ML18219D873
| ML18219D873 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1977 |
| From: | Tillinghast J Indiana Michigan Power Co, (Formerly Indiana & Michigan Power Co) |
| To: | Case E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML18219D873 (12) | |
Text
0 DISTRIBUTION AFTER ISSUANCE OF OPERATZlG LICENSE i NRC PGRM '195 VA NUCLEAR RSGULATORY COMMISSION
? IZ-TSI Ii NRC DISTRIBUTION FGR PART 60 DOCKET MATERIAL OOCXST NUMSSR
- Sts FII.S NVMSSR
'~VTSR CjORIQINAI
~COPY QNOTORIZSO JaCSC~IPISO Mr. Edson G.
Case ITO:'ROP INPVTFORM FROMI Indiana
& Michigan Power Co.
New York, N. Y.
10004 John Tillinghast OATS OF OOCVMSNT 11/17 77 OATS RSCSIV 8 0 Il IS/7'7 NUM88R OF COPISS RSCSIVSO t ea.-
SNCLOSV R8 I
! CSSCRIPTION Const.sts of ie8omation concerni the use of mQlti-pin connectors on safe I
cables at their, connection to the insid i
of containment electiical penetrations...
w/att supporting informationia'.Notorize 11/17/77.........
2p + 6p i
I PLANT NAIIE:.
COOK jcm 11/18/77 gaVF
", gled. ALRe~ey P~P<eQ re QM C..LOCA L Q.'S K IAS?ROC!; l2QI665 SAFETY BRANCH CHIEFI 7
FOR ACTiON/INFORi4IATION INTERNALDISTRIBUTION ICE (")
OELD BAUER C.'KCK 58RSQRt EISEiIHUT SHAO BUTLER GRL'DIES 0
, EXTERNALDISTRIBUTION CONTROL NUMBER ifSIC 16 CYS ACRS SEVE CA~ORY 7>3220056
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'c0 SOWLtNO OAKEN SThTlOH HC'W YORK ~ H, Y, cD004 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Vni.t No.
DocJ:et No. 50-315 DPR Non 5S Hr. Rdson C.
C:@ceo, hctinq Director Off'ice of Nuclear Rc actor Regulation U.S. Nuclear. 'Regulatory'ommission
.Nashington, D.C. 20555 Dear Nr. Cases Nov ~ l7, l9'77 CEiv(0 NOR ~)9
' l HQcccg~
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Thicc 3.ether and ita at:ter)ament@
are oubmittod jn response to the NBC Elt:af F 'cc oral requcat t.oday for ncMitional information cnccrning
{:ho usa of el)3%i-pin connectors on safety cables at their Connection to the in83.dc..of'ontainment olect:riccil pc.net:rations.
>he only use oi such conncctorA at Donald C.
Coo)c Nuclear Plant Unit 'l ia on instrumentation circuit.a for n tota3, of savant:y
{70) inetxumonta.
Those inst:rumc nts and their functicin are 3.i@ted in
Attachment:
A Yesterday, wo tolc ccipiecb to the Staff portions of, our.
Spec@,f 3.antlion DCC-HE-lL5 QCN des'cribing our" poet-accident envi ran-mental criteria for the c3.cctrical penwt:rations and connAct:ore enQ the fL r at t:wn (2') palea of &tie., Spoc.
C 501 5 which ohow that the conncctoro uscQ v'ere qual3.fied for operation at; tempc..rnturea Mp to 257o F
Since documentation ia not, availab1e to c3c.moncctrate that
~ Q})QRQ coAnt>citAc'8 Anc4 the,) l AQQociateo circuity l'Till opera t~
3 n the total poat-accMont envoi ronmc.nt, including the gffc.cts of prese:ure,
,- 'otoam 'end certain chemical@,
wo aro committ.ed to qual ifying there connector'i for this"onviXonment.or replacing.
them with connc ctiona that are Oo qualified.
Xn the intciim until thi6 ici"done, p<tachment; 0 prove.des asnurcincie that we have the c:apnhi3 lity to r>afccly trip the reactor, init;iatc safoty injection, ic:olat:e the containment and monitor the course of the accident without rc..lienee on the connector~
in question.
Attachment 8 also demonstrates
~n abi3ity ta c~nfely shut.
down tho reactor, keep i.t in e ~af~ ~hutdo>>n condit.ion and mc.et all the requirements of 3.0 CFR 50, Appendix K.
773220056
Xn addition to th5.c, n eiqnif3.cant riclc33.tional pub).ic health anR safety consideration 5,c t:he very low likelihood of a high energy pipe bri~o)e whk oh would call upon t:he connectors to function.
This low probability is documented in WARH - ).400 and is reduced even further by the nhort peri o0 of time to @hi ch
-the current review applioe.
Finally, to provide even further a'sAuxance that the plant; w5.ll continua to opi..rate safely, we will immeclSat:n) y im-plement the odmini,otrative proceclures set forth in Attachment.. t:.
VI~ truly your+~
Swox'n Gn4 eubyyribed to. before mo on th9.oflday o2 November, X977 in Now Yerk County, Now York i3.3.ingh Ot Vk.ce Xresic3en P>>
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%~her F P-110 HZP-111 FiP"210 HTP-2~A YPiP-120 P 121 3ZP-2X KP-221 KP-130 ag
>2)0 37R-"=K PPP 1)1 5PP-lr~2 )iVP-1~3 GP-1;1 FiLP-1j2 KP-1;3 5I.Z-ljl UPB-1)3 3VP-2"0, HFP-220 HFP-230 '.Pp-d XZP-211 PPP-~9 m 231. HCS 3I FiD HCS CL HTD HCS CL BTD -HCS EI HTD .HCS EI HTD HCS CI HD HCS CI H"D HCS SI BTD 'PCS HI KD RCS CT RTD RCS CT PTD RCS HT ELD RCS E HTD HCS CL FK HCS CL RTD HCS HL BTD HCS P.L 3TD HCS EL HID HGS F.I Yi'D H~A CL mD HCS CL 3ZD HCS CL RTD H~A CL RD p-es~i'er P es a=e presnzizer Pr ssM8 p e "wizer Press ProsMiÃr Press:z~izer Press&ize>> Pressurizer Pr seizer Le¹ iavel Lev~~ Level wdica,.or Presr~re S:8",a HCS HCS HCS HCS HCS HCS RCS Loop 1 m~op 2 Loom l Loop + Loop 1 Loom 2 Ivor 3 lov ~ov vlos Tlov V 7lov Floe Hyness-Hnov Ban6e-Loom 1 riess-Harro~ Range-Looi 1 Bp088 '4 Tcw RBQ<6 Loco 1 Bypass-Ha~@ Ban"-e-Lao~ 1 ~ss-'Ba~ Hinge-~i 2 Bpu,ss-sl'aver H"~~e-Loop 2 B~ass-Ha~ Hange-Looy 2 3ymss-H'arrov Hanse-Loop 2 Bypass-harv Hange-T<oy 3 3ypass-Har~ Range-T~y 3 3yyass-Narrov Hazge-roy 3 ~pass-KsrroY Range Ts00$ ~ss-Harrov Bande-Looy + 3:~ss-Ha~+ Plunge-Loop 4 Bypass-%a re~ P vg -Lxa + 3+Qss-PR TFs Huge-Loop Mell-dide 3aa~e-L~o 1 Nell-'fide Page-Leos 2 Mell-~fide 3angs-Loop 3 MeU.-',fide ~~re Med~-~fide +~e-Iaap 1 Mell-dide 3a~e-Icos 2 '.~el3.-~fide Ban e-Loop 3 Me&~-Hide Hm~e-Loon 4 Fane+ion i3 t7'fR <-'verpower A>:" Rz ~y Ove&' Ri ~L e~rdi& ~..- Ho Safety ss~lz'e co<<cider,, ~4h ~ ~eg Ei, ~ssuz. - ~:rig Ta.P"essure - Bx Ai tT PTSSSQZ8 CO&Cd.GHli 'Muh LO K8Vel Ei. Level - Bx Trip Tzdk&tion onlv-ho safet7 fungtgon ~ssQri"er Lo pressure-M 4~@ ss of ilov 'Rc vriT) Zunber NFP-241 37P" 212 i'"222 9'P-232 9 P-4r2 UPS-'l ']PS-122 BIP-110 BLP"120 '-130 LZ-140 ALP-111 3LP<<121 BLP"131 r LP-~>>'1 BLP-112 BLP<<122 BLP"l>2 3LP-192 3~M-120 PLY-lj0 QLT-1)Q 1 - 11 '~gC" ~ 20 NFC"121 WZC-130 Q-] 31 +~iP<<1 Q Zovmc~~taze BCS Loop 4 Tov PCS Troy 1 Zlov BCS "T~p 2 Plov HCS Loop ) Plow HCS Loop 4 Floe (HM3) (PZ@O5) Stean Stean Stean St;ean Steam Stma Su@2 Stea'5 Stea~ 8"eu Steam S-.eau Steam Steam Stcam Stean Generator'ene ato ~~ne a ~oT G6M'Z2 or &nerator Generator Genera%" Generator Genera to QeQezatoz'enera" or Nor Qc1o G61 Zato~ Cinerator Generator Le eel<<Honor P~pe-icoy ~mraj <<ga roy ~a Loop Iavel"'Ha~@ Hm~e-Loop ve 'a~ ocT BR'Loo'p ~eel-3a~~ Ran~e-~woy level-Bar ov ~~e-Iaoy Level-'Ba~v Han~e-Loon 'MJel"r7a~v 3DQ>e-Loop Level-'3arrov 3am e-Leo@ Leve1-7fa~ov Range-Loop Level-'3am@ ~~e-Toom Leve~-'Va~ %n"e-Zeoo 7~el-N~ 8e Pence-mccoy T~p1 ',jide pGQge Mop 2 '~(el >1~8 RQ~e A'00 p e PQQ~cl<<Loop bo
- <~<~ St>xa ~o-~-Lac~
No~a Steaa Po-;~-L>oe 1 N~~a Stean Fox-Iooz 2 kh~z Stem.'low-Loop 2 Stem Hov-Loop > a~em Flow >ahoy )- S em Plow-Loop + Na~m Stean P3.ov-Loo BCS dMe Ran=e Press~-Loop 2 BCS Vide 3'e Press~e-Looi Pmetion Loss of Floe - Rx triy g~ ~lcRhVA~ ~ p. coMs R ~cates'On17-Ho Safe+ c t~y on YMn o.em Pcv-FeMmte.. f ov a saat.a Sheave Hov-.Stean~~e Isom~M.on Pend.salve on HB3 Sy<ea Open> Ant.o c1ose ox'HB ovez 600ysi 4 3CS soU.d voter oaex'ation Pres. Protection m-Lo 1evel-Hx Crit 4 aito start mM~>>~ "eeAm+er . Hi-im'-el-Tmbfne. <<rip Peedvaier iso~iiioa & tMj> fea<iyuny 2 3 1 2 3 0 At CachmenC 8 Capabtlf ty of Assurance of React,or Trip, 'afety Ln1ect.ion OJpna.')s round Ab)l,it:y "Co Monitor the Coui se of the Accident Followinp a IIigh Er~ergy J.inc I)rea)( ln-Sidc Containment I. Thc Ability t:o Tn$ Ciate Safeguards from Xnside the Containrniin The first point Co bo considered is Chat; such rx high energy linc break inside conCainmenC ie extremely unlikely event particu1arly in Cho short; period of time required Co qualify or replace connectors to resolve Chks matCer ~ Elect,rascal penetrat,lons exit t,'he contalnmenC in >y quadrants such ChaC Che t;rip signals for the unaffected quad-ranCs could occur before Che hostile environment is experienced aC their location. Mith regard to automatic. actu(xtion of r af eely'ygtc'ms and reactor trip, Chose funcCions are actuated by containment 'ressure signals aC X,.2 POX. For an environment, morc soverc than 1.2 POX>, the safety function vill have already been iniCiaCed by containmenC pressure signal. IC. is unlikely that a mild environmenC 'f about l PSI will fail Cho connectors. Xn addition, were all the OonnccCors Co fail in the shorteQ
- mode, numerous t;rip s3.gnals would occur due Co Che functional diversity of Che proteeC5.on system..
Thus automatic iniCiaCion of';he roquired safety functions is assured. SubsequenC Operator Action -:. For operator acCion required followinp a loss of coolant; accident, 1
- sCeam line break or a feedwaCer line break, Cho following apply r
- Foz the loss of coolant aecidcnC, Chc only manual action required is
-'wjCchover.'his action io iniCiated based on Chc refrxeling water ., otorage t,enk.leve1 which is out'side containment, For the steam line
- nnQ. f'beAwater, X'inc break,
- :in.the absent,e. of npxma3. reactor..coolant system and pres sar 1 me>
9 notrument ation, the oper at or ean allow auxiliary feedwater and safety in)ec.Cion Co run indefinitely. AC " C41s point in plant lifo, Cho reactor coolant systom'nCcpricy will be maintained even 1f the system is pressurized to t,ho relief valve octpoinC s 'w Pi ]'j~~. 'L A 4 I ~ 0 I ~ At;tachmcnt 8 The Backup Ability to Det,ect an Accident; and Xnitinte Safeguards, and the Ab)lity to monitor the Course of an Accident A A review wao conducted oi'he important variables Mhose status following a LOCA, steam3.9.nc brcak or fecdwnt.nr 31nA break are needed by the operator for det,ect;ion of t'c nccidont, initiation of safc-guards and monitoring the course of the accident and which do not requLre the.operab11$ ty of. the HATT Cannon elect;rascal connectors inside the containmont. The variables area Gontainmexxt; pressure " t;ransmittcrs are locot'cd outside .the cozltainment. Steam generator prcssure - this pax'amet er i monitored outside the containmcnt and also yields steam temperature because of t;ho satur at cd. stat c. Reactor coolant syst,.em,temperature .".an approximate temperature ig indicat;ed by steam penerat;or prcssure (scc Xtam 7'bove). 4 ~ Heactor coolant system pressure " t;h).s is monit:ox.ed by a prcssure instrument on the discharge of the centrifugal charg5ng pump. This instrument is not'.solat;cd by.containment isolation. 3n addition, react;or coolant; pressure is availablc from dead weight tester NPX-3.$ 3.. Pressurizer Motor Level " this parameter can be evaluat:ed indirectly through the ufo of nox mal charging flow instr>>mentat:ion out.side con-
- ainmcnt, evaluation of total dmin flow from conta(nmcnt sumps by uoo oi'ump pump xun t;ime counter 3.ocat;ed out.side containment or evaluat;1on of AMST level decrease.
6, Ref'uolte.ng >Eater Storape Tnnk Mater Levels normal instrumentation 1ocated outside containment. P. Boric Acid Tank Solution level: normal inst;rumentat;ion locatod outside containment. 8 Steam Generator Mater Lovo3.s! approximate water levclp wil> be gbt;awned by insta13.in@ a differential pressure cell on the stcam generator blowdo~rn sarop3.e line and the stcam outlet sample line, both located 9n t,he Hucl~ar'Sample Room. To monitor th1s vari-
- able, an instrumentation
~nd control technician will be available 74 hours8.564815e-4 days <br />0.0206 hours <br />1.223545e-4 weeks <br />2.8157e-5 months <br /> a dey until such t;imc that';he t,estinp of the connectoxe ig completed,. ': ~': ~ ~
- ~:
~ r. P ~ ~ ~ w ~ ~ . ~ ~ 'i i. k j l Attgchmon 9 4 i l Expcted response timo go 13.owing + high energy 1 5 ne break inciye containmont Quostion 19 of Appendix N of the FBhR provides the pre@ourn rosponsos f'r a spectrum of'oss of'oolant accidents. For the large break, this shows that the containmont hi pressure signal. of 1.2's% will >e z ea ohnd 1n 0.2 sccondo or 1nss f'ollowing the rnlc~ne to the oontn5.nugent The s4eam lan~ break response is sirn9.lar. This coupled with an actual measured instrument; response t,'irne of less than 0.4 seconds tn initiate a safety infection signal is wi4hiz the envelopA oi'nf'cty in)octagon actuation tiNA AAsllmAcl Ln th& analysis ~ Thus the total response fo33.owinp a hiph onrrpy 1.1ne brea+ w3 t)dn containmen4 is within t he envelope assumed in the oafoty analysis> and the resulting post'ccJQent'arameters will be ~ithin the limibo specif'XOA in 100FHpO.'t6 Appian iix K to lOCFi3 Part p~o. lP 4/lh+hA A ~ + %%2< p'AILh+ItpflpJLQ+~AANIILP 'I ') %w+h4RI+QP4p WAX iPRAA +Ac NWWWA%Xx', alAhlhg)A, g<<)1 +~. l" w W5%l %' ~y ~ ~ I I';1'g If I I I ( Page 1 of l At:t.echmcnt C ln addition tv the atpil ity of thea opr~rator to monitor and control the events as not:eQ in the alcove it.oms 1 t.hrouqh 0, we wilg also commit Co manual emergency ihuMnwn and/ox Safety Xngection actuation if either of the fnllowing occurs> (1} actual.ion of the Xce Condenser Door "opon" 3.ample coi.nciClcnt with either low otcamlinc pre~sure or rise in containment; pressure Accux'R en increase in containment: humidity of 25'h with5 n e per 5od of 5 ~~coy~cl qn both contai>>me nt humLdit y detectors co5nc5.dent wit.h an indicat.ion of containmont preasuro rioo. None oK these items would be effected by the fa5.lure OK the XTT Cannon connectors. The Jc:e Conclc,neer cloorA "open" >amps are harcl-Mired t;hrouqh the containment paneLration and the st<nml in+ and containmont pro@sure indicators aro located outside cont;ainment. The time response of the humidity detectors is short, relative to the accident environment reaching the contain-mont penetration feedthrough. at any t:ime'o are below l00 power on Unit. l. until. the .ITT Cannon connectors..are..qual ified -'or. ri pl clceR( 'UP%'MSX'1 mb)nual ly.'n'iterate start af wixi1 ivory'ciedwater pumps and maintain them in operation until shut. down or roturn to power.