ML19199A436
| ML19199A436 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1976 |
| From: | Vollmer R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905020174 | |
| Download: ML19199A436 (2) | |
Text
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SEP 101976 Jccket 30, 50-320 l'E."C'ulCUM FOR:
D. B. Vassallo. Assistant Director for Light ilater Reactors,T*!
FROA:
R. ii. Vollmr, Assistant Director for Site Analysis, DSE SueJECT:
THREE l'ILE ISLAND C iIT N0. 2 SER I:iPLT HCDIFICATIC' FLA:n W:E: Taree Mile Islanc, Unit Mc. 2 LICE iSI:iG STAGE: CL JCC:'IT I:'2E. : 50-323 tILEST0riE : @ bER:
24-31 RESFO'iSIBLE BRANCH: Li!R i2 FROJECT FKlAGER:
H. Silver PEOUESTEI) C0!fLETI0f4 DATE: Septemoer 3,1976 REVIEW STATUS: AAB Review Complete Attached is the Accident Analysis Sranch SER Input Modifica:1:n for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Unit No. 2 facility regarding turair.a missile protec t ion.
This input was coordinated by Charles Ferrell, Site Ar.alyst, Scction 2, Accident Analysis Branen.
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R. ri. Vell ur, Assistant Jirecter fcr Site Analysis Division of Site Safety anc Envirennental Analysis
Enclosure:
AAB SER Input Pcdification for 79050201]e[
Three "fle Island Unit tio. 2 s
Distribution:
S. Hanauer W. Mcdonald (w/o encl.)
H. Silver H. Denton J. Panzarella (w/o encl. )
C. Ferrell D. Muller P. Shuttlewceth (w/c encl.) Docket File (50-320) <
E F. Miraglia D. Bunch NRR Rdg. File
~ *D J. Miller L. Soffer DSE Eg. File
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L. Crocker R. Boyd AAB Rdg. File R. Vollmer
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3.5.1 Turbine Missiles The Unit No. 2 turbine ger-ator is arranged such that the Unit No. 2 reactor building and a portion of the control rocm building are exposed to potential low trajectory turbine missiles.
Penetration of the control rocm cuilding walls is not foreseeable even in the event of a destructive overspeed turbine failure. The minimum control room wall thickness is 5-1/2 feet of concrete, and the minimum angle of incidence for a turbine missile is 65 degrees, so that the effective thickness of the exposed control rocm building wall is about 10 feet of concrete. The minimum effective concrete thickness for the exposed reactor building wall with respect to low trajectory turbine missiles is about 5 feet. Consequently, the safety related structures exposed to low trajectory turbine missiles are adeouately protected by way of sufficiently thick vertical con-crete barriers. Protection against high trajectory turbine missiles is adequate since all safety related plant structures are covered by high strength concrete (5000 psi ccmpressive strength) roofs of 3 feet or more. This is sufficient to prevent penetration by the postulated design overspeed high trajectory turbine missiles. On the basis of the above considerations, we conclude that the plant is adequately protected Igairst turbine missiles.
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