ML19031B950

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Failure of Non-Class I (Seismic) Equipment
ML19031B950
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 11/02/1972
From: Schneider F
Public Service Electric & Gas Co
To: Anthony Giambusso
US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
References
Download: ML19031B950 (2)


Text

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Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/622-7000 November 2, Mr. A. Giambusso Deputy Director for Reactor Projects Directorate of Licensing U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, DC 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

FAILURE OF NON-CLASS I (SEISMIC) EQUIPMENT NO. 1 AND g UNITa SALEM NUCLEAR GENE~A~ING ST~TION In reply to your-letter of Septe~ber 26, 1972, we have r~viewed the design of Salem Nuclear Generating Station to determine whether the failure of non-Class I (seismic) equipment could adversely affect the performance of safety-related equipment.

As suggested, particular attentiofr was given to the postulated failure of the circulating water and fire protection systems.

The possibility of impairment of safety-related systems from the failure o~ non-Class I sys-tems in the turbi4e building area is non-existent.

This area does not contain any safeguard operating systems.

A circulating water line failure, such as occurred at Qu~d-Cit~es Unit.l, could possibly flood the basement of the turbine building.

However, -this would not affect safeguards equipment which is loca-ted:' in. the nuclear. ar.eas. _ The building structures are independent and are isolate~ below gr~de by a waterproof membrane.

Our analysis of failures in the nuclear area"""Ehows no indication of adverse* effects to safe-griard systems~ Safety-related equipment located in the control room, relay room area, electrical equip-ment rooms, and diesel generator area are protected by a co 2 fire protection system whos~ failure would not affect operation of this equipment.

We also do not anticipate impairment of safeguard systems from The Energy People f\\\\e cy..

50-272

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Mr. A. Giambusso 2

11-2-72 failures resulting in*liquid releis~s in other nuclear areas due to location of eq_ui'pment, enclosed control panels, redundent control systems and totally enclosed motors.

Our study did,.however, uncover some ques-tionable areas including a ventilation system control' panel and some open case motors.

As a result, we will relocate the panel and provide shields to assure that no adverse effects will result due to impinge-ment of water.

Thi~ work will be accomplished in the near future consistent with other construction activities in the affected work areas.

Very lr..uly yours,

~~

Manager of Engineering Electric Engineering Department