ML18352A331

Cancelling of Event Report No. 76-020: After Further Review, Concluded No Longer Reportable, Effects of Seiches Were Appropriately Considered in Design & Construction

ML18352A331
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	06/28/1976
From:	Sewell R Consumers Power Co
To:	James Keppler Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 1976-020-00
Download: ML18352A331 (3)

Text

consumers Power company General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201

• Area Code 517 788-0550 June 28, 1976 Mr James G. Keppler US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road

~len Ellyn, IL 60137 DOCKET 50-255, LICENSE DPR-20 PALISADES PLANT On June 15, 1976, Mr G. Hein of the Palisades Plant staff reported to Mr K.

Baker of your office that we were evaluating a question that had arisen and considered that it might be reportable under Technical Specification Section 6.9.2.a-8.

The question involved the postulated loss of four primary cooiant pumps due to flooding caused by a postulated seiche.

This was classified as Event Report No 76-020.

After further review, we have concluded that the effects of seiches were appropriately considered in the design a.nd construction of the Palisades Plant.

Thus,'we are no longer considering this item reportable and are, therefore~ cancelling it.

Some of the reasons for this conclusion are sum-marized in the attached letter.

//~y;gQ}~

. Ralph B. Sewell Nuclear Licensing Administrator

\\j To FROM DATE SUBJECT

?ali~~ades Pla Reew Committee j,/1/}.//

RBSewell, P-21**317 1::;'//~

Jtu1e 25, 1976 REVIEW OF EFF:Ij:CTS OF A SEICHE BLHarshe, Covert cc DABixel, P-21-319 HWKeiser, P-21-109 INTERNAL CORRESPONDENCE I have reviewed. the following documentation with respect to how seiches were considered in evaluation of the Plant Design:

1)

The references listed in DABixel's letter of May 27, 1976, to JGLewis/PRC.

2)

Event Report PAL-76-020.

3) mn:.eiser letter of June 21, 1976, to ?RC.

I have concluded that the potential loss of four Primary Coolant Pumps due to flooding caused by a seiche is not an unreviewed saf'ety question.

In the following paragraphs I will attempt to outline the basis for my conclusion

• First, the Loss of Coolant Flow Incident described in Sectio_n 14. 7 is an vntici-pated transient.

An anticipated transie::-it is sor::.ething that is expected to occur several ti::.o.es or r:iore during plant life. ?or anticipated transients a minir::mn trarisient D~rn ratio* limit of 1. 30 has generally been established by the HRC as the acceptance criteria. This limit i$ established to insure that damage to the fuel will not occur for these moderate probability events.

I note *specifically that a sii;.ultaneous loss of four coolant pumps was not considered in this tran'sient analysip.because it was judged to be of very low probability. Section 14.7.4 of the FSAR states in part:

11:2'or the case of a single stuck rotor there will be some rods for which the transient mrn ratio drops below 1.30.however the very low probability of this incident allows acceptance of this.condition."* That statement also applies p~ilosophically to the very low probability case of a simultaneous loss of all four primF...ry coolant pum:ps.

FSAR Ap],)endix A.2(g) describes the Plant design with respect to flooding as protected up to elevation 590 feet.

This :provides a margin of 7.3 feet above the highest reported nodern lake level.

Six (6) of these 7.3 feet are described as. an allowance* for seiche, thus, I would conclude that the })Ossibility of a seiche was properly considered in the design of the Plant against flooding to the 59'.) foot level.

I note that the bottom of the four primary coolant 'PU.mp breakers are motL~ted at the 590 foot level *

2.

A review of question 2.4 of Amendments 15 and 18 to the FSAR reveals the following key words.

They are:

"Maximum increase" "especially severe seiche 11 "shutdown safely" "with or without special procedures and provisions executed at the time of flooding."

The context of this question is an inextremis situation. It is -intended to convey a very low :probability event and asks what the maximum flooding level is that equipment required to obtain and maintain a safe shutdo;-m condition would be functional.

The answer given was 594 feet 8 inches ana. states that equipment required to obtain and maintain a safe shutdown-condition would not be flooded until water level exceeded this value. This question did not intend to imply that the four primary coolant pumps could not trip sequentially *. Th_e probability.is conveyed as extremely low as compared to anticipated transients.

The six foot allowance for a seiche a:ppears conservative.

Section 2.2.2(a) shows the greatest level change due to a seiche over an 105 year period to be 6 feet at Michi"gan City, Indiana and 0 at the same time at Holland, Vd.chigan.

Further, HWKeiser's calculations show the maximum level at Palisades to be much less than 6 feet

• Therefore, I have concluded that the FSAR has appropriately considered and evaluated the effects _of seiches on the Palisades Plant and the design and construction bf the Palisades Plant was in accordance with the requirements of the FSAR.

Thus, my conclusion is that this item is not an unreviewed safety question and is not reportable in accordance with Section 6.9.2 a-8 of the Technical Specifications. Further, I believe that this event report should be closed out. With PRC concurrence, I will inform the tmc that we no longer consider this event reportable and are therefore canceling it *