ML19206B212
| ML19206B212 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1974 |
| From: | Maccary R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Moore V US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905080065 | |
| Download: ML19206B212 (13) | |
Text
9 j
g a
UN;TED s'.'ATES
s t, [,}
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
'O i
W AsHINGTCN. O.C.
20543 I'\\eg '
s,
.p >l y
a Al,'S 2 E74 V. A. Moore, Assistant Df ector for Light Water Reactors, Group 2 Directorate of Licensing TEREE MILE ISLA!D 2, FIRST ROCO REVIE'i 0F FSAR Plant Na=e: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 Licensing Stage: OL Decket No.:
50-320 Responsible RP 3 ranch and Project Manager: LWR 2-2, B. W. Washburn Responsible TR 3 ranch: ME3 Requested Cc=pletion Date: August 2, 1974 Review Status: Awaiting Infor.atica Adequate responses to the enclosed list of co==ents, prepared by the Mechanical Engineering Branch, Directorate of Licensing, are required before we can ec=plete our review of the subject application.
These cc==ents pertain to the subject FSAR through Amendment 18.
Ow%
W R. R. Maccary, Assistant Director for Engineering Directorare of Licensing cc w/ encl:
S. H. Hanauer, DRTA F. Schroeder, L K. Kniel, L J. F. Knight, L
- 3. W. Washburn, L S. N. Hou, L A. 3. Miller, L cc w/o encl:
A. Giarbusso, L W. G. Mcdonald, L q*
') [1 /
((
(-
1
'/9050sDCL6 f\\/
11-1 11.0 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 11.1 Reconcile (a) the state =ents made in 3.6.2.1 regarding postulated (3.6) pipe break criteria inside containment, (b) the entries in Table 3.6-2, and (c) the locations shown in Figures 3.6-8 and 3.6-11.
In particular, notice that the figures do not indicate postulated breaks at the ters nal ends uhereas the criteria given in the text in 3.6.2.1 do call for such breaks. The table appears to agree partially with the criteria in the text although the agree =ent is not completely una:biguous.
In making this reconciliation, extend it to any other figures and tabular entries which =ay be sLsilarly involved.
11.2 In the discussion under 4-2/3.8 of Supplement 1 of the FSAR (3.6) regarding Safety Guide (Regulatory Guide) 1.46, clarify the
=eaning of the expression "= ore than the =ini=ue of 2".
Recall that the Regulatory Guide 1,46 calls for a =ini=ue of two inter:ediate locations in addition to the two terminal ends of a piping run or branch run.
The discussion under 4-2/3.8 of Supplement 1 appears to state that pipe breaks have been considered in even more piping runs than are called out by Regulatory Guide 1.46.
If justified, provide a specific statecent that all high energy lines inside
'contain=ent which would require postulating of breaks by virtue of precise and co=plete application of Regulatory Guide 1.46 have been discussed with regard to postulated pipe breaks in the FSAR.
If this is no: the case, describe-and justify the exceptions.
11.3 Provide specific assurance that the piping systens inside (3.6) con tainment have been properly exauined from the standpoint of the physical i= pact of postulated broken lines on saf ety-related linas of s= aller dia eter or wall thickness.
State the criteria used to insure the prevention of unacceptable da age.
11.4 Sub:i: the design criteria for pipe runs which ex:end fro:
(3.6) the contain=ent penetra: ions to the first isolation valve outside containment.
11.5 Basing your response en a general survey of the plant, identify (3.6) thos e safc:y-related s:ruc:ures, systems, and corponants where you might anticipate a proble in their survival and proper functioning if the criterion for the conical spr22d of an impinging j et fr = a pesculated pipe break or crack
=
11-2 were a ten degree half angle or, alternatively, a twenty-two-and-a-half degree half angle out to five pipe diameters from the centerline of the source pipe followed by tero spread beyond that point.
'" 11.6 You have specified the Oconee Unit I reactor internals as the (3.9) prototype of the 177-fuel asse=bly units, which include
'...'I-2. Clearly state ycur intention to perform confir=atory testing of the TMI-2 reactor internals using procedures delineated in Regulatory Position D of Regulatory Guide 1.20.
Indicate which option of said position you plan to use and briefly describe your pro, posed program of testing.
Identify any design differences between the designated prototype and TMI-2 which =ay lead to'different response behavior of the reactor internal structures resulting frc= ficw-induced vi-bration and evaluate the significance of these dif ferences.
11.7 Expand the description of the preoperational piping vioration (3.9) testing program in 3.9.1.1 of the FSAR.
Supply a more explicit statement regarding the flow codes of cperation and transients to which the syscem components will be subjected and the criteria for establishing acceptable limits of response.
Essential elements of an acceptable progran are cutlined in Attach ent A, "?reoperational Piping Dyna:ic Effects Test Progras."
11.8 In FSAR 3.9.2.2, the use of the AIME 3 & FV Code Section III (3.9)
"Ecpper Diagran" is described in cnnecticn eith the design of Architect / Engineer Class 2 cnd 3 cceponents to rhich emergency and faulted conditiens were applied.
Provide assurance that these censiderations rezarding energency and faulted conditions or their equivalent were applied to all such components which are classified Category I or whose failure could result in the loss of structural and functional integrity of a Category I component.
11.9 Clarify the statements in 3.9.2.4 regarding the design of (3.9) pumps for dynamic leads. Whether an equiv.alent static load was derived frcs a dynamic analysis using input based on response spectra curves or was inferred directly frca such curves, indicate explicitly that the respense spectra curves were applicable : the physical 1ccaticn cf the ccrpenent in the fluid piping systen or in the structure or that response-spectra curves of equivalent or greater conservatisn w2re used.
2 i
(.
11-3 11.10 In addition to the infor ation supplied in 3.9.3.2, sub=it a (3.9) list of all items of Category I techanic.1 equipment which have been seismically q slified to assure their ability to withstand the eff ects of the SSE and any plant operating condition including faulted (includes SSE) vithout loss of safety function. For each ites, indicate whether the qualification was perfor:ed by testing or analysis or a combina tio n.
The term mechanical equipment in this context applies to ite=s such as fans, filters, other ventilation, gas control, and safety related cleanup equipment, pump drives, valve coerators, and heat exchanger bundles. For guidance see Attachment 3.
11.11 In connection with the design criteria for-the counting of (3.9) the pressure relieving devices provided for overpressure protection of Category I, ASME Code Class 2 systems and components, describe the methods used to account for possible dyna =ic a=plification of the ef f ects of the blow-of f loads.
Also provide assurance that the design of the valve sounting is adequate for a postulated sequence of discharges of valves on a co==on header which are such as to produce the greatest ratio of estimated instantaneous stress to allowable stress at any point, independent of the relative set-points of the valves.
11.12 In addition to the information already provided in Tables (3.9) 3.2-1 and 5.2-5, submit a ?ist of all active AS:iE Code Class (5.2) 1, 2 and 3 pumps and vai/es, that is a list of all components whose functional as well as structural and pressure-retaining integrity =ay be required for safe shutdown under any plant operating condition. For each item, indicate whether oper-ability is assured by testing, by design analysis, or by a combination of testing and analysis. Describe the basis for the assurance of operability (conservative design stress limits or pressure rating appear to be one of the bases stated in this FSAR in nos cases.)
11.13 In the case of active safety / relief valves, if any, and (3.9) active valves with physically extended valve operators, (3.2) describe the measures taken in design analysis to include the ef fects of dynamic clification of seismic or other vibration induced loads in the cantilevered portions when equivalent static load techniques are used.
qG]
n.
Li
(. -
's O
O 11-4 11.14 Expand the discussion in 3.10.1.3 of the use of shock testing (3.10) of saf ety related electrical equipment as an alternative to vibratory testing. That is, submit facts and details to substantiate a conclusion that the shock testing employed is adequate to represent the specified dyna ic input in ter=s of its resultant effects.
In the case of equipment and supports with essentially linear force-displacement characteristics, recourse to harmonic spectru arguments is acceptable provided due consideration is given to the effect of codal participation factors and mode shapes. Where the equipment has sufficiently non-linear characteristics to limit the validity of the harmonic spectru apprcach, indicate and justify your degree of confidence that the check signature has adequately exercised the equipment.
Discuss the adequacy of the shock tests with respect to the possible build-up of low cycle fatigue damage during the postulated plant operating condition.
11.15 The discussion of active RCP3 components in Section 5.2.1.
'(5.2) of the FSAR does not provide convincing assurance of the operability of these components under faulted plant conditicas.
Acceptable prograss for assuring operability of active conpo-nents are delineated in Attachments C and D " Class 1, 2 & 3 Pump Operability Assurance Program" and " Class 1, 2 & 3 Valve Operability Assurance Program." Supply assurance that the procedures a ployed in designing and furnishing tha active components in the RCPB provide an acceptably eq"ivalent degree of confidence in their operability.
11.16 Supply a descriptica of the finite elecent computer progra:
(5.2) mentioned in the discussion of pump casing decign analysis in Sectica 5.2.1.7 of the FSAR.
Indicate the control nessures used to verify the validity of the progra and its application.
Adequate proced"res are delineated in Attach =en: E " Acceptability of Computer Progra s Analysis of 'dechanical Congonents and Equipment."
11.17 In connertion with the design and furnishing of piping (5.2) connect (
to pressurizer safety valves in a canner so as not to er, ed the maximum permissible laads on the valves, as you have stipulated in Section 5.2.2.2 of the FSAR, explain the choice of stress allowables and the control of pipe dimensions employed to assure such a result.
]4 c,
t..
6/6/73 Attachmant A m
r ~.' 3.. c. L m_ a '3 t. e m'.u
. w,
- s u
6 7
~
P ".w'.m' '.'. *.ML J. ' *t L.' '. 'L L
s.
c2.
..a Preoperational piping vibracional and dynanic effects testing should be conducted during startup functioncl testing on piping systens and restreta:c classified cs ASME Class 1 and Class 2 components.
The purpose of thesc tests is to ccufirr ::.2: these corponents have been designed to uithstani the dynanic lcalings from operational transient conditions that will be encountered during service as requircd by AIT. Ccde Section III, par.
MB-3622. 2 and '.:C-3622.-
'.a acceptable test progrca to confirm the ade-quacy of the designs shoulJ consist of the follotting:
a.
A listing, of the different flcu acdes of operation and transients such as pump trips, valve closures, c:c. to which the ccrponents will be subjected during the test.
For e::anple, the transicats associated - ith the Reactor Ccolant Sys:ca heatap tests should include, but not necessarily be linited to:
W (1) Reactor coolant punp start (2) Reactor coolant pump trip (3) Operation of prassure-relieving valves b.
A list of selected locations in the piping systen that will be subjected to visual inspection and e.casurements (if needed) as perferned by the pipinc desir,ncr durin; there tents.
For each of these cclectcl locc:L:ns, the allo-able def! ccric-i'"'1-to-peak) critaria that wt11 be app >..1ea to estao,ttsa c a; _.ae stress limits are within the design levels should be pro.ided.
c.
If vib.ation is noted bevond th2 accept nce 1e.< 12 ect by tae criteria of b. 250ve, correc:i=re restrcints : bum bc dcrir'cc, incorporated in the pipia; syster. cnalysis an. _a :alled.
If during the teat, the pipin; :rstens restrain., cre.iercr 1 ed to be inadequate or danagel, cor:2ctica restraic.ts should te install _d and another test chould de pcr:er;.. a :o dct2rniae that :L-.. ratir-have been reduced to an acceptable level.
- 9. E n* * ' (.
n4 L\\
"' clear Po'. car Plant Ccuponents"
- Reference AS:1?, Code Secticn III,
.u
- 3.d d i t ic n:1 guid:nce for the ae:actinn af su-h trenaients is,res.d u O8'
@W 8
.W.
---eae m $
gi.
g g g,
,q g,
O.
"L97=e- [w=,
6..
a
.3,
.....6..
,,.w w.
12/5/73 r,
Ct.uCA,. A D v,.
C.:p..C..r
- ~ ~.- r.
.ev..r. w A.
c -.n.. w m. m.u e-u
.1 u
....~s
~.
u I,
Seis=le Test for Ecuireant Ceerability 1.
A test progra is required te confir: the functional c:erability of all Seismic Category ' ciectrical and mechanical equipnent and inetrumentation durin; and af ter an earthquake of magnitude up to and including the SSE.
Analysis withou Casting =ay be acceptable enly if s: uctural integrity alene can assure the design intended function. '/ hen a co plete seistic testing is impracticable, a cenbinatica cf tes and analysis may be accept-able.
2.
The characteristics of the required input motion should be specified by one of the folicwing:
(a) response spectru=
(b) power spectral density function (c) time history Such characteristics, as derived from the structures or systems seis ic analysis, should be representative of the input motion at the equip:ent =cunting locations.
3.
Equip =ent should be tested in the operaticnal condition. Oper-ability should be verified during and after the testing.
4.
The actual input otion should.be charactericed in the same manner as the :equired input :ti:n, and the conservatis in amplitude and frequency centent shcula be de:cnstratec.
5.
Seistic excitation generally have a broad frequency centent.
Randc vibration input nation s.iculd bc used.
Eawaver, sin;1e frequency input, such as sine cea:s, cay ce appli:able provided one of the following conditions are ne::
(a) The characteristics of the required input notion indicata that the to:1on is dominated b;. cna frequency (;.c., by strue: ural filtering effects).
~ %
(b) The an:1cipated response of the equipment is adequately represente'd by one made.
(c) The input has sufficica: intensity and duration to excite all medas c the requ; red ::;ni:ude, su b : hat tha :2s:ing response spectra vill envelope the correspcnding respcase spec::a of the individual =cdes.
qG W
}).
- i. < 3
, i
. 6.
The input coti:n should be applied to one vertical and ene principal (or two crthc;:nal) hori: ental axes sinultaneously unless it can be demonstra:2d that the equipment response along the ver:1 cal directi:n is not sensitive :o the vibratory
=otica along the hori:cntal direction, and vice versa. The ti=e phasing of the inputs in the vertical and horizontal direc-tiens cust be such that a purely rectilinear resultant input is avoided. The acceptable alternative is to have vertical and hori:catal inputs in-phase, and then repeated with inputs ISO degrees cut-of-phase.
In addition, the test must be repeated with the equipment rotated 90 degrees hori:entally.
7.
The fixture design should =eet the following require ents:
(a) Simulate the actual service ecunting (b) Cause no dynamic coupling to the test ite:.
8.
The in-situ application of vibratory devices to superimpose the seismic vibratory loadings en the cc: plex active device for operability testing is acceptable when application is justi:iable.
9.
The test progra
=ay be based upon selectively teating a repre-sentative number of sechanical cc=ponents according to type, load level, size, etc. on a prototype basis.
II.
Seismic "esiin Adecuaev of Succorts 1.
Analyses or tests should be performed for all supports of electrical and =echanical equipment and instrumentation ::
ensure their structural capability to withstand seismic excitation.
2.
The analytical results cust include the following:
(a) The required input notions to the counted equipment shculd be obtained and characterized in the =anner as stated in Sec: ion I.2.
(b) The ccubined stresses of the support structurcs shculd be within the limits of ASMI Section III, Subsection :E -
"Couponen: Support Structures" (draf t version) or other comparable stress limits.
3.
Supports should be tes:ed with equip:ent installed.
If the equipment is inoperative during the support tes:, the response at the equipment counting locations should be tenitored and characterized in the canner as stated in Section I.2.
In such a case, equip:en sh uld be tested separa:ely and :he ac:::1 input to the equip:ent shuuld be more censervative in a:plitude
?.nd f requent:- --- r oa.:
"?-
the enianred rac enge.
4.
The ::guir:::nts :f S:cti:n: 2.2, :.4, I.f, I.5 : i
_2 applicable uhen tests are conducted on the equipment supports.
qr>
i.14 9*
cs
lll 5/24/73 Attach =ent C CLASS 1.
2 & 3 FUMP OPE?.A3ILITY ASSU7ANCE PROGPJM The operability of A5ME Class 1, 2 & 3 " active" pu=ps under plant conditions when their safety functica is relied upcn to effect either a plant r".utdown, or to mitiga:e the consequences of an accident nay be demonstrated by either of the follcuing programs:
1.
An individual pu=p, selected as a prototype pump, may be tested in the manufacturer's shop, provided the test conditions imposed are equivalent to the combined planc condi: ions which the pump is expected to withstand at the time when the " active" function is required.
2.
An indi"idual pu=p, selected as a prototype pump, may be tested in-si:u following installation in the systen during the performance of the systes preoperational functional tests, pcovided the test conditions duplicate those conditions when the "cctive" function is required.
In either of the test programs, 1 and 2 above, vibratory excitation of the pump to simulate seismic loading ray be demonstrated (a) by a separate test under conditions sufficiently severe to provide adequate nar; ins for assurance >f operability undez conbined plant loading condit'.ons or (b) by seismic dynamic analysis of critical pump cc=ponents.
3.
An individual pu=p, selected as a prototype pump, may be tested partially (a) in the nanuf acturar's shop under those test conditions as lintied by the test fccility, (e.g.,
pressure temperature loadings) (b) in a testing laboratory for simulated seismic excitatio.. Ic 2 dings, and (c) in the plant a::er pump installation for confirmation of operability under ficw conditions Gurin; systen preoperational ho:
functional tests. The distribution of test parameters handlei by each testing grcup may have variations depending upcn the pu=p testing requirements.
Such a test progras should be supplementad by analyses as required under test progran 2. above.
4 An individual pu=p, selected as a prototype may be tested completely in-situ follcuing installation in the sfster durin?
the performances of the systen preoperational f unctional tas:s.
Ll t'J
O
. Vibratory excitation of the pump under such test conditions to represent seismic loadinzs may be induced by :ounting devices which will vibrate ptincipally the pump operator and the controls counted on the pu=p system.
5.
Pu=ps that can be demonstrated to be equivalent to a prototype pu=p, which has successfully net the test requirements of a pu=p operability assurance program, =ay be exempted from testing provided:
(a) the test results of the prototype pump are documented and available and (b) the loading conditions for the exempted pump are equivalent to those imposed during testing of the -ntotype pump.
The prototype pu=p may be selected from a group of similar purps which will be used in the plant. A prototype pump used in one nuclear power plant qualifies as a prototype pump for another plant provided the system operating conditions of both plants, and the pump loading conditions at the ti=c when the " active" function is required are equivalent.
r) '
f[ ] O L\\
5/24/73 Attachment D CI. AS S 1.
2 & 3 -VALVE OPERA 3ILITY ASSURA: CE PR00RX4 The operability of ASME Class 1, 2 & 3 " active" valves under plant conditions when their respective safety function is relied upon to effect either a plant shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of an accident may be demonstrated by any one of the following accept 1ble
~"
programs:
1.
An individual valve, selected as a prototype valve, may be tested in the manufacturer's shop, provided the test conditions imposed during the demonstration of valve cpen ng and/or closing are equivalent to the combined plant conditions which the valve is expected to withstand at the time when the " active" function is required (such a test progra= =ay be practical for small size valves).
2.
An individual valve, selected as a prototype valve, may be tested in
=anufacturer's shop under test conditions which simulate separately each of the plant loadings which the valve is expected to withstand in co=bination during valve opening and/or closing.
Such a test progra should be supplemented by analyses wnich demon-strate that the individual test loadings are sufficiently higher than the plant loadings, to provide adequate margins for assurance of operability under combined loa <ing conditions.
In addition, the analyses should demonstrate that the strains in cri:1 cal ccaponeat parts of the valve under individual tes: loadings are greater, by a substantial margin than those which the valve may experience under the combined plant loading conditions.
3.
An individual valve, selected as a prototype valve, may be tested partially (a) in the nanufacturer's shop under those test conditions as limited by the test facility, (e.g., pressure tenperature loadings)
(b) in a testing laboratory for simulated seismic excitation loadings, and (c) in the plant after valve installation for confirmation of operability under flow conditions during system preoperational hot functional tests.
The distribution of test parameters handicd by each :esting group ray have variations depending upon the valve testing requirements.
Such a test program should be supplemented by analyses as required under test progra: 2. above.
4.
An individual valve, selected as a prototype may be :+_st ed complet el:.
in-situ following installation in the system during the performances of the systen preoperational functional tests.
p*
}s t.'
e 9 Vibratory e:: citation of the valve under such test conditions to represent seisnic loadings may be induced by nounting devices which will vibrate principally the valve operator and the controls counted on the valve systen.
5.
Valves that can be deconstrated to be ettivalent to a erototype valve, which has successfully net the tcat requirement.4 of a valve operability assurance prograa, may be exempted iron testing provided:
(a; the test results of the prototype valve are documented and arallable and (b) the loading conditions for the exempted valve are equivalent to those imposed during testing of the prototype valve.
TheprototypevalvemaybeselectedfronIt group of similar valves which will be used in the plant. A prototype valve used in one nuclear power plant qualifies as a prototype valve for another plant provided the system operating conditions of both plants, and the valve loading conditions at the time when the "ac..ive" function is required are equivalcnt.
ka\\
- t. s L
5/24/73
/
Attachment E ACCEP'"ABILITf CF CCM?UTEp p"CGpxtS A1:ALYSIS OF MECHA ;ICAL COMFC:::::TS.G ECUI?"E:;T 1.
A list of co=puter progra s that will be used in dynamic and static analyses to determine =echanical loads and deformations of Seismic Category I structures, co=ponents and equip ent and the analysis to determine stresses should be provided including a brief description of each program and the extent of its application.
2.
The design control measures as required by Appendix 3 - 10 CyR Part 50 that will be employed to deconstrate the applicability and valid-ity of the above computer prograss should be described by any of the following criteria or ocedures (or other equivalent procedures).
(a) The computer program is a recognized program in the public donain, and has had sufficient history of use to justify its applicability and validity without further de=onstration. The dated progran versien that will be used, the software or operating system, and the computer hardware configuration must be specified to be accepted by virtue of its history of use.
(b) The co=puter program's solutions to a series of test problems, with accepted results, have been de=enstrated to be substantially identical to those obcained by a si=ilar, independently written progra= in the public domain. The test problets should be demonstrated to be similar to or with the range of applicability for the problems analy:ed by the computer program to justify acceptance of the program.
(c) The program's solutions to a series of test proble=s are substan-tially identical to those obtained by hand calculations or from accepted experimental test or analytical results published in technical literature. The test proble=s snould be deconstratec to be si=ilar to the problens analyzed to justify acceptance of the program.
3.
Provide,a su==ary comparison of the results obtained from each cceputer program with either the results cerived from a similar progran in the public demain, on a previously approved conputer progran or results from the test problems.
Include typical static and/or dynamic respcnse loading, stress, etc. comparisons pref erably in gr:phical forn.
9
- i. '
u\\
MG O ' F-I
". A. Moore, Assistant Dir::ctor for Li.;ht Water Reactors, Group 2 Directorate of Licensing TE:L"': 'HLE ISLA D 2, F13.ST ROUND RE*.'IEW G7 FSAR
?lant !!a:ne: Three Mile Island !!uclear Station " nit 2 Licensing Stage: OL Docket No. : 50-320 5.esponsible RP Branch and Project WnaSer:
L'.in 2-2, 3. 'J. W2shburn Responsible
~'R 3 ranch: M23 Raquested Conpletion Date: Aus;ust 2,1974 Revier Status: Avaitin; Infor.ation Adequate responses to the enclosed list of cot: cents, prepared by the Mechanical Engineering Branch, Directorate of Licensinz, are required before ve can cooplace 'ur re riev of the subject aoplication.
These corn:nents pertain to the subject FSAR through Amendment 18.
Onginal signed by,
_IL_ R m ce:ry, s
R. 2. Maccary, Assistant Director for Engineering Directorate of Licensing ec v/ encl:
S. H. Hanauer, DRIA F. Schroeder, L K. Knial, L J. 7. Knight, L
- 3. W. Washburn, L S. 2. Hou, L A. 3. Miller, L cc w/o onet:
A. Giambusso, L V. C. Mcdonald, L 2 *i
(. v' O 9'
Docket File 50-320 L Reading File L ME3 File A
L:.
/E L:ME3 g,g JPKi}lgh A3 Miller"If v
ca /
,u.....
8/1/74 -
811 174-Sil 174--
omsc o-Form AEC ilt t Rev. 9 91) AICM 02 40 e.o cas is os aan e s maea
-.