ML19207B408
| ML19207B408 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1979 |
| From: | Kalenevitch B, Shackleton O Metropolitan Edison Co, NRC Office of Inspection & Enforcement (IE Region V) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908280623 | |
| Download: ML19207B408 (28) | |
Text
- - - - =
l.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
}
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION 1
In the Matter of:
2I IE THI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 31 of 4:
Barry R. Kalenevitch Foreman in Maintenance Si Si i
7f 81 i
Trailer #203 91 NRC Investigation Site i
TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 10; Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
June 26, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 131 Julv 17, 1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 316 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
16l 171 l
18!
19j 20i 21; NRC PERSONNEL:
22l Owen C. Shackleton 23j Dale E. Donaldson 24
'l gogz%o6L3
\\'
^
\\
< 99
~
I
L -_
l I
j SHACKLETON:
This is an interview of Barry R. Kalenevitch. Mr. Kalenevitch 2'
i is a Foreman in Maintenance in the Nuclear Operations at the Metropolitan i
3!
Edison operation of the Three Mile Island Nuclear power generation plant.
This interview is taking place at the Three Mile island facility 5!
in trailer 203,' parked just on the outside of the south security gate.
Si The interview has begun at 1:15 p.m., EDT, June 25, 1979.
Present to 7
conduct this interview is from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 8!
is Mr. Dale E. Donaldson. Mr. Donaldson is a Radiation Specialist 9[
assigned to Region I.
My name is Owen C. Shackleton.
I am an Inves-10) tigator assigned to Region V, of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
lb Just prior to beginning thi's interview on tape recording, I presented 12!
to Mr. Kalenvitch a two page document from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 13l Commission, which explains the scope and the authority of the U. S.
14' Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct this investigation at Three 15' Mile Island. It also sets forth Mr. Kalenvitch's rights to refuse to 16:
be interviewed and have someone of his choice present for this interview.
17!
On the second page of this document there are three questions.
And Mr.
18l Kalenvitch answered all three questions to the affirmative.
And-now 19f for the purpose of this record, I'm going to repeat these questions, 20f and ask Mr. Kalenvitch to rescond orally.
Did you understand the 21!
documei t, Barry, that I'm referring to?
22l 23f KALENVITCH: Yes.
24!
25i
\\b o
,w.
s e
l i
I
(
2 SHACKLETON: And do we the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission have 2) your permission to tape this interview?
3!
i N
KALENEVITCH: Yes.
SI 6f SHACKLETON: And would you like a copy of the tape?
7 8
KALENVITCH:
Yes.
9i 10f SHACKLETON: All right, fine. At the close of the interview, we will lh make a reproduction of the tape and you can take it with you.
And now i
INl Barry, for the purpose of the record, and for those persons who will be i
13 interested in the testimony that you': e about to provide, would you 14]
please give us briefly your work experience in the nuclear field?
15!
l KALENVITCH:
I was hired by Metropolitan Edison February 22, 1977, 17l through a personal resume sent in to the company, in response to a 18l newspaper ad. My background qualifying me for my department and the 19j job specifications were electronics technician in both digital type 20l circuitry and pneumatics background, and some hydraulic type work.
All 21l these qualifications filled the specification that they were looking 22j for at the time.
I had no power plant experience up to that point, i
23l l
24l 25i Q
gq
l
(
3 11 i
other than the physics of generating electricity through nuclear power, 2I j
and that background came through some college courses I had. And it 3
was very... on a theoretical level at that time.
No applied experience.
4i E
SHACXLETON: All right, thank you very much, Barry.
And now I'll turn 6i the interview over to Mr. -Donaldson to begin the questioning.
7 8
DONALDSON:
Barry, I'd like to pick up on the morning of the 28th, at 9
the time you arrived on site, if we could.
I'll let you just take it 10l from there and I'll stop.
I 11!
l 12l KALENVITCH:
I arrived on site at approximately 6:25 in the morning.
13 We were held up at the Processing... there was no indication of anything 14; goirg on when I passed through the north gate.
However, I could see 15:
the cooling towe-en my way in from home.
I live approximately 18 16 minutes from the plant.
,$nd I knew that Unit 1 was supposec to up to lh 100% on my day of arrival.
However, I saw none of the condensate.
18t coming off the cooling towers, and I felt this was strange.
So, I just 191 kind of rolling over in my mind what was happening on the way in to the 20!
north gate.
Coming down, I saw that there was... that Unit 1 was 21!
completely shutdown, and that one of the athmospheric dump steam valves 22{
was leaking steam.
I noticed there were people standing out in front 23f of the Process Control Center, and I ran into Pete Snyder, who is the 24!
Instrument Supervisor for the island, and I said... asked Pete what 25j n
b qC I
--~
.. =.
4 I
l'j the situation was.
and he said they're having problems in Unit 2.
At 2
approximately... that would have been approximately 6:50, at that 3
time, because they were ccming through and taking our badge numbers and 4l logging them in.
However, they were not allowing us to pass through cH the Processing gates, and then we heard the word that they... a general 0
... I'm sorry, site emergency had been posted, at which time, they allowed us to pass through, the Health Physics personnel, and the the 8l Instrument personnel.
I immediately went back to Unit 1, Health Physics 9I Station, Unit 1 control point.
And now, part of the criteria for shift 10 maintenance is that anytime a lo:.a1 site or general emergency is set 1
forth, the shift maintenance foreman, that happens to be on daylight 12l that day, is in charge of the emergency repair party.
So, this was my 13 motivation for responding immediately back there.
Upon my arrival at 14)
Unit 1 Emergency Control Station, Gordon Lawrence, the d:3 'ight foreman 15i from the Instrument Department, who arrived there a few moments before 16, I did, was mustering the off-coing shift, which would have been the 11 11:
to 7 shift, and also those personnel who arrived for the relief daylight 18t shift, was mustering them in, in their response to the emergency repair 19!
party, which is also made up of shift personnel.
Once I arrived and I 201 said to Gordy, "I relieve Gordon at that point," and took over.
The 21!
responses as far as you know, what levels er anything was going on, or 22!
Just what actually was happening at that point, was delayed in my mind, 23l because I wanted to get a muster of the people who were there.
And 2 41 also, who was actually needed, and who was not, 0.K.
So, once I saw 25j n '3
\\L 0
\\o,
s
I i
5 l!
that all of my shift had arrived, I sent the 11 to 7 shift outside the 2
emergency control point, with their forman, who was Bud Leakway. And the people that I put officially on the Emergency Repair Party that day, was John Watters, an electrician; Dave Webster, an electrician; my 5
two mechanical maintenance people was John Rollin al.o ?on Nebinger; and 6!
the two people from the Instrument Department was Bill Yeager, and i
7!
Marshall Pratt.
These were the people directly under my supervision at 8
the Unit 1 Emergency Control Station.
Upon doing this, operations 9f persont.el began to arrive on the scene.
All this is taking place i
10!
within a 10 minute period.
Like from about 6:50 to 7 o' clock.
The lh personnel from operation... I had them establish phone communications i
12{
in accordance to the Emergency Repair Procedure with Unit 1 Control 13l Room and Unit 2 Control Room, plus all the party lines within the 14!
plant. We also established radio communications, as far as off site 15'
... contacting off site agencies, that was up to the shift supervisor 16; in the Control Room, the Unit 2 Control Room.
At that point, I then 17, turned to monitoring the severity of the situation, and what was happening 18f around me, as far as the releases, the level of the releases and that 19l type of thing.
It was a little difficult to achieve at that time, 20 because the Health Physics technicians were going in an out of the Aux 21!
Building of Unit 2, and trying to pinpoint the exact point of release 2h at that time, I was not aware at that situation that the comments on 1
23l the drain tank had overflowed.
And this is the origin of the release.
In my mind, I was going over worst case, that for some reason, we had'y 24 25j
(
4 a
{
6 l
l l'i broken containment in the Reactor Building, and... or a pipe or pene-2j tration had ruptured.
Because I was beginning to receive input from 31 the operators as they came down from the Unit 2 Control Room to monitor the Emergency Control Station, as to what had occurred in Unit 2 that y
d morning.
So, at that point, I contacted Mike Janouski, who had just 6
come out of the Aux Building.
And I said to Mike, "What are the airborne I
levels," in this type of thing, and he commented something to the.the 8
fact that they're God damn high, we don't have time for that right now.
9f And I said, "What about here?" And he said this is what I meant, Kav 10f you're safe here.
I said, "0.K."
So we maintained the Emergency 11l Repair Party right there, within Unit 1.
However, once they downed...
i 12!
he was preoccupied with what was going on there, obviously, and the
(
13!
people in my party, I just had to standby... I had to go out and get 14!
on what respirators they could.
There was an emergency repair...
15f clothing and repair box right outside the door.
So I had them go out 16i and net, you know, the respirators that were available.
The security 17!
was holding up the relief personnel for Health Physics.
Also, when I 181 went out and straightened that out with them who was allowed to come in 19f at that point.
And we brought additional Health Physics personnel in, 20' at which time, we had more personnel there to back us up what was 21 happening in the immediate area, as far as monitoring.
The onset, 22l between the buidings, as far as activities... levels that I could l
23l remember... it was 400 mR.
It was beginning to build up between Unit 251 1 and Unit 2.
They said that we could decrease this cross over leakage t
o' 25!
\\ LJ e,
{
7 I
il!
between Unit 1 and Unit 2, if we closed... there's a door... a metal 2
hinged door on rails between Unit 1 and Unit 2 Fuel Handling Buildings.
31 They said that we get that closed and we could decrease the levels.
I 4j talked the job over to... with Don Nebinger and John Rollins. And I 5
said to them that we got to go in and get the door clos M, on a voluntary 6f basis.
And I remember somebody yelling to us, "When the hell are you i
7f guys going to get back there and do that." And I said, "Well, I'm h
going back right now."
And I didn't even remember John or Sid's response 9
after I completed talking to them, because I turned around and started 10!
walking down the hallway.
I grabbed a RM 14 is what I grabbed at that i
11!
time. And I felt at that point, as I walked down to from that corner 1N' that... the full impact of what was happening.
And I turned around 13{
and Sid and John were right behind me.
So, I said well, if you guys 14' don't want to go in, because the levels are quite high, 400 mR that 15i was just a questionation at that point. Because as soon as I opened 16j the door, the RM 14 had gone off scale.
However, 1 did not realize, 17!
nor did any of us realize that the sample lines from between Unit 1 and i
18{
Unit 2, was running right above our heads.
And this might have given 19!
us erroneous readings as to what was actually airborne and what was in 20l the lines.
I later learned that it was as high as 25 mR in the letdown 21l sample lines between the two units.
And I stopped at that point, and 22 closed the door from Unit 1, which we were standing by from between the 23!
Health Physics door, that would lead into the area between the two Fuel i
24!
Handling Buildings.
And Don Nebinger said, "I'm familiar with that l
25i
\\l
~
=
l
{
8 i
l 1
door, I think it would... to reduce exposure time in that, I can get 2
i over there and close it faster, and if I need backup then, you guys
'9 j
will be here."
I gave him the RM 14.
Joe Cemann walked back at that I
point, a Health Physics Foreman, and said, you'd better make it quick, "f
the readings are going as high as 900 mR.
And I said to Don, I said, C
"Did you hear that?" And he said, "Well, yeah, but we don't have time.
7 It won't take long for me to get over there and close it, and get 8
back." So, he put on his respirator, and went across to close the 9
door. However, the chain was missing from the manual foley wheel on 10l it. And I saw him searching around and I didn't realize at that point 11{
what had occurred.
So, Sid Rollin said, "Well I'll go in, you know 12!
he's having problems." So, about time, just as Sid was starting to go 13{
through the door, Don motioned him back, and found a ladder and he 14!
closed the door by hand... the pulley wheel and got the door closed.
15 Total time for all that was probably 5 minutes, maximum.
And he was 16 coming back across, and we were outside.
All three of us were contam-17 inated, at that point.
And we... Joe DeMann... I'm sorry, it was not 18f Joe DeMann at that point.
Peg Pelen, one of the Health Physics, came 191 down and scanned us, before we came back up in the Emergincy Control 20' Center area. And she said, we take showers.
And we took showers.
21(
They washed our clothes.
And we were deconned at that point, then.
22i That was about 45 minutes later, then.
We dressed back up.
However, I 23 was in paper coveralls, and I went up forward, and I was monitoring the 1
2 41 situation there.
By then, Dick Dubiel, and Tom Mulleavy, the Health 25 n'
,,Q
4 I
9
]'
Physics foremen, had arrived on the scene, and were... they may have l
2' l
arrived, you know, earlier, while we were back closing the door.
I 31 j
couldn't give you an exact time when they arrived.
But they arrived on 4!
the scene, and some of the numbers were beginning to get firmed up n
]
then.
And also, the origin of the releases and that type of thing.
Si Remembering back, also, at the time that we were setting up phone communication, in between that period of time, between 6:50 and 7 t
8!
o' clock, some of the operators tht.t came down, were for the off site 9!
monitoring team.
I remember telling the operator that was on the 10; gatronics phone, to call, or to check with the shift supervisor as to whether they had contacted the State Police for helicooters.
And they 12 said that they had.
Our fellows... or our operators said that, you 13 know, we gat trucks.
So, I said, "Go."
The reason for that was, yeah, 14!
0.K., there was a delay, I believe, from the State Police.
To the best 1$!
of my recollection, that they said there would be 45 minutes, or so.
16i And one of the guys, said, "Well, we could 'e over in Goldsboro, in b
11!
half an hour."
Because the wind was blowing dead west, at that point, 1St right into Goldsboro.
And they over there and monitoring, and we were 191 receiving communications from them within a half hour - forty five 20!
minutes, of that point.
That would have been the bulk of what was 21!
going on in the first moments.
22f I
23l 24, 25i o
i g
f i
10 l
l l;i SHACKLETON:
At this time, Barry, we'll have to stop and turn the tape.
2I i
I'd 11Ke to make, it a matter of record that Mr. William H. Beherle, 3
l Project Engineer for Metropolitan Edison Company, entered the interview 4
room, at 1:28 p.m.
Tnd is sitting in on the interview at the request i
of Mr. Kalenevitch.
At this time, which is 1: 40 p.m., we'll stop this 6!
interview while we change -the tape.
7 8;
SHACKLETON:
This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. Barry R.
9l Kalenevitch.
The time is now 1:41 p.m., EDT, June 26, 1979.
This is 10l Shackleton speaking.
Barry, do you want to continue, where you last lli left off?
12!
13 KALENEVITCH:
As I stated, the off site monitoring teams were dispatched, 14 and the personnel had all been organized at the Emergency Control 15; Center, and all forms of communications, to the best of my knowledge, 16i as stated in the Emergency... or Emergency Control Station criteria 17 had been fulfilled. That, as I say to the best of my knowledge, I could Ibi only speak for what was happening directly right at the... in the U11t 191 1 Auxiliary Building.
We had all donned respirators, by approximately 20j
... they were taking air samples, of course, the Health Physics people 21:;
were... we had all donned respirators... their particular mask, by 22l approximately 8 o' clock that morning.
The levels were beginning to 23 rise right there in the Health Physics area.
I moved my people out, as 2 41 strictly a precaution at that time, since there was nothing more we 25\\
i I
- )
\\[-
tM' f
i j
u ll' j
could do, in our maintenance capacity, as such.
The personnel that 2
were monitoring the phone communications and monitoring radio communi-3 cations with the off site monitoring teams, remained on stations, in 4
addition to the Health Physics personnel, in addition to my self. We c;
had, parallel to what was going on down there, there were the Unit 2 t
6i Instrument Foreman, Doug Weaver, came down on station, and asked if...
I!
or thought it would be best if we could split the repair party team up, 8!
and move some of the personnel over to Unit 2, and I felt at that time, 91 there's no conflict with doing that, since there was little we could do 10!
anyway, at that point.
So, we did move personnel around.
They went 11:
over to the Unit 2 Control Room, and waited over there.
The levels II reached a point around... I would just guess about 9 o' clock inside 13!
the Auxiliary Building, so for all personnel were removed from there, 14' and we all went to Unit 2 Control Room, at that point, and remained up
~15; at the Unit 2 Control Room.
There was not too much that I was involved 16i in at that point, because the Supervisor of Maintenance was up there 17 and several other personnel.
So, I more or less stood by.
If 18r you don't have any questions now... particulars.
19!
201 DONALDSON:
Let's go back to your entry on site.
You mentioned that 21!
you had heard an announcement that the site emergency had been declared.
22f Was that over the public address system?
23l 24l 25i t
^
\\$J c VN_
,~
(
12 l
l' KALENEVITCH: Yes, it was.
i 2l l
3 DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
Do you recall tne text of that announcement?
4!
I c-
"j KALENEVITCH: Only... no, it would have been in generalities.
It was 6
very short, because once the word " site emergency" sank home ["ha ha"],
7 everything else that was said was very insignificant.
81 9
DONALDSON: Was there anything else said?
10; i
11 KALENEVITCH:
No.
I believe it was just in the fact that a site em-12!
ergency had been announced.
I'm trying to recollect if the word " evac-l$
uation" or anything else was used in the context, but I can't recollect 14' that.
l 15!
16 DONALDSON: What is the text of that announcement, as you're normally 17!
used to it?
l 18!
191 KALENEVITCH:
That was the first I ever heard it.
Unfortunately...
20i no, very fortunately, I should say.
21!
22 DONALDSON:
You've never participated in a drill?
I 23!
i 24; 25i I
]) -
. \\
. p cu
l i
l 13 1)
KALENEVITCH: Yes. We had, as part of the shift maintenance program, 2
l' and the fact that we were responsible for manning the emergency repair 31 parties, we had gone through emergency repair party training. We do 4i have drills, that are monitored by outside people' that come in and set
- {
c up scenarios, and this type of thing, that we do participate in, yes.
6i DONALDSON:
Do you recall how the announcement of the emergency is, O!
during one of these drills? Was it the same as what you heard that 9!
morning, or was it different?
101 11!
KALENEVITCH:
I would have to say, yes, it would have been according to 12 a set announcement.
131 14I DONALDSON: When?
15' 16 KALENEVITCH: The morning of the incident, the 28th.
171 ISI DONALDSON:
So, it was longer than, just saying emergency, or...
191 20i KALENEVITCH: Yes, oh yes.
There was cther context in there.
- However, 21!
the fact that we were being held up a*, the gate, and I was conversing 22l with Pete Snyder at the time, and trying to gather some input, I
23l wasn't really aware of what was being said until the word, " site em-24'i ergency" was passed.
25i I
<g
\\ '.) '
n c u. ' ?
i' t
14 l
1:
DONALDSON: Normally, in response to an emergency of this type, where 2
is your normal station? Where would you report?
2!
4!
KALENEVITCH:
- 0. K.
Normally, if I am on say a 3 to 11 shift, or 11 to
]4 7 shi?t, I am normally in charge of all shift maintenance problems, 6
directly under the shift supervisor in Unit 1 and Unit 2, whereby, I 7!
will designate people in the mechanical maintenance department, electrical I
8!
department or the I&C department, to respond to the various problems.
91 And then, I will directly supervise them.
If an emergency... a radi-10f ation emergency is declared, if it's in Unit 1, we report directly to Unit 1 Control... Health Physics control point in the passage of the 12{
Auxiliary Building.
If it's in Unit 2, before the Unit 2 Health Physics 13I control point was established, we reported directly to the Unit 2 141 Control Rocm. With the establishment of the Health Physics control 15' point in Unit 2, we now report to the Unit 2 control point in Unit 2.
16i 17l 00NALDSON:
Let me just digress a minute.
So, your understanding is ISj that if there is an emergency in Unit 1, then you will report to the 191 Unit 1...
20t 21{
KALENEVITCH:
- 0. K.
Now, let me qualify that new.
The qualifications 22!
on these... on the points where the emergency repair party will report 23 ff it's a local emergency.
However, if it's a site emergency in Unit 24 let's say a site emergency in Unit 1.
Now the qualifications of a 25; l
g s
l
j 15 I
l' j
site emergency are if we reach 125~mR or greater at the fence.
The 2'j fact that we were... that they declared it in Unit 2, meant to me, and 31 common sense thinking that the whole of Unit 2 was involved... all 4!
buildings were receiving radiation of greater than 125 mR, but then all "N
buildings are Unit 2.
This is why I went to Unit 1 Health Physics.
g 5
Since I was there, I felt, be' fore any of my relief crew would arrive, I 7
could organize them and designate them where to report.
However, when 8
I first went back to Unit 1 Health Physics,. as I stated, Gordon Lawrence 9I was already mustering the off-coming 11-7 shift down at that point, at 1
10) which time he was correct in doing to establish the communications.
l 11!
l 12l DONALDSON:
Under what conditions would you automatically report to the i
1 31 Unit 2?
14!
15i KALENEVITCH:
To the Unit 2?
16!
17 DONALDSON:
Chem, HP point?
i 18i 19!
KALENEVITCH:
Under the circumstances, well, which do you mean now?
20!
21 DONALDSON:
You mentioned that you go to either one of two places.
22l 23 KALENEVITCH:
In a local emergency was... is when we are designated to 24; go there.
25i cyM i
a D
i
. l 16 l
l l
]
DONALDSON:
But where would you go...
2 l
3 KALENEVITCH:
0.K.
Let me qualify also, when the emergency... when 4
the site emergency goes down, we were also supposed to have direction 5
from the shift supervisor. We're supposed to have direction from him.
Si And, of course he was fully involved in the problems of Unit 2 at that 7
point.. And in going back to Unit 1 Health Physics..
0.K., I remember 8!
talking with Pete.
He said also that... go back to Unit 1... more 9f or less under his direction.
It'wasn't his direct... I was just 10) talking to him, though, in that form that... well, if it's a site 1
emergency, you know.
He said, " Yeah, it's in Unit 2."
And I said well 12!
that means, as I stated that Unit 2 was probably fully involved at that ld time. And that if any entrance could have theoretically been made, it 14]
would more common sense if it could be made through Unit 1 into Unit 2, 15; that way.
Rather than having delays of dispatch from Unit 1... or 16; Unit 2 back down and around.
l 17!
18(
DONALDSON:
The notion that you have about where you report in response 1S to an emergency, now do you have that as a result of some training 20t you've received?
e 2 11
+
22; KALENEVITCH:
That is written down, yes.
23t i
24!
25i
\\.;1 1
l goc
I i
{
17 1!
DONALDSON:
It's wri~tten down that you would go to...
2l 3'
l KALENEVITCH: Yes, that is in the repair party.
4j a
DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
So if I understand what you're saying is that if it's 6
a site or general emergency, you have any number of places can go?
7l 8!
KALENEVITCH:
Obviously at that point, because we... a site emergency 9f, would be the fact that, you know, it is contained within buildings with 10{
obvious leakage to the atmosphere. However, it's still contained on i
11!
site, but, you know,125 mR or greater.
In other words, it has not i
12!
left the site, but it is within buildings that are not designed for 131 containment.
I 14i 15; DONALDSON:
So, you got to the situation. You arrived at the Unit 1 16; Chem and HP point because you had talked to Pete.
I assume that's Pete 17l Velez?
18I 191 KALENEVITCH:
20!
21l DONALDSON:
Pete Snyder had said that that's probably where you were 22l supposed to go.
23 24l 25i J
a C, f, i
I f>
18 lt j
KALENEVITCH: Well, it was not more or less as a probability of where
... I felt at that point, it was the best place to go... the fastest 31 j
place to go to expedite setting up communications.
Because I could not 41 see setting up communications in the middle of whatever caused the site e
]
emergency in Unit 2.
Si 7
OONALDSON:
If the emergency had been in Unit 1, where would you have 8!
gone?
9!
10l KALENEVITCH:
If the emergency had been in Unit 1, I would have gone ll!
over to Unit 2.
12!
13 00NALDSON: Where in Unit 2?
14!
15 KALENEVITCH:
Up to the Health Physics control point.
16l l
17l DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
You mentioned shift workers.
What job title... you 18{
know off the pay roll would be classified as maintenance shift workers?
19f 20f KALENEVITCH:
Maintenance shift workers would be personnel who do not 21l work regular, established daylight hours.
That would be from 7 to 3 22{
o' clock.
These are personnel who are on a rotating shift bais, where 23l t
24l 25l i
l
/
\\
c
<o
i i
19 i
~
li i
we rotate work 7 days in daylight, 7 days on 3 to 11, and 7 days on 11 2i j
to 7 at night, and then rotate back on daylight.
There are personnel 3
that are manned in all diciplines, the mechanical maintenance department, 4!
l the electrical department and the instrument and control department.
Si
?
DONALDSON:
Are the titles of these people like repairmen...
7l l
0l KALENEVITCH: Yeah, it would be like repairman, first class, machinist, 9!
first class...
10i 11 DONALDSON:
So there are some repairmen that work the standard 7 to 4, 12!
or whatever daylight hours...
i 131 r
14!
XALENEVITCH:
Daylight, yes, daylight...
15; 16; DONALDSON:
Those are the lucky ones.
And then you have some other r
17!
ones who are always on shift work.
Is that right?
6 ISt 191 XALENEVITCH: Yes, that's right.
That's what we were hired on as.
20!
21!
DONALDSON:
- 0. 4.
About how many of the total classification of people 22l as repairmen, how many... or what percent would you say are on this t
23!
shift?
24l 25j f
I
\\)
cp
J
~
~
R 20 il l
KALENEVITCH:
On shift.
- 0. K.
Let's take a running average of possibly '
2' j
30 people per department. That would include Unit I and Unit 2, you 3
know as a conglomerate per department... let's say the Instrument 4! '
Department, as an example, where we have at one time a full complement 5
of 42 people.
That would give us, per shift, maintenance people...
Si probably a third of that... would be on shift.
7 s;
8!
DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
So, a third of the total. And those would be the 9I people that you would expect to see on repair team?
10f 11' KALENEVITCH:
No, no.
Let me qualify that statement.
Those would be 12 the people out of the total that would be on rotating shifts.
The l
13j people... only the people that you would see on the repair party wenld 141 be those people that happened to be working that period of time.
16j DONALDSON:
Yeah, I understand that, but since this occurred.between 17!
normal daylight, then I would assume that...
18i 191 KALENEVITCH:
That we saw the oncoming daylight personnel...
20!
l 21l DONALDSON: Who are not shift workers... you would not expect to see 22l them...
~
23l 24l
~
25'
\\ ;, i
~
1 w-c i
el p
8,
- f. ~ ""7. / 72.1
- 'a
(
KALENh!TCH:
- 0. K.
We>also got i time variance here; in the fact tnat 2{'
' shift. pirsonnel report at 7 o' clock and daylight, personnel starting
~~
3l time wr.s at 7:30.
1 4t
(
i s(
lp0NAtoSON:
- 0. K.
Let's try this.
Is watters a shift wncker, or not?
~
6l r
4 x 7l
~~
~
XALENEVITCH:
Yes, he is. ' John is. All of...
EI
/
~
9I 00NALDSON: Webster?
101 l
.c
\\ 11!
KALENEVITCH:
Shift worker.
12!
(
~' ~
131 DONALDSON: And Rollin?
14!
15i KALENEVITCH:
Shift worker.
1Si s
17I
', DONALDSON: Nebinger?
13; 19t KALENEVITCH:, Shift worker.
201 251 DONALDSON: Yeager?
22!
23l KALENEVIICH:
Shift worker.
24!
25i 6
O
.o r
\\
i i
i s
l l
22 DONALDSON: And Pratt?
2l l
3 KALENEVITCH:
Shift.
4l 5
DONALDSON: And you're a shift worker?
6i i
If KALENEVITCH:
Right.
So I assume your question was are all the personne.1 8
that were there were, yes, were shift maintenance people.
Yes.
9:
I 10l 00NALDSON:
- 0. K.
At the time you arrived at tae Unit 1 HP control 11!
point, had you established contact, or did anyone frcm the Control Rocm 12 call to determine whether or not a repair party team had formed?
13l 14!
KALENEVITCH: Yes. They did.
And I called them back and affirmed that 15' a repair party had formed... and was mustered in.
I don't remember 16' who I talked to up there.
17!
18f DONALDSON: Was Dan Shovlin on site?
19i 201 KALENEVITCH:
I do not know that.
I assumed he was.
21l I
22 00NALDSON:
But he did not establish contact with you?
23f 1
24i 25j g [g i u,
c
{
23 l
O
~ j KALENEVITCH: At that point, no.
2l DONALDSON:
- 0. K.
4!
5 KALENEVITCH:
He may have been standing in the be,ckground and asked...
Of you know, this is conjectory at that point.
71 1
8!
DONALDSON: Now, if both yourself and Mr. Shovlin are on site, which 9f individual is to be in charge of the repair party?
10l l
11!
KALENVITCH:
He would be.
12l l
13!
DONALDSON:
So you would expect that if he were on site, he would be 14i 154 KALENEVITCH:
Yes.
16r 17!
00NALDSON: Where you were?
18!
191 KALENEVITCH:
Yes.
20!
21, DONALDSON:
Because he should be in charge of the repair party?
22!
23 24!
25I
~
I a
e i
24 1:
KALENEVITCH: That is correct. However, I am his alternate... auto-f matically, designate the daylight shift maintenance person who is on site.
And I was the daylight shift maintenance.
4l 5
CONALDSON:
Now, if Mr. Shovlin had reported scmewhere else, and decided Gi that he was running the repair team, and you had reported to where you I
I were, and he, had notestablished contact with you, or visa versa, who 8!
would be in charge?
91 10l KALENEVITCH:
I would not expect that to happen.
- 0. K.
He would be in N
j charge of wherever he was, at which I can't make any conjectory statements.
12!
However, I did not see Mr. Shovlin, and I felt that time was of the 13{
utmost... to get the repair party established.
14i 15!
DONALDSON: You mentioned that people acted as communicators. Were 16]
they-some of your shif t maintenance people-functioning... as communi-li!
cators?
18f 191 KALENEVITCH:
No.
Shift maintenance personnel are only to report to 20l the Emergency Control Station, in a function of repair... emergency 21l repair. Operations personnel, who are also designated for emergency 22 control stations, respond en their own, and these are the personnel 23 that had responded.
2 41 4$
25j c 0 '_i
25 i
i l
j DONALDSON:
So, these are some operations people?
2l 1
3!
XALENEVITCH: Yes, which at this point, I cannot recollect who it was.
41 However, they did come down with the sound powered phones in hand, and c
I were familiar where to jack in to interconnect the proper phone com-6l munications.
7 8!
DONALDSON:
Now, with you set up in the emergency coordination center 9l
... station, Emergency Control Station, and you have your repair party 10 team formed, who do you normally coordinate with at the ECS?
11!
i 12!
KALENEVI_TCH: The normal coordination from where I stood... as a shift 13l maintenance personnel, I'm only there... supposed to be there, in a 141 support type mode, in addition to Health Physics supervisor, and the
'l$
... again the shift supervisor or his designee.
16i 17 DONALDSON:
So what would be the normal communication chain.
L2t's say ldt the shift supervisor, or scmebody in the Control Room has determined 191 that some function needs to be performed by the repair party? Frem 2d whom would you expect to receive that?
21l 1
22l KALENEVITCH:
That would be from the shift supervisor.
23 24!
25l o.
<u s
5 a
l i
i
{
26 DONALDSON: Direct?
2!
KALENEVITCH:
Direct.
At which point we would talk with the Health 4
Physics supervisor as to what we would run into.
Si b
DONALDSON:
If the Health Physics supervisor were not there, who would 7
you talk to?
8!
9I KALENEVITCH:
It would obviously be the person designated by him.
101 i
11 DONALDSON: Well, if he isn't there...
12; i
13l KALENEVITCH: Well, obviously then you've got to have faith in the 141 people that are there and know what's going on.
15l 161 DONALDSON: On the morning of the 28th, who was in charge of the ECS?
17!
t 18f KALENEVITCH: Who would have been in charge of it?
19i 20j DONAL0 SON:
The Health Physics supervisor... you talk about is normally 21l who?
t 22f 23 KALENEVITCH:
- 0. K.
It would have been Tom Hulleavy.
24l 25!
{ (j I
l 27 I
i l'
i DONALDSON:
Tom wasn't there cbviously, so... who was in his stead?
i 2!
i 31 KALENEVITCH: Not at that point...
4l t
cl
~
DONALDSON: So who was in his stead?
Gi 7I KALENEVITCH:
- 0. K.
I remember Mike...
8!
i 10l e
i 12!
13 14!
15i 16l 17,!
18r 191 20!
21!
22l 23l 24!
2 25i k\\
c, r-I