ML19199A612

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Forwards SER Input for Section l4 of Fsar,Initial Tests & Operation. Initial Test Program Is Acceptable W/Exception of Four Encl Items
ML19199A612
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 05/14/1976
From: Skovholt D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Deyoung R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 7905040363
Download: ML19199A612 (5)


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Docket Files JGilray QA Reading AGarland NRR Reading DSkovholt Docket No. 50-320 RMcDermott BClayton JHeltemes Richard C. DeYoung, Assistant Director fcr Light Nater Reactors, DPM MEE0POLITAN EDISON CCMPANY, TiREE MILE ISIAND UNIT W. 2, SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR INITIAL '11ESTS AND OPERATION The 9uality Assurance Branch has completed review of section 14 of the FSAR, Initial Tests and Operation. Our Safety Evalution Report input for this section is enclosed. We have concluded that the initial test program is acceptable with the exception of the fotT outstanding items identified in the enclosure.

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Donald J. Skovholt Assistant Director for Quality Assurance 4 Operations Division of Project !anagement Enclosure :

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.s 14.0 INITIAL TES7 MID OPERATION ne staff has reviewed the infor=ation provided in the final safety analysis report pertaining to the applic. ant's initial test program.

  • rhis review included an evaJuation of:

1.

the applicant's organi:stion and staffing for the develop =ent, conduct, and evaluation of the test program; 2.

the qualifications and experience of the principel participants

=2naging and supervising the test program; 3.

the ad=inistrative cont:cis that will govern the development, cor,0.tet, and evaluation of the test program; 4.

the degree of participation of the plant operating and technical staff in the test program; I

5.

the applicant's require =ents pertaining to the trial-use of plant j

operating and emergency procedures during the test progras; 6.

the schedule for conducting the test program; 7.

the sequence of testing to be folloved; and 8.

the methods for conducting individual tests and the acceptance criteria to be used in evaluating the test results for plant structures, systems, and cceponents. ~

%e staff's review also included an evaluation of the applicant's 1

method for review of reactor plant operating experiences that is being conducted to dete:=ine where i=provement-or e=phasis may be warranted in his initial test program, n e staff has concluded, with the exceptions noted below, S.at the infor=ati,on provided in the O

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. the application shows that an meeptable initial test program will be conducted that will demonstrate the functional adequacy of plant structures, systems, and co=ponents.

1.

Shutdown from outside the centrol room. H e applicant's proposal for the conduct of this ter' as describec in test abstract TP 800/36, is not consistent with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.68.

He applicant has been advised that this test should be conducted from locations outside the control room rather than by the currently proposed =ethca which requires that several canual actions be per-for=ed fram inside the control room, ne staff will require that the applicant either conduct this test exclusively from locations outside the centrol room or provide acceptable technical justification for conducting the test in the canner proposed.

2.

Control rod scras time testing. Le applicant has only provided acceptance criteria for control rod scras times to the 2/3 insertion point.

The assu=ption used for scras reactivity used in the accident analyses for the facility indicates that only approxi=ately 30-60*4 of the total scras worth would be inserted when the control row, are 2/3 inserted. B ereforef the applicant has been advised that the staff will require that test acceptance criteria be established for ti=es for full, control rod insertion e-

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9 a following receipt of a scram signal during planned tests or acceptable technical justificatich must be provided for not establishing such acceptance criteria for che tests.

3.

Confor=ance with Regulatory Guide 1.79, "PREOPERATIONAL TESTING OF EMERGENCY CCRE COOLING SYSTEMS FOR PRESSURI~ED WATER REACIDRS'.'

'Ihe applicant has not proposed to condue: in-plant testing that would si=ulate recirculation from the. containuent su=p with the low pressure coolant injection syste= (LPCI),as reco== ended by Regulatory Guide 1.79.

Instead, he has proposed to perfor= out-of-plant scale =odel laboratory tests to obtain data on inlet pipe losses and to deconstrate, under various flow conditions, that vortexing ws.11 not occur in the contain=ent st:=p.

The applicant has been advised that for the staff to ce=plete their review of the proposal it will be necessary for the applicant to provide the following:

a description of the scope of the model tests and the schedule a.

for co=pletion; b.

a description of the test =ethod that 1.d be utilized to verify that tim-LPCI syste= flow rates for the as-buile system will not compro=ise pt=p NPSH =argins, and to provide a technical argn=ent that will establish that the =ethod is conservative; a description of in-plant testing to experimentally validate c.

the calculations cf nead loss for the. LPCI pu=p suction lines.

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Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Feat'zres Actuation System response cines. 3e applicant has not proposed to demonstrate by in-plant tests or to otherwise de=enstrate that the response times of protection rystem pri=ary sensors, and interfacing hardware between the measured variables and the input to the sensors, will meet the times assu=ed in the accident analyses for the facility. H e applicaat has been advised that the staff will require either in-plant tests or other acceptable de=onstration tests that will show that the protection channels will =eet tne required response ti=es prior to fuel loading.

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