ML18345A337
| ML18345A337 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07103093 |
| Issue date: | 10/31/2018 |
| From: | Global Nuclear Fuel, US Dept of Transportation (DOT) |
| To: | Garcia-Santos N Spent Fuel Licensing Branch |
| Garcia-Santos N | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18345A335 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML18345A337 (39) | |
Text
GNF Proprietary Information - Class II (Internal)
Model No. TK-C69 US Revalidation DOT/NRC/GNF Meeting October 31, 2018
Introductions
Introductions (GNF/Exelon)
GNF Rich Augi - Project Manager Russell Stachowski - Chief Consulting Engineer Erik Kirstein - Shipping Container Licensing & Analysis Christopher Kmiec - Lead Criticality Engineer Exelon Nuclear Robert Close - Project Manager, TVEL TVS-K LTAs Philip Wengloski - Director, Nuclear Fuel
Summary of TK-C69 Revalidation Request
Revalidation Request-Summary GNF and TVEL formed consortium to bring the TVEL PWR fuel assembly (TVS-K) to US market TVS-K fuel is similar to Westinghouse RFA fuel TVEL delivered four (4) LTAs to Ringhals-3 in 2014 via one (1) shipment of two (2) TK-C69 containers First Shipment GNF and TVEL contracted with Exelon to deliver eight (8) LTAs to Braidwood Nuclear Station (four (4) containers)
Shipment originates from Russia Expected shipment is June 2019
Revalidation Request-Summary (cont.)
Second Shipment
- Eight (8) LTAs planned to another US utility in June 2020
- Shipment originates from Russia Third Shipment
- Domestic shipment planned in August 2020
- Goal to use same authorization with TK-C69 containers
- 49 CFR 173.473(a) - into or from the U.S.
Revalidation Request-Summary (cont.)
Reload Shipment(s)
- Following LTA shipments, larger shipments of reloads planned from Wilmington
- TK-C69 not expected to be used for reload shipments Russian Certificate RUS/3240/AF-96T (Rev. 1)
- Valid until July 23, 2021
- Type A fissile
Revalidation Request-Summary (cont.)
Revalidation Request
- Submitted to DOT July 27, 2018
- Supplemental information provided September 27, 2018 o Mapping of IAEA SSR-6 Type A requirements to SAR sections o Mapping Russian GOST standards in SAR Tables 1-1 through 1-3 to AISI standards
Summary of TK-C69 Safety Analysis Report
Summary of TK-C69 SAR Chapter 1:
General Information
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 1 General Information Two (2) TVS-K 17x17 PWR assemblies per container 16.7 ft long x 4.2 ft wide x 2.5 ft high Empty weight = 2830 kg (6240 lb)
Bounding loaded weight = 4200 kg (9260 lb)
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 1 (cont.)
Major components:
- Base (1)
- Lid (2)
- Platform (3)
- Telescoping post (4)
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 1 (cont.)
- Platform (3) is raised via crane and pivots off base (1)
- Telescoping posts (4) locked in place when platform (3) is raised to load/unload fuel assemblies
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 1 (cont.)
Summary of TK-C69 SAR Chapter 2:
Structural Evaluation
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 2 Structural Evaluation - General No shock absorber materials Principal components constructed of austenitic steels (no ferritic steels susceptible to brittle fracture)
Dynamic drop evaluation performed using LS-DYNA Minimal rod deformations from physical drop test
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 2 (cont.)
Structural Design Development (SAR Section 2.12.1)
Initial version Final version (Sweden shipment)
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 2 (cont.)
Structural enhancements from previous version:
- 1. Square tubes added to lid surface in the central section Designed to prevent lid perforation during drop on bar
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 2 (cont.)
Structural enhancements from previous version (cont.):
- 2. Stiffening angles affixed to square tubes of cradle lid Eliminates the gap between the cradle and the cradle lid, providing confinement during HAC drop
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 2 (cont.)
Structural enhancements from previous version (cont.):
- 3. Bolts fastening platform to base replaced with higher strength bolts
- 4. Rigid arresters welded to channel bar of the base Better secures the platform to the base during HAC drop
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 2 (cont.)
Structural enhancements from previous version (cont.):
- 5. Bolts fastening (a) cradle lid to cradle base ( #5 previous slide) and (b) arms connecting cradle lid to cradle replaced with higher strength bolts Increases bolted connection durability
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 2 (cont.)
Structural enhancements from previous version (cont.):
- SAR Sections 2.12.2 through 2.12.13 document physical tests and analytical evaluations for initial version
- SAR Section 2.12.15 documents the analytical evaluations for the final enhanced version
Summary of TK-C69 SAR Chapter 3:
Thermal Evaluation
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 3 Thermal Evaluation - General Most components constructed of austenitic steels Only non-steel components:
o Rubber gasket in base flange o
Polyurethane sheets in cradles Thermal evaluation performed analytically using ANSYS (no physical fire test)
Maximum temperature of TVS-K FA in HAC = 265°C
Summary of TK-C69 SAR Chapter 4:
Containment
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 4 Containment - General Type A container TK-C69 container provides confinement
Summary of TK-C69 SAR Chapter 5:
Analysis of External Dose Rate from Package
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 5 General Information Type-A, unirradiated fresh fuel.
No shielding required.
Meets the dose rate limits established by 10 CFR 71.47(a) and 10 CFR 71.51(a)(2).
Dose measurements taken prior to every shipment.
Summary of maximum past dose measurements with TVS-K bundles to Sweden:
Measurement Location Dose (mSv/hr.)
Dose Limit NCT /
HAC (mSv/hr.)
Package Surface 7.0*10-3 2.0 / -
Conveyance External Surface 2.0*10-3 2.0 / -
2 Meters from Surface 0.5*10-3 0.1 / 10a a) 10 CFR 71.51 only applies for Type-B Packages and limit is set at 1 meter
Summary of TK-C69 SAR Chapter 6:
Criticality
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 6 Criticality Analysis Summary Criticality Safety Index (CSI) = 3.1 There are only four (4) TK-C69s in use, which is significantly less than allowed by the CSI (N=16)
Type-A material only (fresh unirradiated fuel)
Content is two (2) 17x17 TVS-K PWR bundles (Table 6-2).
Case keff Single Package NCT 0.240 Single Package HAC 0.905 Infinite Package Array NCT 0.343 Package Array HAC (2N=32) 0.904 Evaluation Summary (Table 6-1)
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 6 (cont.)
Model/Analysis Overview Moderation varied in different regions of the TK-C69 to find the most limiting moderation configuration (Section 6.3.4.4).
NCT model consistent with nominal package design and no water ingress (Section 6.3.4.6).
HAC package model consistent with deformation observed during testing and LS-DYNA results (Section 6.3.4.7).
o Most limiting moderation configuration.
o Fuel rod-to-rod pitch adjusted for several pins to conservatively reflect observations during drop test.
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 6 (cont.)
S-95TUK Computer Code Calculations (Section 6.3.3)
Monte Carol N-Particle code used for reactivity calculations including thermal neutron scattering with hydrogen using an S(,)
light water scattering kernel.
Eigenvalue results are similar to the Las Alamos National Laboratory code MCNP5 with the ENDF/B-V and ENDF/B-VI neutron cross-section libraries (Annex 6.9).
Eigenvalue results presented in Chapter 6 use S-95TUK with the ENDF/B-VI neutron cross-section library.
S-95TUK benchmarked using critical experiments for validation purposes using the ENDF/B-VI cross-section library.
Maximum keff values are reported in a different statistical format than what is commonly used in U.S. Safety Analysis Reports (Section 6.4.2).
Summary of TK-C69 SAR Chapter 7:
Package Operation
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 7 Package Operation - General Two options for loading/unloading container:
- 1. Raising platform with crane as shown earlier
- 2. Lifting container without lid and inserting vertically into a support/stand
Summary of TK-C69 SAR Chapter 8:
Acceptance Test and Maintenance Program
Summary of TK-C69 SAR - Chapter 8 Acceptance Test and Maintenance Program - General No special information highlighted
Discussion of Russian Standards cited in Application
Russian Standards in Application Several Russian standards cited in application
- NP-053-16 Safety Requirements during transportation of radioactive materials
- Various GOST material standards
- NRP-93 Norms substantiating strength calculations for transportation packaging carrying nuclear fissile materials
- Others listed in SAR Section 2.1.4 Adobe Acrobat Document
Russian Standards in Application (cont.)
GNF actions to-date
- Mapping of component GOST material standards to AISI standards provided to DOT via letter M180190 (Sept. 27, 2018)
GNF recommended approach
- Provide translations of welding specifications, main GOST material specifications, and NP-053-16