ML19206B353

Forwards Excerpts of Documents Relevant to Emergency Planning:Epa Protective Action Guides,Pa Action Guides & FSAR Conditions for General Emergency Action

ML19206B353
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/03/1979
From:	Kenneke A NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE)
To:	Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
FOIA-79-98 NUDOCS 7905090239
Download: ML19206B353 (83)

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..UCLE Aa C E GU L A TOh Y CUT. MISSIO*.

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l'EP,0 RAT;D'J:1 FOR: Chairman Hendrie Commissiccer Gil;nsky Con:nissioner Kennedy Cc=nissicner Cradford Ccm:nissioner Ahearne FROM:

Al Kenre'<e, Actirg Director, OPE

SUBJECT:

DOSE GUIDELIt;ES FOR DECISIC:i TO RECO 'END PROTECTI','I ACTIO:iS Attached are excerpts of documents relevant to errergency planning, introduced by a brief summary of their contents.

Enclosure:

S: ~cmary wi th Attach".ents :

A.

EPA Protective Action Guides B.

Correnwealth of Pennsylvania I.ction Guides C.

F3 e Cenditions for General Energency A:ticn D.

EPA Discus sion Regarding '..'a rn in g Tires, Dis tances and Demography cc:

Leonard Bickwit Sarn Chilk CC iACT :

25 029 Coakie Ong, CPE C3-41a27

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SUMMARY

Action guidelines are set by EPA (Attachment A) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (page E-7 of Attachment B).

These guidelines are identical and establish two trigger points:

o First trigger level at a projected 1 rem whole body or 5 rems to the thyroid.

(Under the April 2 draf t NRC orocedures for decision to recommend evacuation, projected doses at this level would lead to a recommendation for the local population to take shelter.)

o Second trigger level at a projected 5 rems whole body or 25 rems to the thy oid.

(Under the Aoril 2 draft, NRC procedures call for mandatory evacuation of all persons for doses projected at this level.)

EPA and Pennsylvania protective actions corresponding to these conditions assume that some form of evacuation may be necessary.

The second-level trigger specified in TMI's FSAR is consistent with EPA and the State protection actions but protective actions do not explicitly refer to evacuation.

With reference to the critical population it is import 6nt to note that EPA s ta tes :

Consideration has been made of the higher sensitivity of children and oregnant women and the need to protect all members of the public.

Consideration has also been made that perscnnel may continue to be exposed via some pathways af t r the plume oasses, and that additional PAGs may have to be applied to these exoosure oathways.

(Page 2.6 of Attachment A.)

It is also important to note that EPA calls for decision-makers to appraise the relative risks (e.g., risks due to evacuation as well as not evacuating):

o "The higher guide is a mandatory level at which the respective governmental agency should plan to take effective action to protect the general public unless the action would have greater risk than the projected dose."

(Deaths due to an evacuation itself might occur, e.g.,

from vehicle accidents, heart attacks, premature child births, drownings,etc.)

o "The effectiveness of evacuation in limiting radiation dose is a function of the time required to evacuate.

If a radioactive cloud is present, the dose will increase with the time of exposure; if the evacuation ls completed before the cloud arrives, then evacuation is obviously '00 percent effective."

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, * "There will be some people who will refuse to evacuate. The best time for Ty for an urban family together minht be 0.2 to 0.5 nours, while to shut down a f arm or factory night take hours.

The ev3cuation travel time, T, is related to:

T (1) Total nt.mber of pecole to be evacuated.

(2) The capacity of a lane of traffic.

(3) The number of lanes of highway available.

(4)

Distance of travel.

(5) Roadway obstructions such as uncontrolled mergir.g of traffic or accidents.

The total number of people to be evacuated depends on the population density and affected area.

It is an advantage if good planning can keep the area and thus the number of people to as small a value as possible, or possibly to evacuate one area at a time so that the number of people on the move at one time is within the capacity of the roads."

Any evacuation would, of course, be carried out by the State under the oirection of the Governor af ter the NRC makes its recomrendation to him.

tRC's reconnendation should balance any evacuation actior. with an identified ootential magnitude of release, possible pathways to the popu ation at risk, and how l

much time is available in order to specify three critical factors:

o Time to complete evacuation.

o Size of evacuation area.

o Characterization of potential hazards.

The first EPA report in Attachment D goes into coisiderable tabular detail about approaches for determining these factor:. Table 1.5 on the last page of the first report tends to support the State's estimate that at least 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> would be needed to clear a 20-mile radius (over 360 ).

A fortunate advantage at IMI would be that the travel time appears to be the dominant Dotential segment of the total evacuation time.

Footnote (a) of Table 1.5 states that "high population, high density areas, such as those around Indian Point, present a different situation, where evacuation tiTes are more complex, probably longer, and must be analyzed on a case-by-care basis." Table 1.4 (pace 1.30) suggests initiltion times for various protective measures.

(For example, 25 OM

, cows should be taken off pasture and contaminated milk should be quarantined within 4-48 hours following an unacceptable exposure incident.

Furthermore, milk should be discarded within 2-14 days.) Table 1.1 is a diagram of exposure pathways and approprir.te responses (both protective and restorative actions).

The second EPA report shows that experience in evacuating more than 100,000 peoole have been few (pages 86-87).

Note that the Jefferson County, Texas hurricane incident involved evacuating 108,600 of 111,600 people 80 miles in 7.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> -- without a death or injury. Also note that the weather was clear, that road conditions were dry, and that movement was done in the daytime.

Furthermore, the evacuated area was 945 square miles in size and was similar to the Tfil area characteristics -- suburban, urban and industrial.

Ten deaths were attributed to the 54 evaucations involving a total population of 1,142,336 under a variety of environmental conditions.

Seven of the deaths were due to a helicopter crash, two drowned, and one death was due to a heart attack.

From this, the report's abstract then predicted frecuencies of 8.9 x 10-8 deaths per person-mile and 4.4 x 10-o injuries per person-mile.

The National Safety Council predicted 2.4 x 10-8 deaths per person-mile and 9.0 x 10-7 injaries per person-mile.

Such predictions, however, would have overestimated deaths and injuries for Hurricane Carla in 1961 -- in which there were none.

As a final note, pages 43-47 discusses " myths of panic and hysteria" associated with an evacuation, but states (page 47) -

"Although the studies done by the Disaster Research Center and others (17,4_0) have dispelled the myths associated with peoples' behavior during a disaster, if the causative agent of the incident were radiation, would peoples' reactions be substantially different? The conclusion drawn by many is that because radiation is largely an unknown cua n ti ty, imoerceotible to the ordinary senses, inherently the fear of the unknown and its consecuences would cause a different behavior oattern --

perhaps sir;ilar to popular notions.

This would, in turn, have a dramatic effect on evacuation involving a release of radioactivity."

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!l 2.3 Intereretation of PAGs j!

i The guides for the general population listed in tables 2.1.and. 2.2.rere arrived at in consideration of protection of the public from early effects of radiation and nain*nf 4"g the delayed biological effects at a low probability.

Consideration

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I has been nade of the hither sensitivity of chi 1Eran and pregnant vo=en und the need to protect n11 me=bers of the tuhlic.

Con-sideration has also been made that personnel =ay continue to be exposed via sone.p'a'tE-dja af ter the plu=e passes, and that

-m a additional PAGs may have to be applied to these exposure pathways.

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suggested level 't which the responsible officials should consider

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p adicated above. The higher guide is ae,nAator)y w

Icvel at which the respective sovern= ental agency should plan to tad effective action to protect the general public unless the action would have greater risk than the projected dose.

At projected doses below the lower guide, responsible offir4 min may suggest voluntsg. action available to the public at risk. This should be done with the philosophy that popula-tion doses be kept as low as possible as long as the effects of

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Energency Classification Description Conditions Possible Actions SIM Continued c)

Reactor building high See preceding page tmergency range ganrna monitor alert alarm.

f) The high alarm of the Rad-lation ibnitoring System in two separate buildings due to a single event.

General A General emergency is an inci-A General emergency will be de-Actions as per Site Em sj: M m ency dent which has the potential for clared when a site emergency has gency plus off site nn J.

serious radiological consequences been declared and one or more of toring.

lloti fica tions to the health and safety of the the following conditions exists:

State, ilRC, etc.

Estat general public.

Coordina tion a) Reactor building high range ECS as soon as possibl.

with off-site support agencies ganuna monitor high alarm provides for prompt initiation b

'n N dT3Tian-level at-the m of protective actions.

station boundary is >l25 mREiu nrlirgrid effluent radia Ns tion monitor indicates

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DISASTER OPERrT;CNS iO' A l\\!

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FOREWORD The pr.ta" mission of govemment in an emergency is to provide an organizatic nal structure and resource,.o protect the lives and property ofits citizens. However, the capacity to exploit the self-help and mutual support potential of its citizens within the framework of county and local government organizations is crucial to the development of effective statewide emergency preparedness plans and programs.

Regardless how well the State and Federalgovemments are organized to provide assistance, the unpredictable nature of disasters and the time and space factors involved, are such, that in the final analysis, the county and local political jurisdiction must withstand the initial impact of the disaster on its own. Tne unavoidable period of self-sufficiency enforced on the county and local governments will vary based on the nature and extent of the disaster and may range from several hours in the case of a natural disaster to several days following a war-caused disaster producing high levels of nuclear radiation.

Tne degree to which the disaster is contained and the price that is paid in the loss of life and property will be governed by the readiness posture and capacity of county and local govemment to effectively employ the considerable self-help potential found in any community.

The citizens of each county and local jurisdiction have invested in certain govemmental and volunteer emergency services organizations and facilities. Recognizing that these emergency services will be inadequate should a major disaster strike, it is the duty of county and local govemment to provide for the emergency expansion of its survival capabilities within the limits of available resources. Mutual aid agreements should be negotiated with neighboringjurisdictions; plans should

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be denloped tc ensure effective use of resources and cacabilities of civic and volunteer E

organizations and the private sector; and all county and Ic govemment employes should be cross-trained and assizned to play an effectise and useful role dunng the emergency period.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Disaster Operations P!r.n, including its annexes and other supporting documents and plans, provides a basis for coordinating emergency service operations. It also estabilshes the organizational and operational concepts and procedures designed to maximize the rendering of assistance and m!'timize loss of life and property and expedite recovery from any disaster situation.

The mission of Civil Defense as we know it today is the result of nearly three decades of evoh.iion. Dunng this period of time,it has moved from the world of possibility - the threat of nuclear attack - into the world of probability where the requirement for emergency response and assistance to all types of disasters can be expected. Civil Defense has come of age, and today it is an integral pa

• of the day-to-day operations of govemment at all levels. it is essential, therefore, that all officials charged with responsibility for Civil Defense h dy to confront any emergency in such a way that casualties and property damage will be minimized and normalcy restored as quickly as possible.

Oran K. Henderson Director of Civil Defense Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

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C o m m o Nw cA LTH or PENN SYLVANI A Orrict or THc GovC9NOR HAmatssuno M ai TC N I bHAPP CCvCRNOR July 12, 1977 The Commonwealth has long ecognized its responsibility to mitigate the effects of natural, mar-made or war-caused emergencies, and generally to protect the health and safety and preserve the lives and property of the people cf the Comonwealth.

The Comanwealth of Pennsylvania Disaster Operations Plan has been developed as the basic plan for all emergency operations in the Commonweal th.

It provides a scund basis for emergency preparedness programs and training activities which will ensure an optimum readi-ness posture for survival operations should a disaster occur or i

threaten in any area of the Comonwealth. All emergency planning should support and supplement the basic policies and concepts pre-sented in this plan.

The State Disaster Operations Plan outlines policies and general pro-f cedures to provide a co=on basis for joint State and County / Local

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government operations in natural disaster and war-caused emergency situations. The Plan also is intended to reflect and establish policy for the broad concept of disaster planning and operation and prescribes and assigns objectives, tasks and functional responsibilities to the various departments and agencies of the State government and the counties and local governments of the Cc=anwealth.

The State Council of Civil Defense is charged with the responsibility for implementing this Plan through coordination with all State depart-ments and agencies, counties and municipalities.

Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Comanwealth of Pennsylvania State Council of Civil Defense Act cf 1351, P.L. 28, as amended, I hereby promulgate and issue the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Disaster Operations Plan.

This Plan supersedes all previous editions of the Co=onwealth of Penn-sylvania Disaster Operations and Assistance Plan.

MJLTON

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CO3D10NWEALTII OF PENNSYLVANIA DISASTER OPERATIONS PLAN r(

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Fo re w ord......................

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Authority, References and Recision............................... I II Pu rp o s e..........................

.....................I III Scope

.................... 2 IV Definitions

.................. 2 V

Situation

.............................................. 3 VI Assum p tions........................................... 4 VII Mission

.5 VIII Organization

......5 IX Concept of Operations......

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X Em ergency Tad Assignmen ts.................................. 9 XI Direction and Control 10 XII Mutual Aid Agreement....

.......II XIII Execution...

11 Annexes A.

Responsibilities B.

Organization C.

Vulnerability Analysis D.

Damage Assessment E.

Nuclear Incidents F.

Hazardous Afaterials G.

Trai.tng H.

Communications 97 n$eQ cJ u-

Annexes (Continued)

I.

Waming

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Increased Readiness K.

Crisis Relocation L

Shelter Operations M.

Radiological Defense N.

Public Information O.

Red Cross Senices P.

Salvation Army Senices Q.

Police Senices R.

Fire Services S.

Highway Operation-T.

Transportation U.

Aviation V.

Military Support W.

Welfare Services X.

Health Services Y.

Agriculture Senices Z.

Education Senices AA.

Reports and Records

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s C0515tONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DISASTER OPERATIONS PLAN ANNEX E NUCLEAR INCIDENTS (FIXED FACILITY)

L REFERENCES A. State Council of Civil Defense Act of 1951, P L. 28, as amended.

B. Atomic Energy Development and Radiation Control Act, January 28,1966, P.L.1625, as araended.

II. PURPOSE A. Establish policies and procedures for emergency response to fixed facility nuclear incidents within the Commonwealth.

B. Assign responsibilities to State agencies, and county and local governments in respondini a

t fixed facility nuclear incident.

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A. Provides guidance for the preparation of detailed plans and procedures for warning the public of nuclear fixed facility incidents.

B. Provides a basis for the preparation of county and local emergency response plans for nuclear incidents.

C. Identifies technical and operational responsibilities for fixed nuclear facility incidents.

IV. DEFINITIONS A. Nuclear Incident: The uncontrolled release of radioactive material B. Classes of nuclear incidents based upon offsite consequences:

1. Class 1: Includes those incidents which have no offsite radiological consequences but which arouse public concern. These incidents may require the support of offsite vnice organi:stions (fire fighting and ambulance servi:es).

2. Class II: Includes those inc2 dents which involve an actualloss or major reduction in the protection provided for public health and safety, such as; fire in safety related equipment, security breaches, or accidents which produce effluents in excess of that permitted for continuing operation.

3. Class III: Includes incidents of sufficient severity for offsite organi:ations to take action to protect populations from direct exposure and inhalation hazards.

C. Mode of Discharge: Disenarge of radioactivity to surface water, to the atmosphere or both.

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AUG.1978 E-1

D. Protective Action Guides: Qu2ntitative dose p:ojections which indicate the need for some action to be taken in avoiding the exposure.

E. Fixed Nuclear Facility: A site where nuclear materials are employed in an operation which could cause a nuclear incident.

F. Facility Operator: The manage:nent person or persons responsible for the operation of a fixed nuclear facility at the time of and during recovery from a nuclear incident.

V. SITUATION A. Peacetime nuclear incidents include situations ranging from uncontrolled release of a small quantity of radioactive material with no casualties or damage to incidents causing widespread dissemination of radioactive material which could result in casualties and extensive property damage.

B. Fixed nuclear facility sites are:

1. Power Plants:

Three Mile Ishnd Nuclear Power Station, Dauphin County a.

b. Beaver Valley Power Station, Beaver County Shipoingport Power Stat'on, Beaver County c.

d. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Ycrk County Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Luaerne County (1980) e.

f.

Limerick Generating Station, Montgomery County (1981)

2. Fabrication Plants:

Westinghouse Cheswick, Westmoreland County a.

Babcock and Wilcox, Armstrong County o.

C. The warning time before a nuclear incident may vary from none to hours or days. For most incluents there will be very little waming time.

D. ~ Areas contaminated or threatened by radiatien could require the popuhtion to seek protection in shelters or to be evacuated.

E. The offsite radiological effects of an incident on populated areas are dependent upon the mode of discharge, population distribution, weather and terrain.

VI. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS A. Offsite operations in response to emergencies at fixed nuclear facilities are distinct from other emergencies only in the technical aspeets of the materials involved.

B. County and local governments have primary responsibility for offsitr.sponse to a nuclear incident and will provide the initial response to the incident.

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CHANGE 2 2rJ E-2 VS AUG.1978

E. 'Ihe Federal govemment will provide a sistance upon request by the Governor.

F. During peacetime the Bureau cf Radiological Health, Department of Environmenta!

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Resources will determine levels of radiation in the environment and recommend emergency measures to protect the public from exposure.

G. Appendix 1 provides the notification channels for response to nuclear incidents.

H. Appendix 2 provides a list of selected references relating to emergency planning and responte to nuclearincide its.

V1 RESPONSIBILITIES A. County Civil Defense / Local Govemment Civil Defense

1. Coordination with Local Authorities 2.

React to initial Notification by Facility Management

3. Alert and Warning of Local Population 4.

Emergency Services

5. Situation Analysis B. Bureau of Radiological Health (DER) d' l.

Radiological Monitoring A

2. Accident Assessment 3.

Notification of Federal Authonties 4.

Recommendation of Protective Actions 5.

Recornmendations for Prctection of Potable Water and Food 6.

Recommendations for Recovery and Reentry C. State Council of Civil Defense

1. Issue Planning Guidance

2. Coordination of State Response to nuclearincidents

3. Maintain Emergency Communications Facility 4 Operate State Emergency Operations Center 5.

Emergency Public Information

6. Coordin-tion of State Agencies and Departments D. Pennnsylvania State Police

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l. Maintenance of Law and Order CHANGE 1 25_ 0f!5 OcT.1977 E3

2. Search and Rescue

3. Traffic Control

4. Area Isolation / Quarantine

5. Evacuation

6. Control of Reer.try E. Department af 51111tary Affairs Ii

1. Search and Rescue

2. Traffic Control i

3. Evacuation

4. Control of Reentry

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5. Emergency Transportation j

6.

Aircraft for Acha! hionitoring i

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7. Installation Security i

F. Department of Justice

1. Legal Counsel to Govemor

2. Negotiaticns with Terrorists C. Department of Transportation

1. Assist in Direction of Traffic Flow

2. Clearance of Roads and Highways H. Department of Health

1. Emergency 5!edical Care

2. Identification of Dead, and Afortuary Senices VII STATE ASSISTANCE A. Bureau of Radiological Health (DER)

Fifth Floor, Fulton Building 3rd & Locust Streets Harrisburg, PA 17101 Telephone: 717-787-2480 Provides technical guidance and direction in an emergency where the public is or may be, exposed to nuclear radiation.

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IX. FEDERAL ASSISTANCE r

i A. U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

Regional Coordinating Office for Radiological Assistance Brookhaven Area Office Upton, Long Island, New York 11973 Through Bureau of Radiological Health; DOE makes avaihble from its resources radiological advice and assistance to minimize injury to people, to minimize loss of property, to cope with radiological hazards, and to protect public health and safety. DOE serves to coordinate other Federal Ageacies.

B. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Regional Office 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Telephone: (215) 337-1150 Through Bureau of Radiological Health; responsible for coIIecting and evaluating the facts attending accidental release of radioa;tive material from a licensed nuclear facility. NRC can prov de a significant manpower reso arce in the event of serious radiological incidents.

i C. First U.S. Army f

Department of Defense (DOD) b Fort George G. Meade, MD Telephone: (301) 677-6535 Through State Council of Civil Defefense: Army Nuclear Incident Control Teams and Explosive Ordinance Disposal Teams aid and protect personnel and equipment. Army has primary command responsibility for control of incidents of such scope as to constitute a domestic emergency.

APPENDICES 1 - Notification Channels 2 - Protective Action Guides 3 - Nuclear Incident References v

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i APPENDIX 1 l

ANNEX E NOTIFICATION CHANNELS i

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i FLXED NUCLEAR I

FACILITY i

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STATE COUNCIL BUREAU OF COUNTY c

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RAD HEALTH i

CIVIL DEFENSE i

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'I SELECTED DEIT OF A A STATE AGENCIES ENERGY CONTIGUOUS STATES E-6 CIIANGE 2 AUG. 78

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APPENDIX 3

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ANNEX E l

PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDES

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A. RADIATIOriGUIDES li Protective actions recommended by the Bureau of Radiological Health w.11 be based upon the following radiation levels which are considered to be the upper limit for the activities indicated:

f Projected Whole Body Projected Thyroid i

Gamma Dose (Rem)

Dose (Rem) e f

Qeneral Public 1 to 5 5 to 2 Emer;;ency Activities 25 125 Life Saving Activities 75 No specific upper limit B. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS Based upon the evaluation of radiation levels, the Bureau of Radiological Health wil!

recommend to appropriate County Civil Defense Directors one or more of the following i.

protective action options.

1. General Public a.

Instructions to take cover.

D Control of access to areas designated by the Bureau of Radiological Health.

c.

d.

Specific medications for thyroid prophyl.txis.

2. Exposed workers involved in emergency activities. Same actions as for lifesaving activities; acceptable total dose is lower.

3. E tposed workers involved in lifesaving activities:

Use of masks for respintory protection.

a.

b. Protective clothing.

Specific medication for thyroid prophylaxis.

c.

E-7 CHANGE 2 AUG.1978

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA DISASTER OPERATIONS PLAN 1.

AUTHORITY, REFERENCES AND RECISION A. Authority This plan complements appropriate Federal guidelines and implements Commonwealth directives related to emergency operations. It is issued under the authority of and m accordance with the provisions of the Act of March 19, 1951, Pamphlet Law 28, as amended, legally known as the " State Council of Civil Defense Act of 1951."

B. References

1. The Federal Civu Defense Act of 1950, PL 81-920

2. The Federal Civil Defense Guide

3. The National Plan for Emergency Preparedness m-_

4.

Regional Emergency Operations Plan for Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Region II

5. First U. S. Army Military Assistance Plan (Short

Title:

l A MAP)

6. The Disaster Relief Act of 1974, PL 93-288

7. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Management Directive 720.1, " Assignment of Emergency Responsibilities to Departments and Agencies."

C. Recision All previous editions of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Disaster Operations and Assistance Plan.

II. PURPOSE A. To provide a State emer;;ency operations plan which incorporates civil preparedness standards establibd by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

B. To define the role of local, county and State governments prior to, during and after a disaster, whether war-caused, man-made or natural.

C. To provide guidance to agencies of State govemment, counties, and political subdivisions as to their emergency preparedness and operational responsibilities in coping with disaster situations.

D, To provide coordination, direction, control and continuity of government in disaster situations.

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E. To pro'.ide a basis for preparation of detailed emer;;ency operating procedures and training by agencies of State govemment and the political subdivisions.

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111. SCOPE A. Outlines the State organization for Civil Defense.

B. Establishes the concepts and policies under which all elements of State government and its political subdivisions will operate during emergencies.

C. Provides the framework for State and Federal suoport to county ar:d local governments in emergency operations, to include pre-emergency planning and preparation, disaster or emergency operations and post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation activities.

D. Provides for the integration of total resources of goverrtment and the private sector and assigns broad and specific responsibilities to elements of government, quasi-government and private activities.

E. Sets forth State concepts and procedures which county and local governments may use in the development of local plans for emergency operations which will support the State Plan and make the most effective use of all resources.

IV. DEFINITIONS A. War-caused Disaster - Any condition following an attack upon the United States resulting in substantial damage of property or injury to persons in the United States caused by use of bombs, missiles, shellfire, nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological means, or other weapons or overt paramilitary actions, or other cenditions such as sabotage.

B. Natural Disaster - Any hurricane, tomado, storm, flood, high-water, wind 4 riven water, tidal wave, earthquake, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, drought, fire, explosion, or other catastrophe which results in damage to property, hardship, suffenng or possible loss of life.

C. Man-made Dis' aster - Any industrial, nuclear, or transportation accident, explosion, conflagration, power failur, resource shortage, or other condition, except enemy action, resulting from man-made causes, such as oil spills and other injurious environmental contamination, which threatens or causes damage to property, human suffering, hardship or loss of life.

D. Emergency Services - The preparation for and the canying out of functions other than functions for which military forces are pnmarily responsible, to prevent, minimize, and repair injury and damage resulting from war-caused, natural, or man-made disasters, together with all other activities necessary orincidental to the preparation for and carrying out of the fore-going functions. These functions include, without limitation, firefighting services, police services, medical and health services, rescue, engineering, disaster warning services, communications, radiological, shelter, chemical and other special weapons defense, evacuation of persons from stricken areas, emergency welfare services, emergency

~

transportation, emergency resources management, existing or properly assigned functions of plant protection, temporaiy restorhtion of public utility services and other functions related to civilian protection.

?

E. Standard Public Fallout Shelter - A she!!er that provides a minimum radiation protection 5

factor of 40 (PF 40) (occupant would receive 1/40th the radiation he would receive if unprotected). Studies show that with such protection, more than 90 percent of the people E

who survive the direct effects of a nuclear attack on the United States and who ctherwise would die from the effects of fallout radiation without shelters, could survive.

25 049 ;

F. Best Available Shelter - Shelters that provide a minimum radiation protection factor of ten (10) or better. Studies also show that where PF 10 shelter is not avtilable, use of the best protection locally available will save many lives.

G. Slobilization and Gateway Sites - The emergency organization and facilities established at pre-selected locations for the purpose of orgamzmg best locally available public and private facilities and capabilities for the reception, registration, care and control of personnel evacuated from possible target areas or evacuated from disaster areas.

H. Political Subdivisions - The government of any County, City, Borough, Township or Town.

V. SITUATION A. Potential Hazards (See Annex C)

1. Natural and Stan-made Disasters a.

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is subject to floods, hurricanes, tornadoes and other natural disasters. Based on past experience, any part of the State is subject to a natural disaster at any time with little or no cdvance waming.

b. Industrial complexes and increasing expansion in many sections of Pennsylvania make these areas susceptible to disasters of an accidental nature. Accidents involving nuclear power plants, aircraft, ships, r1ilways, highway vehicles, and industrial explosion could set off disasters of major proportions in the Commonwealth.

c

2. Resource Shortages The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania relies on extemal sources of supply for certain resources essential to the health and welfare of its citizens and its economic well-being.

A variety of circumstances (work stoppages, intermptions of transportation, natural shortages, severe snow or ice storms, etc.), could present a requirement for emergency management of available resources.

3. War-Caused Disasters a.

The National Plan for Emergency Preparedness considers intemational conflict under three broad contingencies: Intemational Tension, Limited War and General War. While General War, which is defined to include nuclear attack upon the United States, is the least likely contingency, it would create unprecedented and exceedingly difficult problems. For this reason, this Plan is presented largely in terms of this kind of contingency. Policies and measures prescribed herein may be selectively applied as appropriate and necessary to other emergency conditions, especially limited war requiring full mobilization of the nation's economy.

b. Under nuclear attack, all areas of Pennsylvania are subject to the likelihood of fallout radiation and some areas would possibly be subject to the hazards of blast, fire and initial radiation. The success of survival and recovery operations following such an attack will rely heavily on the conservation and judicious application of available resources.

B. Disaster Response Capabilities

1. The Cornmenwealth of Pennsylvania and its political subdivisions maintain a combination of govemmental and vo'unteer emergency services organizations and 23 050

facilities adequate to cope with normal day-today emergencies. Based on economic considerations, these organizations are inadequate to deal with major disasters. Effective response to disasters must, therefore, rely on the development of plans, organizations and trained personnel which will permit the rapid mobilization and effective utilization of the total resources and capabilities of government and the private sector as required.

2. Help may not be available from the State or Federal Government to County and local governments for a period of several hours following a natural or man-made disaster and for a period of several days following a war-caused disaster producing high levels of auclear radiation. Each county and local govemment must, therefore, be prepared to bear the initialimpact of a disaster on its own.

3. The impact and timing of disasters will vary from one locale to the next andinmany instances the disaster response capability of a county or local government may be reinforced through mutual support greements with neighbonng political su'odivisions.

C. Emergency Operations

1. The primary goal of the State Council of Civil Defense is to develop a capacity at State, county and local levels of gevernment for the direction and effective coordination of emergency operations. This capability involves having the plans, organization, personnel, procedures, facilities and equipment necessary for governments to analyze an emergency situation and take effective action to preserve lives and property, conduct and coordinate emergency operations, and mange emergency resources.

2. This Plan is the basis for emergency operations in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

VI. ASSUMPTIONS A. That maximum damage and destruction may result from a natural, man-made or war-caused disaster.

B. That since the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is geographically located in the strategically important North Atlantic Regien of the United States, it has a high degree of vulnerability to enemy nuclear attack.

C. That pre disaster warning time will permit the introduction of preplanned readiness actions.

D. That in the event of a nuclear attack on the United States:

1. Military installations, centers of population, industry, and transportation facilities would be probable targets.

2. Large areas may become contaiminated by fallout, requiring the population to seek protection in fallotat shelters.

3. Access to some areas couldbe denied for a period of several days.

4.

Human hardship and suffenng will constitute the most immediate problem.

5. Large areas of the country will be free of physical damage; and substantial resources will be available if properly managed, to support survival an ' recovery efforts.

6. The Pennsylvania National Guard will be mobilized to Federal duty.

o" r

b bj

7 The Federal government will provide disaster assistance during the recovery phase of war-caused disaster.

VII. MISSION A. The mission of the State Council of Civu Defense is to plan and prepare for emergency operations which will insure that casualties and property damage will be... Jaized and normal conditions will be restored as rapidly as possible in the event of a war-causeo, man-made, or nstural disaster.

B. The mission of each county and local govemment is to develop plans and prepare for emergency operations in conformity with this Plan and State Council of Civil Defense Act of1951.

VIII. ORGANIZATION A. General

1. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Council of Civil Defense Act of 1931 provides that emergency services organization and operation will be structured around existing constitutional government.

2. The Act provides for the establishment of a State organization known as the State Council of Civil Defense. The Council is headed by the Governor under the chainnanship of the Lieutenant Govemor and is comprised of 14 members.

3. The Govemor has appointed a Director of Civil Defense to coordinate and administer emergency services operations in the Commonwealth.

4. The Act also requires that each political subdivision shall have a Civil Defense Organization headed by a Director appointed by the Govemor.

B. State Organization ne State organization for emergency operations includes:

1. The Govemor and his immediate staff

2. The State Council of Civil Defent a.

The State primary Emergency Operations Center (EOC) located in Hamsburg

b. He State altemate EOC located in Selinsgrove c.

Three Civil Defense Area Headquarters

d. Three Area Emergency Operations Centers

3. State apncies assigned emergency responsibilities or having the capabilities to provide needed assistance in an emergency situation (See Annex A).

4 Liaison personnel from responsible Federal agencies and participat ng quasi-public activities.

O C. Local Organizations g 25 052

The local organization for emergency operations includes:

1. County and local government a.

County and local Civil Defense Directors

b. County and local Emergency Operations Centers 2.

Locally available manpower, materials, equipment and facilities organized by the local governments for the disaster readiness effort.

D. Forces Available The fcrees available, coordinated by the Director of Civil Defense include:

1. County and Local Civil Defense Organizations, elements of State agencies and activities assigned emergency responsibilities.

2. Nan-governmental and quad-public organizations:

.t.

American National Red Cross

b. Salvation Array c.

Mennonite Disaster Service

d. Civil Air Patrol e.

Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES)

3. Private Sector (Volunteer) a.

Churches

b. Civil organizations c.

Private industry

d. Private individuals LX. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS A. General Principles

1. Direction of emergency operations and administration of disaster relief will be exercised by the lowest level of govermnent affected.

2. State agencies having emtrgency responsibilities will provide assistance directly to political subdivisions where possible. Those agencies having divisions, districts or local offices in the Commonwealth will direct the supervisors in charge of such activities to develop mutual emergency support plans with county and local government officials.

3. Federal assistance is supplemental to and n-t a substitute for relief provided by the Commonwealth and its political subdivisions.

25 053 4.

All appropriate locally available forces and resources will be fully committ:d by the affected county and local government before requesting assistance from a higher level of government.

5. If county and local governments require State assistance the various Commonwealth Departments / Agencies will perform the necessary emergency functions as assigned by Management Directive 720.1 and this Plan. State Departments ar.d Agencies not having an assigned emergency mission under a specific category by the Management Directive will be prepared to carrv out such duties as may be directed by the Governor and/or as requested by the State Cou.'cil of Civil Defense.

6. Support forces furnished county and local governments from outside sources will be assigned on a niission type basis and will be under the operational control of the depar* ment, agency or office fumishing the force.

When two or more political subdivisions are affected, the next higher !evel in We Civil Defense organization (County, Area) will exercise responsibility for coordination and priority support to the area of operations.

8. Direction and control of State emergency operations will be exercised by the State Director of Civil Defense under policy guidance of the State Council of Civil Defense, in order to assure maximum emergency response capability.

9. Centralized direction, control and coordination of major emergency operations will be effected through the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

10. Public information in normal day-to, day operations is generally provided directly to the E= =--

news media by the re:pective Department / Agency Heads of State Government. When the Cor.:monwealth Disaster Operations Plan is activated, all emergency public information will be released through the State Council of Civil Defense by a

representative of the Govemor's Press Secretary's Office. All news and/or Alblic Information contacts concerning emergency situatic,s will be referred to the State Council of Civil Defense Public Inforn.ation Officer by J1 State Government personnel.

B. Emergency Procedures

1. Whenever in the opinion of the Governor, the safety and welfare of the people of the Commonweahh require the exercise of extreme emergency measures due to a threatened or actual disaster, he may proclaim a state of extreme emergency to exist in the Commonwealth or any portion thereof.

2. Whenever the Govemor has proclaimed a state of extreme efnergency, each political subdivision within the disaster area may enter into contracts and incur obligations necessary to combat such threatened or actual disaster, protect the h:alth and safety of persons and property and provide emergency assistance to the victims of such disaster.

In exercising this authority, the political subdivision may : ceed without regard to time consuming procedures and formalities prescribed by law (except for mandatory constitutional requirements) pertaining to the performance of public works, entering into contracts, incurnng obligations, employment of temporary workers, rental of equipment, purchase of supplies and materials, levying of taxes and appropriation and expenditure of public funds.

=

_ cJ u-.

3. Detailed procedures pertaining to increased readiness when a disaster threatens and actions to be taken in support of survival and recovery operations when a disaster strikes, are contained in Annex J to this plan.

4 Procedures for implementing economic stabilization measures and err rgency management of resources will be promulgated in a separate plan.

5. Pennsylvania's statutes do not embody provisioni. for county or local issuance of named or standard proclamations which automatically authorize specified emergency actions.

However, county and local goveming bodies legally may adopt resolutions or ordinances relating to emergency actions necessary to minimize disaster effects or facilitate disaster recovery.

6. Warning of an impending disaster may be disseminated to county and local governments by the State Council of Civil Defense through the Council's Warning and Communications system or, a local emergency may occur without warning.

7.

Emergencies occurring in the geographic area of a political subdivision will be reported by Civil Defense Directors through the operational communication chain of authority.

C. Operations

1. Normal Operations a.

Emergency operations plans and standard operating procedures will be developed and actions taken to improve overall emergency operating capabilities. Training and test exercises will be conducted on a recurring ba is.

b. All records, repor:s and informational data will be maintained up-tcHiate, to provide a continual means of assessing operational readiness.

2. Increased Readiness and Emergency Phases a.

When threat of emergency exists, all State agencies having emergency operatior";

responsibilities and all political subdivisions will alert their personnel and take those preliminary actions necessary to establish control and conduct emergency operations.

b.

Increased Readiness Plans Annex J, will be implemented.

3. Emergency Operations c.c In-Shelter Phase This phase emphasizes activities aid actions to sustain life and protect property.

Preliminary damage assessment and planning for recovery operations will be accomplished. Officials having emergency responsibilities will condinate their actions in order to achieve maximum utilization of resources.

4 Recovery or Post-Attack Phase a.

This phase requirea that priority be given to recovery operations, assessment of damage effects, restoration of essential facilities, economic stabilization, and utilization of resources. Priorities must be established and coordinated regarding the order of emergency actions to be taken to achieve mutual survival and recovery goals. x p5 t_ J

b. The Commonwealth cf Pennsylvania Emergency Resources Management and Economic Stabilization Plan will be implemented upon direction of the Governor.

X. EMERGENCY TASK ASSIGNMENTS A. All State agencies will:

1. Disseminate warnings to appropriate personnel of their agencies.

".. Supplement warnings with appropriate instructions and implement emergency preparedness activities in their assigned area of emergency responsibilities. These actions will be coordinated with the State Council of Civil Defense.

3. Assure maximum utilization of protective measures and available fallout shelt::rs when appropriate.

B. State Council of Civil Defense will:

1. Provide immediate warning of impending attack and attack effects to governments, industry and the gener.d public, and disseminate warning of dangers of other emergencies to areas likely to be affected.

2. Provide a flow of accurate and officia information and detailed instructions to the gener 1 public throuch all means available, immediately before, during and after an emers.:ncy.

C. The following are general emergency task assignments of alllevels of government. (Specific

.m_

resNnsabilities of each State agency and county and local governments are listed in Annex A).

1. Disaster preparedness and coordination of response to disaster situations.

2. Prerare and maintain jurisdictmal emergency operations plans relating to natural, man-made and war <aused disaster situations in consonance with this Plan.

3. Provide forits own continuity in order to maintain civil authonty and render emergency assistance to its citizens and those of neighboring political subdivisions by:

a.

Establishing lines of succession

b. Preserving vital records Estabhshing Emergency Operations Centers, Communications and other essential c.

facilities for agencies and activities amgned emergency functions.

4. Provide for the staffing and functioning of Emergency O -' ions Centers to analyze the P

emergency and take effective action by directing emerg y government services to preserve lives and property, to conserve ano distribute available resources, and to conduct recovery activities.

5. Provide communications to support government operations in emergencies.

6. Provide for the protection oflife and property (to include search and rescue operations) and maintenance oflaw and order under all circumstances.

'; hit 25 056 a-

7.

Protect the population from the effects of nuclear attack by directing them to and sustaining them in the best available fallout protection.

8. Provide emergency lodging, feeding, clothing, registration and inquiry and social services to all persons in need due to disaster; and to pro 5ide for the protection and control of inmates of State institutions.

9.

Provide a Radiological Defense Service to identify for the general public and emergency govemment services, radioactive hazards resulting from enemy attack or peacetime accident.

10. Provide fire prevention and control services to minimize urban or rural fire damage caused by enemy attack or other emergencies and the release of survivors entrapped in damaged areas.

11. Provide individual and emergency organizational trauung programs which will insure that every individualinvolved in emergency services operations is adequately prepared to accomplish assigned tasks, operating in the framework of a responsive, efficient and effective organization.

12. Adopt and be prepared to implement appropriate precautionary m-asures to mitigate the anticipated effects of an impending disaster.

13. Provide for the emergency care and treatment of casualties resulting from attack or other emergencies; and such public health services as are necessary during emergency conditions, including preventive and remedial measures to cope with the effects of enemy radiological, biological, or chemical agents.

XL DIRECTI0N AND CONTROL A. G meral

1. The Govemor will direct emergency operations through the regularly constituted Govemment structure.

2. Succession to the O.Tice of Governor is established in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the following order:

Lieutenant Governor President Pro Tumpore of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives

3. Succession to other State govemment officials' positions will be as provided for in the Emergency Interim-Executive and Judicial Succession Act of 1959 (P.L.1369) and included in the emergency plans of the agencies concemed.

4 The goveming body of all political subdivisions is responsible for the establishment of a government organization and for the development of emergency plans and continuity of govemment procedures to accomplish emergency responsibilities.

5. The Director of Civil Defense will maintain the State Primary Emerg Operations Center located in the Transportation and Safety Building, Harrisburg, ant.

alternate State Emergency Operations Center located at the Selinsgrove Center, Selinsgrove.

6. Heads of State offices, departments and agencies and heads of County and local Q :J l

L

government are responsible for developing and implementing plans and procedures for the protection and preservation of records essential for continuity of government q"~

operations.

B. Natural and Man-Made Disaster Operations

1. During natural and man-made disasters, the Director of Civil Defense, under the operational control of the Governor, will coordinate emergency operations from the State Primary Emergency Operations Center.

2. State agencies and activities having emerg::ncy responsibilities will provide representatives to the State Emergency Operations Center as required. When the State Primary Emergency Operations Center becomes operational, any of the three Civil Defense Area Emergency Operations Centers may be activated on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

C. War-Caused Disasters In the event of an attack warning, or an attack without warning, the Director of Civil Defense is authorized to act in the name of the Governor in directing emergencyservices operation until the arrival of the Governor at the emer1;ency operations center, or such other emergency operations site that may subsequently be designated.

D. Communications Communications networks necessary for the adequate control and coordination of emergency operations will be established, maintained and operated as set forth in the g

Communications Annex. (Annex H)

2. The dissemination of warning will take precedence over all other communications. (See Annex I)

XII MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT A. County and Local Directors of Civil Defense will develop mutual aid agreements with adjacent political subdivisions for reciprocal assistance in case of disaster. Such agreements must be consistent with State plans and programs.

B. In widespread major disasters, requests for mutual aid assistance will be referred to County / Area Civil Defense Directors for coordination to ensure that limited emergency rescuices are utilized in the most effective manner.

XIII EXECUTION A. This Plan is effective upon receipt as a basis for planning, operations, and recovery in emergency situations.

B. State support to county and local governments and coordination of emergency operations sill be accomplished by the Director of Civil Defense assisted by selected State agencies and departments.

C. Whether an impending disaster is predicted or strikes without warning, Civil Defense Area Directors will, to the extent the situation permits. evaluate the situation, assess requirements for assistanct. from State agencies, represent the Director of Civil Defense to county and local govemment emergency staffs and keep the Director of Civil Defense apprised of the situation and conditions in the area. Q}@

D. Those officials responsible for implementing this Pan have the additional responsibility for familiarizing themselves and their personnel with its contents and for developing effective procedures for emying out assigned tasks and functions. E. The Director of Civil Defense is responsible for maintaining and updating this Plan. F. Responsible officials at al! levels of gover ment should review and recommend changes as appropriate to the Director at any time. Oran K. Henderson Director of Civil Defense DISTRIBUTION Director, Region II, DCPA Director, Region III, FDAA Pennsylvania Departments and Agencies Civil Defense Area Directors County and Local Civil Defense Dirxtors 4 a b + Or nqq LJ U"> C0515tONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA g DISASTER OPERATIONS PLAN ANNEX A RESPONSIBILITIES L GENERAL A. Emergency responsibilities listed in this Annex were in general established by 5fanagemer Directive 720.I, Assignment of Emergency Responsibilities to Departments and Agencie: and were designed to support the mission and concepts of operations set forth in this plar They support emergency preparedness activities, emergency operational 2ctivities an emergency assistance activities. B. Agencies assigned emergency responsibilities are required to take action to develo contingency plans, capabilities, and procedures which will ensure responsive support c survival and recovery operations in a disaster situation. C. In addition to cevelopment of coatingency plans, State agencies will prepare and maintai current Standard Op,: rating Procedures (SOP). The SOP should include as a minimum th procedures for canying out the emergency respor.sibilities listed in this Annex. A copy e the agency SOP will oe forwarded to the State Council of Civil Defense for review and file D. Upon notification of the activation of the State Council of Civil Defense primar Emergency Operations Center, emergency representatives of designated agencies will repor to the State Emerger;cy Operations Center for the conduct of emergency operations. IL C0513f0N RESPONSIBILITIES A. In addition to those responsibilities listed in Section X of the basic plan, all State agencie and county and local governments have common responsibilities.

1. Pre-emergency traming of personnel.

2. Pr vision for protection of personnel.

s

3. Development of a system for alerting and warning agency personnel.

4. Transmission of emergency information to and from the State EOC.

5. Prctection of vital agency and governmental records.

6. The establishment oflines of sue:ession for key emergency services personnel.

7. The conduct of hazard analysis in area of responsibility, and maintenance of resource inventory.

8. If not assigned specific responsibility in this plan, support emergency opera ions withir.

{ =; their respective capabilities. 25 060 A-1

B. In addition, County and local governments will plan for feeding and lodging support in the operation of 5fobilization and Gateway sites (appendix 4) in publicly-owned / controlled facilities not otherwise committeed for emergency functions. IU. COUNTY AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITIES A. All public officials have an inherent moral duty, as well as a legal responsibility to ensure that their jurisdiction is prepared to cope with any potential disaster situation. Therefore, the development of appropriate emergency response capabilities and the direction and control of emergency operations when disaster strikes are special responsibilities of heads of county and local governments. B. Section 7 of the State Council ot' Civil Defense Act of 1951 states that. "Each political subdivision of this State is hereby authorized and directed to establish a local organization for civil defense in sccordance with the State Civil Defense plan and program Each local organization for civil defense shall have a Director who shall be appointed by the Governor upon the recommendation of the executive officer or governing body of the political subdivision. The Director shall be responsible for the organization, administration and operation of such local organization for civil defense, subject to the direction and control of such executive officer or governing body." C. Each County and Local Civil Defense Director, under the direction of respective elected officials, is responsible for establishing a civil defense organization within the political jurisdiction and carrying out the following responsibilities:

1. Emergency Planning Stovement of Support Forces - Develop plans for the movement of support forces a.

to emergency locations. These plan will include selection and operation of mobilization sites, procedures for control and coordination of movement, and information on gateways for emergency routing to disaster areas.

b. Afovement of People - Prepare plans for conducting operations involving movement of people from danger areas. This responsibility includes measures for control of movement such as development and issuance of movement instruction specifying areas to be evacuated, routes and destinations, traffic control, coordination among local agencies, and selection and activation of reception centers and sub-centers. All movement plans will be coordinated with Area Headquarters and, where appropriate, with adjacentjurisdictions.

Operation of Police Lines - Prepare plans and procedures for the operation of police. c. lines by county and local police forces.

d. Casualty Care Operations - Prepare plans and procedures for casualty care operations. To be considered are procedures for casualty care operations by hospitals, medical professionals and other treatment facilities in the jurisdiction; control and allocation of casualties among hospitals where large numbers of casualties are involved; and utilization of Packaged Disaster Hospitals.

5f ass Care Operations - Plan for conduct of mass care operations. This responsibility e. includes selection of mass care centers, advance arrangements with facility owners and operators, and maintenance of a listing of potential facilities for mass care and emergency feeding. County Civil Defense Directors are responsible for develeping and maintaining county-wide listings of disaster related hospital patients and fatalities and report these listings to Area Headquarters. A-2 5 {# /} or

f. Highway Traffic Control - Count'/ Civil Defense Directors are responsible for planning and executing the coordination of emergency traffic control measures and Q for assisting State Department o Transportation and State Police in the operation of r highway traffic regulation Local Civil Defense Directors are responsible for conducting actions requ i te control and redirect the movement of street and highway traffic in the vicini.I vf a disaster. Local personnel may be requested to assist in the operation of State eighway traffic regulation posts. g. Emergency Transportation - Plan for arrangement of emergency transportation of people, equipment, rnaterial and supplies. A resource listing will be maintained on transportation services available within the jurisdiction. Engineering Activities - Plan for providing technical advice and assistance on h. engineering matters to elected officials. Be prepared to investigate and make recommendations concerning possible emergency engineering problems, including information on amounts and sources of equipment, materials and supplies required for specific engineering projects. Resource listings will be maintained of the specialized types of equipment likely to be needed for emergency engineering work.

i. Public Information - Plan for the conduct of emergency information programs. This requires detailed planning and organizational work to establish close working relationships with all key news sources and news dissemination agencies. Advance arrangements will be made for dissemination of emergency information and instructions to the public and providing stand-by informational matenals to local newspapers, radio and television organizations.

'~ f. Emergency Supplies - Plan for and make advance arrangements for procurement of supplies which will be needed in an emergency. k. Resource Listings - Prepare and maintain a listing of all public and private resources that are available within the jurisdiction which could be utilized in time of emergency, included in the resource listing will be engineering and transportation equiprnent and facilities and services.

2. Training Each County and Local Civil Defense Director i: responsible for development and operation of a trauung and information program desgned to infcTn all civil defense personnel and local officials on the conduct of emergency operatt.'ns and to develop individual skills in emergency operational techniques. See Annex G for trair.ing assistance provided by the State Council of Civil Defense.

3. Emer2encv Operations Center (EOC)

To exercise effective coordination and control over disaster operations carried out within their jurisdiction, county and local civil defense organizations will establish basic headquarters facilities especially designed and equipped for the purpose. These facilities are known as " Emergency Operations Centers" (EOC).

4. Communications a.

Direction and control of emergency operations associated with enemy attack and major natural or man-made disasters require the utilization of all available functional communications facilities, both governmental and private. 25 052 A-3

b. See Appendix 4 to this Annex for tasks and functions relating to communications esconsibilities.

5. Volunteer Groues a.

Personnel Enrollment.Mablish and maintain a system of personnel enrollment for all persons, both employed and volunteer, involved in civil defense activities. The established system must conform with the procedures prescribed by the State Council of Civil Defense.

b. Community Support - Formulate arrangements for community support for emergency opetations by non-governmentalindividuals and organizations. Volunteer

- community support will be developed for emergency functions which do not have a normal day-to-day government counterpart, or where govemment resources may be inadequate. Where possible, existing non-government organizations with emergency capabilities should be made part of the civil defense organization. All support must be voluntary and seizure of private property is not authorized. c. Manpower Requirements - Make preparations for, and conduct recruitment measures to fill emergency manpower requirements that would be needed in an attack or disaster situation. This preparation will include an analysis of potential needs by skill level and technical background; pre-arrangement of enrollment procedures with potential scurces; and close liaison with the local office of the Bureau of Employment Security for additional sources of manpower.

6. Tests and Exercises Each County and Local Civil Defense Director is responsible for conducting tests and exercises of the various elements comprising the civil defense organization. See Annex G for assistance provided by the State Council of Civil Defense in meeting this responsibility.

D. Appendices 2,3 and 4, of this Annex, set forth the organizational facilities, functions and operations of county and local civil defense organizations. IV. STATE AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES A. State Council of Civil Defense _

1. Emergency Preparedness Activities Maintain 24 hour operational capability utilizing watch officer during non-duty a.

period.

b. Provide to Commonwealth departments and agencies technical information advice and assistance in the performance of plarming and organizational work essential to proper and effective discharge of their emergency responsibility assignments.

Or G4}- c_J U' A-4

Prodde to county and local government officials and representatives, general and c. specialized information conceming their emergency preparedness, operational and assistance responsibilities. including training in the performance of certam operational and assistan:e work and activities.

2. Emergency Operational Activities Disseminate to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Council Members, Departmental a.

and Agency Emergency Representatives, together with county and local govemments, as appropriate, precautionary notices, watches and warnings relating to actual or potential disasters and emergencies.

b. Operate the State and Area Emergency Operations Centers (EOC).

c. Provide overall coordination of increased readiness activities to include dissemination of increased readiness levels and warnings to State agencies, county and local governments, institutions, industry and citizens.

d. Prepare summary and special situation reports for use in the general direction and control of State, county and local emergency operations.

e. Draft emergency proclamations and State requests for Federal disaster,and emergency declarations and associated Federal assistance. EL f. Supply, or assistance in arrrngements for the emergency supply, of essential human and material assistance in State, county and local emergency operations. g. Provide er,ergency instructions and public information: (1) Disseminate emergency instructions and information. (2) Maintain a flow of official information and news,

h. Coominate radiological defense plans and operations to include:

(1) Radiological monitoring. (2) Radiological reporting. (3) Radiological situation evaluation. (4) Preparation and dissemination of timely information on the extent, intensity and duration of radiological fallout hazards. (5) Prediction of radiological fallout pattems within Pennsylvania and adjacent areas. (6) Advice on allowable radiological exposures and decontamination procedures. ... = - CHANGEI OCT.1977 25 054 A_s

(7) Damage effects estimation.

i. Coordinate with Federal government agencies and adjacent States as required.

3. Emergency Assistance Activities Disseminate general and specialized information conceming State and Federal a.

emergency assistance available to both public and private agencies and organizations, as well as individuals and families.

b. Supply to County and Local govemments information, advice and assistance in preparation and filing of applications for Federal Community Disaster Loans.

B. Office of Administration

1. Emergency Preparedness Activities Develop policies and procedures for emergency expenditures, with special attention a.

to financial accounting requirements. b. Develop and disseminate policies and procedures for identification, preservation and recovery of vital records, including but not limited to paper, microfilm, magnetic tape, charts, maps and photographs. Technical advice to local govemments and non-profit organizations on records c. TCCoVerY. d. Develop and disseminate policies and procedures for prc:ection of data processing and. communications facilities from disaster and to recovery of such facilities from disaster.

2. Emergency Operational Activities Assignment of Commonwealth employes to temporary duty with State departments a.

and agencies other than those by which they are normally employed, for the performance of specific and essential disaster operational or assistance work and, activities. b. In coordination with the Civil Service Commission, recruitment of temporary employes needed by State agencies for the performance of essential administrative work and activities associated with disaster recovery.

3. Emergency Assistance Activities Estaolishment and operation, as requested by the State Council of Civil Defense and a.

with necessary assistance on the part of other State departments and agencies, of State disastccinformation and assistance centers forindividuals and families.* b. Provide assistance to agencies in the restoration of normal telephone and radio communication after a disaster. C. Office of the Budcet 25 065 y

1. Emergency Preparedness Activities h

No assignment to this category.

2. Emergency Operational Activities Transfer, as directed by the Govemor, of Commonwealth funds to State departments and agencies for specified emergency operational purposes.

3. Emergency Assistance Activities Overall allocation of available funds to State departments and agencies for use in a.

authorized disaster assistance activities. b. Supply, to the Govemor, advice and assistance in matters relating to the receipt, custody, disbursement and accounting of funds. contributed to the Commonwealth, and used for disaster relief purposes. D. Govemor's Enemy Council

1. Emergency Preparedness Activities

/ Preparation of a Contingency Plan for energy shortage emergencies. /i5. / /

2. Emergency Operational Activities s

Collection and centralized reporting to the State Council of Civil Defense of a. / infonnation and data concerning anticipated or existing energy problems, including selvice disruptions and supp'y shortages.* b. Allocation of fuel, under a priority system established at the time, to affected Commonwealth communities.

3. Emergency Assistance Activities Supply of technical advice and assistance in planning long-range redevelopment conceming supply of energy.

E. Office of State Planning and Development

1. Emergency Preparedness Actisities Action designed to assure the inclusion of due and appropriate provisions for basic and essential emergency preparedness measure, e.g., flood control, flood plain management, etc., in all major Commonwealth planning projects.

• See Matrix in Appendix 1 foragencies with related responsibilities Note that the State agency h primary responsibility is denoted by the letter "P" aving u-

') r g ((3 CHANGE 1 LJ A-7 OCT.1977

2. Emergency Operational Activities No assignment to this category.

3. Emergency Assistance Activities a.

Analysis of overall disaster effects as related to possible need for major, long-range recovery plans and programs, particularly within areas embracing two or more political subdivisions.*

b. Coordination of State, county and local economic recovery programs within disaster areas, the same to include assistance in the establishment of Recovery Planning Councils.*

F. Govemor's Press Secretarv's Office

1. Emergen.,/ Preparedness Activities Action designed to assure due and appropriate dissemination of essential information concerning major Commonwealth emergency preparedness activities, including announcements of new or revised policies.

2. Emergency Operational Activities Supply, to the State Council of Civil Defense as requested, of assistance in public information activities associated with Commonwealth emergency operations of major proportions.

3. Emegency Assistance Activities No assignment to this category.

G. Department of Agriculture

1. Emergency Preparedness Activities a.

Dissemination of information conceming the importance and availability of flood insurance to rural residents to include the preparation of specialized or other material required for the purpose.'

b. Collection or preparation and appropriate advance dissemination of informational materials conceming the emergency protection and disaster rehabditation in rural areas, including people, livestock, buildings, facilities and equipment.

2. Emergency Operational Activities a.

Collection and centralized reporting, to the State Council of Civil Defense, of information and data conceming farm and agricultural damage and problems; and the disruption of dairy products, food supply and distribution services.*

b. Assistance in the alleviation of immediate farm and agricultural problems, including disruption of dairy and food supply and distribution services.

c. Supply of technical advice and assistance in inspection and necessary disposal of damaged or contaminated foodstuffs and commodities.* 7I Ov'7 cJ A4

d. Frovide Response Team Representatives to the 3 tate Council of Civil Defense Energency Operations Centers to assist in the coordination of emergency operacons.

3. Emergency Assistance Activities a.

Assistance in specialized damage survey and reporting work and activities prerequisite to filing of State requests for Federal aid to residents of rural areas. b. Preparation and public dissemination of essential information concerning the avai; ability of Federal farm assistance and the procedures to be followed in applying for such id. c. Development and implementation of special State farm aid programs designed to assist in alleviating unusual disaster problems within agricultural areas. d. Supply of information, advice and assistance to residents of rural areas in matters relating to filing applications for emergency aid and submission of property insurance claims. H. Decartment of the Auditor General

1. Emergency Preparedness Activities No assignment to this category

,ft

2. Emergency Operational Activities No assignment to this category.

3. Emergency Assistance Activities Audit, pursuant to the provisions of Federal-State Disaster Assistance Agreements, of State, county, local and other expenditures of Federal disaster assistance funds " passed through" the Commonwealth.

I. Department of Bankine

l. Emergency Preparedness Activities Assistance in supply of general or specialized information conceming the Federal Flood Insurance Program to banks and other financial institutions and agencies.*

2. Emergency Operational Activities a.

Collection and centralized reporting to the State Council of Civil Defense of ger.eral information and data concermrg damage to financial institutions and agencies, including particularly major disruption of services rendered by such institution; and agencies.* b. Assistance in arrangements for the temporarv emergency supply of banking services in stricken communities.*

3. Emergency Assistance Activities v.

C riA i G E 1 A-9 7E O 4 "D OCT.1977 cJ uv

a. DissemMation of general or specialized information conccming availability of emergency financial assistar.ce (Small Business Administration, Farmers Home Administration and other loans) to disaster victims, including both individuals and public and private agencies and organizations.* b. Supply, to State departments and agencies and county and local governments, of professicnal advice and assistance relatir g to financial aspects of economic recovery projects within disaster areas.* J. Department of Commerce 1. Emergency Preparedness Activities Dissemination of information conceming importance and availability of flood insurance to business, industrial and commercial organizations, to include the preparation of specialized or othet material required for the purpose.*

2. Emergency Operational Activities Collection and 'centrilized reporting to the State Council of Civil Defense, of a.

information and data conceming disaster damage to, or disruption of, business, industrial and commercial facilities and services.* b. Provide Response Team Representatives to the State Council of Civil Defense Emergency Operations Centers to assist in the coordination of emergency operations.

3. Emergency Assistance Activities Dissemination of general or specialized information concerning availability of a.

emergency financial assistance (Small Business Administration, Economic Recovery Administration and other loans) to business, industrial and commercial organizations adversely affected by disasters.* b. Supply, to business, industrial and commercial organizations, of assistance in the acquisition of excess and surplus Federal property made available for distribution and use in disaster situations.* c. Supply, to business, industrial and commercial organizations, of advice and assistance in matters relating to temporary or pennanent relocation of establishments and facilities adversely affected by disasters. d. Preparation, as directed by the Govemor, of requests for Federai implementation of temporary emergency allocation measures goveming the supply of' construction materials within disaster areas. c. Development and implementation, when au thorized, of specialized disaster assistance programs for business. industrial and commercial organizations. f. Supply, to State departments and agencies and county and local governments. of advice and assistance in business industrial and commercial aspects of economic recovery projects within disaster areas." K. Decariment of Community Affairs "c J 059 A-10

1. Emergency Preparedness Activities ehe, u a.

Supply, to c

y and local govemment officials, of information, advice and assistance in ers relating to the establishment of eligibility to participate in the Federal Floo, arance Program.

b. Supply to Commonwealth departments and agencies oflistings of those county and local govemments which have established eligibility to participate in the Federal Flood Insurance Program.

Initiate steps designed to assure the incorpora: ion of essential and appropriate flood c. control and flood plain management provisions in community redevelopment and recreational facilities development plans and programs, particularly those to which the Commonwealth may make financial contributions.*

2. Emergency Operational Activities Collection and centralized reporting, to the State Council of Civil Defense, of a.

information and data concerning disaster and emergency damage to community redevelopmentt and recreational facilities and the possible need for temporary emergency housing.

b. Conduct, as requested by the State Council of Civil Defense, special field surveys of a municipal nature.*

Conduct special surveys designed to determine needs for emergency housing, the s c. gg.y supply of temporary emergency transportation, and similar specialized community services, to include preparatiori ni filing, or assistance in the preparation and filing, of requests for Federal assistance.* d. Integrate personnel and material assets of the ten Uniform Substate Regional Planning Agencies into the overall Commonwealth n sponse to the emergency situation. Provide Response Team Representatives to the State Council of Civil Defense e. Emergency Operations Centers to assist in the coordination of emergency operations.

3. Emergency Assistance Activities No assignment to this category.

L Decartment of Education

1. Emergency Preparedness Activities Development and dissemination of general policy information conceming emergency a.

use of public educational facilities for disaster relief purposes. b. Dissemination of information conceming importance and availability of flood insurance to educationalinstitutions.* Further the aims and objectives of emergency preparedness by the inclusien in the c. curnculum of appropriate civil defense material. CHANGE 1 5 00 A-I l ocT. i977

2. Emergency Operationa! Activities a.

Collection and centralized reporting, to the State Council of Civil Defense, information and data concemiag disaster damage to and disruption of public and pnvate educational systems and facilities.* b. General direction and essential support of emergency operations involving the use of State educational facilities for disaster relief purposes. c. Provide Response Team Representatives to the State Council of Civil Defense Emergency Operations Centers to assist in the coordination of emergency operations.

3. Emergency Assistance Activit;es Dissemination of information concerning the availability of emergency financial a.

assistance, notably that provided by U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, to public and private educationalinstitutions adversely affected by disasters.* b. Supply, as requested by the State Council of Civil Defense, professional engineering assistance in those educational facility damage survey and reporting activities which are prerequisite to the preparation and filing of Federal Disaster Assistance Project Application, to include assistance in the inspection of completed repair and replacement work.* Preparation and submission, on assistance in the preparation and submission, of c. applications for specialized educational assistance grants sometimes authorized.n disaster situations and of Fedem! Disaster Assistance Project Applications filed by or on behalf of State and private non-profit educational institutions.* d. Supply, as requested oy county and local agencies, professional advice and assistance in development of specialized training programs designed to assist disaster victims in meeting qualifications for employment in new fields of endeavor. M. Derartment of Environmental Resources 1. Emergency Preparedness Activities Supply, to Commonwealth departments and agencies as requested, technical advice and assistance in matters relating to flood control and flood plain management.

2. Emergency Operational Activities Collection and centralized reporting, to the State Council of Civil Defense, of a.

information conceming emergency conditions and problems, to include specifically reports of damage to State-owned flood control, forest, park and recreational facilities and to public water supply and sewage disposal systems and facilities.*

b. Supply of technical advice and assistance in the emergency protection of flood control structural integrity of dams, repair or replacement of public water supply and sewage disposal systems and facilities.

c. Conduct surveys of public health hazards, actual or potential, to include the submission of reports of findings to the State Council of Civil Defense, State Department of Health and county and local officials, as appropriate.' A-12 7r n71 c.J U. I

hh Ih EMERGEHCY CONDITIONS Pt C Table 1 Emergency Classification _Descrip tion Conditions Possible Actions Personn.1 involves accidents or incidents a) Personnel injuries may involve Emergency Treatment of is the_rgecn concerning one or more indivi-contamination or excessive ra-dividuals. Possible act duals and/or protective evacu-diation exposures. vation of first aid team or Local ation of one or more buildings. b) More than 1 radiation and/or ambulance and med-iWei enc ~~ ~s~ y A personnel emergency may monitor in a single building cal services. require local off site services reaches their alarm setpoint. Local area evacuation. such as fire, police, anbulance c) Report of an unexpected Possible evacuation of at or medical. increase in the level of entire building or the et This category includes injuries radiation or airborne trolled area. Perform pt which may be complicated by ra-activity in a work area. sonnel accountability foi dioactive contamination or ex-d) Report of a radioactive spill the affected areas. ilRC cessive radiation exposure. Flooding or localized fire, in a work area. tification. e) that could affect a release of radioactivity. L aJ 16 Site A Site emergency exists upon a) A unit vent gas monitor in-Evacuation of all affecte 15EToency the occurrence of an incident dicated 100 times the instan-buildings. Accountabilf t which could potentially re-taneous release limit spect-of evacuees. State noti-sult in an uncontrolled release fled in the technical spe-fications. Perimeter mon of radioactivity to the inrnedi-cifications. toring. HRC noufication a te environment. Such an emer-b) The radiation level at the Possible off-site protect gency may require site evacua-station security fence is actions. fi tion by personnel not essential 125 mR/hr. y T to combating the emergency. c) Loss of primary coolant pres-w This emergency is a potential sure, coincident with high c3 off-site hazard which could reactor building pressure and/ m result in an ef f-site radio-or high reactor building sump S N logical dose. level. ( d) Reactor building evacuation 3 alarm from the source range in-strumentation (Unit 1 manual initiation (Unit 2).

ri ol, en he mosal Emntb osi e eeiEs g ttt s s a iia o s n p Ssc . p o i c i g rfft s t n efi ea l pot c i A d o .n l e ssfCo e c au Ro l l e l s b r sp.i i p r g,s s oynea s e icit o e tnraS P S ceotC A gt S E sf: n - aose y ie eh t g e d t d u d esn .h a x o r amd e Re yriamt5 b i ecoxrr 2 d e he s y l t s bnme at 1 as setl ha e sg e hl a >_ re 0t o g h yn ir tSi grsga l t 7imh l roni ho d. l s t a sew ie ohhei nc d R t f gl t gi o ni n wmei gv ei ee m ent giey ud c th5 e nn iue io mrbv y oinhl r l n c ct2R ce di a fi dm ro e d at e n td nd r nd / e l f jm 5 ei n o l oon er C ooe I ia lit e e ua gsaciti u o u rrrr u r anal r uit o dt pf ao bn org n a hMan e a d gb nab ii3 / i m en oi un~ e d yd rg g pi t s o .ines enrirmd n qo 0 t nrn n n t emhos eawo ao .im1 iiaa o o cgr lhl ot aRirl x swd i a C i awcl cn th n A - nnd anaet o r el t anea/eo ealhawo i RraTitt eddoeahtRhi n wul f f f ooo d ne f R gT s m T t Gaee - Odbr 1 n ern o ) ) e C_ c f l eh) ) ) l Acbt a b c ba T s re oce tfnh sn c et neo nl u oii i a qf i ct ieot na nts aei a n n y n gt eoti ai st ced n. io frtis pl aor n y asoot e cec Cppi nhid pmt et gn uoc g oa.sr a rsl c p eaohie e n mhitl t rv o e dlbioi i d haausft t e l crep - c p u ai h f se i n rhs lf et r i ewueaodo c t n ohr ir s n etit ehvp e o Gnr nt o D C eeoeirf Adst gwpo no i yt ca nc y ei c y J u Owt gf n c r ri e l n es g a e ms e,r r n Ea t e e r im n e l C_ St eg GE ,g! , m" gl, gg j.

ATTACHMENT D Excerpts from 1. EPA-520/1-75-001, " Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents," September 1975. 2. EPA-520/6-74-002, " Evacuation Risks - An Evaluation," June 1974. 25 074

EPA-520/1-75-001 W ?d

c. ;2

+ 5 ? 'IT4 s$. Manual of 3%. Protective Action Guides n and

e. m m

Protective Actions for $'g Nuclear Incidents 3 iG'Q p A September 1975 c-a .m

p Received Nuc!eer P. ming g 6

SEP Ubrary1973 wb Washim42, D. C. M a e Environmental Protection Agency ? Office cf Radiation Progra=s Environmental Analysis Division Washington, D. C. 20460 J, ~ S D LJ b

s I ? 1 0l J

M_

j . UI -= i 'T l response are not required, which steps can be answered on the basis ..;r .{ of prior judg=ents, and which re=ain to be decided in an actual i .a l1 8 energency. From this exercise, it is then possible to devise a EI set or several sets of operational plans which can be called out to 3 W 'l [] answer the spectrum of hazardous situations which nay develop. p

4 In the case of an accident at a nuclear reactor, a hazardous if

[ ] situation could develop which may have public health implications I [j over a large area with diverse populations and population densities. i r i jl! Probably little ti=e will be available to cake decisions. The t i availability of " action guides" based on sdvance planning will facili- =G l f tate rational decisions in energency situations. During the planning i i stage, the responsible public official must consider the total range "s .-1 of possible release scenarios and consider in each what goals are j l-achievable keeping in mind both fiscal and societal costs. Because ,f of this knowledge of local conditions, he will be aware of any con-

7. '

straints which =ay restrict his scope of response, such as specific b8 industries, institutions, traffic patterns, etc. He will then be able '- t .a-) to select the opti=um response for each situation. } Ej 1.2 Nature of Protective Action Guides, Protective Action, and Restorative g Action ~t a -,k Protective Action Guides are the.nEnerical projected doses which 6 i act as trigger points to initiate protective action. p FAGS nust be provided for three broad pathways of radiation 1 l exposure: (1) Exposure fron airbetne radiometive releases. This type of 'i j exposure could occur within a short period folicwing an } i 25 076 'l 1.3 5

P [l ji i.l I h; j

D f

9l d 4' ? . I il ;< t

m incident as a result of inhalation of radioactive =aterials il!

] d I;9. c or fro = external whole body exposure. { a l i 3 (2) Exposure through the: food chain. This expobr wi.ll be j t .,f w a+ s., ll;; E from ingestion of conta=inated foodstuff and water. It 1; 0

• r s

=ay co==ence shortly after the passage of airborne radio- -l;l.] [ active =sterials and =ay'continu'e fofilong or short j ~~ e a -,3 '{

7, time depending on the radionuclides involved.

h, 'a a g(Nji (3) Exposure fro = radioactive =aterials deposited on the ground. l 3y Here we are dealing with a change in background radiation .I y b J I 5 levels, and exposure pathways =ay include inhalation, p k 4 ': [ ingestion, and external whole body exposures. f f' 'lj '!. i O 3 Different PAGs =ust be developed for each pathway of exposure I ) 3 since different criteria of risk, cost, and benefit are involved.. J,Ir J a q~ j Each exposure pathway would involve different sets of protective or [I 4 g y restorative actions as indicated in table 1.1. Each action listed f l la, v 3 applies to the general population except for prophylaxis, respiratory J.g. i P p' j protection, and protective clothing. These actions would pri=arily [ I } apply to e=ergency workers. !j. u. hl. 1 g Exposure to the airborne plu=e is related to the duration of a g! 7 J release into the at=osphere. While release durations as long as y; I 40 d 30 days or = ore are theoretically possible, for e=ergency purposes, jL [j' i y 3 release durations of a few hours up to a few days are = ore realistic. 'l r ( Protective action to be taken for this pathway =ay include any or all i i of the following: I i .t. h ;!, ) c. [J 0/l i;I l.4

x" 7 I (J G O /_' O O m r U E x Evacuation 3 <3 m C :'.t r-

.- M f

mc e e Proniwlaxis n A nn o ---Respiratory pe m

n Protection er c

n k s Clothing a E-Control Access r b n c- {s o Stop._ Protective ,e g ,\\- o L-nn C Actions no

r

-n 9 7 Reentry oD n P n a Decontamination mr o Contro) Foods Q p t o. e, p L ^ e c -o C l Y,.- t 'w m x e m Reserves m o x Alternate > "o L1 e n C o nn n e Source -e o y. 0 0 n Decontamination - n o Diversion _ cy= p p o N e G Destruction s m n N O' M iv o C

F O

O a. m C CC .T r+

c..

E ih r R.- = m n n C gb C >m Slop _ Protective Q" Actions 7Q ,E S-c =n D n L*J W p ,Y n 4 e D n n t O C w, M h ? m x e ? m

• c m

Evacuation Sk I; > n ' -;rol Access j E$ , Y o ae Li M e n ~ O oo nB h. MO 3 o u, e cy mU es or C C r nU n C. g o P >m S tpL_I_o_te ctive e e 0 Actions rn! "o k_. nc i kr:- t om t Deconta..ination a i p n E, n mr Reentry n I m D j. a:

3 71a

n s

-:$3 (1) evacuation, gg F:1 '3 (2) respiratory protection, j_ M Jf 8! (3)

shelter, (4) prophylaxis (thyroid protection), and

({e 11 (5) controlled access. '"E JF Restorativa actions would then include: (1) reentry first by survey and decontamination tea =s, 51 -}' (2) removal of respiratory protection, ]ML 22 (3) exit from shelters, h cg (4) stopping prophylactic measures, and ->d si (5) allowing free access by the population. 3h j Exposure through the food chain =ay be either short ters or 1x; chronic depending on the characteristics and half-lives of the .d: ?.m 2: il radionuclides involved. Control of this pathway of exposure would ~2 ef M.r be by:

j

/j[ (1) control of access to contacinated animal feeds, x S3, (2) decontacination of certain foodstuffs, ST f?][ (3) diversion and storage to allow decay of short half-life P;ar radionuclides, and cc .g i-(4) destruction of contaminated foods. Tc Exposure from =aterials deposited on the ground night also be hff either short ters or chronic depending on the radionuclides involved.

3-jj Protective actions would include:

Y$ .3 7H 'M = f !R Vf oc p' ~'i 9 'J 1.6 .3 ~- s

1y .i e d = d (1) evacuation, and ~;. s_q[ (2) controlled access. $j r Since the problem for ground conta=ination involves an increase U in background levels, denial of access =ight continue for extended n sv lj; periods of ti=e. Decontamination =ay then be the only action _ wh_ich _~ ~ _ a eb will allow free access to and utilization of conta=inated areas within

a qh a short time. Restorative actions would be reentry, decontamination, O

~h and lifting of controls. 9n 3 The PAGs are to provide standardized criteria for selecting i s g, predeter=ined actions at the isacrifice of sene flexibility in g. \\ balancing the risk of health e,ffects versus the ef fects of protective f actions during an e=erger.cy. The loss of flexibility in response is a expected to be within the limits of accuracy of deter =ining the y 1, factors involved. The loss of flexibility is also offset by the 3 i advantage of being able to respond to the i=nediacy of the risks in h y y the case of an e=ergency. L The range of PAG values allows consideration for local constraints d ,} during planning for i=plementation. PACS should be assigned for each I site to assure that local constraints are properly introduced. ' 5 i g 1.3 Protective Action Decision Making 4, 4 A nuclear incident as defined herein refers to a series of events j leading to the release of radioactive =aterials into the environ =ent of 2 } sufficient =agnitude to warrant consideration of protective actions. 1 Protective actions are those actions taken following a nuclear incident d i I o r, 030 La 1.7

=r 23 .Ek that are intended to einimize the radiation exposure of the general -g m d[ public resulting froc incidents. R $[ The decision to initiate a protective action =ay be a co= plex [1 process with the benefits of taking the action being weighed against v 'fR, the risks and constraints involved in taking the action. In addition, fj' i { the decision will likely ba =ade under difficult e=ergency conditions, 5y probably with little detailed information available. Therefore, 7 'f considerable planning is necessary to reduce to manageable levels the w .]'

f.,i types of decisions leading to effective responses to protect t he public in the event of a nuclear incident.

s t;. 1.3.1 Action Factors 0: 23 Within the context of nuclear incidents, a wide variety of tg possible situations =ay develop. Some perspective of the needs of the w Jri-responsible planning officer can be shown in a brief description of ] 5asically, the officer cust balance proble=s the factors involved. d[' 2) involving identification of the =agnitude of the release, possible f pathways to the population at risk, how much time is available to take 4: j action, what action to take, and what the effects night be. M C, 1.3.2 Incident Determinations 3 3' The first problem to arise will be that of identifying the type of i 3l incident and the =agrttude of the release. Nuclear incidents =ay be 1. 3 extre=ely variable a:'d may range fros very s=all releases having no 5 measurable consequences offsite to large scale releases possibly dq involving large populations and areas. Responses cust be appropriate y to the incident reported. 9 11 1 , :J na1 1 1.8 c Uu

1 One of the variables will be the source term, which refers to j i aterial. the characteristics and release rate of the radioact ve cld The amounts and types of radionuclides available for release shou What is actually being be t=nediately calculable by site personnel. firmed released to the envirocrent can be estimated but may not be con k for some ti=e after the incident. l The magnitude and duration of the release may be estinated by y f the type site personnel fres plant conditions or from knowledge o i However, the esti= ate may be highly i of incident that has occurred. d offsite uncertain and cust be updated on the basis of onsite an j d safeguards, conitoring observations and operational status of engineere si t '- not available i=nediately, default a ...__; tie-i inese values could 7 N i lues should be available frca plann4.ng efforts. 'N ), design basis acci-be based on accident scenarios fro

• ASH-1400 E

i for individual h ents evaluated in the NRC safety evaluation report ~~ios appropriate for a specif,igJacility. i w 4 facill. ;, The second cajor variable vill be where the released material :.s J j l Meteorology and geography will affect this variable. 1 $I expected to go. Current ceteorological conditions can be observei directly at the site n 2 However, complete meteorological data will and relevant locaticus. m Ji 5, d }3. never be available, and extension of observed data cust be ca e to 5 the course of released caterial. predict Current weather conditions may restrict the options for respense, 2I i=possible. Weather e.g., evacuation in a bli :ard may be reduced or a 2 M n 1 1 1 n( o i 1.9 h__ q ~U U' ~ L =

..3

g p __

1 '1 2 .A d. = h forecasts have all of the inherent uncertainty of the current condition ff, esti=ates since th_f are derived fro = these. +2 Geography is i=portant both in its influence on =eteorology and .d., il on de=ography and in its influence on value judg=ents to be =ade. 3 .tg The planning for a coastal site or a river valley site =ay be different il 3 due to road patterns and cethods for co=r.unicating or applying protec-0 gi tive actions. 'n De=ography is a variable to be considered during the planning a ?$,g stage. De=ography is of nost i=portance in helping to assess the -4 possible impact of an incident. Population nc=bers, age distribution, El distribution within an area, etc., will have co=e influence on responses z, cvailable in any situation. h w Providing for the ability to detect and ceasure a release are u .N gj important factors for planning. Although it =ay be possible to detect w Ti releases and =easure release rates at the sit, infor=ation fro = environ-51 4g = ental =easure=ents will be needed to cuafir= any estinates cade on the F A basis of onsite =easure=ents. Detectica and =easure=ent at locations

rc

-3 offsite are necessary to update and/or confic= predictions cbout the n:t -??

s

=ovecer.t of the release in the enviren=ent. Locations for installed N kk equip =ent =ust be planned, probably on the basis of average area 6 3 =eteorology. Instru=entation needs are discussed in =cre detail in 2 = Appendix A. =t m.a ',4 The source ter=, ceteorology, and geography paraceters are utilized in =aking a prediction of the path and ti=e profile for the a -s32 N 3 25 093

]

1.10 1

i) I q J .kv 'h

%'j of exposure in the short run.

However, th_ gastrointestinal syste= .w h =ust ba considered for longer ter= ingestion of contaminated drinking &d water. am Q Ingestion of food is an i=portant exposure pathway. However, y 9; with the possible exception of drinking water, = ilk, and conta=inated A leafy vegetables, entry of released =aterials into food and passage a$ along this pathway is delayed. Identification of sensitive points A for control should be made during planning. P

i i

l' Characterization of release caterials involved in air, water, .S

3Q and food pathways will not be done for some ti=e after an accident.

d] The initial decisions will have to be made on the basis of esti=ates %{ developed in planning and codified as real infor=aticn becomes w# available. Direct external whole body radiation exposure may be a hazard. 3 M Released caterial deposited in soil or water or suspended in air and ".~4J i material still at the site serve as sources of direct radiation, =ostly O 4 by ga==a and beta radiations. Although exposure rate =ay be =easured d g directly at siscific locations, the distribution must be esti=ated and ^l. J the estimates,2pdated on the basis of =onitoring data. Fairly co=plete =onitoring vill be needed during 'mplementation of restorative actions. Soil cont:nination, in addition to providing part of the di act k whole body exposure, also provides a contribution to the air pathway. xh Released caterial deposited on soil can be resuspended, thus possibly 1 .jg x$ 70 Obk v 1.12

j d -2 r= j{ entering the air, water, and food pathways. Evaluation of these 21 j hazards will be particularly i=portant in deciding appropriate M 09 actions during the restoration phase, e.g., level.:f deconta=ination ca 3 91 I needed. M (( 1.3.4 Poculations at Risk 5b ,;a ; The next consideration of importance to the responsible official

.r

$h, is what population is to be protected. Prior judg=ent and planning .x ]$, y based on the geography and de=ography of the area around the site nw qp and on critical pathways are essential to identifying populations S 73 at greatest risk. .bb The average population is =ade up of persons with varying ?. /j ! sensitivities to radiation exposure, and responses may be keyed to the = cst sensitive, or responses may be restricted, depending on 14 i ar m ad characteristics of the local population. =d {},i (1) For purposes of response planning, the general population 45 C3 will be evaluated on the basis of risk to individuals withia

i s;e t

C% the population, usually on the basis of avoiding clinical "Al

{

effects. However, the population as a whole will also be ~;. 2, considered in planni,ng sone responses on the basis of jd[ statistical risk of somatic and/or genetic effects.

1. 1 I"

I, (2) Sensitive populations =ay be considered on a special basis.

• S g

Children, including the fetus and unborn c!ildren, are d,g, generally = ore sensitive than healthy adults. For this .: aw [25 reason, such cenbers of the population may be selected .=. =m .M %;m 25 035 ne .rw M 1.13

J ,b j, sensitive receptors or as a special either as the cost a group fo-protection. r These ) (3) Selected populations will also be present. populations =ay be selected on voluntary or involuntary i i bases. Workers at a nuclear facility are classified as radiation workers and fall under different criteria for A protection than the general population. Those persons who q are engaged in public service activities during or af ter I { the accident are voluntarily placing themselves under different criteria for protection than the general popula-J i tion. Finally, so=e persons are involuntarily included u under ditferent criteria because the risk of taking action 1 a is different than for the general population. This involuntarily selected population cay include bedridden kN and critically ill patients, patients in intensive care Tj ) units, prisoners, etc. k i 1.3.5 Radiation Effects A final para:eter which must be considered is radiation ef fects. 2 E N 3 These may fall into two categories, early or delayed, but are not 1 ) cutually exclusive. 3 Early (acute) effects, occurring within 90 days, may include ( (1) .~- fatalities, sy= proms of radiation sickness, or clinically 2 t detectable changes. Efforts to protect selected populations ij will extend to prevention of fatalitics, mini =1:ation of 1 5 t 4 7 7G 'l G () 6a 2 ca m S 1.14 i

T i I I sy=pto=s of radiation sickness in radiation workers and I public service personnel, and prevention of clinically detectable changes of uncertain significance in the rest of the population. The basis for decisions regarding early l i effects is not hard to justify because of the 4-4nence l' of such effects. Ecwever, they cust be =ade rapidly under E F [ conditions of co=peting needs to protect the public. Ij (2) Delayed statistical effects (i.e., biological effects which I can only be observed on a statistical basis) will occur r l 4 at rando in a population after exposure to released =aterials. These ef f ects =sy be f atalities or disabilities of so=atic or genetic origin. The incidence of these f effects is esti=sted on the basis of statistical evaluation I of epide=iological studies in groups of people who had been exposed to radiation. Decisions concerning statist: cal i I ef fects on populations will be core difficult because of the lack of i==ediacy of the effects. But in the long run, these effects might cause the greatest i= pact on the 7 l general population. I i The response ti=es, actions to consider, and possible health i 4 effects for each pathway are shown in table 1.2 for a typical pcpulation. Effects on ani=als, vegetation, or real estate are also pcssible g but =ay be controlled or s.11eviated to the extent that deconta=ination is e= ployed o. that destruction of the affected ite=s is e= ployed. t i 25 037 1 1.15 j t

.31 N.J f .-3 1 mp A Table 1.2 Action and Health Effects wa Versus Exposure Pathways .f..- a [bj Exposure Respense Acticn Public ',2 ; Path <ay Time Available Health 73 Effects tu' l Q Air - Particulate Min - Er P D ~;y Gas Min - Er P F,E,D 7, ! G ' Water - Particulate 373 Raincut Er - Da P D m ' Fallout Min - Er P D ~_j I:=ersion Day P&R ' D,F,E"-~, m A Fced - Milk Da - !!o P&R D .4 Drinking Water Hr - Mo P&R D Beverages Da - Mo P&R D -h ! Fcodstuffs Da - Mo P&R D Gl aty; Soil - Resuspensien Da R ,_D__..______ y Direct Min - Da F&R ,___E,D,F____ z.A. t r#f Direct - Facility Min P&R F,E,D J; Air Min - Er P F,E,D ___ G_ W. +.,. u. o&R __ _D, F, E 93 Mse> Actions: P - Protective R - Restorative Effects: F - P.apid Fatality E - Early D - Delayed h p r .,6A .9 ^ 'h F a 7< b 4 ,h ,*j P Ij ', 5 J. ~2 12 A Y' r 74 e

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l.4 Response Plan Action Times so1 yf3' A typical sequence of events for developing e=ergency plans and ]

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responding to nuclear incidents is shown in figure 1.1. This figure $2h illustrates the general order of events but not relative lengths of -N i f3 ; time for each event. These vill vary according to individual circu=- 1 : fjj[ stances. --m 'ih3 1.4.1 Preparation of Plans - 4 ..$.M Considerable preparation will be required to ensure the adequacy q'- of e=ergency response plans. This preparatory ti=e includes the g

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j following ele =ents: 1 1 J (1) The decision =ust be =ade to prepare e=ergency response plans ( y according to the legislative candates or needs within a 1 given State. 5j (2) Then basic plans should be developed using appropriate I guidance from this canual and the AEC " Guide and Checklf ~' ( 2_). q These plans should include e=ergency response actions for R coping with nuclear incidents and directions on the use of 0

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EPA Protective Action Guides for these situations. J y (3) These plans should be approved by responsible persons or i i agencies. .Ff (4) Scenarios =ust be developed from the basic plans to cover v [] cajor contingencies which can be identified. .c Methods of i=ple=entation =ust be prepared and tested so that nonviable responses and contingency plans =ay be identified and dis-h carded. This discarding of nonviable responses may be based in part 1 2J 039 1 1.17 l.

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RESPONSE

T' L A PJ fJ l fJ G ltJCIDEfJT l1 E S P O fl S E i EMEllGEtJCY PROTECTIOtJ f1ES10 RAT 10tJ Preliminary evalu-Develop emergency response atton of incident pl a'i and projected doses Field monitoring and continuing evaluation tr n per o and test plan of exposure pathways, population al risk, dose projections, PAGs, and protective actions Activate State emergency plan Protective action decision s Review of Protective Action Restorative e plan Initiated Implernented Action h h/p n o e e f Notify State Decision to Acceptance authorities Radiation prepare emer-of returris to gency response plan (D guide levels plan = A = e -~ = Projected Dose Time flotification time Response time =- Implementation time Time before population exposure (Ideally protective actions would be implemented during this time.) N Possible accumulation of projected dose before initiation of protective action j Partial accumulatica and partial avoidance of projected dose Cl Time in which projected dose is avoided by protective actinn Partial accumulation of projected dose during restoration i -2 ca FIGURE 1.1 SEQUEllCE OF EVEllTS FOR RESP 0flSE PLAllllll1G AtlD RESP 0r1DitlG TO IluCLEAR IflCIDEtiTS

? N 1a ,j en evaluation of local constraints. For exa=ple, evacuation of ?? f3 prisoners or critically ill persons =ight not be considered viable 54 5 while alternative protective actions may be at least partially iT effective. A

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$j[ Develop =ent of the basic emergency response plan =ay run a course RN f.q?' of several conths or longer. However, planning should be a continuing .o g; activity af ter the basic plans are ceveloped. Advances in ceteorology, = 9 development of new protective actions, changing de=ography, etc., &] g1 should be used in reevaluation of the original scenarios. And of '.a 14 course, recurrent testing of imple:entatien methods should be carried

3 out.

1.4.2 Innlementation of Plans 4)4 A sequence of steps to i=plement a response plan following a f nuclear incident is also shown in figure 1.1. The time af ter an in-i ~., cident =ny be divided into three phases which are called e=ergency, 31 b protection, and restoration. These phases are not necessarily distinct a Jl! consecutive ti=e periods, but they do serve to indicate the general 1* f natu e of activities in a typical response sequence. .? i 4 The e=ergency phase includes all those activities leading to 3

-g initiation of protective actions.

This phase involves assess =ent of a 3 the situations and is characterized by urgency in determining the need 1 ,{ for protective action and getting the action initiated. In general, t this =ay be considered to be the first few hours following notification } of an incident and deals pri=arily with protection of the population 4 s 3 f I } f 1.19 ,t 25 091

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i1 4g_ [y. jjQ ifdiN} dblb iiiijUu.dbid ti g -um, Table 1.4 Initiation Times for Protective Actions Action to be Initiated Approximate Exposure Pathway Initiation Time i evacuation, shelter, access control, respiratory 0-4 hours inhalation of gases or protection, prophylaxis (thyroid protection) particulates evacuation, shelter, access control direct radiation take cows off pasture, prevent cows from drinking milk surface water, quarantine contaminated milk 4-48 hours harvested fruits and wash all produce, or impound produce vegetable 'I cut off contaminated supplies, substitute from drinking water other sources enharvested produce delay harvest until approved N substitute uncontaminated produce 2-14 days harvested oroduca o ~D discard or divert to stored products, such as milk N cheese filter, demineralize drinking water

/ r / / / Table 1.3 Protective and Restorative Actions for Nuclent / Incidents Resulting in Airborne Releases j l // I Protection Phase { Restoration . Phase (c) Nuclear Incident Approxi= ate Ti=e of Initation 8 hr./ 0-4 hr. 4-8 hr. j Puff Release (# -Gaseous 1,2,3,4,5 3,4,5 3,4, 5 ', 6, 9,10,11 l or Gaseous and 7,8 Particulate I Continuous Release 1,2,3,4,5 l',2,3,4,5 1,2,3,4, 9,'10,11 ~ ~ Gaseous or Gaseous 5,6,7,8 f and Particulate d i 1 Evacuation (a) Puff release - less than 1 2 hours 2 She'.er (b) Continuous release - _ ] 3 Access centrol 1 2 hours or = ore __. j 4 Respiratory protection for 1 e=ergency workers (c) Restoration phase =ay begin at any t e as appropdate 5 Thyroid protection for e=ergency j workers i 3 6 Pasture control a -3 7 Milk control l 8 Food and water control i f 9 Lift protection controls j 10 Reentrf l i l 11 Decontamination I e s i ss l / 25 093 / / 4

I V i I j associated with'a specific site could render the evacuation ineffective or undesirable. Other optional pre cective actions such as taking i k shelter should be considered. The planner must take into consideration 4 4 ? all local constraints to deter =ine whether or not evacuation is a I viable. protective actica for the given situation. [Exa5ples o' the_, k ~ ~ ~~ effects of' coni:traints could b'e provided o'n a general basis. ' Eowever,., '~ it remains the responsibility of the planner to deter =ine the most 1 3 reasonable pro _tective, actions _ for each site. t { A. Effectiveness of Evacuation I The effectiveness of ' evacuation in limiting r3tdiation dose is P a function of the time required to evacuate. If a radioactive cloud is present, '.te dose vill increase with the_ti=e,o_f_ep osure; if the t I evacuation is completed before the cloud arrives, then evacuation i j ~ is obviously 100 percent effective. Anything that' delays an avacuatiod ~ is therefore a constraint, and such constraints are likely to be very _ =uch a fune,t, ion of local site conditions and planning. The planner should be aware of these constraints in order to =in1Eze th'eh]~[- ~ ~ - i= pact, thus =aximizing the effectiveness of the evacuation.. The evacuation ti=e, T(EV), at a particular site is defined as i ) the time from the start of the nuclear _ incident to the time when evacuees have cleared the affected areas. It =ay be expressed as: T(EV) = TD+ N+ M T ~ n r where: l j T time delay after occurrence of the incident associated with D 9h La I 1.31

i e i i notification of responsible officials, interpretation of data, and the decision to evacuate as a protective action. T = ti=e required by officials to notify people to evacuate. N Ty=ti=erequiredforpeopletocobilizeandgetunderway. T = travel time required to leave the affected areas. T T ine u es several separ tte ti=e ele =ents as defined above, D and all of them can be reduced by effective planning. No:inal y ' cs for T cay ra ge fr 0.5 hours up to 1.5 hours and possibly 2cnger D depending on the adequacy of planning and whether the decision is to be based on onsite infor=ation or offsite environ = ental measure =ents. The least well defined ti=e constraint is T, w c s strongly N influenced by local population, geographicIcondi_ticM, a'nd plannEg7 ~~'-- T has been postulated tc be inversely proportional to population N density; the closer people are together, the quicker it is to notify the= to eva.uate. For fast developing incidents, news =edia warnings must be au;=ented by telephone, pulic address, and door kr cking, the effectiveness of which is a function of local planning and resources. There are new innovations such as conputer telephoning, planes with loud speakers, etc., which the local planner =ay find worthwhile to explore. The value of T under the best conditions of local planning N is esti=ated to range fro = 15 minutes to 1 hour or more. T, the time required for people to prepare to leave, depends en 3 such para =eters as: 7C IT C 5 l La U 3

• 1 l

I J. ) f (1) 1s the family together? h (2) Rural or urban community? Some farms or industries require 2j core shutdown time than others. (3) Special evacuations - special planning effort is required to evacuate schools, hospitals, nursing homes, penal institutions, and the like. ij (4) There will be some people who will refuse to evacuate. The best ti=e for T for an urban family together might be 0.2 to 3 0.5 hours, while to shut down a farm or factory might take hours. The evacuation travel time, T, is related to: T ) (1) Total number of people to be evacuated. (2) The capacity of a lane of traffic. (3) The number of lanes of highway aval'.able. (4) Distance of travel. (5) Roadway obstructions such as uncontrolled merging af traffic or accidents. The total number of people to be evacuated depends on the popula-tion density and affected area. It is an advantage if good planning can keep the area and thus the nu=ber of people to as small a value as possible, or possibly to evacuate one area at a ti=e so that the nu=ber of people on the cove at one ti=e is within the capacity of the roads. The capacity or a lane of traffic depends on the number of vehicles per hour and the capacity of each. Surveys during evacuations found 7C 09b as 1.33

i f t i I j limited. Appendix B provides techniques for evaluating the various time periods involved in evacuation. B. Risk of Death or Iniurv If evacuation were likely to greatly increase an individual's risk of death or injury, this would act as a significant constraint i on the use of evacuation as a protective action for a nuclear incident. Fortunately, examination of numerous evacuations indicate that risk I of death or injury is not likely to be increased when evacuation is =ade by cotor vehicle (3). Pre =ature childbirth is routinely encountered in e=ergeacies and subsequent evacuations, and in at least one State emergency plan, prior arrangements are made for this problem, i C. Evacuation Costs ) ror evacuations caused by stor=s or floods, cost is net usually l l a constraint because hazard to life and limb is obvious and because l l the evacuation cost is judged to be small cocpared to the damage i j caused by the disaster. However, in the event cf a nuclear incident 3 where there =ay be the strong inclination to evacuate even though the radiation dese to be saved is vanishingly s=all, the economic cost of I the evacuation may act as a constraint. Therefore, the planner may l wish to esti= ate this cost for various kinds of evacuation. Evacuation costs =ay be broken into four categories: I (1) cocts involving evacuees, (2) costs involving evacuators, (3) financial losses of fara areas, and (4) financial losses of irban and industrial areas. 2J 097

r ai I 2 1 1 3 3 4 persons / car on the average indicating that at 2,500 cars /hr at e 4 35 nph, the capacity of a lane is 10,000 persons /hr. Co=nuter traffic, } however, contains about 1.2 persons / car, lowering the capacity to 1 I about 3,000 persens/hr-lane. Use of buses exclusively, if this is ,s practical, increases the lane capacity by a factor of about 10 such I that 100,000 persons /hr-lane could be coved. However, if buses are [ _ (( 1 used, the increase in time caused by getting the buses to the evacua-4 4 tion area and by rer 't trips =ust be considered. If the average speed of traffic 1 less than 35 mph, capacity / lane-hr is lowered in } l proportion. i The nu=ber of lanes of traffic is ordinarily sufficient for evacu-i ation from the low population zone around fixed nuclear facilities. ( Lanes may be increased by using lanes that ordinarily carry traffic into the area. All these lanes cannot be used, houever, since some, at the option of the planner, cuct be held open for energency vehicles F coming into the area. I Traf fic control will be effective in reducing the evacuation i travel ti=e. If lanes ordinarily inbound are used for outbound traffic, t j traffic officers will be required to direct vehicles to them; otherwise they will not be used. Traffic barriers, ' gns, traf fic light over-~~~ ~ rides, disabled vehicle renovals, etc., will be required to keep traffic speeds high. Traffic control at bottlenecks will be of par-ticular i=portance. Allowing single lanes to run alternately rather than having cars dovetail through an intersection will significantly 1c - 09t

Table 1.5 Approxi=ateRangeofTi=eSeg=gs Making Up the Evacuation Time App roximat e Time Segment Range Hours Id b 6 Sko% Tu -pa-;5 de/ 0 5 - 1.5 67 e i T 'y. gop;p u gl,*e o.2 - 1.0 " 5a4l:te ' lW + g[ 4,'m q pe 0.2 - 2.0(d) TM I0d-0 efA tf ed h*t'6 0.2 - 1.5 (e) T ( T 1.1 - 6.0 1 N a)High population, high density areas such as those around Indian Point, present a different situation, and evacuation tices are core co= plex, probably longer, and =ust be analyzed on a case s s, s,,- ( Maxi =um ti=e =ay occur when offsite radiation L ceasure=ents and dose prejections are required before protective action is taken. (c) Maxi =0s ti=e =ay occur when population density is low and evacuation area is large. (d)Eu:1=us ti=e =ay occur when fa=ilies are separated _a large nu=ber _of_far=s or_ industries must be shut down, and special evacuations are required. (*) Maxi =u=time may occur when road system is inadequat e for the large populatica to be evacuated and there are bottlenecks. h L.

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c. Eh ::: 9 (y h. ~ g O 'q ~ k,#8l) T .i t 9 pson '^ U.S. ESVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Office of Radiation Programs ' {:..::4:-

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I-t i i FOREWORD The Office of Radiation Programs carries out a National program designed to evaluate the exposure of man to ionizing and non-ionizing radiation and to prcmote development of controls necessary to protect the public health and safety and assure environmental quality. Within the Office of Radiation Programs, problem areas have been defined and assigned a priority in order to deter-mine the level of effort expended in each area. One of these, j the Accident Problem Area, has been assigned a high priority i and requires the participation and cooperation of several Federal agencies. Each agency has been assigned specific tasks as outlined in an interagency agreement. This report is directed at a specific Environmental Protection Agency task of establishing action guidelines based on radiation exposure i levels which might result from nuclear incidents. Other raports, I recommendations, and state assistance will be developed and executed to falfill EPA obligations under the interagency agreement. I encourage users of this report to inform the Of fice of Radiation Programs of any omissions or errors. Your additional comments or requests for further information are also solicited, W. D. Rowe, Ph.D. N Deputy Assistant Administrator for Radiation Programs \\ \\ iii 3 9 IOI

4y. 4 C4 2.. AESTRACT L T i; A study was conducted to assess the risk of death, injury, and cost associated with an evacuation of population groups affected by an incident at a fixed nuclear facility. Data and 4 information were obtained by contacting persons and organizations f involved with previous evacuations precipitated by natural or 4 man-made causes and from available literature on the subject. Frequencies of 8.9 x 10-8 deaths per person-mile and 4.4 x 10-8 3 injuries per person-mile were derived from data representing 5 j vehicle evacuations involving approximately,5.5 x 10 persons. 9 National Safety Council (NSC) data for motor vehicle accidents } indicate freque.ncies of 2.4 x 10-8 deaths per person-nile and 4 9.0 x 10-7 injuries per person-mile. Because of the small number 3 of deaths and injuries dr. rived from the study of evacuations, 4' j no statistical comparison with NSC.information could be made; t however, strong subjective information suggests that NSC data 3 can be used for estimating the risk of injury or death. Cnly some fragmentary costs related to the evacuation i process were obtained from data sources, and total costs had to ( be constructed frem available literature. Aspects, other than i risk and cost, concerning evacuations are also discussed in ij the report. 1 i !I 1 6 f i I 1 t i t 5 ? I i

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.I Utilizing derived costs based upon the latter figures to R estimate future evacuation costs is less exact and subject to 1! a larger degree of error than estinating and projecting costs based upon real numbers from actual events; however, judicious s

l use of the data should allow a reasonable estimate of the cost

I of an evacuacion.

'I'; DISCUSSION OF RESULTS t -j The purpose of the study was to determine the risk of I f evacuating people, in terms of deaths, injuries, and costs, z' and any relationship between these risks and the parameters of the evacuation. If the risks attributed to the evacuation l procass are greater than the risk from a specified radiation j exposure, then other countermeasures are advised or guidelines i for radiacian exposure are set for a more favorable radiation j risk / evacuation risk ratio. Likewise, if relationships could be demonstrated between risk of death, injury, or cost and i any parameters of the evacuation, particularly increasing evacuation population size, they might have an influence on the selection of radiation guides for evacuation. g l The parameters thought to have an effect on evacuation risks and which formed the basic questionnaire (appendix A) .i that was developed include:

l 4

1 Diraster agent (flood, fire, earthquake, etc.)

l 2

Number of persons evacuated 3 Size of area evacuated 4 Type of area evacuated (rural, urban, suburban, etc.) 5 How evacuated (private vehicle, boat, bus, etc.) 6 Types of roads (rural, expressway, etc.) i i, 7 Average length of evacuation route 'l 8 Weather conditions at time of evacuation U 9. Road conditions during evacuation i 10 Evacuation plans available and, if so, used 11. Time between evacuation and onset of incident 12 Time required to evacuate 1 13 Time pecple were in an evacuated status i Risk of death Ten deaths attributed to the evacuation process were I reported by the responders to the 64 questionnaires conpleted 4 on the 54 incidents utilized in the study. These incidents l involved the evacuation of 1,142,336 people under a wide i*I I e i 25 103 1 f - 13

i 6 1 Figure 1 8 I Population Density vs. Evacuation Tir:te 1 e ae 1 i e s2 ei7 e EVENT NUMBER e 34 9 toJ:co -== A e 42 m o t } gn 3 99 ) = i e as j i es A g

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7F _i Panic or hysteria associated with catastrophes It appears that to the unknowing, a catastrophe often con- ~ jures a vision of mass confusion, panic, and a ec=plete breakdown of private and public services. Nor=al processes are com-pletely disrupted to a point that the #unctioning and inter-relationships which exist between manxind, its society, and human values are disregarded and chaos exits. In this situ-ation, people are unable to rationalize, follow directions, or relate to one another. The image, fostered by television, movies, and the press, is that people react to a calamity by panic ard hysteria. Numerous studies, both in other countries and in the United States (39,40), which have investigated the reactions of people in many types of emergency situations, have essen-tially dispelled the so-called " myths of panic. " The Disaster Research Center of The Ohio State University, which is the ed only group in the United States now devoted solely to research ([' on disasters and associated problems, had carried out 202 different field studies as of July 1972. These have included many investigations of peoples ' reactions to various crises due to man-made or natural disasters. ~ In a recent publication entitled " Images of Disaster Behavior: Myths and Consequences " (40) the authors enumerate the following popular, but incorrect, Images of disaster behavior: 1. People when faced with great threat or danger will panic. This takes the form of either wild flight or hysterical breakdowns. Even if the response is not intrinsically self destructive,'it will generally involve giving little consideration to the welfare and safety of others. Persons cannot be depended upon to react intelligently and non-selfishly in situations of great personal danger. 2 Those who do not act irrationally are often i= mobilized by major emergencies. Thus, d.i.sas-ter impacts leave large nu=bers of persons . a. da:ed, shocked and unable to cope with the new is realities of the situation, the longer run 'iE personal effects are rather severe emotional ],{ scars and mental health disturbances. Para-ly=ing shock is followed by numbing symptoms f,5 of personal trauma. I~ - .g 23 103 r ,i 1 J

-. W m ,v 7, 3 Partly because of widespread individual patho-e: logical reactions and partly because of the J-can overwhelming damage to the resources of disaster adve affected communities, the ability of local organ-pept i:ations to perform effectively in handling emergency tasks is severely limited. Not only do such organizations have to cope with the i-Olsz irrationality of others, but their own personnel e33: are so immobilized by threat and damage that they cannot fulfill their necessary occupational tasks. Therefore, local organizations are inef-fective agents to handle local emergency problems. 4 The social disorganization of the ec=munity which is a product of disaster impact pro" ices the conditions for the surfacing of anti-social behavior. Sirer recial control is vaak or absent, deviant behavior emerges and the dazed viccims in the disaster araa become easy targets for loot-L ing and other forrs of criminal activity. Crime rates rise and exploitative behavior spreads as Mr. Hyde takes over from Dr. Jekyll. 5. Community morale is very low in disaster stricken areas. Since impact localities are filled with irrational, disorganized and helpless persons and 4 i==obilized groups, the future of such communities h appears bleak and problematical. Residents, even [ those not directly impacted, prepare to leave and there is a reluctance to reopen and rebuild shat-g tered bosinesses and industries. 6 A descent into total personal and social chaos is I possible in such stricken communities. Immediate and firm and unequivocal measures are nec isary to [q prevent such a deterioration. Bu' in general local h and established ce=munity officials lack the resourN8 4 and are so shaken by the disaster that they cannot ( take the drastic steps required. ~ $ The paper then explains why these " truths" prevail and th, negative impact and implications they may have on policy and emergency planning. , l a The greater portion of the paper is devoted, based on 081 4 extensive work done by the Disaster Research Center, to dd%27, ' strate that these popular images are, in fact, myths and ;,f;% . N5EN [ \\ 0()k$h nM =ma 46 b ddR .s.L-JS3 3g 44 - ?tCE $TE

2.=z -8 m : = = - : w n Q 4 2d Sip '8 ca pletely unrelated to actual fact. e cc A generalization that H n be made is that peoples' reactions and behavior under q p adverse, abnormal situations are diametrically contrar" e.o T i* ' popular myths. Based on the Disaster Research Center report [ Disaster Behavior," peoples ' behavior during an em,ergency is - ks " Images of

g characterized by

I 1. The idea that ~eople will panic in the face p of great threat o d or danger is very widespread, However, it is not borne out in rer'ity. l Inso-far as wild flight is concerned, t. opposite behavioral pattern in most disaste 1 s far more likely. PeopL.! will often stay in a poten-Se; tially threatening situation rather than move p 6 out of it. This really should be expected. Human beings have very strong tendencies to E continue on-going lines of behavior in prefer-ence to initiating new courses of action. 2 Just as the panic image of disaster behavior is generally incorrect, so is the view that disas-ters leave victims dazed and disoriented both j at time of impact and in the recovery period. 4 Those who experienced disasters are not immo-j g bilized by even the most catastrophic of events. l ~ They are neither devoid of initiative nor sively dependent or expectant that others, pas-l especially relief and welfare workers, will take I .g care of them and their disaster created needs. SE In fact disaster victima sometimes insist on 7 acting o,n their own even contrary to the expressed Q advice of the public authorities and formal agencies. R y 3 The assumption that local organizations are unable k to cope with disasters is based both on the notion that these organizations and the co== unities in which they are located are overwhelmed by disaster impact, and also by the fear that the employees 3 N of these organizations are so affected by disaster impact that their efficiency is reduced. [ of these notions stand up well under close observation. Neither 4 The idea that disaster aftermath creates the con-ditions for the development of anti-social behavior is widespread. tion that widespread looting takes place.In particular, there is the assu= J p j The term looting has military roots, implying invading g p [ [ $bI d [ n i ( h i e i i I a t 45 j 'il

w, l T l l. A 3 ~,. } N armies take property by force, generally when j the rightful owner cannot protect it. During i 2 disasters, according to co= mon belief, invad-ing ar=les of opportunists take property left '4 unguarded when the rightful cwner is forced out 1 Because of the expectation that by disaster. looting will occur, one does find that there is, f within disaster-impacted co== unities, anxiety about the possibilities of looting and also reports of looting which confirm the initial expectation. On the other hand, those who have done disaster research have found it difficult to cite many authenticated cases of actual i p looting. Contrary to popular image, morale in disaster-5 Partly impacted communities is not destroyed. as a result of the generation of altruism.and . the result the reaffirmation of equality.. over time is an increase in collective morale. ,j Such an increase may team implausible since disasters create to a greater or lesser degree those who have i= mediate personal losses the death of a family me=ber, injury to them-

Victims, i

1 selves or damage to their property. however, ar e always outnumbered by non-victims. s [h Even in a co=munity with a large number of avicti.ms," their losses do not necessarily l c have a cumulative effect in lowering morale. 4 2 i Individual suffering is always experienced in c reference to the plight of others. Suffering v k in the disaster context is not an isolated experience and, therefore, it does not become y ~ an isolating experience. c. ,'L patterns of leadership and of authority in disaster-impacted cummunities are very complex. l 6 Their complexity, however, is usually misin-terpreted as confusion and the panacea of " strong leadership" is frequently of f ered as a solution without understanding the nature of Perhaps the beginning of under-the problem. standing is to start with the observation that ec=munities are not organized to cope with This is true even in communties disasters. with extensive pre-disaster planning since there is a considerable difference in antici-What disasters pating problems and facing them. ,I 25 10B b 46 0 r"_

j u e do is to create a series of new problems for the co=munity and in doing this, they necessitate j new relationships among its parts. Disasters i force the development of a new structure which reflects the current involvement of various parts of the co== unity which, in turn, can make decisions "for" the cc=munity. Although the studies done by the Disaster Research Center and others (17,40) have dispelled the myths associated with peoples' behavioE during a disaster, if the causative agent of the incident were radiation, would peaples' reactions be substantially different? The conclusion drawn by many is that because radiation is largely an unknown quantity, imper-ceptible to the ordinary senses, inherently, the fear of the unknown and its consequences would cause a different behavior pattern--perhaps similar to popular notions. This would, in turn, have a dramatic effect on evacuation involving a release of radioactivity. Dr. Russell R.. Dynes (41), Co-Director of the Disaster acssarch Center, was asked i? he thought people would react differentlty --panic -because of a radiation threat. Dr. Dynes' reply was that there has been an overemphasis placed on the qualitative difference between radiation and other threats by both public of ficials and anti-nuclear groups, "What was assumed was that the nuclear advent represented some new juncture in human history and, therefore, it would evoke and demand a quite different level of human behavior." Dr. Dynes continued, "As I read history, there is not reason to suggest that because of the presence of a new ' order' of threat that human behavior / would disintegrate into ' uncivilized' behavior." The su==ation of Dr. Dynes ' reply is that there is not reason to expect that people will react any differently because the disaster agent is radiation than they would for a ficod, fire, or any other type of causative agent. This " normal" behavior is amply documented (37,39) and does not include panic. Dr. Dynes further states: - If your concern is primarily with evacuation, there is good reason to suggest that the problem in evacu-ation is not one of panic flight but the problem of getting people to move at all. The question of the perception of threat is a very complicated one and is not as obvious as many people assume it to be. 47 Or iog cJ lue l

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