f YUHAS:
Did you hear any instances of where operations supervisors or 5
nuc? ear engineers, who were telling people to go into the auxiliary 6
building and, say, change a letdown filters or seal injection filters, 7
areas that had very high, extremely high dose retes?
8 g
NEELY:
I had no information to that effect.
10 YUHAS:
About how long did you and Mr. Higgins stay in the Unit 2 11, l
Control Room?
1 24' 13 NEELY:
Till approximately 6:00 on the night of the 28th.
14 I
15l YUHAS:
Did the licensee in this several hour period respond to your 16 suggestions as far as enhancement of control?
y7 18!
NEELY:
The licensee was directed to take advice by Gary Miller.
On one occasion We discussed the determination that whether it was short lived isotopes on the filters in the control room or long lived.
He did determine to take some of our advice and make some determinations.
But as far as control, it was the next night that we called in Mr.
Limroth.
We expressed our concerns the following evening with the Unit 1 supervisor, who in turn called in Mr. Dave Limroth, who is the Superintendent of Services.
l 1760 053 i
21 1
YUHAS:
Let's not move ahead quite that fast.
You said that you 2
advised Mr. Dubiel to run a half life on the short, or the particulate 3
isotopes in the control room.
Was that done?
4 5
NEELY:
Yes.
6 7
YUHAS: What was the findings then, half life determinations?
8 g
NEELY:
That he was claiming as Rubidium-88.
10 11
,YUHAS:
Did he take action then on that?
12 13 NEELY:
He took the people off masks in the control room.
14 YUHAS:
Did he have any backup information to indicate that that was 15 16 the prudent thing to do?
17 NEELY:
No.
18 19I 20j YUHAS:
Did you see any, DuBiel, or any of his representatives look at the control room air monitors?
2 22 NEELY:
No.
23 24 25 i
i 1760 054 i
22 1
YUHAS:
Did you or any of your people look at the control room air 2
monitors?
3 4
NEELY:
Yes.
S 6
YUHAS:
What did they indicate?
7 g
NEELY:
They were reading high.
9 10 YUHAS:
On all channels, particularly iodine and gaseous?
11 NEELY:
That's right.
The background radiation levels in the contic2 g
13 m were ranging anywhere from 5 to 10 millirem per hour at times.
r 14l YUHAS:
Was there any discussion or effort to determine the source of 15 this dose rates in the control room?
16 17l gl NEELY:
No, they did not.
I indicated to them that they had to keep the door shut.
Everytime I turned around, the door was propped open g
to the control ronm.
zuj i
21t I
YUHAS:
When the door was closed and you opened it could you tell that the control room ventilation system was working properly?
In that it was on recirc and a positive pressure existed?
25 l
I i
1760 055 e
[
23 1
NEELY:
No, we could not.
2 3
YUHAS:
In other words, you couldn't say it was positive.
4 5
eel :
The*'s right.
l 6
7 YUHAS: What methodology did you did you try to determine that by?
8 Just by pulling the door or....?
9 10 NEELY:
It was hard to determine because the door was hard to open.
11, It was jamming.
12 SHACKLETON:
Gentlemen, we will take a break right now and we change 13 the tapes.
The time is now 7:34 p.m. eastern daylight time, May 2, 14 1979.
g 16 This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. Donald R. Neely, the 17 time is now 7:37 Pt1 Eastarn Daylight Time, May 2, 1979.
Please continue.
g 19l l
YUHAS:
Don, you were still in the control room us talked about what
,9 was going on in terms of health physics control of in plant personnel?
We got the impression that the control was very poor the first day.
What about the licensee's equipment or instrumentation? What did he have available in the control room?
24 25 l
I 1760 056 l
24 1
NEELY:
The only equipment that I saw available in the control room 2,
was an air monitor which he was taking samples for the control room.
3 4
YUHAS:
What type of air monitor?
5 6
NEELY:
There was a low volume sampler pulling the particulate.
7 g
YUHAS:
So this was an air monitor that merely collected a sample.
It g
was not a cam, or continuous airborne monitor, that provided a readout 10 in terms of microcuries per cc.
11 NEELY:
That's correct.
y 13 14 What sort of dose rate instumentation was the licensee providing YUHAS:
j to these technicians who were going into the auxiliary building?
15 16' NEELY:
Since that they weren't bringing instrumentation into the y7 Control room I don't know What they were using.
19 YUHAS:
Were they frisking personnel in the controi room?
20, 21 NEELY:
No they were not.
The control room was, you might say, part of the controlled area at that time.
People were moving around in protective clothing in the same area that people did not have protective clothing.
4 25l i
(
1760 057
25 1;
YUHAS:
What effect did the people in the control room, being on 2
masks, have on the control of the plant?
3 NEELY:
It was very hard to communicate.
If you wanted to get into a 4
5 discussion you would have to, at tne time, pull your mask up and start talking.
We indicated to many people that they must wear respiratory 6
protection.
So most of the conversations were done in the HP, or the 7
shift supervisor's office.
8 9
YUHAS:
Were any of the masks or respiratory protective devices 10 equipped with speak easy or throat mikes or anything else like that?
12 NEELY:
No, they were not.
14 15l YUHAS:
The full face masks that the people were wearing, what type of I
cartridges did they have on?
16l 17 NEELY:
Particulate.
18 19 YUHAS:
Were Scott Air Packs or in-line respirators available?
20 21 NEELY:
I did not see any in the control rocm.
22 23 YUHAS:
As the day moved on and off-site releases began to get reported, 24 was that information widely available in the Unit 2 control room?
25 l
t l
1760 058
26 1
NEELY:
It was coming over the radio that was in the control room from 2
ttie off-site survey teams.
3 YUHAS:
Early in the afternoon of the 28th, you and I had a discussion 4
5 ver the telephone regarding a. bubble in the core.
Can you relate some information about that discussion.
Do you remember that discussion?
6 7
NEELY: What was the date?
8 9
YUHAS:
It was on the 28th.
It was shortly after you arrived, 1:30 or 10 2:00 in the afternoon.
I think we talked about it and then I handed the phone to George Smith or I think it was George Smith that I handed the phone to.
Then he talka to you about it.
14 NEELY:
I can't recall it at this time.
15 16l 17.
YUHAS: What was the motivation for you and Mr. Higgins and Mr. Gallina leaving the plant to see the Governor?
19!
NEELY:
My instructions there was that it was a political motivation.
20 21f YUHAS:
Do you consider that to be a prudent thing to do considering 22 the severity of the TMI condition?
23 24 25l 1760 059 l
27 1,
NEELY:
No, I did not.
2 YUHAS:
Did you voice your objections or your concerns about leaving 3
the plant?
4 5
N es.
6 7
YUHAS:
To whom did you voice such objections or concerns?
g 9
NEELY:
To George Smith.
11 YUHAS:
Then I assume that the decision above Mr. Smith's level was 12 made.
13 14 I
NEELY:
Mr. Allan said that we were to go to interview with the Governor.
16 YUHAS:
Did you ever go on that interview?
18 i
NEELY:
No, I did not.
19l l
20l YUHAS:
Can you explain why?
21 22 NEELY:
I went to the observation center and monitored myself for 23 contamination. I had 500 to 600 counts per minute of contamination on 24 my trousers and did not feel that that would be appropriate for an 25l l
interview in the Governor's office.
l 1760 060
i 28 1
YUHAS:
Did you return to the plant then?
2 3
NEELY:
Yes, I did.
4 YUHAS:
When you returned to the plant where did you go?
5 6
NEELY:
To the Unit 1 control room.
7 8
YUHAS:
Can you describe the conditions in the Unit 1 control room g
at dat time?
10 11 NEELY:
They were still in a state of confusion there.
The survey teams were reporting in their data.
At that point I myself made contact back with the regional office.
I 15j YUHAS:
What leads you to the conclusion that they were in the state of confusion? Could you be more specific? Give us some examples?
What gives you that impression?
i 19 NEELY:
The survey teams, the numbers that they were reporting, they 20 were starting to indicate higher levels of activity out there. I can't 21 recall it.
22 23 YUHAS:
You said that you re-established communications from Unit 1 24 Shift Supervisor's office to the NRC at that time?
25 f
1760 061
29 NEELY:
Yes.
1 2
YUHAS: Was the rest of your team there?
3 4'
NEELY:
I can't remember.
I will have to look at my notes.
5 6
YUHAS:
Once you re-established communications did this impact on your 7
ability to observe the licensee's actions either from the Unit 1 g
control room or from what was going on in Unit 2 or in the Auxiliary g
"9 10 11' NEELY:
Could you repeat that?
13 YUHAS:
By you taking the phone, and answering questions from Region I, did this hinder your ability to move about the plant and gather independent data or perform independent surveys?
17 NEELY:
Yes, it did.
18 19 YUHAS:
About how long were you tied up with Region I on the telephone 20j from the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor's office?
21 22 NEELY:
It was probably until at least 3 or 4 in the morning because 23 the two other people enroute to the site, Phil Stohr and Jim Kottan 24 had arrived with the mobile van.
At that point we were also requested 25 i
I l
1760 062 i
30 1
to go out and take vegetation samples at different locations outside 2
the plant.
I indicated to Mr. Crocker, who was on the phone at that 3
time in Region I, indicated to him that our people were tired and 4
could not the vegetation samples, wait till the following morning.
We 5
were instructed to go take the samples.
6 YUHAS:
7 So you sent your team members out to collect the vegetation samples and perform environmental surveys.
Did that leave you alone 8
in the plant glued to the phone?
g 10 NEELY:
No.
At that point, we also left the site and went to the g
motel.
13 YUHAS:
Did that leave any HP personnel on-site?
15 NEELY:
No.
16i 17 l
YUHAS:
Had you indicated the significant degree of concern to Region 18{
I?
19:j Or had you requested that additional HP personnel be sent out to l
provide relief for you fellows?
20 21, NEELY:
That's correct.
i 22 23 YUHAS:
About what time did you tell them?
24 25 l
1760 063 i
f B
31 NEELY:
That was when we came back onsite at about 6:30 or 8:00 in the 1;
2 morning.
3 YUHAS:
4 So you left at about 4 in the morning and you returned to the 5
site at about 6 in the morning?
6 NEELY:
Yes 7
8 YUHAS:
This is the same crew?
g 10 NEELY:
Yes 12 YUHAS:
Did any of you get any sleep in the interim of the two hour period between?
15 NEELY:
We went back to the motel and you might say we close our eyes.
17 YUHAS: uhas:
Can you describe your physical condition and mental awareness when you returned to the site on the morning of the 29th?
20 NEELY:
We had not eaten since 8:00 on the morning the day before.
We 21 were all tired and just mentally strung out. Tired.
22 23 YUHAS: What was going on at the plant that morning?
24 25 I
l 1760 064 I
l
32 NEELY:
As far as the plant I did not get over to the Unit 2 side.
We 1
were following the emergency control center as far as data coming in 2
from the survey teams.
3 4
YUHAS:
What was your primary objective on that second day that you 5
came in to work? What did you do the second day?
6 7
NEELY:
The second day I ended up as the communicator back to the 8
regional office waiting for backup personnel.
g 10 YUHAS:
Does that mean that you stayed on the phone most of the day?
12 NEELY:
That's correct. We, I met with the licensee rep Gary Miller, over a particular situation where they were wanting to release water frcm the IWT, the industrial waste treatment tank, to the Susquehanna.
15 l
There was a question on their tech spec limits.
That turned out to 16!
end into involving about 3 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, as far as questions and answers 17 from the regional office.
18l 191 l
YUHAS:
Since you were tied up in the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor's 20 office, who were your eyes and ears to gather independent perceptions 21.
as to what the licensee was doing?
22 23 NEELY:
I had r.o contact.
I was solely by myself.
24 i
25j l
t 1760 065
33 YUHAS:
So any information that you transmitted to Region I was from 1
the licensee.
Is that right?
2 3
NEEL7:
That's correct.
4 5
YUHAS:
So you had no way that you could independently verify what the 6
licensee was telling you, to be accurate.
7 8
NEELY:
That's correct. We had one or two of the inspectors had gone g
out in Unit 1 area and taken some radiation surveys and some off-site measurements and that was the extent of it.
12:
YUHAS:
Did you or any member of your team, were they able to get back over to Unit 2 to see how the auxiliary building entries were being controlled on the 29th?
15 I.
16 NEELY:
No they did not.
18l l
YUHAS:
Was Region I asking or causing you to make requests upon the 19l licensee for action? What I am thinking of is either taking samples 20 here or there or turning this pump off or turning this fan off.
21 Whereas, were there quasi-directives being issued which you conveyed 22 to the licensee representatives?
23 24 25 1
1760 006 I
l
34 1
NEELY:
Not from my contact, no.
2 3
YUHAS:
Where were the operations inspectors during this period of 4
time?
5 NEELY:
They were at Unit 2 control room with.a Ray Smith who was the 6
communicator.
7 8
YUHAS:
So this would be Higgins, Baunack and Raymond and Smith for g
vari us periods of time....
10 11 NEELY:
That's correct.
13 YUHAS:
What time did you get relieved on the 29th? Were there more health physicists who showed up to relieve you?
15!
16' NEELY:
It was late in the afternoon when other... Let's see I called, l
I was talking to the Region.
They said that about 11:00 on the 29th, 18{
l several replacements had left the office and some time in the afternoon 19l they still had not arrived on the island.
But I was infc med that 20 they were at the site but they were out taking environmental surveys.
21 22 YUHAS:
So the environmental surveys were taking precedent over the 23 l
in plant health physics throughout this entire evolution?
24 25h I
I i
e l
1760 067
35 NEELY:
That's correct.
1 2
YUHAS:
At what point were you finally relieved?
3 4
NEELY:
It was la'e in the afternoon when they finally came on the 5
island.
6 7
YUHAS:
Who relieved you?
8 9
NEELY:
One of the individuals was John Sereirn.
I would have to 0
- ook at my logbook again.
12t YUHAS:
So for the entire period of the 29th, which was Tuesday, excuse me, which was Thursday, you were not in a position, as the I
senior health physicist, to tour the facility to discuss with licensee's 151 management, and to independently verify the accuracy of reports that 161 you were conveying to Region I.
18 NEELY:
That's correct.
19l l
20 YUHAS:
Could you describe what happened when you left the plant on 21 Thursday afternoon? Could you describe the condition as far as 22 security and frisking and this kind of thing. What was going on then?
23 24 25 i
1760 068 i
l t
36 1.
NEELY:
The only frisking that was, or I should say monitoring of 2
contamination, was being performed in the Unit 1 control room and that 3
was more from insistance from us.
There were times, one specific time 4
when an individual with protective clothing come up to the control 5
r m and we measured as much as 10 millirem per hour on his protective 6
clothing before he pullod away from us.
We instructed the licensee 7
that the man should be removing his clothing down in the auxiliary building of Unit 1 instead of in the control room.
8 9
YUHAS:
On the afternoon of the 29th were you aware of an impending 10 recoolant sample?
g 12 NEELY:
No, I was not.
3 14 YUHAS:
Did you convey any message from the NRC to the licensee requesting 5
or demanding that a reactor coolant sample be taken?
17 NEELY:
No, I did not.
i 19 YUHAS:
After you left Unit 1 control room what was the condition of the process center on your way out?
22 NEELY:
The process center was unmanned.
24 25 1760 069 i
l i
37 1
YUHAS:
When you got to the north gate what was the conditions at the 2
north gate?
3 NEELY:
The north gate was quite busy.
There was a lot of people 4
5 milling around on the outsides of the gate.
~
6 YUHAS:
Were personnel leaving tre plant directed by the guards to go 7
to the 500 KV station to be refr.sked or remonitored for personnel 8
contamination?
g 10 NEELY:
Not to my knowledge.
12 YUHAS:
Was there a device there at the north gate for monitoring I
personnel for contamination?
14!
15 NEELY:
No, there was not.
17 YUHAS:
How were the persoriael laasing in Unit 2 being frisked? Would 18l l
they come to the Unit 1 control room to be frisked?
19l 20 NEELY:
No, they would not.
21 22 YUHAS:
Are you then inferring that the individuals could leave the 23 site on the 29th without being surveyed for personnel contamination?
24 25l i
i 1760 070
38 NEELY:
That's correct.
1 2
YUHAS:
On the 29th, you left.
You, I assume went and got some sleep 3
then right?
4 5
NEELY:
That is correct.
6 7
YUHAS:
On the'29th?
8 9
10 11 YUHAS:
When did you return to work?
13 NEELY:
On the afternoon of the 30th around 5:00 I started shift.
14 15 YUHAS:
Can you describe your actions on the 30th?
17 NEELY:
Car. I make one statement back to the question of the personnel 18l l
monitoring?
I sat down with Mr. Seelinger on the 29th and expressed 19l l
concern with the possibility of people leaving the site unmonitored 20f and advised them to get such equipment maybe as buses and remove the 21 unnecessary cars from the parking lots and bus the people to the gate 22 and set up portable monitoring stations and trailer houses outside the 23 gate.
24 25}
1760 071 i
i
{
39 YUHAS:
Was that done on the 29th?
1 2
NEELY:
No, it was not.
3 4
YUHAS:
Was that suggestion ever implemented?
5 6
NEELY:
The bussing wasn't, no.
7 8
YUHAS:
About when?
g 10 NEELY:
That was after the 30th.
11 12t YUHAS:
If I am not mistaken, on the night of the 29th you had some concerns about the health physics department that were significantly dire.
Apparently you called in the Manager, Mr. Limroth, was that the night of the 29th?
16l i
17 NEELY:
That was the 29th.
18 19 YUHAS:
Can you relate to us what those_ concerns are and why you felt 20 it necessary to call in the....?
21 22 NEELY:
We were talking to the Regional Office, discussing conditions 23 in the plant and the Shift Supervisor, Mr. Potts, was staying in the 24 same room listening to our conversation as he was working on some 25 1760 072 i
40 1
pape mark.
When we concluded our conversation with the Region, he 2
stated he couldn't overhear our conversation and wanted to know what 3
concerns se had so he could respond to them. We told him our concerns.
4 He got on the phone and called in Mr. Limroth from home who arrived somewhere between 45 minutes and an hour later.
5 6
YUHAS:
7 Can you relate to us what specifically those concerns were?
8 NEELY:
Concerns were the practices of people coming in to the Unit 1 g
Control room not monitoring for Contamination, radiation work permits l
were not being implemented, control of high radiation areas were not implemented, the surseys were not being documented, and personnel were allowed to eat in the control rooms where other people were dressed in protective clothing.
15 YUHAS: Was Mr. Limroth responsive to these concerns?
17 NEELY:
He listed the items and indicated to us that he would take 18l action.
19 20 YUHAS:
Did you see indications that the said action had been taken?
21 22 NEELY:
No, I did not.
23 24 1760 073 fi
41 YUHAS:
Did you see indications on the 30th that those kind of actions 1
had been taken?
2 3
NEELY:
No I didn't.
Only as far as the eating on the Unit 2 side 4
they did prevent people from eating on the Unit 2 side.
But Unit 1 5
control room continued.
6 7
YUHAS:
In your opinion, as a health physicist, did Mr. Limroth indicate 8
a keen awareness of health physics problems?
g 10 NEELY:
No he did not.
12 (UHAS:
Do you know Mr. Limroth's background?
Is he a health physicist by trade?
15j l
NEELY:
From later discussions with Mr. Limroth to my knowledge he is 16i not a health physics person by background.
17 18!
YUHAS:
Let's get to the 30th now.
You came back in about 1500 in the 19!
afternoon on the 30th, is that right?
20 21 NEELY:
I think it was closer to 1700.
22 23 YUHAS:
What conditions did you find at the plant that night?
24 25 1760 074 I'
42 NEELY:
1 The conditions were that there were still a lot of people in the control room, and I did not venture to the Unit 2 control room at 2
that time since we were going to a shift operation as far as NRC. We 3
were getting briefed on what has taken place since we had left the 4
s he.
5 6
YUHAS:
On the night of the 30th, I believe it is the afternoon that 7
Harold Denton showed up, ano a complete entourage of health physics 8
i and operations support personnel from throughout the country.
Is that g
true?
10 11 NEELY:
That is correct.
12 13 YUHAS: What size team were you assigned that night?
l 151 i
NEELY:
I was assigned as shift leader for the swing shift being 1600 16i to 2400.
I had five health physicists on my shift.
17 18 YUHAS:
Did this shift lead assignment provide you the additional I
control in terms of verifying what the licensee was doing?
20j 21l
}
NEELY:
Yes, it did.
22 23 YUHAS:
In your opinion, was there reason to implement a greater 24 response as was shown on the 30th prior to the 30th?
25, i
i l
1760 075
43 NEELY:
Yes.
1 2
YUHAS:
3 In retrospect, when would you have installed such a total NRC 4,
commitment?
5 NEELY:
Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after we had arrived there.
6 7
YUHAS:
Did you suggest to the Region that you had concerns about what g
was going on and that additional support was necessary?
g 10 NEELY:
Yes, I indicated that we needed more health physicists as far as determining what the licensee was doing, as far as implementing the program.
14 YUHAS:
Based on your limited observation of the licensee's action, did his actions inspire confidence in his ability?
17 NEELY:
No, it did not.
18 19l
~
l YUHAS:
Can you give us a couple of examples of why you didn't have 20 confidence in the licensee's ability to cope with the health physics 21 aspects of this incident?
22 23 NEELY:
The licensee, there, I did not see any organization being 24 implemented.
The Radiation Protection Manager seemed more interested 25 l
1760 076 I
i
44 1
in what was happening the control room than establishing a program to 2
handle the emergency situation.
3 YUHAS: Was there any indications that the licensee had planned for 4
in plant emergencies that involved v'ery high dose ratas?
5 6
NEELY:
From observations that the licensee was very much unprepared.
7 8
YUHAS:
Could you briefly describe the amount of time that you have g
been on-site at Three Mile Island since the 31st?
11 NEELY:
Since the 31st, I was on-site for approximately 9 to 10 days and have been back again for another 8 days since the incident.
14 I
YUHAS:
In that period, could you give us a brief synopsis of how the 15 licensee's health physics program has developed in the recovery phase 16 of this incident?
17 18 NEELY:
As part of our function as going on shift duty with the health 19l l
physics support from the different Regions, we were auditing the 20 licensee's program and taking independent measurements, advising the 21, licensee where there were inadequacies in the program at the time.
We 22 were constantly going to the licensee, we were indicating problem 23 areas where areas were not posted, barricaded, where people were not, 24 they had not implemented the radiation protection program.
Up into 25 l
l l
1760 077
45 1
the time I'd left on approximately the 9th of April, the licensee's 2
program was very disorganized. They brought in a lot of manpower from off-site utilities.
They were very strong technically, but they did 3
4 not have sufficient manpower inside the plant to actually control the 5
pr gram.
And for my second visit, the, my observations are, and findings are the plant is still in the same condition as'it was at the 6
accident.
The licensee's program is stil-1 disorganized, is lacking 7
communications, lack of equipment, lack of qualified personnel.
8 9
s e
censee c n ucd ng his radiation protection program in 10 such a fashion as to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20, 10 CFR 19 and their technical specifications?
13 NEELY:
No, he is not.
15l YUHAS:
Don, do you have any other comments you want to make at this time?
I don't want to drag this out too long.
18j NEELY:
Since have been in an accident mode, our mission was to assist 19l the licensee in getting his program together, identify problems, 20 trying to get his program back into a state prior to the accident.
At 21f I'
this point it still has not reached that goal.
22 23 YUHAS:
Don, I want to thank you for giving us the time after working 24 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> today.
We probably will talk to a few other NRC guys that 25 l
i 1760 078
46 1
came off with your crew, but probably not get into as much depth as we did with you.
Thank you.
2 3
SHACKLETE:
Thanks Don.
The only thing I can think of at this point 4
is, because you have some notes which might shed a little light on the 5
accuracy as to times, people, and incidents that took place and you 6
witnessed, probably sometime in the future Greg, myself, or other 7
members of the team would reContact you when you have your notes with you, so that we can maybe clarify some of these points.
We thank you g
very much.
We'll close this interview, and the time i; now 8:04 p.m.,
Eastern Daylight Time May 2, 1979.
12 13 14 i
15]
16l 17 18{
19 20; i
21, 22 23 24 25 1760 079