ML19199A359

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Transcript of 790404 Press Conference in Middletown,Pa. Pp 1-23
ML19199A359
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 04/04/1979
From: Harold Denton, Fouchard J
NRC COMMISSION (OCM), NRC OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA)
To:
References
NUDOCS 7904170026
Download: ML19199A359 (23)


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UNITED STATES or AMERICA

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2 NUCLEAR.oIGULATORY COMMISSION I

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PRESS CONFIPINCE i

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ON 1

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i CHREE M.ILE ISLAND l

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14 15 i Middletown, Pennsy2.vani

'6 April 4, 1979 j.

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3:45 p.m.

to 4:10 p.m.

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2 4/4 RAW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORRECTED 1

Madelen l

_P _R _O _C E _E _D _I N _G _S bl I

MR. FOUCHAP.D:

Well, if you'ie ready, we're 1

4..

ready.

5 We thought we would come down here this afternoon 6

and bring you up to date on the situation with respect to 7

the Three Mile Island matter.

And I don't believe, as I said

($)

yesterday, that I need to introduce Mr. Denton, but here he 9

.1s.

10 '

MR. DENTON:

I think there's been a steady improve-11 ment in the status of the plant.

We've made a lot of progress 12 in planning for eventual recovery of this core.

There's been 13 a lot of technical attention given to this issue.

I'm pleased 14 to report that there's been a lot of participation 15 '. by the major nuclear industry and by the power companies that utilize nuclear.

They are contributing to this ef fort.

17 The core remains stable.

There's very little to.

la report in terms of change of the core.

We haven't yet apprcve 19 i

a plan to move it from this state.

B&W has proposed a plan eg :

' I to GPU, and we're looking at this preferred plan.

l.

^

21 C'

h The preferred plan involves establishing a mcde 4

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22 '

d4 of cooling which minimites the need for equipmen; inside the it h containment to operate on a long term basis and which minimize 2r \\'

.,.-uaf:orm.inc.l.

the release of contaminated water outside.

The plan is I

25 -

I basically one that involves natural circulation within the O.1

3 l

I l'

RAW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORRICTED

,4/79 i

i rmob 2 2 ld reactor vessel and a solid accendary side, water in the steam

[

t1 3j generator to rc=ove heat.

l 4'

We've had one more piece of eculpment f ail due 5

to radiation levels since yesterday, a pressurizer level.

But 6

_ there are two other redundant level indicators and other ways 7

of establishing the level.

We are continuing to develop B

contingency plans for that.

9 Yesterday there were some questions about of f site 10 !

doses.

The calculation up to about noontime yesterday indica Il that the maximum offsite dose received by any individual from 12 direct radiction was about 85 millircr. for someone who was 13 continuously present at the bridge on the north side.

The 14 maximum manrem -- this is the summation of all the doses 15

(()

received by people out to a long distance -- the taximum nanr-16 es of yesterday was about 1800 manrem, 1800 to 2000.

i 17 Other than that, I have very little to report 13 except the progress that we are making, and going over 19 i procedures and developing contingency plan 3.

F l'

2 l 14 'PS QUESTICN:

Mr Denton, can You tell us ^t wh^t i

21 ;

point you are with Herman the Robot, and how Herman the Echet i

22 ll is actually going to perform his assigned task, and what that v.

'l 23 {c l

task would be; how you're going to get him in there without 24 i; any rcdiation escaping?

, us a a
,n. inc. 'hj 25 MR. DENTCN:

We haven't vet used Herman the Echot 8

4 I

4/4/79 RAW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORRECTED epb3 l

2 He 's a mechanically operated robot with two TV cameras mounte<

l 3{

He can perform simple mechanical functions, has an umbilical l

4' cord of 3-6: 400 feet.

We hope to use him to take samples 5

in high radiation areas and avoid unnecessary exposures to 6l

people,
d..

7 We thought perhaps we would have a sample takcn

($)

a by him when there's another activity going on in the region 9'

of that plant,, and we'll probably use him sometime later i

10 tonight.

I II '

QUESTION:

Newsweek quotes your deputy Edson Case 12 in describing what happened in the accident as saying:

I 13 "Somebody was screwing around with some of i

i I

14 ;

the equipment in the feedwater system."

I l',

could you explain what he meant by that?

khh

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16 !

MR. DENTON:

I gucss I don' t know what he meant, 17 but I can tell you what I think he meant.

I 13 !

We have provided back at headquarters all the l

I9 information we have on the chronology of the accident.

And 20 f those look to us as though two very important systems were 1

21 l removed from service at critical times.

The auxiliary feed-d 22]D water pumps had been tested for routine surveillance a:.d had L

1 23 h teen made inoperable as a result of that and were not in f

service at the time of the transient.

14

-I 24

,.r:n.%x.... :l:

25 Then, when the relief valve operated during the f*

5 I

4/79 P.AW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORRECTED l.

epb4 2,

transient, and the high pressure injection system, safety li 3

injection system, was turned off, that the plant lost its L

,l two ways of ecoling during this event.

5 QUESTION:

Could you be more specific about the il 6

exact options you have to cool acun, and which ones are in.

7 the B&W plant, and also even a general time frame when you

()

a might start to call down; one day, two days, three days?

9l MR. DENTON:

The presently proposed plan we're

(

10 '

looking at involves -- would require about ten days to cool II '

down.

It requires continually in the present stage to do as p* l.

much degasification of the primary system as we can.

13 You should remember that there's still a lot of i

Id !

dissolved gases in the primary coolant system, somewhat like 15 qgg a bottle of char.'paign.

And so it's est-blishing cutgas in 16 L the primary coolant.

I I7 l The option would be that -- to cintunue outgassin!

l 13 '

for a period of time, select the optimum temperature for 19 {

establishing natural circulation in the primary system, which 20 means you don't have to rely on recirculation pu=p operatien, 1

2!

to turn off the "rimarv num.os, c.o into the natural circula-e I

22!

tion and fill up the secondary side of the sceam generator G ? 10 22 solid with water and rencve heat that way.

", l it By cooling the plant this way you minimize the e C W*ni 54*:Or' s s, f ac.

1 25 !

need for instrumentation.

The pumps are inside the

6 1

pp.y T RAN GCP.,. Pc USCORRECTED I/4/7!,

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c o n,-,, _~~.,a n t, cnd you don..'.,go contaminated water from hid'flwS 3

^nside the con tain: ent outside -

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t 13 p3 2

QUESTION:

May I follow up on that.

If I could l

3 ',

just follow up; is it the Only thing that's standing between e

l 4'

starting the process, including the 3 & M plan?

In other 5

words, would it be one day or two days?

Is that the only --

6.

MR. DESTCN:

Well, the first phase is just the I

7 reapplication, and that's what is going on now.

So in a sence O

a' while we look at the plans for what dight be implemented in 9,

a few days, we are doing --; well, maintaining the plant, That i

10 what we recommend over the next few days.

11 QUESTION:

You might --

12 MR. DENTON:

It's possible ~~

l 13 QUESTION:

Can you explain the possible a'dvantages 14 of the 3 G W plan?

Can you toll us what the possible risks c:

()

13 l disadvantages of that plan would be?

1 16 [I MR. DENTON:

Well, there~are several other ways 17 to remove heat.

One would be to go to boiling inside the 13 ]

vessel, for example.

This gives you higher flow rates than i

19 ;!

does natural circulation.

Another way would be to go solid il D

20 !l inside the

- have the reactor vessel full of water.

We 1

21 now have tbne to look at these types of systems and D.i 22 ) carefully analyze ther and analyze the contingincies that is 1

23 lt what we would do if we were in of'these planc and the 1

24 h equipment failed.

1 0 ? 1 7,'

..; m i a,:e n e..ine.t I

M.

There's a very le.rgo industry effort going on now

e 4/4.

I l RAW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORRECTED david 2 l

7,'.

l involving combustion engineering.

B & W is examining the s

3i

  • I accident in great detail.

l

, II QUESTION:

What are the risk.s of additional 5

radioactive leakage from another B & W plan?

6 MR. DENTON:

Risks from?-

7 CUESTION: 'Frcm a 3 & W plan, of additional

((}

radicactive leakage?

8 I

9 MR. DINTON:

That plant is designed to =ini?.ize the 10 '

risk of additional leakage.

It does not require taking II contaminated water outsido the containment vessel.

It would 12 place the plant'in a condition where the water inside the I3 reactor vessel would be cooled by natural circulation through l#

the existing steem generator which is now being used.

15 QUESTION:

Doctor, I understand that the reactor (b) 16 )

chamber itself is constructed of fcur foot thick cencrete i

I7 ;

reinforced steel.

The auxiliary building that contains I3 radioactive water, has that been so constructed similarly and l

I9 '

will that withstand the impact of -- severe impact of an l

20 !

airplane accident as the reactor buildin7?

i i

21 MR. CENTON:

No, it's not as well procected as the 22 containc.ent s t ri: c t u r e.

It's not as vital in terms of i':t 23 ]r protection frcm airplunc crashes as the containe.ent was.

i 1

2/. h QUESTION:

Is that now filled with)*cossibly

w u e.n a v. s. e. !'

n, 25,

.Ay9 1,

radioactive water?

isit

RAW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORRECTED I

avid 3 MR. DENTON:

No.

Most of the water in the 2'

auxiliary buildjng has been cleaned out, but the water that i

3 rer.ains on the ficor has slowly evolving iodine and it's a 4

source of continuing evolution.

i QUESTION:

During the chronology thnt you gave us, 6

when were these tests being done before the accident?

What 7

was the time lapse before operation --

kh B

MR. DENTON:

I've not focused much attentien on 9l the exact chronolegy of the accident.

I'm leaving that to i

10 !

our people in Bethesda.

'I've been 6. ore'.looking forward.

II QUESTION:

You had mentioned the cmergency cooling 12 pump a number of times; am I correct in believing that I3 someone had -- during testing had not followed the standard 14 procedure and that pump was then directing watcr into the 15 !

condensor instead of the reactors as it should have been?

16 MR. DENTCN:

I think that the critical aspect of l!

17 !

the auxiliary feedwater pump should have been in action and IC !

was not at the time of the transient.

There would havo been I

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I9 l an entirely different outccme if it hcd been in cperatien as I

20 L it should have been.

I la*

m,0 21 QUEST CN:

Is that --

S i,

is 27 q!!

QUESTION:

Could you give us the present radiatian 2 3,,

1 levcis in the containment?

What were the radiation levels l

21 ll incident?

And could ycu

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en.inc.]

attained at the highest during the 25 ll also give us your best estinate as when you.T.ight start to

10 l

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4/4 I

RAW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORRICTED d

david 4 29 draw down the contamina ted water in the containment?

'I i

3, MR. DENTCN:

The radiation level in the containmen' t

i 4l is t changing very rapidly.

I think the monitor in the 5

dotr.;

is still reading about 30,000 R an hour.

And we have 6

no time esti. ate for getting the contacinated water out of.

~

the containment.

(3) 3 It will be some time before any movement of that l

9 ',

contaminated water is attained.

.I 10 !

QUESTION:

And the height of the radiation, the II l highest levels measured?

i 12 MR. DENTON:

I don't know what they were.

It's my 13 understanding that they've been slowly rising throughout the I4 ;

last three or fcur days, so they prchably were not that high i

15 during the first part of the incider.t.

(h 16 l They've been going up due to the dissolved caterisi 17 in the water that's been going on as a result of the relea3c.

13 QUESTION:

Are you concerned, doctor, that the I7 other pressuri cr level tanks have been naintained --

l 20 1 MR. DEMTON:

Thab's scmething we are locking at.

I l

21,l

,-~ other ways -

46

-a iads of a need for constant ewa-o l

22 '

vigilance in this area, and we are plan::ing on backup plans I

r.d 1 23 h as we might lose various instruments.

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4/79 RAW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORRECTED (bl s

2, [.

QUESTICN:

I'm still a little unclear.

What are i.

11 3e the majc riska of the B&W plants?

j ij

'd' MR. DENTON:

My own view is that it 1coks '

5 very' favorable.

I don' t want to comment on it in an authori-6 tative manner until the Staff has had a chance to look it 7'

over and we've reached some position.

(h 8

l It was given to us last night.

It's been locked i

9, at all day.

It looks certainly like a reasonable apprcach.

10 3 But we 'va not yet concurred on that point any.

II QUESTION:

What would be the psi in the pri=ary 12,

leep'; the pressure level, during the B&W plant?

I3 MR. DENTON:

I think at the end of the D&W plant 14 the temperature would be between 150 and 200 deg :ces, and n,

15 [

the pressure would be down and maintained at 100 psi or so.

W t

16 QUESTION:

Stayed down?-

i 17 MR. DENTON:

Yes.

I3 '

QUESTION:

You said that there is still radicact; 9

i iodino being c=itted from the water in the auxiliary buildin.

I 20 {

How long will those emissions continue if they are going to 21 the environment, and how long can we expect some protection i

1 22 i of radioactive iodine in the arca, and the water in this are l

23 N- $$b MR. DINTON:

I hope we will continue until we ar l-4 24 h able to institute a clean up of the building. Plans are to u.s., mi u,2,ms, i,c. 3 25 l decontaminate the auxiliary building.

We installed special

i.

12 1

/4/73 RAW TFANSCRIPT - UNCORRF.CTED cpb2 2

filters.

3 [l Let me ask Frank Congel, wh'o I brought today, i

d who's the section chief in charge of assessments and offsite 5

dosos, to give you a quick rundown on what the offsite doses l

6 from releases of noble gases of radiciodidas and releases to L

s 7

the water have been, and he can just summarize that whole I

B, area for you.

I i

9!

QUESTION:

Would you repeat his name, please?

l 10 I MR. FOUCHARD:

C-o-n-g-e-1, first name, Frank.

l II MR. CONCEL:

I'm section leader of the i

12' radiological assessment branch.

13 Fe've had En opportunity to look at some of the p

14 data that has been collected from the duration of the acci-({)

15 dent, and based on the monitored results, we have indicated

~

16 there have been about an upper limit estimate of one millirem 17 per day to the thyroid of a child who could have been in the 13 area for the duration of the accident up until about yesterda:

i 39 !

a t noon.

We would estimate a dose of less than five millirem 20j to one of the more sensitive individuals.

I 21 I empha3ize that this s probably an upper limit 22 4 dose because t ra people weren' t there for the whole pericd cf J

1 23 'd time, as we have assumed in the calculation.

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Mr. Denton also mentioned earlier that our

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25 l estimata of the offsite dose frem primarily noble gases has

1s l

I

/4/79 RAW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORPS.CTED mpb3 2 [I been on the order of 85 millirem.

This would be at a locatic.

.h 3l near the north ridge on the east side of Route 441.

4 Once again, this assumes full-time occupancy and 5

no shielding that would be afforded by structures such as a 6j residence.

~

l 7{

We've also examined the doses that were possible i

8 ggg from conswning vater that has gone from the Susquehanna River 9

inta%es downstream from the Three Mile Island facility, and 10 '

the dose that one could -- the maximum dose that one could II I hypothesize from this situation based on the data that we 12 were furnished is less than one-tenth of a millirem.

Wo I3 estimate something like

.05.

Id So at this stage of the accident the doses are i

15 still in most cases very trivial, and even in the case of the i

16 1

85 millirem, very small.

11 1

17 CUESTION:

I'd like to ask Dr. Denton:

13 In your language, what word or words are you usine i

19 l to describe the condition at the island; dangerous, emergency.

14 4.<idc what werd?

Y l

21 h MR. DENTON:

I think I would describe the conditic ao 22 !!

as improving, very stable, and rapidly approaching these of --

i.

1 2 3 '-

with the e::ception of all the contamination, contaminated water that has to be dealt with, approaching the situaticn mne,. it e.1:l

, p,m. n 25 h in which normal methods for cooling -- not quite normal --

i

14 I

'4/79 l

RAW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORRECTED neh4 l

2j QUESTION:

In ecmparison to normal, which would t

3' be tra core would be functioning and generating power. How 4 [l i

vhat is this called when you have a breakdown like this?

5 Emergency?

6 MR. DENTON:

Well, I don't see any serious of fsit 6

7 problems associated with the present mode of operation.

I

($f 8

think the reason we're taking a while te look at these and 9

bring them on down is t6 d.inimizenthe'. release of.radioactivit 10 1 QUESTION:

Do your regul'ations require the auxili II feedwater systems to be operational when the reactor is operc I2 tional?

13 MR. DENTON:

Yes, sir.

I4 QUESTION:

Do you have air loci:s for putting the 15l'

\\

robot in the building?

k 16, MR. DEMTON:

The robot is not in the containment.

. l.

17 I It 's being used in the auxiliary building.

18 QUESTION:

What I mean is he asked how you were I9

, going to get the robot in without letting the radiation out.

20 +

MR. DENTON:

The robot is not going into the l,i 1

l containment building, which still has a negative pressurd.

21 22l he's being used in the auxiliary building and jus: sarples 23 'l 14 Tw things.

I 24 !

QUESTION:

The switch that was turned off on the

... r,,.. a, m... e i.,c.,

25 l!

j auxiliary feedwater pumps at the tine of the accident, is th>

I

15

?

/4/79 I

RAW TMMSCRIPT - UNCCRRICTED cob 5 7

operated manually, and is it your understanding it was 3

I turned off during testing a couple of days before the acci-4l dent?

.5 MR. DENTON:

My understanding is the system was 6

tested and these valves,that are required to make the system 7

functional were Icft-in a closed position.

?

S QUESTION:

Are they operated manually?

9

, Fut. DENTON:

They're probably remote manually.

I i

10 1 don' t know just how. }

II QUESTION:

Mr. Denton, what of f site dangers might 12 there be by the a= cunt of contaminated water in the centaince:

i rid f1ws I3 building?

14 Q

15 26 17 18 -

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16 RAW TRAtiSCRIPT - UNCORRECTED tvicl

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MR. DENTCN:

I think it would represent a spe 2 6

2 I

potential for contamination if not carefully controlled, but

/4 3{

I don't think there is any danger of that water getting Ls mb dl

]

out in the near future.

That's one of the plans that has to 5

be developed for decontaminaticn and treatment of that water, 6

QUESTION:

Mr. Denton, you said that the propose.d 7

procedure, proposed by B & W, would take about 10 days to O

i 8

bring it to cold shutdown.

-9

. hat would be the number of days required to reach W

10 I the status you want to 2nitiate the procedures?

In other II words, I'm talking about --

12 {

MR. DENTON:

About five days.

That is also needed I3 to develop the procedure, make some cquipment =cdifications, Id so that the mcde of cooling frcm using the recirculation h

13 pumps end the natural circulation can all be in place.

16 QUESTION:

I don't want tio push you into this, but 17 l

are you close to the decision en the selection of a mode or la precedurc?

h I2 f.

MR. D?.NTC:I Not to date.

eO j QUESTION:

Sorry, we couldn't hear the question.

i 2I h MR. FCUCHARD:

Not to'date.

!)

22 h.

GUESTION:

No, we couldn't hear t M question.

D g iU1 23 MR. DENTON:

The questica was, how clo?e are we 24 to changing the code of operation if we were to adept the

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17 david 2 RAW TRANSCRI?T - UNCORRECTED 4/4 would be the kind of time that we could put in place the procedures and equipment changes to allow adoption of the 3

i l

proposal.

I'm including that five in the --

QUESTION:

Are you saying you don't know when you will start decontamination?

How long will decontaminatien take and where will you put the material you take cut?

We are looking -- than's obviously MR. DENTON:

much further out in time than the immediate problems we've

))

g been diccussing about core ecoling.

It'h.

probably months away.

QUESTION:

What kinds of wastes have been renoved or are scheduled to be removed from the plcat in the next few days, and where are they?

15 '

1,6 MR. DENTON:

We have authorized the applicant to resume release of the industrial weste water that was suscende 17 last night.

It was suspended when it was thecght it was L

being released in excess of the license requirements.

As I? L I say,-we suspended that.

We've new had a chance to go back 21 l and reendlyze the ccncentration of the radiciodidesin that water and recalculate.

And I would assume that the release 22 l

L of that water has now begun again.

It's concentration is 23 n Y

about a third of that to be permitted under normal operations 24,

.; m i a w e s.tae.!

14 7.52 CUESTION:

Mr. Denton, I believe you said earlier 25 l

18 avid 3 RAW TRA.NSO?.!PT - UNCORRECTED

./4 2

that the 30,000 rem per hour of radiction per hour in the 3[

containmont is not causing an immediate problcm. I believe 4

you said that it doesn't pose any problem at this 'ti=e.

S When would it pose a problem?

And when you're talking about 6

deconacination being months away?

7 MR. DENTON:

Well, if released it would pose a O

8 problem.

But the containment is.still under the negative 9

pressure.

. Leakage is inside the containment.

And there are 10 no plans to have any release of that to the outside.

In fact 11 that's one of the major considerations for B & M's developmen 12 of a cooling scheme which doesn' t require bringing any of 13 the material inside the. containment to the outside auxiliary I4 building.

l()

15 QUESTION:

As long as there's a negative pressure 16 in the containment building.there trill be no problem?

17 MR. DENTON:

As long as there's a negative pressure 1 *" i there'.s only the -- but I wouldn't be bothered by small i

19 !

in containment because,'after all, it's designed q,

pressures 20 l to be essentially leak-tight under very high pressure.

i 21 ;

QUESTION:

It could take months?

9 22 }I,i MR. DENTCN:

Yes, sir.

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QUESTION:

Besides the failure of the auxiliary l-2d l feedwa ter sys ter. a t. the rime of the accident, what other

_.r.c.-s n.:.mus. rne. l.

25 {l{

vicantions of NRC reculations do you see?

19 icvid4 RAW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORPSCTCO 4/4 MR. DENTON:

I really haven't gone back and tried s

e to do a point by point check of that.

I do know that the 3'

i 3l failure to maintain the auxiliary foedwater pump : operation was in viclation of the license, 5,

QUESTION:

I don't know if Dr. Denton answered' this, and I'm just asking out of curiosity; if unit one had been in operation,would the accident have affected unit one?

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20 4/79 1

RAW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORRECTED Madelon 2

MR. CENTON:

The -- this is speculation -- there mpbt 3l vould have been no reason for it to have been affected by wha:

was happoning in Unit 1.

But because o[ the leak, in view of A

5 5

some of the effluent treat:c.ent systems that it passes through 6

I in Unit 1, I'm just as pleased that it's not operational nnd 7

that we are able to use Unit 1 '.cilities for some of the was k)

~

8-olean-up in Unit 2.

9:

QUESTION:

You said there was very little radio-

\\

10 !

activity released.

The Governor's said he 's relied on your II estimates to determine (inaudible).

I2 Since your tests show that very little radioactiv

,I3 has been released, why is that voluntary (inaudible) necessar-14 Is it still a threat?

15 OUESTION:

Would you repeat the question?

16 MR. FOUCHARD :

I couldn.'t possibly repeat the 17 question.

18 MR. DENTON:

I think the question is, why is the I9 !

Governor's han still in effect.

20 i As I've said before, that's a decision for the 1

21 Governor.

But it seems to be a prudent one until we get the i

I 22 j pumpback syste..1 working that we hope will pump back into the l't i

23 containcent those gases that are now being occasionally and I

J~ J s t

24

.. cent a m,*m, i, c. [ intermittently released.

- R"J 25 QUESTION:

Do you have an estimate for the total a

21 4/4/79 I

RAN TRAllSCRIPT - UNCORRECTED mpb2 i

2 amount of transuinnics that are in the cooling water?

3l MR. OENTON:

Let me ask Frank.

I 4

No, I don' t have that' daba.

i 5

QUEST.ICN:

Mr. Denton, you said that if those tuc 6

systems,- the auxiliary fcedwater, had been unoperitiodal ran 7

accident of.this magnitude wouldn't have reached.

And then O

8 you explained that the failure was not of systems, mechanical 9!

failure', but one of procedures, and the fact that two valves i

10 '

were closed.

II Does tha' mean that the accident raines less seri 12 questions about reactor safety systems than it might have bee 13 thought earlier on?

I4 MR. DENTON:

I guess I don't really want to get 15 into that area yet.

There were tuo independent systems preti

({g 16 cd to deal with feedwater transients, and these systems were-17' each system had redundant co=ponents.

And in this situation, 18 ;

both the auxiliary feedwater systems, the two systems, were I

19 not operational and both the safety injection systems, which 20,

did come on, were turned off.

21 D MR. FOLCHARO:

One ccre, right there.

22.i GUESTICS:

I'm a little confused about the detai;

'l 23 !!

of the Babccc% and Wilcox plant.

Could you explain that soms l

2q

mcre, 14 m

.,.me.c e ew ers, t, c.1 25 MR. FOUC:-IARD :

The details of the Babccck and ff

.6 As 1/I9 1

RItW TRANSCRIPT - UNCORRICTED r.pb3

{

2 j; Wilcox plant?

3 ll QUESTION:

The details of the B&W plant, sort of a b

4 'l cchematic of the procedure.

Could you do it more syste==atiac 1

5 177 6.

MR. DENTON:

Maybe next time we do a briefing,' we 7l could bring down a model anel do that.

b 8

MR. FOUCHARD:

I think there must be sc=e 9

literature around that describes the B&M plant.

I QUESTION:

In your answer when you were asked abo II l!

the governor's advisory, how soon would the conditions change 12 that he night be able to change his advisory?

I3 MR. DENTON:

Well, I was hoping we'd be able to Id report.that we had this punpback system every day for some day 15 '

..nd we continue te have prcblems getting it fully operational.

i'.

There is hydrogen in the waste gas tank that we 17 '

had hoped to pump back into the containment.

So we were wait-18

{

ing originally to get the recombiners running -- and, incident ally, they are running well, their performance is exceptional I

.d The hydrogen is coming down in the contain=ent.

,,, t We took a second samole of the waste gas tank and

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,g r, ;

c.. O c it showed scme oxygen in the tank which we think was really 22

  • i

-- indicates the sample was contaminated by air.

So we 're no' 23 I

2d !

waiting for another sample of the tank to show whether or not e Fc~ral R*:cer-1. f ee.,

25i

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4/4/79 I

PAW TRA.iSCRIPT - UNCORP2CT.30 I

mpb4 j

2 l

MR. FOUCI!ARD:

Thank you very much.

3l (Whereupon, a t 4 :10 p.m., the press conferen, 4

was adjourned.)

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