ML18219D960

Letter Response to Request for Detailed Evaluation of Potential Consequences of Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containment

ML18219D960
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	03/21/1977
From:	Tillinghast J Indiana Michigan Power Co, (Formerly Indiana & Michigan Power Co)
To:	Rusche B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML18219D960 (14)

Text

NRCFC.M 195 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORV Co ION

{2.76} c

'IRC DISTRIBUTION FoR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL DOCKET NUMBER FILE NUMBER TO:

Mr. 1hnard C. Rus'che FROM: indiana 5 Mgcg. Power Co.

New York, N.Y.

10004 John Tillinghast DATE OF DOCUMENT 0 DATE RECEIVED 0 SfLETTER ABORIGINAL 0 COP.V QNOTORIZED glJNCLASSIFIED PROP INPUT FORM NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED DESCRIPTION(

" s 1

Qj,~y-.'I'~.;",('

Ltr. Notorized 03-21-77...Ref our 01-17

~77 ltr...Trans The Following:

(,,~

),'DO ROT 1IZigOyg ENCLOSURE Consists of Requested, info. regards'g~

, Potential consequences of a.cruel handling

~

accident inside the containment of Donald C.

Cook Plant Unit No. 1.....; ',

I

( 4 pages

) .

DONALD C.

COOK UNIT P 1 gcm RCK+OglLEDGED FOR ACTION/INFORMATION ASSIGNED AD:

C NAE L C.ASS PROJECT MANAGER LIC ASST

~

REG F NRC PDR I &'E OELD GOSSICK & STAFF MIPC CASE HARLESS PROJECT MANAGEMENT BOYD P

COLLINS HOUSTON PETERSON HELTEMES SKOVHOLT INTERNALD SYSTEMS SAFETY HEINEMAN SCHROEDER ENGINEERING MACARRY BOSNA<.'IHWEIL PAWLICK REACTOR SAFE ROSS NOVAK ROSZTOCZY CHECK AT& I SALTZMAN RUTBERG EXTERNALDISTRIBUTION ISTR I BUTION PLANT SYSTEMS TEDESCO IPPOL TO OPERATING REACTORS STELLO OPERATING TECH EISENHUT B

E STESA ERNST BALLARD YOUNGBLOOD SITE TECH GAMMILL STEPP HULMAN SITE ANALYSIS VOLLMER BUNCH J

COLLINS KREGER CONTROL NUMBER LPDR'IC:

o e

NAT LAB REG V IE ULR KSON 0

NSIC'.

ASLB:

ACRS CYS H8bi@88IJ E

NRC FORM 196 (2-76)

LA PDR CONSULTANTS:

7 ~08%>g@

kit~

bp

~ Qi I

%II t

II L

V M

'I t

h

INDIANA II MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY P. O. BOX 18 BOWLING GREEN STATION NEW YORK, N. Y. 10004 KMLGNi'fM~uà I'l.i@@@,

1977 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit No.

1 Docket No. 50-315 DPR No.

58

'; HKl MAR2@ )97) ~

illRf GUIANA OIIY.

QV4N15$ IPN Mr. Berhard C. Rusche, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington',

D.

C.

20555

Dear Mr. Rusche:

This letter is in response to Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann's

request, dated January 17, 1977, for a detailed evaluation of the potential consequences of a fuel handling accident inside the con-tainment of Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit No. 1.

The evaluation was to use assumptions comparable to those given in Regulatory Guide 1.25 "Assumptions Used For Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized

>later Reactors."

It was further specified that the analysis should be performed in two parts:

(1) a conservative analysis using parameters as limited by the technical specifications and (2) an analysis using parameters associated with cur rent known facility operating conditions.

The details of these analyses are presented in Attachment l.

The conservative analysis based on the assumptions in Regulatory Guide 1.25 yielded results which indicated that an individual at the site boundary would receive a 0-2 hour thyroid dose of 82.3 Rem and a 0-2 hour whole body dose of 1.3 Rem.

In the realistic analysis, employing the assumptions listed in Regu-latory Guide 4.2 appendix I, the 0-2 hour thyroid and whole body doses to an individual at the site boundary were estimated to be 5.61 x 10-3 Rem and 3.73 x 10-4 Rem, respectively.

I II I

II C

h I

h ll

~ I I

E Based on this analysis, the radiological consequences of a fuel handling accident inside the containment of Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit No.

1 are well within the limits (300 Rem to thyroid and 25 Rem to whole body) of 10 CFR Part 100.

Very truly yours, ice President

-Sworn and pubscribed to before me this ~/~ day of March, 1977 in New York County, New York Notary Public DAVIDG. HUME NOTARY PU8t.lC, State oi New Yoik No. 314608113 Quali%ed in New York County CC

~

G ChaT,noff commission Exp'res arch 30, 197$

R.

C. Callen P.

W. Steketee R. J.

Vollen'.

Walsh R.

W. Jurgensen

- Bridgman R. S. Hunter

I

~

~

- r t',"

~

il

~

If f

)'i r;

Il II

.v P

li.":".

li I'I A

11 If b

If l

f 11 f44%

= I 1

il 1

~'i 11" EW iIll

'I fl

I t

1 hf.1~ I

~

~

~

IA, I

I t I" i

II

Attachment 1

Fuel Handling Accident, Inside Containment of Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant potential consequences of a fuel handling accident were evaluated using (1) the conservative assumptions listed in Regulatory Guide 1.25 and (2) the realistic assumptions given in Regulatory Guide 4.2 Appendix I.

I.

Assum tions Used A.

Conservative Case 1)

Gap activity from all rods in the assembly (204')rods') xmas>sreleased.

2)

Accident occurs 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after the plant shutdown 3)

Radial peaking factor is 1.65

4) All the gap activity in the assembly is released and consists of 10% of iodines, 10% of all noble gases other than Kr-85, and 30%

of Kr-85> of the total activity in the rods at the time of the accident.

5)

Iodines are composed of 99.75% inorganic and. 0.25%

organic species.

6)

Effective pool decontamination factors for iodines and noble gases are 100 and 1, respectively.

7)

Activity is released into the atmosphere 8)

No plateout of iodine inside containment or in ducts 9)

Atmospheric dilution factor (X/Q value'- = 3.15 x 10 m-if...c'orresponds to 8-24 hour value given in Regulatory Guide 1;4.

10) Effective energies for Beta and gamma radiation are estimated using references given in Regulatory Guide 1.25

11) Breathing rates and dose conversion factors for iodines are taken fxom Regulatory Guide 1.25.

w ~

w N

w rw s

w w

w N

(>>

N 8)

~

N N -,I

~

w w

g c;

w w

Iww gII

( r N

, s-I, wwwr p>>

,-)I r r ah N

,N

,w. )

~

N'q N

~

~

, )

w

~:

N

= "C w

~

~

I Fl

• w w

)N l'

i

~w g

~

N w i

)

w I

gw,

~ yf

~ w II w

w

'%P'N,

(

)

~ w w

j r N )rw

~ <<)rr'

B.

Realistic Case 1)

Gap activity consists of 1% of the rod activity.

2)

The gap activity from 1 row of xods in the assembly was released.

3)

The accident occurred one week after shutdown.

4)

Effective pool decontamination factor for iodine'is 500.

5)

X/Q value is 1/10th of that, in Regulatory Guide 1.4 (3.15 x 10 sec./m

)

II.

Anal tical Methods A.

Thyroid Dose Model 0-2 Hr. thyroid, dose at the site boundary was estimated using D = F W. F P R.-

X (DF

)

(DFf)

D = thyroid dose from Isotope Ii (rads)

Fg = fraction of core damaged Ii = core iodine inventory (curies)

Ri = Dose Conversion Factor for Ii P = fuel peaking factor (1.65)

B = breathing rate (3.4 x 10 m 3/sec.)

Z/Q = atmospheric dilution factor (sec./m

)

DFp = pool decontamination factors DFf = filter decontamination factor (1 for both cases-no credit is taken).

F = fraction of fuel rod iodine inventory in fuel x'od void space (O.l)

C, Tj>> ~ I

~ T QP~

P)

$ ~ I'QTJ~P)tt>>

Tf

)

4

~

C)(lg)i(),

'I(.

$f T

4'T,T,

,',3'Vyt.)() T'(

I IIEET T

~ n l>>

• )

14 T

IIW kd V V ( r;g

~r)IS PNJ(

A (TQI' 4

I IT 4 l '>>

P

B.

Whole Body Dose Equation 0-2 hour whole body dose was estimated using D

(0.23 E

+0 ~ 25 Ey

) X where E = effective bete energy (Mev/dis) 8 = effective gamma energy (Mev/dis) concentration of the isotope in the cloud (curies/m

)

IXX.

Results The results of this analysis are listed below:

0-2 hour site boundary doses (rem)

Thyroid Whole Body 10 CFR 100 Limit Conservative Case Realistic Case 300

82. 3 5e61 x 10 25 1.3 3e73 x 10 For both conservative and realistic cases, no credit was taken for the closure of the containment isolation valve, since the radiation monitor that generates the signal for the closure of this value is Seismic Class IIX and is not redundant.

Further, it was observed that the minimum isolation valve closure times as specified in technical specification limits were longer than the calculated transit, time for the radioactive puff to reach the valve from the pool.

However, assuming no earthqua'ke or single active failure of radiation monitor and with actual measured valve closure times as opposed to technical specification minimum, it was shown that only a small fraction of the above cited activity willbe released to the environment since the isolation valve will close before the major portion of the gaseous release reaches the isolation valve.

Ir g

• II I

~

I /

I

(

re f'

r,,)

rg

> CrM r

rr N'

f

,'l IN v

d ~

(+

~

~

I I

f

'P y

g N

Q I

/'I IIIr r d 4

~

g ,I If'lw

'I "l

d'I r

rI Irrg,'

',I'l >", N',I I

rlfrd II, 'A NI' I'" I'",

I r'I I

I Ie r[

I I'$

N ~

N.a

I N

Il NIl r II Mg ~ I l'

d

(

'I d

~

"IIlQ N

~ )

~

r II*

IV.

Conclusions From the results of this analysis it is concluded that the radiological consequences due to a fuel handling accident inside containment are well within the limits set forth in 10 CFR part 100.

v<

P>>

tk

~,

~

R~r~~vcn vo",l ~~el t

5/(

fA',P, 35 W ff 24 C

Qg%t P

H'