ML19206A632
| ML19206A632 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1978 |
| From: | Kepford C CITIZENS FOR SAFE ENVIRONMENT |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7904200308 | |
| Download: ML19206A632 (69) | |
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NUCLEAR EGULATORT CCSCSSICN D
w BEFCRE TH2 ATCMIC SATI*T AND LICENSING 1FFEAL 3 CARD In the Matter of
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METSCTOLIT13 EDISON CO.,
et al.
)
Cocket No. 50-320
)
(Three MiIe Island Nuclear
)
Generati:q Station, Unit 2)
)
u.r2<.
ORS' BRIEF IN SUPTCRT OF EXCIPfIONS TO THE INITIAL DECISICN DATSD DECEM3E2 19, 1977 January.30, 1978
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T1312 CF CCNTI:i"5 Pase TA3LI 07 AU*HCRITIES CITID....................
11 A IR CRAM......................................
1 E7ACUr"!CN PLANS AITU EMIRGENCT RESPCNSI CAPA3I!.ITT...............
3 FINAiCING.............................-......
18 CCMPIRA*I7I EIAL*H. NCT3 CF TEZ NUC'I17 TUIL CTCLE 24 sur.m DISCUCSION OF "'HZ 3 CARD'S STATUTCET 7ICLATICNS.......................
42 US 326
s e
e e
TA3!.2 OF AUTHCHITIES Cases Page Calve-t Cliffs Coordinating Cc==1ttee v. Atc=ic Ehergy Cc=sission, 449 F. 2nd 1109 (D.C. Cir.1971)...
26, 33, 38, 51, 54 Environnental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 39 35 F. Supp. 728(I.D. Ark., 1971)
Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Consission, 455 F. 2nd 612 (2nd Cir.,1972).....
55 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Cossission, 547 F. 2nd 633 (D.C. Cir.,1976) 27, 34, 38, 43, 45, 49 Tork Co-dttee for a Safe Invironment v.
Nuclear Regulatory Co=missien, 527 F. 2nd 812 (7.C. Cir. 1975) 4, 18, 45, 46, 53 Statutes National Invironmental Fo31cy Act of 1969, as amended...
throughout Ktomic Energy Ac t of 1954, as ame nded...................
nistrative Procedure Ac t of 1946, as amended........
Adad En ergy Re orga nisa tio n Ac t of 1974.......................
28 U.s.C. see. 2342(4)..................................
48 4 2' U.S.C. S e c. 2 2 3 9 ( b )..................................
48 Federal Register 41 Fed. Reg. 50829-38...................................
19 10 C JP J2. 2. 73 2.........................................
4 10 C.F.2. 2.743(a) 19 IS C.F.2. 2.760(e) 7, 17 10 C.F.R. So, App. D.................................... 39, 48, 55 10 C.F.2. 50 51.........................................
12 10 C.F.2. 51.20.........................................
39, 43,55 b8 227
s 1 9 T13LZ 07 AU"".ICRITIES--Continued Administrative Proc eedings Page AL13-367...........................................................
30 AL13 429............................................................
6 Miscellaneous NUREG-0116.....................................................
29, 34 Health Physics, Norssber, 19 7 7.............................. 12, 32, 3 3 "Appendiz," January 20, 1978...........................
36, 38, 39, 43 Construction Status Report, July, 1977.............................
47 Nuclear Pewer: Issues and Choices..................................
37 Celected Materials on Atomic Zsergy Indesmity and issu=nnes Le g is la ti o n........................... 14, 15 EPE Workshop teceeding on the October, 1976,
' tisese Fal'.out Incident...................................... 10, 11 Memorandus, Dr. Walt er Jordan....................... 24, 25, 34, 35, 36 38-228
,r Aircraft Contention 5 of the Intervencrs' Fetition alleged tha t the safety-related structures of TMI-2 are of insufficient strength to withetsud tse impact of aircraf t above 200,000 lbs.
All parties conceded that this statement was a statement of fact (I.D., para. 40).
Further, none of the parties refuted the concern of the Intervenors that such su impact sight lead to radiologieel consequences greater than the admittedly unacceptable levels of 10 CFR Part 100 The rest of the contention, as interpreted by the Board, pertained to whether or not the number of flights of large aircraf t (seaning greater mass than 200,000 lbs. or the design basis aircraft), constituted a threat to the health and safety of the public.
Both the Applicant and the Staff took the approach that the probles could be solved by the use of predictive models, without an articula ted discussion cf the e,nsequences of an accident with larger than design basis aircraft.(tr. 521, 709).
Under cross-examination, both Staff Witness Read and Applicant Witness 7allance admitted that their respective predictive models were subject to an unk cwn level of uncertainty is the model itself (tr. 562, 653 k).
In addition, both Witnesses admitted that it was not even important or worth >311e to assess the confidence limits is part of (tr. 653) or all of their input data (tr. 362, 607).
This approach to the use of a predictive =odel has the advantage that the results are essentially unassailable. If one is interested primarily is insuring that the adnis-istrative decision to license the plant will be affirmative, the approach is perfect.
The public bears the burden of administrative errors, hewever, and is this proceeding, a number of factors contribute to cast very serious doubt on the rosy aura of security in the use of unqnostionable numbers based on unverifiable predictive models with isput data of unknown confidence.
The data used for the isput 1sto the codel of Witness 7allance ec=-
tained as admitted bias (tr. 658), and did not contais data pertisent to d8 329
n+-
.e the Pennsylvania growth rates of air traffic (tr. 530).
It also was revealed that all of the flights of large aircraft (greater than 200,000 lbs.) is or out of Harrisburg International Airport were unscheduled aircraf t (tr. 555-6).
Yet the ersch data used by Applicant Witness Vallance included crashes of scheduled aircraf t, indeed the data were composed primarily of scheduled aircraf t crash data (tr. 357),
with a " relative asall ascunt of unscheduled cargo traffic incorporated in those data also."
The record does not demonstrate the applicability of scheduled aircraf t crash data to unscheduled aircraf t landings and takeoffs (tr. 557).
A request to the Applicant for crash data on military aircraft was made (tr. 560), and the data were premiced (tr. 585) but sever felivered.
Military crash data were of relevance since sc=e of the large aircraf t were silitary aircraf t (tr. 586).
Staff Witness Read acknowledged "At the present there is no agreed upon way of designing a rigid atructure, steel reinforced structure, against aircraft impact."
( tr. 624).
And Witness Read further stated, when asked if there was any guarantee that TMI-2 could withstand the incsc of a 200,000 lb.
aircraf t (again, the design basis aircraf t), "to the best of =y know-ledge and belief, no test of a large aircraf t agai=st a rigid structure" had been performed since immediately following World War II (ending, August, 1945)(tr. 6?i).
In addition, the subject of consequeness to the public of an accident with larger than design basis aircraf t was discussed to a li=ited snount on the record, with less than confidence-inspiring results.
Applicant Wit =esa Vallance ack=cwledged that he had not con-sidered the consequences of an accident to the public in his analysis (tr. 521).
Staff Witness Raad stated that accident consequences were not cemuletely ignored in his analysis (tr. 709), and conceded that he couldn't describe is scy meaningful way wnat the consequeness would be if a large airersft crashed into a nuclear pewer plaat (tr,663).
Witness Read admitted that the crash could produce consequences no worse than the worst postulated in the Reactor Safety Study (tr. 696).
Read subsequently stated that he thought the existing criticis=s of the Reacter Safety Study (WA32-14CO) were about as valid as the Study itself (tr. 696).
He aiMhrly agreed that, ccabising the estimated magnitudes of the GS*230
-D s
h e
underestimation of health consequences and probabilities, one could co=9 up with such, much higher levels of risk than were es ti=ated in the Study (tr. 696-9).
When the foregoing is all put tcgether, it becemes clear that there is very 13 ttle that is known te be factual with regard to the sa' ject at hand, na=ely, the probability of and consequences of a large aircra.
crasaing into TMI-2.
The qua'lity and applicability of the input data are not known.
The model used by the Applicant is a home-made one, and has never been subjected to peer review and criticias (tr. 563, 565).
The NEC model does not require thorough analysis 'er knowledge; the " analysis is just a filling out of the little for=ula
( tr. 652 ).
And the record ahews clearly that there has been no clear understanding or consideration of the consequences to the public of an aircraf t impact into TMI-2.
It is not known whe ther or not the safety related structures can even withstand the crash of a design-basis aircraft.
Under these circu= stances, the conclusions of the I.D. are precature (para. 50).
Indeed, the clads of co=serva tiss is para. 49 of the I.D. is based on exceedingly tenuous evidence.
When asked about his " conservative analysis," Staff Witness Read stated that he used values that were realities or that were "substantially conservative com-pared to things that have happened in the past." (tr. 620).
Subsequently, Read stated that the conservatissa "=icht in the future be quantifiable."
( tr. 1305 ).
This is such less than a definitive description of what is to be expected from the Staff in performing a " conservative analysis'*
designed to protect the health and safety of the public.
The Intervenors attempted to break through this norces of equivocation by means of a motion of April 15, 1977, filsd under extre=e hardship and inconvenience imposed by the Board.
The Intervenors made xn oral motics to compel the Applicant to produce a witness to describe the consequences of a large aircraf t crashing into TMI-2 (tr. 590-37, and the Scard deferred ruling on the motion (tr. 600).
Subsequently, the Staff offered to produce a witness to describe the structural ability of IMI-2 to withstand design-basis aircraf t crashes, at the suggestion of the Board (tr. 637-3 ).
On the basis that such a witness would be produced by the Staff, the Intervenors deferred cross-examisation on the question of the structural integrity of IMI-2 (tr. 638).
38 331
/
e The Board ultimately recuested the Intervenors file a =otion to require production of the witness.
The Board set an arbitrarily short and exceedingly burdense=e tine 11=1t (10 days, even though the Board was told that Intervenors were to travel to New Mexico during this ti=e) on the Intervenors in which to produce this notion, denying Interrenors' plea for an extra two weeks to for=ula te the =otion.
Thus th e Board deprived the Intervenors of any opportunity for research or benefit of legal advice or even a typewriter (see tr. 727 47 for a fuller discussion of this issue).
The notion was submitted, in ti=ely fashion, handwritten.
Having saddled the Intervenors with an arbitrary and unresconable time limit, the Board then dismissed the request that the Staff produce a witness to discuss the structural make-up of TMI-2 (tr. 748).
After having denied the Intervenors ' request for enough ti=e to put careful thought into the motion (tr. 737), the Board waited until May 13, 1977, to dery 4he notion and procrastinated until Augast 8, long af ter the record had been closed, to supply the required justification for the denial.
Thus the Scard denied the Intervenors the opportunity to pose legitisato questions regarding an inportant aspect of accident analysis and the consequences of possible Class 9 accidents from aircraft impacts, for which no knewn preventive engineered safety features exist.
The Board, by its own acts, effectiveIy put a lid on the subject.
Sinilarly,
the Board refused the offer of the Staff to discuss whether or not TMI-2 could even withstand a design basis aircraf t crash (tr. 748).
Ih its denial of the In t ervonors ' motion to produce a witness
- h e Board attempted illegally to place the burden of proof on the Intervenors by suggesting that the Intervenors' motion was rejected because it did not show that the large aircraf t impact "sheuld have been considered a fesign basis event" (emphasis is the original document).
Such a position is inconsistent with the Comsinaion's rule, 10 CFR 2.732.
Compare york Cec =ittee for a Safe Environment, e t al., v. USNRC, 527 7. 2nd 812, 815 816, a t n. 12 an d n. 13 ( D. C. Cir. 1975 ).
This spurious argn=ent by the Board esse af ter the Intervenors had been denied the opportunity to establish a possible relaticeship between a Class 9 accidant and a largs aircraft impact, since the Board arbitrarily and capriciously had denied the Intervenors the right to cross-exasine the Staff witness wits regard to aircraft impact consequences because of the pendi g motion b6 ~ 23
D
,f end "until we rule is your f a ror on that sotion.
." (tr. 1309).
The Board's denial of the motion, and the I.D. (pare. L ), are 5
illegal because they rely on an arbitrsry chosen ispact probability rate.
The decisions to deny the cotion and issue the I.D. were based upon assusptions, shewn under cross-examination to be highly dubious, as explained above, that the probability of a large aircraft impacting into TMI-i was (sligh tly) less than 10" per year.
Ihis use of an air-craf t 1spect probability of 10~7 per year is without any reliable or probative basis in the record of either a k=cwledge of the risk to the public of exposure to large quantities of radiation or a k=owledge of the radiolegical consequ'ences to the public of such an accident.
Th e Scard,is effect, ignored or considered negligible the radiological con-sequences is excess of the exposure guidelines of 10 0FR 100 which could result from the crashing of a large airersf t into TMI-2. (I.D. para. 46 ).
By ignoring the radiolegical riska and consequences to the public, the Scard failed to protect the health and safety of the public, as required under AEA, NEPA, and IRA.
Is short, the only solid information th e Board had upon which to reach its conclusion (I.D. para 50) consisted of the professional judg=ents of the two witnesses (tr. 610, 674) and their estimates of the large aircraf t volumes necessary to constitute a threat to TMI-2.
But even in this latter regard, there was no agreement.
Witnesa 7allance indicated that "ceveral orders of =agnitude" in increases of large air-craf t sevements would be required before the guideline level was reached (tr. 5537. Witsess Reed initiall7 i= plied a factor of 4 i= crease in traffic would reach the guideline level (tr. 613).
Witness Read later, in his supplemental testimony (af ter tr.1297) stated that nircraf t sove-ments greater than a factor of 10 larger than current levels would exceed guidelise levela, though he retained his value of 2400 flights as the guidelise level, Is a decision dated August 24, 1977, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Soard issued ALA3 h29 In that case, the Appeal Board re-manded to the Licensing Board certain aspecta of the proceeding.
The laaue involved concerned the potential threat of LNG (liquified Natural Gasl tankers, crashes,and ignition of any released games to the Hope 38-233
IG g
Creek Genersting Station, Units 1 and 2.
The Appeal Board cited a nu=ber of deficiencies in the evidentiary record, including conflicting evidence, confusion in the assu=pticas nade in the chcice of data, and failure to cocault other potentialL relevant sources of infer =ation (1113 429, pages 10, 11).
An entirely analogous situation exista in the present proceeding.
The Intervenors sought by means of a motian dated August 27, 1977, to have the reasond r of the Appeal Board in ALA3-429 applied to this proceeding with regard to an external hanard to TMI-P., large aircraf t crashes.
This motion was snemarily dis =issed with no articulatedbenson by an order dated September 19., 1977.
For exa=ple, as =entioned earlier, the crash data used by Appli-cant Witness Vallance applies to all co==ercial air traffic, scheduled and unscheduled, with the majority cf the data being due to acheduled aircraf t (tr. 557).
Yet Witness Vallance stated that the larg e air, craft using Harrisburg International Airport were entirely unscheduled and military (tr. 557, see also Read testimony, page 1) aircraf*,
The applicability of this data has not been established.
The refusal of the Applicant to supply the military aircraf t crash data also has not contributed to acund and reasoned decisionmaking is this proceeding.
The aircraf t crash into a nuclear power plant, as TMI-2, creates a spectre unlike any other externally propagated hazard at nuclear power plancs : with the possible exception of earthquakes.
The problem here rests r..wir with the ability, or inability, of the sa fety-related structu;eu to withstand aircraf t ersahea.
If these structures fail, then the last
'd e of defenau for normal accidenta bececes the first safeguard to fail.
However, such a single failure does not necessarily lead to holocaust.
The record remains totally void of any infor=ation on the nature ir degree of any subsecuent failures of the plant safety boundaries and the consequences of such failures--cocaequences to the plant, if any, and consequences to the public, if any.
Thus, the point made by Staff Witness Read, "Tou never accept the probability if the consequences are too high." (tr. 709-10). fell on deaf' ears.
In reality, the crash probabilities assumptions were given complete acceptance by,58-234
7 h
the Scard, with culy the nost vague of references to consequences, even though the Scard explicitly had expressed concern over whether large aircraft could initiate a Class 9 accident (tr. 727-2).
or not a Again, the Board relied on judgnenta ob tained frc= inserting nu=bers of unquestionable and unknown accuracy and applicability into unveri-fiable nodels.
This reasening by the 3 card does not even satisfy 10 C72 2.760(c),
let alone the dictates of the APA, 5 Usc 7c6, or the requirenent of the AIX, NEPA and IRA to protect the health and safety of the public.
The Board obviously prefers to play bookie when other peoples' lives are at stake.
The Board has no such authority.
o8-335
h Evacuation Plans sud E=errecev Resnonse Carability Intervenors contended that the e=ergency response and evacuation plans of the responsible governmental agencies and the Applicant were inadequate and unworkable.
The plans were based upon the unproven and queeticeable assusptions that all necessary officials w;11 be available at all ti=es, will known how to respond and will react proe ptly, and that me=bers of the public will respond to a radiological e=ergency and allow the=selves to be evacuated, despite prior assurances that accidents severe enough to warrant evacuation are " highly unlikely."
The Initial Decision (I.D. page 33) sisquetes the final sentence of
- Intervenors' Contention 8 as follows:
"Ne operating and evacuation pla, are shown to be workable through 117w tests."
The Final sentenc e of Contention 8 sctually reads as follows:
No operating license should be granted for Unit 2 until e=ergency and evacuation planc are snown to be workable through live tests.
In other words, Intervonors sut=it that a license to operata TMI-2 should not issue before the e=ergency response and evacuation plans have been sucwn to be workable through live tests and drilla of these who would be evacuated.
The cor :dbace expressed by Applicant and Cc==enwealth witnesses that evacuation could be acco=plished in a ti=ely =anner was based entirely upon studies of and experiences with non-radiological e=ergencies (tr. 805-6, 829-32, 2431 A, 25287 and upon previously announced drills involving only official personnel (tr. 786-7, 793).
These reliances are unfounded because they are based on past events and uncested paper plans which have little bearing on the ability to aceoeplish evacuation during a real radiation disaster.i Their-assurances that evacuation could be acco=plished in s radiation e=ergency were not based on personal knowledge
$ It is relevant to note here that, follewing the Millstone reactor accident in Ccc=ecticut in Dece=ber, 1977, New Tork state placed civil defense emergency personnel on Long Island on alert, but did not netify the public of the potential need to evacuate.
Further, in January, 1973, U.S. officials failed to sotify the Canadian govern =ent of the i=pending reentry of the damaged Russian nuclear-powered satellite in order to
'thead off a re-creation of Merenfr7 Theater," a reference to the 1938 radio braodcast of " War of the Worida," which had created ' acme public panic.
(New York T1=es, January 25, 1978, page 1),58-236
Y Cc=monwealth witnesees ad=itted their ignorance of radia tion and radia tion-induced injury or other radiation-induced health ef f ec ts (tr. 1355-56, 813-14, 837, 1567).
Hence there is substantial doubt that the judg=ent of those responsible for public health and safety protection would not be defective in the after:ath of a radiological accident at TMI-2 which required evacuation of the surrounding area.
The Board acted with caprice and arbitrariness, and violated its own rules of practice, in accepting these unfou.,ded assurances by the Cc==onwealth witnesses of their ability to effect the safe evacuation of all affected persons.
Af ter ad=1ssions with regard to the absence of even a rudi=entary under-standing of radiation or of what constitutes a *mdiation injury (tr.1355-1356, 813<14), or of the maximum per=issible dose to which volunteer evacuation personnel are per=itted to be exposed (tr.14h3) lense one =ust Civil Ce inquire, as the Board did not, whether Cauphin Countyjg Director Molloy, would fail to take appropriate action ta protect his volunteers, e.g.,
whether he would have any way of knowing when to withdraw them from evacuation efforts to protect them frem exposure greater than the nazisus permissible doses,
The Board's cenclusion (I.D. para. 65) thet State and local officials "will not be hamrered" in the discherge of their re-sponsibilities to protect the healta and safety of the public" is arbi-trary, capricious, evasive, and irrelevant.
The record de=onstrates, however, that these officials have no understanding whatacever of the
=sguitude and nature of possible radiological accidents er theirconse-quences, of the public 's lack of demonstrated ability to respond to radiological accidents swif tly and effectively, er of the kinds of difficulties that say develep in the process of evacustion following a radiological accident at TMI-2.
The Board's reliance (I.7. para. 65) on the confidence expressed by the Commonwealth witnesses, who admitted to being unschooled and unknowledgeable in radiological matters, that their ignorance would not compromise their own effectiveness of response and is therefore in violatica of the Commission's rules.
The assurances by the Com=cnwealth's Witness Molloy, who is the primary person responsible for i=planenting evacuation following a radiological accident at TMi-2, with regard to the ability of the County Civil Defense organi=r. tion to cope adequately with the sanagsment of uS~337
f) g g
psblic vehicular traffic following such an accident is contradicted by Molley's ad=1ssica that he knows of no studiesbf traffic flow in the Harrisburg netropolitaa area (tr. 1434).
"o showing was nado in the record that evacuation of large nu=bers of p, from the environs of the plant could be expected to proceed with sufficient speed and effectiveness to protect adequately or credibly the health and safety of the public.
Further assurances of the Co==onwealth 's witnesses, whose authcrity with regard to the proper techniques for response to an accident at TMI-2 is doubtful, as shown above, that public drills are not needed to ensure that t.s public will respond quickly and eff ec tively to emergency evacuation instructions (I.D. para. 65) do not constitute reliable, probative, and substantial evidence that such is in fact the case in radiole; cal emer-gencies.
The 3 card's conclusion (I.D. para. 66) that a "diverstty of non-radiological events" referenced provide suffielect basis for disre-garding the need for live tests to demonetrate the workability of evacuation plans in the event of a radiological emergency is not based upon evidence in the record and is arbitrary, capricious, and illegal.
In addition, the 3 card's finding (I.D. para. 63) that a " randomly required initiation of the appropriate emergency response plans will not fail due to any inabd'* ty to contact state and local officials" is also arbitrary and capricious, and is not based upon evidence in the record of setual experience by state or local officials or the Applicant with randos drill, In this same vein, Co==enwealth's Director of Radiological Health, Thc=as Gerusty, who was present during cro ss-s - ination of Co=monwealth u-.
who did not hi=self witnesses on the energency preparedness issue, testify, has declared una=biguously 14 the record of the Draft of the ZZA Worksher Proceeding on the Cetober, 1976 Chinese Fallout Incident that tse Chinese Fallent experience showed that the Commonwealth 's ability to essess doses quickly and effectively probably would not have been adequste had the incident resulted from a nuclear reactor accident.
(Draf t Proceedings of a Workshop on the October, 1976 Chinese Fallout Incident, pp. 23-2 4).
Gerusk7 is the pri=ary person responsible fcr determinatics of the need to evacuate in response to an accident at TMI-2.
38 23S
ll
~
e This recently released docu=entation corroborated the record's demon-stra tion of the inadequacy of the Co=nonwealth 's radiological seeident response capabill:7 Specifically, the Co==onwealth 's Director of Radiolcgical Health Tho=as Gerusky stated, at page 24 of the EPA Drsf t Proceedings dccusent, that, with respect to response to the fallcut from the Chinese nuclear test:
We had acceptable programs for this particular case.
I doubt that they would be acceptable in the case of a reactor accident.
The Co=monwealth concealed this crucial insight into its inability to respond effectively to a radiological accident at TMI-2.
The Cc==onwealth did not enter into the TMI-2 record this or any other adverse assessment of its abd7'ty to calculate doses accurately and in ti=e to enable a deter =ination of the necessary evacuation requirements, even though the Cc==onwealth was a full party during the subsequent TMI ? Operating License Hearings.
The inability of the Co=mouvealth to =aintain its existing monitoring capabilities was raised in the TMI-2 proceedings, but =ade no visible impression on the Board or Staff.
The Board (I.D. para. 64) igscred the health and safety of the public and therefore acted contrary to AEA, NEPA, and E21, because it ignored the extensive and andisputed testimony in the record that the Co=sission has no procedures for assuring the sxistence
~
of a continuing eepability to respond to a rsdiological e=ergency.
For e= ample, the Board tiolated the APA, AEA, NEPA, and E2A in sceepting the Staff's deter =ination tha t the Xpjlicant would fill the void in the event that the Co==onwealth's Bureau of Radiolegical Health Suffered a reduced emergency response capability (I.D. para. 64).
There had been no shewing in the record that the Applicant is willing or able to assume the Commonwealth 'a ro' '
er these circumstances.
There had been no shewing in the record tt Co==ission has or will develop procedures for assuring the conti-ng existence af an emergency response capability by the Co==onwealth, the Applicant, or any other entity, with regard to the possibility of an accident at TMI-2.
Evidence that a reductica in the Co=monwealth 's response capability was a very real possibility was entered into th e record be the Interveccrs ( tr.1109), but was con-veniently doenphasised by the Board (I.D. para. 64).38-339
/ 2-g h
37 restricting Intervenors ' cross-examination of the Commonwealth witness from Oauphin County Civil Cefense to discussion of an area beyond the boundary but in the i= ediate environs of the Applicant's designated evacuation :ene, the Board also acted arbitrarily and capriciously, preventing full exploration of the ability of the County Civil Defense sgency to protet. all potentially affected persons residing withis its jurisdictica, irrespective of any limitations based upon the alleged improbability of the Class 9 accident.
Civil defense and diraster preparedness officials =ust take disasters as they come without regard to whether or not they exceed seco arbitrary level of probability, risk, or consequence.
"'h e Board and Co= mission cannot turn their backs on the responsibility for licensing under lo CF2 50.57 (a)(3)(1) and (a)(b) and their fundanental responsibilities under AEA, NEPA, and ERA.
The failure of the Staff and Board to 1cok beyond the confines of the evacuation zone defined by the Applicant constitutes a failure to conform with the =andate of the Atemic Energy Act, particularly is view of NEPA and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, to protect the het lth and safety of the public.
The prejudice to the public interest by this l
rastriction of inquiry to evacuation of the areas in the i=cediate vicinity of TM!-2 is cespounded because the record had already shown that a Class 9 accident at TMI-2 could occur by the crashing of a large aircraft into the TMI-2 plant.
It should also be noted that the recent find 1:ss of sn increased relationship between icw dos (s of radiation and serious health effects have implications for the evacuation of menbers of the public who reside close to, though not is the i= mediate envircus of, TMI-2.
The prepared testi=ony of Applicant iiitness Herbeis, et al. (af ter tr. 7571 speci-l fically nentions public exposure levels considered to be the levels
]
which =unt not be exceeded (Testimony, page 9).
Cue of these levels
)
that Herbeis notes say not be exceeded, the whole body dose of 5 rem, i
f' alls in the range of doses found to double the incidence (cc= pared to that which would be expe.:ted without the dese) of certain forms of c'ancer, according to the first broad-based epidemielegical study of low dose expesure to humans ever undertake =, the Mancuso Report ( t:. 2331 1
233d).
This implias that the public is being sub jected to extraordisary risk prior to the call for evacuation.08-240
/
e The question of who looks af ter the health and safety of the public during and after a reactor accident received a considerable a: cunt of attentien in this proceeding.
Staff Witness 3ritts sta ted that it was not :TEC policy to sessure radiation doses to people, but that the Applicant was recuired to do ao through calculations (tr. Ic65).
Under accident conditions, the responsibility for socitering exposure levels to sembers of the public andicoking af ter the protection of the public would fall upon the State, according to Staff Witness Van Niel (tr. 1075).
Witness Van Niel later reaffirmed that doses received by members of the public during accident conditions would be assessed by the Applicant ( tr. 1743 ).
Staff Vitness Stohr admitted that the responsi-bility of the Applicant teward any socitoring of radiation doses extended only out to the edge of the Lew Population Zcne (tr. 1770).
Witness Stohr ves unable to identify any agency at all which had radiation dose sonitering responsibility beyond the Low Population Zone (tr. 1770),
and stated that he was unaware of any regaulations deliseating such res;<nsibility (tr. 1771).
The testi=eny of Applicant Witness Herbein identifies the thyroid as the critical organ durini :n eccident (after tr. 757; testimony, page 9).
Staff Vitneer Stohr stated that the a=ount of radioactivity in the thyroid could be measured through the use of properly calibrated whole body counters (tr. 1787).
Witness Stohr further stated that he had received assurances that the State would use whole body counters in its dose asseessents for ne=bers of the public, depending on the circumstances, though he acknowledged that the State had no such counters (tr. 1738).
However, the record does not show that the Applicant er Staff have cocsidered how sany people may need to have their thyroid doses nessured as a result of an accident at TM!W4 the location and availability of the counting equipment, or the means of transporting those people affected to the counters.
Thus, here again, the Staff and the :GC, is their eagerness to license another plant, have recklessly ignored the non-delegatable duty of the Co-*sion to protect the coalth sud safety of public.
38 - M1
/v Furthermore, the Applicant is required. by '.he rules of the Cc~~'ssion to furnish the information concerning an accident to ths Cc==ission (sfter tr. 757).
On pace one <l its prepared testi=ony on Interveco.r s ' cvatention 8, the Applicant states:
In the highly unlikely event of an accident.
. Metro-politan Edisen Cc=pany (Met Ed)'as overster of 7:t!-2 has the resron. bility to de tect the event, initially assess and thereaf ter constantly reevaluate its potential effect on on-site and off-site personnel, and provide infor=ation of off-site consequences to local, state, and federal authorities (emphasis added).
This infor=ation which the Applicant is required to provide the Cc==1ssion te co= ply with the Cc==issicu's rules corsista of, among o ther things,
the essential infor=ation needed by a se=bor of the public to e a tsb lish his level of radiation exposure, regardless of whether or :ot the persen is evacusted.
Ecwever, Sec.190 of the AIA specifically s',stes tha t any infor=ation required to be provided under the Co=sission ? rules cannot be used as evidence against the Applicant in Court.
These rules of the Co==ission, which require that the Applicant be the sole so :ce of information on exposure levels to the public, and information regar-ding any potential corrective action, conflict with the interest of Congress in the Price-Anderson Act and the AIA, and with the letter and intent of the ERA.
TMI-2 cannot be licensed because the granting of a generating license would thwart the intent of Congress expressed in the Price Anderson Act, as explained below.
The Price-Anderson Ar t is composed primarily of Sec.170 of the AEA.
This Act was added to the AIA in 1957 to fulfill two basic needs:
First, to protect the public by assurring the availability of funds for the payment of clai=s arising from a catastrophic nuclear incident; Second, to recove a deterent to private industrial participatica in the atomie energy program pcsed by the threat of tremendous liability claims.
(Report of the Joint Cc=sittee on Atomic Energy, of August 26, 1965, to acccmpany S.20k2, wnich later became P.L 89-210, approved
,ptember 29, 1965)
(fres Seincted Materials on Atomic Energy Indemnity and Insurance legislation, Joint Cetuittee Print, March 1974, at 284).
While the latter of these tw( purposes has clearly succeeded, the suceers of the former need has yet to be established.
The Joint Consittee s-342
/5' on Ito:1c Energy was aware that the laudable goal of protecting the
~
public by providing soney to satisfy certain claiss in the event of a nuclear catastrephe had not been fully realized, and in a 1965 Report on renewing the Pric e-Andersca Act, the Co=sittee stated:
It is the clear intent of this legislation tha t if a member of the public is ever injured by a nuclear incident, he will not be subjected te a series of substantive and procedural hurdles which would prevent the speedy satisfaction of a legitimate clais.
(Selected Ma terials on Atomic Energy Indensity and Insurance Legislation, at 293).
Thus, the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act sho
Court in York Co=sittee for a Safe Enviro nm e nt v. USNHC ( D. C. Cir. 1975,
- n. 13) tnat ".
. it would be unrealistic to expect public interest litigants to underwrite the expense of mounting the kind of p"peration and presentation of evidence that la ordinarily required is tais, type of case.
[d3'POb
proceeding, the Intervenors did so, knowing that 0:ey could not afford expert legal advice or a complete set of expert witnesses, yet believing that their abbreviated Jet of contentions raised issues of grave signi-ficance to the safety and health of the public.
In its Statement " Financial Assistance to Farticipants in Co==dssion Proceedings," (Fed. Reg. 41, p. 50829-38), the Co= mission gave itself aeesingly unstinting praise for the ability of the Staff to handle safety and environmental matters.
If all safety probless of nuclear reactors had been understood and had been solved at the time of the State =ent, Nov.1976, such a state =ent sight be believable.
If all of the environ-mental ispacts of the nuclear fuel cycle had even been acknowledged and evaluated by the Staff (fully 8 years af ter the passage of REPA), such a soothing statement sight be appropria te.
Ecwever, this proceeding dilustrates that at least with regard to environmental matters, the Staff has hardly progressed =uch since Calvert Cliffs.
The use of a clearly defective value in Table S-3 (74.5 curies for raden-222) and the 50-year dose co=sitsent model (or, more properl7, a million year dose conceal =ent model) constitute blatant and illegal attempts by the Staff and Co=sission to ignore the AIA and IRA, and to evade the =andate of NEPA and the subsaquent and related court decisions, and to deceive the public.
The need for expert legal advice in this kind of proceeding is obvious.
The Applicant has its own legal staff.
Yet to handle its affairs in this proceeding, the Applicant obtained the services of outside experts in the field.
This decision of the Applicant was obviously made to protect its evn interests.
None of the other parties have suffered in this proceeding for a lack of expert witnesses or expert legal advice, except the In t e rvencrs.
The Intervenors cannot even pey for non-expert legal advice.
The Inter-venors were not able to hire a single expert witness.
The rights of the Intervenors under Commission rule 10 CFR 2.743(a) and under the consti-tuticnal guarantees of due process and equal protection received no protection from the Cc==ission whatacever.
If it was Consission policy to insure that any intervenors were meant to be bled of their meager 38 347
H Fesources anc exhausted ef their energies, that nuclear power plants were always to be licensed no =atter what the intervencra put forth as evidence, ut changes frem the present system could be esadily observed.
In this preceeding, there can be little doubt that the Intervenors have ec==itted various exotic procedural miscalculations and errors.
To what extent such errors due to igno rance occurred, the Intervenors will prcbably never knew.
But that is not important.
The real point is that the Intervenors were effectively denied the opportunity for expert legal and expert technical advice by the rossission's policy of de f acto denial of due process and ual protec tion, and by the Cc==ission policy of insuring that its hearings are thoroughly stacked assinst the Inter-venors, and supportive of the Applicant.
The promotional aspects of the old Atomic Energy Co= mission were re=oved from the NRC by Congress under the ERA, a change that the Con =1ssion seems to be unaware of.
Ihis problem is well illustrated by the procedural antics of the Board con-cerning the Intervenors ' motion to require the Applicant to present witnesses to discuss the structural ability of TMI-2 to withs tand aircraf t impacts.
The Board imposed an arbitrary and wholly inreasonable t1=e constraint upon the Intervenors in this instance, knowing full well that the Intervenors' representative would be away from resource sateriala and even the possibility of informed legal advice during that short ti=e.
The 3 card seined upon the Intervenors' inability to be e= pert in every-thing, denied the sotion which the Board itself had requested, and then procrastinated months before offering reasons for its desiri.
The issue was closed, and the 3 card saved itself fres a nasty confrontation with the Applicant.
(The Applicant had stated rather than undertake an engineering study to deter =ine the ability of TMI-2 to withstand a large aircraf t crash, the App.icant would refuse to obey the Board's request or directive, tr. 640-2I.
The Board, on Fridav, June 10, 1977, precised I The letter of June 27, 1977, to the Chairman of the NRC, by Mr. Earold Green, very accurate'v su=s ^he situa tion, as far as it goes.
Drawing on the entire experience of the Intervenors.in this preceeding, it becc=es ocynors that the sole purpose of this hearing was to create a record for the purpose of granting a license to the Applicant.
The 3 card, Staff, and Applicant shared a ec= mon goal.
Furthermore, there would be no infor:atica the Intervenors could supply which would alter this predeternised conclusion.58-248
at the Intervenors that its reasons for having denied the Intervenors '
sotion of May 18, 1977, would be forthcoming "in the very near future
~
(tr. 26o2).
When, on July 5, the request for reasons was repeated, the Board ermected "tc issue a written order on tha t =otien this week" (tr. 2764).
The order was finally issued on August 3, 1977, fully one south later, al=ost 3 sonths af ter the announcement of the motion'a denial and a scath af ter conclusion of the evidentiary hearings.
The end result was that a lid was kept on an extre=ely i=portant issue; the questics of whether or not it could be shown that TMI-2 could with-stsud even a design-basis aircraft impact (tr. 631) was never explored.
The Applicant was apared an embarrassing confrontation with the Board, and the Intervenors were denied the opportunity to even try to get advice, were stalled and sialed by the Board, and finally were faulted by the 3 card for not having been able to read the Board 's collective sinda in draf ting their motion.
The lid was being kept securely on 0he subject.
Potentially damaging crose-examination was in this way pre-vented.
The Intervenors ' interesta and rights were violated.
'The two basic questions of public participation in Cc= mission licensing haarings were conveniently ignored in the Cc= mission's Statement.
These questions are:
Do Intervecors have any protected rights in these proceedings!, and, to what extent are these rights, if any, comprecised by the ruIes, regulations, procedures, practices, and policies of the Cc==1ssion?
The easy answer to the first question la yes, since 10 CFR 2.714(a) and (b) offer potential intervenors a mech ta for participation.
What the Cosmission's rules do not spell out is tha the history of hearings before the Cosnission shows clearly that the party with the largest economic stako ad resources, the applicant, always pr evails, literally without exc eption.
As a result, the righta the intervenors sought to protect by lawful means are compromised.
The intervenors ' interesta and rights in a proceeding receive no considera-tien or protection frca the Cc==ission beyond condescending toleration.
All serious challenges to the adequacy of an applicant's caso are pro-cedurally disallowed.
Only the applicant is allowed to prevail.
The Co= mission 's practice of subsidining the nucisar industry by denying Istervenors' rights to effective participation guarantee.s the saistanance of the colcasal financial imbalance in funds available US 249
32 for the proceedt between Applicant and Intervences.
The Cc=siasion's yederal Register State =ent eatinates that a full-scale intervention uight coat $1C0,000.
The Cc==iasion is atrangely silent on the subject of hew much an applicant spends to advance its case.
It should also be pointed out, tha t each step in this preceeding brought an experience, process, or procedure which was totally unfamiliar to the persons authorined to represent Interrencrs in this case.
- Thus, this proceeding involved the first cross-exa=ination, first sworn testi-sony by Dr. Kepford and the first preparation of finding of fact and conclusions of lawf exceptions to an Initial Decision, Supplemental Me=orandus in Support of a Motion for Stay, ever perfer=ed or prepared by the Intervenors' representative, and all in the ce=plete sbaence of legal training.
No other party had this burden.
The Intervenors could not hire expert legal or expert technical advice for any part or pre-paration of this proceedirs, except for whatever expertime the record shews that the Intervences the=selves provided.
This i= balance vaa not based on a voluntary decision by the Intervenors to conduct their case in this inadequate sannor; their dacision was dictated entirely by the fact that there was no money to hire outside cenaultanta, legal or technical.
In this case, the Intervenors had lees than $500 with which to present its case, do all the necessary research and paper work, travel, eat, sleep, and tu an.
Intervencrs' authorined representative under-took the case tre bono eublico, with no expectations of rei=bursecent,
=uch less salary.
No =eney was available for witnesses.
The case of the Intervenors has been clesrIy prejudices by this handicap.
Would any applicant enter an ASL3 proceding with auch paltry funds? Would any applicant allcw itself to be confined to spending no mors than $500 for an entire hearing! The obvious answer to both questions is of course not.
The Cc= mission practice is to reserve that " treat" just for Intervencrs.
There is an adcitional troubling d1=enaien of both a rather more philosophical nature and crippling reality that deserves consideration here.
As the at best meager resources of intervenors are exhausted by their participation in the successive proceedings that comprise the 38-250
23 gg, adminis trative pro cedures, intervenor af ter intervence, in case af ter case, is forced into the position of nounting an inadecuate, ince=plete case and eventually, bled to death financially, forced to drop out altogether.
In this nanner, case law by default and faulty and illegal and fraudulent precedents are allcwed to stand by tae attrition of one side in these unequal and unjust adversarial proceedings.
This body of biased case law is then used by the agency to bludgeon rubsequent challenges by other underfinanced intervenera.
Neither justice aor the public interest la served.
The Cc==1asion policy of denying funds to intervenors is uncon-stitutional since this policy, and the Cc= mission policy of advocacy of the applicant, serve to caprive the intervenors of due process of law and equal protec tion under the law.
The Consismics, the Staff, and the 3oard have advanced no reason whatacever why those who oppose having nuclear power. plants i= posed upon then for the private gain of an applicant acculd not have reanurces ecuivalent to chose of the applicant for the protection of intervencrs' righta.
US'351
M Cc=raestive Health Iffects of the Nuclear Puel Cvele Parac:w.ch nos. 7, 23, 24, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, and 39 of the Intervenors' Exc eptions to the Initial Decision of 2ec. 19, 1977, refer to aspects of the long-term health ef fec ts of the uranium fuel cycle.
These paragraphs will be discussed tcge ther in the ensuing dis-cussion which will focus primarily en the long-ters health effects of the radioactivity produced by the =ining of the quantity of natural uranium-238 needed to support operation of Three Mile Island Unit 2 (IMI-2) for one year.
In particular, the pri=ary subjects for consider-ation are radon-222 and its daughter products, the period of ti=e involved in the release of these decay products, and their as yet unaccounted for health effects.
The follewing discussions of the quantity of radon-222 produced and the time periods involved, it should be emphasised, will pertain to that quantity associated solely with the sill taili:gs lef t af ter the removal of the uranius necessary to fuel TMI-2 for one year.
The evidentiary record in this proceeding shows a remarkable level of agreenent between Staff Witness, Dr. Reginald Gotchy, and the Intervenors' sole witness, De, Chauncey Kopford, on numerous aspects of the raden-222 problem.
Kepford's testi=eny revealed that from the mill tailings piles about 320 million curies of raden-222 would be produced by the thorium-230 initially present in the tailings pile.
A larger source of curies would be the s=all a=ount of uranium-238 not recovered in the silling process, producing ultimately about 2 trillion curies of raden-222 (both nu=bers, Iepford testimony, Table 2).
Gotchy agreed that enor-cus quantities of raden-222 would be produced (tr. 2888) and ackscwledged, on rebuttal, the validity of Kepford's estimate of the quantities of raden-222 produced (tr. 2890).
Cn this subject, there is no controversy.
The fact that hundreds of millicas to trillions of curies of raden-222 wilI be produced by decay of thorius-230 and uranium-238, respectively, in the sill tailings piles ; aduced frem milling uranius for one year's supply of fuel for TMI-2 is undisputed ou the record in this proceeding.
The me=orandum of Dr. Walter Jordan of the Ito ic Safety and Licen-sing Board Panel, dated Sept. 21,1977, (but not =ade available to tse Intervenors by the Staff natil Nov. 30, 1977) addresses radon-222 emissions38-352
25 only fres the thorium-230 initially present is the sill tailings piles.
His calculations add further support to the record and Dr. Kepford's testi=eny on the subject of rsdon-222 emissions.
In sarked centrast to the har=eny described above is the Cc==ission policy of recognising only 74.5 curies due to the radoc-222 produced as a result of the mill ta111:ss piles needed to produce fuel for one year of reantor activity.
The emissions which ec=tinue for a sillion years (tr. 2228-9) and billions of years (tr. 2888-90), apparently have not been recognized or evaluated as contributing to adverse health effects, even though such recognition and evaluation is required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended ("NEPA"), the Atc=ic Escrgy Act of 1954, as amended ("AIA"), the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
(" ERA"), and the Ad=isistrative Procedure Act of 1946, as a= ended ("APA").
The magnitude of this omission was alluded to by Dr. Jordan (Jordan memorandus, page 3), and was the subjec t of Kepford 's testimony.
The prepared testimony of Staff Witness Gotchy confer =s to this apparent Consission policy by not considering the actual durstien of radon-222 e:issions.
In this prepared testimony, Gotchy concluded that a total of 0.48 persons would die fres causes ascociated with each year of operation of a 1000 MW(e) reactor (Gotchy testi=ony, Table la).
As a footnote te Table la of his testiseny, he noted that an additional O.C23 deaths per year of operation would be caused by the si:1:g and milling portions of the urnsins fuel cycle.
These figures prepared by Gotchy were deficient largely because they were derived by assu=ing that che sill tailings would produce radon for only one year per year of plant operation.
As explained below, Gotchy neglected to consider the sill tad'dngs relsases for the duration that radon-222 emissions are produ ced fres the mill tailings piles.
Ih reaching its conclusicus en the cc=parative " health effects" of the coal sud uranium fuel cycles, the Board apparently accepted the (at times identical, word for word) arguments of the Staff and Applicant.
The term " health effects," as used by the Board, is a cuphesism for avoidable pre =ature deaths frca leukemia, cancer, and other disease produced by ionizing radiation, including gene tic de fects.
In short, the Staff arguments which the Board relied upon are as follows:
US~353
~1b (a)
Kopford did not use the sa:e 50-year dose co=sitsent nodel as the Staff, (Staff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, August 19, 1977 (" Staff F.O.T.},
para. 65) Kepford's population model is u= acceptable; his conclusions remote and speculative (Staf f F.O.F-para. 69I.
(b )
Raden-222 releases from any fuel cycle are small ecmpared to natural background releases (S taf f F.O.F., para. 66 ).
Radon-222 deaths from TMI-2 are insignificant compared to all otner deaths during the same interval (Staff F.C.T.,
para. 69).
(c )
The nuclear fuel cycle is less harsful than the coal fuel cycle, and is econcaically preferable to coal (Staff F.O.F.,
para. 70).
All of thsee 1rp=ents by t.k. Staff and Board are without merit.
r The first arfurent prppeusde cy the Staff (?oint (a), above) is d
trite in the extrema.
na Ctaff has not established that its 50 year dose co=mitment model is tne correct model to be used.
The NRC has no rules, regulations, or even guidlines on the subject of predictive nodela.
Nor has the Staff established that the 50 year dose commitment model is even remotely an antrotriate =odel.
To begin with, the Staff has failed to take into account the lo=g-ters nature of the problem of long-lived radioisotopes.
Since many radiciaotopes relessed to :he environment due to the nuclear fuel :ycle have ruch longer half-1.'.vec than 50 years, and many others produce decay products which persist beyond the Staff's arbitrary 50 year limit, th e Staff's ahort 50 year perl-4 of consideration obviously and grossly underestimates the environmental impacts of the nuclear fuel cycle, in defiance of the letter and spirit of NEPA.
In Calvert Cliffe Coordinating Cdemittee v. USAIC, 449 4. 2nd 1109 (D.C. Cir., 1971) ("Calvert Cliffs"),
the Court stated:
We conclude, then, that Section 102 of NEPA mandates a particuler sort of carefal and inferned decision-=aking proceva and crea tes judicially enforcable duties 2ut 12. the decision was reacbed precedurally without in-dividuall:ed consideration and balascing of environmental factors--conducted fully and in rood f aith--it is th e re-sponsibility of the courta to reterse. (emphasis added).
o8 254
,/
O Regsrding emissions frem the sill tailings piles, the 50-year doce co- ' taent model in connection with the 74.5 curies used by the Staff actually corresponds to a several billion year dose conceal =ent :odel.
(See Staff Witness Gotchy's re= arks, tr. 2333.)
Cc=cealment bere =eans the intentional c=ission of the overwhelming majority of health effsets caused by the nuclear fuel cycle.
The Staff dose co==itment.odel there-fore doas not qualify as " careful and i= formed decision =aking" or a balancing of environmental =atters "cenducted fully and in rood faith.'
(Calvert Cliffs, above).
(emphasis added).
The use of the 50-year dose consit=ent model must also be viewed in the light of footnote 12 of NEDC v. USNEc, 547 F. 2nd 633 (D.C. Cir.
1976), which states, in part, We note at the outset that this standard is =isleading because the toxic life of the wastas under discussion far ereseds the life of the riant beine licensed.
The environ-mental ef f ects to be considered are those flcwing from re-processing and passive storage for the full 'etoxifiestion period.
(e=phasis added).
Here :he Court plainly articulates the principle rule for consideration of long-lived radioactive pollutants:
the environ = ental effects of long-1.ved radioisotopes are to be considered "for the full deterification period."' The detoxification period is a property of the particular isotope, and say not be limited by an arbitrary and capricious (hewever convenient) administrative decision to ignore the laws of physics.
The uncontroverted Table 1 of the Kepford testimeny (page 2) and the acccupanying dienussion in the record identify the sill tailings as being toxic for periods com-parable to the spent fuel wastes.
The 50-year dose ccesitsent model, therefore, is legs 117 and scientifically unacceptable and wholly inappro-priate.
It sheuld also be noted that the Co=sission has yet to apply NEPA's " full disclosure" principle to any of the long-lived radioactive products of the nuclear fuel cycle.
The sill tailings probles is just one aspect of this larger unaddressed probles of the s111enia.
With respect to =ill taili9gs piles and radon-222, the prima ry defect of the 3taff's 50-year dose co=mit=ent model is the underlyi'ag assumption that the mill tailings are producing radon-222 for only one year.
The record shows unequivocally that the raden-222 emissiona con-tinua for more than one year.
The physical laws that govern radioactive b8-255
&a O
decay determine that emission of rade -222 frem the tailings piles continues for =illions and billions of years.
(See page 1 and Table 1 of Kepford testi=ony.)
Only when the duration of the =111 tailinrs probles has been fully factored into the ca:culstions can the =sgnitude of the real health effects of the -ill tailings probles be al,reciated and considered.
And in order to estimate such health effects, a model describing future populations and population distributions must be used (point (b), above).
Clearly, there is no model available which could be expected to even reasocably accurately predict nu=bers of human beings and their distribution patterns a thousand, ten thousand or a million or a billion years into the future.
The lack of a model capable of calculating these numbers with precision does not, however, mesn that the health effects attributable to emissions can be simply disregarded or ignored.
Models for estimating health effects far into the future can be verified only by actual 37 counting the numbers of human be!ngs--cr, -s it were, performing the experisent.
To determine accurately the future health effects, the experiment would entad es tablishing with certainty the populaties numbers and distributions throughout the next twenty billion years or so by ebservation and recording of the necessary in-for:ation.
The impossibility clearly arises in doing so and in trans-sitting such information back for decision-making new.
To trans=1t this information back to current decision =aksrs would entail restoring at least some part of the universe of the fagfuture (the end of the ex-perisent) to the conditions of toda.v, obviously a hopeless viola tion of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.
There are sany more fruitful endeavers than challenging the Second Law.
Of relevance hers is the practice of choosing models to forecast future events within the limita-tions imposed by the S' cond Law.
s In the Three Mile Island 2 proceeding, several predictive models were used.
One such vehicle for prediction was used by the Board to decide that the censequences to the public of a very large aircraf t i=pacting into TMI-2 seed not be considcred seriourly ( I. D.. p ar a. 50 ).
Another was a short-range predictive =odel used by the Applicant to esti= ate the quantity of electricity it expects to sell in the next five or so years (se, Final Supplement to Final Environmental Statement (?3750),
b8-25G
M Sec. 3].
This model was relied upon by the Board is the I.D. (para. 12 1).
The fact that this Applicant =odel is defective and inaccurate (compare Table 8.3, FSFCS with Table 21, FSFIS, page 3-65) apparently did not trouble the Board.
Tet another predictive model relied upon by the Staff addresses the satter of future population.
Recently the NRC published a report entitled Envirennental Survey of the Retrocessigg and Waste Mansee-
=ent Fertions of the LWR Fuel Cvele NURIG-0116, Oct., 1976 (tr. 2400-1}.
Of pertinence here is a section of this report which discusses the con-sequences of a failure at a high-level radioactive waste repository.
The report states Assess =ent of long-ters consequences should consider future hu=an habits and de=ography.
Since there is no
=eans of accurately determining distant future societal habits and desegraphic data, one arrreach is to assume that societal habits and torulation dis tribu tien will not chance uch frem those of today.
Alternatively, concentrations of wasta =aterials in the lithosphere,
hydrosphere, and atmosphere can be projec ted for sc=e future time, and arbitrary future societal scenarios can then be superi= posed on these distributions.
As a ref er-ecce esse, and for perspective, the tresent societv, with its habits and terulation distributions, can and has been used.
( NU REG-011b, page 4-oc, and tr. 2390-2401) (esphasia added).
This Staff report then goes on to calculate the doses to the =ari= ally exposed individual at periods of 100, 10,000, 100,000, and 1,000,000 years after the repository is sealed (Tables 4.19-22).
Thus the Consission itself has used a futuriatic model involving the projection of the population and population distribution of today far off into the future.
Kopford has merely confersed to the Consission's own approach to popula-tion projection.
The foregoing discussion on predictive modela used in this pro-ceeding was for illustrative and illuminative purposes.
It above that, by their very nature, long-ters models are unverifiable, and therefore are to sc=e extent speculative.
To what ext ent they are speculative may be unknown and udenewable.
At any rate, the position of the Staff (accepted by the Board) with rwgard to the predictive population model used by the Intervenors' Witness Kepford is absurdly centradic tory.
08 357
]O The 5tsff position is totally untenable.
It accuses Kepferd of using "a vast array of assu=ptions" (Sta f f F.O.F., para. 69) and states incorrectly that his cenclusions ars " remote and speculative" ( S ta f f 's F.O.F.,
para. 69).
No elaboration or reference to the record is =sde for aupport of these charges, nor is any articulation off ered.
Eut the most shocking aspect of the Staff's position is the Staff's hypocrisy, since the Co=sission itself has used exactly the same model as Empford, as discussed above.
The population assumptions contained in Kepford's model are not a Kepferd concoction;. Staff usage of these same assumptions predstes Kepford's use of them.
The attitude of the Staff here is like the petulant child taking his ball and going home when thiags don't go his way.
Since Kepford's results do not support the Staff position, the Staff doesn't want Kepford to use the same model that the Stsff had used.
The Staff, however, has no sonopoly on predictive =edels.
A model good enough for Staff usage must also be good enough for use by Intervenors.
The Board (I.D. para. 125) and the Staff (point (b), above) also argue that the releasea of radon-222 attributable to the operation of TMI-2 are small compared with naturally occuring releases of radon-222 (Sta ff 's F.C.F., para. 66).
The context of this antire discussion of the ecmparative effects of the coal and uranium fuel cycles =ust be re-called:
it ca=e about as a result of deficiencies of tae FES prepared by the Staff is the Eartsville case.
The Appeal Board, in ALA3-367, found that the Staff did not present sufficient infor=ation, with regard to environmental effects of the coal and nuclear fuel cycles, in its dis-cussion of " alternatives to the proposed action."
(5 NRC 92 (1977), 103).
In the conte== of a discussion of alternative energy sources, such as coal, nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, conservation, or any other generating scheme, the inclusion of the quantity of naturally occuring releases of raden-222 is whelly inappropria te, and is nothing short of ridiculous.
These natural releases of radoc-222 would occur entirely independently of any of the means of genersting electricity and is an equivalent =anner for each and every alternative.
For the nuclear alternativs, such natural releases would be augmented by additional r
.am d
eu
31 amounts of raden-222 released frc= uranium mill tsilings piles.
It is these added releases of raden-222 frem the mill tailings uver time, above and beye=d na turally eccurring amounts of raden-222, that = ale the difference between the uranium fuel cyr:le and any other fuel cycle.
The naturally occuring emissions of radon-222 have, therefore, no place in the comrarstive analysis of the uraniu= and other fuel cycles.
As the Appeal 2 card stated in ALAS-367, "...it is the ultimate consequences to human-health of the two tyres of elants that have to be compared.
( AIA3-367, note 52)(emphasis added), not natural releases of radon-222, not the effect of ece=ic rays, aor the total amount of sunlight incident upon the U.S. in one ye ar, the total nu=ber of deaths in the U.S. in one year,or the price of tea in China.
The Applicant sought to create the impression that Kepford testi-fled under cross-examination that the su=ber of deaths caused by the operation of Th!-2 for one year would add only one additional death per billion deaths frem other causes over the time spin considered (I.D.,
para. 125, tr. 2867-75 ).
As the record clearly shows, Kepferd pointed out that these mathematical sanipulations insisted upon by the Applicant were totally irrelevant co=parisons (tr. 2863, 2864 5, 2869, 2875).
The reasoning here by the Applicant and the Board was fully as faulty as that of the Staff in its attempts to attach i=portance to the natural releases of raden-222.
Here, under the assumption of a constant world population, the number of people dying naturally over the next 27 billion years frem all other causes applies equally to TMI-2 and any other generatir.g option.
The i=portant parameters, again, in any comrarstive study ere the factors that differ among the options, not those which are the sese.
The only relevant _rars=eters in i ec=parative study of the health effects of the coal and nuclear fuel cycles are tha differences is nagnitud-tween the health effects attributable solely to tne coal fuel cye those attributable solely to the uraniu= fuel :yele.
Thus the argu.
of the Staff, Applicant, and Board for giving no weight to the K pfera testinony on the basis of comparison to any naturally occurring background effect which effects both coal and nuclear fuel cycles ecually hut separate from their own contributions) are co=ple tely irrelevant in a discussion of the cencarative health ef fects of the coal and nuclear fuwl cycles.
i Cbasic rays would also set equally on each energy option, and therefore are ".ot included in the analysis of alternativeei, sinc e the differential effects are nonexistent.
US 259
Furthermor, the relevance of these arguments by the Board, Applicant, and Staff to the cost-benefit analysis or to the consider-stion of alternatives of TMI-2 has not been es tablished.
The eviden-tiary record does not shew that the Board, Applicant or 5taff has articulated in a reascued manner that naturally releasedbaden-222 is in I
any way related to the operation of this plant nor does the record shew that the Board, Applicant, or Staff have discussed how that quantity of rsdon-222 is to be factored into the cost-benefit analysis cf 7"I-2.
or the relevance of such if it even can be factored into the analysis.
Nor have the 3 card, Applicant, or Staff shcwn how the natural releases of radon-222 pertain to the evaluation of alternatives to TMI-2.
These emissicas of the Board and Staff constitute procedural violations of APA and KIPA.
Thus, in order to jus tify the granting of an operating license for TMI-2, the Board (a) disregarded the uncontroverted evidentiary record with regard to the duration of rsden-222 releases, and thereby disregarded the physical laws governing radioactive decay, and, (b) ruled that predictive =edels are adsiasible only whers they provide conslus.ons favorable to the Staff's and Applicant's positions.
Under the APA, AEA, NEPI, and ERA, the Board has no such authority.
One of the more glaring emissions of the prepared testinony of the Staff Witness Gotchy was the fact that the testi=eny ignores is-portant new findings in the area of the effects of lew-levels of ionizing radiation on hu=ana.
As Gotchy correctly stated, the present radiation standards are based on studies of high doces and high dose rates (tr. 2402).
Ecwever, very recent findings (tr. 2331-6) have indicated that low doses, such as thoce to which workers are routinely exposed, cause a =uch higher incidence of cancer than would have been expected from the high-dose studies.
One such study has recently been published (the Mancuso Report, tr. 2331), with prior peer review, in the Journal Health Physics (November, 1977, pages 369-335).
Here the authors found that allevable routine occupational doses of workers in governmental nuclear facilities were sufficient to double the incidence of some forskof cancer amo=g workers.
This would correspond to an increase of at least a factor of 1GO over the risk esti=stor upon which Gotchy relied.
Witness Gotchy testified that he was acquainted with the Mancuso study.
Reliance upon the Gotchy b8-260
33 estima :es of health ef fects, therefare, does not conform to the principles of " infer =ed decision =aking" or " full disclesure".
In his opening statement, tr. Eepford observed tha t members of the Armed Services were exposed to ionising radiation during nuclear weapons tests in Nevada during the 1950 's (tr. 257-259).
subsecuent to that prophetic statement, a series of articles appeared in various newspapers (attached) concerning the plight of these irradiated servicesen.
While a study of their health problems as a reeult of their exposures is only beginning, the data ao f ar corroborste the findings of Mancuso, Stewart,
and Eneale that low doses of ionini=g radiation are 10 to 50 times =cre damaging than thw upper bound of the SEIR Co=sittee 's findings ( tr. 2331-2338).
It should also be noted that Gotchy based his estisates on the lewer bound of the BEIR Con =1ttee cancer risk estimates ( tr. 2171-2 ).
The Coraiscion also acted illegally by issuing the I.D. prier to
- Ykh the complet.on of review of the testi=ony of Dr. Gotchy.' This testi=ony 4
was entered into the proceeding as a supplement to the FSTES (tr. 2096-7).
The testi=eny was submitted to other Federal Agencies on Septe=ber 29, 1977, for ec=sent, and the fi=al version, containing reasoned responses to
-1 agency and public criticias has not yet, as of January 30, 1978, been issued.
As a result, the Board's I.D., issued Dec enb er 19, 1977, was legallyrpremature, since it anticipated no significant changes in the health effects assessment.
NEPA requires that the agenev's decision-
=nki g be infor ed by a complete and adequate evaluation of environ = ental
, fs impacts and alternatives.
Calvert Cliff'e Coordinating Co=mittee v.
AEC, 449 F. 2nd 1109 (D.C. Cir.1971), e=phasines that strict ec=pliance
.:k with NEPA is required is spite of any alleged delay, cost, or adminis-
[
trative burden.
By failing to wait to consider the ecspleted final impact statement, produced as a reault of the agency's review of public 7
I and agency ec=ments on Dr. Gotchy's circulated testimony, the Board violated its obligations under NEPA.
R, The questien of whether or not the testimony of Intervenors' Wits-as Iepford challenged Table S-3 er the Co==1ssion'a rules was akirted by the Socrd (I D. para. 12'+, 125 ).
Intervenors submit that GS~261 k
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r, TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 lf R" a
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-5
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6" a /A s
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< C f4'Q/ g w g /> A,,j;y 4 % g. A fA \\
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only af ter it has been de ter=ined how the 74.5 curie nu=ber in Table S' 3 can be reconciled with the more ecsplete information presented to the 3 card during the evidentiary TMI-2 proceeding can an operating license for I:C-2 possibly be granted.
In N2DC' v. USNRc, 547 F. 2nd 633 (D.C. Cir.19761, the court found that Regarding nost phases of the fuel cycle, these precises were fulfilled and the Environ = ental Survey did an adequate, even ad=irable job of describing the processes involved.
It asse=bles data on the consumption of resources, and discusses the risks of accidents and other hanards in detail, sup-porting the staff's conclusions with nu=ereus references to the scholarly literature and to technical reports on file with the Co-"'ssion.
The Co==ission has used this portion of the decisica to justify these portions of Table S-3 not recanded by the Court, as stated, for example, in the Forward to NUREG-0116, Environnental Survey of the Recrecessine and Weste Manace ent Fortions of the LWR Puel Cvele, October, 1976.
However, the very next sentence of that decision points out that the only two portions of the fuel cycle under review were the reprocessing and waste sanagement portiens:
However,with regard to the two thsses of the fuel cycle which are the focal reints for ::1s acceal, rerrecessic; and waste distesal, that kind of detailed explanation and support for tue staff's conclusions was noticeably absent from the Environnental Survey as originally pub-lished (e=phasis added).
Apparently, the other deficiencies in the Cc==ission's rulensking pro-ceeding were not brought to the Court's attention.
The Court went on to say We therefore hold that, absent effective generic pro-ceedings to consider these issues tsey suar be dealt with in individual licensing proceedings (emphasis added).
One must seriously question the effectiveness of a generie proceeding.
wh1ch has permitted the underestication of a particular number by a factor of at least 100,000 (Jordan Menorandus, page 2).
There is also reason to be concerned if decisicus involving "=ajor Federal acticus" (NI?A, See,
102(2)(c)) are made based oc a number so patently, so obviously falae, a8 282
It also seems pertinent to inquire for how long have the Staff and Cc==ission knew: about the fraudulant na ture ci this 74.5 curies nu=ber.
Purthermore, the Kepford analysis has received corroboration frem the se=crardus of Or. Walter Jordan of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Ecard (Memorandum of Dr. '4 alter Jorda n, September 21, 1977.
See Staff letter, Nove:ber 30, 1977, i= this proceeding).
Dr. Jordan not o=17 confirmed the quantities of raden-222 released by decay from the thorin=-230 initially present in the =111 tailings piles; he also suggested that the popc1stien exposure would not be 1C0 person-res as assu=ed by the Staff, but, scro properly, 10,0C0,000 person-res.
Followits the established Co==ission procedure of sultiplying this 10 million person-res figure by the Cc=sission's $1C00 person person-res value placed on huss life (10 CyR 50, Appendix I), o=e calculates a $10,000,000,00C ( ten billion dollars) environmental health cost attributable to just one year's operation of TMI-2.
This value is to be ecsparec with the value of the benefit of electricity generated by TMI-2.
Assuming a value of $0.05 per kilowatt hour, (kwh), 900 MW(e) capacity, and a 0.65 capacity factor, a value of the benefit for oca year's operation of TMI-2 of about
$250 sillion is obtained.
In order to catch the health cost suggested by Dr. Jordan, the " benefit" of TM!-2 (electricity) would have to be priced at abcut $2.00 per kwh.
I' is questionable if any atate public utility ce==ission or other regulatory agency would conclude that elec-tricity priced at $2,00 per kwh provides a benefit to society; it might indeed be judged a= intolerable burden.
Thus it has not been clearly established that the electricity generated is, in itself, an adequate benefit to justify operation of TMI-2 under AZ1, NZ?A, and E21.
- And, therefore, on a cost-benefit basis, it has not been shown that TM!-2 is of any benefit. (Cc= pare I.D. para. 128).
It is thus clear that the long ters health cost of just lasage attributable to the raden-222 emissions from the thorium-230 initially present in the mill tailings created to fuel a nuclear reactor for one year overwhelsi gly dwargs the benefit derived frem the as=e nuclear reactor.
Had the raden-222 from the decay of the small amount of ura=ium-238 been 1: eluded is this calculation, the resulting health costs would be about 50COfti=es larger' These costs the Staff entirely igntres, and the 3 card states without justification that its decision
/
b9-001
need "not recuire a resolution of these =atters" (I.D. para. 12 5 ).
The Staff lettezbf Nove=ber 30, 1977, pre =ises a future Staff evalua tion of the Jordan Me= ors =du (but not of the Kepford testi=cuy}.
The Staff sever explaimed why it believed that Kopford's tecti =c 7 was any less deserving of Staff evaluation than the Jordan Me=orandu=.
This pic=ise is repeated in the Staf f le tter of Dece=ber 20, 1977.
- Ecwever, the serious questioco raised by Zapford's testimony and Jordan's =e=orandus were totelI7 ignored by tre Staf f when the Staff failed to propose any exception to the 3 card's Initial Decision, dated December 19, 1977.
On January 28,1978, (only two days before the deadline for filing this brief) the Intervenors received a Staff assess =ent entitled =erely "Appendi=."
This otherwise unidentnfied document, consi3ti=g of four affadavita and discussions by me=bers of the EiC Staff, does a long way teward aiding the withdrawal of the Staff's head frc= the grou:d en the subject of health ef fects a tt ributable to radon-222.
fhe docueest wholly confir:s the Interve: ors ' cc tention that the 74.5 curie sunber used i= Table S-3 bears no relationship whatacever to the actual releases of redon-222 frc= the =111 tai ~.ings piles, that the 74.5 eurie cu=ber is a totally inaccurate dad fictitious refleccios of the rado -222 prob-les, an d, tha t its pa s t, prenest, and future continued use is therefore fraudulent in the full sense of the word.
While the Append 1= represents a gia:t step forward toward a tru.h-ful assess =ent by the Staff of the full mill tailings piles prchism, it still falls far short of a full and accurate evaluation of the healt.i effects due to the creation of mill tailings piles to support one ye ar 's reference reactor operation.
A=cag the shortconings noted is the enort ti=s available to review this Appendix are the following:
(1)
The treatment assc=es stabilization of the =111 tailings, which does not rerlect corrent practice (tr. 2198).
(2)
The assess =ent of health effects is projected only out to 1,000 years, which constitu tes caly one-eigntie th of the first half life of the thorium-230 in =111 tailings,
ignores cc=pletely the contribution of urani =-238 re=aining is the =111 tailings, and thus la still far ahort of " full disclosure."
b3 C$
(3)
The assess =ent of health effects still relies on the eeerletelv irrelevant argn=e n t tha t releases of raden-222 frem the =111 tailings are a=al' ces;ared to natural back-ground releases (page 12 of " Appendiz, and Table 3).
Ter ressens discuseed earlier 4
this brief, this co=parisce is invalid.
Furthermore,
- Staff has not applied this argn=ent on the benefit eide of the ledger, where the result of the analysis would east doubt on any perceived need for TMI-2.
The Staff has not yet compared the annual output of the asst =ed " benefit" of TMI-2 (electrical energy),
to the natural solar energy incident upon the U.S. each year (See Final Supplement to the Final Environ =e a1 Statement, para. 10.2 ).
(4)
The health effects assess =ent points out the philosophical
=sture ('p. 7) of calcula ting future health effec ts and suggests such estimations are meaningless (p. 13I.
If correct, this reasoning should then be applied to all prsdictive =edela uniformly, no*
at medels where such reasoning is useful to suppert or to discredit a particular
=cdel.
For instance, tha years required to validate all of the accident probability asseer=enta in the Reactor Safety Study and the tine required to verify the aircra f t crash modela in this proceeding (tr. 654)~ should also be regarded in the sa=e light.
Furth ar=or e, if glaciation is expected to recur (p. 13), the Staff shculd era =ise its concept of mothballing nuclear facilities, since they cannot be expected to withstand a glacier.
<* Accordi=g to " Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices," Ballinger Press,1977, about 44,000 quads of energy (one Cuad = lo153tu) fall on the U.S. each year (p. 130), or 4.4 x 1C193tu.
By contrast, TMI-2 (assuming 900 MW(e),
o,65 espacity factor) weuld produce only about 1,8 x lol33tu.
The output of IMI-2 would then be 4 x lo-5 per cent of the sun's input, and thia output would be 1 distinguishable frem the " background" solar energy.
03 obTo
.c J
v
_w
=
e (5)
The Staff has revealed that its i=tentions with regard to a permanent solution to the raden-222 e=ission probler smot.nt te =cthing nore than a chcrt-ters expedient " solution" (Data is " Appendix" fres R.M. Wilde, pages 3 and 9).
The proposed covering is expected to last "at least several hundred years" (page 9).
This " pussycat =ethod" of disposing of very long-lived toxic substances by =erely scratching a little dirt over the pile and walking away is hopelessly inadequ.ste a=d is illegal (See NRDC v. US!GC, D.C. Cir 1976, at s.12 discussed earlier), whether the covering proposed is twee ty inches or twenty feet.
The full cest of the full solutien to the probles should be borne directly by whatever population directly receives the postulated 'senefit of the re ac ter.
O th e rwis e, the cost-benefit analysis would be incomplete, in violatics of the AEA, NIPA, 22A, and the Cc--dssion's own rules.
It shculd also be =oted that if the environ = ental dose ce sit =ents (mas-per curies per reference reacter year) from Table 2 of the Staff's Appe= dix are =ultiplied by the number of curies to be released to the enviro =ent by the 6ventual decay of o=ly the thorius-230 present in one reactor year's sill tailings piles, 300 million curien (Iepferd testimony, Table 2 and page 3), and are then sultiplied by the cancer ris(esti=ates of page 7 (Ippendiz), one ob tains an estimate of nu=bers of deaths en the crder of thousands to tens of thousands per reference reacter year.
These utsbers fully support the Kepford assessment of health effects from thorium-230, and the full thrust of the Jordan
=ecorandum.
However, the Staff's assess =ent is the "Appendiz" is only for a thousand years, which will not suffice.
The Staff has again fr.iled, as explained above, to consider the toxic nature of the raden-222 for the full duratics of the period during which the to=1e radon continues to be released.
The Staff clai= that such calculations are speculative or remote and are therefore *=eaningless" is so justification for the continued ecceesisent of the vast majority of satisated health effects which will occur af ter 1,0C0 years and which have yet to be ack=cwledged 67 the ShAff*
5%T 00tF
dr O
The Staff is to be ec=tanded for its progress in the direction of full and true assess =ent, as shown in this new " Appendix.* However, this "Ip pe ndix" c anno t b e conside's the final word on mill tailings piles enissions s=d their consen,4 tas, in view of the still short period of sill tailings health effects included in this new Staff assess =ent, compared with the full lo:g duration of the probles.
In short, the Staff "Ippendix" of January 20, 1979, falls far short of the full diaelosure and the full discussion and consideration "to the fullest
- Itent possible" wcich is required byrNEPA.
The Staff Appendi= also reveals that' the Staff feels future generations will have to fend for the=selves when the this layer of dirt (still only proposed by the Staff) washes away ("Appendiz," Got.chy a ffadavit, pages 12-13).
This is a clear viola tion of the NI?A principle requiring this genera tion to be caretakers of the environment for future generations.
During the TMI-2 evidentiary proceeding, the Staff relied wholly on the discredited Table S-3 of 10 CFR 51.20 and 10 CFR 50, Appendiz D, to exclude fres consideration environ = ental effecta tien would c all into question either the adequacy of the Sta!!'s environmental analysis or the validity of the Staff's er Board's pre-conceived conclusions.
Througbout the TMI-2 proceeding, the Staff and Scard have simply arbitrarily and capriciously refused to consider in any =eaningful way any arguments which night cast doubt er suspicion on the cost-benefit analysia or discussion of alternatives for TMI-2.
This position of advocacy is beyond the statutory authority of the Staff and Board under AIA, NEP1, and ERA, and is also beycud the statutory responsibility of the Board under the APA.
The Staff and Board havg in particular, also igncred *'2e sandate of the Court in Calvert Cliffs ' Coordinating Cc-d ttee v.1EC, kh9 T. 2nd 1109 (D.C. Cir.1971), a decision with which the Con =ission apparently has barely begun to comply.
The Staff and Ecard actions during the "MI-2 proceeding have also sneered at the " full dia-closure" require =ents of NEPA which are described by the Court in Environ = ental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 759 (E.3.. Irk.1971):
-(usr c-n) uLd
O At the very least, NIFA is an environmental full disclesc e law.
. The " detailed statement" re-
~
quired by Sec. 102(2)(c) should, at a =ini=um, centain such infer =ation as will slert the President, the Ccuscil on Environ = ental quality, the public, and, 1: deed, the Congress, to all known rossible envirc -
tal consecuences of proposed agency action (emphasis r-supplied by the ' Arkansas Dis tric t Court).
The above mentioned actions by the Staff and Board do not cc form to ressened decisionmaking, exploration of all environ = ental effects to the fullest extent possible, or protection
,f the health and safety of the public.
In defiance of the letter and intent of ERA, they fail to rec ognise the re= oval of the promotional aspsets of nuclear power frc=
the legal authority of the Com=ission.
These violations of AFA, NEFA, AZA, anc ERA, and the related judicial decisions constitute sufficient basis to reverse the I.D. in this proceeding.
The end result has been that the Staff and the Board relied upon an inadequate survey of the health effects of the uranium fuel cycle, a seriously defective cost-benefit analysis for TMI-2, and an equally defective analysis of alter-native = to the operation of TMI-2.
These actions by the Staff and the Scard are not supported in the evidentiary record by reasoned judgments, full disclosure of environ = ental damage, or evaluations and full consideration of environmental da= age "to the fullest e= tent possible,"
is violation of the APA, AEA, and NEPA.
Ent this reliance by the Staff, the Scard (and Commission) has even deeper and more sisister implications.
By definite 74.5 curies as the total a=cu=t of raden-222 to be attributable for all time from any source generated to fuel a nuclear reactor for one year, the Co d=sion denies the existence of the physical processes governing radioactive decay of the parent elecenta of raden-222 af ter one year.
It is diffi-cult to imagine a more arbitrary, capricicua, unreascued, usarticulated, arrogast or deceptire act.
It defias reason.
The deception of this action by an age:cy required by law to protect the health and safety of the public cannot be overstated.
Thus, it would stretch the i=sgination to consider that the 7k.5 curies number, which, by ad=1ssion of the Jordan estimate, is at leas t in error by a fcetor of 100,000, representa an adequate evaluation of US 006
the raden-222 emissions problem.
Table S-3 aas survived an uncanny nu=ber of revisicas considering its inadecuacies.
See the Jordan secorardum fer a fuller descript10: of the errers, old and new, incorporated into Table 5-3.
The conclusion see=s u=sveidable that the incorporatics into the Co=siasion's rulse of a provision to repeal the laws of physics describing radioactive decay was an intentional act to create an artifice in order to avoid cc=pliance with NEPA.
This een-clusion, with all its implicatic=s, ranifications, and consequences, seena inescapable.
The Interve: ors, therefore, submit that the value of 74.5 enries is defective, dishonest, and the continued use of this number by Atomic Safety and Licensing Soards and the Cc=misaics can only be termed fraudulent.
For the 3 card or the Co==ission to use Table 5-3 as a vehicle to conceal and withhold fres consideration i=portant infer =atio: concerning enorsona environmen tal costa, =skes a =ockery of justice, of all of the enviro== ental protection intentions and requirements of NEPA, tee public health and safety recuirements of the AIA and ERA, the arbitrary and s
capricious and reasoned decialcemaking standards of the APA, and the re= oval of the promotional duties of the Co= mission under the E2A.
The 3 card's reliance an a fictitious an=ber la an extraordinary abuae of discretics, an abuse of unprecedented magnitude.
Therefore the I.D.
suat be reversed.
N b3 007
l' Purther Discussion o f the Board's Statuterv 71olations The pri=ary bas a of the Interveners' argn=ent is that the Staff and Board have cc=mitted numercus procedural and substantive viciati:ns of the Administrative Procedure ProcedureAct of 1946, as a= ended ("A7A"),
the Ate:ic Energy Act of 1954, as amende d (" AZ A" ), the National Inviron-mental Policy Act of 1969, as scended ("NIFA"), and the Energy Reorgan-ination of 1974 (" ERA").
Among these errors ce==itted by the Staff and Board are nu=ercus errers which require that the I.D. be reversed.
Th e
.Ifect of these errors of emission and ec= mission has been to place the Staff and Board in a position of total opposition to any position taken by the Int ervenors.
While such a position =ay not in itself be reason for reversal, in this particular proceeding such a positica necessitates that the Staff and Board turn their backs on the laws of both physics and =an, as shown above.
The Staff position has also re-quirad that the Staff turn its back on the statements of the Staff's own witness, Gotchy,who wholly and ce=pletely corroborated the basic thrust of the crucial and uncontroverted testi=eny of Intervenors '
Witness Kepford.
It is arbitrary, capricious, ludicrous, and without support in the record for the Board to have ignored the fact that Staff Witness Gotchy's testi=eny in the rec ~ord and the Jordan ne=orandus of September 21, 1977 subs ta ntia te, and do not is any way detract fre=,
the infor=ation which the Board considers that Keptord merely " alleges" witt regard to raden-222 releases from the mill tailings piles (I.D.
para. 12 5 ).
The cad result has been that the Staff and 3 card relied on an inadequate survey of the health effects of the uranium fuel cycle, a
1 seriously defective cost-benefit analysis forpMI-2, and an equally fefective analysis of alternatives to the opera tion of TMI-2.
These actions by the Staff and Board, which have been described acre fully above, do not conform to reasoned decisionmaking, exploration of all enviren= ental damage which would result from the proposed operatica of TMI-2, or protection of the health and safe ty of the public.
The I.D. was rendered either in defiance er through a serious nis-conception of the Board's statutory obligations.
Even if the Co=missior a3-008
had officially recognized rnd was investigatims and considering the raden-222 emissics problem to the fullest e= tent possible, NEPA re-quires that a detailed analysis and consideration of the proble=, its probable and possible implications, and alternatives be available to agency and outside decisionmakers before the Soard can approve the proposed licensing action.
This NIFA requirement is necessary to assure that major federal agency actions will only be taken after the agency has reached an informed, ccherent, and accountable decision.
The AEA and ERA authorise the Board togrant licenses for nuclear facilities only to the extent that such action is " consistent with the health and safety of the public." (NRDC v. USNRC, 547 F. 2nd 633, 640 at n. 15, D.C. Cir. 1976 ).
Therefore, and in view of the enor=ous magnitude of the errors in Table S-3 and Dr. Gotchy's trerared testimony, which the record, Dr. Jordan 's se=o and the Staff." Appendix" of Jan. 20, 1976 viv. idly de=c ctrate, any further co==it=ent to Gotchy's prepared testi=ony or Table.S-3 and its built-in def ects would be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise illegal, and would also violate the due process and equal protection guarantees of the U.S. cons titution.
(The affadavit of Jack Rothfleisch in the Staff Appendix of January 20, 1978 states that the 74.5 curies of raden-222 list;
- n Table S-3 cc=es fro = the tailings pond of the mill durine the operi
.;n of the nill ( age 3).
This means, then, that Table S-3 centains nu,-an..a no reference wistsoever to any emissions of raden-222 from seg:121 tailings piles, stabilised or unstabilized).
Alotg si=ilar lines, Judge Ta=s was moved to ce==ent in the final closing paragraph of his concurring opision 1: NREC v. USNRC (emphasis added):
The Cc==ission should b e able to suppl 7 the ccurt wi.th a statement of the methuds by which its staff arrived at the figures embodied in Table S-3 and by which Dr. Pitt=sa con-cluded that the waste storage problem is already technelegic-ally and eco=ocically soluble.
If it cannot, then we will have no choice but to invalidate tne Co==irsicn's rule under the "arbitrarv, carricieus" standard; if it can, we s=ould defer to the ad:::1strative weigning of risks and bene;its of additional reactors.
The I.D. is is viola tic? c' NE21 because it is effect relegates important portions of the full and good faith environmental considerations required under NE7A to other proceedings, which, even if they are to be d~903
ef1 conducted at seme future date, would be conducted af ter.se " major federal
- 1on" proposed by th e I.D. has been taken.
Footnote 17 the NREC v. US:TEC decisien indicates that the pessibility tha t a ir-ticular issue =ay eventually beco=e the subject of an ef fec tive rule-
=aking proceeding does not entitle th e Board to refuse to consider tha t issue i= individual licensing actions.
Thus in the abse=ee of effective and cespleted generic bearings concerning redon-222 emissiens, indivi-dual facility hearings, such as TMI-2, are the apprcpriate and necessary foru= for ventilation of this and other basic and as y St unresolved issues in the proposed licensing action.
The Cc==ission is required to protect the health and safety of the public urier Sections 2(d), 2(e), and 3(d) of the AEA, parti:ularly in view of the purpose and language of the ERA, wcich was enacted to separate the reculatcry fu=ctic:s of the for=er Atc=ic Energy Co==ission from the developmental and promotional dispositice of that ag e ncy.
NE?A, in addition to requiring that agencies discuss and consider environ = ental i= pacts and alternatives to ensure more informed and enviren=ectally benign decisicc=aking, expands long-stands agency missicus by recuiring the establish =ent of a broader view of the public interest.
Section 102(1) of NEPA requires that all federal policies, regulations, and laws must be "futerpreted and administered" to the fullest extent possible with NEPA's policies. f environmental protec tion.
Thus the Cc =ission 's obliga tion to protect the public health and safety under the AEA and ERA sus t be ad=isistered in conjunction with NEPA's emphasis on health, saf ety, and the importance of serving as a care taker to preserve the environment for future generations.
Section lOl'b)(3) of NIFA requires that all federal agencies "use all practicable seats
. [to] attach the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degrada-tien, risk to health or cafety, or other undesirable and unintended con-sequences" (emphasis added).
It cannot be disputed that this policy of preventing unnecessary risks to the public health or safety must also be construed from the perspective of the Cos=1ssion's responsibili-ties as trustee of the environ =ent for future generations.
Section 1Cl(2)(eJ(iv) specifically requires the agency to analyze and consider the relationships between short-ters uses and the long-ters producti-rity of the enTiretsent.
Section 101 (a) of TEPI establishes a comple-mentary requirement to use "all practicacle means and sessures to 69-010
creste and =aintais conditic:a under which =an and nature can exist in productive har:eny, and fulfill the accial, econc=le, and other require-sects of present 1 d future gererations Cectio: 101(b)(1) repests this s=phasis by restricting federsl action to a manner which.
is consistent with the needs of future generations, by cbligating all federal agencies to strive to " fulfill the respcesibilities of each generation as trustee of the envirotsent for succeeding generstions."
To paraphrsas the court in NRrc v. UsNRC, 547 F. 2nd 633, at 640' (D.C. Cir. 1976), 1: _.
2 is granted an operating license then "= ore and sore" sill tailingr piles and raden-222 emissions "are brought into being, irretrievable ec==it=ents are being made and options precluded, and the age:cy rust predict the environmental consecuences of its de-a cisio:s as it =akes tu er.' Radioactive decay-producing rade:-222 and its daughter products is mos; definitely an inevitable eennequence of the operation of TMI-2.
The continuing conceal =ent of the radon-222 conse-quences of the proposed licensing action and the continuing refusal to evaluate and respond adequately to these adverseenviron=antal consequences cannot be justified under NE71 or any other lessi au thority.
An ob jec tive effort which a=custa to a full and good faith consideration of environ-
= ental i= pacts and alternatives is required under NEPA.
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Cc==ittee v. USAIC, 4h9 F. 2nd 1109,1112-13, and at n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The Board and Staff have,iolated NEPA's full disclosure and sub-stantive requirements beenuse they have failed to be responsive to the raden-222 problee once it had been brought to their sttention.
Cc= pare Terk Cc==ittee for a Safe Inviron=ent, e t al., v. USNRC, 527 F. 2nd 3 12,
815 316, a t n. 12 a nd n. 13 ( D.C. Cir. 1975 ).
Apparently the agency did not =ake a reasoned choice based upon a full, good faith, explicit, and objective ecusideration of the alternatives to granting an operating license to IMI-2.
It is i= porta =t to reiterate that the 2111 tailings Thia quote frc= the Versent Tankee ocurt and the other references to judicial decisions in this brief are seant only to be representa-tive and suggestive of the larger nu=ber of judicial decisions which support the view of NI?1 which I=terveners rely upon is tais brief.
n o - (t, A dJ uAl f
T.o emissics proble= results invariable and exclusively fr,s the currest tech =icues for productio: -af fuel for nuclear facilities.
C=e obvious sclution to the mill tailings problem related to the proposed operatic:
of IMI-2 is to withhold the TMI-2 opera ting licerse until such ti=e that a technologically reliable and long-ters solution to this probles, including beliercble guarantees that such a long-ters solution will be imple=ented, is available.
Prior to fuel loading of TMI-2, urs= ins are will hav s to be mined and milled, wit the separation of U On "yellcweake" fro = ore.
I= this 3o process, sill tailings are created.
Th e creatics of mill tailings mark the begi= sing of a nacy-billien year public health probles, discuss ed above, still awaiting even acknewledge=ent by the Staff.
As such, the creation of these sill tailings to support TMI-2, absent the availability of tech:olegically reliable, lo:g-ter= solutions ( toge ther with cohere =t and dependable Cc=sission policy and regulations c the disposal of these tailings) to prevent altogether these future health effects, cos-stitutes as irreparable injury.
The Interveners also submit that fuel loading with subsequent radioactive contamination of TMI-2, including any fission reactions at all, will tur: TMI-2 trrevocable and irreversibly into radioactive vaste.
Decc==issioning of nuclear reactors is one of the sa=y unresolved prob-less of the fuel cycle and has received c=ly the nest superficial and wholly insufficient evaluation by the Scaf f, and, is this proceeding, by the Board, under its supposed " full NEPA review".
E.g. tr. 263-264, and 2395-2397, Compare Tork Co=sittee for a Safe Environment, et al.,
- v. USNEC, 527 F. 2:d 812, 815-816, at
. 12 and n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The Intervenors submit that the ac t of achieving the first fission reaction, with subsequest radioactive conta=isation of IMI-d also ec=stitutes irre-parable injury to the Intervenors and to the public generally and consti-tutes a irreversible action.
Any pre-operational fuel loading or testing of 24I-2 invclving radioactive fuel will recuire the production of mill tailings and the related lo:g-ters radon-222 e=issica problem.
Once t:eee mill tailings piles have veen produced, irreversible damage has been done to the public health and safety and to the environsent.
Although so=e =112 33-012
O tailingn piles =ay have already been produced in order to provide the Appliesst with fuel for TMI-2, in anticipation that the Xpplicant would entair an o:erating license f o r TMI-2, the total redon-222 related dancge =sy be sitigated by using such fuel for a nuclear facility which has already been granted an operating license, and by withholding an operating license fro = TMI-2 as described above.
Therefore, and in order to prevent IMI-2 from being turned irretrievably into radioactive waste as described in the previous paragraph, the I.D. say not allow leading of the fuel until the Interrenors have exhausted their appeals before the Co==ission.
This effective stay of the I.D. pending the outcc=s of final review of tae I.D. by the Co==ission is recuired and essential because of the severity and irreversibility of the consequences of an erroneoue decision to authorise the loading of fuel in this pro-ceeding.
The Interrenors believe that no party to this proceeding will be har=ed by the stay 'of this decision pending the enhaustion of all re-views provided for in the Cc==ission's rules.
The Applicant has, for its ews reasons, delayed the co=pletion date of TMI-2 for about 4 years (se., for instance, Construction Status Report, July, lo77, NUREG-0030-77/7).
This fcur year delay does not includa the ti=e involved in the planning and construction of TMI-2 but invorres primarily preventabir, d e lt.ys brought by the Applicant's voluntary decisions.
The Applicant has no vested right to de=and an operating license prior to a final finding by the Co==ission that the plant can be lawfully licensed.
Until such ti=e as the full Co==ission review has been ecepleted, the Applicant has no legal justification for saking, or causing to be made, TMI-2 irreversibly radioactive.
It is also inportant to note that the Co= mission's funda-mental responsibility is to protect *he health and safety of the public and to obey NEPA.
These statutory oblica ticus cannot be 1 nored simply because the Applicant is able to conjure up the possibility that delay will be nore costly than prompt but illegal action, perticularly where that illegal action will cause irreparable injury to Intervenors or the general public.
The Intervenors believe that the public interest is best served when all parties, including the Cocsiasion, fully obey the letter and a3~013
intent of the sppliesble laws and related judicial decisions.
Th e public interest would be served by the preventing of irreparable damsge to the Intervenors who represent =e=bers of the public and the public interest at large.
The public has a right :o hava agencies of govern-
=ent follew the dictates of the law.
The I.D. must be stayed and re-versed in order to restere public confidence and trust in the Co==issio=
and its attitudes toward its statutory obli stions.
Ihus, to the extent that the I. U., p ar a. 132(d), atte= pts to allow the loading of fuel or any pre-operational testing involving rs dioac tive fuel (a) before all appeals before the Cc==ission in the TMI-2 proceeding save been waived by all parties to this proceeding; or (b) before the Co:sission has resolve all appeals of the I.D., which have been properly filed with the Appeal Board or with the Co= mission, and issues an order which is final and appealable before the federal courts under 23 USC Sec. 23k2(4) and h2 USC Sec. 2239(b), the I.D. causes irreparable and irrevocable harm, and =ust therefore be reversed because it was issued is violatio.: of the AZA, NEPA, and IRA, and the due pro-cess and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
Is indicated above, Table S-3 addresses only an infinitesi= ally a=all frac tion of the raden-222 emissions a ttributable to the proposed operation o f !M!-2..
Both the Inte rvenors ' cross-examina tion of Gotchy and Kepford's testi=ony initially relied upon the e=ission rate of radon-222 in Table S-3 (e.d., tr. 2 399-2 903 ), and used the I-3 calcula-tiens as a springboard for an analysis of the true disensions of the mill tailings probles.
Commission rule lo C7R 2.75S(b) was not appli-cable to this investigation of the implications of Dr. Gotchy 's prepared testimony because the sill tailings emissica problem which that investi-sation nucovered is not in any special or unique way related to operation of IMI-2, since the problem is a product of the sining and silling of e
uranius are generally.
The discussion of the true nature of the =111 tailings probles in the TMI-2 licensing proceeding =ay ac tually be consistent with the Cc=sission 's regula tions.
Regulations lo CFR 51.20(e) and lo C7R 50, Append 1= D (point 15 of part A) state that no fur *her discussion of the envirocaental effects of the uranius fuel cycle, apart frca the discussion 39-014
8 which has been included in Table S-3, "shall be recuired."
Ferhaps this language, as written, does not preclude further consideratien by the Co==ission of infor=stic= submitted by the Staff, the Applicant, er the Interve= ors en the effects of the uraniu= fuel cycle.
In other words, the Board would be recuired to assess the full impacts of the fuel cycle oniv when provided with infor=ation suggesting that such an investigatics was in har=ony with its overall statutory responsi-bilities, as in the TMI-2 proceeding.
The numbers contained in Table S-3 I
would then represent =i=isum numbers of curies rathegthan the maximum numbers that the Board is required to consider, cuce information con-cerning the effects of the fuel cycle has been provided to the Board by any of the parties to a licensing proceeding.
Thus this "shall be required" language wculd not authorize the 3 card to refuse fully and in gecd faith to censider the total environ = ental effects of the uraniu=
fuel cycle, including these < Jfects not already incorporated into Table S-3.
Interve= ors suggest that any other interpretation of these regulations would be contrary to andb viola tion of the AEA, NEPA, and i
ZEA.
It is also i=cortant to note footnote 57 of Narc v. US:Gc, 547
- 7. 2nd 633, at 653 (D.C. Cir.1976), which indicates the.t S-3 is not to be applied =echanically in the Cc= mission's licensing preceed1=gs.
The Applicant has previously described the Intervenors ' e=phasis on the raden-222 emission problem as bei=g illegal on the theory that this emphasia, albeit consistent with AEA, NEPA, and ERA, represents a "challerge" to Table S-3, which is included in a Cc= mission regulation.
As noted above, Intervenors suggest that the Applicant =ay have sis-understcod the =eaning of the "shall be required" clause, and the Inter-venors therefore are not challenging the Commission regula tion which includes Table S-3.
Iven if the Intervenors are viewed by the Appeal Board as in effect contesting the S-3 regulation, then, with all due respect to the Appeal Board, the Intervencrs submit that the rules, regulations, policies,
procedures and practices of the Co= mission are entitled to great deference, but not to the point where (as here) the record de=onstrates tnat they would be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, an abuse of d14 cretic =, or U9 ^ O.D
0
(,
otherwise 111ega; cr unconstitutional. _This sta te:ent is particularly pertinent where (as in this particulap7receeding) the record indica tes
~
that the existing Cc==issien rules, regulations, policies, practices, or proc ed".res do =ct adecuately or credibly protect the hesits and sa fe ty of the public, as the Cc==issic: is recuired to de under Sections 2(d), 2(e), and 3(d) of the AEA, and under IRA and NEPA; or where th e record demonstrates (as is this particular proceeding) tha t the existing Cc==ission rules, regula tio ns, policies, practices, or precedures are being applied to prevent the full disclosure and full consideration of environmental i= pacts and alternatives to a propcaed..ieensing action that is reonired under FEPI.
C Eig, to the extent tha t exis ti.ng policies, procedures, prsetices or regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Cc==1ssion =ay be inter-preted so as to prohibit or restrict the Intervenors fro = challenging the Cc==ission's practices, procedures, policies, rules, or regulations with regard to (a) the probability c airersf t i= pact contained in Standard Review Plan 3.5.1.6, NUREG-73/087 ;
(b) evacuation and radiation monitoring responsibil'..ies and prepardedness beyond the low population zone; (c)
"able S-3 of 10 CF2 51.20 and Appendix D of 10 CF2 50 and the assu=ptiens that no adverse health effects are to be considered to occur after a certain arbitrarily short ti=e; (d) the supple =ent to the Final Supple =ent to the Final Invirc = ental Statement prepared by the Staff (testimony of Dr. R.L. Gotchy);
(e) the policy of denying financial assistance to Interveners; (f) 10 Cr2 2.758 any such restrictive application of these exis ti:g Cc==issics policies, procedures, practices, rules and regula tions in this manner is illegal, discri=inatory, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and an abuse of discre tion, beyond the statutory authority of the Co==ission, and would ccustitate a denial of due process and egaal protection as they are guaranteed by the United States Consitution.
b9 ~ 94 -b
g The undispu.ed information described in the record sud above prevents the granting of an operating liceas-for IMI-2.
The Board and Co==ission cannot chocse to ignore the laws of radicactive decay and the intolersble inadecuacy in the Applicant, Staff, and Scard assess =ents of the TMI-2 opers ting license proposal.
The granting of an operating license is arbitrary and irresponstele if, as in this pro-ceeding, it ignores the laws of nature.
The granting of an operating license is also arbitrary and irresponsible if, as is this proceeding, it ignores the Nation's governing legal fra=ework, which forbids arbi-trary govern = ental incursions which violate the letter, spirit, and intent of federal law and the Constitution of the United Sta tes, A separate proceeding to consider the generie validity of Cc==ission regulations, which the Applicant has protested that the Intervenors in effect are " challenging
- is unnecessary and u=warrs ted.
A separate proceeding of this kind is not appropriate because uncontreverted infor=ation brought to the attention of the Board has already u==istakably denenstrated that any Cc==ission regulations which the Applicant suggesta be =ade the subject of such a separate proceeding (e.g., S-3, the ecc-coquences of an aircraf t i= pact, or e=ergency preparedness beyond the low population =c=e) are, as atelied to the cuestion of crantis: TMI-2 au thori ty t o cre r s t e, arbitrary, capricious, illegal, unco stitutional, and otherwise beyond the authority of the Board and Co==ission.
The decision to evaluate and consider fully all of the infor=ation presented to the 3 card can and sust be made withis the scope of the TMI-2 precedure, without *he need fo/ a=y separate generic proceding.
I= addition to the fact that such a separate proceeding may not be used to justify granting TMI-2 an opersting license, Intervenors lack funds to pursue any such separate proceeding for purposes of generally challenging Co= mission regula tions, e.g., tr. 247-249, and request by I:terve cre of June 18, 1974 NEPA recuires a full and open discussica of environmental impacts and alternatives for purposes of infor=ing the Co==ission, but NZ7A's full disclosure policy is also reeded to isform decisic:=akers outside the agency procear.
Calvert Cliffs ' Coordisating Cc=mittee v. U312",
449 F. 2nd' 1109, at 1114 states :
rc - r)f rs d
v.c f
Moreover, by compelling a forward " detailed state =ent" and a descriptien of alternatives, NEFA provides evi-decce that the mandated decisien making process has in fact taken place and, mest irrettantiv. allew these renoved frem the initisi rrecess to evaluate and balsnee tne factors on tuetr own.
(anynasis added).
To the extent that the Cc==ission regulations or policies operate to truncate this recuired NE7A asseas=ent and consideration of issues relevant to the proposed licensing action, it la also important to note that Section 102(1) of NEPA states:
The Congress authorines and directs th a t, to the fullest extent rossible the policies, regulations, and puolic laws of tne United States shall be intertreted and ad=inis-tered in accordance with the policies se t fort: in this Ac t.
(e=phasis added).
Preventing a full ventilation of environ = ental impacts and alter-natives to operatics of TMI-2 is also contrary to Appendix D of 10 CTH 50, which counsel for the Staff stated governs the TM -2 proceeding and requires a full review under NEP1 (tr. 2128).
A full NEPA review, as required under the statute and under Appendiz D, cannot be conducted where the Board and Staff ignore adverse infor:ation presented and pre-vent-serious questions from being raised, as was done repeatedly by the Scard and Staff in this proceeding.
For the above reasons, Intervenors conclude that the Board and Staf f have failed, utterly and co=pletely, in performing their full NEFA review function.
The Applicant has like-wise neglected its responsibilities under 10 CTa 51.20(d) because the Applicant bas disregarded data adverse to its proposal in its filings before the Board and Cc= mission.
E.g.,
the reccrd shows no evidence of any full and objective review by the Applicant, Staff, Board, or Co= mission of the following issues:
(al how and when TMI-2 =ight be decommissioned, and the resulting economic and environ = ental costs.
The record shows no evidence of a knowledge of the quantitier of residual radioactivity remaining in the plant af ter re= oval of used fuel or the radiation levels to which werkers will be exposed; (bI the long-term radiological heal th and environmental effects of the uranina fuel cycle, as related to the operation of TMI-2 as required for cost-benefit analysis; a9 - 0.! S
93 9
(c) the epidemiological relaticeship betwe,n rsdiation deses to workers is the nuclear industry and subae-quant adverse health effects; (d) the ef fect on the stated or perceived need for power of a chaage, fro = a rate struc ture which eff ers users or classes of users reduced rates for increased elec-trical consu=ption, to a flat-rate structure.or an increasing-rate s truc ture ;
(e) the financial capability of the Applicant to fulfill its obligations to the public in the event the Price Anderson Act is declared unconstituticnal in all jurisdictioca, as in Carolina Environmental Study Group, et al. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Co= mission, U.S.
District Court, Wester District of North Carolise, March 31, 1C77; (f) the effect of a serious program of energy conservation, such as, for example, the one proposed by the President of the United States, on the stated need for power; (g) the inctitutional =echanis=s by which a continued reliance on large, central-sta tion generated electricity precludes serious efforts at scorgy conservation, home insulation, and the wide-scale use of the various forms of solar energy; (h) health benefits of conservation of energy as an alterna-tive to operation of the plant; (1) data by sources independent of the nuclear industry shewing that coal ecmbustien is a more economical msthod of generating electricity than nuclear; (j) reports which suggest tha t nuclear reactor accidents are such more probably and have =uch more severe con-sequences than stated in the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-14CO ;
(k) the social, political, technical, and environmental problems associatedwith all forme of radioactive waste disposal, including mill tailings piles; (1} considerstice of all the long-ters radiological and enviren= ental effects of all aspects of the uranium fuel cycle as related to the operation of TMI-2.
These twelve issues =ust also be addressed and fully considered before en operating license can be granted under AZI, NEPA, and IRA.
To the extent tha t these issues have been sectioned in the record, they are sentioned is cenclusory and perfunctory fers or were raised by the Interrecors but excluded by the 3 card.
Compare York Co==1ttee for a Safe Invircament, et al., v. USTuC, 527 7. 2nd 812, 315-816, at n.12 cud' n. 13 (D.C. Cir. 1975 ).
The Board and 3taff have violated both the
- Ri n ij v.
U
4 letter and spirit of AEA, NE7A, and ERA by the -
- usal to consider d
the long-ters health effects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including but not li=ited to the rsdon-222 esisnions probles.
Thus the ec=plete cost-benefit analysis supposedly carried out by the 3 card (I.D. para.
129(k)) is inadequate, since 1* censistently, substs tially, and =sterially overestimates the benefits and underesti=ates the costs of granting an operating license forTMI-2, as shown above.
NE7A places the burden of consideration of environ = ental impacts and alternatives on the federal agency involved, and does not require interested citizens to stir these agencies towards environ =entally benign decision =aking.
The Intervenors ha re requested funding fro = the Cc==ission is order to assure that the importa:t enviren= ental i= pacts of and alter-natives to the granting of an operating license for TMI-2 be presented before the Board, since the Applicant and Staff are unwilling or u=able to aid the 3 card i fulfilling its NEFA and other statutory responsibili-ties.
All such requests by the I:tervenors were categorieslly denied by the Board, e.g., Request by Intervenors of June 13, 1974; sud tr. 246-249 The Interveners were lef t a sidst the Board's =ase of procedural niceties and indiffere=ce to the public health and safety, which only a barrage of expert technical and expert legal resourcss could be expec ted to pe etrate ec=pletely.
In auch a setting, the TMI-2 formal proceeding became, is large part, a subterfuge to enable the Board to evade its statutory obligations.
As described above, neither the Board, nor the Staff conducted a full NZ2A review.
The Sta'f's Final Z:vironmental Statement, i
=any i=por-tant places, =erely and uncrities117 parrots various unsupported infer-
=ation filings submitted by the Applicant, e.g.,
FSTES eiscussics on
" System Feak Loads and Energy Requirementa," Sec. 8.i.1; en "Ispact of Energy Conservation en Applicant's Syste= Energy Requirements and Peak load Demand," Sec. 3.3.2.; and on "cperating Costs," cec. 8.3.3.
Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Cc==ittee v. US LEC, kk9 F, 2nd 1109 (D.C.
Cir.1971) established tha t auto =stic deference to the desrminations of another agency of gover==ent conflicts wi..
the duty under NEPA to con-sider fully and independently all enviren= ental cons squences of the proposed licensing action.
Autcmatic or practically autcsatic deference 59-020
)
to unsupported assertions by the Applicant, whcce i==ediate econo =ie needs reflect vslues and priorities inconsisten: with the public need for preservatics sud enhancenent of the e nviren:nent and for prenotion of the public health and saf ety, likewise constitu ted a vielstien of NIPA.
Cospare Greene County Planning Board v.
Federal Power Cc= mission, 455 7. 2n d 412 (2nd Cir. 1972 ).
Thus NEPA places the burden of conducting a detailed, full, and good faith considerstion of the enviren= ental impacts of and alternatives to the operst1on of TMI-2 on the Cc==ission, rather than on the Interrenors.
By requiring the Cosmission to assume responsibility for identifyi=g, discussing, and fully considering the enviren= ental consequences of its actions, NEPA initiates the Congres-sionally sandated shif t is agency values teward more environmentally responsive objectives.
As discussed above, the !.D. is defective because of NEPA viola-tions and because it failed to protect the health and safety of the public as required under the AIA and ERA.
These violations also involve a violation of the APA, 5 USC 706, because the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously and exceeded its statutcry obligaticas.
These excesses can:ot in good faith he rationalized as attributable to the discretion which the AZ1, NIPA, ERA and APA grant to the Board and Consission because these viol ticas involved an extrece abuse of discre tica by the Board.
With regard to raden-222, circraft impact, evacuation prepared-ness, financing, and all other issues addrecsed is this brief, the I.O.
is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, an abuse of discretio=, beyond the utstutory authority of the Board or Cossission, and otherwise illegal.
The I.D. sust therefore be reversed.
Under 10 CFR 50, Appendix D, Parts D92) and D(3), the Board is not authorised to grant an opersting license beyond 20 percent (20%) of full power.
Ite I.D. violated this Cc= mission regulation by authorizing the issuance of a full operating license (I.D. para. 133).
Appendiz D, Parts D(2) and D(3), are applicable to the TMI-2 proceeding under the provisions of Appendix D, Part C(3)(a).
Intervenors note that a review of the I.D. shows only two references by the 3 card to the Intervenors' proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions39-021
{O of Law of August 15, 1977 (I.D. pars. 15 and 45).
Intervenors had subsitte, 100 separate proposed findings for consideration by the Board.
~
The Board did not even have the decency to address each of these pro-posed findings, seperstely er otherwise.
Th e Board did not address the overwhelning majority of these 109 proposed findings at all.
The 34ard noted =erely that it had read these findings (I.D. para. 4).
This evasive actics by the 3 card constitutes a clear violation of APA, 5 USC 557 (e), which states, in part, that
. The record shall show the ruling on each finding,
, conclusion, er exception filed by any party to the agency proceed 1=g.
All misions, including initial, recc = ended, and tenta tive decisions, are a part of the record and shall include a statement of:
(1) findings and conclusicas, and the reasons or basis therefore, on all the =aterial issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.
(esphasis added)
Section 557(c) of the APA entitles Intervenors to knew why the 3 card ignored, without exception, every one of their 109 proposed findings.
These findings discussed the isses presented in this brief above.
Section 557(c) requires that the Board specify its reasoning in order not to leave the Interveners guessing, and to prevent decision =aking behind closed doors.
Intervenors were also prejudiced in the writing of this brief by not knowing the reasons, if any, which led the Scand to ignore the i=pertant questions which these basic issue raise.
The AP'i also requires articulated and soundly reasoned agency decisions.
Under the APX, the 3 card sust inforn the affected parties of its decision threugh specific and detailed responses to the issues that were presented before the Board.
Disclosure of the haderlying rationale of agency action, as required generally under APA, operates to deter and prevent agencies of government fres exceeding their authority, because the parties will be apprised of the reasons or lack of adequate reascus w=1ch provided the official basis for the decision.
This requirement of reasoned decision =aking is also in-herent in NZ7A, and was violated in the extreme by the Board.
09 - Tr$
O O
In addition to ~virla ting Section 557(c ) of the APA and the spirit of reasoned decasion=aking which per=estes the APA generally, paragraph four of the I.D. epitemizes the genteel conte nt with which the 3 card, the Staff, and, unde s tandably, the Applicant, responded e
to the Intervenors at every critical stage of the TMI-2 proceeding.
Ih e Intervenors submit that their rights to due precess and equal prc:ection, guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, were abridged by the TMI-2 proceeding.
Ihese rights were abridged because the Board's denial of financing, as explai=ed above, prevented a balsaced presenta-tien of issues.
These constitutional rights to a fair hearing were also viola ted because of the prejudicial and predetermined nature of the entire proceeding.
The I.D. does not reflect an evenhanded response to the record.
A pre-es tablished outocce, the production of another opersting license, could not be swayed by the many significant and still usaddr*ssed issues raised by the Intervenors and su==srized in this brief above because the Board applied cespletely different standards to the evidence elicited by the In t ervenors than it did to.d:e infer:ation supplied by the Applicant.
Such conduct is appropriate to advocacy, not to objective de:isionmaking, Such conduc t violates the basic principles of fustice tha t are funda= ental to due process and equal protection under the law.
For the reasons described above, the I.D. must be reversed.
An operating license cannot, consistent with the Consission's legal obligations, be granted to TMI-2.
39 023
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J s e > i i st ir h s r nt e i m osCl n s c c e o e mt e a e - i st u e t s ea s a d a aa t o mu nf a b el e N"bT"otmhao.l mf aa a t uia IWouWc r u u i l' A h r l A e h a c s us nDh t od n a t c s s lem L. p y r ba w d s n m r ri t r - tenWrl.. A p e u tu l. i r e c a >c m a o st e mt 1 to.c cl t d e a n nie s t l c s n Q f ee l t t er Ca i nt e n a t ot n.C p nnr n a s. 4 hi o oudl e nu a r. A s h a g k t e ri e i e a a T#e .d n a mt - Whh h hS h wl .e uC ot ea r c h e on at I tn. b w h r o u o eTayDeM W gi, ntok n1 u s C 3 u [ s amr Tl e1u s r a n o e t ik Cn nthc a A I' u - Triu t o' n e g 0h c r s o n aa a " tscoc AAktd m h {h nCew et uga 3t h ahtL eu t of a h t i k e ..= ee (. a- - s e yl r od ef y 0 sae e n e h nh o . 0 e k o. h ir lhc wat e a s t ed 0 'e h h e0 rl r 1, Tusd a s n V3 A a 1 e e r i d r ys e g ih a nnf dC od ps s i u t u a kb h f e a-uc e iot a e y - e" b s f t sh r ts ) C mt ncl o r ih at la? h at e sa D od le e t o n a t s i )0 h rh s t u i o n ed i a 'n t t e u a im xt >d t omt u0, tcor mk n n e s e eC h sd u t a o t w a e ehn0 i oCf 0 s e o l rt al m d e t a i ok w w1 a a e r s t d la e 1, n. C n iJ c s e e unt m. w u r l y "e. d r Y o h f g ht i. d i e e n n u e e i Ye d t m m dt at i m r ell li i qc en ki e :. h c2p: l t i ad n ua mt n"0 c a s ut o ioe s e / l t r f t c r s s i r C' i t l b. ar bd h e i d T lu e o x l t e a y .o pt im1 n A a ac o r" J' i tnDit f i t f r t a nic dr mCnc w hh e o ur 5 a t h s la a l p pc ma e if e e c t r o d n e ty b ly rt moi e n m e. oe ss sl ef l a ,s r a c g k et e f oa e Ee upnnsg rl n o e a mll w ad tl t s e gA loec a i o e r dd r t d n n r e e a i e sb s e u P i e )l e s nd 3 b cns s dl t a e me g n a mc a p 0 i e e b ns e n 0lJ" l cme n l h id s h s o s on wTs nl %s oma a a e e e wa fl l a r g mnd Cul p* a ol r p i n oe ta e e I m pacc mo ccl s h i e~ n" i a mh om C I t e oh ti r t l ek t s o o at c N c h. lt f t , n0 s yn f e 7 eC o g r l . s - s a nin id. t ne oh i n oat o0 e r e n 6 I chm ni n u i g la a r lct dt op tyC y a 8 r o a e o e i e yt ed a i f 4 tyMt 1 d o e / B C vmt l si r
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r o e s r ul. f tt a l n t e a ed u a T* t pl a w n tu e gi rl t 7 Nmet s t Bl 4. h p ht e e ar o wn. o c ge i E rh. n w r r a ns u un u o r et n e e, et a t le w o s g ,C Dy. te e e e s tr ys N e y at ma t a o i y I C e l, e i n le e r v pl r I t I pl n r l n ar e. r! Kedll tihe s c n o i a c Te a s e s t t h ue J. h yl d s t s c I cl e s d wnnPal. mbns le. w oips t' No A 7 c s aCb c a n e C st or 8, ef ei t y s e i r mn yA ya li et t l r a e na noia e e ng a e r s n r t >t h iat Ah tal r tu e w ome w a n n c. yula A m. o e r n. t io ea a Nh mu. n e n. n n t as r t po uh ml T s ot ed u n ) t et e a e w o l r f s st f pt oGha mCimfet t h nugf la t i n u e h mo nn rh s 1, s a ce a A wt a ae cnmnml msangy Wr ant ani t ns t c. 9 M Tn cs mh pc T h at i t a oe e r n Ls, s d c e u I 3 \\ s e p e s r c n e t e t c e aDe ot leh mc r a e a n nl hr ta ma e k o e ob o e oo r oe nst s l a ouh Aa L T Y w a r lr CWl on prpmAop 1 t n a t t e t a ebyI e l t v s l t Je1 i e f l l C,$ QNp (
18 U.S. bnts G1.'s at '57 At@nic Test ~ - To Check Radiation-Leukemia Link Py MALCOLM W. 3ROWNE T e disab:hty claim of a rnemer midier : stom c hema test is r*0u:~d to 'A ea a who c arges t.' at he contrn ed leuWiir, N n bac that reraters cad.2.:on accu-because of a 1957 atom:c bomb test $as : 'i'l'd U l *'3"#- Sut son e sc:ensta are excemd bar pr:rnpted a nacenwtda sesrch for other,l evenl w doses may cause in eMects after veterans present at the test. no Nat:onal Center for Disev.e Cas, e bg mod. trol in At!anta, wr.:ch !mt:sted the -t-ll f years, among nc*m of massne rado Leuke ua ts cocnmon, after a ;er oc o vestigation, is trettirg the caw as an epidemiological study, tryuig to fino a l at:on dc es, such as surmvcra cf the, pensible linic between the test and leu. Hirosh.ma and Nagasak: ex p.o s.on s. !.f doses now consdere:1 s.afe were. I ke n'A Shou'd a re!adonship be found, offt-found to have effects such as feukemia. l ciais say, se enests would have n r, over a Ior ger tenn. the redesgn of! i appraims the safety standards arpMng, nuc! car per nacm3 m:gnt prove ! ' to radiation exposure, and this cou;d 38C5'f7' ! have profour.d e*fects en the future of Medical Records Sought i i nuclear tectnclogy, possibly involving De first step !n the investgaticut w:l!; . the Mademgn of nuc!est resctors. I be to locate the mes; wno p. art:c pat d ! At a meet: t of Dec. I, the Desaf-nent f ;n the tbt and to octa:rt n'ed: cal ecords ; cf De*mse. the Vetera ts Adm.nistrstion. ! and <teath cert:ficates. De eteragency ': the,0eoartment of E.ernv. the Pub.ic ; w.n:ttee set up to conduct the study ' Hee:th See.,re and t'e Natmnal Reararen i l est mstes t'at t.he ts.sk of checHng ava.!.wel be enenpW.M m su l l C:une:1 decided to help with the sa,dy. able eroms Se At nv veterans whose case prompo l months at a cat of acout 5:00.000 ed the snidy is Paul R. Coooer. 43. of cer..rae Depriment spokesman said.' a. E..n -it. Idano. Mr. Coopw was serv:ng Memp
- e. however. Dr. Ca
- duel. ans! l
- In a pr v:sional ur.it of the 92d Air-his sr.att sta.ff at the Di.sease Contro( '
, bor e Oms:en uten the didston par-Center have succeeded on inetr own m
- c: pated i t an atomic bem!> test code-locanng 402 of the peopie they are named "Smckey" on Aug. 31,1957, at seeking.
heca Flats. Ne?- Because of press acootets of the in. C;airn Was Dented vesugaton, Dr. Caldwe!I saad. his offics !.n a crencensation c!asm submitted to has received thousands of etters fr:-i [$,(([ en and others uno un the Veterans Admimstration. Mr. Cooper contended that his feckem:s was a re-ym,n tu,,f rst atomic bomb test h2 suit of..:s presence at the test. His claim wts den'ed, as wts his subsepent arpeal, b'ulY M5 "l
- P' e Nodd'l But the Natienal Center for D set.so mc ne ce two mat Con raJ. 'n respense to an Inquiry frec2 War !!. Dr. C4! dwell se.:d. In 1957 alone the Vete ans Adm:n:strat:on, tooit an in-
- 3,7,,,,e S Ar-artcan ers. Dr. Ca.4-Leg in the case last August.
we!! estmutes th.at up to two m:: hon ' .. s party a matte of partly of hurnanitanamsm.,.sc:ence and ; Ameg.'uns w-e present at tests poten. l Dr. G;y t G.. ;;g Caldwe!!. deputy chief of the center's '!ow.ievety,,g 3,,2 m ron e em c.f i radiation. cancer branen, said m an.rterv ew I Many of the iet:ers he has receted. f Because Of the attention Mr. Coope's ' C.Jdweil said were frern peop!e! case generated in the press, another teu-l Cr. wy, ,,,e at tests' othe* than Smcev kemia victim who was at tne " Smokey- , test. Donald Coe of.ompiensvine Ky l and wno therefore cannot be tec!uded n the prewnt stt.d y, because of tae came. to.ignt. and four other possibie I wide!y varying cond:t:ons cf other tests. l ,eukemia victim.s have acert ident:fia2. De Pantagon has told us thst-acout l: the mihtary and other orgin::st.ons has He said trsckmg dcwn records with:n I 3.153 people, g ve or take a,few we-e Dr. Cald ! proved extr uneiy dif ficuit, part:y be-present,d. "We knowat the Smokey test. the eversy l,,.au.Mury .w M N Federal Privacy Act weG sa: that mcrd keapirg Ns m age of the 8:4 Airborne people was ! nearly as good in 1957 as it :s today and we have stattvics on the numner of. than icukemia cases one ould ex ect ;a an j egg,us to computers.** he sa:d. "and tnN
- ,,e mds an m' n pm t '
unexposed pneulaune M 3. ! $3 peep;e. l Furtter problems will a r se w en we! a L3 Cases Predletable ! :oost for mihtary personnel Ncords be ;
- Pe predictable nismbe-fv people ! cau.<e of the 1973 fire at the 5t. L:u:s :
at tfe age th%e snidiem would be new military reterds center wnich destrovad ' wcu!d N-ahnut I n leukemia cases." he many of them. Even hnkmg n.ames wth ser at numbers turns out to be a rna;or, sa:d. "?.a t is, any number of cases frera re-o to six wou:d not be signif,. OrmW !C cant in snow:rg s retat:onship between But Dr. Ca!dwel benevas tha t the the test and : uke ia. records gerersted "when money cnanges "3ut evet sit c:*es m t*:t 5 sTidi. bands." :nsurance files, r*t:raa e9t pav-rant. ;f we kr.ew how rN ny n! thow rt '13 casan.11ty c' aims and so fortit, mp. People ;;re*ent at the te t' hate u ted furmish (!uct. tf and when they become
- s. nee then.'
at a dan e. De De(e t.se Depanmeat has a.4 that Me need to talk to dor + ors a hnse. alhough non e of those present wr c ' ponents nuv N the men we're :nter-t ed ' wnhm two and a half mdes of the 44. 'in. We need to interview the me them-e f) - OO l'~ dV dd ki oum esclaboet, rad:stiers dose = were scives. as a cersaan point We need to wv! be.!ow the accepPd Lmrt of s.ifety. l tifiestem
- knoar cauvs of death ott deata cer ;
tv ticft ts f:ve reds a year. Evervnae at sra i e
4 FrLi '.in.. le8 TMF T \\MUNCTON Pnq v-... i.- 'n - s.g n!,. e s.s .333 - s : c,3 1 -; ? s .f -- % s, % Vf IAv ir. .3 ...A .,...v i . v.. Y ' 6',d m 7 0 * *~* ar O g,,a. y o L J*l 7 .v., u.. , h*.1. %2 L u L L L t. L e G s. t..G,! U t) 6 o %,.) e o c: .6 -ce <f d:p ".....'d.c Ey "/-:4.- Pi ui vis e u. + 2- ... s m.a e r..n: r-wn.:ste. Put star: s r.:er c:#c., Or incrG#cd scen: m'n C' 30'e i (0 Cont.oversy h:s des eloped over sto.n:e nue.'e:r r:r!!::s-C w ord.n: to who should run a government study Dr. W ".s:a IL Fi.ce, s>cter.t sur-cf whctser a IM7 nuc! ear wespcns
- test er.used a 31;
- nificant number cf von gen:r:1 and directar of the COC.
leuk:mia c. ses amen; 3.D0 soldiers The Dec. I ::rcup 215o dceided that and ci.4:n p:r:::: pants. alon.: w :h the 1.07 test code named IU" "I2dI Sh""Id IO# 2d * ~ Two key membe s of Canness. Rep. SC'k#F'IC"CUS "Y
- I*
Psui Rc;:rs (D-Fla.) snd Rep. T::n The.t:1:ds b cd C'JC's I;r GI. n v Lee Ca*t e r (R KyJ. ch:irmsn and C. C d e. c:1. depu.; chief of the c:n,. ranking CDP member renec::vely of cer br:nch. h:.s s;c:rne:ded the M- {, the Ho:se He:lth and Ent:r nment Subec==:ttee. h:ve wr ::cn President pry up to now. Carter th:1 they are -deeply ce n-de conf 3-.c:: throu:h invec:::t.:n ! cer.v i" that the planned inquiry tha fi st tw o leuse- :a esses and :.;ded i "n 2y be transfe ed frc:n the Center usecte-v cf f ur more Omon; i for Disease Centrol" Sm Key part:cip:nts-At a Dac. I Penta;on meetin:, it .6ce:rdin : to C::dwc!!. the f;ndin ' was detided that the Nat:0nal R e-of s:x Icus:mia c:ses smen:: :he 0.:00, search Coun::1. := at: t of the .N s-Smokey ; r cir:nts wss cn :be bor. l ' tional Acada -- cf Sciene:s. would un-deri:ne* of prov:n2 : si:nific:n: rel:- dertake the...: y daccted t.nd funded tionsnt: between : &::cn recetved :t bf the Dep::.:nents of Defense and the test :nd tne 11:ncss. F.ncrgy. Only 500 individu:1 Smokey partici 1: The "u.rpose of t.he study was to re-pants have bec thor ughly ocmmed. Leukemia, a cancer of the blood ' that has been c:0ic!'c related to ::d:s- .. occurs in tion exposure. cener::.y abOut ond Cf I.CCO pCrsC".s. f \\ The two con:ressmen pein:cd out in i' the:r letter th:- th:: COC h:s no ' vested interesi n e outreme cf the study
- while the Pe".3 :n Fncr;y l Department and 1*eterans.\\dm-inrs-tien are involved ":n connnt.m. '; r-tion ar: sin; from ::cm:c :ces.'
The three s:ano:es. R:.e s and C-- ter went on base ";ctent;a; fin:ne:1 lisbthty and obsious po!:cy in: crest 3' . in the outcome of the stucy. The v:cws of the two :eg:3!:::rs will l carry add: tion:1 wc: ht w:: n :he d. [ wnistr:: tion smce 'ncy are p::n m:: to hold public her.rma un S= der bc-fare the:r subcamm:ttee wit.::n the next few w ceks. The Smokey test took p!:ce ne:r dswn on.\\u::. 0:.1Z7. at Ycres F::t in the.Wuds nu A :r te .:.'.i -+ ki!c,ta,n der:re n:.* cc:Mr.ted * : s 73% frm t tGu r t. V.'. m. ...ra .T the. p, .r-g Vers ! 6:: 1;.t' s - t.. 'a % e t r. ('.- ; ; *p se ......, :J Cl e' L *.s r * ' s .\\r c ; re-3 s.* w . ' '* e ' 3', w 2 s { J t.# 4e '. s ..t-2. CN :nl..cac L t W.. : ; w J. '.... t
h Ja.RUf THE TUmNGTON P05T Batue dh Radiation *Biandards, y-1 nyer w er.r2.s aow Exnamm. m 3 .m r e Ei W rrEli! ham and Mancuso l Rep. T.m Lee Carter iR Ky). 2nt:n: Ey W:lte- ?!ncus contoversies is the b:tter fight that minority memoer cf the subcommit-w..awor. N su:: wn:n In the summer of U.4. Dr. Samtv1 yesn whLn the seten-tee, headed by Paul G. Rogers tD., tfie community over the possible yta.). a Milham of the Washington State :-ut> effecta of c{c r[ausing A key witness at the heir n; 13 e't. lie Hea;th Service completed i study ; of ad deaths in the state snr deter-peeted to be Dr. Karl Z. Morgan. now n. n e des e the esfaty level a professor at Georgia Te<*t but for - m:nec that there were excevve can-6 '#$*an.aovernmentstandares ts sed to low-level radiatis t2 at the U.S. g s.e e <! aimed
- hat sc:enuf!c lI more than 7.3 years t'2e c:.rect cer fatahties among the workeri expo-g j t.
en censored by the gov. l ,,cg.h Physics Div:szon at the eovern-Healt [# ' government's nucicar 'acdities at ,,,,[t ed Me al re'e3rei rants i s Oak Ridge nurJear facdity. Hanford. Wash. en tled to saapress acd.uon.al criti. A man M Internstional reputation The Milhsm study ran tounter to cam. la the radiation health field. Mor;an the estactsned re ze-1=ent ;: ition Feaeral or:icials and their n:pport. has worwed from the start of the na-3 that present fe teral exposure sisnd-ers cuunte t. hat enticsi ficincs have tien's ata=:c bomb pregrarn (,a the ards for low-levs i rsd! anon are safe-- come from poor research tecnniques dange s of cancer from radioactive a pos;non tMt reently has ecme un-or self pro =otion by groups and mdi- - material, particularly plutotuus2. der ice easet attack u additonal vid asis. Mor:an is no stranger to the cov[ 5* des 51.nace. A new National Academy of Sci-etnrnents adesed penchant for pres." L.pon '.earnin:t of w..1 ham,s conclu-wnces panel has been convened to sunng its entics m the racisuon f.ela.
- stons, offte: sis at the Energy Research take another look at the covernment In the summer cf IR1, Mor an. su'l and Deve!cpment Ad=.nistration.
Iow-level standard. The current battle Caic Rid:e's director of health phys-ma cind on before that W. ics, ced a pape enucal d W ' cr ao J.e ; t c impa It has also reached the couns. health dangers he saw in the f a st. the study. They firrt tned to eenvince Mi! ham In Las Ve:as two widows have filed breeder nuclear reactor. The pat'er; e was to be dehvered to an Inter 7a-that he snou.d not publish the resu4ts suit acainst the government, elatmang t:onal Atomic Ener;;7 Agency confer -. of his study. When he did. m an co-thst tnetr husbands died of leukemia. enee m Gemany. scure ;ournal. ERDA officials tned to as the result of raciation they re-However his AEC Superiors at Oak ' get Dr. ? omss Mancuso cf the Unt-c*tved in December IMO. when a nu-tersity of httsbur:b. their contrset c!eer underground test called Bane. Ridge censored matenal ent: cal of the bre-der reac*or and the pluto : ree:rcher on the Hanford werkers' Nrry v'ented and sent fallout into the naum it used, and sent the new ver. hesith. to sien a news release saym; atr. ston to Germany with instruenons to his ISyear study had turned up no eX* The two men, guards, were arnong Mor:an mat he was to retneve the - cess of cancer esses. Mancuso refused-100 persons exposed at a c2=p near earlier copies and deuver their ver-ERD A t:ien hved another research the test nte. Another guard also e-3' "* or:an;zstma to analy:e Cham's sta-cently died of leukemta. ttstes :s see tf another resuit could be M rean complied, not wanting. he In the Baneter y ase. the govern-said recently, to cause a stir in has last 'I ment p ans to produce scientific wit-In a.3. Mancuso was tcId his study I' 5 '5 O ' ' E *7-nesses wno say the dose received was contract was to be tracsfer ed to W to produce leukemia. The wid. Now, loonmg back upon the epi-RDA 1 CJ g.. 4e fac:llty for adminis-ows have as tbetr chief witness Dr. sode. Mor:sn says there :s a dance-in
- ~** "T m the summer of Shields Warren, former director c.
pressures on research frorn funcing One year wtr asene:es that can be brou:ht to bear the AtocJe Enugy Commissaco 0.vt. 1975....ancuso ~me up with results against those wno disaerea.* samt!ar to Milhsm's. Wort:rs at the stor' of Biology and Medic:ne, who Hanford facilities, accortimg to Man, v.41 say the dose could have esused He has baceme a major eembatant - .be disease. Warren was also for eignt in tne Manicuso affair. It was a Mor-cusa, exposed to low levels of rsdia tion showed a 6 per cent greater leve,- years U.S. representat2ve to the U.N. garrletter to Energy Secretan James Schlesmger Jr. questioning Manieu ' , R.,s dismissed that reportecly led to. Scienttfic Comnuttee on the Effects of of cancer than that !aund in the gen so Nuclear Endf ation. - lat ttie cent bwa mersi MM a ou e als in 17.J worked to tie hattle over the standards will gation. delay Mancuso s puclicanon cf his re-also te played out before the House suits. They developed entic:s=s of the Subcomm:ttee on Health and the En. For Morgan the *eensorth:p* !> volved m tne Manicuso esse ia mere-finings and circulated then among vtronment, wn ch on Jan. ::3 plans to important than the ficcings of the the sc:ent.fic community, beem a enes of hearin;;s on low level ## l'8'N-In Dece neer.1W. however. Man-radiation. enso and his two colleagues. Dr. Alice One specific subject for inqutz y will Stewart a-d.Dr. Geor:e Kneale, pus-be the Mancuso study. lished their findn:s in Health Phys. Another ares will be Smoicf. the vs. the pr=-';er ;curnsi m the occupa-1957 nucietr weapon test in Nevada , tiona2 rad.a:wn f. eld. wne-the Arrr.y marched G!s in the Recently, ERDXs sucee"cr atency, vietntly of g ound zero within two the Centr *=ent of Ener:y. star *ed an hours after the 44 k110 ton shot (thr*e insee nor raneral s investi.:ation to es- ! umes that of Hiroshima)iwas deto-tablish w., Mancuso was dropped, as nated. a of t2us Tear. as the etuel gover ment. One of the six leukeniin esses al. supoor ed re*eartner into the long-ready found among Smokfs *OS .terrn health of Manford and Oax Ar xy ;utrucpants is a constituent of J.d4 m ten 2 JaclL*y wn tsm.__.. .AJ d.), p v
b hr. M L U.a 'llll; h D ill.M.It h h bil G~~ p f73 nn p - v lNOOi.MCAM mOSLSOH 6.SH CT. ~ In V.ep.- l',"rus atinn ef fi rts unum 1,e ruratured on l lic Ilt rartment of Torrry, whleh 3 car nf the Ir c - "I l-t nu tre"t mv controls the t ri nvits of the Al C. sahl h air fril.nd in f.let. '" i ris Heu s .c .c e n men.e hurran brines. Arrnr ling to one N r v.'. uli ,'>nn' t he u*e of troops enure e. allrr the 4? kih. ton blast of thrnnrh n rpnkesinan vrirnfly thst to sifri'an.1Ih"IeIm r'oni n't' ( vin : r- ~b 1r n e 'enns tests in Nc. 1%i one solunte er inv in his trench ennipac a enmple te list ni m m r po.. Srs er al > c.r s latre D ion.fru let s u *i i., tin. t i,n. ar e est.cctr1 to with htowl m rr his f arr. 000 chillan anel mlbtas y nh r rst r and ellrilnc.,pett h in 3r.1 n-la a piea ...-ar. f r.cn b-av in s t his u rek he. Altnerthrr, the Armv hat pu t t r>- test l'a r t ii l p a n t, i nn h! t r<luit e sit gdr.:lc as th. n -nh of an ani oh 'it. linrers and t'at tr r e in' In tne the O
- 11.. i, -
3.. ilth and ensienn-rrther a lia t of.to GI soluntrots from 3 rar g. Is 'tt in lil and IG but nn appatrnt I.aik of Hohlc lists will himler cf. hr M ini"5 1" 'n 'L " ' ' ' ' "n l h. v e I, o r, driav in thothe end w h is ha; pi nrd to r at - ' o :.Jfr. ' e i 1 .t...scry that at taast rt' ort hat tiren m ule torently in timt fmts to rsrlme stirther law level, of '"'U d"" ^h""e bcd a t Hic Int s e a n t.e nHWeSmd ? sosIn t M t 'N'""'""' nMd nw m Im M an W A borram t we We bmMw et .?: 'i w n e g m ti. 6pate I in a Tonips nWn u ne rnan hed into W tirased ri=k of trukrmia or other ofer v av mit!nn Ine e ut ut.se t ranc h ! 7t d.1 e i.;,r ! Irul emia-a blom! Immc hate strinity of r.r ounit scro forrns of tancer. for c ontrol m rr Ihr sina. e-xn ic i Jr.1 s ith r adiatinti-the shor@ af h t indir sl nts .n.sl in,a nry is espected to Af ter a il kiloton des ire t alled On Turslay the fint uttneves re-t!p in n. w ' tic ( ev. r f.r 11; w l. . anu ru nt e r fir: din;s. sinppy Ifonil u as set of f in Nesada in July lalcel to Smnkv mill appear hefore the C ontoil In.\\llinta 1 is
- i.e r in.v'd r
i l's.7. Starines urre marched to within linuse subrummittre chalard by Itrp. the cltne t. m tule the Art v an i lic i In 11"- h mdling of film in o rinnn ren'. neronHng ul en ID I i Han ng He pntturnt M Onw. t e e h Gant sup c. l 1,
- ba I erm.ry rneans used to a artrntly drilassified report.
liran on the suhrommittee is firp. Tim por t. g j ,,,,y.,7 .n, gn,,, ,.,m riert-I rr b.do ido. l ra listion e x po. Ing I chi pt 'he U.r', n i'.. A d a C-lon trim atmt) ~ sno. s - '.1 1.e n f, in ha f es u rre not .. u. 'r. ,-,nh n g t o,~ "I lost my tectlu, nuy lunir fell ont in Matclues, At. e te d e. hame-1 u ~
- s. m i,I r ~. h 3
Counril of the-N at ern it Temtena of d;
- i..i ti A l'cntaron report S,la ne r, r illwr th it. tw ClC.
I e 'ggg .[gg[ gggy [ [gggg[ g [ggg 3 ggg g gggg I hr e nn. e r m-n r41c. f..I fint
- te h s
is i ~ n s ri e a r tert wrirg r te 1 .'.rvr* .in rs either Inst or an effort u m:bl be f.n vu f, a t: 1 di-r v it: r!i ' e s. rcrted t y I'e ntai nn anel I n. r :v ntfi-i Al: 31 It':rie a Califntnla insur. dah hadog an inu n d ni the aiub .r e -. i. u " a Marine w ho chse:T ed One blarine offierr at that test. Lee Carter (Ky.). a ph)*1 clan o hnw l r
- 1. ?
!" t a nl thereaf ter w Ch ar tri Itromly, who also wit neurd constituent. Donald One, is a Smoky I"" I # ' '" " ' " ' " " ' t ore - 1 it tn the sirinity of rround f un other nurtrar tests in 10^>7. mas seteran nnw suffrting from truhrmla. ns and t. ry r gyr wd for traW.* W a -rn. *! r e t t..nl in a irre nt Inten test ifbrnnwd in I!r;7 as hasing cancer. Ile and srscral others w!m scoe at ""F"#' * "'hI' N'I N ".at i.. ta'. s s.. r c t n on liis unit. Ile slic ! last Octnher. Smoky will testify Wednc<ilay. Depailment i a liralth. Edoi ation an i . ? me-mi e later llas sis said, he da-at kast two pW One uHnres w.q k Hu M Jack w,i g,,,, ho nc s -to.
- a in...n.. r f.>r s ha h he still pants in a 1%7 trst called Sinnky, a Dann. win, u p. at bmnky prul Galifco.
parattnnp rornpiny was marched another ehr t two days Irter. Dann i r o.. t t a r v t-f. Af er t.p Unale I.nercy Com. uithin 3n0 3ards of rround rero sst4 scrcrtly hig film hvire w as rol-r I. ' n ntf u 1 In the brait h ficid. Dr.
- Ithin two hnuts of the shot. At least lcrted aller the fitst trst ernt he had j
b ael / 3!n-ni. swl that at curly one of t hee rncn s'aul C. Coord. hat none at the se tomt. N.. rr I.c.s as pr esent, only aNcc de scinred leukemia. Darn, tl rr a paratronrcr and the Iadc - pr.1 rad ation les rls for all Ms b able 10 hlast f rom the 45 kilotnn Umoky =hnt ih'.... In e o h unit u rre riven a f-untm er only one trst othrr than "knoc k r.1 me 15 In 70 frrt' from 4,, a cr e t 'ri mi rd by as tra.;ing. Smt.ky whree film bndcc r adiation w here he w as n nreling gume 'o Tim nihtsrv t.ad a soinntrer pro-les els torneded for cas h military par. miles from t'rounit icit.. It (nre nt. nf t + ' ire r m.le vin,Is. Inith in aml ticipant arc sid! atadable. In all, imw-steel hrim.t. frasimt only the plastle w rs e pisted in escr. the Ar my hai bern able to hirn-liner whh h w as retured by a chhe ra- 'pT
- t lb.
s. r ..nc nnir fi mn lif 3 ciron.t un.0W Gls u ho weie at the strap. b DJtin ?3hl trtently th3t. wlthin a h
- t. f twrmal an l radi INO test s.
/ e e 't
mksmscrox post n._.,__..x., e, Pentagon Plans to Eunt u bahl GH blS In 2 -1ests n m By Walter Pincus Throughout the heirint committee wuneewe nu sun wem members enticized the Defease De-A Defense Derartment off:etal told partment for wnst they desented as. haphazard esforts to :nonttor the med-Congress yestercay that the Pentagen leal effects of the nuclear tests. will 1 nderta4e a "erssa program
- t Soccifically, the Pentagon and omer collect records of Gls who were expos.
agencies were taxen to tssa for not ed to nuclear weapons test in the eco erstine with a Center fer Disease Control study on the possttillty that . Peter H. !! ass. deputy director of the troops were exposed to increased the Defense Nuclear Agency. a n* nst of contrs eting leu kemia and acunced the :=cve ta a House subcom-other forms of esoc+r as a result of mattee on health and the environment the 1957 nuclear test, nicsca=e1 toward the e!ase of a dsylong hear:n; S mo ky. an possible rsdistjon induced illneces of troops uno part;cipated in tne pg g, tests. See itADIATION. A8. Col 1 RADIATION, From Al-of 1300 indmduals who parici. The Tennesse, unit had come to h:2 pated in other militsrv nue'est tests. stten ten. Skerker to.d the subcom-Rogers (D Fla.) said it was said the CDC offic:st. 52 said they had ~nittee. throu:n Caldwell. untelevacia* that the Defense De-leuke=tt and another 211 had some IIe added that Caldwell told him partment fai:ed to ;2ve -hi;h pnority'* form of cancer. 00' O f U m'" 13 O' I'U"53** #"P to the locat:on of pldiers who took Earlier. an Army witness. Sf aj. Alan part in the testa. Sierker, had told Roi:ers that for the had turned up with leukem:2 The subcomrnittee was 1-fornted past year he had been the only Army The subcomrnittee's ir.itial wt'. yesterday that 3 statistically si;n2fl-officer in the Penta;on trying to lo-resses yesterday were veterans of the cant" number of leuke=la cases-<he cate information un soldiers in the ..~ n~* number now resenes eight-has been Sanaky nuclear test. and only for Russell Jack Dann of Albert Lee, found arnon; *.*:S sold:ers wno took about 25 percent of my tin:e." . inn. test!!!ed from a wnee! chair. de-M part in maneuvers after Srecky, a 45* Skerker also said he had found the kaloton tests hot detonated in Nevada names of three soldiers who had senbin; cw he was knocked over bv on Aug. 31,1957. higher than allowable doses at 5moky S m0kY.'m nt h.:s res:t:en on a h.;l Dr. Clyn C. Caldwell of CDC cau-but that he had not :ooked for them. W yards from the *ower/* tiened the subcoc:mittee, howevv. In his prepared statement. Skerxer Dsnn astd
- hat af ter tNe test. "I Mst that more ini:rmattan is needed be-desenbed severn! otner tests wnich, my asir in blotches. then it ;rew back fore any cause effect conclusions he said, should have a " follow up pro.
- rsv and turned to mv natural cu!cr. 3 Sfy
- eets began falling out and Ilost could be reached on the relationship gra m."
heamd ;n my : eft ear. ' Dana a La) between test exposures and later can* One he noted was a March.1953. shot cert called Nancy, a 24-k:!aton device deto-saad he had been :cid by his doctors, that he has a low sperm count. a sit.a. His boss. CDC Dtreetor Dr. T.111am nated frem a 300 foot tower. tien associated with radiation expo H. Foege, s22d his personal view *as ' Film bad;es were not issued ta each sure. "When you have eight cases you have man /* Skerner noted, though there to go on the assumption that it is cut was " heavy fallout in the n1 neuter of the nor921 range.* area." f The nor nal prcbab1Iity for oceur-Skerker noted that the radiat:on rence oi leukemia from a group of *- safety monitors went into the contans.
- ".,5 young =en would be two. Foe ge insted area 3,thout ;:ving readic;s to [
'sa2d. In the course of his testimeny the:r commanders. Foege read' a letter to Rogers finm When the radiation safety offleen Health. EducatJon ard Welfare Secre-directed the troops to be withdrawn. tary Josepn A. Cal 2fano Jr. who said some 7-0 yseds frorn gMund zero. CDC's Smory study would "be enedi- "the unit command ers expenenced ted to the maximum extent possibleJ' d!!ficulty in withdrawin? their tinops.* Caldwell told the su" Jittee snat Skerr.er also told of find:n that a he found O') additional. sneers in re-Teanessee Air Naticest G.ard grouo viewing the recordi of 500 $ mok7 had flown a photo mimon oser tne partict; ants-a num44r he said was Smcacy atte after oe onattun. IIe added still below what could be et;eeted i,ta-that he could not toeste any record of tistjeally from the entire Sms47 tne men or ano ordered thern to per-group. form that =11sston. y 9. e.-' i 4 ,f d
h Ts. N. :.. ln T!!F T UIUNCTnN iwT Ag A rs p ] h i N O i'O E X E O S S G .1. and furnished their own tadiolu;:es! [U q, Q 'O O safety and suraort." ] b3 Kerr te? tined that sinu the 'AEC $.en N. .hl hb h
- V d.-
was not .r runs.ble for troop seim-me a ve dd .a. ties durin g tmony it w:s the De-do say mediest fe(s M :co.Ety ta few Dem en By Walter Pincus leukemis. The response was th:t DOE uow up. w aaac.o rs.s smt s raer expert witticoes wnl1 test.fv at the A Depir =ent of Eser;y off!cisl law ault that the radiation that day did rettar of the da tal'n o. .:3med: cal tc!d a Hause subcomitteee yesterday
- not, and enuronmertal & earen who con-that at least M persons at atmos-What tizd they d o, est some trol. human r:c.: tion roesrta pr>
- be.e cu
- ! ear wescons tests tr.Ne-chocolates?" Carter a doctor himse!f.
r'as. said a stWF of ! e id c"' pund to radiation in ::mcq 2nd c.ner vada and tne Scuta l'acine from D51 asked sarent:ca!!y. to IM received adtstun ex;ose Carter awed if DOF had done 3 f4 ccses ttat exceeded then permusible Iowup on the M Saneber-y wt:ms cuelcar tests w uld be d fficult te-and was told none had been done. }e v els, cause h Ws, Ch wered Is anmr *.o quest:o.s frem mem. -!!cw do you make a jud;;ement un-sor e tsd stion e osurcs, were :ot s a study these people"' !!ogers bers of t..e House Commerce subecm-K. err said after the,.,. ear:n:. -It mittee on be11th and environmem Dr. Rocers nnted that as suetenor Donald M. Ker. act:c; assutant en.
- acency to the At~n c Ener:y Commis. macs the se:ent fie peop:e nervousto m:ie a s s u m p t io ns
as they wouh1 ergy secretary for defense pronms sien. DOE carries an re sesren to de. said his a;ency presectly has ::o t!ans termine raai,tton e:fects on humans. hee to if they took up a study of tte " \\ PO'Cd 8 0 'C f *- to ecoduct follow up medical e%2ft:na. After beina told that $G million is \\nother committee member. Rep. M 5:YHf "tro L ear studying h: a. t!on cf the indm:tuals invoived. Douc!:s Nal; red iD-Pal aho er:t.- nese survivari of Hiroshima and '.a.
- ass ia-Er es e Wded-3:y tr - etic 1 tne DOE w:tne3sey f r the 13ac o,rew entwm from His statement of 10 erest
.,a tne so.. ers % ho had Ch:rman P:ul..a ers iD-Ms.i. w to is $oth:nC ne::r (hat is betn*' uvd to . ~~ .G direct:n; the invest:a:snan t:ta ;om.
- 'e* car 'w e sp*o*t:sl h3
'C I 3 used,. A*"C ble increased rist of :eukem a and (nu been ecused t', rad:stloc at the u-
- n incie cther esnrers for sc!a:ers wno pa tici.
!C'I** c! ear te3ts. p::rd L: : clear weapons tests its tue On Wedne? day. the subcommittee .We have a record that is develop-3;ws. l 3 CC E d3 .n:; a ser:ous health h az a rd.- the CO m e o t s o n. Atte asked Ke - abcut Sanebe-v. a D70 d:ers who tM rm in une D;, test f P e s 5 m e et con 4re'sman sa:d. ":-d naknamed 5mui) Jou,rmple f ref e~in: to th e DCT underround snot run by DOE's pred. -You took no actron on Smoky,- ecessor a;ency, the EnerTr Re?s arch omc:al l inst;:ut:onsHy or pe--nnah Ro ers toni the D O E ofsict !s w ho and Des ciopment Admin:stratiofu hon e no" been su-me nus, I'd feet were test:tyin.:. -!t has 13 be a ct t. Banebetw vented and sent rsdlose-muen more com f ort 2cle if we had S sted by" the Altanta based feder21 tise fallatic.M feet in the air. The soniec::e skeptical enou::n to bel: eve Center or Dise29 Centrui. is1 aut dr>:ted os er a nearty tent city where M test site employees had _to Ro.:ers added b:titr!y. -We ll nes er gst sgethi d adverse may be ::p-be evaeusted and 35 of them esarrined find out if it. v f ere! radiatica has any ~ ~ ~
- f. e hie ner, tnas normal tad t.it te s ef fect if we don't Irok/*
lev e!s-Kerr told the subcommitteo that the 3 nee " eq. th ce emni inve5+d D "u rt -' eat of 1sren c in 193 re- 'c n t '..n e d.e 3 C f e a k m.J. feue -leal Sn l i e t ritt il tur:: rid gur the l3 t ': t* 3r .3 w. .as
- N..
, ': e.; f t' T * "I'- i'* a.' m-[:1.;ry trgops s um :.i me.... u t e m. - a, LE '" ' M S'*f L ' ir* e r 3 w/o f !'. e DOE C'. 53 AI
- t* 7 T r,y f e..w to t d ()u'% -
N N C l' O)f n > (t
- G)
\\m i CV Y m g s j U a gr IN 9.\\s737 1 .0
- G.
g CERT!?ICATI CT SER7!CE k~\\ 4 *t AP ,o-Q, # C,y. p M)S w I hereby certify that copies of "Intervenors' 3rief 1-bygnd of Exceptions to the !sitial Decision of December 19, 1977, dated January 30, 1978, have been served on the following by deposit in the U.S. Mail, First Class, postpaid, thia N th day of January, 1978. Edward Luton, Ea c., Ch a irma n George T. Trowbridge, Esq. Atomic Safety and Iicensing Board Shaw, Fittsan, Fotta L U.S. N eler.r Regulatory Consimaton Trowbridge Washington, D.C. 2c555 15cc M Street, N.w. Washington, D.C. 2CO36 Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger Atemic Safety and Licensing 3eard Atomic Safety & Licensing U.S Nuclear Regulatory Cossission Board Fanel Washiagton, D.C. 20555 U.0. Nuclear ReguIstory Co=nission Dr. Ernest O. Salo Washington, D.C. 2C555 Professor. Fisheries Research 1se titut e, Wii-10 Atomic Onfety and Licensing College of Fisheries Appeal Hoard University o f washington U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Seattle, Washington 95195 Commission Washingtoa, D.C. 20555 Karin W. Certer, Aest. Attorney General Office of Enforcement Docketing and Service C'epart=ent of Zavironmental Resources Section 709 Health and Welfare Building Office of the Secretary Harrisburg, 7ennsy17amia 17120 U.S. Nuclear Re;ulatory Comminaion ~~ Washington
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20 N Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Chairman
- Atomic Salety and Lice = sing Appeal af,ry 3, yeau 7,,
Panel Counsel for NEC Staff i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Regulatory Cosniasion l Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 I Dr. W. Reed Johnson, Me=ber l Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ~ Washington, D. C. 20555 a I& < -:e cY l W 4 -G' Jerome E. Shariman, Esq.. Member Chaunce~v KepPid ' // Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Representati'/e of thed 3 ' f N, Panel Intervenors 'e //x. l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccm=ussion g,3(f,Wo l W=<hingron. D. C. 20555 g h jj { /ggoj 9MN W}}