ML19206B373

Forwards 790402 Memo from C Stoiber Re Issues Which NRC Should Consider in Approaching Demands for Investigation Into TMI Incident

ML19206B373
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/02/1979
From:	Bickwit L NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:	Ahearne J, Bradford P NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 7905090256
Download: ML19206B373 (1)

Text

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WASHINGTON, D. C 20555

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April 2, 1979 IEMORANDUM FOR:

Commissioner Bradford Commissioner Ahearne bOLeonardBickwit, Jr., General Counsel FROM:

SUBJECT:

REVIEW MECHANISM FOR MATTERS RELATED TO THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT Attached is a very useful memorandum from Carl Stoiber which might serve as a basis for your discussions en possible review mechanisms.

Attachment:

Stoiber memo Bickwit, 4/2/79 cc:

Chairman Hendrie Commissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Kennedy OPE SECY 2u } ()b r

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UNITED STATES 3 *'g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 April 2, 1979

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Memorandum for:

Leonard Bickwit, Jr.

General Counsel From:

Carlton Stoiber Assistant General Counsel

Subject:

An Inquiry into Matters Related to the Three-Mile Island Incident This paper contains some extremely preliminary thoughts about what issues the Commission should consider in approaching the demands for an investigation into the recent incident at the Three-Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant which will inevitably follow the immediate crisis.

The analysis falls into two parts: first, what are the desiderata of such an inquiry; and second, what options are available for deciding what persons, agencies or other groups might appropriately be tasked with conducting such an inquiry?

A.

Desirable Attributes of the Review Mechanism (1)

Independence It i.s important that the persons or groups conducting the inquiry not be linked (or appear to be linked) with the nuclear industry, avowed nuclear opponents, the NRC or the White House.

These bodies have already staked out certain positions in this area; and the credibility of any review could only be damaged if those performing it are subject to justified criticism about their motives or ability to examine the evidence with an open nind.

(2)

Competence Of course, whatever body conducts the inquiry must have (or be able to obtain) s ubstantial scientific and engineering expertise to make the type of judgments it is called upon to make,

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Page 2 tj Insofar as the group's charter extends to s

matters of law or administration, it must have j

the resources to conduct those kinds of reviews i

as well.

(3)

Perspective 5

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i Although the review will have a substantial i

technical aspect, the real matters at issue go far beyond mere scientific and engineering j

judgments Therefore, the group must have a i

broader perspective on national policy in the i

energy and governmental field, as well as the j

technica'

(' apetence mentioned in (2) above.

I (4)

Reasonable Time-Table There will be in understandable urgency about

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obtaining the results of any inquiry which is 5

set in m'; ion.

However, the chronology of the i

review should provide sufficient time for a detailed investigation.

Otherwise a hur.4+d and i

incomplete product will be more harmful than helpful.

H o w e vr:. r, a fixed deadline for the group's report is needed, to insure timeliness.

(5)

Soecific Chartec The scope of the r eview effort must be spelled out in come detei4.

If only a narrow technical review is wanted, that should be clear from the outset, to enable selection of the proper body to conduct the investigation.

If a broader inquiry is envisaged, a different mechanism might be more appropriate.

The following alt' rnatives might be e

included in such a review:

(a)

Consideration of the specific handling of the incident at the Three-Mile Island facility.

This inquiry would focus on the response of the utility, the NRC, and other responsible agencies and of ficials, to determine whether proper decisions were taken, and in timely fashion.

(b)

Eeview of the structure and staffing of NRC -

(and possibly other agencies) to determine whether the agency is organized properly for dealing with this kind of emergency.

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Page 3 i

f (c)

Review of the adequacy of federal law to i

provide for this type of emergency, with I.

the mandate to suggest any changes in

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statutory provisions to resolve difficulties.

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i (d)

Study of the handling of generic issues in i

the nuclear safety field, to determine whether current approaches to resolving these l

issues is adequate, or whether some different i

approach should be adopted.

5 Of course, the focus of the inquiry could be far i

broader, or much narrower than the topics suggested i

above.

The proposed charter of the review group is j

the most Amportant factor in deciding where the responui:,ility for conducting the inquiry is to be placed.

(6)

Nature of the Charter An issue which is fully as important as the specific contents of the charter for the inquiry is the legal character of the effort.

There are seve::al possibilities here:

(a)

Presidentially mandated study--Such an effort could be undertaken relatively quick 2y, depending on what group or agency is selected.

Such a review would have the valuable attribute of proceeding from the order of the Chief Executive.

However, because the conduct of independent agencies and state government agencies are involved, a broader legal base might be useful.

(b)

Statutorily mandated study--Delay in the commencement of the review would be the chief weakness of this alternative.

However, the gain in broad support for the effort could be worthwhile.

Of couren, an ex post facto congressional ratifir ' v of a study already underway is not unk' y

.a the federal government. (E. g.,

s (c)

Commission mandate, g --This approach is burdened by tha f act that the NRC is a chief actor in this crisis, whose judgments and performance are subject to review.

A Commission call for a review by outside bodies might or might not be heeded.

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Possible Choices of Parties to Conduct the Inquiry Having discussed briefly some of the factors which might be relevant to determining the nature of any inquiry, it is necessary to canvass the various possibilities for assigning the review.

There are numerous groups or agencies which might be called upon here; all have some strengths and weaknesses, which will be briefly noted below.

(1)

Internal NRC Study As stated before, because the NRC is implicated in the incident being reviewed, the need for a perception of independence would not be met by an internal review.

Of course such a review will be conducted as a matter of course for the NRC's own benefit.

However, in this situation a broader inquiry is also necessary.

(2)

Office of Science and Technology Policy OSTP also suffers from linkage with a major player in the incident--the White House.

Also, it is unclear whether OSTP has sufficient resources for such an effort, in the midst of other chores.

(3)

General Accounting Office / Congression Budget Office GAO certainly possesses the reputation for independence which the Congress would feel essential to such an effort.

However, th e GAO 's resources are currently strained and delay could ~

result.

CBO has a fine reputation for what it does, but its charter is somewhat narrower (being largely confined to budget and macro-economic policy) than would be suitable for this review.

The competence of both of these congressional cffices for such a highly-technical inquiry is also unclear.

(4)

Advisory Committee on_ Reactor Safeguards As an NRC advisory committee, the ACRS suffers from the independence problem discussed in connection with some other form of internal NRC review.

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(5)

Professional Societies sj If the inquiry is envisaged as a rather narrow technical inquiry, then some of the national i

scientific or engineering societies might have i

the ability to convene a panel of experts to i

conduct the review.

However, if the matuers to i

be investigated go beyond these subjects of narrow import, the perspective of professional p

societies might be considered too narrow.

ci (6)

National Science Foundation i

I am not sure, however I do not believe that the i

NSF typically accepts assignments such as the one under consideration.

It also shares the weakness of perspective mentioned with regard to j

professional societies.

i (7)

Private Consultinc Firrs There are companies which are available for the conduct of certain well-defined issues or problems in the science and technology field.

The Rand and Mitre Corporations come to mind in this context.

However, the breadth of the issues conce_ned in this matter suggest the need for a governmental perspective, at least at some point in the process.

(8)

Quasi-governmental Organizations The British call these critters "quangos", and I would suppose one might consider the Brookings.

Institution and other organizations in this cate go ry.

However, Brookings lacks the technical ccmponent essential to this inquiry; and I am not aware of c:her similarly-situated organizations' which might possess such competence.

(9)

Presidential Commission In my personal view, this last alternative should be given strong consideration in the present circumstances This device, shich the Eritish use frequently to produce the so-called " White Papers" used to develop Parliamentary policy, has an accepted usage on this side of the Atlantic also.

For example, the Hoover and Warren Commissions 2b

e Page 6 performed extremely valuable service; the Commissions on the Reform of Marijuana Law and that on the Causes of Violence in America produced more equivocal results.

However, this device has important features which recommend it in the present circumstances.

If the members of any commission selected are recognized as men and women of judgment and probity, the confidence of the public in the results of the review can be bolstered tremendously.

Since a major reason for any review is the need to ensure some public confidence in the process, this desideratum is of potentially great significance.

Also, the independence of the body can be insured, as well as its competence, if the proper individuals are selected and sufficient resources provided.

The perspective of such a Commission can also be made adequately wide by the selection of persons with broad public policy experience and viewpoint.

The visibility and importance this effort will have suggests that such persons will be willing to serve in such a capacity.

With a specific charter and a reasonable charter, such a Presidential Commission on Nuclear Safety could perform a service that no other institution presently established could perform.

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