ML19141A222
| ML19141A222 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/24/2019 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Green, K J, 301-415-1627 | |
| References | |
| NRC-2018-0109 | |
| Download: ML19141A222 (515) | |
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28 MK 1 28 MK 2 28 MK 3 28 MK 4 28 MK 1 28 MK 2 28 MK 1
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36 LG 1 36 LG 2
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52 FB 1 Note: This text is directly copied from page 1, paragraph 3 of the letter. The commenter makes no indication of support of or opposition to draft letter
53 EE 1 53 EE 2
54 RL 1 55 JH 1 56 GB 1 57 PA 1 57 PA 2 57 PA 3 57 PA 4 57 PA 5
58 HB 1 59 EH 1 59 EH 2 59 EH 3
61 SH 1 61 SH 2 61 SH 3 61 SH 4 61 SH 5 61 SH 6
62 CA 1 63 PA 1 64 AN 1 64 AN 2 64 AN 3
65 VH 1 66 HC 1 66 HC 3 66 HC 2 66 HC 4 66 HC 5 66 HC 6
66 HC 7 67 LH 1 67 LH 2
67 LH 3 68 DA 1 69 MG 1 70 LB 1 71 MB 1 72 SC 1 73 DR 1 74 BS 1 74 BS 2 74 BS 3
75 JL 1 76 JL 1 76 JL 2
NOTE: This file is a duplicate.
The comments in this file are tracked under the orginal submission contained in Comment 76.
78 GS 1 78 GS 2 78 GS 3 78 GS 4
82 LC 1 83 AN 1 83 AN 2
84 TP 1 85 TC 1 Note: Link does not work
86 AN 1 86 AN 2 86 AN 3 86 AN 4 86 AN 5
87 DH 1 88 AN 1 Note: These comments are the same as the first paragraph of Comment 94.
Individual comments marked in Comment 94.
89 CW 1 89 CW 2
92 MM 1 93 VD 1
94 AN 1 94 AN 2 94 AN 3 94 AN 4 94 AN 5 94 AN 6 94 AN 7 94 AN 8 94 AN 9 94 AN 10 94 AN 11 94 AN 12 94 AN 13
94 AN 14 94 AN 15 94 AN 16 94 AN 17 94 AN 18 94 AN 19 94 AN 20 94 AN 21 94 AN 22 94 AN 23 94 AN 24 94 AN 25
94 AN 26 94 AN 27 94 AN 28 94 AN 29 94 AN 30
94 AN 31 94 AN 32 94 AN 33 94 AN 34 94 AN 35 94 AN 36
94 AN 37 94 AN 38 94 AN 39 94 AN 40 94 AN 41 94 AN 42 94 AN 43
94 AN 44 94 AN 45 94 AN 46 94 AN 47
94 AN 48 94 AN 49 94 AN 50 94 AN 51 94 AN 52 94 AN 53 94 AN 54 94 AN 55 94 AN 56 94 AN 57
94 AN 58 95 CH 1 96 JC 1 96 JC 2
98 FS 1 Note: Text Copied from Cover Letter in Comment 5.
These comments are handled in Comment 5.
99 DB 1 100 KG 1 101 MM 1 101 MM 2 101 MM 3 101 MM 4
102 DL 1 103 LG 1 103 LG 2 103 LG 3
104 NC 1 105 TM 1
107 EOD 1 108 JD 1 108 JD 2 108 JD 3 108 JD 4 108 JD 5
109 JM 1 109 JM 2
110 AN 1 110 AN 2 110 AN 3 110 AN 4
111 KC 1 112 EM 1 112 EM 2 113 AN 1 113 AN 2 113 AN 3 113 AN 4 113 AN 5
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114 AN 4 114 AN 5 114 AN 6 114 AN 7 114 AN 8 114 AN 9 114 AN 10 114 AN 11
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118 NF 1 119 TE 1 120 VT 1 120 VT 2 120 VT 3
120 VT 4 120 VT 6 120 VT 5 120 VT 7
121 PM 1 121 PM 2 121 PM 3 121 PM 4 121 PM 5
122 ML 1 122 ML 3 122 ML 2 122 ML 4
123 ANON 1 123 ANON 2 123 ANON 3 123 ANON 4 123 ANON 5
124 ANON 1 124 ANON 2
125 PC 1 127 DE 1 128 DE 1 128 DE 2 128 DE 3 128 DE 4
129 EGC 1 130 XE 1 131 ANON 1 131 ANON 2 131 ANON 3 131 ANON 4 131 ANON 5 131 ANON 6
131 ANON 7 131 ANON 8 131 ANON 10 131 ANON 9 131 ANON 11 131 ANON 12 131 ANON 13
133 ANON 1 133 ANON 2
134 ANON 1 134 ANON 2 134 ANON 3 134 ANON 4 134 ANON 5
134 ANON 6 135 ANON 1 135 ANON 2 135 ANON 3 135 ANON 4
136 RE 1 136 RE 2 136 RE 3 136 RE 4
137 ANON 1 137 ANON 2 137 ANON 3 137 ANON 4 137 ANON 6 137 ANON 5
137 ANON 7 137 ANON 8 137 ANON 9 137 ANON 10
138 M&FG 1 138 M&FG 3 138 M&FG 2 138 M&FG 2
139 CC 1 140 GS 1
143 KH 1 July 19, 2018 NRC-2018-0109 Mark Leyses Comments on the Draft Letter from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the Nuclear Energy Institute, Titled Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18100A045) 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS Mark Leyses Comments on the Draft Letter from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the Nuclear Energy Institute, Titled Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18100A045)......3 I. Statement of Commenters Interest.....3 II. Commenter Supports the Development of Accident-Tolerant Fuels4 III. Commenter Supports the Non-Concurrence Harold K. Chernoff (of the NRC) Filed and the Union of Concerned Scientists Comments on the Draft Letter from the NRC to the NEI, Titled Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18100A045).....5 III.1 Safety Issues...6 IV. Accident-Tolerant Fuel (Extra-Enriched, Extra-High Burnup Fuel).......7 IV.1 Safety Issues.......9 V. Conclusion...11 2
July 19, 2018 NRC-2018-0109 Mark Leyses Comments on the Draft Letter from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the Nuclear Energy Institute, Titled Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18100A045)
I, Mark Leyse (Commenter), am responding to the Federal Register notices that the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published on June 7, 2018 and July 2, 2018 soliciting public comments on the draft letter from the NRC to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), titled Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18100A045).1 144 ML 1 In agreement with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), Commenter believes that the draft letter must not be finalized and issued. It is an entirely inappropriate means for communicating regulatory expectations on safety regulations protecting workers and the public.2 144 ML 2 I. Statement of Commenters Interest Commenter is concerned about nuclear safety issues, focusing on fuel-cladding issues, loss-of-coolant accidents, meltdowns, prevention of hydrogen explosions, spent fuel pool accidents, and improving the evaluations of postulated accidents.
On March 15, 2007, Commenter submitted a 10 C.F.R. § 2.802 petition for rulemaking, PRM-50-84,3 to the NRC. PRM-50-84 requested: 1) that the NRC make new regulations to help ensure licensees compliance with 10 C.F.R. § 50.46(b) emergency core cooling systems 1
NRC Draft Letter from Brian E. Holian, Acting Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to Pamela B. Cowan, Vice President, Nuclear Generation of NEI, titled Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18100A045). And NRC, Draft Letter to the Nuclear Energy Institute Regarding the Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, NRC-2018-0109, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 110, June 7, 2018, pp. 26503-26505. And NRC, Draft Letter to the Nuclear Energy Institute Regarding the Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, NRC-2018-0109, Federal Register, Vol. 83, No. 127, July 2, 2018, pp. 30989-30990.
2 David Lochbaum and Edwin S. Lyman, Comments on Draft Letter to the Nuclear Energy Institute Regarding the Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, [NRC-2018-0109] as published June 7, 2018, in the Federal Register, pp. 26503-26505, Union of Concerned Scientists, June 27, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18180A137), Cover Page.
3 Mark Edward Leyse, PRM-50-84, March 15, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070871368).
3
(ECCS) acceptance criteria and 2) to amend Appendix K to Part 50ECCS Evaluation Models I(A)(1), The Initial Stored Energy in the Fuel.
In 2008, the NRC decided to consider the safety issues raised in PRM-50-84 in its rulemaking process.4 And in 2009, the NRC published Performance-Based Emergency Core Cooling System Acceptance Criteria, which gave advanced notice of a proposed rulemaking, addressing four objectives: the fourth being the issues raised in PRM-50-84. 5 In 2012, the NRC Commissioners voted unanimously to approve a proposed rulemakingrevisions to Section 50.46(b), which will become Section 50.46(c)that was partly based on the safety issues Commenter raised in PRM-50-84.6 Commenter also coauthored a paper, Considering the Thermal Resistance of Crud in LOCA Analysis, which was presented at the American Nuclear Societys 2009 Winter Meeting.
II. Commenter Supports the Development of Accident-Tolerant Fuels 144 ML 3 In agreement with UCS, Commenter strongly supports the development of accident-tolerant fuels (ATF) as part of a comprehensive program to strengthen reactor safety. 7 As UCS has stated, the goal of developing accident-tolerant fuels should be to increase safety margin[s] and defense-in-depth, not to justify relaxing safety requirements. 8 4
NRC, Mark Edward Leyse; Consideration of Petition in Rulemaking Process, Docket No. PRM 84; NRC-2007-0013, Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 228, November 25, 2008, pp. 71564-71569.
5 NRC, Performance-Based Emergency Core Cooling System Acceptance Criteria, NRC-2008-0332, Federal Register, Vol. 74, No. 155, August 13, 2009, pp. 40765-40776.
6 NRC, Commission Voting Record, Decision Item: SECY-12-0034, Proposed Rulemaking10 CFR 50.46(c): Emergency Core Cooling System Performance During Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (RIN 3150-AH42), January 7, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML13008A368).
7 Edwin Lyman, Presentation Slides for the NRCs April 12, 2018 Public Meeting: Briefing on Accident Tolerant Fuel, UCS Perspectives on Accident Tolerant Fuel, Union of Concerned Scientists, April 12, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18100A002), p. 2.
8 Edwin Lyman, Presentation Slides for the NRCs April 12, 2018 Public Meeting: Briefing on Accident Tolerant Fuel, UCS Perspectives on Accident Tolerant Fuel, Union of Concerned Scientists, April 12, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18100A002), p. 2.
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III. Commenter Supports the Non-Concurrence Harold K. Chernoff (of the NRC) Filed and the Union of Concerned Scientists Comments on the Draft Letter from the NRC to the NEI, Titled Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18100A045)
Commenter supports the non-concurrence Harold K. Chernoff, Branch Chief, ROP Support and Generic Communications Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, filed in opposition to the draft letter from the NRC to the NEI, titled Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies. 144 ML 4 On Mr. Chernoffs non-concurrence, UCS stated: The non-concurrence filed by an NRC staffer on the draft letter to NEI challenged, among other things, the provision that the proposed pathways departed from past policies and practices that required license amendments for Lead Test Assemblies (LTAs). UCS finds the logic and evidence provided by the non-144 ML 4 concurring staffer to be sound and convincing. 9 Commenter agrees with UCS that the logic and evidence provided by Mr. Chernoffs non-concurrence is sound and convincing.
And along with UCS, Commenter agrees with the concerns expressed in the non-144 ML 5 concurrence about the proposed NRC positions unfairly depriving the public of legal rights. 110 On excluding the public from the regulatory process, Mr. Chernoffs non-concurrence states:
The draft letter to NEI provides guidance that is inconsistent with the NRCs Principles of Good Regulation. With respect to Openness, the guidance would establish a new regulatory framework that would exclude the public from any meaningful participation in licensee use of LTAs [lead test assemblies] (i.e., since license amendments would generally not be needed). 11 9
David Lochbaum and Edwin S. Lyman, Comments on Draft Letter to the Nuclear Energy Institute Regarding the Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, [NRC-2018-0109] as published June 7, 2018, in the Federal Register, pp. 26503-26505, Union of Concerned Scientists, June 27, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18180A137), p. 5.
10 David Lochbaum and Edwin S. Lyman, Comments on Draft Letter to the Nuclear Energy Institute Regarding the Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, [NRC-2018-0109] as published June 7, 2018, in the Federal Register, pp. 26503-26505, Union of Concerned Scientists, June 27, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18180A137), p. 9.
11 Harold K. Chernoff, Non-Concurrence Related to Federal Register Notice of Availability (ML18122A036) for Comment of Letter Titled Clarification of Regulatory Approaches for Lead Test Assemblies, from Brian Holian, NRC, to Pamela Cowan, NEI (ML18100A045), May 31, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18151B016), p. 11.
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III.1 Safety Issues Commenter is also concerned that the safety of operating reactors will be diminished if the NRC reduces regulatory oversight for lead test assemblies (LTA) of new types of fuel and cladding that are currently under development. Commenter agrees with UCS that the NRC should not weaken its licensing standards for ATF [accident-tolerant fuel] lead test assembly (LTA) or batch loading to meet unrealistic industry timelines.112 144 ML 6 On safety issues related to testing LTAs of new types of fuel and cladding, Mr.
Chernoffs non-concurrence states:
[W]ith respect to safety significancemaintaining the integrity of the fuel cladding is one of the fundamental concepts with respect to the plant safety margin and defense-in-depth. Furthermore, a nuclear core reload utilizing fuel assemblies with the following attributes could potentially represent a significant hazard due to a significant reduction in safety margin: (1) fuel assemblies different than those previously found acceptable to the NRC; and (2) fuel assemblies whose analytical methods have not been previously approved by the NRC.13 Providing two examples of operational experience in which LTAs compromised safety, Mr. Chernoffs non-concurrence states:
It is of note that operational safety issues have resulted from the implementation of new fuel cladding including its use in LTAs. Two examples of this are the twisting of LTAs at Three Mile Island, Unit 1, resulting in impaired ability to fully insert and move some control rods and the inability to fully insert control rods at South Texas Nuclear Power Plant. This operating experience underscores the importance of having materials of construction for fission product barriers explicitly delineated in the Design Features section of the technical specifications in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36. 14 144 ML 7 Like UCS, Commenter is also concerned that the NRC has not stipulated clear limits on how many LTAs are allowed to be inserted into respective reactor cores. Nor has the NRC 12 Edwin Lyman, Presentation Slides for the NRCs April 12, 2018 Public Meeting: Briefing on Accident Tolerant Fuel, UCS Perspectives on Accident Tolerant Fuel, Union of Concerned Scientists, April 12, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18100A002), p. 2.
13 Harold K. Chernoff, Non-Concurrence Related to Federal Register Notice of Availability (ML18122A036) for Comment of Letter Titled Clarification of Regulatory Approaches for Lead Test Assemblies, from Brian Holian, NRC, to Pamela Cowan, NEI (ML18100A045), May 31, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18151B016), p. 11.
14 Harold K. Chernoff, Non-Concurrence Related to Federal Register Notice of Availability (ML18122A036) for Comment of Letter Titled Clarification of Regulatory Approaches for Lead Test Assemblies, from Brian Holian, NRC, to Pamela Cowan, NEI (ML18100A045), May 31, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18151B016), p. 2.
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stipulated clear instructions on the locations at which LTAs are allowed to be inserted in 144 ML 8 respective reactor cores.115 To illustrate problems with the NRC draft letters ill-defined instructions regarding limits on the quantity and locations of LTAs, UCS has provided the following theoretical example:
Theoretically, evaluations for a proposed reload core consisting of four non-LTAs and the remainder LTAs would pass this clarification if the fuel assemblies showing the least margin to the fuel thermal limits throughout the cycle were the four non-LTAs. The LTAs would theoretically be in non-limiting core regions.
Yet the very reason LTAs are necessary is to confirm their performance or detect shortcomings such that the evaluations would be fraught with considerable uncertainties. While a reload core containing but four non-LTAs represents a theoretical extreme rather than a likely core design, it illustrates the fundamental flaw in the clarifying guidance.16 144 ML 1 In agreement with UCS, Commenter believes that the draft letter must not be finalized and issued. It is an entirely inappropriate means for communicating regulatory expectations on safety regulations protecting workers and the public. 117 144 ML 2 IV. Accident-Tolerant Fuel (Extra-Enriched, Extra-High Burnup Fuel) 144 ML 9 Accident-Tolerant Fuel is a commonly used term for new types of commercial fuel and cladding currently under development. Perhaps Extra-Enriched, Extra-High Burnup Fuel would be more appropriate. New types of fuel would not be accident tolerant; however, they would most likely have a higher enrichment and higher burnup than the uranium dioxide fuel, sheathed in zirconium alloy cladding, that is currently used in light water reactors (LWR).
15 David Lochbaum and Edwin S. Lyman, Comments on Draft Letter to the Nuclear Energy Institute Regarding the Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, [NRC-2018-0109] as published June 7, 2018, in the Federal Register, pp. 26503-26505, Union of Concerned Scientists, June 27, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18180A137), p. 4.
16 David Lochbaum and Edwin S. Lyman, Comments on Draft Letter to the Nuclear Energy Institute Regarding the Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, [NRC-2018-0109] as published June 7, 2018, in the Federal Register, pp. 26503-26505, Union of Concerned Scientists, June 27, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18180A137), p. 4.
17 David Lochbaum and Edwin S. Lyman, Comments on Draft Letter to the Nuclear Energy Institute Regarding the Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, [NRC-2018-0109] as published June 7, 2018, in the Federal Register, pp. 26503-26505, Union of Concerned Scientists, June 27, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18180A137), Cover Page.
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144 ML 9 The term Accident-Tolerant Fuel seems propagandistic; however, it is a standard term for new types of commercial fuel and cladding. For conveniences sake, Commenter refers to new types of commercial fuel and cladding currently under development as Accident-Tolerant Fuel (ATF).
Discussing the prospect of having more power uprates, higher fuel burnups, a March 2014 Nuclear News article, Development of advanced accident-tolerant fuels for commercial LWRs, states:
Advanced nuclear fuel and cladding must maintain, at a minimum, the level of performance and safety margin associated with the current industry standard fuel system. To warrant the additional costs associated with the development, licensing, and implementation of a new fuel technology, advanced fuel options must not just meet these performance levels but must exceed them by providing for the possibility of power uprates, increased fuel burnup, reduced number of assemblies per reload, and increased cycle length (reduced outage frequency), as well as significantly enhanced safety performance under off-normal conditions18
[emphasis added].
Discussing the prospect of increasing fuel enrichments, the March 2014 Nuclear News article states:
A new fuel system must maintain or extend plant operating cycles, reactor power output, and reactor control. To maintain current operational levels, some proposed fuel system concepts may require higher fuel enrichment. While the impact of higher enrichments is fairly well understood from a technical perspective, regulatory, equipment, and fuel performance issues would have to be addressed for both the fuel fabrication facility and the operating plant19
[emphasis added].
And on challenges of having increased fuel enrichments, the March 2014 Nuclear News article states:
The impact of new fuels and cladding on the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle must be assessed within the framework of current and future regulations and policies. For instance, if an advanced stainless steel cladding were to replace Zr-based alloys and maintain the same wall thickness, the required fuel enrichment would increase by 1 to 2 percent (referred to as the uranium-235 penalty). Some concepts could require even greater increases in enrichment. In addition to the economic penalty associated with fuel enrichment activities, higher enrichment 18 Shannon Bragg-Sitton, Development of advanced accident-tolerant fuels for commercial LWRs, Nuclear News, March 2014, p. 84.
19 Shannon Bragg-Sitton, Development of advanced accident-tolerant fuels for commercial LWRs, Nuclear News, March 2014, p. 84.
8
would result in lower uranium utilization, would have a major impact on operations at current enrichment and fuel fabrication plants, and would require changes to operating licenses20 [emphasis added].
(It is noteworthy that particular types of fuel under consideration might end up having relatively high enrichments: a 2014 Idaho National Laboratory report states that very robust fuel forms with multiple layers of containment and fission-product barriers (e.g.
microencapsulated fuels) could require enrichment up to the low-enrichment limit of < 20%. 21)
For new types of fuel and cladding, it is likely that if the cladding were to have the same thickness as contemporary zirconium alloy cladding, the fuel would have to have an increased enrichment. Alternatively, if the fuel were to retain contemporary levels of enrichment, its cladding would likely have to be thinner than contemporary cladding. 22 An Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) report from 2015, states that for boiling water reactors (BWR), switching from Zircaloy to FeCrAl [material] requires a 70%
reduction in cladding and channel box thicknesses [from 600/1600 m to 172/460 m] when maintaining 4.11% enrichment23 [emphasis added]. The same 2015 ORNL report also states that if BWRs were to maintain contemporary (zirconium alloy) cladding and channel box thicknesses (600/1600 m) with FeCrAl material that the fuels enrichment would have to be increased up to 6.46 percent.24 IV.1 Safety Issues On potential safety improvements ATFs might provide, an ORNL report from 2015, states:
Candidate ATFs should improve performance during beyond design basis accidents [severe 20 Shannon Bragg-Sitton, Development of advanced accident-tolerant fuels for commercial LWRs, Nuclear News, March 2014, p. 84.
21 Shannon Bragg-Sitton, Advanced Fuels Campaign: Enhanced LWR Accident Tolerant Fuel Performance Metrics, Idaho National Laboratory, INL/EXT-13-29957, February 2014, p. 9.
22 Akito Oizumi et al., Evaluation of neutron economical effect of new cladding materials in light water reactors, Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2014, p. 82. And J. J. Powers et al., Report on Reactor Physics Assessment of Candidate Accident Tolerant Fuel Cladding Materials in LWRs, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-2015/415, August 28, 2015, p. 5.
23 J. J. Powers et al., Report on Reactor Physics Assessment of Candidate Accident Tolerant Fuel Cladding Materials in LWRs, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-2015/415, August 28, 2015, pp. 11-12.
24 J. J. Powers et al., Report on Reactor Physics Assessment of Candidate Accident Tolerant Fuel Cladding Materials in LWRs, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-2015/415, August 28, 2015, pp. 11-12.
9
accidents]by increasing the amount of time available for operators to take mitigation actions, reducing the rate and/or extent of heat and hydrogen production during high-temperature steam oxidation, or reducing severe accident consequences by enhancing fission product (FP) retention within the fuel25 [emphasis added].
It would indeed improve safety if new types of cladding were to have lower oxidation rates than zirconium alloy cladding in high-temperature accidents. It would also improve safety if the oxidation of new types of cladding produced less hydrogen and heat than the oxidation of 144 ML 10 zirconium alloy cladding in high-temperature accidents. However, any new types of cladding (and fuel) that are intended to be used in LTAs need to be thoroughly investigated.
Hypothetically, there might be some ways in which new types of cladding (even ones that would have reduced rates and/or extents of oxidation) were less safe than zirconium alloy cladding.
The NRC needs to thoroughly investigate any new types of cladding and fuel that are intended to be used in LTAs. Below is a partiall list (not listed in order of importance) of safety issues that need to be investigated.
- 1) There need to be experiments and analyses for new types of cladding and fuel to 144 ML 11 determine their vulnerability to criticality accidents in dry environments (such as casks for the dry storage of spent fuel assemblies) and wet environments (such as spent fuel pools (SFP)).
There also need to be experiments and analyses for how contemporary zirconium alloy cladding 144 ML 12 and uranium dioxide fuel might interact with new types of cladding and fuel to cause criticality accidents in dry and wet environments. Such experiments and analyses need to be conducted for fresh fuel and discharged fuel.
- 2) There need to be experiments and analyses for new types of cladding to investigate the extent that it might balloon and rupture if it were overheated in a reactor or SFP accident. 144 ML 13 Related to such phenomena are the consequences of fuel fragmentation, relocation, and dispersal.
- 3) There need to be experiments and analyses for new types of cladding and fuel to 144 ML 14 investigate the extent that, in the event of an accident, eutectic reactions might occur in an overheated reactor operating with such cladding and fuel. There also need to be experiments and 25 J. J. Powers et al., Report on Reactor Physics Assessment of Candidate Accident Tolerant Fuel Cladding Materials in LWRs, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/TM-2015/415, August 28, 2015,
- p. 1.
10
analyses for new types of cladding and fuel to investigate the extent that, in the event of an SFP 144 ML 15 accident, eutectic reactions might occur if such cladding and fuel became overheated.
Furthermore, there need to be investigations of the extent that, in the event of a reactor or SFP 144 ML 16 accident, eutectic reactions might occur between zirconium alloy cladding and the different types of cladding and fuel that might be used in LTAs.
- 4) There need to be experiments and analyses for new types of cladding to determine 144 ML 17 their vulnerability to air oxidation and nitriding in the event of a serious SFP accident.
- 5) There need to be experiments and analyses for new types of cladding and fuel to 144 ML 18 determine how they might affect the progression and outcome of a SFP accident. It is significant that spent fuel assemblies with new types of cladding and fuel would most likely be more radioactive and thermally hot than contemporary spent fuel assemblies with zirconium alloy cladding.
V. Conclusion 144 ML 1 In agreement with UCS, Commenter believes that the draft letter must not be finalized and issued. It is an entirely inappropriate means for communicating regulatory expectations on safety regulations protecting workers and the public. 226 144 ML 2 Respectfully submitted,
/s/
Mark Leyse P.O. Box 1314 New York, NY 10025 markleyse@gmail.com 26 David Lochbaum and Edwin S. Lyman, Comments on Draft Letter to the Nuclear Energy Institute Regarding the Clarification of Regulatory Paths for Lead Test Assemblies, [NRC-2018-0109] as published June 7, 2018, in the Federal Register, pp. 26503-26505, Union of Concerned Scientists, June 27, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18180A137), Cover Page.
11
145 ANON 1 145 ANON 2 145 ANON 3 145 ANON 4 145 ANON 5 145 ANON 6 145 ANON 7
145 ANON 8 145 ANON 9 145 ANON 10 145 ANON 11 145 ANON 12 145 ANON 13
146 ANON 2 146 ANON 3 146 ANON 1 146 ANON 4 146 ANON 5 146 ANON 6 146 ANON 7 146 ANON 8
146 ANON 9 146 ANON 10 146 ANON 11 146 ANON 12 146 ANON 13 146 ANON 14 146 ANON 15
147 ANON 2 147 ANON 3 147 ANON 1 147 ANON 4 147 ANON 5 147 ANON 6 147 ANON 7
147 ANON 8 147 ANON 2
148 LD 1 148 LD 2 149 ANON 3 149 ANON 1 149 ANON 2 149 ANON 4 149 ANON 5
150 JS 1 150 JS 2 150 JS 3 150 JS 4 150 JS 5
This comment attaches UCS' comments Duplicate of Comment Set 5 from UCS
This letter is a duplicate of Comment Set 144
153 ANON 1 153 ANON 2 153 ANON 3 153 ANON 4 153 ANON 5
154 ANON 1 154 ANON 2 154 ANON 3 154 ANON 4
154 ANON 5 154 ANON 6 154 ANON 7 154 ANON 8 154 ANON 9 154 ANON 1
155 ANON 1 155 ANON 2 155 ANON 3 155 ANON 4 155 ANON 5 155 ANON 6 155 ANON 1
156 JS 1 156 JS 2
157 RS 1 157 RS 2 157 RS 3 157 RS 4
157 RS 5 157 RS 6
158 AM 1
159 ANON 1 159 ANON 2 159 ANON 3
161 MI 1 162 GS 1 162 GS 2 162 GS 4 162 GS 3
163 HB 1 164 BT 1 164 BT 2
165 ANON 1 165 ANON 2 165 ANON 3 165 ANON 4
166 SH 1 167 CL 1 168 SM 1 169 WF 1 169 WF 2
170 SG 1 171 ANON 1 171 ANON 2 171 ANON 3 171 ANON 4
172 PA 1
173 MG 1 173 MG 2 173 MG 3 173 MG 4 173 MG 5 173 MG 6 173 MG 4 173 MG 7 173 MG 8 173 MG 4
174 LS 1 175 PG 1 175 PG 2
178 DS 1 178 DS 2
179 PB 1 179 PB 2
180 JC 1 182 JS 1 182 JS 2 182 JS 3 182 JS 4
184 ANON 1 184 ANON 2 184 ANON 3 184 ANON 5 184 ANON 4
185 ANON 1 185 ANON 1
186 ANON 1 187 SG 1 188 JB 1 188 JB 2
188 JB 3 188 JB 4 188 JB 5 188 JB 6 188 JB 7
190 RC 1 191 RK 1 191 RK 2 191 RK 3
192 LB 1 193 ANON 1 193 ANON 2 193 ANON 3
194 ANON 1 Comment appears to be unrelated to subject of draft letter.
195 ANON 1 195 ANON 2
196 FG 1 196 FG 2
196 FG 3 197 LG 1 197 LG 2
198 ANON 2 198 ANON 1 198 ANON 3
199 JQ 1 200 AN 1 200 AN 2 200 AN 3
201 AN 1 202 AN 1 202 AN 2 202 AN 3 202 AN 4
203 DS 1 205 PM 1 205 PM 2 205 PM 3
206 EB 1 206 EB 2 206 EB 3 206 EB 4 206 EB 5 206 EB 6 206 EB 7
207 EM 1 207 EM 2 207 EM 3 207 EM 4
208 BS 1 209 JS 1 210 AN 1 210 AN 2 210 AN 3 210 AN 4 210 AN 5
211 AN 1 211 AN 2 211 AN 3
212 AN 1 212 AN 2 212 AN 3
212 AN 4 212 AN 5
213 AN 1 213 AN 2
214 AN 1 214 AN 2
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219 ANON 3 220 ANON 2 220 ANON 1 220 ANON 3
221 ANON 2 221 ANON 1 221 ANON 5 221 ANON 3 221 ANON 4
222 EG 1 223 ANON 1 223 ANON 3 223 ANON 2
224 ANON 1 224 ANON 2 224 ANON 3
225 KBF 1 226 ANON 1 226 ANON 1 226 ANON 2
227 CT 1 228 SACE 1 228 SACE 2 228 SACE 3 228 SACE 4 228 SACE 5 228 SACE 6
228 SACE 7 228 SACE 8 228 SACE 9 228 SACE 10
229 CD 1 229 CD 2 229 CD 3
230 ANON 1 230 ANON 2 230 ANON 2
231 DE 1 231 DE 2
232 BF 1 233 ANON 1 233 ANON 2
234 ANON 2 234 ANON 1 234 ANON 3 234 ANON 5 234 ANON 4 234 ANON 6
235 ANON 1 235 ANON 2 235 ANON 3
236 ANON 1 236 ANON 2
237 ANON 2 237 ANON 1 237 ANON 3 237 ANON 4 237 ANON 6 237 ANON 5 237 ANON 7
238 ANON 1 238 ANON 2
239 ANON 1 239 ANON 2 239 ANON 3 239 ANON 4
240 ANON 1 240 ANON 2
240 ANON 3 240 ANON 4
241 ANON 1 241 ANON 2
242 ML 1 242 ML 2 242 ML 3
243 DM 1 244 BR 1 245 DW 1 246 LL 1 246 LL 2 246 LL 3 246 LL 4
246 LL 5 247 GM 1 247 GM 2
248 JW 1 249 LF 1 249 LF 2
250 SW 2 250 SW 3 250 SW 1
251 ANON 1 251 ANON 2 251 ANON 3 251 ANON 4
252 ANON 1 252 ANON 2 252 ANON 3 252 ANON 4
253 ANON 1 253 ANON 2 253 ANON 3
254 ANON 1 254 ANON 2 254 ANON 3
255 ANON 1 255 ANON 2 255 ANON 3 255 ANON 4
256 ANON 1 256 ANON 2 257 ANON 1 258 ANON 1 258 ANON 2
259 ANON 1 259 ANON 2
there's no issue 5 below 259 ANON 3
260 ANON 1 260 ANON 2 260 ANON 3 260 ANON 4 260 ANON 5
260 ANON 6 261 CL 1 261 CL 2 261 CL 3 261 CL 1
262 ANON 3 262 ANON 1 262 ANON 2 262 ANON 4 262 ANON 5 262 ANON 6
263 ANON 1 263 ANON 2 263 ANON 3
264 ANON 1 264 ANON 2
264 ANON 3 264 ANON 4 264 ANON 5 264 ANON 6 264 ANON 7
265 ANON 1 265 ANON 2 265 ANON 3
265 ANON 4 265 ANON 5 265 ANON 6
266 ANON 1 266 ANON 2 266 ANON 3 266 ANON 4 266 ANON 5
Note: The above quotation and the one below appear to be taken from an older version of the letter and not the version that was published for comment.
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268 ANON 1 268 ANON 2
269 JS 1 269 JS 1
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