ML18348A705
| ML18348A705 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1977 |
| From: | Hoffman D Consumers Power Co |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML18348A705 (34) | |
Text
consumers Power company General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Ja_ckson, Michigan 49201
- Area Code 517 788-0550 March 23, 1977 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Att:
Mr.LU.bert Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactor Branch No 1 US !Juclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255, LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT -
SUBMERGED ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS STUDY B;yr letter dated May 26, 1976, you requested additional information concerning environmental qualification of eiectrical equipment and the effects of its submergence.
That attached letter and report provide answers to questions attached to the reference letter with the exception of lb.' The environmental qualifications of other related equipment are provided in Sections 6 and 8 of the Palisades Plant.FS.AR and will provide the answer to question lb.
On March 16, 1977, this subject was reviewed with members of yot:r sta~f and we have concluded that implementation of the concepts provided in the Bechtel report will complete this issue.
Consumers Power is making every effort to complete the required plant m.odi:'ications during our next refueling outage.
David P Hoffman Assistant Nuclear Licensing Administrator CC:
JGKeppler, USNRC
Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation 777 East Eisenhower Parkway Ann Arbor, Michigan*
MaitAdaress:P.O. Box 1000, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 Mr. J. R. Yope Operating Services Department Consumers Power Company 1945 West Par~all ~oad Jackson, Michigan 49201 December 8, 1976 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant CPCO-GW0-8428 Bechtel Job No. 10512-040 Sub1!1erged Electrical Systems Study File No. 0275 76-040-4
Reference:
a)
CPCo letter HFMN 07-76 Hoffman to Bixel dated 1/22/76
Dear Mr. Yope:
Please. find enclosed six (6) copies of the report on the investigation of sub-merged electrical equipment inside.containment for Palisades Pl~nt.
The fo-llowing salient factors are put forth for your consideration during the review of the report:
- 1.
JJet.~mination.. of.submerge.¢! equipment ;Ln,side containment is based on a maximum water elevation of 596 '-O" following LOCA.
This was determined by our contairiment flooding calculations based on the following worst case flooding conditions, resulting from water volumes from the fol-lowing:
a).1 -.SIRW Tank b) 4 - Safety.Injection Tanks c)
- 2 - Clean Waste Receiver Tanks, eac*h ~ full (rupture) d)
Primary Coolant System (LOCA)
Please note that this figure of.596-0" is in agreement 'with CPCO.'s calculations, ref. (a).
Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation Mr. J. R. Yope December 8, 1976 Page 2
- 2.
T.he exact mounting elevation of. certain solenoid valves could not be determined from the 1ayout drawings*.
It has, therefore, been conservatively asstnned that all solenoid valves mounted on racks at elevation 590'-0" are liable to become s.ubmergedo*
In case a CPCo field check indicates.that some of these valves are located above 596 '-0", they should be deleted from Appendices A and E of the enclosed reporto 3a In the case of size 2 MCC starters listed under Appendix C of the report, the schematic diagrams do not indicate.the size of the existing.control circuit fuse.
It is reconnnended that this.infor-mation be obtained from the field and entered under "Existing Pri-mary Fuse" column in Appendix c.
The riext higher standard size of fuse should be selected for backup protection and its rating* is to be entered under "Additional Backup Fuse Requirements" column.
- 4.
Certain submerged instrmnents listed under Appendix F *have been identified as being located outside.containment and certain others as being above flood level.-
This is based on our review of Palisades physical layout drawings.
These instruments have been included in Appendix F because of the reason that CPCo had already inciuded these inthe submerged elec-
'trical equipment list conveyed to NRG by,CPCo by letter dated 4/7/76 by R. Bo Sewell.
It is recommended that CPCo review the location of these instruments again and delete these from Appendix F* if it is determined that these are located outside containment or above flood level as the case may be.
It is also to be noted that in a few cases, Appendix F does not indicate primary ~nd backup protection fuse ratingso This is because of the reason that this infor~ation is not shown on the schematics. It is recommended that.CPCo obtain this information from the field and include it under Appendix F.
- 5.
As regards the.environmental qualification o~ safety related coni.-
ponents of the ECCS required to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA, it is to be noted that "safety related" or "non-safety related" status of equipment has not been altered as a result of this study and its findings.
S~nce the safety related components of the ECCS had been.originally procured with suitable environmental
I Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation Mr.
J~ R. Yope December 8, 1976 Page 3 qualifications, it is our opinion.that no further verification is required since the design changes recommended by the submerged elect systems study do not alter the safety related status of equipment.
The subject of MCC 9, which is located inside containment, has been investigated.
Even though MCC 9 is lqcated well above* flood.level, since it is not disconnected following a safety injection signal but left exposed.to the severe environmental conditions following a LOCA, it was assuined that electrical faults can develop in MCC 9.
as though it were submerged.
Our review indicates that in the cas.e of MCC 9 feeder, under cer-tain conditions, the fault current is too low to ope:i::ate' the backup protection ACB 52-1302 which is the incoming ACB to the 480V load centero It is, therefore, recommended that a breaker fa"ilure type of protection be employed on the _MCC 9 feeder ACB.
This will com-prise of IDMT overcurrent relays and a timer connected to CTs on the feeder ACB.
In case a feeder fault is not. cleared by the tripping of the feeder ACB within a preset time, it will be assumed that the feeder ACB has failed and the load center incomer ACB will be tripped through the timer contacts~ This will ensure that the penetration integrity is maintained in case of failure of primary protection and operation of *backup protection.
In conclusion, we. believe that the pr_esentation of the enclosed report concludes the Bechtel activities covered by the scope of the CPCo Purchase Order No.
82320-Q dated 8/12/76 *.
In case of any questions, please do n_ot hesitate to contact USa
. TM/CASO/pj h (In Quintuplicate)
Enclosures (6)
Ve~y truly yours, *
~4.H:a~ -
C. A. St. Onge Project Engineer
Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation 777 East Eisenhower Parkway Ann Arbor, Michigan*
. Mail Addre;s:P.O. Box 1000, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 Mr. J. R. Yope Operating Services Department Consumers Power Company 1945 West Par~all Rpad Jackson, Michigan 49201 December 8, 1976 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant CPCO-GW0-8428 Bechtel Job No. 10512-040 Submerged Electrical Systems Study Fil~ No. 0275 76-040-4
Reference:
a)
CPCo letter HFMN 07-76 Hoffman to Bixel dated 1/22/76
Dear Mr. Yope:
. Please. find enclosed six (6.) copies of the report on the investigation of sub-merged electrical equipment inside containment for Palisades Pl~nt.
The following salient factors are put forth for your consideration during the review of the report:
- 1. Determination of submerged equipment inside containment is based on a maximum water elevation of 596 1-0" following LOCA.
This was determined by our contairiment flooding calculat*ions based on the following worst case flooding conditions, resulting from water volumes from the fol-lowing:
a) *l-.SIRWTank b) 4*- Safety Injection Tanks c)
- 2 - Clean Waste Receiver Tanks, eac*h !z full (rupture) d)
Primary Coolant System (LOCA)
Please note that this figure of* 596 1-0" is in agreement *with CPCQ.' s calculations, ref. (a).
I
.. - -...... _. --***'.. :_ -- --.\\ --
Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation Mr. J. R. Yope December 8, 1976 Page 2
- 2.
The exact mounting elevation of certain solenoid valve~ could not
- be determined from* the 1ayout drawings*.
It has, therefore, been conservatively assumed that all solenoid valves mounted on racks at elevation 590 1-0" are liable to become ~ubmerged.,
In case a CPCo field check indicates *that some of these valves are located above 596 1 -0", they should be deleted from Appendices A and E of the enclosed reporto 3.,
In the ~ase of size 2 MCC starters listed under Appendix C of the report, the schematic diagrams do not indicate.the size of the existing control circuit fuse.* It is recommended that this.infor-mation be obtaine.d from the field and entered un.der "Existing Pri-mary Fuse" column in Appendix C.
The next higher standard s'ize of fuse should be selected for backup protection and its rating* is to be entered under "Additional Backup Fuse Requirements" column.
- 4.
Certain submerged instruments listed under Appendix F have been identified as being located outside.contairunent and certain others as being above flood level.*
Th:Ls is based on our review of Palisades physical layout drawings.
These instruments have been included in Appendix F because of the reason that CPCo had already inciuded these in.the submerged e].ec-
. trical equipment list conveyed to NRC by. CPCo by letter dated 4/7 /76 by R. Bo.Sewell. It is recommended that' CPCo review the location of these instruments again and delete these from Appendix F* if it is determined that these are located outside contairunent or above flood level as the
- ca*se *may b*e.
It is also to be noted that in a few cases, Appendix F does not indicate primary ~nd backup protection fuse ratings.. This is because of the reason that this infor~ation is not shown on the schematics. It is recommended that.CPCo obtain this information from the field and include it under Appendix F.
- 5.
As regards the.environmental qualification of safety related com-ponents of the ECCS required to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA, it is to be noted that "safety related" or "non-safety related" status of equipment has not been altered a*s a result* o.f
- this study and its findings.
S;i.:b.ce the safety related components of the ECCS had been.originally procured with suitable environmental
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Bechtel Assoc"iates Professio11al Corporation Mr. J. R. Yope December 8, 1976 Page 3 qualifications, it is our opinion.that no further verification is required since the design changes recommended by the submerged elect systems study do not alter the safety related status of equipment.
The subject of MCC 9, which is located inside containment, has been investigated.
Even though MCC 9 is lqcated well above* flood level, since it is n9t disconnected following a safety injection signal but left exposed.to the severe environmental conditions following a LOCA, it was assumed that electrical faults can develop in MCC 9 as though it were submerged.
Ou:i:- review indicates that in the cas.e of MCC 9 feeder, under cer-tain conditions, the fault current is too low to ope~ate* the backup protection ACB 52-1302 which is the incoming ACE to the 480V load centero It is, therefore, recommended that a breaker fa'ilure type of protection be employed on the.MCC 9 feeder ACB.
This will com-prise of IDMT overcurrent relays and a timer.connected to CTs on the feeder ACB.
In case a feeder fault is not. cleared by the tripping of the feeder ACB within a preset time, it will be assumed that the feeder ACB has failed and the load center incomer ACB will be tripped through the timer contacts~ This will ensure that the penetration integrity is maintained in case of
.failure of primary protection and operation of *backup protection.
In conclusion, we.believe that the presentat,ion of the enclosed report concludes the Bechtel activities covered by the scope of the CPCo Purchase Order No.
82320-Q dated 8/12/76.
In case of any questions, please do n.ot hesitate to contact usa
. TM/CASO/pj h (In Quintuplicate)
Enclosures (6)
Ve~y truly yours, *
~4.H.a~
C. A. St. Onge Project Engineer
- ~. -**
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INVESTIGATION OF SUBMERGED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT INSIDE CONTAINMENT FOR PALISADES PLANT CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY BECHTEL JOB 10512-040 PREPARED BY BECHTEL ASSOCIATES PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN DECEMBER, 1976
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.j TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE I
PREFACE 1
II INTRODUCTION 2
III ASSUMPTIONS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 2
rv CONCLUSIONS 4
v RECOMMENDATIONS 7
ATTACHMENTS Appendix A, Sheets 1 thru 3 Appendix B, Sheet 1 Appendix c, Sheet 1 Appendix D, Sheet 1 Appendix E, Sheets 1 and 2 Appendix F, Sheets 1 thru 5 Submerged Equipment Submerged Motor Operated Valves not Disconnected following a Safety Injection Signal - Power
- Circuit Backup Protection Submerged Motor Operated Valves not Disconnected following a Safety Injection Signal - Control Circuit Backup Protection Submerged Pumps not Disconnected following a Safety Injection Signal -
Power Circuit Backup Protection Submerged Solenoid Valves not Dis-connected following a Safety Injec-tion Signal Submerged Instruments
I.
PREFACE Consumers Power Company issued a Purchase Order No. 82320-Q
- -dated-***August--12, 1976,*- *requesting--Bechte-1-to-conducr-+-t------
an investigation of electrical systems inside containment that will become submerged during a Loss of Coolant acci-dent.
Bechtel was requested to provide a report that explicitly defines methods of corrective action that can be taken to prevent any safety related system from being disabled as a result of submergence of any electrical system in 'containment.
The Bechtel report was to be utilized by Consumers Power Company for providing answers to the ques~ions presented by NRC to CPCo in the NRC letter d.ated May 25, 1976, Docket No. 50-255e Bechtel provides this report in fulfillment of the above requirements for Consumers.Power COII),pany' s information only and makes no representation, warranty, or guarantee, regarding any of the assumptions made in this report or the data contained herein.
Further, Bechtel makes no repre-sentation, warranty, or guarantee as to the accuracy of the statements contained in the report regarding the methods of plant operation, plant operat,ing history, or thermal withstand capability of penetration.and accepts no liability whatsoever for such matters.
1
Further, the recommendations presented herein are based on attached and/or referenced documents which may or may not accurately depict the existing conditions of the Palisades Plant.
II.
INTRODUCTION The purpose of this study is twofold: first, to verify and document penetration integrity at calculated fault levels due to electrical faults inside the containment caused by submergence of electrical equipment following a LOCA; and second, to verify by analysis that operation of the backup protection for faults caused by submergence does not interrupt the supply to safety related equipment.
The enclosed tables, Appendices A and F, provide a complete listing of all submerged equipment in the containment.
III.
ASSUMPTIONS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
- 1.
It is assumed that primary protection does not operate and the fault is cleared by the operation of backup protection.
- 2.
The penetration manufacturer, Viking, no longer manu-facturers containment electrical penetrations and the business interests have been acquired by Pyle National.
2
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The latter was contacted for the purpose of obtaining information concerning the thermal withstand cap-ability of penetrations, but were unable to provide any information.
The thermal withstand capability has, therefore, been determined on the basis of fault current withstand ratings.specified under Section 3.1.4 of Specification No. 5935-E-20, Specification for Electrical Penetration Assemblies, which states the 1following:
"The penetration assemblies shall be designed and built to withstand fault currents as follows:
Pl 80,000 amperes P2 -
60,000 amperes P3 through PS - 15,000 amperes except for #9 and #12 conductors which shall be 1500 amperes.
The currents are momentary asymmetrical with an off-set factor of 1.6 which decays exponentially for 3 cycles, then is interrupted by a circuit breaker."
Based on the above, the thermal withstand capability was calculated and found to be as follows:
3
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(.
(.
Penetration type Pl - 3.2 x 108 Amp2 Sec.
P2 - 1.8 x 108 Amp2 Sec.
P3, P4, PS - 1.125 x 107 Amp2 Sec.
- 9, #12 - 1.125 x 105 Amp2 Sec.
IVu CONCLUSIONS
- 1.
PENETRATION INTEGRITY As a result of calculations and analyses, it has been determined that additional backup protection fuses are* required to ensure that the integrity of penetrations can be maintained by the operation of the backup protection to clear the faults due to sub-mergence in the following cases:
- a.
480 volt feeders fed through Motor Control Center starters listed in the enclosed tables, Appen-dices B and D.
- b.
120 volt AC control circuits associated with size 2 starters in the 480 volt notor Control Centers listed in the enclosed table, Appendix c.
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The enclosed tables, Appendices B, c, and D provide a complete listing of circuits under category (a) and (b) above and also indicate the size and type of t?e recom-mended backup protection fuses for each case.
Further details have been sho\\"m under Section IV, Recommenda-tions.
In the case of 120 volt AC control circuits associated with size 1 starters in the 480 volt Motor Control Centers, it has been determined by apalysis and calcul~tions that the worst case fault currents cannot exceed the
- continuous maxim.um current withstand.capability of the associated penetrations. It is; therefore, concluded that no additional protection is required for these circuits.
In the case of instrumentation loop circuits, it has been concluded that even though submergence can lead to electrical faults, penetration integrity will not be compromised because of the current limiting feature inherent in the low energy instrumentation circuits.
The
- enclo*sed *table, *:Appendix F, provides a.
listing and identi~ies all such submerged instrumen-tation devices.
5
- 2.
INTERRUPTION OF POWER SUPPLY TO SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMEl~ ON OPERATION OF BACKUP PROTECTION
- a.
Provision of additional backup protection fuses for 480 volt feeders from Motor Control Centers shown under item IV~l(a) above will, in addition to ensuring penetra~ion integrity, also serve to prevent the interruption of power supply to safety related equipment on operation of backup protection to clear faults on submerged equipment.
Enclosed tables, Appendices B and D, provide a complete listing of the above circuits.
- b.
In the following cases, it has been determined that the operation of existing backup protection is likely to lead to the interruption of the power supply to safety related equipment:
- 1.
Certain 120 volt AC solenoid valves supplied from instrument AC distribution panel YOl.
- 2.
Certain 125 volt DC solenoid valves and the Containment Building Gas Analyzing Panel Cl02 supplied ftom distribution panels Dll and D21.
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- v.
3~
2400 volt feeders to Pressurizer Heater Trans-former Xl6.
The enclosed table, Appendix E, provides a com-plete listing of the circuits covered by items 1 and 2 above.
Suggested design modifications for the above cases are outlined under Section V, Recommendations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- 1.
480 volt feeders fed through MCC starters feeeing sub-merged equipment not de-energized following a LOCA As discussed under Conclusions, IV, l(a) and IV, 2(a) above, it is recommended that additional fuses be installed in the MCC starters to provide backup pro-tection for the existing circuit breakers in the MCC starters and also to ensure that the operation of backup protection does not lead to interruption of the power supply to other safety related equipment, namely, the remaining loads on the Motor Control Center
- 7
- 2.
\\.
It is recommended that a warning label be affixed to each of the above starters to caution the operator that both the starter circuit breaker and the backup fuses should be checked in case of interruption of power supply.
The enclosed tables, Appendices B and D, provide a complete listing of the above circuits and also the size and type of the recommended backup protection fuses.
120 volt AC control circuits for size 2 starters feeding submerged equipment not de-energized following a LOCA For the above circuits, it is recommended that in addition to the existing control fuse, an additional fuse be installed to provide backup protection.
The second fuse shall be installed in close proximity to the existing fuse to facilitate easy identification in the event of fuse blowing.
It is also recommended that a warning label be af£ixed to each o.f the above starters to caution the 8
operator that both the main and backup protection fuses should be checked in case of control circuit problems.
The enclosed table, Appendix C, provides a listing of the above circuits and indicates the requirement of backup protection fuses.
- 3.
120 volt AC control circuits for size 1 starters feeding submerged equipment not de-energized following a LOCA For reasons outlined under item IV, (1) above, it is recommended that no design changes or modifications be instituted in these circuits since the penetration integrity is not compromised even under worst case fault conditions.
The enclosed table, Appendix D, provides a listing of the above circuits and indicates that control circuit backup protection is not required.
- 4.
2400 volt feeders to Pressurizer Heater Transformers XlS and Xl6 Pressure Heater Transformers XlS and Xl6 are fed from 9
~.....
2400 volt buses lE and lD through ACBs 152-305 and 152~211 respectively.
It is recommended that Combustion Engineering be con-sulted to confirm Bechtel's conclusion, discussed below, that the above ACBs be tripped in case of Safety Injection Signal through SIS relay contact's.
It is our opinion that de-energizing of Pressurizer Heater Transformers following a Safety Injection Signal will not lead to a safety violation or com-promise of Plant safety under any circumstances.
This conclusion is supported by the fact that according to the present circuit configuration, even though the Pressurizer Heater Transformer feeders are not tripped directly by SIS signal, in the event of SIS combined with a loss of offsite power, both these feeciers are tripped. It is also to be noted, that subsequently, transformer Xl6 which is fed from
~ safety bus lD is not sequenced back even after the diesel generator restores voltage on bus lD.
- 5.
- a.
Solenoid Valves supplied from 120 volt instrument AC Distribution Panel YOl, listed in the enclosed table, Appendices A and E 10
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- b.
Solenoid Valves and the Containment Building Gas Analyzing Panel Cl02 supplied from 125 volt DC Distribution Panels Dll and 021, listed in the enclosed table, Appendices A and E In all above cases, depending on the circuit configura~
tion, it is recommended that either additional backup protection fuses only or both additional primary and backup protection fuses be included for reasons discussed under item IV, 2(b) above.
The reason for the addition of bo~h primary and backup protection fuses in some cases is to ensure that the operation of backup protection does not interrupt the supply to other safety related equipment.
In these cases, such an interruption will occur if the existing fuse is used as backup protection fuse.
Complete details including fuse sizes are shown in the enclosed table, Appendix E.
11
- 6.
INSTRUMENTATION CIRCUITS As discussed under item IV, (1) above, it has been concluded that even though the submergence of instru-ments and devices can lead to electrical faults, penetration integrity will not be compromised since the fault currents in the loops will be maintained at very low values because of the current limiting feature inherent in the low energy instrumentation circuits.
In view of the*abover no design changes* or modifica~
tions have been recommended for the instrumentation circuits.
The enclosed table, Appendix F, provides a listing and identifies all submerged instrumentation devices for informatlon only.
q 12
I SUBMERGED POWER SOURCE EQPT.
D. C. PANEL MoC.C./L.C.
sv 0101 D21 SV 0142 B MCC BOl SV 0143 B MCC B09 sv 0148 D21 I-sv 0150 021*
I sv 0152 D21 sv 0160 D21 sv 0861
SV 0867
- Dll I
LC Bl:t. ---- ___ J
.L sv 0869 Dll I
LC Bll
. l sv 0870 D21 LC Bl2 SV 0873
- I
- D21
~-~12 ___
- SUBMERGED EQUIPMENT BRK. NO.
72-219 52-195 52-926 72-209 72-209 72-209 72-219 72-205 72-205 72-205 72-205 72-105 72-105 72-205 72-205 Appendix A L.C. - LOAD CENTER
- - THESE SOLENOID VALVES ARE DISCONNECTED FOLLOWING A SAFETY.*.
INJECTION SIGNAL.
sµeet 2 of 3
SUBMERGED POWER SOURCE EQPT.
D. C. PANEL M."C.C. /L.C.
BRK. NO.
M 3008 MCC Ill 52-141 M 3010 MCC III 52-147 IM 3012 MCC 112 52-247 M-3014 MCC 112 52-251 I
.{'
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1P 77 A MCC 112 52-291 I
!P 77 B MCC Ill 52-l)l I
I Transformer Xl5 Load Center IE 152-305 I
I i Transformer X16 Load Center lD 152-211 I i SUBMERGED EQUIPMENT Appendix A Sheet 1 of ~
~. '
I su~~~
J-n ~ -c. - PANEL POW:.c-:-:~~-c --. _-_-_-_-_B_R.=-K-.-N-o-*
~----~--~~---1---------~
SV 0932
~1..
72-229 sv 0934 Dll I 72-129 LC B12 72-205 sv 1819 D21 I
i sv 1820 D21 LC B12 72-205 L.C. - LOAD CENTER sv 1821.
D21 LC B12 72-205 I sv 1822 D21 LC B12 72-205 sv 1823 Dll LC Bll 72-105 sv 1868 Dll LC Bll 72-105 sv 1890 Dll LC Bll 72-105 D21 1 72-209 SV 2321---+i-------i~--Y-01
_____ 1_#_3_4------~-~
~-V-2--3-2_2 ____,
I YOl 1134
- sv 2323
- -F------==~-~~~,--~~~---~--~-1-- -----=-- l---=-i-13=4====-~-----
...__P_a_n_e1_c_-_1_02 __
~,l __ n_--2_.*-1~_.-_----~~~:~-----------~----=~---_.___1_2_-2_1_4 ____
sv 2191 SUBMERGED EQUIPMENT Appendix A Sheet 3 of 3
I POWER SOURCE RECOM.+
FUSE FAULT CURRENT (AMPS) FUSE MELTING TIME SEC FAULT lt EQPT.
to---*-****-
MCC BRK NO. RTNG(A) PENETRATION*
! M 3008 BOl 52-141 80 695 l M 3010 BOl 52-147 80 695
! I M 3012 B02 i52-247 100 844 r---
I M 3014 B02 52-251 100 868 l
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- The fault occurs at the *p~netration
- The fault occurs at the equipment
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~uses recommended are ~ype KTS-qOOV Limitron Fuse EQPT** PENETRATION EQPT PENETRATION 474 472 504 500 0.03 0.2 1.45 x 104 0.03
! 0.2 1.5 x 104
~..,.,...
0.03 01135 2.13 x 104 0.03 0.35 2.2 x 104 l
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SUBMERGED MOTOR OPERATED VALVES NOT.DISCONNECTED.FOLLOWING.A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL POWER CIRCUIT BACKUP PROTECTION Appendix B
- l.
SPEC I 2t ! '
EQPT iWITHSTANDj I
- 4. 5xl04 I
.125x105 I
.4 5x{o4 L125xl05 ;
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!s. 9xl04.12sx105 i 18
&i s i 1 o75xl l.125xl0 !
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Sheet 1 of 1
EQPT.
M 3008 M 3010 M 3012 M 3014 EXISTING PRIMARY POWER SOURCE ~~TER NO.
FUSE B01 B01 B02 B02 42-141 42-147 42-247 42-251 SUBMERGED MOTOR OPERATED VALVES NOT DISCONNECTED FOLLOWING A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL CONTROL CIRCUIT BACKUP PROTECTION (SIZE 2 STARTERS)
Appendix*c A~DITIONAL BACKuP I FUSE REQUIREMENTS I
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_J Sheet 1 of 1
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RECOM.-t (AMPS)
FAULT I2t SPEC I2t '
POWER SOURCE FAULT CURRENT FUSE MELTING TIME SE<
i EQPT.
FUSE WITHSTAND i
MCC BRK. NO AATINGJ! )PENETAATION EQPT.
PENETRATION EQPT.
PENETRATION EQPT.
i I s2-291 1.1 x 104 9.6x104 l.12Sx105 I P77A B02 80 830 370 0.016 0.7 I
I s2-111 9l~-
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- 1. 6x1~*4 I P77B BOl 80 389 0.01 o.s 1.33 x 104 ll.125xl05 I
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Fuses recommended are type KTS-600V SUBMERGED PUMPS NOT Limitron Fuse DISCONNECTED FOLLOWING A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL POWER CIRCUIT BACKUP PROTECTION (THESE ARE SIZE 1 STARTERS FOR WHICH CONTROi. CIRCUIT BACKUP PROTECTION IS NOT REQUIRED.)
Appendix D Sheet 1 of 1
POWER SOURCE EXISTING PROTECTION ADQITIONAL PROTECTION RE Q'D EQPT.
D.c.PANEI LOAD CTR LOC.
PRIMARY FUS'F.BACKUP CB PRil1ARY FUSE
- BACKUP FUSE SVOlOl D21 C13 lOA 72-219 5A Existing ~OA Primary F,use SV0160 D21 Cl3 lOA 72-219 SA Existing ~OA
- Primary Fuse Existing tOA SV0148 D21 C0-2R lOA 72-209"
. SA Primary Fuse svblso D21 C0-2R lOA 72-209 SA Existing i_iOA Primarv Fuse SV01S2 D21 C0-2R lOA 72-209 SA Existing ~lOA Primary Fuse SV2191 D21 C0-2 lOA 72-209 2A 5A I
I SV0862 D21 B12 lOA 72-20S 2A SA i
SV0865 D21 B12 lOA 72-20S 2A SA I
SV0870 D21 B12 lOA 72-20S 2A SA l
SV1819 D21 B12 lOA 72-20S 2A SA I !
l SV1820 D21 B12 lOA 72-20S 2A SA I
SV1821 D21 B12 lOA 72-205 2A SA I
SV1822
- D21 Bll lOA 72-205 2A SA I
SV0932 D21 C0-8 lOA 72-229 2A SA SUBMERGED SOLENOID VALVES NOT DISCONNECTED FOLLOWING A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL PRIMARY AND BACKUP PROTECTION Appendix JE Sheet 1 of 2
EQPT.
SV0869 SV0934 sv!l.823 SV1868 SV1890 SV2321 SV2322 SV2323.
SV0142B SV0143B Panel C-102 POWER SOURCE EXISTING PROTECTION ADDITIONAL PROTECTION REQ'D I
l.C.PANEL LOAD Dll Bll Dll Dll Bll Dll Bll Dll B07+
YO!*
YO!*
YO!*
BOl +
B09+
D21 CTR~ LOC.
PRIMARY BACKUP CB
?RIMARY FUSE lOA Fuse 72-lOS 2A co-s
!OA Fuse 72-129'.
2A
~
lOA Fuse 72-lOS 2A lOA Fuse 72-lOS 2A None 2A YO!
lOA Fuse Brk No.
1134 2A YO!
lOA Fuse Brk No *.
JJ 'J /,
?4 Brk No.
lOA Fuse YO!
1134 2A Brk. No.
MCC Breaker S2-19S Brk. No.
S2-926 MCC Breaker 72-214 lOA SUBMERGED SOLENOID VALVES NOT DISCONNECTED FOLLOWING A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL Appendix E BACKUP FUSE SA I
I ' '
I SA I
l SA
' i SA j
\\
I I SA i
i
'iA i
I I
I SA I
20A
\\'
i 20A I
I I
I i
Existing CB.
72-214 I
I I
\\
i I
I i '
~
+
480 VOLT MCC 120 VOLT INST.
AC DIST. P~*EL
~..
DEVICE NO.
POWER SOURCE I
PROTECTION REMARKS I
i DISTRIBUTION PANEL BREAKER NO.
PRIMARY BACKUP PDT 0112 AA YlO I
115 I!,,\\ Fuse lA Fuse RPS & Trip & Primary Loop Flow Indication would be PDT 0112 BA YlO I
115 lA Fuse liost from these transmitters
!2.A Fuse I
I
!2.A Fuse PDT 0122 CA YlO 115 lA Fus~
PDT 0122 DA YlO 115 1~ Fuse 1A Fuse I
I PDT 0112 AB Y20 115
! !2A Fuse 1A Fuse I
PDT 0112 BB Y20 I
115 I
!2A Fuse lA Fuse PDT 0122 CB Y20 I
115 I
!2,A Fuse lA Fuse I
I PDT 0122 DB Y20 115 l ~A Fuse 1A Fuse PDT 0112 AC Y30 I
115 I ~A Fuse lA Fuse PDT 0112 BC Y30 115 i !!2,A Fuse lA Fuse PDT 0122 CC Y30 115 l~A Fuse lA F""'"'
PDT 0122 DC Y30 115
.-1.~.Fuse lA Fuse PDT 0112 AD Y40 115 1~ Fuse 1A Fuse PDT 0112 BO Y40 I
115 1~A Fuse lA Fuse I
PDT 0122 CD Y40 115 j~A Fuse lA Fuse PDT 0122 DD Y40 115 I
~A Fuse lA Fuse PDT 0104.
YOl 118 None I
POS 1024 Dll 72-125
~use 72-125 (None SUBMERGED INSTRUMENTS Appendix F Sheet 1 of 5 "'
- j.
- Located above flood level.
DEVICE NO.
POWEil SOURCE
~
PROTECTION PISTRIBUTION PANELi BREAKER NO.
PRIMARY BACKUP REMARKS POS 1027 nn
- _I 72-125 I Fuse 72-125
'None POS 1030 Dll I
72-125 Fuse 72-125 None POS 1033 Dll 72-125 I
Fuse 72-125 None POS 1023 Dll 72-126 Fuse 72-126 None POS 1025 Dll 72-126 Fuse 72-126 None POS 1028 Dll 72-126 I
Fuse 72-126 None POS 1031 Dll 72-126 I
Fuse 72-126 None PT 0101 A YlO 116 ll/8A Fuse 3/8A Fuse None 116 I
3/8A Fuse PT 0101 B Y20 11/SA Fuse None PT 0102 A YlO 115
.1/8A Fuse 3/SA Fuse RPS Trip SI and PR! Loop l1/8A Fuse 3/8A Fuse Press. Ind. would be lost PT 0102 B Y20 115 from these transmitters PT 0102 C Y30 115 l/SA Fuse 3/8A Fuse PT 0102 D Y40 115 l1/8A Fuse
- 3/8A Fuse I
I PT 0103 YOl 1126 11/lOA Fuse SA Fuse None I
!1/lOA Fuse
- PT 0131 A YOl 1126 SA Fuse None jl/lOA Fuse
- PT 0131 B YOl 1126
- SA Fuse None I
I 1126 I
- PT 0132 A YOl
- l/lOA Fuse SA Fuse None I
- PT 0132 B YOl 1126 11/lOA Fuse SA Fuse None SUBMERGED*INSTRUMENTS Appendix F Sheet 2.of 5
+ Located outside. ontainment.
I
~ocated* above flood level.
1 DEVICE NO.
POWER SOURCE I
PROTECTION DISTRIBUTION PANELj
- PT 0133 A YOl
- PT 0133 B YOl
- PT 0141 A YOl
- PT 0141 B YOl
- PT 0142 A YOl
- PT 0142 B YOl
- PT 0143 A YOl
PT 0751 D*
Y40 PT 1001 YOl PS 0101
+pg 0103 MCC Ill PS 0935 MCC Ill FS 0927 INSTRUMENT CONNECTED TO 125 V DC CONTROL CIRCUIT OF ACB.
i I
I I
I I
I I I
BREAKER NO.
I PRIMARY 1126 l/lOA Fuse 1126 I l/lOA Fuse 1126 I 11/lOA Fuse 1126 l/lOA Fuse
- 1 l/lOA Fuse 1126 I
1126 j l/lOA Fuse 1126
.l/lOA Fuse 1126 11/lOA Fuse 114
- Fuse 114 Fuse llS 1/BA Fuse
/IS j 1/BA Fuse llS I 1/BA Fuse 115 I 1/BA Fuse 1127 I 1l/l6A Fuse I
i I Starter 42-167
- Starter 1+2...:171.
I !
252-_103 I SUBMERGED INSTRUMENTS BACKUP SA Fuse SA Fuse SA Fuse --
- SA Fuse.
SA Fuse SA Fuse SA Fuse SA Fuse lOA CB lOA CB 3/8A Fuse 3/8A Fuse 3/BA Fuse 3/8A Fuse YOl-27 REMARKS None I
None None None None None None None None I
None I RPS Trfp and Loss of Ind. on E 50 A S.G.
None None None None l
I I
I I
Appendix F Press.
Sheet 3 of 5
~-
POWER SOURCE I
PROTECTION DEVICE NO.
DISTRIBUTION PANEU i
BREAKER NO.
PRIMARY BACKUP I
FS 0928 I
2S2-203 !
FS 0929 I
-2S2-104 I I FS 0930 I
2S2-204 I FT 0701 YlO, 30 114 I
Fuse lOA CB I
FT 0702 Fuse lOA CB FT 0703 Y20~ 40 114 I
Fuse lOA CB FT 0704 Fuse lOA CB I
- RE 1808 Y40 1114
- '~Fuse lA Fuse I
RE 1817 YOl 1134 I
!~Fuse lA Fuse RE 1817 Pump i
! !i;A Fuse lA Fuse LT 0101 A YlO I
116 I 1/8A Fuse 3/8A Fuse l1/8A Fuse LT 0101 B Y20 116 3/8A Fuse LT 0102 A YlO I
- S I 1/8A Fuse 3/8A Fuse LT 0102 B Y20 I
115
. I 11/BA Fuse 3/8A Fuse LT 0102 c Y30 llS
- l/8A Fuse 3/8A Fuse LT 0102 D Y40 llS I 1/8A Fuse 3/8A Fuse LT 0103 YOl 1126 I 1/lOA Fuse SA Fuse LT 0116 YOl 1126 11/lOA Fuse SA Fuse INSTRUMENT CONNECTED TO 12S v DC CONTROL CIRCUIT OF ACB SUBMERGED INSTRUMENTS REMARKS.
None 1Possibl~ one channel
) None None None None None None None None None None I I I
l l
Appendil F I *
"?'
j isolation
~,.
r i
I
DEVICE NO.
j l
. LT 0701 LT 0702 LT 0703 LT,0704 LT 0751 A
.LT 0751 B
- i. I LT 0751 C LT 0751 D LT: 1001
- LT 1012
! I 1
- I
- LT 1014
- LT 1016
- LT 1018 I ;
I'
. J I'
LS 0358 1
1.s oa6s i
,. *----~*....----*-..
POWER SOURCE DISTRIBUTION J.>Aimrl BREAKER Ndo i
I I
YlO, 30 I
- 4 -
YlO, 30 I 114 Y20. 40 114 Y20. 40.
/)4
- THESE L.T.'S ARE ABOVE FLOOD LEVEL.
PROTECTION REMARKS PRIMARY BACKUP Fuse lOA CB None Fuse lOA CB None Fuse lOA CB None Fuse lOA CB None
()...
. "i I
r : _, l
~ **
! I j
.l
{
i i j
YlO 05 l/8A Fuse 3/BA Fuse RPS Trip and SG *Level Ind,.
1/BA Fuse 3/8A Fuse would be ;Lost Y20 iJS Y30
'r*.
05
.1/BAFuse 3/8A Fuse Y40 115 I 1/BA Fuse 3/8A Fuse YOl 1127 ll16A Fuse None 1121 l/16A Fuse YOl None YOl i/27 1/16A Fuse None YOl 1127 1/16A Fuse None YOl 1127 1 /1 ~II P11i:::.r:>
None YOl 1113 I
None I
YOl 1/13 None 72-219 SA Fuse None 72-~19 SA Fuse None 72-219 SA Fuse None 72-:219 SA Fuse None
... **--.. ~..... ~.. -*.. -.,.,.. *--*---***** ***-*.. ------* -* *--*
SUBMERGED INSTRUMENTS Appendix F Sheet 5 of 5
~
~
.... '.'