ML19206A781
| ML19206A781 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1978 |
| From: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19206A777 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR TM-0167, TM-167, NUDOCS 7904210233 | |
| Download: ML19206A781 (6) | |
Text
JUN 5
'C' SAFETI EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR PIAC'ICR FIGUIATICU SUPPORTING R4E2iOME2iT NO. 5 'IO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. CPR-73 ME"ROPOLITNJ EDISCO CCHPMPI JERSEY CE:iTPAL POiER & LIGHT CCb!PXTl PEuh5YLVAdIA ELECTRIC CCFSNPl COCKET NO. 50-320 THPIE MILE ISIJ1 D NCCLEAR STATICN, UNIT 2 1.
Fuel Handling Bridge Coerabi'.ity Introducticn By letter dated June 1,1978, transmitting Technical Smcification Change Recuest Lio.13, :letrocolitan Edison Company (Met Ed) recuested Amendment of A;rendix A to Facility Operating License do. CPR-73 for Tnree Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2). The requested change would acend the Technical Specifications to require apcropriate testing to establish the operability of the TMI-2 fuel handling oridge and its associated mast assecolies.
Discussion The existing TMI-2 Tecnnical Specifications prescribe the testing methods for determining tne operacility of the TMI-2 fuel handling cridges used for the movement of control rods or fuel asserrblies. However, the existing TMI-2 Technical Soecifications requir that the same test loads te acplied to tne fuel handling bridge mast assemoly which is used for moving control rods as to the fuel handling bridge mast asseccly wnicn is used for movement of fuel assemblies. At T:4I-2, two indeoendent and markedly different mechanisms are used in performing tnese functions.
7904210233 G1-2fiO M.et Ed states that to load the control rod handling mecnmism to 2950 pounds- (as is currently required oy the 211-2 Technical Soecifications) could crage the grappling connection whien grasps tne control rod.
Tne grappling connector consists of three small " fingers" wnich engage tne inner ring of tne contr'l component nort ie.
"'he maximum weight which these " fingers" will ce required to maintain is tne weight of a full length control rod (125 pounds).
During control too teroval, a telescoping mecnanism pulls the control rod (held oy tne above-mentioned grapoling fingers) into tne control roa inner mast asseroly. Tnen this entire mast asser:uly is removed.
Thus the grapoling " fingers" are never required to supcort the weight of tne inner mast assemoly (2100 pounds) but mu.3t instead supoort only tne weight of the control rod. Tne cacle which re:noves the mast assettly however is required to lif t coth the mast asse21y and the control rod
( 2100 + 125 = 2225 pounds).
Because the fuel handling bridge mast asses'.y used for the receval of control rocs is recuired to support a different weight tnan that supported oy tne mast asseccly used for tne removal of fuel asserclies, it can be tested for different loadings. Currently, Section 3/4 9. 2 of the 21I-2 Tecnnical Specifications does not allcw for tnis.
( ' 4
.9 rei vA
. o
. As indicated acove, tne current TMI-2 Tecnnical 3cecifications require tne control red hoist to ce load tested at 2950 pounds. Because tne inner mast assently weigns 2100 pounds, tnis would require the grappling
" fingers" to lif t 850 pounds. This v %ht is beycad the design capability of the grapoling mechanism. Becauce the maximum weight whicn these
" fingers" are required to lif t is 125 counds, it is unnecessary to perform the load test at 2950 pounds. Instead this test may be perforced at 550 pounds over the weignt of the inner mast assembly (2J 00 + 550 =
2650 pounds). Under these circumstances the grappling fingers would be required to lif t nearly four tires the weight of a tull length control rod, and yet could ce tested within their design capabilities.
In acdition, the hoist overload cutoff limit for the mast assembly used for moving control rods should ce set at 450 pounds above the weignt of the inner mast asremely ( 2100 +.50 = 2550 pounds). This reduction in the hoist cutoff limit from 2750 pounds is in the conservative direc-tion as it reduces tne lif ting force which could ne applied to the core internals and/or pressure vessel in the event that tney were inadvertently engaged during lif ting operations.
The present casis of Technical specificatien 3.9.6 (Fuel riandling 3riage Ocerability) is to assure that:
1.
Fuel handling bridges will ce used for movement or control reds and fuel assemcl;.es.
61 ~' 2;Y
_4 2.
Each hoist has sufficie'nt load capacity to lif t a fuel element.
3.
Tne core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lif ting forces in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.
This change will not affect Items 1 and 2 above, in that the cortions of the specification which require that the fuel handling bridges be used for movement of control rods and fuel asserolies remains unchangec, as dces the portion wnich pertains to tne mechanism used for movement of fuel assentlies.
In aedition, cecauce the hoist overload cutoff is reduced (for the mechanism used for removing control rods), the total lif t force that could be applied to tne pressure vessel and/or internals is reauced.
Therefore, Item 3 acove is changed in the conservative direction.
Evaluation We have reviewed tne information provided by tne licensee, and find that the proposed cnange adequately tests the bridge-mast assemblies for their intendea purposes, and adequately protects core internals anc tne pressure vessel during lifting operations.
Baseo on the above, we conclude that the progesed cnange in Fuel Handling Bridge Coeracility raquirements is acceptacle, and that tne facility Operating License can be airenced by cnanging the Tecnnical Scecificaticas
'7 tj'j e,s
. as shown in the attacncent to this license amendment.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that tne amerximent does not autt orize a change in effluent types or total amounts not an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we nave further concluded &at the arendrent involves an action wnich is insignificant free the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environrental irgact statement or necative declaration and environmental impact aperaisal need not te prepared in connnection with the issuance of this c.aence.en t.
Cenclusion
' e nave concludec, cased on the considerations discussed acove, tnat:
(1) because tne aaencment does not involve a significant increase in the prcoacility or consequences of accicents previously censidered and does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonaole assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered 'cy operation in the pec osed manner, and (3) such c
c n r;,3 L
e,
. activities will ce cenaccted in compliance with the Cortmission's regulations and the issuance of this ainendment will not ce inimical to the comen defense and security or to the healtn and safety of the puolic.
/
it-fr't t -
,. m H. Silver, Project Manager Light iiater Reactors Brancn No. 4 Division of Project Management M5
- 2 73 Steven A. Varga, Chief Light viater Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Project Management D,5 _ OfD*
- m dd i.