ML18283B615

Responding to Letter of 7/29/1976, Referring to IE Inspection Reports for 50-259/76-14, & 50-260/76-14, Letter Advising No Proprietary Information Is Contained

ML18283B615
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	07/20/1976
From:	Gilleland J Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Moseley N NRC/RGN-II
References
IR 1976014
Download: ML18283B615 (19)

Text

OgUTIQy TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 830 Power Building 1',s ting JUi 20 ~g76 Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulat:ory Commission Region II Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street, NW.

Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

This is in response to F. J. Long's .June 29, 1976, letter, IE:II:BJC 50-259 76-14 50-260/76-14, which transmitted for our review an IE Inspection Report (same number)

We have reviewed that report and do not consider any part of it to be proprietary.

Very truly yours~

J. E. Gilleland Assistant Manager of Power An Equal Opportunity Ernpioyer

tP,s RECCO' p UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 330 PEACHTREK STREET, N. W. 5UITE 8t8 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303

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.In Reply Refer To:

IE:IIIBJC 50-259/76-14 50-260/76-14 Tennessee Valley Authority Attn: Mr. Godwin lB.lliams, Jr.

Manager of Power 830 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Gentlemen-xefers to the inspection conducted by Mr. B. J. Cochran of this

'his office on May 20 June 4, 1976, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License Nos. DPR-33 and DPR-52 for the Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2 facilities, and to the discussion of our findings held with Mr. J. R. Hilding during the inspection.

Areas examined during the inspection and our findings are discussed in the enclosed inspection report. Mithin these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examination of procedures and represe'ntative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.

Vithin the scope of this inspection, no items of noncompliance were disclosed.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"

Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you submit a written application to this office requesting that such information be withheld from public disclosure. If no proprietary information is identified, a written statement to that effect should be submitted. If an application is submitted, it must fully identify the bases for which information is claimed to be proprietary. The application should be prepared so t at information sought to be withheld is incorporated in a separate paper and referenced in the application since the application will be placed in the Public Document Room. Your application, or written statement, should be submitted to us within 20 days. If we are not contacted as specified, the enclosed report and this letter may then be placed in the Public Document Room.

Tennessee Valley Authority Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, F. J. Long, Chief Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

Enclosure:

IE Inspection Report Nos.

50-259/76-14 and 50-260/76-14

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 0 230 PEACHTREE STREET, N. W. SUITE 8I8 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 n

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IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-259/76-14 and 50-260/76-14 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 830 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 Facility Name: Browns Ferry Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos.: 50-259 and 50-260 License Nos.: DPR-33 and DPR-52 Category: c/c Location: Limestone County, Alabama Type of License: GE, 1098 Mwe, BWR Type of Inspection: Special, Fire Damage Restoration Dates of Inspection: May 20-21, 1976 May 25-28, 1976 I

June 2-4, 1976 Dates of Previous Inspection: May 6-10, 1976 May 12-14, 1976 Inspector-in-Charge: B, J, Cochran, Reactor Inspector Projects Section Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Accompanying Inspector: T. D. Gibbons, Reactor Inspector Engineering Support Section No. 1 Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Other Accompanying Personnel: None Principal Inspectcr:~N B. J. Cochran, Reactor Inspector Date Projects Section Reactor Construction and Engineering Sup o t ranch Reviewed by:

Bryant, Chief Date P objects Section eactor Construction and. Engineering Support Branch

ZE 'Eps. Nos. 50-259/76-14 and 50-260/76-14

SUMMARY

OF FINDINGS I. Enforcement Items None II. Licensee Action on Previousl Identified Enforcement Matters 76-11-Al Im ro er Weldin Procedures Contrary to procedural requirements to prevent use of the wrong welding procedure, records indicate that welding of aluminum piping was'one using a procedure for welding stainless steel piping not aluminum.

III. New Unresolved Items None IV. Status of Previousl Re orted Unresolved Items None V. Desi n Chan es None VX. Unusual Occurrences None VII. Other Si nificant Findin s None VIII. Mana ement Interview During the inspection, the inspectors were in continuous communication with the Browns Ferry Plant management and as there were no items of noncompliance, no scheduled exit interview was held since it would have been superfluous.

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IE Rps. Nos. 50-259/76-l4 and 50-260/76-14 DETAILS I Prepared by:

B. J. Cockran, I& Reactor Inspector Date Projects Section Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Dates of Xnspection: May 20-21, 1976, May 25-28, 1976 une 2<<4, 1976 Reviewed by:

J. C r'yant, C f Date Pro ts Section Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch All information in Details I applies equally to Units 1 and 2 except where identified with a speci'fic reactor.

I. Individuals Contacted Tennessee Valle Authorit (TVA H. J. Green Plant Superintendent J. R. Hilding Fire Restoration QA Manager T. G. Campbell Modification and Additions Director D. Wright Electrical Engineer T. Ziegler Mechanical Engineer D. Jent Restoration Engineer J. Robinson - Restoration Engineer Supervisor J. Haynes Restoration Engineer s J. J. Wilder Restoration Engineer

2. Xn Part X, Section A of the Browns Ferry Fire Restoration Plan and Section 7.2 of the SER, TVA committed to liberal application of FlameMastic on all cable trays in the cable spreading room and secondary containment before startup. TVA has coated all the cable trays in the reactor buildings, the horizontal penetrations between the reactor buildings and the cable spreading room and cable trays five feet into the cable spreading room. The remaining trays within the cable spreading room will be coated with flamemastic prior to one percent power.

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The flamemastic coated cables and trays plus QA inspection records will be inspected when the work is completed.

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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-259/76-14 and 50-260/76-14 I-2

3. In Part X, Section A of the restoration plan, and Section 7 of the Safety Evaluation Report, TVA committed to modifying the cable spreading room ventilation system to shutdown in the event of fire by adding dampers and automatic controls to the cable spreading room ventilation system to exhaust smoke and heat. Operation of the Units 1 and 2 cable spreading room ventilation system will not adversely affect the Unit 3 spreading room system or vice versa.

To effect this modification TVA issued Pork Plans 4328, 4329 and 4378 to (l) shutdown the ventilation system and close the dampers, (2) provide manual override of controls, (3) add pressure relief dampers to protect the cable spreading room from over pressurization by the CO system and (4) install the isolation dampers and pneumatic operators. 2 The modifi'ed system, the documented work plans, and QA inspection records were examined.

No items of noncompliance were identified and IE has no further questions at this time.

In Part X, Section A of the restoration plan, TVA committed to reroute the Units 1 and 2 relief valve control cables to separate the automatic operation circuitry from the manual control circuitry.

TVA issued engineering change notices (ECN) L-9059 and L-1660 which included work plans 4396, 4397,, 4696, 5369, and 5370, which included:

(1) separating the control circuits; (2) relocating foux relief valves,, in each unit, on the relief valve header to equalize the resultant forces on the header during blowdown to the torus; (3) resetting valve pressure settings in accordance with GE design requirements and (4) relocating pressure switches, accumulators and associated piping.

I The completed work plans and QA inspection records were inspected to confirm that the modifications were done in accordance with the engineering change notices. IE has no further questions on this item at this time.

5. In Part X, Section A of the xestoration plan, TVA committed to remove the sealant material from all penetrations in Units 1 and 2 and to replace it using the new design materials. ECN L-9057, which was implemented by work plans 4401, '4402, 4403, 4404, 4405, 4406, 4407, 4408, 4409, 4411, 4412, 4413, '4415 and 4416 was issued to xemove the sealant materials and clean all penetrations in accordance with procedure BF-205R. Inspections were performed of cleaned penetrations and cleaning work in progress. All completed work plans and QA inspection records wexe inspected and no items of noncompliance were identified.

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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-259/76-l4 and 50-260/76-14 I-3 IE has no further questions on this item at this time.

6. In Part X, Section A of the restoration plan and Sections 3, 5 and 7 of the Safety Evaluation Report, TVA committed to modify the fire protection system by installing fire hose connections, fire hose racks and sprinkler systems throughout Units 1 and 2.

These modifications were identified in ECN L-9008, L-9061 and L-9062 and implemented by work plans 4379, 4383, 4387, 4651, 4661, 4665, 4697, 4905 and 5423.

The modifications included: (1) installation of additional fire hose connections and fire hose racks to the diesel generator building, turbine building, control bay and intake pump structure; (2) instal-lation of magnetic door release devices on diesel generator fire door (No. 294) to automatically close on signal from smoke detectors located on either side of the door; (3) raising fire pump discharge pressure to 175 psi and hydro testing fire protection system piping in turbine building, control bay, reactor building and diesel generator building at 225 psi for two hours and piping in the intake structure at 300 psi for two hours; (4) increasing the actuation pressures on the back pressure and surge relief valves to 175 psig and 190 psig; (5) installation of additional products of c'ombustion detectors (smoke detectors) in specific zones such that fire'n an area containing equipment essential to safe plant shutdown will be detected and the zone of influence alarmed. Forty-four detectors are installed in each reactor build'ing, sixteen in the turbine building, thirty-two in the intake pump structure, nine in the pump cable tunnel and seven in the diesel building; and (6) installation of heat detectors along cable trays runs parallel to the north wall of Units 1 and 2 reactor buildings at elevation 593, at the penetrations from the cable spreading room to the turbine building at elevation 586, at all penetrations from the cable spreading room into the reactor buildings and cable trays at elevation 565 in the reactor buildings. All completed work plans and QA inspection works were examined and installed smoke and heat detectors inspected. No items of concern were identified.

IE:II has no further questions on this item.

7. In Part X, Section A of the restoration plan, TVA commits to the installation of spare conduit sleeves to 'be installed through penetrations to allow future cable additions without breaching established penetrations.

To implement this commitment, Engineering Change Notices L-9057 and L-1616 were issued and the work was performed under work plans MP-4359 and WP-4370.

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IE Rpt. Nos. 50-259/76-14 and 50-260/76-14 I-4 The work plans'rovided for the installation of flexible conduit in penetrations that are not more than 60 percent full. In addition to the spare conduit sleeves, sections of multiconductor cables were run thru selected penetrations with the cables to be terminated on screwed terminal strips in terminal boxes located on both sides of the penetrations to be used as spare cables when needed.

The work was performed and inspected in accordance with the require-ments of procedure BF-206R, Rev. 2.

The installation of the spare conduit and cables and the completed work plans and QA inspection reports were inspected.

IE has no further questions on this item at this time.

8. In Part X, Section A of the restoration plan, TVA commits to install covers or shrouds over electrical panels or boards to protect components from water.

To implement this commitment, TVA issued ECN L-9061. The ECN was clarified with TVA letter dated May 28, 1976, in which they limited the installation of covers to the shielding of solenoid valves FSV-67-50 on each unit until the spray system is modified prior to the first refueling.

The installation of these covers completes the work required under this ECN prior to fuel loading of either unit.

IE:II has no further questions on this item.

9. In Part X, Section A of the restoration plan, TVA committed to seal conduit leading from, trays to ESS equipment to keep water from the spray system out. Work plans 4384 and 4912 were issued to implement this work. The work plans provided instructions to seal conduits and splice box entrances in reactor buildings, turbine buildings, cable tunnel, intake pump structure, cable spreading room, diesel generator building, and control bay, including the auxiliary instru-ment and battery board rooms.

The seal is made by forming a dam in the end of the conduit using Cerafibre, .then filling the end of the conduit with RTV-102. After inspection and / acceptance the end of the conduit and all exposed RTV is covered with flamemastic.

This work is completed in Unit 2 with approximately 40 percent remaining to be done in Unit 1, plus all conduits in the cable tunnel and intake structure. All conduit in Unit 1 that is within

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IE Rp t. Nos. 50-259/76-14 and 50-260/76-14 I-5 the zone of influence of the spray systems has been sealed and inspected. All of Unit 1 is scheduled for sealing prior to fuel loading in Unit l.

IE has no further questions on this item at this time.

1E Rpt. Ree. 50-259/76-14 aad 50-260/76-14 DETAILS II Ptepated by: AP . .457ee 0 z'/I'L-T. D. Gibbons, Reactor Inspector Date Engineering Support Section No. 1 Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Dates of Inspection Hay 25-28, 1976 Reviewed by:

T. E. Conlon, Chief Dat Engineering Support Section No. 1 Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch The- discussion contained in this section, of this report applies to Unit 1 and 2 equally unless noted otherwise

1. Persons Contacted Tennessee Valle Authorit TVA J. Hilding - QA Restoration Manager (OP/A)

R. Cole - gA Engineer (OP/A)

C. Hine - Electrical'ngineer {DPP)

2. Penetration Seals and Firesto s The inspector continued the examination of penetration seals and and firestops. The controlling procedure is BF 206R, "Electrical Penetration Seal and. Firestop Installation and'nspection (Units 1 and 2. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant);" The items inspected are summa-rized belov:.

Penetrations examined are as follows:

a~ Alphabetical Group Penetrations P, S, V which vere inspected vhile in process of construction

b. A Group Penetrations (3, 8, 9', 42-47). Of these pene-trations, 46-47 were complete the balance were still in process of construction

c. B Group Penetrations (3, 14, 34 thru 85, 87 thxu 90).

Of these'enetrations (3, 14, 38-39', 45, 46, 52, 53, 60, 61, 85, 87 thxu 90) were in the process of construction, the balance were complete.

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d. T Group Penetrations (1, 2, 8) were observed while being constructed

e. W Group Penetrations (1, 2, 3) were observed while being constructed The inspector noted that the TVA commitment in the fire restoration plan Part X, Section A requiring that the metal barrier plates and/or conduit be coated with Flamemastic 71A had been followed.

This requirement has been included as a part of drawing 45N830-27, Revision 4, and BF206R.

Within the areas examined, there were no items of noncompliance identified.

3. A lication of Flamemastic 71A.

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TVA committed to apply Flamemastic 71A on exposed electrical cables throughout secondary containment, diesel building,'able spreading room, water pump station and the pump station cable tunnel. This commitment is contained in Part X, Section A of the Restoration Plan. The inspector examined the installations to assure that it conformed to BF206R. The specific areas inspected on this in-spection were Unit 1 secondary containment elevations 565 and 593, and Unit 2 secondary'- containment elevation 565. The diesel generator building, water pump station and the water pump station tunnel were also inspected. This effort continues .the examinations made and reported in prior IE Region II'eports.

Trays examined are as follows:

a. Unit 1 Secondary Containment (1) Elevation 565, Trays (AT, AV, EL, KO, IU, KFI, VE, KG, EG,

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(2) Elevation 593, Trays (FU, ME, UK, TL, TC, BC, EW, LE, VE, TE, KT, KS)

b. Unit 2 Secondary Containment Elevation / 565, Trays (EV, LG, AQ, EU, KW, TF, MAQ, KX, EP, BP,

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c. Common to both Units 1 and 2 (1) Diesel Generator Building, Trays (EA, JA, VA)

IE Rp t. Nos. 50-259/76-14 and 50-260/76-14 II-3 (2) Water Pumping Station, Trays (GN,, RF, WP, VE, CA, CB, GO, RI, EV, CP, PI)

(3),Water Pumping Station Cable Tunnel, Trays (GN, RF, WP, VE, CA, CB, CP)

This completes the inspection of the Flamemastic installation in Units 1 and 2 secondary'containment,* the diesel building, water pumping station and the"water pumping station cable .tunnel. The licensee has applied Flamemastic 71A in the cable spreading room for the required five feet 'from the penetration seal" face. The application of the full coverage will be completed prior-to reach-ing 1% power. The cable spreading room full coverage will be inspected on a future'inspection.

Within the areas examined there were no items of noncompliance identified.

4. Nondirected Ins ection Activities The inspector made a walk-through inspection of Units 1 and 2; In the secondary containments the sealing of conduits was observed.

In the spreading room areas the Cardox system was checked to assure that the glass plates were installed. In the'ontrol room the inspector spot checked the sealing of conduits.

Within the .areas examined there were no items of noncompliance identified.,

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