ML18283B111
| ML18283B111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry (DPR-033, DPR-052) |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1975 |
| From: | Gilleland J Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Case E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML18283B111 (4) | |
Text
AEC DISTr.
JTIO.'! FOR PrsRT aO DOC!i T(.14 RIAL (TEi,iPORARY FORiVi)
COiNTROL NO:
RLE:~HKIIX F RO )1: TennesseelValley Auth.
Chattanooga, Tenn.
37401 J.E. Gilleland DATE Or" DOC 1-20-75 DATE R FC'0 1-23-75 LTR RPT OTHER
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. 'Mr. E.CASE CLASS Ui1!CLASS PROP INFO ORIG 1 signed INPUT CC OTHER r"JO CYS REC'D SEi~!T AEC PQR KX SENT LOCAL PDR DOCKET NO:
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Ltr trans the following:
50-25 26o 1
ENCLOSURES: Browns Ferry Plant Units 1
%. 2 NonRoutine 30-Day Report re failure in the piping system....
PLANT NAh;IE:
Browns Ferry 1 8: 2 (1 cy encl rec r d)
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'G FILE 2
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'eguiatoyy Docket Pile TENNESSEE VALLEYAUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 January 20, 1975 Mr. Edson G.
Case Acting Director of Licensing Office of Regulation U.S.'tomic Energy Commission Mashington, DC 20545.
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Dear Mr. Case:
TENNESSEE VALLEY-.AUTKORXTY ~ BROHNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLRVZ UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS ~ 50-259,(~2~6-FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33', DPR-52, The enclosed report, submitted as required by Browns Ferry Nuclear -Plant Technical Spe'cification 6.7.2.B(3),
is to provide details concerning Browns Ferry's units 1 and 2 control bay air conditioning equipment.
It was disco; crc",on Dcccmbcr 19 3.97';, <<h"t thc control air conditioning equipment could be disabled by a single failure.
Very truly yours, J. E. Gilleland Assistant to the Manager of Power Enclosure
-CC (Enclosure):
Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Directorate of Regulatory Operations U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Region II Suite 818 230 Peachtree
- Street, NN.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 gc~
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OC An Equal Opportunity Employer
ENCLOSURE e
gegUIBt0ry- 00c~Bt Fit~
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j 13ROWS FERRY NUCLEAR PIANT UNITS 1 AND.2 NONROUTINE 30-DAY REPORT g~j,@ ) 7', ll74~W%
Description of Occurrence Certain single failures in the piping system of the control bay air conditioning equipment (CBACE) could result in the loss of cooling water to all control bay cooling equipment; Causes of Deficiency The deficiency arises due to the fact that the normal and emergency water supplies to the control bay chillers share a
common distribution header.
The discharge lines have a similar situation.
Safety Im lications Since the operability of the control bay air conditioning equipment must be assured, system separation will be desirable to increase
) eliability.
This will require a provision for sepa at operation of the emergency cnolina equipnent from the nnrrnal nr>ntrol
'hyper conditioning system.
P Corrective Measures Seismically qualified piping and valves will be added to the existing h
system to obtain the desired separation.
This involves connecting the EECM water supply directly to the emergency chiller and providing separate discharge piping from this chiller into the EECN discharge conduit.
ECN-L1321 was issued'o make these design changes.
Corrective measures will be implemented by March 15, 1975.
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