ML18219D800
| ML18219D800 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1978 |
| From: | Tillinghast J Indiana Michigan Power Co, (Formerly Indiana & Michigan Power Co) |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| AEP:NRC: 00077 | |
| Download: ML18219D800 (25) | |
Text
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL 0-.
REC:
DENTON H
R NRC ORG:
TILLINGHAST J IN 8c MI PWR DOCDATE: 09/13/ 78 DATE RCVD: 09/14/78 DOCTYPE:
LETTER NOTARIZED'ES COPIES RECEIVED
SUBJECT:
LTR 1
ENCL 1
FORWARDING INFO CONCERNING MOVEMENT OF HEAVY LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL AREAS AT SUBJECT FACILITY... WJATT DRAWINGS.
PLANT NAME: COOK UNIT 1
COOK -. UNIT 2 REVIEWER INITIAL:
XJM DISTRIBUTER INITIAL:
~~~~~~~~<<~~~~~~~e DISTRIBUTION PF THIS MATERIAL IS AS l=PLLGWS ~<++~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
NOTES:
I 5 E 3 CYS ALL MATERIAL GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FOR AFTER ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LICENSE.
(DISTRIBUTION CODE AO01)
FOR ACTION:
INTERNAL:
EXTERNAL:
BR CHIEl ORBOi BC~~~W/7 ENCL REG WfENCL
. E~~W/Q ENCL HANAUER44WfENCL AD FOR SYS 0 PROJ++W/ENCL REACTOR SAFETY BR4wWJENCL EEB+< WfENCL J
MCGOUGH4%W/ENCL gPDR S
ST.
JOSEPH'I+4W/ENCL TERA~~W/ENCL NS IC++W/ENCL ACRS CAT B4%W/16 ENCL NRC PDR44W/ENCL GELD+>LTR ONLY CORE PERFORMANCE BR%<W/ENCL ENGINEERING BR>+W/ENCL PLANT SYSTEMS BR++W/ENCL EFFLUENT TREAT SYS>>W/ENCL DISTRIBUTION:
LTR 40 ENCL 39 CONTROL NOR:
7807202 8
SIZE:
2P+13P ~4P END
%%%%%%%4%4%%%%%%%4%%+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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@AU)IIIOII%ll5~<~
INDIANA R MICHIGAN POWER COtriPANY P. O. BOX 18 BOWLING GREEN STATION NEW YORK, N. Y. 10004 September 13, 1978 AEP:NRC:
00077 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos.
1 and 2
Docket Nos.
50-315 and 50-316 License Nos.
DPR-58 and DPR-74 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
By letter dated August 25,
- 1978, AEP:NRC: 00017, AEPSC informed the Commission that we would not be able to supply the information requested by Mr. V. Stello, Jr. of your staff, concerning the movement of heavy loads over spent fuel areas at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, until September 12, 1978.
The enclosure to this letter contains the information requested by Mr. Stello.
Very truly yours, ice President Sworn and subscribed to before me this >>+
day of September,1978 in New York County, New York Notary Public cc:
(attached)
IMTIILEI'NBARRY NO7ARY PUBLIC, State of New'ork No. 41-4606792 Qualitied in Ctueens
- County, Qftificcto tried in'New York County Connrass or, expires March 30, i&try 7807ZOZ88 gay
~Q
l" J
\\
1 t
R 1
e I
I Harold R. Denton cc:
R. C. Callen G. Charnoff P.
W. Steketee R. J. Vollen R. Walsh R.
W. Jurgensen D. V. Shaller Bridgman
~
.ENCLOSURE QUESTION/REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 1.
Provide a diagram which 'illustrates the physical relation between the reactor core, the fuel.transfer canal, the spent fuel storage pool, and the set down, receiving or storage areas for any heavy loads moved on the refueling floor.
RESPONSE
l.
- Included, as Attachment No. 1, to this submittal are four (4) design drawings, two (2) for each unit of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, depicting the physical layouts requested.
Please note that the spent fuel storage pool proper is a shared 'system't the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant=.
'.QUESTXON/REQUEST FOR XNFOKlATXON 2.
Provide'a list of all objects that are required to be moved over the reactor core (during refueling) or the spent fuel storage pool.
For 'each object listed, provide its approximate weight and size, a diagram of the movement path utilized (including carrying height) and the frequency of movement.
RESPONSE
The following equipment is required to be moved over the reactor core during-refueling.'escri tion Approximate
-~ii i i:
Primary Dimens i on 15 x 15 Spent Fuel Handling Tool*
Upper Internals Burnable Poison Rod Assembly Handling Tool Upper Internals Guide Tube Cover Tool radiation Sample Hand'ling Tool 15 x 15 New Fuel Handling Tool*
Rod Control Cluster Thimble Plug Handling Tool Shaft Tool*
17 x 17 Spent Fuel Handling Tool*
17 x 17 New Fuel Handling Tool *
- Manipu1ator Crane Fuel Assembly Polar Crane:
Trolly Polar Crane:
Large Hook and Block 397 116,000*/125, 000 ~*
800*/634"'"
185 230 75 235*/270 145 412 85 42,700 1,400 (max.)
240,000 7;600 35 Ft.
38.0= Ft.
34,00 Ft 48.0 Ft 24.875" in.
445* in/43C** in
'14 in.
35 ft 24.5 in.
12 Ft.
Polar Crane:
Small= Hook."'"
and Block t 5AE, 1, 344
- Unit 1 Specific
- Unit 2 Specific
RESPONSE
Cont'd The specific movement paths of the objects listed above are dependent on the nature of the operation being performed.
Hence it is not possibe to supply exact movement paths as requested.
The specific object being removed from the reactor core is raised to a height sufficient to assure that the reactor vessel has.been cleared.
The object is then moved away from the reactor core and transported to its 'final'estination as shown in the drawings included as attachment No.
1 to this submittal.
-2a-
1 h1 4
QUESTION/REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 3.
What are the dimensions and weights of the spent fuel E
casks that are or will be used at your'acility?
RESPONSE
3.
The Cask Drop Protection System (CDPS) to be installed.
at the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant is designed to handle the largest, practicable spent fuel cask currently available, namely the National Lead Industries, Inc.,
(NL),
No. 10/24 one hundred ton rail cask.
The nominal parameters for the NP No. 10/24 rail cask, and the corresponding CDPS design parameters are as follows:
Parameter
/
k Weight (Empty)
Length Diameter (Overall 179,500 lbs.
170 88 in.'00,000 lbs.
170 ft.
88 in.
The CDPS to be installed at the'Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant is capable of handling different cask desi.gns with one or more of the above parameters being smaller than'the corresponding NL No. 10/24 rail cask parameter valve.
The
'effects of a hypothetical, inadvertent cask drop are con-tained in our response to FSAR Question 14.15.
The analysis'.
contained therein is based on the inadvertent dropping of a spent fuel cask, the dimensions of which are given above under
'CDPS Design'.
These results are bounding (worst case) results for a hypothetical cask drop accident, and the effects of a cask drop accident with a smaller cask (one or more design parameters smaller than the CDPS design parameters),
would be correspondingly less.
QUESTION/REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 4.
Identify any heavy load or cask drop analyses performed to date for your facility.
Provide a copy of all such analyses not. previously. submitted to the NRC.
RESPONSE
4 ~
I The cask. drop analyses and questions pertaining to an inadvertent cask drop over the spent fuel pool can be found in our responses to FSAR Questions 14.15.1 through 14.15.21.
QUESTION/REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 5.
Identify any heavy loads that are carried. over equipment required 'for the safe shutdown of a plant that is operating
- at the time the load is moved.
Identify what equipment could be affected in the event of a heavy load handling accident (piping, cabling, pumps, etc.)
and discuss the
.feasibility of such an accident affecting this equipment.
Describe the basis for your conclusions.
RESPONSE
5..
No heavy loads are carried over equipment required for the safe shutdown of either unit of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
I
QUESTION/REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 6.
If heavy loads are required to be carried over the spent fuel storage pool or fuel transfer canal at your facility, discuss the feasibility of a handling accident which could result in water leakage severe enough to uncover the spent fuel.
Describe the basis for your conclusion.
'ESPONSE 6.
No heavy loads are required to be carried over the spent fuel storage pool or the fuel transfer canal at the Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant.
To Prevent damage to the spent fuel pool which would result in water release severe enough to uncover spent
- fuel, a system of limit switches,'nterlocks and the necessary admininstrative controls will be installed.
When this system is finalized, movement of the spent fuel cask over the spent fuel will be limited to the critical path as described in our responses to FSAR Question 14.15.4.
Movement of the spent fuel cask, while lowering or raising the cask to the top of the spent fuel pool immediately adjacent to the outside edge of the pool wall, will be restricted to a vertical corridor directly above a knock-out section of the floor, which is designed to give way in the event of a cask drop event, allowing the cask to come to rest, on the ground level without affecting the integrity of the spent fuel pool wall.
At present, any movement of the overhead (auxiliary building) crane over the spent fuel pool is under administrative control and is limited by means of limit switches and inter-locks to a portion of the end of the pool away from stored fuel assemblies.
I
" ENCLOSURE QUESTION/REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 7.
Describe any design features of your facility which affect the potential for a heavy load handling accident involving spent fuel, e.g., utilization of a single failure-proof crane.
RESPONSE
7.
. The auxiliary building crane will be interlocked using limit'witches and relay logic so that the crane hook can never pass over the spent fuel cells and can only pass over the east end of the spent fuel pit proper during cask'oading.
Two zones of protection'ill be provided.
Zone l, over the spent, fuel cells, can never be entered by the crane hook and if an attempt is made to do so, the crane will automatically shut down.
Zone 2, over the local cask storage area can only be entered by the crane hook by by-passing a crane bridge limit switch 3.ocated on the crane runway rail just east of the local cask storage area.
To avoid unauthorized by-passing of this limit
- switch, a keyed by-pass control will be provided on the crane contxol cabinets located upon the crane walkway.
0
ENCLOSURE QUESTION/REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 8.
Provide copies of all procedures currently in facility for the movement of heavy loads over core during refueling, the spent fuel storage equipment required for the safe shutdown of a is operating at the time the move occurs.
effect at. your the reactor pool, or plant that
RESPONSE
8.
No heavy loads are moved over the reactor core during refueling operations.'ovement of heavy loads over the spent fuel storage pool is discussed in our response to Question
- 6. of this submittal.
ENCLOSURE QUESTION/REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 9.
I Discuss the degree to which your facility complies with the eight (8) regulatory positions delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.13 (Revision 1,'December, 1975) regarding Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis.
RESPONSE
9.
Re ulator Guide Position No.
1 The spent fuel storage facility including structures, fuel racks, cask drop protection system, and cranes which traverse over the'pool are Category I Seismic Design.
Re ulator Guide Position No.
2 The spent fuel pit is wholly contained in the Category I Seismicly Designed Auxiliary Building which is designed to withstand the effects of tornado winds and missiles generated by these winds from entering the spent fuel pool.
Re ulator Guide Position No.
3 The response to this question is given in response to Questions No.
6 and No.
7 above.
Re ulator Guide Position No.
4 The auxiliary building which encloses the spent fuel pool is designed to contain all liquid leakage which occurs in this building to the environs of this structure prior to processing and to normally maintain a negative pressure within the building to control gaseous removal from the b'uilding.
The design of the ventilation and filtration systems meet Regulatory Guide 1.25 assumptions and the resulting radiation dose consequences from a fuel handling accident based on these assumptions are present in Chapter 14, Section 14.21 of the FSAR.
Regulator Guide Position No.
5 The installation of the Cask Drop Protection System and restriction of cask'movement to the critical path discussed in responses to Questions No.
6 and No.
7 above in conjunction with our responses,to FSAR Questions 14.15.1 through 14.15.21 limits cask movement over the pool to an area that will not affect, the stored spent fuel or uncover it in the inadvertent event of a cask drop (Regulatory Po'sition C under Section C.5 in Regulatory Guide 1.13).
Re ulator Guide Position No.
6 Small diameter drains 'located within the spent fuel pool stucture directly under the pool floor liner do not breach the liner where installed solely to detect any small leakage through the liner.
All piping which enters the pool is terminated at an elevation approximately six (6) feet above the stored spent fuel assemblies so that syphoning of water below this elevation will not occur should an inadvertent
~ leak occur at any point, in this piping (either in or outside the pool) or in the systems connected to it.
Re ulator Guide Position No.
7 Two (2) water ~evel indicators are installed in the spent fuel pit which alarm both at a local control panel and in the control room in the event that the water level falls six (6), inches below nominal pool level.
As mentioned in response to Regulatory Guide 1.13 Position No."6 above, the pool water level cannot be inadvertently dra'ined below an elevation six (6) ft. above stored fuel assemblies due to a break in any piping.
A radiation monitor located in the exhaust path of air sweeping over the pool activates the mechanism to channel the exhaust air entraining any radioactive gases through charcoal filters in the event of a High-Radiation-Level Alarm..
~ a'
Re ulator Guide Position No.
8 Since the spent fuel pit is wholly enclosed within the Auxiliary Building which is designed to withstand earthquakes, missiles originating in high winds, and turbine missiles, and the Cask Drop Protection
- System, controlled movement of the spent fuel cask, and restriction of the A'uxiliary Building overhead crane movement over the pool except along the critical path during spent fuel
- shipment, are the design features to prevent loss of water
'from the pool in the inadvertent event of a heavy load drop.
- Hence, no water make-up system to add coolant is
~ required.
ATTACHMENT TO AEP;NRC 00077