05000338/LER-1979-093-03, /03L-0 on 790726:during Mode 1 Operations,Fire Door S54-11 Between Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear Room & Turbine Bldg Found Nonfunctional.Caused by Temporary Cooling Water Hoses Preventing Closure.Hoses Removed

/03L-0 on 790726:during Mode 1 Operations,Fire Door S54-11 Between Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear Room & Turbine Bldg Found Nonfunctional.Caused by Temporary Cooling Water Hoses Preventing Closure.Hoses Removed

ML19207B359
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	08/17/1979
From:	Cartwright W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19207B353	List: 05000338/LER-1979-093-03, /03L-0 on 790726:during Mode 1 Operations,Fire Door S54-11 Between Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear Room & Turbine Bldg Found Nonfunctional.Caused by Temporary Cooling Water Hoses Preventing Closure.Hoses Removed 05000338/LER-1979-095-03, /03L-0 on 790727:during Rapid Power Reduction & Subsequent Increase in Power,Oxide Flux Difference Deviated More than 5% from Target for 104 Minutes.Caused by Power Reduction.Power & Control Rods Manipulated by Operator ML19207B352
References
LER-79-093-03L, LER-79-93-3L, NUDOCS 7908240493
Download: ML19207B359 (2)

LER-1979-093, /03L-0 on 790726:during Mode 1 Operations,Fire Door S54-11 Between Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear Room & Turbine Bldg Found Nonfunctional.Caused by Temporary Cooling Water Hoses Preventing Closure.Hoses Removed

Event date:
Report date:
3381979093R03 - NRC Website

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l and the turbine building, was found to be non-functional. This resultad in dogradat.1 ion of the control room fire boundary.

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Virginia Electric and Power Company Attachment page 1 of 1 tiorth Anna Power Station, Unit ill Docket flo. 50-338 Report flo. LER 79-093/03L-0

Description of Event

On July 26, 1979, during mode 1 operations, fire door 554-11 was discovered not functional in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.15.

This door is in the Unit 2 Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room.

It shares, however, a common habitability with the Unit 1 Switchgear and Relay Room.

Probable Consequences of Occurrer ce The penetration fire barriers required by T.S. 3.7.15 are provided to assure continuous occupancy of the area during and after normal phenom-ena, fire and nissiles as well as for all postulated accidents which may or may not release radioactivity to the environs.

In this case, door S54-11 is used both as a pressure envelope boundary and a penetration fire barrier. The health and safety of operating personnel and the general public were not affected by this event.

C_ause Temporary hoses supplying cooling water to a battery load tester were running through the fire door preventing the door from fully closing.

Irrmediate Corrective Action A fire watch was stationed to insure complete closure in order to maintain administrative control of the pressure boundaries and the hoses were disconnected and removed from between the door.

Scheduled Corrective Actions Applicable area logs will be revised to check fire doors closed every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Also signs will be placed on all fire doors instructing personnel to keep doors closed at all times to maintain the required control room fire boundary.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence The scheduled corrective actions will prevent recurrence of the pro-blem.

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