ML18215A067
| ML18215A067 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/31/1996 |
| From: | Division of Administrative Services |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SOC 50-199 | |
| Download: ML18215A067 (866) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Rules and Regulations Title 1O - Chapter 1 CODE of FEDERAL REGULATIONS Volume IV STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION JANUARY 1, 1987 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1996 PARTS 50-199 Division of Administrative Services UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 J
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Rules and Regulations
- I Title 1O - Chapter 1 CODE of FEDERAL REGULATIONS Volume IV STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION JANUARY 1, 1987 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1996 PARTS 50-199 Division of Administrative Services UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 1.oll
PREFACE The Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, distributed a reissuance of the "basic book" of the NRC Rules and Regulations in June 1999. This edition of the NRC Rules and Regulations monthly supplement program contains all codified text of 10 CFR effective through March 1999, including the 40 supplements that comprised the publication as of February 26, 1999, plus the supplement for March 1999. As part of this reissuance of the basic book that comprises the "loose-leaf' NRC Rules and Regulations, the Statements of Consideration for final rules published from January 1, 1987 thru December 31, 1996, were removed. This decision was made to reduce the unwieldy size
- off this monthly publication.
The Statements of Consideration for final rules in this bound, two-volume set (Volumes Ill and IV) are to be used as a permanent companion to the NRC Rules and Regulations. These volumes are not a complete historical set of NRC rulemaking preambles but merely replace those Statements of Consideration for final rules that were removed as part of the March 1999 compilation. The Statements of Consideration for final rules prior to January 1, 1987 are also available in a bound, two-volume set (Volumes I and II). Volume I consists of the Statements of Consideration prior to January 1, 1987, for Parts 0-49 of 10 CFR. Volume II consists of the Statements of Consideration prior to January 1, 1987, for Parts 50-199. Volume Ill consists of the Statements of Consideration from January 1, 1987 through December 31, 1996, for Parts 0-49. Volume IV consists of the Statements of Consideration from January 1, 1987 through December 31, 1996, for Parts 50-199. iii
RULES.and REGULATIONS TITLE 10, CHAPTER 1, CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS-ENERGY IPART 50 I-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION AGENCY: .Nuclear Regul~tozy Commission. ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY
~ The Nuclear Regulatoiy
'52 FR 1292 Commission tNRC or CommissiotJJ u Published 1/12/87 ame:1*=.:r\g itf regu.l.a!io~s to !c:~a:~gt::: the Effective 2/11 /87 timing re(2u.ire:::ie:itE for,a foll Bakkruptcy Fi/ing;.Notification.. paMi:::i;:;ation emer!'enCJ prepare.cineS5 Requi(em~nt~ ..* exercise for power .reactors prior ,io issuance of a full-power opera ting Part 30 Statements of Consideration license [one authorizing-operation aho\'t:
5% of .ratedpower.of the .reactor}. The amendment .r.equir.es a full participation
- 52 FR 1415 exer.cise. including State and local Published 1/13/87 governments, lo be held within two years before lhe issuance of .a foll-power 10 CFR Part 50 oper.itin_g license. as opposed .to the current reauirement of within one vear.
Domestic Licensing of Production and An exerci;e which tests Llie Jicens~'.li Utilization Facilities; Minor Corrective onsite emergencr plan, but which need Amendment not include State or local governm!!nt Correction
- participation, is .still required !o he held within one year before issuance of a In rule document 86-29170 beginning . full-power operating 1icense.
on page 47206 in the issue of This rule change is unrelated to the Wednesday, December 31, 1986, make : Commission':s notice of .,proposed th!! following corree:tion: rulemaking thai would ~tab!ish criteria for the evaluation of .emergency
§ 50.54 (Corrected]
plannin,g for nudear plan ts in .those On page 47206, in § 50.54, in the third situations in which a State or localitj' column, the first paragraph designation has -elected not to participate in the should be "(p)(l)". emergency planning process. EFFECTIVE DAT.£: This ru1e 'is effective on
*52 FR 9453 May 6, 1987.
Published 3/25/87 Effective 5/26/87 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Jamgocbian, Regu1atory Operators' Licenses and Conforming Applications Branch, Office of Nuclear Amendments Regulatory "Research. U.S. Nuclear See Part 55 Statements of Consideration Regulatory Commission. \\'ashington. DC 20555, ielephcne (301} 4!1&-:7657. 52 FR 16823 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Published 5/6/87 Effective 5/6/87 I. Bacl<.ground This notice of final rulemaking will 10 CF.R Part 50 change the timing reguirements for a foll Production and UtHization Facilities; participation emergency preparedness Timing Requirements for Full exercise for power reaciors prior to Participation Emergency issuance of .a full-power operatillB Preparedness Exercises 1or 'Power license. It is unrelated to the Reactors Prior *to Receipt of an Commission's notice of proposed Operating 'License rulemaking, published in the Federal 50-SC-1
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Regislflr on March 6, 1987 {52 FR 6980), has concluded that no safety (January 8, 1987) (Shearon Harris that would establish criteria for the requirement mandates a full- Nuclear Power Plant: eight-month
.evaluation of emergency planning for participation exercise within one year extension); 51 FR 41035 (November 12, nuclear plants in those situations in prior to plant licensing. To the extent 1986) (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; wbich a State 1oca1ity bas elected not to that an offsite pre-licensing exercise is eleven-month extension); 50 FR 32129 participate in the eme!ilency planning intended to reveal whether an (August 8, 1985) (Limerick Generating process. emergency plan ha~ fundamental flaws, Station, Unit 1; two-week extension); id.
The 'Commission published .the that purpose can be achieved at least as 28485 (July 12, 1986) (Enrico Fermi proposed timing-requirements rule for well by an exercise held within two Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2; three-week comment on December .2, 1986 {51 FR years of licensing as within one year. To extension); id. 9917 March 12, 1985) 43369). A notice extending the .30-day the extent that the exercise is designed (Waterford Steam Electric Station. Unit comment period was published in the to lest the preparedness of those 3; five-week extension); id. 5829 Federal Register on January 7, 1987152 individuals and organizations that must (February 12, 1985) (Byron Station, Unit FR 543). During the 40-day comment a participate in offsite emergency ~ t:-.. ;-ef::-::-::.::-1fr1 e>:tc~sjon1. Tt1E' total -0f 18 public .comments were planning. NRC and FE.\.iA experience freuue!i~V and circumsta!1ces 0 received. Nine supported the proposed with post-licensing exercises has surround ing these exempiions support rule and nine opposed it. As indicated convinced us that exercises every two the Commission's conclusion that the below, the Commission has reviewed years, including rem~dial exercises one-year scheduling requirement has the comments and has decided to when necessary. perform this function proven difficult to meet and that an promulgate a final rule which includes a satisfactorilv. Exercises on a more emergency exercise conducted more number of rnodifica lions from the one frequent ba;is are not necessarv to than one year before plant full-power b;'. had been proposed. The Fecieral enable the Commission to dete~ine licensing is adequate to assess the E:-'.,e;gency Management Agency. by whether an emergency plan provides propriety of an emergency plant. memorandum dated March 27, 1987, has "reasonable assurance that adequate As a result of the Commission's advised the Commis'sion of its protective measures can and will be experience with the one-year pre-concur~ence in the final rule that is taken in the event of a radiological licensing exercise requirements and being issued here. emergency." lo CFR 50.47[a). FEMA and NRC experience with the
\-\7hen the Commission decided to Moreover, since the Commission's two-year post-licensing exercise require a full-participation emergency promulgation of its original requirement requirements. which provides for planning exercise within one year prior for a full-participation exercise within remedial exercise when necessarv. the to the licensing of a power plant. it one year of the licensing of a power Commission has determined !hat *its based this scheduling decision on a plant it has also become clear that the previous pre-licensing requirement for a ba:ance between foe des;rabilitv for an resource and scheduling burdens full-participation exercise wi'.hin one exe,cise close to the date of licensing in created by this t_iming requirement have year of the licensing oi a power piant is o,der to assess the adequacy of the proven far more onerous than originally
- not necessary. The benefits of a pre-emergency plan being tes!ed and the expected. First, with the United States licensing exercise requirement can be countervailing need to avoid scheduling Court of Appeals for the District of fully achieved by allowing that and resource burdens. Based on the Columbia Circuit's decision in Union of requirement to be met within two years Commission's experience since the Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d of the lic-ensing of a power plant. This
'original promulgation of the scheduling 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 approach also should reduce the requirement the Commission now U.S. 1132 (1985), it has become unnecessary scheduling and resource believes that it is appropriat-e to strike a necessary to permit litigation in burdens that have become e\*ident to the new balance. The new rule strikes that contested proceedings over the results Commission based upon its experience balance by requiring a full-participation of pre-licensing exercises. This litigation with the one-year requirement.
emergency planning exercise within two occasionally has not been completed
' within the year following the exercise. II. Summary of Public Comments and years prior to the licensing of a power Commission Responses plant. the same scheduling requirement See e.g., Long Island Lighting Co.
mandated for full-participation (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit J_ Commonwealth Edison emergency planning exercises after 1). Such a delay makes it impossible to
*1*1censmg.
. comply with the regulatory scheduling Summary of Comment.
Since the promulgation of its requirement and the dictates of UCS v. Commonwealth Edison supported that emergency planning requirements in NRG. Even when the delavs do not portion of the proposed rule extending 1980. both the Commission and the make compliance with both from one to two years the period within Federal Emergency Management requirements impossible, they which the pre-operational offsite Agency (FEMA) have gained much unnecessarily complicate both the exercise must be held. However. Edison experience in assessing the results of. licensing proceeding and the scheduling disagreed with the last two sentences of a:id the requirement for. full- of the required pre-licensing exercise. the proposed rule which require the participation exercises. Most of these Second. utilities are finding it difficult to applicant to conduct an exercise of its exercises have been the post-licensing predict the actual date when their plants onsite plan if the offsite exercise is more exercises that NRC and FEMA will be receiving an operating license. than one year prior to issuance of the regulations now require to be held every Thus, experience is proving that it is operating license. Edison argued that the two years. In setting the two-year often difficult to know precisely when additional test would be of marginal requirement for operating plants in 1984, the pre-licensing exercise should be value and might tend to introduce prior NRC and FEMA experience scheduled to comply with the one-year additional issues into the operating demonstrated that the reasonableness of requirement. license hearing. On this basis Edison emergency planning at a nuclear power Certainly, an important indicator of recommended deletion of the last two pl ant can be fairly tested and* this difficulty is the fact that in the last sentences of the proposed rule. adequately assured by a full- two years six plants that have been Commission Response. The participation exercises which are held awarded operating licenses have sought Commission disagrees that a pre-every two years rather than on a more and received exemptions from the operation13l onsite exercise *within one frequent basis. 49 FR 27733, 27734-27735 scheduling requirements of the pre- year_before issuance of a full-power [July 6, 1984). Similarly. the Commission licensing exercise rule. See 52 FR 713 operating license is of marginal value. 50-SC-2 l__
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION The importance of annual onsite 2. Edison Electric .institute li. Stone -& 11rebster Engineering emergency planning exercises by the Corporation licensee's operational staff has already Summary ,of Comment. The EdiSGD been recognized in the Commission's Eleciric Institute supported the proposed Summwy of CommenL Stone &
rule hnd did not suggest any chanaes to W ebst~r supported the proposed rah! regulations, which now require that after Hs text or .rationale. "' *tmd -did not suggest any ~hanges. a facility is licensed to operate there must be an annual onsite exercise. This Commission Response. None required. Commission Re-~ponse. '.',:cnt Tt'c;'..::~ed. annual emergency response function 3. 1-lunion and V.-'i1liams 7. Seacoast Anti-Pollution Leat!ue drill erisures that the licensee's new persanne1 are adeq~ai.el}* onC p;-o~!p1Jy Summaryo_f Comment. This 1aw Ii.rrr: Summon* of Comment. The Seacoast trained and that exisitn~ hcensee fiied comments on behalf oI Long ls1and Anti-pollution League (SAPLj opposed pe:so:mei maintain thei; e:rnergenq Li~nting Compan_y fLILCO). LILCO the amendment and agreed with the response capability. The exisiing stated that it suooorted the amendment views of Commissioner Asseistine. anc:i agreed with the Commission*s basic SAPL argued that ernergencr response requi,er:ient of a pre-operational onsite premise that the two-_year inierrn] was personnei experience fairly rapid exercise within one year prior to full-adequate to ensure an acceptable lev.el turnover, and therefore "a full scale power license issuance -is consistent cf emergency preparedness. LILCO cited exercise is needed annuallv." SAPL did with this philosophy as well as foe its experience with .the Shoreham not accept the Commission's reliance on Commission's general desire to haYe facility as supporting the need for the the fact that State -and local pre-operational emergency planning amendment. and disagreed with go\*emments are ofien called upon to exercises as close *as practicable to the Commissioner Asse1stine's view that the respond :to a 1.*ariet!' on non-nuclear time of licensing. And since, unlike foe exemption process was the approprlBte emergencies. situation v.ith offsite exercises, no one means-to address the problem. LlLCO Commission Response. The has identified any existing response or did not offer any suggestions Ior Commission does not agree that two timing difficulty with the cnsite changes in tbe Jlroposed rule. years between full pa;ticipation requirement. we find no reason !o rev"ise Commission Response. None requir-ed. exercises is unwarranted based on the requirement at this time. personne1 changes. The Commission*',s Moreover, to mandate an onsite 4. l\,1arvin Lewis
.and FEMA's rules have, since 1984, exercise within one year of operation Summary of Comment. Mr. Lewis permitted the two-year cycle for fu11 while requiring -an offsite exerclse opposed the proposed rule, staling .that participation exercises for operating within two -years is a rncognition of the it ,would "weaken regulation and _pose a plants. The Commission's view was .in distinct nature of the participants danger to the health and safety .of the 19B4. and is today, that there are more involved in each ir1stance. The Stale .and public by allowin_g unlicensed operators beneficial uses of State and local local emergency planning organizations more freedom lo act w1th nuclear governments* resources, such -as that are primarily involved in offsite bazards before baving proven thal they providing for additional training and emergenc:y planning are in .almost all can act .responsibly." equipment, than using such resources 'to instances .organized and trained to deai Commission Response. Licensees are -support an annual full participation with eme~gency situations long before not being granted any additional exercise.
facility operation. Wniie the offsite ~*freedom~ by this rule. The fu11 The Commission does not rely -so1e1}' emergency test is important to judge the participation exercise must still be he1d .on the fact that State and loca1 abiiity of these existing organ;zations to prior to fuli-power .operation of the governments routinely respond to a respond to the particular of a facilitr and a pre-operational onsite variety of public emergencies. However, radiological emergency, in iight of their exercise will continue to be reouirerl one the basic principles involved in handling ongoing responsibility for all types of year prior to full-power operation. The non-nuclear .emergencies, such as emergencies a demonstration of offsite only change is the timing of the full evacuations due to an impending preparedness by such agencies withill participation exercise. lmrrlcane or a leak of toxic chemicals. two !*ears prior to licensing affords .5. Atom1c Industrial Forum also apply in responding-to a nuc1eaT -reasonable assurance of their accident. This lends support to the rule capabilities at the time-of1icensing.1n The Atomic Indusirial Forum {AlF) because State and loca1 emergency contrast, as an applicant mal<es a fuii- :supported the proposed rule but pointed response organizations are Ireguentl_y scale shift from a facility construction to out, with Tespect to its last two called upon and must maintain a hlgh a facility operation mode within tbelast sentences, tha1 Section IV.F.Z of degree of readiness independent of twelve to eighteen months prior to Appendix E already requires a 1icensee nuclear power plant exercises. operation, as a general .rule many new to conduct annua1 exercises o'f its rnergency p1an. A1F suggested thal this 8. Liz Cu1lingtt:J11 operational personne1 are retained wbo must .be ready to carry out the utility'.s was .a redundant requirement and SummaIJ' of Co!f!ment. Ms. CuTiington onsite emergency response therefore the last two sentences -of the opposed the proposed rule and stated as responsibiiities. It is also .in recognitwn proposed rule should be deleted. follows: -of this distinction that the Commission Commission Response. The In extending the time period Irom one yaar finds that an onsite exercise should be Commission disagrees that the 1ast lwo to two, the NRC would be essentially handing required within one year of licensing to sentences of the proposed ru1e sbm.ild be to the *utilities an across-the-board offer af provide assurance that the applicant*s deleted. bul has determined to revise total exemption from lhe reguirement -to onsite response capabilities are those .sentences for ;pwposes of clarit_y. prepare emergency response plane Tor adequate. {Also. in the interests of clarity. the reactors under licensing review, as long 11s un preceding sen_tence is modified to acceptable number of sheets of paper -ere For the pur_poses ofdarjty, the submitted to the Commission with specify that an operating license "for full Commission is revising the last two power~ is lo be taken, in this context, to appropriate title pages. Under this propose&! sentences, which pro,*ide that a :pre- rule change, -ll :utility could submit :a xeroxed be "one authoriz1ng operation iibove '5% ,eopy-of !fl'ebsler':i; Dictionary as iitll operationa1 onsite exercise be held of raled power." The prior reference fo within one year before *operali-on above emergency response *plan. and have ruil 5% of Ia ted power was ambiguous.) deadline for completil\\: the plan itself. .15 *
- i% of rated power.
.reality, £or either exercisin&-it. Dr
.demonstrating that it is Ieasible.
50-SC-3
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Commission Respoose. The proposed pennit the use oi a two-yea, cycle ior ir. ar, cpcra!~n~ license pro8eeding under Sec:ior: 18!'!~ of the Atomic Energy Act ior a rule change is more limited in scope the holding of a pre-operationai off site thar. the c;ommem sugt1ests. Ii does not exercise. This timing would be hearing or, the results of a full participation affec~ elthe: tht re~:r..:.irPC content of consistent with the two-year cvcie for exercise, this requirement created some emergency pi2!'ls n;r th:: need to difficulty in scheduling the exercise so that it the holding of a post-op~ratior{al off site would e!iow time for a hearing while still exercise such p;an~ or. 2 ~egular basis. exercise for operating plants which has being conducted within one year of plant The amendmeni ur.]v exiends from one been in effect since'1984. readiness to be licensed. In 1982 the to two years the period within which the Sound principles of administrative Commission adopted a rule which, by finding preoperational full-pa;ticipa tion law dictate that where agency policy is that emergency preparedness exercises were exercise mus\ be held. All other no longer correctly reflected in its rules, not required for a Licensing Board, Appeal Appendix E and 10 CF'R 50.47 rulemaking should be undertaken and Board. or Commission decision, would have requirements must continue to be met as public corc,.rnent sought. The al!oweci the exercise to be conducted close a prerequisite for issuance of an Commission now belie\'es that a two- enougl-. to a licensing decision lo avoid this operating license, including the year period between full participation difficulty and to avoid annual pre-iice:-ising requirement that a pre-operational exercises should be used in all cases. exercises (47 FR 30232, July 13. 1982).
onsite exercise be held within one vear and therefore has proceeded with However. the Court of Appeals for the before going above 5 percent ofrat~d rulemaking to codify this policy. District of Columbia Circuit vacaied that rulem2king. The court held that the power.
- 11. Union of Concerned Scientists/New Commission could not remove from the
- 9. Georgia Power Company England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution healing requirements of Section l B9a of the Atomic Energy Act a material issue relevant Summar}' of Comment. The Georgia Summary of Comment. The Union of to its licensing decision, and that the Power Company supported the proposed Concerned Scientists [UCS) and the prelicensing exercise was such a material rule and did not suggest changes in its New England Coalition on Nuclear issue. Union of Goncemed Scientists v. NRC.
text. Pollution [NECNP) oppose the rule on 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984). cert. denied, Commission Response. None required. the following grouJ1ds: 105 S.Ct. 815 [1985).
- 1. The Commission has not adequately The Commission has thus been left with a
- 10. Nuclear Information and Research explained its reasons for making a change in regulatory scheme for frequency of full Ser.'ice
- participation emergency preparedness policy.
Summon' of Comment. The ~uclear 2. The proposed rule ignores a distinction exercises that treats sites with an operating Information a'nd Research Service previously drav..-n between pre- and post- license difierentlv than sites without an [NIRS) opposed the amendment, and operational exercises. operating license: The Commission does not stated three reasons for doing so: 3. The Commission should have prepared a believe this disparity in treatment is backfit analysis for the proposed rule. warranted. The Commission is concerned .
- 1. Changes [in emergency procedures] will about the burden the present rule may place be more likely to occur in a new plant where Commission Response. The logic for on State and local governments. The lest minute alterations in technical the proposed rule was stated in the requirement that those governments specifications. guidelines. newly trained notice of proposed ruiemaking (51 FR participate in a full participation exercise operators. and actllal equipment ar~ common 43369, December 2, 1986). as follows: every two years is in addition to the occurrences. It is precisely this kind of change which marks 2 new plant from an The Commission in 1984 revised its requirement for their participation at sites operating plant and which necessitates an emergency preparedness regulations to relax without an operating license. Requiring exercise no more than one year prior io the frequency of fuU participation exercises annual participation at sites without licensing. by State and local governments for sites with operating licenses could thus place a
- 2. An exercise no more.than one year prior an operating license. This was done in part significant burden on State and local to licensing **would ensure that any new because the Federal Emergency Management government resources.
- government officials or workers are familiar Agency [FEMA). based on its experience in The Commission in the prior rulemaking with the plans themselves. and are capable of observing and eva!ua ting exercises. adopted determined that emergency preparedness carrying them out."' a biennial, rather than an annual. would be adequate if Slate and local
- 3. The one-year requirement has been requirement for full participation exercises. governments participated in an exercise easily satisfied in most cases, and a schedule Under the biennial requirement adopted by every two years. There seems to be little exemption is an available option where the Commission. State and local governments reason why State and local governments needed. need only participate in one full participation nonetheless should have to participate in full exercise. at any site, every two years. The participation exercises on an annual basis in Commission Response. Changes of the Commission revised this regulation because the pre-licensing stage solely because a type cited by NIRS do occur prior to it found that annual exercises used a license did not issue within 365 days of the issuance of an operating license and disproportionate amount of Federal. State, exercise. The only requirement should be that throughout the life of an emergency and local government resources, and that. the participants be adequately in place and plan. However, these changes would be State and local governments frequently trained to make the exercise meaningful. This addressed in the utility's emergency exercised their emergency preparedness could well occur two years before issuance of capabilities by responding to a variety of an opera ting license. If the exercise plan. The proposed rule retains the natural and man-made emergencies. such as requirement that a pre-operational demonstrates that preparedness was chemical sprns. on a continuing basis. The onsite exercise be held within one year Commission concluded that biennial full inadequate. then remedial steps. including before going above 5 percent of rated participation exercises were adequate to another exercise, if appropriate, can be taken.
power. protect public health and safety. The r..foreover in accord with the Commission*s Commission in revising its regulations for full regulations for sites with operating licenses, When changes in offsite emergency participation exercises retained the applicants will still have to conduct annual procedures or offsite personnel occur, it exercises, i.e., if the full participation is the responsibility of the State or local requirement for annual exercises of each licensee's emergency plan {49 FR 27733, July exercise is held more than one year before government to ensure that personnel are issuance of the operating license. then the
- 6. 1984).
adequately trained to carry out their The Commission did not make a similar applicant must conduct an exercise of its functions under the plan. The licensee is change regarding the required frequency of eme:-gency plan before license issuance. required by Commission regulations to fuJI participation exercises at sites without an However, that latter exercise need not assist in such training. See 10 CFR Part operating license. Because of the opportunity involve State or local governments. 50 Appendix E, Section F [introductory paragraph). The proposed rule would 50-SC-4
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION UCS no!nts ou! tha~ inc ~~e:: litigation the results of the exercise. 13. Laura Drey ruiem2king on emergency pia,ming. the under UCS l' NRC. 735 F.2d 1437 rD.C.
Commission remarked on the Cir. 1984). it is clear that the results of Summary of Com,7lent. Ms. Drey desirabiiity of ha\'ing the pre- exercises are litigable in the operating opposed the rule change bu! Slated no operational exercise close in ti:ne to license proceeding. irresuecti\'e of when reasons. commercial operation. The reason those exercises are 'held: so long as the Commission Response. None required. slated b\* the Commission was that the holding of an exercise is a pre-license 14. Kenneth Vic.kery "exercis.es are best held at a later time. requirement. However, while the two when the opera ling and irnrnagcment year time period pro\'ided in this rule Summary of Comment. Mr. Vickery staff of the plant-who are central was not premised on the time needed to opposed the amendment. stating that figures in an exercise-are in piace and litigate the results of an exercise. as was "the !\'RC must know if the plants and trained in emergency functions." (47 FR explained earlier, one of the faciors on the surrounding areas are ready for 30233, July 13. 1982). As was explained which the Commission did base this accidents when starting operation since earlier. the Commission continues to amend:neni was the observed difficult\' many se:-ious accidents occur early in support this principle and has retained in some cases [alihough not in the
- the opera ting li\*es of nuclear power the reouirement that an onsite exercise Shearon Harris proceeding) in plants."
of the ~mergency plan be held within scheduling the exercise so that it would Commission Response. See response one year prior to operation abo\'e 5 allow time for a hearing while still being to comment of \'Velis Eddleman, .#12 percent power. . . conducted within one year of plant abo\'e. The backfit ru1e, 10 CFR 50.109, readiness to be licensed. Another factor applies only where the Commission 15. Rachel Allen was the observed difficulty of utilities in seeks to impose new or different predicting a plant's readiness for a full- Summary of Comment. This comment reouirements on licensees. It does not - power operating license. In this was a duplicate of Comment -#14. apply where requirements are either situation. as int.lie case of the Shearon relaxed or deleted. Harris plant. while the holding of the full 16. Shaw, Pittman, Potts Er Trowbridge
- 12. M'ells Eddleman. et al. participation exercise and the licensing Summary of Comment. This law firm hearing would be completed within one filed commen.ts on behalf of 9 entities Summary of Comment. :l',.1r. Eddleman . year, due to unaniicipated construction holding nuclear power plant operating and others joining him oppose the delays the plant would not be ready for licenses or construction permits. These amendment for the following re&sons: a full-power operating license within the commenters supported the proposed
- 1. ** . . . a one year time range before one year time frame. rule. fundamentaliy for the reasons cited operation above 5% power is a practical With regard to the commenter's by the Commission in the notice of maximum for giving an up to date "snap statement that nuclear accidents tend proposed rulemaking. The commenters shot" assessment of the level and capability of emergenc~* preparedness existing when the "to occur early," it is correct that the also noted that the proposed rule uses planl begins to operate." few major nuclear accidents that have the term "full-scale exercise" which is
- 2. Om: year is adequate to litigate the occurred, i.e .. -the Three Mile isiand otherwise undefined in the regulations results of the exercise, based on the Shearon Accident and the Browns Ferry fire, did and recommended that the term "full Harris proceeding. in fact occur early in the operational participation exercise" be used.
- 3. " .*. nuclear accidents have a tendency history of the plants. Howe\'er, the to occur early in the operation of a nuclear Commission Response. The term "full-number of these occurrences is far too scale exercise" has been replaced with plant ...", citing Three Mile Island and the small to establish a "tendency." In any Browns Ferryflre. the tenn "full-participation exercise"
- 4. Ylle rule is iliegal because it is an case. the commenter's suggestion that and the last two sentences of the attempt lo deny hearing rights to intervenors the need for emergency preparedness proposed rule have been re,*ised for in the Shearon Harris case on the exemption may be heightened during the initial purposes of clarity.
gran led from the existing one-year period of plant operation, e\'en if well requirement. taken, does not present a valid objecfion 17. Carolina Power and Light Company to this rule change because, for the Summary of Comment. Carolina Commission Response. The reasons given above, the rule change Power and Light Company [CP&L) Commission disagrees that a full does not decrease the le\'el of supported the amendment and cited participation exercise is needed within emergency preparedness at a nuclear reasons similar to those given by the one year of operation to demonstrate power plant. Commission. CP&L noted that its recent adequate emergency preparedness. The The license and exemption ha\'e experience in licensing the Shearon Commission has determined that a two- already been issued in the Shearon Harris facility bore out the need for the year cycle for full participati,on Harris proceeding. This rulemaking was rule change.., exercises is sufficient for making a not the basis upon which a hearing on Commission Response. None required. finding that adequate protective the exemption request was denied. measures can and will be taken in the Carolina Power & light Co. et al. 18. North Carolina Department of Crime event of an accident. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant) Control and Public Safety The Commission has not based its CLJ--86-24, 24 NRC __ (December 5. Summar!/ of Comment. This acceptance of the two year requirement 1986). Certainly, if the exemption commenter supported the proposed rule for holding a full participation exercise request were pending. it would now be on three grounds: on the time needed to litigate the results mooted as a result of this rulemaking. of such exercisE:. ;,ather, as indicated The scope of issues open for litigation 1. It makes !he NRC rule consistent with FEMA's and increases internal consistency in abo\'e and in response to comment # may be changed by rulemaking. NRC regulations. 11, the Commission has determined that Engaging in such rulemaking has been 2. It reduces undue burdens on State and a two-year cycle is an appropriate held by the courts not to deny hearing locai go,*~rnments. period of time for holding full rights of any person. See Siegel!'. AEC. 3. It allows more time for litigation of the participation exercises. With regard to 400 F.Zd 778 (1968). results of a pre-operational exercise. 50-SC-5
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Cc.'T:r;, *:-t*:.Jr: ht!:-J,on5t:. Tht: reasons that the final ruie has no significant Branch, O:fice c,f ~:i;;:ear F,:>?c:2.1,:;ry g:ven by th!~ commenler support the environmental impact. Tni~ Research. U.S. r\iucicar fc.t,f:;ia,0;y Cor!"1missi::in*s position as slated in the determination has beer-; made beca:.Ise Commission, Washington. DC ZD.355.
notce of proposed miemaking. the Commission cannot identify any Telephone (301) 443-7657.
- m. Commission Decision impact on lhe hum8l} environment assodated with changing the timing of Backfit Analysis The Commission has reviewed all full participation of State and local This final rule does not moc!ify or add commenis received and has decided to governments in pre-licensing emergency to systems. structures, components o:-
proceed with a final rule. The text of the. preparedness exercises from within one design of a facility; the design 1opp:-oval proposed rde has beer; altered as noted year of license issuance to within two or manufactu,ing license for a facility-: o:- in the response to comments :;;: 5 and years.
#16 above. Upon publieolion of the the procedures or organization :*eq;.:ired The need for this rulema}...iiig is to design, construct or opera re a fad::y.
final rule. a full p;;.rticipation exercise explained in the Supplementary must be held v.ithin two years prior to Accordingly. no backfi: analysis issuance of & nuc1ear pov.:er plant Information accompanying this final rule. The alternative approaches that is pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109 rec;ui~ed for operating license for opera!ion above 5 this final rule. were considered in L'lis rulemaking percent rated power. If the full proceeding were: Regulatory Flexibility Certification participation exercise is conducted more than one year pr;or to issuance of an 1. To retain the requirement for a full In accordance with the Regul2tory participaiion exercise within one year of Flexibility Act of 1980. 5 U.S_C. 605(b). operating license for full power. an issuance of an operating licel19e. onsite exercise which tests the 2.. To relax the requirement to within two the Commission certifies that this rule licensee's emergency plans shall be years of issuance of an operating iicense. will not have a significant economic conducted one vear before issuance of impact upon a substantial nuwber of an operating li;ense for full power. There were no environmental impacts small entities. The mle concerns the identified from either of the altematfres timing of a full participation exercise of Additional V'iews ofCommissioner considered. Asseis ll~'le emergency plans for applicants for In addition, when promulgating the nuclear power plant licens~s. The I continue to believe that fhe original emergency planning and electric utility companies owning and reauirement to conduct a full preparedness regulations in 1980, the operating these nuclear power piants participation exercise, which inciudes NRC prepared an "'Environmental are dominant in their service areas anc State and local government Assessment for Final Changes to 10 CFR do not fall within the definition of a participation, within one year prior to Part 50 and Appendix E of 10 CFR Part small business found in the Small issuance of an operating license is 50, Emergency Planning Requirements Business Act. 15 U.S.C. 632, or within needed to provide an accurate* and for Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG- the Small Business Size standards set
- timely verification of the adequacy of 0685, June 1980}. and concluded that forth in 13 CFR Part 121. Although part emergency preparedness. The purpose under the criteria of 10 CFR Part 51 an of the burden for the conduct of of this requirement is to provide an up- environmental impact sta!ement was to-date assessment of the state of emergency preparedness exercises falls not required for the Commission's emergency preparedness for a new plant on Siate and local governments_ Ltie emergency planning and preparedness at the time the plant receives an regulations, which included 10 CFR Part final rule. by changing the frequency of operating license. This requirement has 50, App. E a-s hereby revised. NUREG- the requirement, if anything lessens the been easilv satisfied in most cases. In 0685 may be examined in the amount of the current burden. Thus. the the few ca;es in which there has been Commission's Public Document Room, final rule does not impose a significant some difficulty, the Commission's 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC. economic impact on a substantial exemption process provides a suitable Copies are available for.purchase number of small entities, as defined in alternate method for addressing the through the Superintendent of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980.
situation. Given the satisfactory Documents, USGPO, Box 37082, List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 experience with the current rule and the Washington, DC, 20013-7082. benefit in having up-to-dale and Antitrust, Classified information, Fire Paperwork Reduction Aci prevention. Incorporation by reference, accurate information on the state of emergency preparedness at new nuclear The final rule contains no information Intergovernmental relations. Nuclear power plants, l would not relax the collection requirements and therefore is* power plants and reactors, Penalty, existing one-year requirement for a full not subject to the requirements of the Radiation protection, Reactor siting participation exercise. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). requirements. Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact Regulatory Analysis For the ;easons set out in the preamble, and under the authority of the The Commission has determined The Commission bas prepared a Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, under the National Environmental Policy regulatory analysis for this regulation. the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Act of 1969, as amended, and the The analysis examines the costs and as amended. and 5 U.S.C. 553, the !\i'RC Commission's regulations in Subpart A benefits of the action and the is adopting the following amendment to of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a alternatives considered bv the 10 CFR Part 50: major Federal action *significantly Commission. A copy of the regulatory affecting the quality of the human analysis is available for isspection and environment and therefore an copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public environmental impact statement is not Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., required. See 10 CFR 51.ZO(a)(l]. Washington. DC. Single copies of the Moreover, the Commission has analysis may be obtained from Michael determined. pursuant lo 10 CFR 51.32, T. Jamgochian, Regulatory Applications* 50-SC-6
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION 52 FR 19303 52 FR 28963 II. Summary and Analysis of Comments Published 5/22/87 Published 8/5/87 Effective 10/5/87 The NRC received 35 comments on 10 CFR Parts 50 and 51 the proposed rule to amend its property 10 CFR Part 50 insurance regulations. The comments Domestic Licensing of Production and may be grouped as follows:
Utilization Facilities; Communications Changes in Property Insurance ;21 Utilities Procedures Amendments; Correction Requirements for NRC Licensed 5 Counsel to Utilities Nuclear Power Plants 3 Insurers/Insurance Trade Groups AGcNCY: Nuclear Refmh,tor~* Co:mnission. AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 2 Utility/Nuclear Trade Groups Commission. 2 Individuals ACTION: Final rule; correction. 1 Bar Association Committee ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY
- This document corrects a 1 Environmental Interest Group final rule amending 10 CFR Part 50 and
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Because the issues considered in the 51 with regard to procedures for Commission (NRCJ is amending its rulemaking are complex and affect submitting correspondence, reports. regulations requiring licensees to different utilities in different ways, the applications, and other written maintain substantial amounts of onsite focus of the comments varied communications pertaining to the property insurance to provide financial considerably. Nevertheless, the majority
- domestic licensing of production and security for stabilizing and of utility commenters tended to endorse utilization facilities. The final rule was decontaminating their licensed reactors the positions taken by two trade groups, published on November 6, 1986 [51 FR in the event of an accident. These : the Atomic Industrial Forum and the 40303) and inadvertently omitted a changes will increase the amount of Edison Electric Institute, but chose to recentiy published revision of one of the insurance required to $1.06 billion, emphasize areas of their particular affected sections. This action is impose a modified decontamination concern. The two individuals who necessary to return the omitied priority on any proceeds from such commented tended to support the information and to inform the public and
- insurance, and require that proceeds 'positions of those utilities with smaller licensees of this omission. subject to the decontamination priority plants worried about being required to shall be paid to an independent trustee. carry more insurance than they believe FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
All commercial reactor licensees are is necessary. The set of comments from Donnie H. Grimsley, Director, Division subject to this rule. the environmental interest group of Rules and Records, Office of EFFECTIVE DATE: October 5, 1967. supported most aspects of the NRC's Administration and Resources Management, U.S. *Nuclear Regulatory FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Iproposal. The insurers provided a Robert S. Wood, Office of Nuclear [slightly different perspective from the Commission. Washington, DC 20555, Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear *utilities but made many of the same Telephone: 301-492-7211. Regulatory Commission, Washington, ipoints. The Bar Association Committee In FR Doc. 86-25045, published in the 'comments provided the most distinct Federal Register of Thursday, November DC 20555, Telephone 301/492-8413. perspective on one aspect of the 6, 1966. make the following correction: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: proposed rule, the decontamination
- 1. On page 40309, in the first column priority.
(containing the revision to § 50.54[f)), in I. Background The following is a detailed discussion the fifth line ending with the word On November 8, 1964, a proposed rule and analysis of the comments received "revoked.", insert the following words was published in the Federal Register arranged according to topic. The topics after the period: ! (49 FR 44645) which would increase the
'amount of onsite property damage iare: (1) Amount of insurance; (2) method Excep1 for infar;nation so"Jgh! tD insurance that commercial reactor Iof future adjustment of insurance; (3)
Yerifr licemee compliance with the !site-wide vs. unit coverage; (4) State licensees are required to carry pursuant cc.rrent lice::.sing basis fo; tha~ facility. to 10 CFR 50.54[w). Operating reactor jprohibitions against buying certain the ]';RC r.rnst prepan, the n;a~or: or licensees are currently required to carry 1 types of insurance; (5) the reasons for each info~mation ;e~'c'est both (1) the maximum amount of !decontamination priority; and (6) other rrior to iEsunnce to er.sure that ,he. property insurance offered as primary issues. Of greatest concern to the burden lo be in:posed on respondtnts is coverage by either American Nuclear commenters was item five, NRC's justified in Yiew of the poiential safeiy proposal to require insurance proceeds Insurers/Mutual Atomic Energy to be used first to decontaminate the significance of the issue io be adcireFsed Reinsurance Pool (ANI/MAERP) or in the requested information. Each such facility when so required to protect Nuclear Mutual Limited (NML)- just}fication pr?vici!r.d for a;: eYc}?atior; currently $500 million-and (2) any public health and safety and so ordered perio~med by tnE: !,RC s!a:::1 m~s1 oe by the Director of the Office of Nuclear excess coverage in amount no less than Reactor Regulation. epproved by the Exermin: Director for that offered by either ANI/MAERP-Operations or his m he~ c:iesignee prior $120 million-or Nuclear Electric 1. Amount of Insurance to issuance of the request. Insurance Limited [NEIL-11)-$610 Summary of Comments: Most of the Dated at Be!hesda, Jv1a;-ylanci. fob 1 str. day million. Thus, the minimum currently commenters, including most utilities and required under the rule is $500 million their representatives, either supported For thr: Nuciea.r F..egu1al.o:y C.mT'.:::H:.:,~-::*:-;. primary coverage and $120 million the proposed coverage limit of $1.02 James M. Taylor, excess coverage. By buying both excess billion or at least found it acceptable or Acting Deputy Execu/i\*e Directo,_for layers, utilities are able to purchase a non-burdensome. However, most of Operations. total of $1.23 billion in property those who accepted the proposed limit insurance. in principle suggested that the rule be The proposed rule also provided for a modified to reflect the potential for modified decontaminatio:i priority on reductions in capacity because of any proceeds from such insurance and changes in the insurance markets. To sought comment on several related avoid such a situation, several issues. commenters suggested that the rule be 50-SC-7
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION modified to require either-$1.02 billion them on an ad hoc basis through the* imprecise to be specified to the degree or, if that amount were not available, exemption process. A few commenters done in the rule. However, in the the total of the primary coverage offered indicated their support for special proposed rule, the rationale for requiring by either ANI/MAERP or NML plus the provisions for smaller reactors based on $1.02 billion was not only that this was total excess coverage offered by both physical size, core inventory, etc. Even the most available al that time, but that ANI/MAERP and NEIL-II. Others those against special treatment of it approximated the maximum estimated suggested a modification to allow smaller reactors suggested that existing in a PNL study 1 to be necessary to clean utilities which may incur property losses exemptions should remain unaffected by up a reactor in its entirety after an during a particular policy year to take the new rule and that the final rule accident. The actu~l maximum required reasonable steps to have their insurance should clarify that this interpretation is was estimated to be $1.06 billion. The reinstated so as not to be in technical correct amount currently available is $1.23 violation of NRC's regulations. To avoid NRG Response: 1.a. Issue: Amend the billion. The Commission believes that this, commenters suggested that the rules to reflect reductions in available $1.6 billion should be required, because NRC clarify its position that claims insurance through changes in insurance at least that amount is now available made by a utility which resulted in a capacity. and no other amount is as technically reduction in policy limits for that policy supportable.
year would not be considered a Response: The NRC believes there is The NRC does not believe that most violation of NRC regulations. some merit in commenters' proposals to utilities would have difficulty obtaining Alternatively, some proposed that address in the rule the problem of the slightly higher amount since most
- § 50.54(w) be amended to require a reductions in capacity. To require more choose lo buy the maximum available.
licensee to take reasonable steps to than what is available would be The NRC agrees that the process of obtain reinstatement of insurance, an meaningless because licensees' only determining the actual amount needed action keeping that licensee in realistic alternative to buying insurance to protect public health and safety is compliance with§ 50.54(w). Another would be to self-insure which the NRC imprecise and that the threat to public commenter suggested that reductions in determined would provide no additional health and safety usually decreases as capacity could be handled by allowing a assurance. This is discussed under cleanup progresses. Clearly, there is a "cushion" of $50 million to $100 million issues "4". Futher, the Commission has sliding scale of effect on public health between what is available and what the traditionally never required more and safety so that after some NRC requires. Special action should be insurance than that generally available. undetermined point is passed, the required on reinstatement only if it Surety bonds, letters of credit, and other contributions to public health and safety . affected public health and safety. ~ethods of assurance may be available that additional amounts of insurance A few commenters took issue with the to certain licensees in relatively small would make are less significant. amount established. One suggested that amounts, but would probably not be although this problem is addressed more the rufe is not sufficiently flexible generally available especially if fully in the discussion on the because it would require insurance to be capacity shrank substantially. decontamination priority. Thus, there purchased from all insurers offering this Consequently, the NRC has modified currently appears to be no adequate coverage, which tends to limit a utility's the rule to allow the lesser of the basis for selecting any figure that would options. It was alleged that this specific amount or the maximum be better than the amount suggested in requirement might also lead to anti- available from insurance sources. The the PNL report. The NRC is not competitive behavior. Another slated Commission will continue to monitor the persuaded that there is any compelling that the NRC should not be concerned adequacy of the amount of property reason to keep the $1.02 billion with the full cost of restoring a reactor insurance that is available to reactor originally proposed, or to round off to $1 lo service after an accident but rather licensees. billion, or to choose some figure other with the costs associated with The NRC also believes that there is than the $1.06 figure derived from the protecting public health and safety. This justification for amending the rule to PNL report. commenter suggested using provide reasonable lime for The NRC is also not persuaded by the decommissioning funds for cleaning up reinstatement of insurance when a claim argument that requiring the purchase of after an accident, and stated that, filed by an insured causes coverage al a insurance is unduly restrictive or may because of lessons learned from TMI. facility lo be reduced during the lead to anti-competitive behavior by cleanup costs have been substantially remainder of the policy year by the forcing the purchase of insurance from reduced. Another commenter suggested amount of the claim. Because a all carriers. Other carriers could rounding off required coverage of $1 reduction would be for only the remainder of the policy year, after conceivably enter the insurance market. billion because of the lack of precision In fact, by requiring a specific dollar in establishing a required amount. A which the insurance would be amount rather than insurance from non-utility commenter suggested that the automatically reinstated, the NRC does specific carriers, NRC has avoided a "enormous" premiums generated for not believe a serious threat to public property insurance are directly removed health and safety would exist. It is ' Technology, Safety and Costs of from expenditures that would otherwise highly unlikely that any single utility Decommissioning Reference Light Water Reactors be made for nuclear safety. One would face two large accidents within Following Postulated Accidents. (NUREG/CR-2601). one year at the same site. Therefore, the Pacific Northwest Laboratory, November 1982. [See commenter suggested that requiring a especially pages 2-26 to 2-28. The PNL study specific dollar amount, rather than all .NRC has modified the rule to require estimated that accident cleanup costs at a reference that is offered, would lead to the that licensees take reasonable steps to PWR following a scenario 3 accident would be established figure being considered by obtain reinstatement of insurance within approximately $404 million. However. additional 60 days. costs lhat can appropriately be ascribed to such an utilities a maximum as well as a accident include: minimum. 1.b. Issue: Change the amount of Base operations and maintenance............................ $124M Several commented on the related insurance required. Design differences (when comparing to TMl-2)...... $84M issue of whether special provisions Response: Because most commenters Cost escalation during cleanup................................... $209M Additional decontamination of the containment should be made for licensees of smaller supported the amount of coverage building.................. $100M reactors. Most who commented on this proposed in the rule, there was little Net Stabilization cost.... . .......................... $139M issue supported the NRC proposal of not discussion of whether that figure should When these costs are added to the $404 million specifically providing for smaller be changed. A few commenters stated basic cleanup cost estimate, a total of$1.06 billion is that coverage was higher than necessary derived.) This report is available for purchase from reactors in the rule but rather treating the U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, to protect public health and safety or too Washington. DC 20013-7082. 50-SC-8
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION restriction which would have prohibited requirements that would outstrip the reinstatement of coverage for their others from offering the insurance. availability of insurance. Similarly, facilities. One commenter suggested that Similarly, NRC does not accept the requirements based simply on the some latitude be allowed so that argument that the $2-3 million spent per capacity available would not different licensees sharing the same site reactor on insurance premiums each necessarily equal the amount necessary would not be required to maintain a
. year represent a drain on a licensee's for decontamination. Insurance capacity single insurance limit for the site. Most expenditures on safety. These premiums tends to increase based on the demand others strongly endorsed the NRC's . represent only small percent of a for it. This demand is not only acceptance of site-wide as opposed to licensee's annual expenditures on comprised of funds necessary for per-unit coverage. operating the reactor safely. NRC also decontamination and debris removal, NRG Response: The NRC continues to notes that the utilities did not state that but also reflects the needs of insureds believe that site-wide coverage is they had been prevented from receiving and their owners for compensation to appropriate given that general per-unit ratepayer revenues to cover the replace the facility, a concern beyond coverage has not been and probably will insurance premium expenses. the province of the NRC. not be available and that the chance of The argument that a specified dollar One commenter suggested that a second accident occu~rii1.g at one.site amount will be considered a maximum insurers determine the future amount to during a policy year prior to as well as a minimum is beside the be required, which presumably is akin to reinstatement of the full policy limits is point. The Commission has based its requiring whatever capacity is available. extremely remote. As indicated under amount on what the PNL study NRG Response: The NRC basically issue "1", the NRC also believes three is determined would be needed for accepts the reasoning propounded by some merit in revising the rule to allow decontamination and cleanup following most commenters on this issue. Property reasonable steps to be taken for an accident. Any amount above that has insurance capacity available now has reinstatement. With respect to the not been shown to be significant in apparently reached, if not exceeded, the comments that provision be made for protecting health and safety, but maximum amount necessary to units of different licensees at the same represents the. economic replacement of decontaminate and clean up a large site, the NRC agrees. Although per-site the facility itself. If a utility decides not commercial reactor as determined by coverage is acceptable where a single to insure for the replacement value of its the PNL study. Although there may be - licensee owns more than one reactor, plant, that is its decision to make. cost increases in the future, no separate coverage is needed for 1.c. Issue: Clarify that exemptions satisfactory formula for measuring them different licensees operating different already granted will not be affected by exists. Unlike such measures as the units at the same site. This is because new rulemaking. Consumer Price Index or the Handy- differences in factors such as reactor Response: The NRC agrees that the Whitman construction index, measures design and utility management can reasons for exemptions from the current of decontamination costs depend on a result in different risks for different rule have not been changed by the final very limited universe of experience. licensees. In addition, separate coverage rule. Exemptions have been granted to Furthermore, present trends suggest that conforms to the manner in which reactor growth in insurance capacity will property damage insurance is offered four licensees of small reactors from outstrip decontamination cost and held. For these reasons, the final carrying the full amount of insurance escalation. It can be expected that most rule requires each licensee to obtain currently required by 10 CFR 50.54(w). licensees will purchase the maximum property damage insurance for its These exemptions were based on case-available notwithstanding changes in nuclear facilities. Thus, different by-case analysis of accident costs at the NRC requirements. licensees operating different units at the specific plants. Increasing the required Of course, NRC resources might be amount of insurance based on general same site would each have to provide required to perform periodic analyses to coverage for their reactor units. technical studies in no way negates the determine changes in accident recovery continued validity of the specific studies costs and possibly to conduct 4. State Laws Prohibiting the Purchase upon which the existing exemptions rulemaking based on these analyses. of Certain Insurance were based. Thus, the exemptions for Nevertheless, as one commenter has amounts of property insurance required Summary of Comments: Relatively pointed out, any future rulemakings few comments were received on the should remain in effect. Licensees should be substantially less onerous and currently exempt from full requirements .issue of what should be done about involved than the present one. Even PNL those utilities subject to State laws or of 10 CFR 50.54(w) will not be required technical studies should be substantially to reapply for an exemption. constitutional provisions prohibiting the less expensive if the same cost purchase of mutual or retroactive
- 2. Method of Future Adjustment of estimation methodology were to be insurance. 2 All those commenting on Insurance used. Thus, the costs to the NRC of any this issue insisted that the NRC must future rulemaking should be lower. show greater flexibility to those utilities Summary of Comments: Almost all These costs would most likely be less who commented on this issue suggested prohibited from buying full insurance than the excess premium costs incurred coverage. Commenters suggested that that future changes should be effected by those few licensees who would be by rulemaking based on a periodic required to buy more insurance than assessment of need. Some suggested they otherwise would because of any updating the PNL report. Commenters automatic upward escalation of generally argued that relying on some insurance requirements as discussed formula tied to measures of inflation or above.
increasing insurance based on 2 Prohibitions generally take two forms. One availability would not be appropriate. 3. Site-Wide vs. Unit Coverage prohibits public entities in some States from owning stock in private corporations. Such prohibitions They believe that an inflation-based Summary of Comments: Very few have been construed to include the purchase of formula probably would not reflect the commenters addressed this issue insurance from mutual insurance companies actual needs for insurance necessary to directly, although some discussed it in whereby the insured becomes an owner of the protect public health and safety because relation to the reinstatement company. A second prohibits public entities from extending credit to private corporations, an acti?n decontamination cost changes could not considerations covered under issue "1". interpreted to include the payment of retrospechve be measured accurately by any existing Consequently, most recommendations premiums. The insurance offered by NML and cost index. Additionally, changes in an were concerned with allowing a NEIL-II is mutual insurance and may require the index might lead to property insurance reasonable period for licensees to obtain payment of retrospective premiums. 50-SC-9
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
§ 50.54(w](3) 3 of the existing rule should amendments. Several commenters requirement. There are no reasonable be retained. This section provides some mentioned that if these alternatives alternative means of financial assurance leeway for affected utilities either to were unavailable, they would probably available to these licensees. Based on obtain alternate coverage or to be be forced to shut down their reactors at these changed circumstances, the exempted from unachievable NRC enormous cost. Commission believes that its property requirements. Finally, one commenter suggested that insurance rule would preempt Several commenters indicated that one result of the NR.C's proposal in this conflicting State laws.
they have taken a variety of steps to area was to inject itself into the There can be no doubt that this rule is attempt to purchase additional regulation of terms and conditions of concerned with reactor safety. Indeed, insurance. One commenter described property insurance, a result the NRC in discussing the issue of whether to recent efforts to amend the sections of previously indicated it wished to avoid. impose a decontamination priority in the the Texas Constitution pertaining to the NRG Response: The proposed rule proposed rule the Commission stated: prohibitions against purchasing was designed to allow utilities either to In fact, the Commission has no reason to insurance. The only way the Texas purchase the requisite insurance or to impose a property insurance requirement Constitution can be amended is by demonstrate an equivalent amount of other than to protect the public health and referendum and the proposal submitted protection by alternate means. When safety. Proceeds from insurance would be to Texas voters in November 1984 was the Commission published the proposed used both to assure that contamination from defeated. Another commenter indicated rule for public comment, it believed that a reactor immediately after the accident did that the Nebraska Constitution prohibits such alternate means of financial not threaten public health and safety and the public entities in the State from assurance would be available. This environment and to eliminate delays and degradations to the cleanup process that becoming "a subscriber to the capital assumption formed the basis for the could cause threats to health, safety and the stock, or owner of such stock, or any Commission's conclusion that it environment over time. portion of interest therein of any probably could not promulgate a rule railroad, or private corporation, or that would preempt the State Thus, the rule operates in an area of association" (Article XI, Section I]. The prohibitions at issue. Based on the exclusive Federal control. Although the New York Power Authority stated that comments received, however, it now State prohibitions at issue do not NEIL-II excess insurance is unavailable appears that alternate means of attempt to regulate within this area, they to it at the present time but did not protection might not be available to prohibit what the Commission's rule explain why. some utilities. As noted above, these requires. They would, therefore, be Some commenters indicated that they utilities indicated that surety bonds or preempted because they are in direct have made efforts to secure equivalent letters or lines of credit are not available conflict with Federal law. It should be protection, including surety bonds or in the amount necessary to comply with noted that "[f]ederal regulations have no letters or lines of credit. However, the proposed rule. Self insurance, less preemptive effect than federal instruments in the amount necessary to although discussed as a possibility in statutes." Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. comply with the rule are not available. the legal analysis of the preemption Crisp, 81 L.Ed.2d 580, 589 (1984), quoting Even if available, however, these question, would not be acceptable Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Assn. commenters concluded that "the because the potential liability would v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). In existence of such protection on a greatly exceed the net assets of the addition, the State prohibitions concern liability (however contingent], backed affected utilities. Thus, a guarantee insurance, a matter that the States have by no assets and not covered by any based on the financial strength of the traditionally regulated. Accordingly, current revenues, would effectively licensee would be insufficient. A trust Congressional intent to preempt must be preclude them from future financing fund based on collections from "clear and manifest." Rice v. Santa Fe needed to maintain, improve, and customers would be prohibitively Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). expand their physical plant." . expensive if funded immediately, Such intent is present, however, when Commenters concluded, therefore, that because it would require collecting the the requirement of Federal and State they would be unable to furnish entire amount in advance. If funded over law are in conflict. See Florida Avocado evidence of equivalent protection in a period of time, it would not meet the and Lime Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
- accordance with the proposed rule. Commission's objective of providing 142-43 (1963); Ferebee v. Chevron Commenters suggested that three financial assurance for decontamination Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.
alternatives exist. First, affected utilities and cleanup because an accident could 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). could continue to explore with NEIL-II occur before the full amount had been A conflict with Federal law arises the possibility that through amendment collected. when compliance with both Federal and to its by-laws and charter and to its In these circumstances, the State law is impossible or the State law current policies, NEIL-II could offer Commission believes that a clear frustrates the accomplishment of a insurance structured to comply with conflict exists between the requirements Federal objective. Pacific Gas and State law. Nebraska publicly-owned of Federal and State law. The Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources utilities have done this and are awaiting Commission has determined that $1.06 Conservation and Development a decision by the Nebraska Supreme billion of nuclear property damage Commission, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983). In Court. Second, the relevant portions of insurance is needed to stabilize, Capital Cities, supra, the Supreme Court State laws or constitutions could be decontaminate and clean up a reactor held that an FCC regulation requiring amended. However, as indicated above, after an accident so as to mitigate cable television operators to carry this could be a protracted process with potential threats to the health and safety certain broadcast signals without no assurance of success. Third, of workers and the public and to the alteration preempted an Oklahoma licensees could seek exemption under 10 environment. Accordingly, the constitutional provision prohibiting the CFR 50.12 from the proposed Commission is requiring reactor advertising of alcoholic beverages licensees to purchase this insurance. within the State. State law compelled 3 This paragraph reads, "When a licensee is Some State laws or constitutions deletion of wine commercials, an action prohibited from purchasing on-si le property damage prohibit certain licensees from that Federal law prohibited. Cable insurance because of state or local law, the licensee operators who complied with Federal shall purchase the specific amount of such purchasing mutual or assessment insurance found by the NRC to be reasonably insurance. No other insurance is law were subject to criminal prosecution available to that licensee, or to obtain an equivalent available in an amount sufficient to under State law. amount of protection ... " comply with the Commission's 50-SC-10
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION The Court found a conflict based on with Federal law because licensees with hope that earlier objections by the impossibility of complying with both could pay both Federal fines and State- utilities could be ameliorated. In the Federal and State law, as well as imposed punitive damages. Citing a ANPRM, utilities had objected to an obstruction of the Federal objective of failure of proof, the Court declined to absolute decontamination priority increased program diversity. 81 L.Ed.2d decide whether an award of damages because such a priority: (1) Would at 593-94. Similarly, it is impossible for a could be so large as to conflict with the conflict with trust indenture language reactor licensee to comply with both the NRC's policy of avDiding penalties and fuel leasing agreements that require Commission's rule requiring the which would put a licensee out of licensees in general to maintain purchase of nuclear property damage business or have an adverse effect on sufficient insurance to protect insurance and the State constitutional safety. Thus, the Court did not preclude bondholders and fuel lessors in case of provisions prohibiting the purchase of the possibility of Federal preemption in damage to property; (2) would be that insurance. In addition, the State an appropriate case based on a conflict unnecessarily restrictive in allowing prohibitions interfere with the Federal with Federal law. utilities to respond to an accident and objective of exclusive Federal regulation Finally, the Commission rejects the thus would inhibit an expedited of reactor safety. Thus, the provisions of notion that a conflict with Federal law recovery and adversely affect public Federal and State law are clearly in could be avoided by the licensee's health and safety; (3) could, because of conflict. option of ceasing to operate the reactor. reduced investor protection, lead to This conclusion is consistent with Rather, the Commission believes that in reduce access to funds from investors or recent Supreme Court decisions on analyzing this issue, a court would increased cost of funds; and (4) would Federal preemption under the Atomic conclude that a conflict exists where the be unnecessary because of the existing Energy Act, notwithstanding the licensee's only option is to withdraw 1 priority offered in the excess layer absence of a conflict in those cases. In from its Federally licensed activities. through NEIL-II. (This priority covers Pacific Gas, supra, the Court upheld This is suggested not only by Pacific ", .. all expenses necessarily incurred California's moratorium on the Gas, supra, but by other Federal in discharging the obligation or liability certification of new nuclear power 'preemption cases. See, e.g., Ferebee, of the Insured(s) to remove debris of and plants pending Federal approval of a supra, 736 F.2d at 1541; Douglas v. to decontaminate the property covered demonstrated technology or means for Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 by this Policy following direct physical the permanent disposal of high level (1977); Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 damage to such property caused by any radioactive wastes. The Court reasoned (1963). peril covered under the Underlying that, under the Atomic Energy Act, The Commission believes that, where Property Policy . . . " (see NEIL's a reactor licensee has no reasonable Decontamination Liability and Excess Congress provided for a system of dual alternatives to purchasing nuclear Property Insurance Policy, p. 12)).
regulation of nuclear-generated property damage insurance, the State electricity in which the Federal Many of these same arguments were prohibitions at issue would conflict with Government maintains complete control raised again by commenters in response Federal law. For all the foregoing over reactor safety and the States to the modified decontamination reasons, the Commission concludes that exercise their traditional authority over its property insurance rule would proposal. Some commenters indicated economic questions, such as the need preempt these State prohibitions. that a modified priority, while not as for power, type of facilities to be seriously affecting finances as an licensed, land use, and ratemaking. 5. Decontamination Priority absolute priority, would still have Because the moratorium was based on Summary of Comments: The great substantial adverse impact. This point economic rather than safety concerns majority of comments received on the was made most comprehensively by the and did not conflict with Federal safety proposed rule focused on the NRC's Edison Electric Institute (comment 13) regulations, the Court held that the proposal to require some form of and endorsed by several other California statute was not preempted. decontamination priority, that is, commenters. It stated in part: The Court relied on the fact that the proceeds from insurance should be used While the EEi recognizes that the moratorium would only affect reactors to decontaminate and clean up after an Commission sought to afford utilities some at the planning stage, cautioning that accident before any other purpose such financial flexibility lo respond lo any future
"[s]tate regulations which affected the as facility restoration or payment of
- accident by giving the Director of Nuclear construction and opera lion of federally investors. Reactor Regulation the authority to require approved nuclear power plants would Although the comments in response to payments under the decontamination priority, pose a different case." 461 U.S. at 223 the Advance Notice of Proposed the sole substantive standard guiding the use n.34. The State prohibitions at issue here of this authority is that he may direct Rulemaking (ANPRMJ published on June
. affect a reactor licensee's ability to insurance proceeds be used 'to the extent 24, 1982 (47 FR 27371) evoked a similar that such decontamination is required to comply with the Commission's safety degree of interest in the issue of protect public health and safety.' ... While requirements. Thus, they would affect decontamination priority, comments on this approach provides more flexibility than the operation of a Federally licensed the proposed rule provide more detail an absolute decontamination priority, we reactor and would not escape Federal and elaboration of the reasons for the continue to have serious concerns about this preemption under the rationale of extensive opposition to the NRC proposal. In particular, there seems to be Pacific Gas. proposal. virtually no limit upon the discretion of the In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 The NRC proposal was drafted as a Director, other than the 'public health and U.S. 238, (1984), the Supreme Court held modified decontamination priority 4 safety' standard. If an accident were to occur, that the Atomic Energy Act does not we fear that the Director would immediately impose the decontamination priority for all preempt an award of punitive damages 4 As proposed, paragraph 50.54(w)[3) reads, "The insurance proceeds, whether or not all funds under State tort law for personal injuries proceeds of this insurance shall be used first to are necessary to protect public health and or property damage from radioactive decontaminate the licensed reactors before any other purpose when and to the extent that such safety since this step maximizes his future materials. The Court examined the decontamination is required to protect public health options. Once this happens, there would be legislative history of the Price-Anderson and safety and is so ordered to be used by the no administrative mechanism to cause a Act and found ample evidence that Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation." reconsideration of this decision. Moreover, Congress had assumed that remedies under State tort law would continue to be available to persons injured by nuclear incidents. There was no conflict 50-SC-11
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION the Director is likely to be under pressure that requiring a decontamination In the case of a possible bankruptcy, we from multiple sources to (1) require priority would preempt the coverages believe that, as a practical matter, the decontamination prior to other actions that filed by ANI/MAERP with State licensee, its creditors and NRC would have a may be appropriate to restore the property to insurance departments and would thus common interest in working out a plan that operating condition and (2) manage the allowed the licensee to continue as an entity course of repair and clean-up through his be in effect a preemption of State law, a result the NRC sought to avoid while decontaminating to the extent control of the insurance proceeds. These necessary to protect public health and safety.
factors cause EEi to fear that the broad (comment 7, p. 2). Our analysis is that the proposed priority discretion vested in the Director over the use Another commenter analyzed several could not facilitate that result and in some of proceeds from the decontamination scenarios in which an accident caused circumn*stances would impede it. We priority may effectively deprive utilities of varying amounts of damages and the therefore urge that NRC reject 50.54(w)(3). any of the benefits of property insurance. In resulting actions that probably would be effect, the Director would become the A somewhat different conclusion was taken by the trustee (Comment 15, p. 2): reached by another commenter. This ultimate manager of the decontamination and repair operation. If the damaged plant can be reused, commenter suggested two approaches. EEi believes one way to balance the need decontamination would be a necessary First, perhaps a licensee could "identify for flexibility to respond to an accident with element of the repair, and the trustee would those decontamination costs which are the need to limit the Director's authority over release insurance proceeds. After initial decontamination, repairs would proceed not treatable as capital repairs and property insurance proceeds is to restrict the cause them to be insured separately or time period in which any order regarding the simultaneously with decontamination. The use of proceeds from property insurance for only effect of an order establishing a priority at least paid separately under existing decontamination remains in effect. Limiting for decontamination would be to forbid use insurance. It may then be possible to the dura lion of any such order will ensure of the funds acquired from the trustee for conclude that such insurance is not that post-accident response decisions are anything but decontamination. This would property insurance which must be periodically reevaluated as conditions presumably require the licensee to segregate payable to mortgage trustees." change and new information becomes and invest the portion of the insurance (Comment 20, p. 2-3). This approach available. EEi proposes that the Director's proceeds trhat would be spent on repairs would allow release of a significant initial determination respecting use of the rather than decontamination and to use other sources of funds for the repairs. When the amount of funds not subject to the property insurance proceeds for control of the trustee. Second, funds decontamination shall issue a new order priority order was lifted, the segregated funds regarding the use of such proceeds. This could then be used to replace the funds spent would be released by the trustee if they second order would remain in effect for no on repairs. In short, the priority order would were to be used for repairs that would more than six months. It could be followed by cause some added bookkeeping without be treated as additions "chargeable to new orders which terminate every six serving any useful purpose. plant accounts in accordance with months. All such orders should be final If the damaged plant could not be restored sound accounting practice." (Ibid, p. 3) orders which are subject to judicial review. to use, the trustee might refuse to release However, this commenter concludes, Each should reveal the rationale, basis and funds for decontamination on the ground that record which are relied upon support the they would not be used for repairs or To the extent that decontamination Director's determination. In addition, the replacement. However, the utility could still expenses do not constitute repairs so Director should sequest [sic] only those obtain the funds if it could provide additional chargeable, the trustee may refuse to release portions of the insurance funds reasonably unhanded property. While the utility would the funds unless the Company happens to needed for decontamination so that funds probably use the funds for decontamination have available property additions which also would be available to carry out other without compulsion, NRC could require it to have not previously been tendered to the activities necessary to restore the utility's do so even in the absence of the proposal in trustee. There can certainly be no assurance property. § 50.54(w)(3). that the Company will have independently Finally, EEi interprets the Commission's If the licensee did not have additional available property additions to tender to the proposal to allow the Director to act unbonded property to offer the trustee, it trustee to obtain such release. The Company expeditiously without holding hearings since could obtain the proceeds only on the basis simply may be unable to obtain release of that could seriously delay the decisionmaking that it would use them to build or acquire funds to expend on decontamination, at least process. In order to avoid any confusion, we new public utility property. Thus, an NRC to the extent that such expenditures do not suggest the Commission confirm our priority order would require the use of the constitute repairs under the provisions of the understanding of this process. proceeds for decontamination while the mortgage. (Ibid, p. 3) indenture would forbid their use for that Other commenters suggested similar purpose, and the licensee might be unable to Other commenters emphasized the problems. For example, by not reach the proceeds. impact on investor perceptions. One establishing standards or criteria by This could push the licensee into commenter indicated that because of the which the Director of NRR is to order a insolvency and possibly bankruptcy. We lack of clear standards for imposing a decontamination priority, the resulting doubt that reorganization would be appealing decontamination priority, bondholders uncertainty would be as unsettling to to NRC since it might find itself with the probably would not have a investors as a more rigid priority. responsibility for the cleanup and the "significantly greater sense of security possibility that in the post-bankruptcy period Further, such an order would probably it could not recover the cleanup costs from for their investment than they could be subject to a protracted review the licensee. have had under the 1982 proposal of an process, open to intervention, and might. Absent a priority, the trustee, in its absolute priority." (Comment 18, p. 4). so tie up funds that the cleanup process discretion, could still refuse to relinquish the Further, "existing bondholders could be hampered and public health proceeds if the licensee was unable to purchased their bonds with an and safety adversely affected. One substitute additional property. But this is not understanding that Federal regulatory commenter stated that, although the a position it would take lightly. Such a step policy would allow utilities to protect NRC has authority to impose could also push the licensee into bankruptcy, their investment with insurance." (Ibid, decontamination requirements on a and the trustee would run the risks that (i) its p. 5). A letter from Morgan Stanley & Co. efforts to use the proceeds to benefit licensee, it does not have authority "to bondholders would be automatically stayed was enclosed with EEi's comments to dictate either to insurers or to indenture and [ii) it would be forced to turn the support this view. This letter states that trustees how they are to deal with the proceeds over to the licensee or particularly since TMI, investors expect insurance proceeds" (comment 15). reorganization trustee for use in post- that, "in the event of an accident, a Similarly, another commenter suggested bankruptcy operations. portion of these insurance proceeds will 50-SC-12
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION be available to repair or replace their vested rights to a given amount or type Finally, the Association believes that investment." of coverage. It also recognized that to such an approach should not conflict Finally, the comment from the respond properly to a nuclear accident, with utility indenture provisions insurance pools suggested a licensee may be required to take a because such indentures generally that they were able to pay the owner of TM! range of actions apqrt from require a utility to maintain property Unit 2 $68 million for loss to their nuclear decontamination and debris removal. insurance to the same extent as fuel, even though decontamination was Consequently, this commenter favored companies similarly situated and barely commenced. This contributed to priority for payment of decontamination opera ting like properties, and not a regaining financial stability and made it more and debris removal expenses only particular level of coverage. Primary likely that the owners could address the long-insofar as it is "necessary to remove any policies offered by ANI/MAERP and range plans to decontaminate the reactor.
(Comment 31, p. 2). significant health or safety hazard." The NML would have to be modified Association suggested this goal could be analogously to the NEIL-II excess Despite their strong reservations accomplished if a regulation were policy, yielding a hybrid about a decontamination priority, properly drawn, although it proposed no decontamination liability and property several commenters proposed ways of wording for such a regulation in its insurance policy. making such a priority less burdensome. comments. NRC Response: The NRC disagrees Suggested revisions to the proposed rule In responding to the proposed rule, that a decontamination priority would would: (1) Provide specific criteria for however, the Association changed the conflict with bond indenture language. determining when public health and As the Association indicated, such focus of its comments. Although the safety is endangered, such as by Association indicated that it supported language typically would require a following limits used in 10 CFR Part 20; "in principle the form of utility "to insure its property against (2) establish "sunset" provisions so that loss or damage to the same extent that decontamination priority which the the Director's order would last only for a property of a similar character is usually Commission has proposed," it believes specified time, e.g., three to six months so insured by companies similarly that, "as now proposed, the subject to renewal; and (3) have the situated and operating like properties." 5 amendments to the Commission's Director of NRR issue a show cause The NRC agrees with the Association's property insurance regulations may not order requiring the licensee to explain conclusion that such language would its prepared work plan and schedule effectively provide for the decontamination priority which the allow the NRC to impose a and related expenditures are in the decontamination priority because all public interest. Following a hearing on Commission desires to achieve ... that in the event of a serious nuclear utility licensees would face similar the show cause order, the Commission accident, the utility's indenture trustee conditions, would be insured "to the could issue a modifica lion of the may refuse to release property insurance same extent" and would thus comply licensee's work plan or schedule. Until proceeds for decontamination or debris with indenture language. More recently, an order was issued, the licensee would removal purposes." (Comment 12, p. 5). the Association concluded that, after a be able to proceed with its work plan. Others suggested that the term The Association believes that "only large accident, conflict between the "decontamination" be defined. These by restricting payment of insurance interests of bondholders as represented commenters argued that preparatory proceeds to the trustee can there be any by their trustees on the one hand, and expenditures, such as stabilization costs reasonable assurance that the proposed the NRC on the other, could seriously and purchase of equipment and other decontamination priority will prove impede, in some circumstances, materials necessary for cleanup might effective." (p. 6). Such a restriction of recovery from an accident. The not be included in the definition of payment would not be effective merely Association's recommended solution, decontamination priority. Similarly, the by payment directly to the utility i.e., to require all insurance proceeds to degrees of decontamination should be because funds would still be vulnerable be deposited in a trust apart from the tied to avoiding "exposure of the off-site to creditor delays due to bankruptcy or utility or bondholder's trustee, would public to radiation levels exceeding insolvency. The Association perceives a provide additional assurance that funds those allowed by NRC regulations" fundamental conflict between the would be available for accident (comment 18, p. 6) or should otherwise Atomic Energy Act, NRC regulations, decontamination and cleanup but could indicate the level above which health and the terms of the license on the one exacerbate this conflict, if imposed. and safety is endangered (comment 16, hand and the provisions of the The extent to which this conflict
- p. 3). Bankruptcy Code on the other. The would adversely affect investor One comment addressed the specific Association presents a legal analysis perceptions and thus increase utility issue of timing the implementation of a and synopsis of the arguments that the cost of capital and reduce access to decontamination priority to coincide parties might use in obtaining property capital is speculative. It is possible that with the renewal dates of the policies. insurance proceeds and concludes from utilities would incur some, perhaps Because policies issued by NML and its analysis that significant, increased capital costs if a NEIL-II are, in effect, bilateral contracts, full decontamination priority were a decontamination priority can only be changes would be difficult to make effectively implemented if the imposed. However, there are a number without mutual consent, or without decontamination proceeds are paid neither to of factors which should temper the awaiting policy expiration. the indenture trustee nor the utility itself but In preparing the proposed rule, the rather into a separate trust fund previously 'One commenter indicated that its mortgage NRC relied on comments and proposals established for that purpose. The proceeds provisions require it to maintain insurance in "a under the insurance policy would be paid to reasonable amount against loss or damage by fire submitted by the Association of the Bar and from other causes customarily insured against of the City of New York (the the trustee of the trust fund and disbursed to pay for costs incurred in decontaminating the by similar companies." [Comment 20). This is not Association] in response to the 1982 reactor and removing radioactive debris. The appreciably different from the language cited by the ANPRM. As indicated in the proposed Association. The staff has attempted without remaining amounts, up to the limits of the success to obtain assistance from the Federal rule (49 FR 44647, Co. 3), the Association policies. would then be available to pay for Energy Regulatory Commission (FERCJ and others determined that utility trust indentures property damage and these funds would be to determine the extent to which indenture language do not in general give bondholders any paid to the indenture trustee." (p. 13}. varies.
50-SC-13
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION rational investor's possible disquiet. itself ever became an impediment to interest may be affected by the First, as some commenters pointed out, accident recovery and resulted proceeding could request a hearing or the NRC has the authority under indirectly in a threat to public health file a petition to intervene. If the sections 161, 182(a), and other sections and safety, it could be rescinded or Commission followed its usual practice of the Atomic Energy Act to impose a made part of a broader recovery of confining the scope of the proceeding decontamination priority after an framework as the previous commenter to whether the order should be accident whether or not such a priority discussed. The NRC, no less than the sustained, only pesons opposing the is actually spelled out in 10 CFR investors, would not wish to precipitate order could request a hearing or petition 50.54(w). Given this, it can be argued bankruptcy and so impede accident to intervene. Petitioners who did not that a conflict existed all along, although recovery. object to the order but might seek perhaps not known to certain investors. The NRC rejects the argument that a further corrective measures would lack Second, investors now are covered for decontamination priority would reduce the requisite interest in the proceeding.
a relatively small portion of their flexibility in responding to an accident. See Bellotti v. NRC, 725 F.2d 1380 (1983). investment, although it has increased Obviously, the NRC would not interpret Thus as a practical matter, the Director's from the maximum $300 million a priority in so rigid a manner as to ability to impose the priority without a coverage at the time of the TMI-2 preclude prudent practices necessary to hearing would most likely depend on the accident. Because NEIL-II coverage has an orderly decontamination, such as licensee's response to the order. its own decontamination priority, 6 the equipment purchases, stabilization With regard to the commenter's most coverage investors could currently activities, etc. The decontamination concern about delay in the expect is $620 million. When compared priority was not meant to be applied decisionmaking process, .the to the $5 billion or more to construct the sequentially in that all expenditures on Commission notes that, even if a hearing la test nuclear power facilities, an cleanup would have to be made before were held, insurance proceeds would investor would be covered for little over any others. The priority has been not necessarily be tied up. This is 10% of the value of the investment. The worded to allow licensee flexibility, because the Commission's authority to NRC doubts that an investor would particularly after a reactor has been impose the priority before holding a derive security from this limited stabilized after an accident. Despite hearing would depend on the coverage but would tend not to invest if possible utility reluctance, the priority circumstances. an NRC decontamination priority were should be compatible with the broadest Other suggested changes to the actual imposed. range of actions necessary to protect wording of the priority concern the Third, commenters essentially ignored public health and safety. Further, the definition of the degree to which public in their comments the rapid growth in decontamination priority is meant to be health and safety should be protected. insurance capacity. The NRC cannot invoked only when there would be Some commenters recommend defining speculate on whether and to what serious concern over the availability of what is meant by protection of public extent capacity will grow further. funds for decontamination. health and safety; others suggest Nevertheless, because of the shortfall in coverage as compared to facility value, Although most commenters opposed referencing the radia lion protection it would be expected that demand for, if imposition of a decontamination guidelines used in 10 CFR Part 20. not supply of, insurance will remain priority, many did recommend changes The NRC favors tying high. If capacity continues to grow at a to the wording of the priority that would decontamination limits to 10 CFR Part 20 pace that substantially exceeds possible make it less onerous. One change, standards for radiation protection and increases in estimated facility suggested with slight variation by the ALARA principle (as low as decontamination costs, it would be several commenters, would require that reasonably achievable). expected that investors would find a a definite time limit be established for Notwithstanding reliance on these decontamination priority progressively an order by the Director of NRR. Some radiation protection standards, the NRC less onerous as more funds would be suggested that a time limit, of three or believes it is also necessary to work made available exceeding those subject six months duration, could be extended with a decontamination plan tailored to a priority. as necessary. The NRC agrees that both to the specific problems and Fourth, as some commenters have periodic reevaluation of the need to characteristics of the particular site suggested, a decontamination priority is continue the Director's order is desirable suffering the accident and to the general only necessary for a scenario in which a and is thus incorporating a variety of characteristics that differentiate plant is completely written off and the provisions in the final rule relating to decontamination after an accident from interests of the NRC and indenture duration of the priority. However, the decommissioning. This approach would trustee would conflict to the extent that NRC believes that, as a practical matter, allow both the NRC and the licensee bankruptcy might occur. Without a orders for decontamination priority greater discretion in initiating and priority, some commenters argue that would be extended as necessary to completing a safe recovery and would both the NRC and the trustee would protect public health and safety. Thus, be particularly desirable because have incentive to work out a plan "that the principal effect of sunset provisions accidents are expected to be rare and, to allowed the licensee to continue as an would be to allow for additional a large degree, unique. The NRC also entity while decontaminating." consideration as each order was believes that some commenters have (Comment 15) Again, the NRC disagrees replaced or extended. confused the purpose of this rule-to that a decontamination priority would Concerning the matter of hearings, the provide adequate funds for recovery destroy that incentive. If the priority mechanism for imposing the after an accident-with the process of decontamination priority would be an accident recovery itself which is more 6 The fact that NEIL-I! itself has a order to show cause by the Director of thoroughly covered in other parts of the decontamination priority raises the question of NRC. The Commission's rules in 10 CFR NRC's regulations. whether NEIL-H's priority would not also conflict Part 2, Subpart B, afford the licensee the This rule applies to decontamination with bond indenture language. The comments directed to this area did not differentiate between right to demand a hearing when the after an accident; it does not encompass the adverse effects that the NEIL-I! priority and the NRC staff seeks to impose requirements decommissioning. The NRC realizes that NRC priority might have. by order. In addition, any person whose there may be an overlapping area of 50-SC-14
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION tasks which cannot be defined as significant risk to the public health and seek legislation in Congress that would uniquely decontamination or safety. After the reactor is safe and give preference in any bankruptcy decommissioning. For example, certain stable, the licensee is required under proceeding to expenditures that mitigate components would be removed and section 10 CFR 50.54(w)(3)(ii) to submit threats to public health and safety. The disposed of whether as a result of a cleanup plan that identifies all cleanup NRC is currently studying the feasiblity cleanup following an accident or as part operations necessaNy to bring the of this approach.
of decommissioning operations at the reactor to the point of decommissioning end of a plant's useful life. The NRC has or restart. Various cleanup operations
- 6. Other Issues attempted to minimize this overlap, but are indentified and reference to 10 CFR Summary of Comments: Very few acknowledges that it cannot be Part 20 occupational exposure standards comments were received that were not eliminated. is made so as to differentiate between related to the previously discussed The NRC understands, as confirmed decontamination after an accident and issues. One commenter endorsed NRC's by ANI officials, that insurers would decommissioning. Section 10 CFR position stated in the proposed rule of likely pay for activities required or 50.54(w)(3)(iii) addresses the scope of not becoming involved in regulating components damaged as a result of the the decontamination priority. insurance terms and conditions accident. Insurers would not distinguish With respect to the Association's (comment 1). Another endorsed the between accident decontamination and recommendation that all insurance NRC's position of not requiring licensees decommissioning when paying out proceeds be placed in trust so as not to to carry coverage from both primary insurance proceeds, as long as a be available to the bondholder's trustee, insurers [i.e., NML and ANI/MAERP) licensees could offer proof of causation the NRC believes this requirement [comment 19). Finally, one commenter of damage. provides additional protection of public suggested that the term "financial If a reactor suffered an accident so health and safety. As explained in the protection" not be used in 10 CFR severe that restart would not be Association comments, utility bond 50.54(w)(2). "Financial protection," as possible, the reactor would have to be indentures typically require available defined in the Atomic Energy Act and 10 decommissioned. In this situation, the property insurance proceeds to be paid CFR Part 104, is used in a specific sense distinction between decontamination directly to the indenture trustee, not to not meant in Part 50.
and decommissioning would be difficult the utility. This means that in the event NRG Response: The NRC essentially to maintain. For example, a licensee of a serious accident, the insurance agrees with these comments and is could use property insurance proceeds policy proceeds would not be under the incorporating them in the rulemaking. for decontamination activities, such as control of the utility. If the NRC were to The NRC agrees that the term "financial removal and disposal of certain order the utility to spend all or part of protection" might be misleading to some components, that under normal the proceeds for protection of the public in the context used in Part 50. Thus, the circumstances would clearly be health and safety, the utility would be rule will be revised to use the less considered part of the decommissioning powerless to do so without asking for ambiguous term, "financial security." process. As a result, the licensee might and receiving the proceeds from the be able to preserve some trustee. Environmental Assessment and Finding decommissioning funds for other However, the bondholder trustee of No Significant Environmental Impact purposes following completion of might not be willing or even legally able decommissioning. Conversely, a to release the proceeds. The trustee's These amendments to 10 CFR 50.54(w) licensee might try to draw upon funds obligation is not to the public health and will increase the amount of insurance reserved for decommissioning to safety, but to bondholders, and the that each commercial reactor licensee is perform decontamination tasks if bondholders are interested in preserving required to maintain to clean up a property insurance proceeds were their investment. Thus, utility indentures licensed reactor site after an accident. expended prior to completion of generally limit the trustee's ability to The amount of required insurance will decontamination. pay insurance policy proceeds to the increase from a minimum of $620 million If an accident were severe enough to utility to circumstances where the funds currently required to $1.06 billion. The prevent restart of the reactor, however, will be used for repairs to or rule also adds a requirement that essentially all of the property insurance replacement of the damaged property proceeds from insurance must be used proceeds would likely be needed for and the bondholder's interests will first to stabilize and then decontaminate decontamination. Because property thereby be protected. Most importantly, the licensed reactors before any other insurance also covers replacement of if a utility were forced into default purpose when and to the extent that components, equipment, and structures, because of the financial consequences decontamination is required to protect the insurance proceeds would be of a serious accident, the trustee might public health and safety and is insufficient under current (and likely be legally prohibited from paying policy consistent with the Commission's 10 future) limits to cover all replacement as proceeds to the utility. As the CFR Part 20 radiation protection opposed to decontamination expenses. Association points out and NRC's own standards. These actions are required to Thus, it is likely that all property experience confirms, the NRC's ability provide greater assurance that insurance proceeds would be paid out under the Bankruptcy Code to get commercial reactor licensees will have regardless of whether used for accident priority for expenditures of funds for sufficient funds to clean up their decontamination or decommissioning safety is very uncertain. For these reactors following an accident. activities. reasons, the Commission is adopting the Assurance of these funds is required so In sum, the Commission is Association's proposed approach to the that public health and safety is not implementing a decontamination decontamination priority. Thus, 10 CFR adversely affected during the cleanup priority further modified to reflect many 50.54(w)(4) requires that the policy process. Alterna lives to this action commenters' concerns. The section of proceeds be paid to a separate trust consist of maintaining the existing rule the rule containing the priority, 19 CFR fund established for the sole purpose of or establishing some other limit of 50.54[w)(3), begins by establishing a protecting the public health and safety. insurance. Neither this action nor the priority for stabilizing the reactor after The NRC also believes that an alternatives to it have any significant an accident so as to prevent any approach worth further evaluation is to impact on the environment. No other 50-SC-15
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION agencies or persons were contacted for manner as the regulatory analysis expansion and associated stresses this action. mentioned previously. leading to pipe cracking is avoided.
Consequently the Commission has Also, the duration of inservice Regulatory Flexibility Certification inspection will be reduced, yielding determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as As required by the Regulatory substantially less occupational amended, and the Commission's Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605[b)), exposures. regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part the Commission cei:tifies that this rule EFFECTIVE DATE: November 27, 1987. 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not will not have a significant economic ADDRESSES: Copies of the written public be a major Federal action significantly a impact on substantial number of small comments are available for public affecting the quality of the human entities. inspection and copying for a fee at the environment and therefore an This rule affects only the licensing NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H environmental impact statement is not and operation of nuclear power plants. Street NW., Washington, DC. required. Although changes in insurance The companies that own these plants do FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: requirements affect the financial not fall within the scope of the definition John A. O'Brien, Office of Nuclear arrangements of licensees and have of "small entities" set forth in the Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear economic and social consequences, they Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Regulatory Commission, Washington, do not alter the environmental impact of Business Size Standards set out in DC 20555, Telephone (301)443-7854. the licensed activities. As determined in regulations issued by the Small Business SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: the above environmental assessment, Administration at 13 CFR Part 121. the alternatives to the proposed action Table of Contents List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 likewise do not have any significant !. Background impact on the environment. No other Antitrust, Classified information, Fire II. Scope of Rulemaking documents related to this proposed prevention, Incorporation by reference, Ill. Final Rule action exist. The foregoing constitutes Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear IV. Acceptance Criteria the environmental assessment and power plants and reactors, Penalty, V. Invitation to Comment finding of no significant impact for this Radiation protection, Reactor siting VI. Issues Analysis final rule. criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping VII. Availability of Documents requirements. VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Paper Reduction Act Statement For the reasons set out in the Impact: Availability IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule does not contain a new preamble and under the authority of the X. Regulatory and Backfit Analyses or amended information collection Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, XI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification requirement subject to the Paperwork the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, XII. List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 Reduction Act of1980 (44 U.SC. 3501 et as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, and the seq.). Existing requirements were NRC is adopting the following On July 23, 1986, the Commission published a proposed rule on the board approved by the Office of Management amendment to 10 CFR Part 50. scope modification to General Design and Budget approval number 3150-0011. 52 FR 31601 Criterion 4 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part Regulatory Analysis Published 8/21/87 50 (51 FR 26393). This proposed rule The Commission has prepared a Effective 8/19/87 contained a summary of the acceptance regulatory analysis for this regulation. criteria which the Commission had Statement of Organization and General developed. A 60-day public comment This analysis examines the costs and Information benefits of the alternatives considered period was allowed. Twenty-eight by the Commission. Interested persons See Port 1 Statements o! Consideration written comments were received from may examine and copy for a fee the utilities, reactor vendors, architect-regulatory analysis at the NRC Public engineering companies, industry groups, Document Room, 1717 H St. NW., 52 FR 41288 consulting firms and a citizen group. Published 10/27/87 There was no overt opposition to the Washington, DC. Single copies of the Effective 11 /27 /87 analysis may be obtained from Robert S. proposed rule; each commenter Wood, Office of Nuclear Reactor 10 CFR Part 50 supported the proposed rule or its intent Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory either in part or entirely. However, the Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Modification of General Design citizens group expressed certain legal Telephone (301) 492-8413. Criterion 4 Requirements for reservations which are addressed below Protection Against Dynamic Effects of in issues 20 and 21. A compilation of the Backfit Analysis Postulated Pipe Ruptures twenty-one issues raised as a result of This final rule requiring an increase in public comments and the accompanying property damage insurance does not AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission response is given under require "the modification of or addition Commission. Issues Analysis. The text of the final to systems, structures, components, or ACTION: Final rule. rule is identical to the text of the design of a facility; or the design proposed rule. The final rule should be
SUMMARY
- The Commission is amending approval or manufacturing license for a applied consistently with the guidance its regulations to broaden the scope of a facility; or the procedures or in this Supplementary Information.
recent modification to General Design organization required to design, Criterion 4 (GDC-4). The amendment I. Background construct, or operate a facility." would allow the removal of numerous Accordingly, this action is not a backfit Background to this rulemaking can be pipe whip restraints and jet as defined in § 50.109. However, the found in the limited scope modification impingement barriers as well as other staff has prepared an analysis of the to GDC-4 published as a proposed rule related changes in all reactor types. rule's impact in light of the factors listed in the Federal Register on July 1, 1985 (50 Implementation of the amendment will in§ 50.109(c). This analysis may be FR 27006). Research performed by the increase safety since inadvertent examined or obtained in the same NRC and industry, coupled with restriction of pipe growth due to thermal operating experience, has indicated that i 50-SC-16
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION safety can be negatively impacted by This amendment to GDC-4 allows reference to the probability of fluid the placement of protective devices such exclusion from the design basis of system pipe rupture. For reactor coolant as pipe whip restraints near certain dynamic effects associated with high loop piping, a representative value piping. The Commission adopted a two- energy pipe rupture by application of which would qualify as "extremely low" step approach to the modification leak-before-break technology. Only high would be of the order of lE-6 per because safety improvements could be energy piping in nuclear power units reactor year when all rupture locations quickly realized without extensive and that meets rigorous.acceptance criteria are considered in the fluid system piping time consuming review and discussion if is covered. High energy piping is defined or portions thereof. For other piping, the scope were initially limited to the as those systems having pressures representative values will be developed primary main loop piping of PWRs. The exceeding 275 psig or temperatures consistent with this definition as the Commission decided not to defer the *exceeding 200 'F. need arises. Alternatively, a limited application of leak-before-break Studies completed by Lawrence deterministic evaluation with verified technology while the detailed provisions Livermore National Laboratory under design and fabrication, in addition to of the acceptance criteria were being contract to the NRC indicate that adequate inservice inspection, can meet reviewed and approved. Many near adverse safety implications can result the extremely low probability criterion.
term operating license (NTOL) nulcear from requiring protective devices to The deterministic evaluation is based on power plant units and operating nuclear resist the dynamic effects associated the requirement that structures and power plant units had requested with postulated pipe rupture. The components are correctly engineered to exemptions from the requirements of placement of pipe whip restraints meet the applicable regulations and GDC-4 and could benefit from the degrades plant safety when thermal NRC-endorsed industry codes. limited scope rule. A broader growth is inadvertently restricted, This rulemaking will introduce an application of leak-before-break reduces the accessibility for and inconsistency into the design basis by technology requires adoption of the effectiveness of inservice inspection, excluding the dynamic effects of general criteria published in NUREG- increases inservice inspection radiation postulated pipe ruptures while still 1061, Volume 3, Chapter 5, November dosages and adversely affects retaining nonmechanistic pipe rupture 1984, entitled "Report of the U.S. construction and maintenance for emergency core cooling systems, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping economics. containments, and environmental Review Committee, Evaluation of qualification (see issue 4 below for III. Final Rule Potential for Pipe Breaks". additional information on potential The final rule consists of a substitute relaxation with respect to II. Scope of Rulemaking sentence at the end of GDC-4 (replacing environmental qualification). The This rulemaking modifies General the sentence introduced by the limited Commission recognizes the need to Design Criterion 4 to the extent that scope rule) permitting the use of address whether and to what extent dynamic effects of pipe ruptures in analyses to exclude dynamic effects of leak-before-break analysis techniques nuclear power units may be excluded pipe ruptures in all high energy piping in may be used to modify present from the design basis provided it is all nuclear power units. A deterministic requirements relating to other features demonstrated that the probability of fracture mechanics evaluation is of facility design. However, this is a pipe rupture is extremely low under mandatory. Evaluations of the potential longer term evaluation. For the present, conditions consistent with the design for for water hammer, corrosion, creep the rule allows the removal of plant the piping. damage, fatigue, erosion, environmental hardware which it is believed negatively Dynamic effects of pipe rupture conditions, indirect failure mechanisms affects plant performance and safety, covered by this rule are missile and other degradation sources which while not affecting emergency core generation, pipe whipping, pipe break could lead to pipe rupture are also cooling systems, containments, and reaction forces, jet impingement forces, required. In order to demonstrate that environmental qualification. The decompression waves within the the probability of fluid system piping Commission's primary justification for ruptured pipe and dynamic or nonstatic rupture is extremely low, applicants and this rulemaking rests with its statutory pr*essurization in cavities, -licensees may follow procedures and responsibility to ensure an adequate subcompartments and compartments. acceptance criteria developed by the level of protection of the public health However, cavities, subcompartments staff. and safety. This action also rests upon and compartments necessary to the The supporting safety analysis must advances in the state of knowledge and containment function are not affected by demonstrate from the results of a technology that allow the Commission this modification. fracture mechanics analysis that a to better focus its regulatory To retain high safety margins, the substantial range of stable pipe crack requirements so as to improve safety of application of leak-before-break sizes can exist for an extended period plant personnel. The Commission. technology to various piping systems which provides detectable leaks, and decided to quantify the degree to which should not decrease the capability of that the fluid systems piping will not overall safety was improved by this _containments to perform their function rupture under these conditions action, and to set forth those economic of isolating the outside environment consistent with the design basis for the impacts associated with these safety from potential leaks, breaks, or piping. benefits. These are highlighted below. malfunctions within the containment. The language of the rule specifies For existing PWRs, considering Containments will continue to be "conditions consistent with the design primary coolant loops only, cost savings designed to accommodate loss of basis for the piping." The design basis of $186 million and reductions of 34,000 coolant accidents resulting from breaks for piping means those conditions man-rem are estimated for a population in the reactor coolant pressure boundary specified in the FSAR. as amended, and of 85 PWRs. These figures do not up to and including a break equivalent may include 10 CFR Part 50 (especially include savings resulting from redesign in size to the double-ended rupture of the General Design Criteria in Appendix of heavy component supports. One the largest pipe in the reactor coolant A to Part 50), applicable sections of the licensee taking advantage of the limited system. Also, the functional design for Standard Review Plan, Regulatory scope modification of GDC-4 has emergency core cooling systems still Guides and industry standards such as estimated a per plant cost savings of $20 retain.s nonmechanistic pipe rupture. the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel million and reduced worker exposures Environmental qualification of electrical Code. of about 2,000 man-rem associated with and mechanical equipment is discussed The term "extremely low" is used in a redesign of reactor coolant pump under issue 4 below. this amendment to GDC-4 with supports. 50-SC-17
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION The above-mentioned value-impacts 2. The scope of piping which could or uncertainty in the total procedure, were realized under the already should be affected, supported by including stress analyses and fracture published limited scope amendment to technical justification. mechanics evaluations, warrants some GDC-4. Additional benefits which can 3. The decision to limit impacts of this margin [see issue 7 below). Applicants be achieved under this broader modification of GDC-4 to only dynamic or licensees must maintain the margin amendment are discussed below. effects associated with pipe rupture. on loads at 1.4, except when the For existing BWRs, considering only 4. The acceptance criteria which the deadweight, thermal expansion, recirculation loop piping, cost savings of Commission proposes to use to evaluate pressure, seismic inertial and seismic
$30 million and reductions of 8,600 man- whether leak-before-break technology is anchor motion loads are combined rem are estimated for a population of 38 applicable to specific situations. based on individual absolute values. In plants. 5. Acceptable allowables for pipe- this case, the margin on loads may be In existing PWRs and BWRs, offsite connected component supports which reduced to 1.0. The evaluation of seismic ris~ is estimated to be insignificantly would provide adequate assurance that anchor motion loads at SSE conditions impacted, or if credit is taken for component support failure would not be may be omitted when these loads are improved inservice inspection and a source of the pipe rupture loads being shown to be small at DBE conditions.
enhanced safety, to be reduced by an eliminated from the design basis. The Commission believes that, unquantified amount. 6. The imposition of a temperature because of uncertainties associated with The Commission has not quantified limitation as a way of avoiding concerns flaw geometry and the different situations in existing plants other than with creep damage. analytical procedures, the margin those discussed above; however, it is between the leakage crack size and VI. Issues Analysis critical crack size stated in the proposed believed that other high energy piping will also indicate favorable value- Issue 1: Margins for leak detection rule should not be reduced below the irnpacts. should not be rigidly fixed but should be value of two. Value-impacts resulting from this rule based on uncertainties for each Issue 3: The acceptance criteria are greatest for future plants, where particular situation. should refer to "crack detection" rather estimated costs can be reduced Commission Response: In the than "leakage detection". approximately $100 million per unit. Of Commission's proposed acceptance Commission Response: The fracture this sum, about $30 million are direct criteria, the postulated through-wall mechanics evaluation outlined in the
- costs and the balance sterns from crack used in the deterministic fracture Commission's acceptance criteria reduced financing costs and improved mechanics evaluation is based on a .examines a postulated throughwall flaw scheduling. Reduction in worker detection margin of ten with respect to which may grow under service and radiation exposures varies from plant to the leakage from the postulated crack. .earthquake loads. The size of the plant, but is in the range of 300 to 800 The Commission agrees that the postulated flaw for fracture mechanics man-rem. Offsite risk is believed to selection of the margin should be evaluation purposes depends on the decrease by an unquantified amount due derived from the uncertainties involved. ability to detect the presence of the flaw to improved effectiveness of inservice As noted in issue 7 of the final limited during service with an adequate margin inspection and enhanced safety. The scope-GDC-4 r-ule (51 FR iz°5i:iz, ApriT11.-- - for detection. The standard methods to above quoted figures are based 1986), the Commission recognizes that detect the throughwall flaw during primarily on the elirnina tion of pipe the measurement or determination of service depend on the magnitude of flow leakage from a system under pressure or leakage through the flaw. Therefore, whip restraints and jet impingement involves uncertainties for which margins the methodology has to be based upon barriers and do not treat other facility are needed. Cornrnenters suggesting leakage detection rather than crack
.changes that could result from this rule. relaxation in the detection margin cited detection. IV. Acceptance Criteria only limited sources of uncertainty such Issue 4: Leak-before-break technology The Commission developed a new as material properties and calculated should be extended to relax pipe rupture Standard Review Plan Section 3.6.3 flow rates through a crack. Other requirements for containment design, which gives more details on how sources of uncertainty not mentioned emergency core cooling systems and applicant and licensee submittals will include plugging of the crack with environmental qualification of electrical be evaluated. This document has been particulate material over time, stresses and mechanical equipment. issued for public comment (52 FR 32626) and number of cycles, and uncertainties Commission Response: This was prior to being adopted by the associated with personnel and addressed as issue 3 in the final limited Commission. The Commission may also instruments used to detect leakage. For scope GDC-4 rule (51 FR 12502). The the present, the Commission will retain Commission plans to consider whether develop at some future time a the leak detection margin of ten unless environmental qualifica lion Regulatory Guide after experience is detailed evidence can be presented for requirements can be modified based gained with the use of SRP 3.6.3. other values. The Commission may upon leak-before-break technology. The V. Invitation to Comment require administrative controls to Commission does not intend to consider Comment was invited on the following enforce adequate implementation of near-term changes to emergency-core topics in the proposed broad scope leakage detection and monitoring. cooling system and containment design amendment to GDC-4. Additionally, the Commission may :bases as discussed in the Final Rule
- 1. Value-impacts associated with this undertake recurring inspections to verify *section of this SUPPLEMENTARY expanded modification to GDC-4, with that leakage detection and monitoring INFORMATION.
particular reference to experience with satisfy leak-before-break requirements. When leak-before-break technology is the use of pipe whip restraints and jet Issue 2: Margins on loads and leakage applied to dynamic effects design bases, impingement shields near nuclear crack sizes used in the deterministic these effects are reduced to zero; there reactor piping. (The value-impact fracture mechanics evaluation should be are no replacement dynamic effects analysis prepared by Lawrence relaxed. postulated. However, environmental Livermore National Laboratory is Commission Response: The Commission acknowledges that there qualification design bases cannot be available for inspection and copying for reduced to zero when leak-before-break are many situations where the margin is a fee in the NRC Public Document technology is applied to piping. The not required on loads resulting from the Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, postulated pipe rupture has served as a design basis piping analyses. However, DC.) convenient and conservative umbrella there are situations where the covering many sources of environmental 50-SC-18
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION qualification design bases, such as quality piping which does not require case leak-before-break analyses are breaches in the fluid system pressure pipe whip restaints and jet impingement performed.
boundary from failed pump seals, barriers. For any new application, the However, if archival materials are not leaking valve packings, flanged Commission would permit the applicant available or if actual plant material connections, bellow, manways, rupture to decide whether or not to use leak- properties cannot be defined practically, disks and throughwall cracks. Thus, in before-break technology. generic plant specific or industry wide applying leak-before-break technology Issue 7: Leak-before-break technology material data bases can be assembled to environmental qualification, the should be applicable to discrete and used to define the required material Commission faces the task of developing locations. There should be no tensile and toughness properties. To a replacement environmental requirement that leak-before-break provide an acceptable level of qualification design basis. technology be applicable only to an reliability, plant specific generic data The Commission is not prepared at entire piping system or analyzable bases must be reasonable lower bounds this time to propose new environmental portion thereof. for sets of compatible material tensile design criteria for temperature, pressure, Commission Response: Standard and toughness properties associated humidity and flooding. If it can be Review Plan [SRP) Section 3.6.2 of with actual materials at the plant. Any shown that it is beneficial to apply leak- NUREG--0800 has been used for more industry generic data base must be a before-break technology to than a decade to postulate the number reasonable lower bound for the environmental qualification, another and location of pipe ruptures in nuclear population of material tensile and modification to GDC-4 would be power plants. SRP 3.6.2 ignores or treats toughness properties associated with proposed. In the interim, the indirectly many factors, such as material anyTndividuai material specification Commission recognizes that situations properties, potential corrosion, and the (e.g., A106 Grade B), material type [e.g., may arise where justification can be potential for water hammer, which austenitic steel), or welding procedure. developed by the industry for actually determine where and whether Except as indicated in the Commission alternative equipment qualification pipe rupture will occur: Leak-before- response to issue 13, industry generic requirements. Such justifications, if break procedures explicitly treat these data bases for the range of piping accepted by the Commission pursuant to factors. The Commission will not materials in light water reactors have the existing exemption process, would commingle SRP 3.6.2 with more not been assembled and proposed for aliow a limited number of case-by-case advanced leak-before-break leak-before-break analyses. Industry relaxations in environmental methodology. Leak-before-break is groups are encouraged to assemble and qualification requirements. The intended to be a substitute for SRP 3.6.2 use reliable generic data bases so that Commission encourages the only when all breaks in a fluid system analyses and evaluations can be development of generic alternative piping are eliminated. This avoids performed efficiently and effectively. equipment qualification design bases by consideration of synergistic effects, that Issue 10: The temperature limitation of the industry. This could support future is, the effects of a pipe break at one 750°F should not be adopted for amendments to GDC-4 and other location on another potential break evaluation of creep damage. affected requirements addressing location. Commission Response: The environmental qualification. Additionally, the Commission, through temperature limitation of 750°F is Issue 5: Can minor modifications of long term and extensive piping research revised as follows: for ferritic steel piping systems not related to the programs, has become aware that piping, the temperature limitation will exclusion of dynamic effects be made differences exist between analytically be 700°F; for austenitic steel piping the without examining impacts on the calculated stresses and actual stresses temperature limitation will be 800°F. original leak-before-break evaluation? occurring at discrete locations in piping. These values more accurately reflect the Commission Response: The original The differences between calculated and creep performance of piping and are in
- leak-before-break evaluation must be
- actual stresses usually stem from accord with the ASME Code. Recent applicable for the life of the plant. difficulties in modeling pipe supports experience in fossil fuel plants operating Changes in configuration or operating under dynamic and static environments. at temperatures over 1000°F has conditions must be examined to Leak-before-break will be applied only indicated that creep-related ruptures in
-determine impacts on the validity of the to an entire fluid system piping or large diameter piping may not be low original leak-before-break evaluation, analyzable portion thereof. probability events, and suggests particularly as to how stresses are Issue 8: Creep should not be an issue deficiencies in creep design standards influenced. The Commission believes in applying leak-before-break after a service life of ten years or that many minor modifications, such as technology. greater. Until creep behavior after long changing piping insulation, can be made Commission Response: This rule gives service intervals is better understood, without affecting the original analysis. guidance for reactors other than light the Commission will retain the However, modifications which are not water reactors. Creep can be an issue temperature limitations cited above. minor in scope as for example when the for gas and metal cooled reactors. Normally, creep damage is not an Issue 11: Delete the words "reviewed number or type of pipe supports are and approved by the Commission" from changed extensively, require an important concern in light water reactors. the text of the rule. evaluation of the applicability of the Commission Response: This comment original leak-before-break analysis. Issue 9: Extensive materials testing requirements should be relaxed. The use is rejected. Leak-before-break Issue 6: Leak-before-break should be technology is applicable only to high mandatory for plants which have not yet of generlc materials properties should be permitted. quality piping which is maintained in a received their construction permit. Commission Response: The ductile high quality condition. Since much of the Commission Response: The piping fracture mechanics analysis plant's piping is custom designed, the Commission believes that economic and operational considerations will motivate techniques that are applied in the leak- Commission would have to undertake many utilities to apply leak-before-break before-break assessment are strongly detailed case-specific review to technology. While it is estimated that an dependent on the material tensile determine that acceptable standards of unquantified reduction in public risk properties and material resistance to quality are achieved and maintained, results from this rule, the actual scope of crack extension. The material testing and that the analyses meet the piping contributing to the reduction will requirements are necessary to provide Commission's requirements. Detailed vary from plant to plant. The reliable assessments of margins against reviews are especially needed in piping Commission encourages the use of high unstable flaw extension when case-by- other than PWR primary coolant loops 50-SC-19
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION to assure that failure mechanisms such the plant FSAR, are investigated by evaluation procedures and materials as water hammer, corrosion, erosion, applicants and utilities. These include properties have not yet been approved fatigue, and creep are not significant seismic events and system for ferritic piping by the ASME Code or contributors to the potential for pipe overpressurizations due to accidents the NRC, leak-before-break analysis for rupture. Additionally, factors such as resulting from human error, fires or ferritic piping will continue case-by-case leakage detection, material properties flooding which cause electrical and until approved Code procedures are and environmental conditions are more mechanical control,.5ystems to available.
variable outside PWR primary coolant malfunction. The analysis of indirect Issue 14: Leak-before-break should not
- loops, and possible misuse of leak- sources should also confirm that be limited to high energy piping.
before-break technology can occur, snubber failure rates are maintained at Commission Response: The unless careful review and evaluation of *a low rate.-corniilfance with- the snubber Commission's rules require postulated these aspects are performed by the surveillance requirements of the pipe ruptures only in high energy piping. Commission. Consequently, the words technical specifications can be used to There is no reason to apply leak-before- "reviewed and approved by the demonstrate that snubber failure rates break technology in_moderate energy Commission" were added specifically to are low. Missiles from equipment, piping because there are no postulated ensure that a careful evaluation damage from moving equipment and pipe ruptures in such fluid system enforcing the Commission's rigorous failures of systems or components in piping. acceptance criteria would be performed close proximity to the piping are Issue 15: Strict adherence to for each individual request from investigated as well. The results of prior Regulatory Guide 1.45 should not be licensees and applicants. analyses conducted to show compliance required outside the containment. The adopted revision of GDC-4 with Commission regulations can be Commission Response: The requires NRC review and approval of applicable to potential sources of Commission does not require and did the analyses on which the elimination of indirect pipe rupture. not intend to suggest the need for strict dynamic effects are based. As reflected Issue 13. It is recommended that adherence to Regulatory Guide 1.45 in the limited scope rule (51 FR 12502), adequate material toughness be outside the containment. The proposed which is replaced by the adopted broad demonstrated when limit load analysis rule stated only that"* *
- leakage scope rule, the NRC has previously is applied and that the margin of three detection requirements equivalent to reviewed and approved the application be on the applied force and moment Regulatory Guide 1.45 must be satisfied of leak-before-break technology for combined rather than just on moment. for all piping within the scope of this eliminating design basis dynamic effects The limit load analysis procedures in rule." Scheduled operator walkdowns of postulated ruptures in PWR primary ASME Code, Section XI, Appendix C, can be used as a means of leak loop piping. No additional review and Winter 1986 Addenda, should be detection outside the containment.
approval by the Commission in these allowed. Issue 16: Older operating plants cases is required under the adopted Commission Response: The should not be held to the requirement broad scope rule for elimination of Commission is revising its requirements that heavy component supports should design basis dynamic effects of on limit load analysis procedures as meet ASME Code allowables as a postulated ruptures in PWR primary stated in the proposed amendment to condition for applying leak-before-loop piping provided the conditions set GDC-4 (51 FR 26393). The new break. forth in the Supplementary Information requirements do not contain the accompanying the rule (51 FR 12502) are Commission Response: The use of arbitrary margin of three on applied ASME Code allowables for heavy satisfied. moment, but instead are based on an The proposed broad scope component supports of older operating experimentally verified ASME approved plants as a condition for applying leak-amendment (51 FR 26397, July 23, 1986) procedure. also stated that "Modifications of the before-break technology is not required. During preparation of NUREG-1061, However, when heavy component licensed plant design of operating plants Volume 3, there was significant may involve an unreviewed safety supports are redesigned excluding the uncertainty associated with reliable dynamic effects of pipe rupture, current question under 10 CFR 50.59 * * *. A application of limit load analysis for simple removal of pipe whip restraints *industry codes (such as the ASME or austenitic steel, especially in the case of AISC code) may be required. and jet impingement barriers would not submerged arc welds (SAW) and involve an unreviewed safety question." Additionally, current NRC criteria for shielded metal arc welds (SMAW). This calculating seismic loads (coupled with The meaning of this last sentence is that uncertainty led to restrictions on the use after analysis reviewed and approved the already existing SSE) may also be of limit load analysis and application of required. For example, a simple by the Commission demonstrate that the methods originally used as the basis for probability of fluid system piping replacement of high strength fasteners IWB-3640 in Section XI of the ASME with more ductile fasteners of lower rupture is extremely low, then, without Code. yield strength would not require changes prior approval, pipe whip restraints and Recently, the ASME Code approved in the industry codes or seismic criteria jet impingement barriers may be removed. Pipe whip restraints and jet revised evaluation procedures for from that used in the original design. On impingement barriers cannot be austenitic steel piping (see Appendix C the other hand, modification of the removed, however, without conducting of Section XI); these procedures heavy component supports that involves an appropriate leak-before-break incorporate methods to account for redesign and removal of snubbers in evaluation, submitting the evaluation for reduced toughness associated with early vintage plants would require use Commission review and obtaining SAW and SMAW. The Commission has of current industry codes and NRC Commission approval. Moreover, concluded that the evaluation method in seismic criteria. Dynamic effects from removal of a pipe whip restraint which Appendix C of Section XI (including the pipe ruptures in branch connections also serves as a seismic restraint would tensile and toughness properties defined must be considered if the branch not be a "simple" removal of a pipe for base metal and welds) is acceptable connections do not qualify for leak-whip restraint and, therefore, would when performing leak-before-break before-break. In heavy component involve an unreviewed safety question. analyses for austenitic steel piping, support redesign, improved functional Issue 12. How is the demonstration of provided the margins presented in the reliability must be demonstrated for any extremely low probability made for Commission response to issues 1 and 2 changes made. Structural capacity indirect sources of pipe rupture? are met. The value of flow stress used associated with the original steel and Commission Response: Indirect with this method will be evaluated by concrete, including struts, columns, sources of pipe rupture, as discussed in the Commission. Because generic pedestals, hangers, trusses and skirts 50-SC-20
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION cannot be diminished in the support highest stresses coincident with poorest 22 NRC at 548-549. The Board's views system of operating plants or plants materials properties occur * * *". This on these matters were upheld on appeal.
under construction. Redesigns will be sentence should have read "identify the A direct application of this case to the limited to replacing high strength location(s] which have the least GDC-4 context shows that the fastener material and reducing the favorable combinations of high stress commenter's conclusion is incorrect. The number and capacity of snubbers. and poor material properties * * *". staffs acceptance of a GDC-4 analysis Applicants and licensees undertaking The Commission did not intend to will not preclude litigation of either the heavy component support redesign, with combine the highest stresses at one scope of piping included or the dynamic effects of pipe rupture location with the poorest material adequacy of the analysis itself. eliminated, should use independent properties of another location. The However, a challenge on either basis design and fabrication verification - critical rupture locations depend on must be confined to the overall scope of procedures to minimize design and stress and material properties, among GDC-4 and could not be used as a construction errors. Displacements and other things, and investigators may need collateral challenge to other parts of the rotations resulting from potential failure to examine several locations to decide regulations or to argue that the rule itself of redesigned lateral (horizontal] which is the controlling case. is inadequate. Challenges of this type supports should not lead to the rupture Issue 19: The decision that leak- must be brought pursuant to 10 CFR of piping connected to the reactor before-break technology is not 2.758. coolant loop heavy components. applicable to materials subject to The staffs review and approval of the Issue 17: Additional guidance is cleavage type fracture should be piping integrity analyses is an needed on the acceptability of remedial reconsidered. indispensable part of the stress enhancement programs such as Commission Response: This comment implementation of the leak-before-break induction heating as it pertains to stress, is rejected. The Commission will allow concept. Without such review (for piping . corrosion, cracking, residual stress leak-before-break technology only to other than the PWR primary loop]. the states and sensitization. materials which are ductile under the staff has no means to assure itself that Commission Response: The rule full range of system operating the acceptance criteria have been precludes leak-before-break evaluations temperatures in order to avoid sudden properly applied. The comment is for systems that have materials that are brittle piping failures. therefore rejected. susceptible to intergranular stress Issue 20: The clause in the rule Issue 21: The reallocation of resources corrosion cracking (IGSCC]. The requiring Commission review and within the NRC to review piping Commission recognizes that remedial approval of analyses demonstrating integrity analyses submitted under the residual stress improvement treatments piping integrity will preclude litigation amendment is barred by the Atomic are effective in reducing susceptibility to over the scope of piping affected and the Energy Act, which requires that public IGSCC. However, remedial stress adequacy of the analyses. This would safety take precedence over cost improvement treatments of amount to a de facto illegal removal of a savings to licensees. nonconforming materials alone do not material issue from an operating license Commission Response: The provide a sufficient basis to support amendment proceeding. Regulatory Analysis performed to leak-before-break evaluations in the Commission Response: The support this rulemaking shows that context of this rule. The Commission would, however, review such commenter cites in support of this there is a net safety benefit to be evaluations case-by-case if hydrogen proposition Cleveland Electric realized from proper application of leak-water chemistry were used as an Illuminating Company (Perry Nuclear before-break technology. The adjunctive measure with the remedial Power Plants, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-841, Commission has undertaken the stress improvement treatments. (July 25, 1986), reconsideration denied rulemaking for that purpose. The Practices with regard to facility water ALAB-844, (August 18, 1986). The positive results in terms of simplicity of chemistry would be an additional factor Licensing Board case affirmed in ALAB- the plant, ease of inspection, avoidance considered in the review. 841 is Cleveland Electric Illuminating of improper removal and reinstallation Nonconforming piping with any planar Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, of unneeded supports and restraints, flaws in excess of the standards in IWB Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-35, 22 NRC 514 and the reduction of personnel 3514.3 of Section XI of the ASME Code (1985). exposures have been shown to vastly would not be permitted to use leak- A careful reading of these cases outweigh any additional risk associated before-break analyses. However, shows that they do not stand for the with removing supports and restraints. nonconforming piping that has been commenter's proposition. At issue was Therefore, reallocation of NRC treated by two mitigating methods may the scope and adequacy of the resources to ensure that NRC qualify for leak-before-break if the applicant's preliminary hydrogen control acceptance criteria are rigorously piping contains no flaws larger than analysis required by 10 CFR 50.44(c](3). adhered to is fully justified in terms of those permitted by IWB 3514.3 of One of the criteria for this analysis is public safety. Section XI of the ASME Code. If piping that it "use accident scenarios that are In addition to these issues, the has been repaired by weld overlays, accepted by the NRC staff." Commission deleted the fatigue crack leak-before-break technology cannot be (50.46(c)(vi)(B)(3)) The Licensing Board growth analysis specified in the applied. did not hold that the staffs approval of proposed rule. This requirement was Issue 18: The fracture mechanics the applicant's analysis was binding and found to be unnecessary because it was approach should not require that the thus precluded a challenge to the scope bounded by the crack stability analysis. location of highest stress utilize the and adequacy of the analysis. Rather, Having considered all of the above, poorest material properties. the Board permitted such a challenge on the Commission has determined that a Commission Response: The proposed a number of issues. 22 NRC at 533-548. final rule be promulgated rule stated that, in conducting the However, the Board did not allow the VII. Availability of Documents deterministic fracture mechanics intervenor to raise other issues under evaluation, investigators would this contention which went beyond the 1. Copies of NUREG-1061, Volume 3, "identify the location(s) at which the scope of the hydrogen control rule itself. may be purchased from the SO-SC-21
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
- Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Document Room, 1717 H Street NW, 52 FR 42078 Government Printing Office, P.O. Box Washington, DC. Single copies of the Published 11/3/87 37082, Washington, DC, 20013-7082. analysis may be obtained from John A. Effective 12/3/87 Copies are also available from the O'Brien, Office of Nuclear Regulatory National Technical Information Service, 10 CFR Part SO Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA Commission, Washlngton, DC 20555, Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off-Site 22161. A copy is also available for telephone (301) 443-7854. A backfit Emergency Planning for Nuclear public inspection and/or copying at the analysis under 10 CFR 50.109 for the Power Plants at the Operating Ucense NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H purpose of completeness was published Review Stage Where State and/or Street NW., Washington, DC. in the proposed broad scope GDC-4
- 2. Copies of the ASME Boiler and Local Governments Decline To modification (51 FR 26393), although it Participate In Off-Site Emergency Pressure Vessel Code may be obtained was not required because the rule will Plannlng from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 345 East 47th not require licensees or applicants to AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Street, New York, NY, 10017. make any changes. The Commission's primary justification for this rulemaking Commission.
- 3. Copies of Regulatory Guide 1.45 rests on its statutory responsibility to ACTION: Final rule.
. entitled "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems" ensure an adequate level of protection
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory may be obtained by writing to the of the public health and safety.
Com.nission is amending its rules to Division of Technical Information and Economic advantages or disadvantages provide criteria for the evaluation at the Document Control, U.S. Nuclear resulting from this action did not affect operating license review stage of utility-Regulatory Commission, Washington, such responsibilities. The Commission prepared emergency plans in situations DC, 20555. remains mindful of its statutory in which state and/or local governments VIII. Finding of No Significant responsibilities pursuant to Union of decline to participa le furthe: in Environmental Impact: Availability Concerned Scientists et al. v. NRC, DDC emergency planning. The rule is No. 85-1757, August 4, 1987. The consistent with the approach adopted by The Commission has determined Commission has prepared, however, a Cor,gress in sr.ction 109 of the NRC under the National Environmental Policy regulatory analysis to set forth clearly Authorization Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-Act of 1969, as amended, and the the costs and benefits of the impacts of 295, described in the Conference Report Commission's regulations in Subpart A this rule and the examined alternatives. on that statute (H.96-1070, J:me 4, 1980), of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule if adopted, would not be a major Federal twice re-enacted by the Congress (in XI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Pub. L. 97-415, Jan. 4. 1983. and Pub. L. action significantly affecting the quality Certification of the human environment and, 98-553, Oct. 30, 1984), and followed in a As required by the Regulatory prior adjudicatory decision of the therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. Although Flexibility Act of 1980, (5 U.S.C. 605(b]J, Commission, Long Island Lighting Co., the Commission certifies that this rule (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit certain plant hardware might be will not have a significant economic 1 ). CLl-86--13. 24 NRC 22 (1986). The rule removed from the plant, consistent with this rule, the removal would not alter the impact on a substantial number of small recognizes that though state and local environmental impact of the licensed entities. This rule affects only the P?rticipati?n in emergency planning is activities as set out in the Final licensing and operation of nuclear highly desirable, and indeed is essential Environmental Impact Statement for power plants. The companies that own for maximum effectiveness of each facility. The environmental these plants do not fall within the scope emergency planning and preparedness, assessment and finding of no significant of the definitions of "small entities" set Congress did not intend that the impact on which this determination is forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or absence of such participation should based are available for inspection at the the Small Business Size Standards set preclude licensing of substantially NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H completed nuclear power plants where out in regulations issued by the Small Street, NW., Washington, DC. Single
- there is a u !iii ty-prepar~d emergency Business Administration at 13 CFR Part copies of the environmental assessment plan that provides reasonable assurnnce 121. of adequate protection to the public.
and the finding of no significant impact are available from John A. O'Brien, List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 EFFECTIVE DATE: December 3, 1987. Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Antitrust, Classified information, Fire FOR FURTHER INFORl'I.ATION CONTACT: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, prevention, Incorporation by reference, Peter G. Crane, Office of the General Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) Counsel, USNRC, Washington, DC Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear 443-7854. 20555,202-634-14~5 power plants and reactors, Penalty, IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Radiation protection, Reactor siting Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping Nuclear Regulatory Research, USNRC, This final rule does not contain a new Washington, DC 20555, 301-443-7657. or amended information collection requirements. David B. Matthews, Office flf Nuclear requirement subject to the Paperwork Reactor Regulation, USNRC, Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 350i et Final Rule Washinr"on, DC 20555, 301-492-9647. seq.). Existing information collection SUPPLEMENTARY INFOl'IMATION: For the reasons set out in the requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 were preamble and under the authority of the Discussion approved by the Office of Management Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Budget approval number 3150-0011. . On ~arch 6, 1987, the NRC published the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974;
. X. Regulatory and Backfit Analyses as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC its nohce of rr0posed rulemaking in *the Federal Register, at 52 FR 6980. The The regulatory analysis is available is adopting the following amendments to period for public comment (60 days, for inspection in the NRC Public 10 CFR Part 50.
so-sc-22
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION subgequently extended for an additional (December 19, 1979). Before the or utility plan, such as the emergency 30 days) expired on June 4, 1987. Commission took final action on the preparedness plan submitted by the The proposed rule drew an rnles, however, the Congress took applicant, provides reasonable unprecedentedly large number of action, writing emergency planning assurance that the public health and comments. Some 11,500, individual provisions into the NRC Authorization safety is not endangered by operation of letters were sent to NRC, as well as Act for fiscal year 1980, Pub. L. No. 96- the facility." [Emphasis added.)
27,000 individually signed form letters 295. It is extremely important to focus on The statute. which was enacted on sent to Congress or the White House what the Congress did in that Act, June 30, 1980, and the Conference Report and forwarded to NRC. Approximately because CongreGs' actions were the make abundantly clear that in Congress' 16,300 persons signed petitions to the starting point for all the NRC did view, the ideal situation was one in NRC, Every comment was read, subsequently in the emergency planning which there is a state or local plan that including form letters, which were area, as the written record makes clear. meets all NRC standards. It is generally examined one by one so that any Section 109 of the NRC Authorization clear that in Congress* view, there could indivdual messages added by the Act directed the Commission to be emergency planning under a utility signatories could be taken into account. establish regulations making the plan that to some degree fell short of the NRC attempted to send cards of existence of an adequate emergency ideal but was nevertheless adequate to acknowledgment to each commenter. plan a prerequisite for issuance of an protect the health and safety of the The sheer volume of the comments operating license to a nuclear facility. public. received makes it clearly impracticable The NRC was further directed to That Congressional judgment was to discuss them individually. As a result. promulgate standards for state before the Commission when it the following discussion will focus on radiological response plans. considered final emergency planning the principal issues raised in the In the same section of the 1980 Act, rules only a few weeks later, and the comments. Congress specified the conditions under Commission took pains to make clear on Issue #1. ls the proposed rule legal? which the Commission could issue operating licenses, and in doing so, it the ree,ord that it was following the Specifically, is it in accord with the Congress' approach. As the Commission language and legislative history of the made clear its preferences with regard to state and local participation. Its first stated in its notice of final rulemaking. emergency planning provisions enacted published on August 19, 1980, at 45 FR preference, reflected in section by the Congress in 1980? 55402: Answer: Yes. The intent of the 109(b)(l)(B)(i)(IJ, is for a "State or local radiological emergency response plan Finally, on Juiy z3:-1*eiio:*iit1iie final proposed rule, as clarified in Commission consideration of these rules, the Commission testimony and in other wliich provides for responding to any radiological emergency at the facility Commission was briefed by the General responses to the Congress, is to give Counsel on the substance of conversations concerned and wr.,ch complies with the with Congressional staff membr.rs who were effect to the Congress's 1980 Commission's standards for such plans." involved with the passage of the NRC compromise approach to emergency phmning, not go beyond it. To explain In section 109(b)(l)(B)(i)(Il), however, Authorization Act for fiscal year 1980, Pub. L. this requires a somewhat detailed the Congress set out a second option: No. 96-295. The General Counsel advised the "In the absence of a plan which satisfies Commission that the NRC final rules were discussion of the background of the the requirements of subclause (I), there consistent with that Act. The Commission actions taken in 1980 by Congress and hes relied on ell of the above information in by the Commi~sion with "egard to exists a State, local, or utility plan its consideration of these fine! rules. In emergency planning. which provides reasonable assurance addition, the Commission directs that the The backdrop for the actions taken by that public health and safety is not transcripts of these meetings shell be pert or the Congress and the Commission in endangered by operation of the facility the administrative record in this rulemeking. 1980 was, of course, the 1979 accident at concerned." [Emphasis added.) In In addition, in a key portion of the Three Mile Island. The accideni changed addition, section 109 providecl that the rule, dealing with the question of the NRC's regulatory approach to Commission's determination under the whether NRC should automatically shut radiological emergency planning. Before first but not the second r.:* the two down nuclear plants in the absence of the accident, rimergency planning options could be made "only in an NRG-approved slate or local received relatively little attention from consultation with the Director of the emergency plan, or should instead nuclear rlgulators. The prevailing Federal Emergency Management evaluate ell the relevant circumstances assumption was that engineered safety Agency end other appropriate before deciding on remedial action, the features in nuclear power plants, agencies." Section 109[b)(1)(B)(ii). The NRC again explicitly followed the coupled with sound operation and statute further directed the Commission Congress' lead. In determining what management, made ii unlikely that to "establish by rule * *
- a mechanism action to take, the Commission said, it emergency planning would ever be to encourage and assist States to comply would look at the significance of needed. At that time, only a limited as expeditiously as practicable" with deficiencies in emergency planning, the evaluation of offsite emergency planning the NRC's standards for Slate availability of compensating measures, issues took place in the pre-construction radiological emergency response plans. and any compelling reasons arguing in review of applications to build nuclear Section 109(b)(1 )(CI. favor of continued operation. 10 CFR power plantu. The Three Mile Island The Conference Report on the 50.47(c). The Commission explained:
accident led to the widespread legislation, H. 96-1070 (June 4, 1980) "This interpretation is consistent with recognition that, while there is no explained in clear terms,. at p. 27, the the provisions of the NRC Authorization substitute for a wr.11 built, well run, and rationale for the two-tiered approach: Act for fiscal year 1980, Pub. L 96-295." well regulated nuclear power plant, a "The conferees sought to avoid 45 FR 55403. Thus in deciding that the substantial upgrading of the role of penalizing an applicant for an operating la!:k of an approved state or local plan emergency planning was necessary if license if a State or locality does not should not be grounds for automatic the public health and safety were to be submit an emergency response plan to shutdown of a nuclear power plant, the adequately protr.cted. the NRC for review or if the suLmitted Commission expressly declared itself to The Commission issued an advance plan does not satisfy all the guidelines be following the statutory approach. notice of proposed rulemaki!!g in July or rules. In the absence of a State or This background sheds considerable 1979, 1md in September and December of local plan that complies with the light on a passage from the Federal ti, sa.ne year it issued proposed 0 guidelines or rules, the compromise Register notice which some commenters emergency planning rules. 44 FR 54308 pem1its NRC to issue an operating saw as indication that the Commission (Septembe, *g, 1979); 44 FR 75167 license if it determines that a State, local consciously decided in 1980_ that states 50-SC-23
*PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION end localities should have the power to state end local authorities decline to appropriate framework to evaluate a exercise a veto over nuclear power plant participate in emergency planning, the utility plan. Therefore, the new rule operation. The Commission said: NRC has the authority and the legal provides for the first time that where a obligation to consider a utility plan and utility plan is submitted, in a situation of The Commission recognizes that there is a stale and/or local non-participation in possibility that the operation 0£ some render a judgment on the adequacy of emergency planning and preparedness. emergency planning. it will be eve'lueted reactors may be affected by this rule through for adequacy against the same inaction 0£ State and local governments or an Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham inability to comply with these rules. The Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLl standards used to evaluate a slate or Commission believes that the potential 13, 24 NRC 22. The Commission local plan. However, due allowance will restriction 0£ plant operation by State and observed in LILCO that the emergency be made both for the non-participation local officials is not significantly di££erent in planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(bl- of the state and/or local governmental kind and effect from the means already the regulation which establishes the 16 authorities and for the compensatory available to prohibit reactor operation .... planning standards by which a state and measures proposed by the utility in Relative to applying this rule in actual reaching a determination whether there practice. however, the CommiFsion need not local plan is to be measured-"are premised on a high level of coordination is "reasonable assurance the: adequate shut down a facility until all factors have been thoroughly examined. between the utility and State and local protective measures can end will be governments," so that "(i]t should come taken.
45 FR 55404. (Emphasis added.) es no surprise that without To sum up, therefore, the rule is in It has been argued that the language governmental cooperation [the utility) accord with legal requirements for just quoted indicates that t~e .. has encountered great difficulty emergency planning RI nuclear power Commission made a conscious dec1s1on complying with all of these detailed plants because: in 1980 to allow states and localities lo planning standards." 22 NRC 22. 29. The -The rule is consistent with section 109 exercise a veto power over completed Commission noted, however, that Its of the NRC Authorization Act of 1980, nuclear power planl_s. Seen in context. emergency planning rules were intended a measure which has twice reenacted however, It is apparent that the to be "flexible," and that a utility plan by the Congress, though it has since Commission did no such thing. Rather, will pass muster under 10 CFR 50.47(c) expired. In addition, the House of
- the Commission was acknowledging the "notwithstanding noncompliance with Representatives recently rejected an fact that under the approach It was the NRC's detailed planning standards amendment designed to bar taking, the action (or inaction) of a state * * * (1) if the defects are 'not implementation of the rule for two or locality had the potential to affect the significant': (2) if there ere 'adequate specific plants.
operation of nuclear power plants, since interim compensating actions': or (3) if -The rule is consistent with existing state and local non-participation would there are 'other compelling reasons.' " NRC regulations, end is well within clearly make It more difficult for an The Commission added: "The decisions NP.C's rulemaking authority. applicant to demonstrate the adequacy below focus on (1) end (2) end we do -Since the rule provides for no of emergency planning. It is worth likewise. diminution of public protection from emphasizing the word "potential" in the what was provided under existing The Commission then explained that quoted passage. It indicates that the regulations, it cannot be in the "measure of significance under (1) Commission believed that In some contravention of any statutory and adequacy under (2) is the cases, slate and local action or Inaction requirements governing the level of fundamental emergency planning might have the effect of restricting plant standard of§ 50.47(a) that 'no operating NRC safely st,mdards. operation, while in other cases ii would license * *
- will be issued unless a Issue #2: ls this a generic rule, or is not. In other words, l~e Commission finding is made by NRC that there is this proposal really aimed et the foresaw a case-by-case evaluation, with reasonable assurance that adequate Shoreham and Seabrook plants?
the result not foreordained either in the protective measures can end will be The rule is generic in the sense that ii direction of plant operation or of taken in the event 0£ a radiological is of general applicability and future shutdown. Clearly, neither the emer!jency.' "The "root question," the effect, covering future plants as well as Cr,mmission nor the Congress Commission said. was whether a utility existing plants. At present, however, envisioned that state or local non- plan "can provide for 'ad,!quate there are on'.y two plants with pending participation should automatically bar protective measures * *
- in the event operating license applications for which plant operation without further inquiry. 0£ a radiological emergency.'" To state and/or local non-participation is The mechanism adopted by the answer that question, the Commission an issue. Those plants are Shoreham Commission for implementing the two- continued, requires recognition of the and Seabrook. The NRC's 1980 rules, tiered approach was set forth in 10 CFR fact that emergency planning perhaps because of optimism that states 50.47 0£ the Commission's regulations. requirements do not have fixed criteria. and localities would always choose lo For the first tier, sixteen planning such as prescribed evacuation times or be partners in emergency planning, standards for a state or local emergency radiation dose savings. but rather aim at included only a general provision, 10 plan were spelled out in 10 CFR "reasonable and feasible dose reduction CFR 50.47(c), dealing with cases in 50.47(b)(1-16) of the Commission's under the circumstances. 24 NRC 22, 30. which utilities are unable lo satisfy the regulations. The second tier, by contrast. standards for stale end local emergency was dealt with in a brief and unspecific Thus the Commission is already on record es believing itself legally plans, and had no specific discussion of provision, 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1): the evaluation of a utility plan in cases obligated to consider the adequacy of a Failure to meet the 1161 applicable utility plan in a situation of slate and/or of state or local non-partic:ipalion. This standards set forth in paragraph (b) of this local non-participation in emergency does not mean that the NRC was
- section may result in the Commission compelled to adopt new regulations in declining to issue an operating license: planning. Likewise. it is on record as however, the applicant will have an believing that the evaluation of a utility order to act on the Shoreham and opportunity to demonstrate lo the satisfaction plan takes place in the context of the Seabrook license applications. On the of the Commission that deficiencies in the overriding obligation that no license can contrary, the NRC hes always had the plans are not significant £or the plant in be issued unless the emergency plan is option of proceeding by case-by-case question. that adequate interim con:pensating found to provide reasonable assurance adjudication under its 1980 regulations.
actions have been or will be taken promptly, of adequate protective measures in an Issue #3: Will this rule assure licenses or that there are other compelling reasons lo emergency. The Commission believes to the Shoreham and Seabrook plants? permit plant operation. It will not assure a licer:se lo any that the planning standards of 10 CFR In a 1986 decision. the Commission 50.47(b), which are used lo evaluate a particular plant or plants. It will declared that in a situatic,1 in which slate or local plan, also provide an establish a framework in which a utility
. 50-SC-24
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION seeking an operating license can, in a and engineered design fe11tures ere conditions-for example. the case of stale and/or local non- needed to protect the health and safety availability of the emergency core parlicipation, attempt lo demonstrate lo of the public." (Emphasis added.) 45 FR cooling system-would warrant
!he NRC Iha! emergency planning is 55403. The Commission also explained immediate shutdown.
adequate. Whether a utility could the: in light of the Three Mile Island In sum, despite language indicating
- succeed in making !hat showing would accident it had become "clear that thP. that emergency planning was depend on the record developed in a protection provided, by siting and "essential," the Commission in 1980 specific adjudication, the results of engineered design fee lures must be created a regulatory structure in which which would be subject to multiple bolstered by the ability to lake emergency planning was treated levels of review within the Commission protective measures during the course of somewhat differently, in terms of the as well as lo review in the courts. an accicjent." Id. Though the word* corrective actions to be taken when Issue #4: Is state or local participation "bolstered" suggests that the deficiencies are identified, from thu essential for the NRC to determine that Commission of 1980 viewed emergency engineered safety features ("hardware")
there will be adequate protection of the planning as a backstop for other means that would be relied on in an emergency. public health and safety? of public protection rather than as of Issue :::ti: Assuming that NRC should We do not have a basis at this time equal importance to them, the issue consider e utility plan, what criteria for determining generically whether cannot be resolved definitively by should apply? In part.icular: state and local participation In microscopic analysis of the particular (a) Should the utility plan provide just emergency planning la e11sential for NRC words chosen in 1980. as much protection es a state or local lo determine that there will be adequate More relevant lo the task of plan, or may less protection be protection of the public health and ascertaining the intent of the 1980 adequate? safety. There has yet to be a final rulemaking is the regulatory structure adjudicatory determination in any (b) If less protection may be adequate, established under the 1980 rules. In 10 proceeding on the adequacy of a utility must NRC still find reasonable CFR 50.54(sl(2l(ii), the Commission plan where state and local governmental assurance that under the utility plan, provided that if it "finds that the state of authorities decline to participate in adequate protective measures can and emergency preparedness does not emergency planning. Clearly, it will be will be taken? Or is it sufficient for NRC provide reasonable assurance that more difficult for a utility to satisfy the to find that the totality of the risk, adequate protective measures can end NRC of the adequacy of its plan in the including all relevant factors, including will be taken in the event of e absence of slate and local participation, the likelihood of an accident, assures radiological emergency ' ' ' end if the but whether it would be impossible that there is adequate protection of deficiencies ' ' ' ere not corrected remains lo be seen. The fact that public health end safety? within four months of that finding. the Congress provided for evaluation of a Commission will determine whether the Under the rule adopted in this notice, utility plan in section 109 of the NRC reactor shell be shut down until such e utility plan, to pass muster, is required Authorizat'ion Act of 1980 (and in two deficiencies are remedied or whether to provide reasonable assurance that subsequent Authorization.Acts) other enforcement action is adequate protective measures can and indicates that Congress believed that it appropriate." In other words, e plant will be taken in an emergency. The rule was at least possible in some cases fore ordinarily may operate for at least four recognizes-as did Congress when it utility plan to be found to provide months with deficiencies in emergency enacted and re-enec.ted the provisions of "reasonable assurance that public planning before the NRC is required Section 109 of the NRC Authorization health end safety is not endangered by even lo decide whether remedial action Act of 1980-that no utility plan is likely operation of the facility concerned, in should be taken. This approach. the to be able to provide the same degree of the words of the "second tier" provided Commission said in the Supplementary public protection that would obtain in section 109. Information to the 1980 rule, was under ideal conditions, i.e. a state or Issue #5: Is emergency planning as consistent with section 109 of the :-JRC local plan with full state and local impt1rtant to safety es proper plant Authorization Act of 1980. 45 FR 55407. participation, but that it may design 11ncl operation? At the time that the Commission creeled nevertheless be adequate. The rule First of all, this issue does not have to the so-celled "120-day clock" for starts from the premise that accidents be addressed in the ::ontext of the final deficiencies in emergency p_lenning, it can happen, and that et every plant, rule announced in this notice, since the adequate emergency planning measures was settled Commission Jew (end present rule involves no redrawing by are needed to protect the public in the remains so today) that the NRC must NRC of the balance between emergency event an accident occurs. Whether in issue en order direr;ing e licensee to planning and other provisions for the fact a particular utility plan will be protection of health end safety. Having show cause why its license should not be modified, revoked or suspended found adequate would be a melter for said that, we tum to the question of the adjudication in individual licensing piece of emergency planning in the whenever it concludes that "substantial health or safety issues he[ve) been proceedings. overall regulatory scheme for the raised" about the activities authorized Issue #7: May NRC assume that a protection of public health and safety. state or local government which refuses Though the Commission in its 1980 by the license. Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point. to cooperate in emergency planning will rulemaking explicitly described Units No. 1, 2 end 3), CLl-75-8, 2 NRC still respond to the best of its ability in emergency planning as "essential," it is less clear what importance the 173, 176. That standard was endorsed by an actual emergency? If so: . Commission assigned to emergency the Court of Appeals for the District of (a) May NRC assume that the state or planning, as compared to the importance Columbia Circuit in Porter County local response will be In accord with the accorded to other means of pro lee.ting Chapter of the Izaak Walton League v. utility plan? public health end safety, notably sound NRC, 606 F.2d 1363 (1978). In the context (b) May NRC assume that the state or siting, design, and operation. In the of that standard, the 120-dey clock local response will be adequate? Supplementary Information explaining provision for emergency planning (c) If the NRC rule calls for reliance on the 1980 rulemaking, the Commission deficiencies amounts to e Commission FEMA, and FEMA says that it can't. stated that "adequate emergency finding that, et least for the first 120 judge emergency planning except when preparedness is an essential aspect in days, even a major deficiency in there is state and local participation in the protection of the public health and emergency planning does not . an exercise, how can the NRC ever safety," 55 FR 55404, and commented automatically raise e "substantial health make a judgment on emergency that "onsile and offsite emergency or safety issur." with regard to plant planning In a situation in which state preparedness as well as proper siting operation. By contrast, e major safety and local authorities do not participate? deficiency relating to emergency In this rule, the Commission adheres to the "realism doctrine, enunciated in 50-SC-25
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION its 1986 decision in Long island Lighting plan would be adequate in every case or incorporaiing provisions implementing Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. that ii would be inadequate in every the Congress's 1980 policy decision into Unit 1), CLl-86-13, 24 NRC 22, which case. Implementation of this rule may the NRC's rules. As noted elsewhere, the holds that in an actual emergency, stale ultimately provide that informational 1980 statute, twice re-enacted, has end local governmental authorities will basis.* expired, but the NRC does not need the act to protect their citizenry, and that it The problem of how the NRC can specific authority of that statute to is appropriate for the NRC to take decide the adequacy of emergency adopt this rule, which is promulgated account of that self-evident fact in pursuant to the NRC's general authority, planning in the face of FEMA's declared under section 161(bJ and other evaluating the adequacy of a utility's reluctance to make judgments on emergency plan. The NRC's realism provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, to emergency planning in cases of state regulate the use of nuclear energy.
doctrine is grounded squarely in and local non-participation does not common sense. As the Commission The House of Representatives, as has appear insoluble. Though FEMA has been described above, voted 261-160 on statecl in L/LCO, even where state and expressed its reluctance to make local officials "deny they ever would or August 5, 1987 to reject an amendment judgments in such circumstances, which would have barred the could cooperate with [a utility) either because of the degree of conjecture that before or even during an accident," the -application of this rule to two specific would in FEMA's view be called for. we plants. The Congress is thus well aware NRC "simply cannot accept these do not interpret its position as one of statements at face value." 24 NRC 22, 29 of the Commission's emergency refusal to apply its expertise to the planning rulemaking. fn. 9. It would be irrational for anyone to evaluation of a utility plan. For FEMA to suppose that in a real radiological For the Commission to terminate its engage in the evaluation of a utility plan emergency, state and local public rulemaking and ask the Congress to would necessitate no retreat from its address the policy issues involved thus officials would refuse to do what they stated view that ii is highly desirable to have always done in the event of seems unwarranted at this lime.The have. for each nuclear power plant, a Commission is still well within the r.mergencies of all kinds: do their best to state or local plan with full state and help protect the affected public. framework of the guidiance which the The long Island lighting Co. decision local participation in emergency Congress gave it in 1980 (and in the two included the observation that in an pla~ning, including emergency re-renactments of the statute) and also accident, the "best effort" of state and exercises. (The Commission shares that well within its rulemaking authority. It county officials would include utilizing view.) FEMA's advice would has yet to carry through that guidance to the utility's plan as "the best source for undoubtedly include identification of the point of making an adjudicatory emergency plr.nning information and areas in which judgments are decision on the adequacy of a utility options." 24 NRC 22. 31. This rule leaves necessarily conjectural. and NRC's plan. If and when the Commission it to the Licensing Board to judge whet overall judgment on whether a utility's determines, through adjudications in form the "best efforts" of state and local plan is adequate would in tum have to individual cases, that there is a officials would take. However, the take account of the uncertainties continuing problem which only rulemaking record strongly supports the included in FEMA's judgment. Beyond a Congressional action can solve, it can so proposition that state and loco! certain point, uncertainty as to notify the Congress, but that point has governments believe that a planned underlying facts would plainly make a not yet been reached. 1esponse is preferable to an ad hoc one. positive finding on "reesonabli, Issue #9: Doesn't the proposed rule Therefore it is only reasonable to e_ssurance" increasingly difficult. These still leave open the possibility that state suppose that in the event of a are issues, however. which can bl' or local action or inaction can have the radiological emergency, state and local addressed in the case-by-case effect of blocking operation of a plant? If officials. in the absence of a state or adjudications on individual fact-specific so, how can the proposed rule be said to local radiological emergency plan situations. It should be noted that while effectuate the Congressional intent that approved by state and local the rule makes clear*thet ultimate licensees not be penalized for the governments, will either look to the decisional authority resides with NRC, it does envision a role for FEMA in the inaction or inadequate action of stale utility and its plan for guidance or will and local authorities? follow some other plan that exists. Thus evaluation of utility plans, although Yes, the proposed rule does leave the presiding Licensing Board may section 109 of the NRC Authorization open the possibility that state or local presume that state end local Act of 1980 did not specify any role for non-participation cari indirectly block governmental authoritie I will look to the FEMA in the eveluatio'J) of utility plans the operation of a nuclear plant. This is utility for guidance and i!enerally follow (as opposed to state and local plans). so because under the particular facts of its plan in an actual emergency; Issue #8: If this is a national policy an individual case It may*be impossible however, this presumption may be question, why doesn't the Commission for the NRC to conclude that a utility rebutted by, for example, a good faith leave the issue to the Congress to plan is adequate, as defined in this rule. and a timely proffer of an adequate and resolve? That does not mean, however, that the feasible state or local radiological Congress did address, in 1980, the Congress's intent, es expressed in the response plan which would in fact be issue of what should be done in the 1980 statute and its re-enactments, is relied upon in en emergency. The event there is no acceptable state or thereby frustrated. The Congress was presiding Licensing Board should not local emergency plan: it directed the concerned that utilities not be hesitate to reject any claim that state NRC to evaluate a state, local, or utility "penalized," but not to the extent that it and local officials will refuse to act to plan to determine whether it provided was willing to countenance operation of safeguard the health and safety of the "reasonable assurance that public a nuclear power plant in a situation public in the event of an actual health and safety is not endangered by where the public was not adequately emergency. In actual emergencies, state, operation of the facility concerned." protected. Congress intended to give a local, and federal officials have Perhaps because it was overly optimistic utility the opportunity to demonstrate invariably done their utmost to protect that there would be an acceptable state that its plan provided "reasonable the citizenry, as two hundred years of or local plan in every case, the assura1 *ce," but it also provided that the American history amply demonstrateo. Commission did not, except in general NRC cou;-1 not permit a plant to operate At the present time, the Commission terms (at 10 CFR 50.47(c)J, provide in its unless it fouud that the utility had met does not have a basis in its adjudicatory regulations for the evaluation of a utility that burden. experience to judge either that a utility plan. The present rule is an effort to Issue #10: Will the proposed rule make up for that omission by discourage cooperation between 50-SC-26
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION licensees end slate end iocel emergency planning process. Ideally, in (with i:illowencee made both for those governments in emergency planning? the NRC's view. the new rule would areas in which compliance is infeasible There is no reason to believe that the never have lo be used, because states because of governmental non-rule would discourage coopere tion and localities would never refuse lo participation end for the compensatorv between licensees end slate end local participate in emergency planning. measures proposed by the utility). It governments in P.mergency planning. Issue #13: Does the proposed rule must be recognized that emergency Realistically, the only way in which the 11lter the place of e111ergency planning in planning rules ere necessarily flexible.
rule could discourage such cooperation the overall safety finding that the Other then "adequacy," there is no would be if utilities were lo decide that Commission must make? uniform "passing g::'.!r.le" for emergency because of the new rule, they had less of It does not. As described above, the plans, whether they ere prepared by a en incentive lo be accommodating to the Commission must make both a finding state, a locality, or a utility. Rather, needs end desires of slate end local of "adequate protective measures * *
- there is a case-by-case evaluation of euthorititls. That might be a possible in an emergency" end an overall safety whether the plan meets the standard of result if it appeared that the new rule fi~ding of "reasonable assurance that "adequate protective measures ... in make it easy end fest for a utility to the health and safety of the public will the event of en emergency." Likewise, obtain approval for its plan in cases of not be endangered" (10 CFR 50.35(c), the acceptability of a plan for one plant slate end local non-participation. implementing section 182 of the Atomic is not measured against plans for other In reality, it is likely to be much more Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232). The rule nuclear plants. The Commission, in its difficult and lime-consuming for a utility does nothing to alter either the 1986 LILCO decision, stressed the need lo obtain approval of its plan in the face requirement that emergency planning for flexibilty in the evaluation of of slate end local opposition. The must be found adequate or the place of emergency plans. In that decision, the problems highlighted by this rulemeking emergency planning in the overall safely Commission observed that it "might ere likely, if anything, to impress finding. look favorably" on a utility plan "if utilities anew with the desirability of Issue #14: What effect if any does the there was reasonable assurance that it doing everything necessary to obtain proposed rule have on nuclear plants was capable of achieving dose end retain full stale and local that are already in operation? reductions in the event of an accident participation in emergency planning. The rule does not specifically apply to that are generally comparable to what Issue #11: Is the proposed rule based plants that already have operating might be accomplished with government on en NRC consideration of economic licenses. As described above, 10 CFR cooperation." 24 NRC 22, 30~ We do not costs? 50.54(sl(2)(ii) of the Commission's read that decision es requiring a finding The NRC rule is en effort to bring the regulations already provides a of the precise dose reductions that NRC's regulations more clearly into line mechanism (the "120-day clock.) for would be accomplished either by the with a policy decision made by the addressing situations in which Congress in 1980. *,*he NRC's rule is thus utility's plan or by a hypothetical plan deficiencies are identified in emergency that had full state and local based on econonic considerations only planning et operating plants. To the lo the extent the1 the Congress's policy participation: such findings are never a exten) that this rule provides criteria by requirement In the evaluation of decision of 1980 was based on economic considerations. In the Conference a which utillly plan would be judged by emergency plane. The final rule makes state end local withdrawal from clear that every emergency plan le to be Report on the NRC .l\uthorizetion Act of 1980 (H.96-1070, June 4, 1980?, che participation In emergency planning, evaluated for adequacy on Its own conferees slated that they did not wish those criteria would presumably be of merits, without reference to the specific assistance to decisionmekere In dose reductions which might be utilities to be "penalized" in situations determining, under 10 CFR 50.54(e)(2J(ii),
in which there was no acceptable elate accomplished under the plan or to the or local plan. That could be taken es a whether remedial action should be capabilities of any other plan. It further taken, end if so, what kind, where makes clear that a finding of adequacy reference to economic costs or simply lo coneiderati,me offairneee, in that the deficiencies In emergency planning for any plan Is to be considered issue wee whether a utility wee to be remain uncorrected after 120 days. generally comparable to a finding of barred from operating a plant by the Issue #1!;: Does the Commiesion;e rule adequacy for any other plan. action& of third parties over which it had mean that the NRC does not have to find The rule change is designed to no control. that a utility pl,.m would offer protection establish procedures end criteria The NRC'e motivation in promulgating equivalent to whet a plan with full elate governing the case-by-case adjudicatory this rule is not economics. Ile motivation end local participation would provide? evaluation, at the operating license is to assure that the NRC is in a position As elated previously, under the rule review stage, of the adequacy of to make the decisions that Congress adopted in this notice, a utility plan, lo emergency planning in situations in intended that it make, end that the , pees muster, is required to provide which state and/or local authorities .Commission has declared that it would reasonable assurance that adequate decline to participate further in m&ke. protective measures can end will be emergency planning. It is not intended to Issue #12: Is the;1>ropoeed rule taken In emergency. The rule assure the licensing of any particular intended lo reed elates and localities out recognizes-es did Congress when it plant or plants. The rule is intended lo of the emergency planning process? enacted and re-enacted the provisions of remedy the omission of specific Section 109 of the NRC Authorization procedures for the evaluation of a utility Emphatically not. The rule leaves the Act of 1980--that no utility plan is likely plan from the NRC's existing rules. existing regulatory structure unchanged for cases in which elate end local to be able lo provide the same degree of adopted In 1980. In providing for the public protection that would obtain evaluation of a utility plan, however. the authorities elect to participate in under ideal conditions, i.e. a slate or* emergency planning. The NRC, in _ rule represents no departure from the local plan with full stale and local approach envisioned in 1980 by the common with the Congress end FEMA. participation, but' that it may .regards full state end local participation Congress and by the Commission. In in emergency planning to be necessary nevertheless be adequate. 1980, the supplementary information to for optimal emergency planning. The The Commission's rule, as modified NRC's final rule stated that the rule was rule change is directed lo the question of end clarified, would establish a process consistent with the approach taken by whet the NRC's regulatory approach by which a utility plan can be evaluated Congress in Section 109 of the NRC should be in which elates end localities against the same standards that ere Authorization Act of 1980 (which, in a decide to take themselves out of the used to evaluate a s!ale or local plan compromise between House and Senate 50-SC-27
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION versions, provided for the NRC lo provided in the Commission's decision utility for guidance and generally follow evaluate a utility's emergency plan in in long ls/ond lighting Co.. (Shoreham its plan in an actual emergency; situations where a state or local plan Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1). CLl however, this presumption may be was either nonexistent or inadequate), 13, 24 NRC 22 (1986). The rule rebutted by, for example, a good faith though the rule itself included no incorporates the "realism doctrine,"' set and timely proffer or an adequate and explicit provisions governing the NRC's forth in that decision, which holds that feasible state or local radiological evaluation of a utility plan in such in an actual emergeocy. state and local response plan which would in fact be circumstances. It should be emphasized governmental authorities will act to relied upon in an emergency. The that the rule is not intended to diminish protect the public, and that it is presiding Licensing Board should not public protection from the levels appropriate therefore for the NRC, in hesitate to reject any claim that state previously established by the Congress evaluating the adequacy of a utility's and local officials will refuse to act to or the Commission's rules, since the emergency plan, to take into account the safeguard the health and safety of the Commission's rules and the Congress probable response of state and local public in the event of an actual have since 1980 provided for a two-tier authorities, to be determined on a case- emergency. ln actual emergencies, state, approach to emergency planning. The by-case basis. local, and federal officials have rule takes as its starting point the That decision also included language invariably done their utmost to protect Congressional policy decision reflected which could be interpreted as the citizenry, as two hundred years of in section 109 of the NRC Authorization envisioning that the NRC must estimate American history amply demonstrates.
Act of 1980. That statute adopted a two- the radiological dose reductions which a The rule thus establishes the . tier approach to emergency planning. utility plan would achieve, compare framework by which the adequacy of The preferred approach was for them with the radiological dose emergency planning, In cases of state operating licensee to be issued upon a reductions which would be achieved if and/or local non-participation, can be finding that there is a "State or local there were a state or local plan with full evaluated on a case-by-case basis In radiological emergency response plan state and local participation in operating license proceedings. The rule
* *
- which complies with the emergency planning, and permit does not presuppose, nor does It dictate, Commission's standards for such plans," licensing only If the dose reductions are what the outcome or that case-by-case but failing that, it also permitted "generally comparable." Such an evaluation wlll be. As with other issues licensing on a showing that there is a interpretation would be contrary to NRC adjudicated In NRC proceedings, the "State, local, or utility plan which practice, under which emergency plans outcome of case-by-case evaluations of provides reasonable assurance that the are evaluated for adequacy without the adequacy or emergency planning public health and safety Is not reference to numerical dose reductions using a utility's plan will be subject to endangered by operation of the facility .which might he accomplished, and multiple layers of administrative review concerned." without comparing them to other within the Commission and to judicial Under the Commission's 1980 rules, emergency plane, real or hypothetical. review in the courts.
tie regulatory provision that The final rule makes clear that every Backnt Analysis implemented the second of the two tiers emergency plan is to be evaluated for of Section 109 was general and adequacy on lie own merits, without Thie amendment does not Impose any unspecific. The relevant regulation, 10 reference to the specific dose reductions new requirements on production or CFR 50.47(c), allowed a nuclear power which might be accomplished under the utilization facilities; It only provides an plant to be licensed to operate, plan or to the capabilities of any other alternative method to meet the
*notwithstanding its failure to comply plan. It further makes clear Iha t a Commission's emergency planning 'with the planning standard of 10 CFR finding of adequacy for any plan is to be regulations. The amendment therefore is *50.47(b), on a showing that "deficiencies considered generally comparable to a not a backfit under 10 CFR 50.109 and a in the plane are not significant for the finding of adequacy for any other plan. hackfit analysis le not required.
plant in question, that adequate interim The long Island lighting Co. decision Regulatory Flexibility Certification compensating measures have been or included the observation that in an will be taken promptly, or that there are ln accordance with the Regulatory accident, the "beet effort" of state and Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(h), other compelling reasons to permit plant county officials would include utilizing operation," without defining those terms the Commission certifies that this rule the utility's plan as "the best source for will not have a significant economic further. The Commieeion currently emergency plannin~ information and believes that the planning standards of impact upon a substantial number of options." 24 NRC 22, 31. Thie rule leaves small entities. The proposed rule applies rn CFR 50.47(h), which are used to it to the Licensing Board to judge what only to nuclear power plant licensees evaluate a state or local plan, also form the "best efforts" of state and local provide an appropriate framework to which are electric utility companies officials would take, but that judgment dominant in their service areas. These evaluate a utility plan. Therefore, the would be made in accordance with new rule provides for the first time that licensees are not "small entities" as set certain guidelines set forth in the rule forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act where a utility plan is submitted, in a and explained further below. The situation of state and/or local non- and do not meet the small business size rulemaking record strongly supports the standards set forth in Small Business participation in emergency planning, it proposition that state and local will be evaluated for adequacy against Administration regulations in 13 CFR governments believe that a planned Part 121. the same standards used to evaluate a response is preferable lo an ad hoc one. state or local plan. However. due Therefore it is only reasonable to Paperwork Reduction Act allowance will be made both for the suppose that in the event of a This final rule amends information non-participation of the state and/or radiological emergency, elate and local collection requirements that are subject local governmental authorities and for officials, in the absence of a state or to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 the compensatory measures proposed local radiological emergency plan (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These by the utility in reaching a approved by state and local requirements were appro*,ed by the determination whether there is governments, will either look to the Office of Management and Budget, "reasonable assurance that adequate utility and its plan for guidance or will approval No. 3150-0011. protective measures" can and will be follow some other plan that exists. Thus, taken. *
- the presiding Licensing Board may List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 The approach reflected in this rule presume that state and local Antitrust, Classified information, Fire ampli~ies and clarifies the guidance govermental 11uthorities will look to the protection, Incorporation by reference, 50-SC-28
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear Objective Decision Rationale power plants end reactors, Penalty, The objective of the proposed amendments The decision rationale is set forth In detail Radiation protection, Reactor siting ere to implement the policy underlying the In the preamble lo the rule change published criteria, Reporting end Recordkeeping 1980 Authorizeiton Act end to resolvr., for in the Federal Register.
requirements. future licensing, whet off~ite emergency planning criteria should apply where state or Implementation Environmental Assessment end Finding local governments deolde not to participate in The rule should become effective 30 days or No Significant Environmental Impact offsite emergency planning or preperedneu. after publication in the Federal Raglater. The Commission hes determined Implementation will involve coopere!ion with Alternatives FEMA end the development of FEMA/NRC under the National Environmental Policy criteria for review of utility plans may be Act or 1969, es emended, end the Five alternalivea were considered, including leaving the existing rules required before the rule Is applied lo specific Commission's regulations-in Subpart A cases. unchanged. The pros and cons of these of 10 CFR Pert 51, that this rule is not a eltemellves ere discussed in the rule Environmental AaseHmant for Amendments major Federal action significantly preamble published in the Federal Register. lo Emergency Planning Regulations Dealing effecting the quality of the human With Evaluation of Offslt11 Emergency environment end therefore an Consequences Planning for Nuclear Power Pienta et the environmental impact statement is not NRC Operating license Review Siege Where Slate required. The Commission has prepared, The amendments will probably not impact end/or Local Governments Decline lo in support of this finding, an on NRC resources currently being used in Pertlclpela In Ofrslte Emergency Planning environmental assessment which is licensing cases because current NRC policy. Identification of the Action available for inspection and copying, for developed in the adjudicatory case law, is to evaluate utility plans es possible interim The Commission is emending Its a fee, at the NRC Public Document regule lions lo provide criteria for the Room, 1717 H Street NW .. Washignton, compenseling actions under 10 CFR evaluation et the operating license siege of DC. 50.47(c)(1). Thus, while there could be offsite emergency planning where, because of extensive litigation end review regarding the non-participation of state end/or local Regulatory Analysis whether the rule's criteria ere met. !hie would governmental authorities, a utility hes The Commission has prepared a likely be similar lo the review end litigation proposed Its own emergency plan. under current preciice. regulatory analysis for this regulation. The Need for the Action This analysis further examines the costs Other Government Agencies As described in the Federal Register notice end benefits of the proposed action and No Impact on other agency resources accompanying the final rule, the the alternatives considered by the should result with the possible exception that Commission's emergency planning Commission. The analysis is available FEMA will need to devote resources to regulations, promulgated in 1980. did nol for inspection end copying, fore fee, at develop criteria for reviP.w of utility plans explicitly discuss the evaluation of a utility the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H endjor to review the plans on a case-by-case emergency plan. although Congress expressly Street, NW., Washington, DC. uesis. pr1,vided that in the absence of a state or lndusty local emergency plan, or in cases where a For the reasons set out in the state or local plan was inadequate, the NRC preamble, and under the authority of the Impacts on the industry ere speculative should*consider a utility plan. That omission Atomic Energy Act or 1954, as amended, because there is no way to predict. in
- hes led to u::icerteinty es lo whether the NRC the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, advance of their actual application, whether is empowered to consider a utility pion in as emended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the any pertculer utility plan will satisfy the rule. cases of state end/or local non-participation, Commission is adopting the following However, industry should generally benefit es well es about whet the standards for the amendments lo 10 CFR Part SO: from knowing that rules ere in piece so that evaluation of such a plan would be.
plans for compliance can be formulated. Alternatives Considered (Editorial riote: Tbe.foDowlng regulatory." . enal)*ai, and en~ironmental assessment' w,11 Public The Commission published a proposed rule not appear in the Code of Federal Under the rule being adopted e utility plan, change on March 6, 1987, el 52 FR 8980. In Regulation11] to pass muster, is required to provide deciding on a final rule. the Commission
- Regulatory Anelysis-Eveluetion of the reasonable assurance that adequate considered four options in addition to the one protective measures con and will be. token in reflected in the final rule. These were:
Adequacy of Offsite Emergency Planning for issuance of the rule es originally proposed Nuclear Power Plants al Iha Operating au emr.rgency. The rule recognizes-es did Congress when it enacted end re-enacted the end described: issuance of a rule making Ucense Review Siege Where Stele end/or clear that in cases of stale end/or local non-Local Governments Decline lo Participate in provisions of Section 109 of the NRC Authorization Act of1980-thel while no perticipetion, licenses could be issued on the Offsite Emergency Planning basis of the utility's best efforts: issuance of a utility plan Is likely to be able lo provide Statement of the Problem precisely the same degree of public rule barring the issuance of licenses in cases In 1980, Congress enacted provisions protection that would obtain under ideal of elate end/or local non-participation: end dealing with emergency planning for. nuclear conditions. i.e. a stale or local plan with full termination of the rulemaking without the power plants in the NRC Authorization Act issuance of any rule change. slate end local participation. such a pion may for fiscal year 1980. Section 109 of that Act nevertheless be edquete. The rule alerts from Environmental Impacts of the Action provided for the NRC to review a utility's lhe premise that accidents can happen. end emergency plan in situations in which estate The rule does not alter in any way the that el every plant, adequate emergency requirement that for en operating license to or local emergency plan either did not exist planning measures ere needed to protect the or was inadequate. The NRC published be issued, emergency planning for the plant public in the evenl en eccidenl occurs. in question must be adequate. The rule is regulations later then year that were Whether in feet e particular utility plan will designed to be consistent with the designed lo effectuate the second track of the Congressionally mandated approach, but be found adequate would be a melter for two-track approach adopted by the Congress they did not include specific mention of adjudication in individual licensing 15 the NRC Authorization Act of 1980 end utility plans. The absence of such a provision proceedings. two successive authorization eels, es hes led lo uncertainty about the NRC's described in detail in the Federal Register Impact on Other Requirements notice. The rule does not effect the piece of authority to consider a utility plan end the
, criteria by which such a plan would be The proposed amendments would not emergency planning in the overall safety judged. The present rulemeking is designed to affect other NRC requirements. finding which the Commission must make clarify both the NRC's obligation to conside_r prlo~ lo the licensing of any plant.
Constraints Accordingly, the rule change does not a utility plan et the operating license stage in cases of stale end/or local non-participation No constraints have been identified that diminish public protection and hes no in emergency planning end the standards effect implementation of the proposed environmental Impact. against which such a plan would be amendments. evaluated. 50-SC-29
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Agencies and Persons Consulted Addenda, and 1986 Edition of Section XI, Division 1, of the ASME Code. A A summary of the very numerous limitation is placed on the use of comments appears as pert or the Federal Register notice. Shortly before presenting en paragraph IWIJ:-3640 as contained in the -
options paper to the Commission. NRC _.Winter 1983 Addenda and Winter 1984 representallves briefed representatives of the Addenda of Section XI, Division 1. This Federal Emergency Management Agency on limitation requires that for certain types the contents of the options paper. of welds,.IWB-3640 when implemented Finding of No Significant Impact shall be used as modified by the Winter Based on the above, the Commission hes 1985 Addenda. In addition, the existing decided not to prepare an envlronme"i1tel 52 FR 49362 modification pertaining to the inservice Published 12/31/87 .inspection of pressure retaining welds in impact statement for the rule changes. Effective 2/1/88 ASME'Code Class 2 piping has been Completeness and Accuracy of revised to limit its applicability up to the: Information 1963 Edition with addenda up through the Summer 1983 Addenda. The sections See Part 2 Statements of Consideration of the ASME Code being incorporated by reference provide rul~s for-the 53 FR 6137 Pubti*hed 3/1/88 construction ofHght-water-cooled . Effective 3/1 /88 nuclear power plant components and specify. requirements for inservice Relocation of Office of Nuclear inspection of those components. Reactor Regulation Adoption of these amendments would See Part 19 Statements of Consideration permit the use of improved methods* for construction and inservice inspection of nuclear power plants. . 53 FR 8845 Published 3/17/88 EFFECTIVE DATE: Ma:v 5. 1988. The incorporation by ref~rence of certain 10 CFR Part 50 publications list~d in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Office of Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off.Site th~ Federal Register as of May 5, 1988. Emergency Planning for Nuclear FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Power Plants at the Operating License Mr. G.C. Millman. Division of Review Stage Whe.re,State and/or
.Engineering. Office of Nuclear
- Local Governments Decline To Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Participate in Off-Site Emergency *Regulatory Commission, Washington, Planning DC 20555, Telephone: (301) 492-3872.
Correction SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June In. rule document 87-25439 beginning 26, 1987, the Nuclear Regulatory
*on p*age 42078 in the issue of Tuesday, Commission published in the Federal
- November 3, 1987, make the following Register (52 FR 24o15) a proposed
.correction: amendment to its regulation, 10 CFR On :page 42079, in the third column. in Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of the second complete paragraph, in the Production and Utilization Facilities," to sixth line, "generally" should read update the reference to editions and addenda of the American Society of "equally".
Mechanic;al Engineers Boiler and
*53 FR 16051.
Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code). Published 5/5/88
- This amendment revises § 50.55a to Effective 5/5/88 incorporate by reference all editions through the 1986 Edition and all 10 CFR Part 50 addenda through the Winter 1985 Addenda that modify Division 1 rules of Codes and Standards for Nuclear Section III, "Rules for the Construction Power Plants of Nuclear Plant Components," and, subje.ct to certain.limitations and AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory modifications, addenda through the Commission. Winter 1985 Addenda that mcidify ACTION: final rule. Division 1 rules of Section XI, "Rules for the Inservice Inspection of Nuclear
SUMMARY
- The Commission is amending Power Plant Components," of the ASME its regulations to incorporate by Code. Specifically, this amendment to reference the Winter 1984 Addenda, § 50.55a incorporates by r1;iference the Summer 1985 Addenda, Winter 1985 Winter 1984 Addenda, Summer 1985 Addenda, and 1986 Bdition of Section Addenda, Winter 1985 Addenda.and Ill, Division 1, of the American Society 1986 Edition for Division 1 rules of of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Section III, and the .Winter 1983 Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code), Addenda, Summer 1984 Addenda, and the Winter 1983 Addenda, Summer Winter 1984 Addenda, Summer 1985 1984 Addenda, Winter 1984 Addenda, Addenda, Winter 1985 Addenda, and Summer 1985 Addenda, Winter 1985 1986 Edition for Division 1 rules of 50-SC-30
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Section XI of the ASME Code. The 1986 earlier addenda.for the examination or specified in IWB-3514.3. Concern was expressed by the NRC staff and others Edition is equivalent to the 1983 Edition, pressure retaining welds in ASME Code as modified by the.Summer 1983
- Class 2 piping, including residual heat that IWB-3640, as presented initially in Addenda, Winter 1983 Addenda, removal systems, emergency core . . the Winter 1983 Addenda, did not Summer*1984 Addenda, Winter 1984 cooling systems, and containment heat provide an acceptable level of margin Addenda, Summer 1985 Addenda, and .. removal systems. Thit staf~ previously as:;ams! faiiure ior materiais with 10w
.Winter 1985 Addenda...The*Slim.riier 1984 . addressed these concerns by specifying t~ughness, such as might occur in fluxed Addend1tand Summer,1985 Addenda for a modification in § 50.55a(b)(2](iv), welds [i.e., submerged arc welds (SAW) ..Section XI do not include technical whi::h reauireci that foi; exHml o: or shielded metal arc welds (SMA WJ). requirements, but are included-in the examimitions for pressure retainio~ One concern with low toughness reference to prevent the confusion that weids in ASME Code Class 2 pipino be materials was that such materials might _might occur with a lack of continuity in ~*.::iermined based upon specific* rni~s in fail at load levels Lernw limit load. the addenda references. tne 1974 Edition and Addenda \nrough Additionaliv. there was c'oncern that Interested persons were invited to foe Summer 1975 Addenda. Aifr,ou::'h the secondary ;tresses, which were not submit written comments for commenier did not make tr1e poin;
- included in the stress analysis consideration in connection with the specifically. the proposed ruie shouid procedures required by JWB--3640, might proposed amendmei;it by August 25, have recognized the improvements in contribute to the failure of low 1987. Comments were received frorr. the Winter 1983 Addenda by toughness materjals.
three individuals in response to the incorporating a revision to limit the .The ASME e5~;c;bli,;r;;;d .a special task notice oi proposed rulemaking. Two of applicabilitv of the reaui.-red existino group to address foe concerns the commenters were in favor of the modificatio;l soeciii.ea" in para!ITaohc associated wHb-paragrnph IWB-3640 as proposed rule, and submitted (b)(2)(iv) to ASW.i.E Corie editi;ns and 0 contained in the Vvinter 1933 Addenda. suggestions for editorial clarifications. addenda up to the 1S63 Edition with In the interim. the NRC staff required One of these commenters wa$ addenda up through the Summer 1983 that licensees utilizing the procedures concerned that the manner proposed ior Addenda. This final rule incorporates and acceptance criteria of IWB-3640. as specifying the.endorsed editions and this limitation to the *use of the contained in the \,Vint.er 1983 Addenda, addenda in§§ 50.55a [b)(l)and [b)(2) modification specified in paragraph apply additional safety factors in their was potentially confusing for thir. (b](Z){iv). anatyses to be submitted to the staff to specific amendment because the latest The third commenter opposed the account for the above concerns. NRC addenda that is specified does not proposed amendment. That commenter staff acceptance criteria were provided modifv the latest edition that is believes that the NRC should not rely on in Generic Letterfl4-1.1. "Inspections of specified (i.e., the Winter 1985 Addenda industry standards, but rather should BWR Stainless Steel Piping." 2 modifie~ the 1983 Edition). The staff develop its own standards based upon In the opinion of the NRC staff, the agrees with the commenter and has NRC experience and data. NRC practice concerns associated with material modified paragraphs (b](l) and (b](Z) to is to utilize national standards, such as toughness have been adequately make it clear that the Winter 1985 the ASME Code, whenever possible to addressed by the ASME Code with the Addenda applies to the 1983 Edition, define acceptable ways of implementing modification to paragraph IWB-3640 in and that the 1986 Edition is the latest the NRC's basic safety regulations. This the Winter 1985 Addenda. This addenda ASME Code update being incorporated is consistent with OJ\.m Circular No. A- provides specific acceptance criteria for by reference into the regulation. 119 (Revised), 1 which provides. policy SAW amfSMAWtype welds, and these The other commenter in favor of the and administrative.guidance to federal criteria address the concerns associated proposed r_ule believes that the proposed agencies regarding participation in the with fimit load and the need to
- additional sentence in § 50.55a(b)(Z)(i) development and use of voluntary incorporate secondary stresses in the -
which specifies a limitation on the use standards. Consistent with this policy, evaluation. of IWB-3640 for certain addenda should the NRC staff participates actively in the This amendment to § 50.55a be provided for clarity in a separate develop~ent of many national incorporates a limitation -in paragraph paragraph. The staff has considered and standards, including the ASME Code, to {b){2){v) that allows for the use of adopted this suggestion. In this final ensure that NRG experience and data is paragraph IWB-3640, as contained in rule, the specified limitation is contained part of the information base used to the Winter 1983 Addenda and Winter
- in a new paragraph (b)(ZJ(v). This support development of the standard. 1984 Addenda, for all applications commenter also recommended a Although the NRC staff is heavily permitted in that paragraph except those .
revision to Footnote 6 to clarify details involved in the development of the associated with SAW*and SMAW type regarding implementation of the code ASME Code, endorsement of the ASME welds. For these welds, this.amendment cases specified.in the identified Code by the NRC without exception is specifies that paragraph JWB...3640, as regulatory guides.'It is the opinion of the not an automatic action BS evidenced by modified by 1he Winter 1985 Addenda, staff that the rule should not be the existing linii.tations and must be used. cluttered with such information.. . modifications* specified in § 50.55a(b)(2) Footnote 8 of§ 50.55a provides Therefore, that proposed revision has
- and the new limitation specified in reference to the NRC Regulatory Guides paragraph-{b)(2)(v) by this final rule. that denote which ASME Code* Cases *:
not been incorporated into the final rule. However, the staff is considering
- Paragraph IWB-3640 was
- have been determined to be acceptable incorporating additional information incorporated into the Winter 1983 to the NRC staff for implementation.
directly into the regulatory guides to Addenda of Section XI, Division 1, to Previously, this footnote provided
- clarify their use. . provide procedures and acceptance reference to only Regulatory Guides 1.84 Additionally, this commenter noted criteria for determining the acceptability and 1:115, which denote acceptability of that the Winter 1983 Addenda to.Section for continued service of austenitic Section m, -Division 1, Code Cases on XI included significant' imprcivements ..to . * *stainless* steel piping with flaws in design and fabrication. and on the inservice insjlection*of Class 2 . . excess of the allowable indications materials, respectively. This amendment piping:-Tliis comment-is-correct: In- . . : 1 Single copies of 0MB Circular No. A-119 may particular; the.rti.lesspecified in that 'A copy.of Generic Letter 64-11 is available for be obtained from the 0MB Publications Office, 726 inspection or copying for a fee al the NRC Public addenda satisfy NRC staff-concerns Jackson Place NW~ Washington, DC 20503, Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington.
associated with the rules specified in Telephone [2112) 39!>-7332, DC: 50-SC-31
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION revises Footnote 6 to incorporate a foe seiection ci a more receni eJnwr. Regulalory Fiexibility Certification reference to Regulatory Guide 1.147, and addenda than will use of L'-:-e .A.s 1*eouired b,* the Reirn:alo,r "lnservice ir1suecuon Code Ccsf Section Xl rules. Satisfying foe requirements of§ 50:5.5c\ 6 )i4 J[i) for !:nf of Flexibili.ty Act 1!'.180. 5-U.S.C.'605fb),
Acceptability.:__i'.SME Section Xl tne Commission herehv certifies Lliat Division l," which identifies the Code initial 10-vear insoec!ion tnfo:::,::il wi'.'.. ir: this rule does not have" a significant Cases acceptable to the NRC staff for general. als0 5ati~fy foe ruies of Seciior, economic impact on a substantial impierpentation in the inservice XI.
- number of small entities. This rule inspection [ISI} program of ligh!-water- It is the Commission's intent that in all affects only the licensing and operation cooled nuclear power plants. At presen~. cases the existing requirements in of nuclear power plan.ts. T1e con~panies
§ 50.55a(g) be the basis fcir selecting the the hnplementation section of that own these plants do not fall with.in Regulatory Guide 1.147 specifies that edition and addenda of Section XI to be the scope of the definition of "small applicants should make a specific complied with during the preservice entities" set forth in the Regulatory request to the J\."RC to use Code Cases inspection. the 10-vear inspection Flexibility Act or the Small Business endm:sed in the regulatory guide. The interval. and succ~ssive 10-veer Size Standards set out in regulations next revision of Regulatory Guide 1.14i inspection intervals.
- issued by the Small Business (i.e., Revision 6j wilt reflect thE Subsection IWE, Requirements for Administration at 13 CFR Part 121.
proposed change in Footnote 6 of the Clas*s MC Components of Light-Water Cooled Power Plants," was added to List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 regulation. It will permit the use of Code Section XI, Division 1, in the Winter Antitrust, Clas!rlfied information, Fire Cases endorsed in the regulatory guide 1981 Addenda. Howevei-, 10 CFR 50.55a protection; Incorporation by reference, without a specific request to the NRC for presently incorporates only those approval. In the interim, it is the intent Intergovernmental relafimi.s, Nuclear portions of Section X1 that address the power plants and reactors, Penalty, of'the NRC that Code Cases listed in ISi requirements for Ciass 1, 2, and 3 Regulatory Guide 1.147 be used without Radiation protection, Reactor siting components and t.lieir snpports. The criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping specific application to the NRC. This .regulation does not currently address amendment further revises Footnote 6 to requirements; the ISi of containments. Since this correct the referenced titles for amendment is only intended to update Pursuant to t1;ie Atomic. F.ne.rgy* Act of Regulatory Guides 1.84 arid 1.85. current regulatory requirements to 1954, as- amended, the Energy
- Section 50.55a(g) provides . include the latest ASME Code edition Reorganization Act of 1974. as amended, requirements for .selecting the edition and addenda,' the requirements ,of and 5 U.S."C. 553, the NRC is adopting and addenda of Section XI to be Subsection IWE would not be imposed the following amendments to 10 CFR complied with during the preservice upon Commission licensees by this Part 50.
inspection (§ 50.55a(g)(3), for plants amendment. The applicability of .whose construction pennit was issued Subsection JWE is being considered 53 FR 19240 on or after July 1, 1974); the initial 10- Published 5/27/88 separately. Effective 7 /26/88 year inspection interval (§ 50.55a(g}{4)(i));*and successive 10- Environmental Impact: Ca.regork:al Retention Periods for Records year inspection intervals Exclusion (§ 50.55a{9)(4J(ii)). Paragraph IWA-2400 The NRG has determined that this See Part 4 Statements of Consideration of Section XI. as revised by the Winter final role is the type of action described 1983 Addenda, incorporates rules for in categorical exclusion 1D CPR selecting the applicable edition and 51.22{cJ(3). Therefore, neither an addenda of Section XI during :the environmental impact statement nor an preservice inspection (IWA-2411); the enviromnental assessment has been 53 FR 20603 initial 10-year inspection interval (1W A-* prepared for this final rule.
- Published 6/6/88 2412); and successive 10-year inspection Effective 7 /6/88 intervals {1WA--i413). Regulatory Analysis
.The criteria provided in the The Commission has ptepared a 10 CFR Part 50 regulations and Section XI are regulatory analysis for this amendment effectively 1he same for the preservice to the regulations. The.analysis Revlslon of Backflttlng Process for inspectioni-und the successive 10-year examines the costs and benefits of the Power Reactors inspection intervals, but-differ for the alternatives considered by ilie initial 10-year inspection intervat For Commisaion. Interested -persons may AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory exami.De a copy of the regu).q_tory Commission. *
'the !nitial 1.0-year inspection interval, the regulations specify that inservice analysis at theNRCPnblic Docwnent ACTION: Final rule.. . examinations *of components and Room, 1717 H SL NW., Washingten. DC. imiervice tests shall comply with the Single copies: of'the analysis may be
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatocy requirements in- the latest edition* and obtained from Mr. G.C. Millman. Commission is promulgating an addenda of the Code incorporated by Division of Engineering. Of&e of _ amended rule which governs the reference on the date 12 months prior to Nuclear Regulatory Resean:h, U.S. backfitting of nuclear pow*er plants. This the date ofissuance *of the operating Nuclear *Regulatory.Commission, action is necessary in order to have a license while Section XI provides that Washington, DC20555, Telephone (301) backfit rule which UIJambiguously the inspection-plan shall comply with 492-3872. . conforms with the August 4, 1987 the Edition and Addenda of Section XI Papeiwork Reduction "'-ct Statement decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for that has been adopted by the regulatory the District of Columbia in Union of authority 36 months after the date of This final.rule amenda information Concerned Scientists, et al., v. U.S.
issuance of the construction pennit. or collection requirement& that are subject Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This subsequent Editions and Addenda that to the Paperwork. Reduction Act of 1980 action is intended to clarify when have been adopted by. the regulatory (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These economic costs may be considered in .authority. In general..use of the requirements were approved by li:iC' backfitting nuclear power -plants. Commission requirements will result in Office of Management and BudgeL approval number 3150--0011. EFFECTIVE OATE;_luly 6, 1988. 50-SC-32
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION FOR FURTHER IMFORMATION CotHACT: decided not to appeal the decision. Particularly 1n response to tht Court s Sleven F. Crockett, Office of the General Instead, the Commission decided to decision, the rule now provides that if Counsel, U*.S. Nuclear Regulatory amend both the rule and the related the contemplated backfit involves Commission, Washinglon. DC 20555. NRC Manual chapter (Chapier 05i4) so ddining or redefinirrg what level of Phone: (202) 492-1600. that they conform u,nambiguously to the protection to the public health and SU?PLEFAENTARY lt~FORMATION: Court's opinion. On September 10, 19S7. saletv or common defense and securitv the Commission published pn;,posed shouid be regarded as adequate, neith~r Background amendments to the rule (52 FR 34223) the rule's "substantial increase
On September .20, 1985, after an and provided for a comment period standard, nor its "costs justified" ending on October 13, 1987. The final 1 extensive rulemaking proceeding which standard, see § 50.109(a)(3), is to be included sequential opportunities for rule as set .out in this document is applied. (See § 50;109(a)(4)(iii).) Also in public comment on an advanced notice substantially the same as the proposed response to the Court's decision, see 824 of proposed rulemaking (48 FR 44217; rule (52 FR 34223: September 10, 1987). F.2d at 119, the rule now also explicitly' September 28 1983) and a .notice .of In this rulemaking the Commission says that the Commission shall always proposed rulemaking (49 FR 47034; has adhered to the following safety require the backfitting of a facility if it November 30, 1984); the Commission
- principle for all of its backfitting determines that such regulatory action is adopted final amendments to its rule
- decisions: The Atomic Energy Act necessary to ensure that the facility which .governs the backfitting of nuclear commands the Commission to ensure provides adequate protection to the power plants, 10 CFR 50.109 (50 FR that nuclear power plant operation health and safety of the public and is in 38097; September 20, 1985). Backfitting is provides adequate protection to the accord with the common defense and defined in some detail in .the rule, but for health and safety.of the public. In security.
purposes of discussion here it means .defining, redefining or enforcing this On instruction from the Commission, measures which are directed by the statutory standard of adequate protection, the Commission will not the NRC slaff has amended its Manual Commission or by NRC staff in order to chapter on plant-specific backfitting to improve the safety of nuclear power consider economic costs. However, adequate protection is not absolute ensure consistency with the Court's reactors, and which reflect a change in a opinion. Copies of the revised chapter prior Comm_ission or staff position on. protection or zero risk. Hence safety improvements beyond the minimum are available for public inspection in the the safety matter in question. Judicial review of the amended *needed for adequate protection are . Commission's Public Document Room, backfit rule and a related int~rnal NRC . possible. The Commission is empowered .* 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC 20555. 2 . Manuafchapter which partially under section 161 of the Act to*irnpose implemented it was sought and, on additional safety requirements not Response to Comments 'August 4. 1987, the U.S. Court of . needed for adequate protection and to Appeals for the DC Circuit rendered its consider economic costs in doing so. Comments were received from 12 decision vacating both the rule and the The 1985 revision of the backfit rule, utilities, one Federal agency (IJOE), one NRC Manual chapter which which was the subject of the Court's vendor, seven individuals, seven implemented the rule in paPt. UCS v. decision, required, with certain citizens' groups, and two industry . NRC, 824 F.2d 103. The.Court concluded .exceptions., that backfits be _imposed
- groups. Lengthy and detailed comments that the-rule, when considered along only upon a finding that they provided a were-submitted by the Union of with certain statements in the rule . substantial increas~ in the overall Concerned Scientists (UCS) and the preamble published in the Federal . protection of the public health and Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Register, 'ilid not speak unambiguously .safety or the common defense and Group (NUBARG). Both organizations in terms that constrained the security and that the direct and indirect were active in the rulemaking which led Commission from considering economic costs of implementation were justified in to the 1985 revision of the rule. The costs in establishing standards.to ensure view of this increased prptection. The comments submitted by these two adequate protection of the public health amended.rule, set out in this document, groups encompassed most-of.the and safety as dictated by section 182 of restates the exceptions to this comments made by others. Below,.the the Atomic Energy Act. At the same requirement for a finding, so that the Commission paraphrases the chief time, the Court agreed with the rule will clearly be in accord with the comments and responds to them. The Commission that once an adequate level _safety principle stated above. .Commission has given careful of safety protection had been achieved consideration to every comment:The
.under-section 182, 1he Commission was - I In jts Comments On the proposed amendm.entS, original comments,may be viewed.in the fully authorized under section 16li of the
- the Union of Concerned Scientists asserts that*the NRC's Public Document Room in Atomic Energy Act to consider and take Federal-Register notice of !he proposed Washington, bC.
- amendments was technically defective. UCS argues economic costs into account in ordering that si_nce the Court had vacated the entire rule, the further safety improvements. The Court Federal Register notice should have proposed *
- Several commenters argue that the revised therefore rejected the position of * *enactment of an entire, amended, rule, rather than Manual chapter should undergo what amounts to simply amendments to the vacated rule: In weighing notice *and comment rulemaking. However, the petitioners in the case;"Uriion of the technical *merit of UCS' argument. It should be Manual chapter, If it is a rule at alJ, is a rule of Concerned *scientists, that economic. note"d that as of the date of the Federal Register agency organization. procedure. or practice, and costs may never be a factor in safety notice. the mandate of the Court bad not yet issued ther~fore is not subject to the notice and comment decisions under the Atomic Energy Act. end the rule was thus still legally in effect. requirements of the Administrative Procedure AcL However, the more important consideration is that See 5 U.S.C. S53{h){AJ; see also § 553(a){2). The
*Because the Conrt'.s opinion regarding the notice clearly revealed the Commission's Intent Commission did publish for comment an earlier the circumstances in which costs may
- to reissue the backfut rule once It had been version of Manual Chapter {49 FR 16900: April 20, be considered in making safety conformed to the Court's decision. UCS understood 1984), but that version was already in effect when It decisions on nuclear power plants was this intent and took the*opportunity*to renubmit the was published for comment, and it was published
*comments it had nubmitted during the rulemaking for comment only because the Commission was still completely in-accord with the leading up to the 1985 revision of the rule. In any . in the process of making fundamental changes to Commission's own policy views on thii; event. the Commission is publishing the*entire rule *the backfilling process and wanted comment on the important subject, the Commission In this document. *
- procedures then "in effect. See id.
50-SC-33
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION "Adequate Protoctiun ** adequate protection. These view5. imp!1ldent. and certainly notninp iliepil.
The great majority of the commenter~ differing in emphasis. reflect the twu about decisions which ultim.ately turn raised issues about the rule's use of thr f!:-Oups' opposite concerns about the on the application-by duly constituted phrase "adequate proter.tion".'This pcssibil:'.y that the Commission vvoulc authoritv and after full consideration of phrai,e is used in the rule's exceotioP. u~:e the ph~c!SC "adequate pro!eciior," all rf'iev',mt information-of ohrases provisions. See § 50.109[a)l4). Generallv. arbiira~iiy. ucs is Concerned that the v,nid, are not fully defined. Consider. the rule requires. among other things,
- Commission might interpret the. phrase for instance. the "reasonable assurance" that it be shown for a given proposed "adequete protection" to refer to a level determination the Commission must backfit that implementation of the of safety such that every proposed make before issuing an operating backfit would bring about a "substantial improvement would be subjected to license.* Indeed. most of the increa!;e" in overall protection to pubiic cost-benefit analvsis. Converselv. the Commission's rules and regulations are health and safetv. and that the direct industry appears-concerned that the ultimately based on unquantified and. as and indirect costs of the backfit are Commission might interpret the phrase we note below, presently unquantifiable justified by that substantial*increase. "adequate protection" to refer to a level ideas of what constitutes "adequate See § 50.109(a)(3). However, of safety such that no proposed protection".
§ 50.109(a)(4) also requires that these improvement would be subjected to Were there something peculiarly two standards not be applied in three cost-benefit analysis. critical about the role of "adequate situations: The Commission certainly did not protection" in the backfit rule, the issue First, where the backfit is required to intend that this rulemaking should focus of the phrase's meaning could have been bring a facility into compliance with on the meaning of the phrase "adequate raised in the rulemaking for the 1985 NRC requirements or the licensee's own protection". The main point of this rule. Two of the three exception written commitments: rulemaking was simply to negate the provisions set out above were ,*n the Second; where the backfit is misimpression.left by two statements in the preamble to the 1985 version-of the 1985 revision of the rule,-where*they necessary to ensure that the facility backfit rule. UCS puts forward two used the equivalent phrase "undue risk" provides adequate protection to the grounds for its emphasi's on the phrase instead of "adequate protection". Also.
health and safety ofthe public and is in "adequate protection'\ First, UCS as the Court in UCS v. NRC noted, 824 "accord with the .common defense and asserts that w(t)he crucial decision as to F.2d at 119, the statement of security; and whether cost benefit analysis will .be considerations which accompanied the . Third, as noted above, where the used in assessing the need for 1985 version of the rule quite explicitly backfit invoives defining or redefining backfitting is dependent on whether the 11-t least twice limited the sonsideration what level bf protection to the public particular backfilling under of costs in backfilling decisions to
- health and safety or common defense consideration is needed to ensure situations where "adequate protection" and security should be regarded as 5 adequate safety * * * ." Second, UCS was already secured.
adequate. The comments on the rule's use of the claims that the Court "ordered" the Nonetheless, an issue which is a
- phrase "adequate protection" generally Commission to "stop trying to obscure concern of almost every commenter in took two forms, each discussed more its intentions through ambiguous and this rulemaking should not be ignored.
fully later on in this notice. The first *vague language* * * ." *
- Therefore, the Commission will answer form, most fully represented by ucs* . However, as *w:ill .be explained. more as best it can the questions the
- comments, wa,s that the rule itself fully below, 14e. Court's decision turned conimenters have raised concerning the should actµally include a definition of a not on the rule's lack of definition of rule's use of the phrase* "adequate "adequate protection" (the final rule set "adequate protection" but rather on two pi;otection". We begin with UCS'*call for out in this document does not), a phrase statements which seemed to the Court to an objective.and generally applicable nowhere explicitly defined in general imply that the Commission*intended to - definition of "adequate protection~;We terms, either in the Atomic Energy Act, .take cosui"into consideration in argue that such a definition is not from which the phrase comes, or iii the determining what "adequate protection" possible in the near future, buUhat the Commission's regulations. required; the .meaning of "adequate , public :and licensees are nonetheless
- The second, more modest, form of the protection" was simply not an issue in protected against misuse of .the phrase.
comments on **adequate protection", the litigation. Moreover,-UCS In the course of.responding to UCS' . .. most fully represented by NUBARG's overestimateslhe*r.ole the phrase 'Comments; we*shall. of necessity. be**
- comments, was that one or another of "adequate protection" plays in the making at least preliminary. responses to
.. the three exception provisions in the backfit-rule. The threshold decision in most ofNUBARG's comments-also.*.
- rule was redundant (none is). While not considering a proposed backfit, and very ucs argues that the rule permits the amounting to a call for a definition of often the only decision that need be agency to escape its legal responsibility *
"adeq{!ate protection", NUBARG's . made, 3 is not whether adequate comments displayed some of UCS' protection is at stake but rather whether * "' * * {A)n operating.license may.be issued by
- the facility is in compliance with the the Commission ' *
- upon finding that: * * * *
- uncertaintv about what the Commission (t)here is reasonable assurance * *
- that the
. meantby the phrase. Commission's requirements and the activ/ties authorized by. the operating license an be Each group had difficulty applying the licensee's written commitments. conducted without endangering the health.and phrase to characterize.past Commission Even if UCS is right about the safetr df the public* * * .* 10 CFR 50.57(a)(3').
;iction in backfitting. UCS claimed that importance oflhe phrase "adequate * "The consideratioo and weighing of costs
- protection; *th!lre is*nothing unusu.al or contemplated by the ruJe.applieslo backfits 3hat are the Commission had never backfitted in intended lo result in incremental aafety **
order to achieve something beyond improvements for a plant that already. providef an
*"adequate protection." NUBARG,
- For inlltance. a majority of the plant-speclfi*c acceptable degree of protection(,)" 50 FR 38103. col.
however, claimed that the Commission backfits carried out during the first year after the 1: also, "(t)he 'COSls ausociuted with proposed new 1985 re"!ti=: !:'f the beckflt rale became effective safety requirements may be considered by the *- had neverTeqµired e*backfit on the were for the sake of ,eompliance. See SECY-416-46. Commission provided thal the Atomic F.nergy Act grormds that compliance with the Evaluation of Managing Plant-Specific Backfit
- fihding 'no undue risk' can be made." Id. al 38101.
- regulations was not enough to provide Requirements (November 21. 1986), Enclosure 'l. col. 3.
50-SC-34
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION lo urticulaie !he factors on which it emerge as a byproduct of tl,~ coi. 2. l'\ovember 30. 1984, proposed 1985 bases its b<.1c.kfittmg decisions. UCS Commission's efforts, stili in their ear:, rule; see abo 50 FR 38097, 38101. col. 3, a~ser!s that lhe rule shot!ld "enunciate stages. to implement ib gene~al s;;f('t~: September 20. 1985, final 1985 rule: 51 FR cri1e~u.1 a!ld iiuidelines about what goals. which take a nartl-,* quantitat1H 30023. col. 1. August 21, 1986. Policy consti:ules redefi!ling and defining form. (See 51 FR 30028; Aui'.Js! '.!1. 193G. S1a!~1:1cn1 on Safety Goals.)
adeau.ite protection le*,els. what Policy Statement o~ Saiety Goals.) Because "adequate protection" is con;titulcs an adequate as opposed to a However, given the state of ihe art in presumptively assured by compliance beyond adequate protection level, and quantitative safety assessment, it is not with the regulations and other license what factors place a particular reasonable to expect that the requirements, all the versions of the circumstance within the rule or within Commission could make licensing backfit rule-the 1970 rule, the 1985 rule, the ex.ccptions." Another comment decisions-let alone decisions on and the one set out in this document. see asseits that any definition of "adequate whether to consider cost in backfitting- § 50.109[a)[4)(i}-have a "compliance" protection" should include the resolution , wholly on a quantitative definil!on of exception: plants out of compliance may of all outstanding safety issues. Yet "adequate protection". Surprisingly, be backfitted without findings of another calls for ."objective* criteria", some of the commenters who call for "substantial increase" in protection or a
-some real numbers" on releases, "objective_criteri(l", "spme real **justification" of costs.
accident consequences, and the like. numbers; and the like; have in the past There does not exist, and cannot criticized quantitative risk assessments. However-and here is where the lack exist, at least not yet, a generally of a general definition for "adequate Nonetheless, even in the absence cif a protection" poses a challenge-applicable definition of "adequate useful and generally applicable protection'! which would guard against "adequate protection" is only definition of "adequate protection", the presumptively assured by compliance. every possible niisuse of the phrase. Commission can still make sound Congress.established "adequate As the Commission said in promulgating judgments abou_t what "adequate the 1985 revision, the presumption may protection*~ as.the standard the protection" requires, by relying upon
. Commission is to apply in licensing a be overcome by, for instance, new eY,pert-engineering and scientific
- plant, see 42 U.S.C. 2232(a), and gave the . judgment, acting in the light of all information which indicates that *
.Commission authority to issue rules and relevant and material'information. As improvements are needed to ensure regulations necessary for protection of UCS itself s*aid in its comments on the adequate protection. (50 FR 38101, col. . public health and safety, see 42 U.S.C. proposed 1~85 revision of the rule, 3.) Such new information may reveal an
. 2201, but ,Congress did not define "(u)ltimately, the determination of what unforeseen significant hazard or a "adequate protection", nor did it standards must be niet in order to substantially greater potential for a
- command the Commission* to define it. provide-a reasonable assurance that the known one, or insufficient margins and
- Such a definition would have to take public health and safety will be backup capability. Engineering judgment one of two forms, one of them incapable protected comes down to the reasoned may, in the light of such information, of preventing the abuses the professional judgment of the responsible . conclude that restoration of the level of commenters are concerned about, and official." *
- protection presumed by.the regulations the other simply not possible*yet. The The Commis.sion's exe.rcise of this *requires more than co~pliance. Thus both the 1985 revision and the revision first of these would be a verbal
- judgment will take two familiar forms, definition of the kind encountered in, for of which the most important is rule and below: contain exemptions for backfits instance, the various "reasonabie man" .. regulation; An essential point of the necessary to assure "adequate standards in the common law. After -the Commissio.n's Jiaving regulations is to protection", or, *as the 1985 rule pattern of fhese, the Commission could flesh out the adequate protection" equivalently said, "no undue risk". See say, correctly, that "adequate § 50.109(a)(4)(ii) of the rule. set otit in this standard entrusted to the Commission protection" is not zero risk. that it is* the .
- by Congress. See UCS v:NRC, 824 F.2d document. **
same as "no undue risk", that it has at 117-18.:Exercising engineering and
- If compliance does not assure long-term and s~ort-terin aspects, arid scientific judgme~t in the light of all . adequate prote_c;_tion, the Commission -.
that it is that level of safety. which the relevant and material information, the must be able to determine how much: Atomic Energy Act requires for initial NRC identifies potential h~zards and more protection is required, and a
,and continued operation of a nuclear then requires that designs be able to precise and generally applicable .
power plant.l-iowever, such a *definition cope with.such.hazards with sufficient definition of "adequate _protection" clearly will not, ofitself, prevent *the safety*margiAS and reliable backup would facilitate tl1at.determination. But
.abuses UCSandNUBARG"iire: * .. O'i1ysteIIis ..-Regulations and guidance such a definition would have only a concerned about, nor is such *a standard arrived atin this way do not, sirictly limited role to play. The first and most suffici.ently, heipful_to the NRC staff in . speaking, define" adequate protection, crucial .question is *wh_ether the proposed actual practice ... since there will be times when the NRC
- backfit is required to bring a plant into Thus:ifthere is to be a useful arid issues rules which-require something .
- compliance. Only if the* proposed backfit generally applicable definition of beyond adeqiiate*protection. requires more.than compliance with
*"adequate protection.;it must fake .Nonetheless,-compliance with such NRC regulations and license conditions another, more precise form, namely,* *regulations and guidance may be a need there be determination as to quantitative. Several of the commenters presumed to assure-adequate protection what ..adequate protection" requires.
seem to have such 8 definition in mind at a minimum, As the Commission has . Given this relation between compliance when they call for "objective criteria", said on many. occasions, compliance and "adequate protection", the industry some "real numbers", and the like. In - with the Commission's *regulations and might be more concerned than UCS is fact, the Commission is actively . guidance "should provide a leve1 of
- about the lack of a general definition of "pursuing reliable quantitative measures safety sufficient for adequate protection "adequate protection", for UCS will at of safety, and some quantitative end * *
- of the public.health and safety and
- least have the comfort of knowing that generally applicable definition of
- common defense and security under the compliance will be secured before cost "adequate-protection" may eventually Atomic Energy Act." (49 FR 47034, 47036, is considered, but the industry cannot be 50-SC-35
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION sure !ioV\' m*;Jct' 1;1::~e thu!"i :umpliunce Not~;:ig in the Court's rulin:; ir. UCS \. tc: **ar!eq:;ate protec!!cn**. UCS L:~lc!:~
may uc asked c;J 1\ uesr.:le lhe cost. r,RC forbids the Commission's approach asserts that the prepused rult Where, as in the cases contemplated "completely fail[ed] lo co:nport with the l,y the second exc.:eption provision of the However. the fact,- of th*e situatiuns -...*..-ert no! orders and directions of the Court of rulc. mun: than cc,I:1pl1crnce is required what UCS alieges 11,em lo have been: indeed the Appeals in UCS v. NRC, that the Court and amrntilatin criteria do not define Lac.kfit rule was not invoJv(:d. Letters were sen~ on "could no! have been more ciear about "udPquc1te r~o!ectioP.". the agency mus\ April 23. 1986 requirm~ the licensees to submi! the defects of the backfit rule", that the fall back on the second familiar form in witl,m Z:J days information which would _"enable proposed revised rule "suffers from the the Commission to determine whether or not (their) which engineering judgment is exercised license(s) should be modified." Such information exact same defects" as the one vacated, by the Commission, namely. case-by- included information on design, operational history. that. inaeed, "the new proposal is even case. Administrative agencies are not schedules for inspection, 'plans for operator training. more devoid of objective guidance or required to proceed by rule alone. for and "'any analysis performed subsequent to those criteria * *
- than*was its predecessor."
. the method of .. ase-by-case judgment is done for the FSAR (Final Sufety Analysis Repo,t) which would address the consequences of a locked UCS' criticisms are based on part of a quite capc:ble of meeting the rotor or broken shaft event during plant operation." single paragraph in the Court's decision. requirement that the factors.on which These letters were sent undP.r the first part of 10 ln pertinent part, that.paragraph says, administratke decisions are based be CFR 50.54(1): This part authorizes such information *.... *
- In our view, the backfitting rule articulated. Rather than proceeding by requests without consideration of cost. As an earlier is an exemplar of ambiguity and an*almost ministerial application of draft of the April 23 letter available in the NRC's vagueness; indeed, we suspect that-the Public Docwnent Room shows. the NRC had "objective criteria", the Commission planned to ask for new analyses under a later part Commission designed the rule lo must fashion a series of case-by-case of § 50.54(1) which authorizes requests not required achieve this very result. The rule does judgments into a well-reasoned and to assure adequate.protection if "the burden-to be not explicate the scope or meaning of factually well-supported body of imposed * * * -is justified in view of the potential the three listed 'exceptions'. The rule decisions which, acting as reasoned safety significance of_the issue to be addressed in does not explain the action the precedent;-can control and guide the the rcquesteil information:'" 10 CFR 50.54[1). (This "safety significance'" standard, by its emphasis on Commission will (in italics) take when a Commission's exercise of the discretion "potential'", requires less than is required by the backfit falls within one of-these
*granted it by Congress in precisely the "[actural) substantial increase" stiindard in the exceptions. In short, the rule does not: ,vay in which common-law precedents backlit rule ,µid olso avoids the circularity UCS speak in terms that constrain the eontrol and guide the common law alleges.] However, the staff sensibly opted for first Commission from operating *outside the judge's exercise of his or her judgment. . asking whether iiuch*analyses had already been.
done. In fact they bad, *or were underway when "the bounds of the statutory scltetne;" 824
- See Nader v. Ray, 363 F.Supp.-946, 954- letters -were sent. The backfit rule played no part . F.Zd al 119. .
55 (D.D.C, 1973) (determining what here.
- UCS says that this portion of a constitutes adequate protection calls for ucs* second instance of alleged abuse involves paragraph was an "order'.! by: the Court exercise of discretion in a judgmental the Mark I containment, about whose performance to get the Commission to "stop !J"Ying to process very different from acting in in beyond-design-basis accidents [ones which obscure its intentions through accord with a clear, non-discretionary involve damage to the reactor cor~) there is
- substantial uncertainty. UCS asserts that cost ambiguous and vague language * * * ."
legal duty).
- Whether-the Court's laniuage amounts considerations have blocked staff action which The Commission foresaw the-need to would have brdught about a significant reduction in to an '-'order" or cinly strong advice, we proceed case-by-case on.occasion and some of the figures which estimate the prob&bility have followed it. For one thing, the rule*
therefore made *it a principal aim of the that the i,;fark I would foil in*certain kinds of explicitly says that backfits fallii;ig
- backfit rule to centralize the beyond-design-basis accidents. UCS adds in passing that those-figures represent undue risk. The NRC within the exceptions will be imposed
-responsibility and document the bases (inexplicably, UCS asserts that*the staff has already made a formal reply to similar fQr case-by,:case decisions for such charges of undue risk. See. e.g ..-Boston Edison Co. proposed rule did not have this decisions. The Commission thereby [Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station). Interim provision). See § 50.109(al{4). For hoped to better assure that such
- Director's Decision under 10 CFR Z.206, DD-87-14, another, bath in :what we haye already
- decisions as might of necessity be case- . 26 NRC'87; 9&;-106 [1987). Suffice it-here to say that- said, and in what_ we shall be saying in by-case. would form *a reasoned and. the NRC staff ha!*by no means _completed its
.. considerations of the Mark I.containment; but that, response to.N(JBARG's.commerits _on coherent body. * .: 6 given present information; the- staff has concluded the exceptions provisions, we shall .have that overall severe-lfccidenf risks at plants with - - explicated the scope imd meaning of the * *
- UCS alleges that fn three instances the Mark I coniainments are riot undue: Id. iii iD4--1Jl6. three listed exceptions. * *
.Commission has abused its discretion by applying UCS is content_10* put fonrard only unsupported cost *considerations in specific cases where assertions to the contrary*.Thus the staff may . 'However; we have-not taken the licensees are in compliance but adequate proteciion legitimately consider cost when deciding whether to quoted language of the Court fo mean is at stake. Howev~r. UCS is misinformed about the . backfit the_Mark_l con)ai_l).lllents. . , . that, after years of making rules and firsi of the three cases, arid its allegations about the ucs* third_ allegation of abuse rllhearses part of adjudicating cases 'which ultimately ..
- other two. redu*ce simple to disagreement over what its February 10, 1987_ § 2.206 Petiiion to the constitu!es adequate protection. We briefly discuss depend on the Commission's-judgment Commission for immediate' action to relieve the three cases below.* aliegedly undue risks posed by nude'~r pow~r
- about what "adequate protection" Citi~g ltade journal articles which quote unnamed *plants designed by the.Babcock &-Wilcox Company.- requires; the-Commission should *be NRC sources. UCS claims that the backfit rule The NRC's Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation obliged to give a mechanically.
- caused-the NRC staff to change its mind about requiring two licensees to conduct certain
-responded fully to the Petition. den~ing it. on applicable definition of "adequate
*October 19, 19B7 [UCS' COJ!lments on !he propo&etl - protection" in order to avoid using the inspections and analyses in orrler to justify * .
backlit rule Were submitted ori Octobe*r 13). See continued operations. The two plants in question Director's Decision Under 10 cm* 2.206. DD-87-1B, time-honored method of case-by-case, _- had reactor pump coolant shafts similar to ones which elsewhere had shown a high probability of
- 26 NRC-{October 19, 1987). The Director concluded . precedenhguided,. judgment to
. shearing off under certain condiiions. ucs asserts tha! "there are-no substantial*health*and safety
- implement only a part of the l:iackfit ,
that "lw)e * * *. learn from this example the issues that would warrant the suspension or rule. Ce~tainly, the Court never even
'inherent lack of logic and circularity embedded in revocation of any. license or permit.for such - noted a lack.of a general definition* of the rule: l'IRC is prevented, by.operation of the rule, facilities:" Slip _Opinion at 63. Simply because UCS frum asking questions needed to learn the degree of disagrees with such conclusions does not mean that "adequate pmtection" *in the rule, let risk of a known equipment problem- beca,;se 11,ey do the Commission is misusing° the "adequate
- alone "ordered"- the ,Commission to not know the an*wers in advance."_ . protectjon~- standard. provide such a definition.
- 50-SC-36
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION ucs* position laci-;s all sense of and '"costs justified"' standards will not Retaining§ 50.109(2!!~:iiii wi!! r;J1 proport,un. We must emphasize the core apply to backfits necessary lo provide give the Commission the power to of the Cour!"s decision, rafrier than get adequate protection to public health and proclaim at will that compliance is not bogg~d 001\*n by !ransformini a safety. NUB.-\RG calls this provision enough. As we said in the statement of suspi::ion a!lO a few criticisms of the redundant to the exception for backfits considerations accompanying the 1965 rule inio an order to undertake an required for the sake of co;noliance. rule. and have in part reiterated in the unpreceuen,ed task oi defini!ion. § 50.109lal(4J(i). As 'was noted abo\'e, resoonse to UCS' comments, the Reviewing the exceptions in the rule, l\'UBARG reports that its research has re~lations, though they do not define and various statements in the Federal uncovered no case in which the "adequate protection.., *are presumed lo Register notice accompanying the rule. Commission "has recognized that some ensure it, .and, in the absence of a the Court said, "We conceivably could additional measures not contained in redefinition of '.'adequate protection",
read the terms of this rule to comply existing requirements are necessary to that presumption can be overcome only with the statutory scheme we have ensure that a facility continues to meet by significant new information or some described above {that is, a scheme in the current level of adequacy." Two showing that the regulations do not which economic costs can play no part other commenters believe that U1e address some significant safety issue.
- in establishing what adequate protection exception.pr{)vision added because of "(l)t may be presumed that the current requires)." Id. Moreover, the Court says the litigation, § 50.109(a)(4)(iii), should body of NRC safety regulations provides this despite the lack of any summary, be deleted, as being redundant to the adequate protection. Where new general. "objective" definition of provision NUBARG would like to see information indicates that improvements "adequate protection" in the rule. deleted. are needed to ensure there is 'no undue But the Cow't'then went on to say, No matter which of the two provisions risk' on * *
- a * *
- basis which the "Statements that the Commission has the commenter would like to see Commission believes to be the minimum made in promulgating the rule and in deleted, the commenter would like some necessary, such requirements must be
- defending it before this court. however, restrictions placed on the use oi the imposed." (50 FR at 38101-102.)
disincline us from interpreting the rule in ~remaining one. The restriction by far the
- Second, the exception provision for this fashion." Id, Again, it is not the lack most frequently proposed is that no backfits which *BI'e necessary under a of a definition*of adequate protection action may be taken under the defining or redefining of"adequate that disinclined-the Court from saving remaining exception provision in the protection",§ 50.109{a)(4)(iii}, must be the rule, but rather certain statements absence of "significant new inform!ltion retained because it must be made clear the Commission had made which or the occurrence of an event which _that, as the Court held, cost may riot be seemed to suggest that the Commission clearly shows" that the actiori is a factor in setting the level of protection might consider economic cost when necessary.
- judged as "adequate".7 As NUBARG -
deciding what adequate protection acknowledges, citing Power Reactor required. In sum, these commenters either Development Co. v. International, Union reopen an issue settled in 1985 or they of Electrical, Radio and Machine The Three Exceptions recommend deleting that part of the rule Workers, AFL-CI0,..367 U.S. 396,408 Echoing the Court's remark that the which directly responds to the Court's {1961), the Commission has both the rule "does not explicate the scope or ruling. We take neither course, for, even power to define ~adequate pmtectionN, meaning of the three .listed putting the 1985 rule and the Court's arid the power to re-define-it.8 Without
'exceptions' ", id., NUBARG "believes ruling aside, if either of the two this last exception provision, it might that there is e substantiatamountof provisions were to be deleted, an appear from the rule either that the overlap in these exceptions and that . essential power of the Commission Commission had no such power or that they have not been adequately defined would be remain unimplemented. it was restricted by cost considerations, or explained in the proposed rule." First, the exception for backfits contrary to the Conrt_'_s_ruling. Nor
- NUBARG and others representing the necessary to secure adequate protection, should this exception provision be
. industry are concerned that the two § 50.109{a}(4){ii),must be retained, limited to situations involving exception provisions which use the because :it must be made clear that . "signific,ant new information,'.' as phrase "adequate protection., Commission action is.not to be proposrci in several comments.
§§ 50.109(a)(4){ii).and (iii), may obstructed by cost considerations' in a This la.st exception. may be thought by "swallow" the.rule. One industry situation where compliance has.indeed some to threaten to swallow the*backfit commenter objects to the notion. implied proved to be insufficient tosecure the rule. We believe; however, that by§ 50.109(a)(4)(ii). that adequate level of protection presumed .in the rule,
- instances ofbaclcfits based on.a.
protection might require more than *order, or commitment in question.. ' "redefinition" of "adequate protection" compliance. Another iii concerned that Despit~ the results of NUBARG's will be rare. Moreover, the case-by-case
§ "5o.109[a)(4){iHJ, the exception which research, such situations have arisen. approach which is required in the has been added in response to the See, e:g., SECY~346. "Evaluation of*
- Court's ruling, might lead to . Managing Plant-Specific Backfit redefinitions of "adequate protection" ' Requirements", November 21, 1986.
- As the rule notes in I 50.109(e){7), cos! may
. nonetheless be a conlriderstion in clloosing the that .would threaten Joss of licenses. Accordingly, this exception provision is means of achieving *adequate protection".
To avoid these results, NUBARG and riot redundant to the exception for , The words udefinlng or Tedcfuring" in this third
'othersl"ecommend deleting one of the backfits necessary to restore exception 11hould not be constrned nece9Sarily to mean "providing Ii nseful and iienerally applicable two exception provisions which use the -* *compliance. Neither is it redundant to *ilefmition~. al leaat not until socb a definition phrase "adequate protection".* ... the ~xception for backfits involving the becomes possible. Under present conditions. !he NUBARG's clioiceis § 50.l09{a)(4l{ii),
- defining or redefining of "adequate Commi1!sion wiH have ~defined or redefined what retained from the 1985 version of the protection", for,the latter exception ... level of protection ill*to beyeganlcd as adequate* if
* ~t makes a judgment thaL mthough compliance . -
rule, where.it.used the equivalent -* assumes some changejn the NRC's assures the le,rel of protection that. had been.
- phrase, "no undue risk". This section .
- judgment _of what level of protection . thought of 11s adequate. that level of protectimi provides that the "substantial increase"* - should be regarded as *~dequate". should no longer be considered adequate.
50-SC-37
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION absence of a general ddini1ion of thnt since rules "define" "c:dequatt*
adequate protection" provides . protection", the Commission cannu! The revision to 10 CFR 50.109 will licensees-and the public-a large apply the rule's "substantial incn:,!sc*" measure of protecllon from arbitrarv bring it into conformance with the nnd "cost justified" standards ir: holding in Union of Concerned action by thE: Commission. Citing c~se rulemaking without applyin~ cos! law. NUBARG says thal. in applying H1is considerations in setting the standa:c_; c*i Scientists. et al.. i.*. U.S. Nuclear las! exception provision. the Regulator~* Commission. D.C. Cir. Nos. adequate protection, contrary to the 85-1757 and 86-1219 (August 4. 19B7). Commission "must act rationally and Court's holding. consistently in light of available The revision clarifies the backfit rule to The answer to this comment is, of reflect NRC practice that in determining evidence", and "must apply a reasoned course, .that the rules do not, strictly whether to adopt a backfit requirement. analysis indicating the prior policies and standards are being changed, not speaking, "defi~" "adequate economic costs will be considered only casually ignored * * *."We wholly protection", and they only when addressing those backfits agree, and believe that the approach presumptively assure it. Not only may involving safety requirements beyond envisioned by the backfit.rule will there, as stated above, be individual those needed to ensure the adequate facilitate the Commission's acting cases that require actions that go protection of public health and safety. accordingly. _beyond what is necessary under the Such costs are not considered when regulations to assure adequate establishing the adequate protection of Other Matters protection, .there will also be times.when public health and safety. This revised Two other comments bearing on the the l\o'RC issues a rule which requires rule does not have a significant impact phrase .adequate protection" require an something b~yona adequate protection. on State and local governments and explicit response. First, several This follows directly from the geographical regions, public health and commenters from the industry would Commission's power under section 161 safety, or the environment; nor does it prefer that the rule state that the of the Atomic Energy Act, affirmed by
- represent substantial costs to licensees, "documented evaluation" which the .the Court, to issue rules or orders to the NRC, or other Federal -agencies. This NRC must prepare in connection with "minimize danger to life or property." constitutes the regulatory analysis for any action under one of the exception See 42 U.S.C. 2201; see also USC v. NRC, this rule.
- provisions, see § 50.109[a)(4), should 824 F.2d at 118. If a proposed rule Regulatory.Flexibility Act Certification include consideration of as many of the requires something more than adequate .
factors which§ 50.109(c) requires of a protection, applying a cost standard to Jn accordance with the Regulatory . "backfi.t analysis'\ as are appropriate. the proposed rule will not be introducing. Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b),
- The suggested modification of the rule cost considerations int.o the setting of
- the .Commission hereby certifies that
- would have only limited utility. Few of this final rule, if promulgated, will not the factors listed in§ 50.i09(c) of the the adequate protection standard and is .
therefore permitted. Of course if the rule have a significant economic impact on a rule are appropriate for consideration in substantial number of small entities. The a documented evaluation justifying is directed at either establishing what affected facilities are licensed under the action under the compliance e*xceptiori
- level of protection is "adequate" or provisions of 10 CFR e0.21(b) and 10 in the rule. It is true that several of the assuring that such a level of protection Cffl 50.22. The companies that own factors in § 50.109(c), indeed, all:of.them is mel, then cost* will play no role. these facilities do not fall within the but those in paragraphs (c) (5) and (7)
- The bat:kfit rule as set out below is scope of "small entities"as set forth in and some of those in paragraph (c)(8) substantially the same as the rule
- the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the
. are approprill.te for considimition under . proposed in.the Federal Register. (See 52 Small ijusiness Size Standards set forth . th~ "adequate protectiori" exception, to FR 34223; i,eptember 10, 1987.)
- in regulations issued by the Small*
the extent that they require a showing of_ Provisions' which appeared at the end of Business Administration in 13 CFR*Part _exactly what the licensees must do.and § 50.109(a)(4) of the proposed rule, or in 121. l} showing th~t the backfit-in question the footnote to that paragraph, appear actually contributes to.safety; However, below in new paragraphs (a) (5) through Backfit Analysis the Commission believes that the.rule's (7). .
- The NRC has determined that a requirement that the documented . backfit analysis is* not required for this .
evaluation *~include a statement'of the En'rironmental Impact: Categm:ical
- Exclitsion rule because it does not impose objectives of and reasons .for the .. , .. requirements on 10 CFR Part 50
. modification and the basis {or invoking The NRC'has det~rmined that this licensees.
the exception" adequately~.i.ssures that final rule is the type of action described the fact_ors in § 50.109( c) 'r'{m be -
'in*categorical exclusion 10 GfR List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 considered to the extent relevant, witlrourtheir being listed and labeied as 51.22(c)(3).Therefore, neither an Antitrust, Classified information, Fire if they were a part of a § 50.109( c) environmental impact statement nor an prevention, Incorporation by reference, analysis. Thus, little; if anything, is to be environmental assessment has been Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear gained.by an explicit requirement that prepared for this final rule. power plants and reactors, Penalty, * § 50.109(c) factors be considered in a Radiation protection, Reactor siting Paperwork Reduction Act.Statement criteria, Reporting and Recordkeeping *documented evaluation.
Second, one citizens' group asserts *
- This*final rule does not contain a new requirements. . .. .
*that the backfit _rule should not apply _to or amended information c*onection
- Fo~ ihe reasons set out in the
- ruleniaking. This issue was thoroughly
- requirement subject to the Paperwork preamble and under the authority *of the discussed in 1985. However, this group's -Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
.comment puts the issue in a slightly -seq.). Existing requirements were the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, alteredlight,. and provides another approved by the Office of Management as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553,
- opportunity to clarify the meaning .of and Budget; Approval Number 3140- the NRC is adopting the following "adequate protection". The-group argues 0011. . . *amendments. to 10 CFR Part 50.
50-SC-38
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION EFFECTIVE DATE: July 21, 1988. In 1975, the results of the Reactor FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Safety Study (WASH-1400) 1 showed Aleck Serkiz, Division of Reactor and that station blackout could be an Plant Systems, Office *of Nuclear important contributor to the total risk Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear from nuclear power plant accidents. Regulatory Commission, Washington, Although this total risk was found to be DC 2.ll555, Telephone: (301) 492-3555. smell and not undue, the relative SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: importance of the station blackout accident was established. Subsequently, Background the Commission designated the issue of The alternating current (ac) electric station blackout es an Unresolved power for essential and nonessential Safety Issue (USI); a Task Action Plan service in a nuclear power plant is (TAP A-44) was issued in July 1980, and supplied primarily by offsite power. studies were initiated to determine Redundant onsite emergency ac power whether additional safety requirements systems are also provided in the event were needed Factors considered in the that all offsite power sources are lost. analysis of risk from station blackout These systems provide power for included: [1) The likelihood and duration various safety functions, including of the loss of offsite power; (Z) the
. reactor core decay heat removal and reliability of the onsite ac power system; containment heat removal, which are and [3) the potential for severe accident essential for preserving the i~tegrity of sequences after a loss of all ac power, the reactor core and the containment including consideration of the capability building, respectively. The reactor core to remove core decay heat without ac decay heat can also be removed for a power for a limited time period limited time period by safety systems The technical findings of the staff's that are independent of ac power. studies of the station blackout issue are The term "station blackout" means presented in NUREG-1032, "Evaluation the loss of offsite ac power to the of Station Blackout Accidents at Nuclear essential and nonessential electrical Power Plants, Technical Findings buses concmrent with turbine trip and Related to Unresolved Safety Issue A-the unavailability of the redundant 44." Additional information is provided onsite emergency ac power systems in supporting contractor reports:
[e.g., as a result of units out for service NUREG/CR-3226, "Station Blackout of maintenance or repair, failure to start. Accident Analyses," published in May on demand, or failure to continue to run 1983; NUREG/CR-2989, "Reliability of after start). Ha station blackout persists Emergency AC Power Systems et for a time beyond the capability of the Nuclear Power Plants," published in July ac-independent systems to remove 1983; NUREG/CR-3992, "Collection and decay heat. core melt and containment Evaluation of Complete and Partial failure could result. Losses of Offsite Power at Nuclear The Commission's existing regulations* Power Plants," published in February establish requirements for the design 1985; and NUREG/CR-4347, "Emergency and testing of onsite and offsite electric Diesel Generator Operating Experience,
- 53 FR 23203 power systems that are intended to 1981-1983," published in December 1985.
Published 6/21/88 reduce the probability of losing all ac The major resulta of these studies ere Effective 7 /21 /88 given below. power to an acceptable level. (See General Design Criteria 17 and 18, 10
- Losses of offsite power can be 10 CFR Part SO .characterized as those resulting from CFR Part 50, Appendix A.) The existing regulations do not require explicitly that plant-centered faults, utility grid Station Blackout blackout, and severe-weather-induced nuclear power plants be designed to AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory assure that core cooling can be failures of offsite power sources. Based Commission.. maintained for any specified period of on operating experience, the frequency ACTION: Final rule. loss of all ac power. of total losses of offsite power in As operating experience has operating nuclear power plants was
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory accumulated, the concern has arisen found to be ebout one per 10 site-years.
Commission is amending its regulations that the reliability of both the onsite and The median restoration time was about to require that light-water-cooled offsite emergency ac power systems one-half hour, and 90 percent of the nuclear power plants be capable of might be less than originally anticipated, offsite power losses were restored
- withstanding a total loss of alternating even for designs that meet the within approximately 3 hours [NUREG/
current [ac) electric power [called requirements of General Design Criteria CR-3992).
"station blackout") for a specified 17 and 18. Many operating plants have
- The review of a number of duration and maintaining reactor core experienced a total loss of offsite power, representative designs of onsite cooling during that period. This and more occurrences can be expected emergency ec power systems has requirement is based on information in the future. Also, operating experience
- developed under the Commission's with onsite emergency power systems 1 Copies of ell NRC documents ere available for study of Unresolved Safety Issue A-44, has included many instances when public inspection end copying fore Fee al the NRC "Station Blackout." The amendment is diesel generators failed to start. In a few Public Document Room at 1717 H Street. NW.,
Washington. DC 20555. Copiea or published intended to provide further assurance cases, there has been a complete loss of documenla may alao be purchaaed through the U.S. t~at a loss of both offsite power and both the offsite and the onsite ac power Government Printing Office by calling (202) 275-onsite emergency ac power systems will systems. During these events, ec power 2060 or by writing to the Superintendent of not adversely affect the public health
- was restored in a short time without any Documenta, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O.
Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082. and safety. serious consequences. 50-SC-39
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION indicated a variety of potentially design and operational characteristics, acceptable period of time), and to have important failure causes. However, no plus site-dependent factors (such as procedures and training to cope with single improvement was identified that anticipated weather. conditions) such an event. Licensees may use an could result in a significant introduce a level of variability which alternate ac power source if that source improvement in overall diesel generator warrants a need foi; plant-specific meets specific criteria for independence*
reliability. Data obtained from operating coping analyses to provide greater and capacity and can be shown to be experience in the period from 1976 to assurance .that core cooling can be available within one hour to cope with *a 1980 showed that the typical individual maintained until ac power is restored. station blackout. A coping analysis is emergency diesel generator failure rate Thus the Commission believes that not required for those plants that choose was about 2.5 x 10* 2 per demand (i.e., § 50.63 of 10 CFR Part 50 will bring this alternate ac approach if the one chance of failure in 40 demands), about a significant increase in alternate ac can be demonstrated by and that the emergency ac power protection to the public health and test to be available to power the
- system unavailability for a plant which safety. As a result of station blackout shutdown buses* within 10 minutes of the has two emergency diesel generators, . coping analyses, improved guidance will onset of station blackout. Use- of,an one of which was required for decay be provided to licensees regarding alternative ac source, one that
- heat removal, was about 2 x 10* 3 per maintaining minimum emergency diesel minimizes common mode failure, is a demand (NUREG/CR-2989). generator reliability to minimize the preferred option since this approach will
- Compared to the data in NUREG/ probability of losing all ac power. In also- benefit other safey concerns.
CR-2989, updated estimates of addition, the Commission is amending On the basis of station blackout emergency diesel generator failure rates its regualtions by adding a new§ 50.63 studies conducted for USI A-44 and Indicated that diesel generator to require that all nuclear power plants presented in tl1e reports referenced reliability has improved somewhat from be capable of coping with a station above, the NRC staff has developed 1978 to 1983. For the period 1981 to 1983, blackout for some specified period of Regulatory Guide 1.155 entitled "Station the mean failure rate for all demands time. The period of time for a specific Blackout," which presents guidance on was about 2.0 x 10* 1 per demand (i.e., plant will be determined based on a (1) maintaining a high level of reliability one chance of failure in 50 demands). comparison of the individual plant"s for emergency diesel generators, (2) However; the date also indicate that the design with factors that have been developing procedures and training to probability of diesel generator failures identified as the main contributions to restore offsite and onsite emergency ~c during actual demands (I.e., during risk of core damage resulting from power should either one or both become losses of offsite power) is greater than station blackout unavailable, and (3) selecting a plant-that during surveillance tests (NUREG/ These factors, which vary specific acceptable station blackout CR-4347). . significantly from plant to plant because duration which the plant would be .
- Given the occurrence of a station of considerable differences in design of capable of surviving without core blackout, the likelihood of resultant core plant electric power systems as well as damage. Application of the methods in damage or core melt is dependent on the site-specific considerations, include: (1) this guide would result in selection of an reliability and capability of decay heat Redundancy of onsite emergency ac removal systems that are not dependent power sources (i.e., number of sources acceptable station blackout duration (e.g., 2, 4, 8, or 16 hours) which depended on ac power. If sufficient ac- minus the number needed for decay heat independent capability exists; removal), (2) reliability of onsite on the specific plant design and site-additional time will be available to emergency ac power sources (usually related characteristics acceptable to the restore ac power needed for long-term
- diesel generators), (3) frequency of loss staff. However, applicants and licensees cpoling (NUREG/CR-3226). of offsite power, and (4) probable time could propose alternative methods to
- It was determined by reviewing to restore offsite power. The frequency those specified in the regulatory guide in design. operational and site-dependent of loss of, and time to restore, offsite order to justify other acceptable factors that the expected frequency of power are related to grid and durations for station blackout core damage resulting from station switchyard reliabilities, historical capability. Additionally, the regulatory blackout events could be maintained weather data for severe storms, and the guide on station blackout presents near 10** per reactor-year with readily availability of nearby alternate power guidance on quality assurance and achievable diesel generator reliabilities, sources (e.g .. gas turbines). Experience specifications for alternate ac source(s) provided that plants are designed to has shown that long duration offsite and non-safety-related equipment cope with station blackout for a
- power outages are caused primarily by required for coping with station specified duration. The duration for a severe storms (hurricanes, ice, snow, blackout. The equipment Installed to specific plant is based on a* comparison etc.). meet the station blackout rule must be of the plant's characteristics to those The objective of the rule is to reduce implemented so that it does not degrade factors that have been identified as the the risk of severe accidents resulting the existing safety-related systems. This main.contributors to risk from station from station blackout by maintaining
- is. to be accomplished by making the
- blackout (NUREG-1032). highly reliable ac electric power systems non-safety-related equipment .
The stafrs technical findings show and, as additional defense-in-depth, independent to the extent practicable that station blackout does not pose an
- assuring that plants can cope with a from existing safety-related systems.
undue risk to public health and safety.
- station blackout for some period of time.
- The guidance provided In the regulatory The findings summarized above show
- The rule requires all plants to be able to guide illustrates the specifications that that recovery from loss of offsite power cope with a station blackout for a*
- the staff would find acceptable for non-occurs for the most part in less than 4
- specified acceptable duration selected safety systems and equipment. The hours, emergency diesel generator on a plant-specific basis. All licensees quality assurance guidance for the non-reliability is high (i.e.,;..0.95), and that **
- and applicants are required to assess safety-related equipment for which there given a station blackout the likelihood the capability of their plants to cope are no existing NRC quality assurance of core damage is more dependent _on with a station blackout (i.e., determine requirements (e.g., Appendix B.
decay heat removal systems that are that the plant can maintain core cooling Appendix R) embody the following non-ac-dependenL However, plant with ac power unavailable for an e'.ements: (1) Design control and 50-SC-40
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION procurement document control, (2) be viewed as being in the same accident would resolve this issue without instructions, procedures and drawings, prevention context as the ATWS.rule rulemaking. Thirty-nine of the industry (3) control of purchased material, ( § 50.62) and the fire protection rule letters supported NUMARC's submittal.
equipment and services, (4) inspection, (§ 50.48) in that it r.ecogniz.es, es the NUMARC proposed a fifth initiative (see (5) test end test control, (6) inspection, other two rules recognize, multiple iteni 21) by letter dated October 6, 1987, test and operating status, (7) non- failure possibilities resulting from On the other hand, the Union of conforming items, (8) corrective action, common cause effects that should be Concerned Scientists, the Illinois (9) records, (10) audits. NRC inspections addressed. This concern has been Department of Nuclear Safety, and the will focus on the implementation and recognized in the Introduction to
- citizens group supported the the effectiveness of these quality Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50. Commission's objective in the proposed controls as described in the regulatory Proposed Rule rule, but did not believe the rule end guide. guidance associated with the rule went Based on the rule end regulatory On March 21, 1986, the Commission for enough to reduce the possibility of a guide, those plants with an already low published a proposed rule In the Federal serious accident that could be initiated risk from station blackout would be Register (51 FR 9829) that would require by a total loss of ec power.
required to withstand a station blackout (1) light-water-cooled nuclear power Every letter was reviewed and for a relatively short period of time and plants to be capable of coping with a considered by the staff in formulating probably would need few, it any, station blackout for a specified duration, the final resolution of USI A-44. Because modifications as a result of the rule. end (2) licensees to determine the of the large number of comments, it was Plants with currently higher risk from maximum duration for which their not practical to prepare formal station blackout would be required to plants as currently designed are able to responses to each one separately. withstand somewhat longer duration cope with a station blackout. A 90-dey However, since many comments were blackouts. Depending on their existing comment period expired on June 19, on similar subjects, the discussion and 1986. capability, these plants might need to On April 3, 1986 (13 days after the response to the comments have been make hardware modifications (such as proposed rule was published), the NRC grouped into the following subjects: 3 increasing station battery capacity or published in the Federal Register (51 FR 1. Quality classification of modifications.
- condensate storage tank capacity) in 11494) a notice of availability and z. Whether the backfit analysis adequately order to cope with the longer station request for comments on a draft Implements the Backfit Rule. *,
blackout duration. The rule requires that regulatory guide entitled "Station 3. Cost-benefit and whether § 50.63.meets each light-water-cooled nuclear power "substantial increase in the overall protection Blackout" (Task SI 501-4). This draft of the public health and safety". plant licensed to operate must be able to guide provided guidance for licensees to withstand for a specified- duration and 4. Whether NRC should require substantial comply with the proposed station improvements in safety that go beyond those recover from a station blackout. The rule blackout rule. Many letters commenting requires each plant to perform a coping proposed in this rulemaking. on the proposed rule also included 5. The need for generic rulemaking. analysis end identify the coping comments on the draft regulatory guide. 6. Applicability of the proposed I 50.83 to duration, along with the basis therefor Responses to these comments provided specific plants. and a description of procedures below address the public comments on
- 7. Plant-specific features and capabilities.
established for coping end recovery. If the draft guide as well as on the 8. The source term used to estimate modifications to equipment or plant proposed rule. consequences. procedures are necessary, these are to 9. Specificity on the extent of required be identified and a schedule provided Comments on* the Proposed Rule coping studies. . *
- for implementing such changes. 10. Acceptable duration for coping with a**
The Commission receives 53 letters station blackout. It should be noted, based on all
- commenting on the proposed rule. 2 11. Credit for alternate or diverse ec power evidence that staff has on hand, that no Forty-five of these were froitrthe sources. .
undue risk exists with, or without, the nuclear industry, comprised of electric 12. Trends on the reliability of ~c power promulgation of the station blackout utilities, consortiums of electric utilities, sources. rule. However, station blackout may still vendors, a trade association, and ail 13, Sharing 9f emergency diesel generators remain an important contributor to architect/ engineering firm. Other lettera between unite at multi-unit sites. residual risk. This station blackout rule were submitted by the Union of 14. Certification of the definitions of station will enhance safety by accident Concerned Scientists, the Department of blackout and diesel generator failure. prevention and thereby reduce the 15. Specificity end clarification of Nuclear Safety of the State of Illinois, a requirements. likelihood of a core damage accident representative of the Professional 16. Technical comments on NUREG-1032. being caused by a station blackout Reactor Operator Society, a citizens I7. Relationship of USI A-44 to other NRC occurrence. This does not mean group, .a consultant, and three Generic lssu.es.
- however, that further enhancements in individuals. Largely, the industry 18. An alternative of plant-specific reducing the overall residual risk ere not comments were opposed to generic probabilistic assessments.
achievable by additional improvements rulemaking to resolve the station 19. Procedure, and operator actions during ' in severe accident management, given blackout issue. The Nuclear station blackout. the assumption that core damage occurs, 20. Schedule provisions in the proposed Management and Resources Council I 50.63.
- whether from station blackout (NUMARC). formerly the Nuclear 21. Industry lnltlaUv!!S, sequences or other causes (such as Utilities Management and Resources small or large loss-of-coolant accident Committee, submitted, along with its The comments end responses to each sequences). Initiatives that provide such comments on the proposed rule, a set of of these subjects are presented on the safety enhancements (through four industry initiatives that it believes following pages.
improvements of core damage management procedures) are currently 1 CopiH are available for public Inspection and
- The first four eubJecla are ones on which the being pursued apart from the station copying for a fee at the NRC Public Doc:ument Room Commlsolonera specifically requested public blackout rule. Therefore, this rule should at 1717 H Street, NW .. Washington. DC. comments when the proposed rule wee published.
50-SC-41
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
- 1. Quality Classification of. modifications; however, detailed 3. The relationship to proposed and Modifications guidance is provided in Regulatory existing regulatory requirements should The Commission requested comments Guide 1.155 dealing with quality be considered further.
on whether the staff should give further assurance and equipment specifications 4. Potential impacts of differences in consideration to upgrading _to safety for non-safety-related equipment. Any facility, type, design, or age should be grade the plant modifications needed (if safety,related equipment used either considered further. any) to meet the proposed rule. presently, or in modifications resulting 5. The reduction in risk from offsite Upgrading to safety grade would further from this rule, should meet the criteria releases to the public has been ensure appropriate licensee attention is currently applied to such equipment. overestima tcd. paid to maintaining equipment in a high The technical analyses performed for On the other hand, the Ohio Citizens state of operability and reliability. . USI A--44 (NUREG-1032) show that for Responsible Energy (OCRE) and the Comments-The prevailing view by plant-centered events (i.e., those events Union of Concerned Scientists industry on this subject is representt:ld in which design and operational commented that the backfit rule should .by the following comments submitted by characteristics of "the plant itself play a not apply to the proposed rule. OCRE NUMARC: role in the likelihood of loss of offsite took the position that "application of the power), and area- or weather-related backfit rule to [NRC) rulemakings * *
- Quality classification is unnecessary...:..
Equipment used to prevent or respond to a events (e.g., grid reliability or external is plainly illegal," and the Commission station blackout should be sufficiently influences on the grid) are the dominant is not empowered to consider costs to available and operable to meet its required causes of loss of offsite power. Neither licensees in deciding whether to impose function. To this extent, the Commission's seismic events nor events related to new requirements. The Union of desire that appropriate attention be paid to single failure causes were found to be Concerned Scientists commented that maintaining a sufficiently high state of major contributions to loss of offsite the cost-benefit analysis should not be . operability and reliability is appropriate. The applied in this case because safety point of departure begins with the method for power. Therefore, both the stafrs achieving this objective. Specifically, by findings and public comments received improvements are needed to secure Itself, a "safety grade" classification scheme do not support an explicit rieed for plant compliance with existing NRC does not solely equate with high states of modifications for coping with station regulations, specifically General Design equipment operability end reliability. Such blackout to be seismically qualified. Criterion 17, Electric Power Systems classification systems too often can become a (Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50). documentation exercise more than a process The substantial increase in protection sought by this rule can be achieved by Response-NUMARC's comments on for providing the requisite level of system
- the backfit analysis were taken i~to functionality. modifications which meet criteria somewhat less stringent than generally account by the staff in revising the draft Duquesne Light agreed with this view required by safety grade criteria. Safety- version of NUREG-1109, "Regulatory and expressed the following comments: related equipment modifications to meet Backlit Analysis for the Resolution of
&_ty plant modifications or additional all safety-grade-related criteria would Unresolved Safety Issue A-44, Station equipment required to meet the proposed rule be more burdensome and expensive and Blackout," and a separate appendix that should not be specified safety grade. For would likely achieve only a very small addresses the factors in § 50.109(c) was equipment which is to be manually started added to that report. All but Item 2 end placed in service-for testing or in the further reduction in risk. The major contributors to the residual risk of loss above are on the same subjects as event of a loss of power condition there is no letters from other commenters and are necessity for specifying safety grade since of offsite power are adequately dealt adequate reliability can be obtained through with by modifications which conform to discussed In more detail under subjects normal surveillance testing and the proper the quality assurance and equipment 3 [Item 1), 6 (Item 4), 8 (Item 5), and 17 maintenance of commercial power plant specification guidance provided in (Item 3) in this section. NUMARC's Item equipment. The cost difference in safety Regulatory Guide 1,155.
- 2, the potential impact on radiological
- grade vs. commercial grade modifications is exposure of facility employees, would significant and must he emphasized. 2. Whether the iJackfit Analysis need to be assessed in detail only if it The opposite point of view was taken Adequately Implements the Backfit Rule were a major factor in the value-impact by the Illinois Department of Nuclear analysis. The effect of radiological In addition to comments on the merits exposure on facility employees, if any, Safety. of the proposed rule, the Commission would be extremely small in comparison No credit should be given for the capability specifically requested comments on to the reduction in radiological exposure of equipment to respond to a station blackout whether the backfit analysis for this rule unless the equipment was originally to the public from accident avoidance.
adequately implements the Backfit Rule, Therefore, this factor would have no designed, constructed, inspected, . § 50.109 of 10 CFR Part 50. performance tested. qualified, certified for !he impact on the overall value-impact intended safety-related purpose, and the Comment.Of-The Commission analysis.
- eq1.1ipment is maintained to the highest received two differing views in response Contrary to OCRE's and the Union of industry safety standards. to this request. On one hand, NUMARC Cemcemed Scientists' comments, the Gulf States Utilities commented, expressed the view that the proposed Commission may subject the rulemaking rule does not meet the backfit rule process to internal controls. Moreover, The proposed rule does not provide standard because the analysis of the sufficient direction on the quality the Commission is empowered to factors set forth in§ 50.109(c) were not consider the costs of incremental safety classification of plant modifications that may be required to meet the rule. *. *
- the quality adequately considered by the staff. improvements which go beyond the classification of plant modifications Specifically, NUMARC stated: level of safety necessary to ensure no implemented to meet the proposed rule 1, Installation and continuing costs undue risk to the public health and should be commensurate with classification associated with the backfit have been safety. Sre UCS, et al., v. NRC, D:c. Cir.
of the system they support. underestimated. Nos. as-1-57 and 86-1219 (August 4, Response-The proposed§ 50.63 does 2. Potential impacts on radiological 1987). The improvements embodied In not specifically address the topic of exposure of facility employees should be § 50.63 go beyond the level of safety safety classification of plant further addressed. necessary to ensure no undue risk. 50-SC-42
PART 50 ** STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Finally, contrary to.the Union of low. Commonwealth Edison and other* percent to almost 140 percent greater Concerned Scientists' cominent on GDC utilities felt that performance of en than the* estimates in NUREG/CR-3840, 17, new station blackout measures analysis to determine the maximum depending on the specific modification cannot be imposed on licensees as a duration a nuclear plant could cope with considered. On average, the cost matter of compliance with GDC 17, a station blackout would be estimates for hardware backfit were under the compliance exception in the substantially costlier than what is found to be approximately 80 percent backfit rule, § 50.109(a)(4)(i). GDC 17 estimated in NUREG-1109. Industry also greater than estimated in NUREG/CR-does not explicitly require that each expressed concern that the 3840. However, the cost estimates in plant be able to withstand station interpretations associated with the NUREG/CR-3840 were not used by the blackout for a specified time, or that proposed rule could lead to substantial staff in the value-impact analysis in the each licensee perform a coping
- costs above those addressed by the draft version of NUREG-1109 where assessment and make whatever NRC staff in its backfit analysis. AIF estimates approximately 100 percent modifications may be necessary In the commented that "The estimate of 120 greater than the NUREG/CR-3840 light of that assessment. Nor are any of NRC man-hours per plant [for NRC estimates were used. Therefore, the these highly specific requirements review] * *
- appears inadequate to revised cost estimates used in the final logically compelled by any part of GDC account for technical review and value-impact analysis are not
- 17. Moreover, GDC 17 has never been evaluation of the determination of significantly different from the estimates interpreted by the staff or the
- maximum coping capability and of the used In the draft version.
Commission to contain these specific description of station blackout Industry's comments on the costs to requirements. Thus, to impose them procedures which the rule would require assess a plant's capability to cope with under GDC 17 would amount to a each licensee to submit." a station blackout were based on the backfit which resulted from a new staff (B) Several commenters expressed the proposed rule that required an and Commission interpretation of GDC view that the NRC failed to consider all assessment of the maximum coping
- 17. the risks associated with a station capability and the potentially The issue in this rulemaking is blackout in its value-impact assessment. unbounded nature of such an whether some additional protection is The Union of Concerned Scientists assessment. Based on public comments, warranted beyond that already thought independent failures, in addition the Commission has revised the final provided. The Commission is entitled to to failures that lead to a station rule to modify the requirement for inquire, and seek public comment on, blackout, should be included. One licensees to determine the maximum whether additional safety measures individual stated that "both NRC reports coping capability. (See response to should be imposed where there is a [NUREG-1109 and NUREG-1032] are public comments in subject number 9.)
substantial increase in the overall completely deficient in that neither look Instead, a coping assessment is required protection of public health and safety at sabotage. OCRE commented that only for a specific duration. The cost for and the cost of implementation is seismic events should also be such a study is estimated to be from 70 justified in view of this increased to 100 percent higher than the original protection. considered: (CJ With respect to safety estimates by the staff, and these revised
- 3. Cost-Benefit Analysis and Whether improvements and overall risk. different costs are used in the final value-impact
§ 50.63 Meets the "Substantial Increase points of view were expressed. On one analysis. in the Overall Protection of the Public hand, NUMARC commented that, while The staff revised iis estimate of the Health and Safety" the risk reduction might be large for a resource burden on NRC for review from Chairman Zech and Commissioner limited number of plants, the risk 120 to 175 person-hours per reactor. This Roberts requested comments on the reduction associated with the majority revision was based on technical review analysis of cost benefit, value impact, of plants will be small. Thus, as a required for other comparable NRC and safety improvements and the general matter, the reductions in risk activities.
- station blackout standing on the overall offered by the proposed rule constitute a (BJ The technical analyses performed risk (e.g., is the reduction of risk only a small percentage of the oveall risk, a for USI A-44 indicated that the small percentage of the overall risk, or is risk which is already small (and contribution to core damage frequency it a major component of an already acceptable). AIF stated that there is no from independent failures, in addition to small risk?). Chairman Zech and standard by which to conclude that failures that must occur to get to a Gommissioner Roberts were particularly "substantial additional protection will station blackout, is low. Likewise, interested in specific comments be realized. results of USI A-44 studies and other assessing whether or not this proposal A different view was expressed by the probabilistic risk assessments have meets the "substantial increase in the Union of Concerned Scientists who shown that, for station blackout overall protection of the public health stated that "station blackout is clearly a sequences, the contribution to core and safety * * *" threshold now major component of the total risk posed damage frequency from seismic events required by the backfit rule. by operating nuclear plants. The is low.
Comments-{A) One of the major magnitude of the total risk is largely Not all events can be analyzed on a comments by industry on the cost- unknowable due to the enormous probabilistic basis. Sabotage is an benefit analysis was that the costs of uncertainty which surrounds example. Even though sabotage was not implementing the proposed probabilistic assessments." explicitly considered in the stafrs value-requirements have been underestimated. Response-CA) In order to adequately impact analysis, it is discussed in NUMARC end the Atomic Industrial respond to industry's comments above, NUREG-1109 under other Forum (AIF) commented that the cost the staff and NRC contractors reviewed considerations. These considerations estimates for hardware modifications the cost estimates associated with support the conclusion that a station reported in NOREG/CR-3840, "Cost implementing the station blackout rule. blackout rule will provide a substantial Analysis for Potential Modifications To Based on this review, the estimated safety benefit. Enhance the Ability of a Nuclear Plant costs for hardware modifications were (CJ The revised value-impact analysis To Endure Station Blackout," were too reviewed end are in the range of from 20 performed for the resolution of USI A-44 50-SC-43
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION indim&es that there me substantial planls. 1n fact, t'hey said, "111e Fnmch. 5. The Need for Generic Rulemalring heaefits in lemu of redm:ed COM approadt to station blackout dOe11 not da.mQge £,,eqaeocy and reduced risk to CollUlHNltM-Five letters from the appear to depart significantty from the pubac that result from the station current regulatory approaches in the nucle4u- industry commented that blackoat rule. and the costs are U.S." Similarly, AIF stated, "The generic ndemaltiog wnot nece*ary to wammted in light al. these beoefits. The asserliom of extensive stalion blackout resolve the station blackout isBUe. Their best e1tima lie for tne owrall value- coping capability at foreign {notably reinona &:r tlm isne wel'e as follows:
impact ratio is 2AOO person-rem per European) nudelll' power planhs are not A genmc ndeimik;ng ill imlpprupriate sim:e million ~rs. Ewen if those p&ants wilh sufficiently substantiated to serve as the hislDric ffllfflber of 9iles experiencing a the ~ risk (and tbelefore the even part of tile basis for the proposed loss af aU of&iR ~ ia AJalL (Texu greateet dlk ~ n } were not Utilities) req uire1m:11ts." The station blamcmt iane slurnld be conaidered. the "fllllle-impact .ratio for '11!ree other letten {Union of hamiJedOR a ~ buia and does (i.e., *oat the re,naining pmilll ia still favorable doll.an}. t.500 pel'IIGlll-rem per million Coocemed. Scientists, OCRE, and Illinon Department of Nuclear Saf-ety} supported the NRC rulemaking to II01 ue.d lo be resolved by j8IM!ric rulemalwJ&. Each plant l!aa IIAiqae prabawlity for* a lDSB-of-pltWer event based Analyses reported in NUREG-1150, require all plants to be ablt! to a,pe with on trerwmission sy11!mn, location of plam.
"R.eactar Risk Reference Document a statkm bladcout, but urged the *and Ot111ite power systems. [Duquesne Light)
(draft issued for comment in February CA,,nmistrioo to 80 beyond the proposed The Commission med nut pnmre generic 1987). 4 indicate that .&tatioo Waclrout is rule. The Illinffl! Depertment of Nuclear rulemekm@ in order ro l"eSO!ve II non--g1meric a dwnmant risk Cllllltributor ta overall issue. 1n the proposed atation btackom role. Safety st1!.1ed that: the numbs ~ plants of concern ill. residual risk for m0.'1t of the aix plants analyzed. Thea l'eaulu support the The goal of holdins the expected frequency ackno11riec:li,:d 111 be limited. (NUMARCI af core damage from station blackout to 10- 5 Stalilm blackoat la& bes foand nat to be a commea.t by the Union al Qiooemed per reactor-yell!' ill not snffitient\y striIJsenl
- generic issue. Station blackout risk is plant Scientists in resrpooae to the . With re111tnr~ fflOMfit momficlltiomr~ the specific and. accordiB8 lo die ataffa o -
Commissiooer'11 ,:equeat Cur Q)DlrneDts pn,paed ni1e, a &eqa,mcy of 10-~ a,,peeni anaiyaa, the propoul ~ a ollft! Oil tll.ia mihject. achienbe at reaammble mat. Specifically, expected lo result i.n modi!u:atiam at DD tht! rule slmuld n,quin no lea dt1111 20 hours more lhan a few facilities. if al a11y. Requiring
- 4. Wltefher NRC Should Require decay heat removal C11pacity imteed of only an 1icensees to undertake exte11Bive analyse&
Substanfial fmpn111en1enrs in Safety that four or eigmt boars .in the pnlpOll8d nde. in the under Im! provisionB of lhe proposed rules Go Beyond Thm,e Proposed in tfris event of a blackout. when only II mnail gn,op of planbl 1llll1 have Rulemaki~ a need for n!mt!diat aetiffll ts not appropriate. lle.spoose-The staff agrees with (AIF) Co.lilDlhsloner .Asselstine requeated industry'* romment1 that foreign comments on wheiher Jhe NRC should countries may have valid reasons fur /tes~The Commission believes r~uire substallilal improW!Dlellts in imposing requirements that differ from that a rule is appropriate to ensure that safety wilb respect to station blackout, or exceed those in the U.S. For example, station blackout is addressed at all like those beiug accomplished in some it appears that there is a highB nuclear power plants. The plant-specific other coUDtrie1, which can be .achieved fmqwmcy of losses of offsite power in feature!I that oontnoute to ri9k for at reasonable cost and which go beyond Frence than in the U.S. Thhl experience. statron bladroat {e.!., di~ g-eireratm those proposed in tlli& rulemaking. along with Frend. safety objectives, led configmation. probabilitJ of loss of
*Comments-NRC received eight the French to deaip their new standard offsite power) are considered by lhe letters that included comments ao this staff in the at.atim blackout regulatoiy nuclear power plants to be able to COjle subject. Five of these were from the wi1h a very long duration. station guide to determine au acceptable coping nucleal' iDduatry, none of which felt that blackoat {i.e., up to three days). "l1te duration fo,r each plant. Even though not the approach to station blackout taken all sites haw experienced a loss of Frem:h safety appmacli and their station in EurOj)ean countriea sbo11ld be used to offsite power, there ia not 91,ffici.ent blackuat deliga featme* are justify safety improvements that go documented in NUREG--1208, "Analysis aasurance that 1111ch eYent. would not beyond the proposed J 50.63. 'Ihe main of Frendi {Paloel) Pressurized Wat-er oocur in the Iutnre.: Since historic j11t1tification .mr indwitry's arsument is experience has shown chat a total loss Reador Desip Differences Compared to t'hat foreign cowitries may have reason, Current U.S. PWlt Dellisns," June 1988. of offsite poser occun about once every for requiring adivities tbat differ from, 10 site-yeara. and many am:lear plants or exceed, those in the U.S. For example, The Commillllion beli1m!1I that the staff has adequately considered foreign have operated fur less than 10 years, it Washington Public Power Supply is not surprismg that some plants have Systems (WPPSS) commented. "It is not approaches in preventing core melt from station blackout in developing the experiera:ied a loss of offaite power apparent that the details of U.S. grid while others have not.
stabilities end onsite power reliabilities resolution of USI A-44. Although tht: rule req,aire9 plsntw kl be able to cope Even though it is likely that many are substantially similar enough to those with station blackout for a epeci& plants will not need hardwe.re found abroad to warrant a simple duration, that duration is not si,ecified modifications m comply with the role, adoption of t'hese {European] measures." In another comment from industry on in the rule. Guidance to detennine an the as11essnnmt of 5lation blackout this subject, NUMARC 1tated that tbere acceptable duration is included. in copmg capam1ity fur II specim: duration are several reasons why ma11y of the Regulatory Guide 1.155. This guidance and implementation ma"SSociated features for cupm,g wilh a statio11 should appiy to ID08t plants, but if there procedures will affect a Hfety benefit blackout in new French nuclear power were adeqwtte justification, diffe!'ent for all plants. 'I1nl "limited number of plants may already exist at most U.S. requirements {either more or less plants of com:em* in NUMARC's tetter stringent than the regulatmy gui&!) refeni to those plant, havin,g the highest could be applied to-wpecific plantll. The risk from statiml blaclrout {i.e~ those
- Free single copies may be obtaaoed £ram the that would need ha,-dware Division of Information Support Services. UA use of alternate ac 90Ul'Cetl provides a NudeerReg,,1-,,Co!fflffleslon. Wmiington. 0C nreans to acllieve further ;ncremental modificatioml). Without a plant-specific ZD551i. decrease. in core melt frequency. assessment, these plant! cari not be 50-SC-44
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION identified.- Even excluding these plants diesel generafors; gas turbines, or term research can be taken into from consideration, the staffs analysis
- nearby "black start" ac power sources. account." They based this statement on has shown that the improvements in
- Extremely reliable offsite power the premise that If the consequences safety associated with the rule are supplies because of multiple right-of- used. in the staffs value-impact analysis consistent with backfit considerations ways or underground feeders to back up were reduced by a factor of 10, none of set forth in §. 50.109. above ground transmission lines. the alternatives would be feasible.
- Dedicated shutdown systems and The Union of Concerned Scientists
- 6. Applicability of the Proposed§ 50.63 associated diesel generators to meet the to Specific Plants expressed a different point of view in fire protection requirements of their letter which said "* *
- available Comments-Four letters included Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. evidence indicates that the comments or questions regarding the
- Common or shared systems consequences of an accident involving applicability of the rule to specific between two units at multi-unit sites station blackout may be even worse plants. For example, does the rule apply such as direct current (de) power, than those estimated either in WASH-to high-temperature gas-cooled reactors auxiliary feedwater, or diesel 1400 or the NRC's more recent studies."
(HTGR) (i.e., Fort St. Vrain)? What generators. Response-NRC has had an extensive about TMl-2 or plants that are near Response-The analyses performed research effort underway since about completion but will not have an for USI A-44 clearly show that plant- 1981 to evaluate severe accident source operating license prior to the specific features do affect the risk from terms. The staff has reviewed the results amendment's effective date? Houston station blackout, and the station of this research to take into account the Power and Lighting Company wrote: blackout regulatory guide takes this into public comments received on this account in providing guidance on subject. Since there is still a great deal Proposed Section 50.63 provides schedular different acceptable coping durations guidance for implementing station blackout- of uncertainty regarding source terms related modifications on plants that already depending on the most significant of and associated consequences, the staff hold operating licensees or will be licensed to these features. Those plants with revised .its value-impact analysis for USI oper,ite prior to the effective date of the extremely reliable offsite and onsite ac A-44 considering a range of estimates amendment. Plants who may be NTOL's power supplies need only have a very for consequences of a station blackout. [near-term operating license) but will not be short (e.g., 2-hour) coping duration to be The NRC research on severe accident licensed prior to the amendment*s effective acceptable. Plants that have a dedicated source terms has resulted in the date should be accorded the same shutdown system with its own compliance period under parts (c) and (d) of independent power supply* could take development of significant new. this section. Otherwise this proposed rule analytical tools by NRC contractors, as credit for this system to cope with a could be interpreted to imply that plants not station blackout. The final rule and discussed in NUREG-0956, licensed prior to the effective amendment Regulatory Guide 1.155 have been "Reassessment of the Technical Bases date must comply with the rule and make all clarified to give credit for alternate ac for Estimating Source Terms," July 1986. necessary modifications prior to receiving an The analytical methods developed, O.L [operating license). The rule should be power supplies (see response to subject 11). generally referred to as the Source Term amended to address plants which are Code Package (STCP), have been used scheduled to receive an O.L. within a short Therefore, the Commission believes time following implementation of this rule. that for almost all sites, plant-specific to analyze a number of severe accident differences have been adequately sequences for five reference plants, Response-Rather than identifying accounted for in the resolution of USI namely: Peach Bottom, a BWR Mark I specific plants for which the rule does A-44, but the door is open to licensees design; Sequoyah, a PWR ice condenser; not apply, § 50.63(a) specifies when it who believe their plants have additional Surry, a PWR with a sub-atmospheric does apply (i.e., "each light-water- capability that should be considered by. containment; Grand Gulf, a BWR with a cooled nuclear power plant licensed to the staff in demonstrating compliance Mark III containment; and Zion, a PWR operate"). Since Fort St. Vrain is an with the rule. with a large dry containment (NUREG-HTGR, the generic rule would not apply. 1150, "Reactor Risk Reference Station blackout will be considered 8. The Source Term Used To Estimate Document," Draft for Comment, individually for that plant based on its Consequences February 1987). unique design. Since TMl-2 is not Comments-NUMARC and others in The results of these analyses show licensed to operate, likewise the rule the industry commented that the that releases from station blackout would not apply to that plant. Any plant consequences of offsite releases that sequences can be expected to vary licensed to operate after the date the would result from a station blackout significantly depending upon the plant rule becomes effective will comply with event are overestimated, and new and the specific sequence. Although the same 270-day schedule for source term information would lead to generalizations are difficult, it appears information submittal applied to plants the prediction of much lower that calculations using the STCP yield
- previously licensed. This affords NTOLs consequences for this event. Several release fractions for most of the the same compliance features as plants commenterli felt that the approach taken sequences range from about one third of already licensed to operate. by the staff to estimate consequences of an SSTt release (for the case of Surry,
- 7. Plant-Specific Features and a station blackout event was improper- without condensation) to roughly one Capabilities decreasing by a factor of three the order of magnitude less than this.
estimated consequences of the siting However, the uncertainties in our Comments-A number of utilities source term (SSTt) from NUREG/CR- present understanding also do not described plant-specific features and 2723, "Estimates of the Financial preclude the possibility of a large capabilities that reduced the risk posed . Consequences of Nuclear Power Reactor release, approaching that of the SSTt by a station blackout event compared to Accidents" (September 1982). estimate. the staffs analysis. Examples of such AIF felt that "implementation of any To determine the consequences m features are given below. requirements resulting from the terms of person-rem, given the above
- Availability of alternate, resolution of USI A-44 should be range of release fractions, data taken independent ac power sources such as deferred until the results of the source from NUREG/CR-2723 indicate that the 50-SC-45
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION variations HI peniOIH!etll associated *, plant CBll cope with a station blackout . woukl go beyond the coping analysis for wit!. reJeasea Qf mqrutacie SST1. SST2 are not welt defiDed and CIJllld a specified dtR'Btion and recowry from and ssn are virtually identical to the potentially be unbounded. These station btackout. Therefore, the rule and variations in .latent t:ancer fatalities for commenta focused on twq mam.
- points. regulatory guicie have been revitted the same three releases. Hence, the First. the propoaed role NqDil'ed plants aooordingly to dell!ffl the requirement for estimated climJ,81! in iatent caocer to determine the Dll!Xinymt dul'ation the licensees to determine a plant's fatalilies with releaae &actions provides plmt cmdd cope with a station blackout, maximum wping capability.
a reliable mdicatwn of change in yet the draft regulatmy guide indaded With regard to the comments OD pec.aoo-rem a, we11. specific gu.idance on acceptable ooping assessments to determine equipment .
'Table 10 in NUREX;/CR-D.23 presents durations {e.g., 4 or II hoaraJ. operaln1ity during a station blackout, the variationa i11 eatimated latent canGel' Deterrnimng the maximum duration, staff feeh strongly that .such fatalities .associated with clmnges i.n rather than ~ n g the plan1:"s assesmwrrt11 are 02cessary tu determine ssn release fractilJDS {fur all elements capability fur a specific aa:epmt:M a plant's respome to station blaclwuL except aoble gasea). Thi9 table shows duration, could be an open-ended -* By delelini the requirement to determine that a release fractioo of one-third of an requirement Alon,g these linel'I, a plant's "maxinmm" coping capability, SSTl release would yield a value of NUMARC stated: the assessment of equipment operability about 50 psrcent of the lat.ent cancer Un1esa the required coping demcnstration would not be as costly as assumed by f.atallties {and persoo-rem) of an SSTl is ~ecifically bounded by clearly stated industry. Goidance on acceptable copin,g release. Similarly, a release fracliOll of definitiOI111, BSsumptions, and criteria, there assessments is provided in the station one-third of an SST1 release would yield could conceivably be a ~ of supporting blackout regulatory guide. Also, an estimated person-rem of about 15 special effect* analyseB whicl\ lu:eosees may have to comider aa a resi:il: of. the exercise of guidelines to evaluate the effects of loss percent of that associated with an SST1 release. Conseqmmtly, for value-impact discretion by mdmdiaal staff re1fiewem. of ventilation under station blackout Under the rule .aa prapased. licenlll!ea cannot cooditions are provided in Appendix E calculations, the staff estimated the ascertam the ultimate l'equiremeDta they will of NUMARC-a?'OO. "Guidelines and range of coni.equences of atation be expected to meet (i11cluding lhe potential blackout, in tenm of person-rem, to be Technical Bases fur NUMARC plant modificaUons they v.111 need to make) Initiatirea Addressing Station Blackout from 0.1.5 to 0.5 of the estimated person- to demonstrate campaanoe.
rem of an SST1. release. As noted, the at Light Water Reactoni. The. efforts N original value-impact analysis was Second, industry al.ao commented on provide adrlitionai definitions, criteria, based on 1J.3 times the estimated person- the potential open-endedness of and utandarda for lk:ensees' rem of an SST1 release. analyses to determi.De the operability of asse9!1ment9 of eq\riplll1!nt operability With regard to a possible delay in the equipment in.environmental conditions without the med for ..prescriptive re11Dlution of USI A-44 until "bettm"' resulti!J8 from a station blackout (e.g., resn}ations" by NRC. source terms become available, key without heating. ventilation. and air In order to further ewlnat~ indwltry's considerations appear to be when better conditioning}. Unless these analyset1 comments on thia sohject. NRC soorce t-enns are l;kdy to become were well defined, industry felt ilie requested Sandia National Laboratories avmTuhh! and to what degree analyses coo1d be much more costly to identify specifu: tasks neceesmy to uncertain'tie in phenomenology as well than estimated by the staff. Howevar, det-ennkm c,perability of equipment as di~ces between invffligators NUMARC made the following statement duri.og a station blackout and to will be resolTed. Althuugh Te9eal'ch on relating to tlie need for detailed estimate the cost to perfann these tB11ks. source tenmi mexpected to continue prNCriptive requirements by NRC that Resol.ta oI thia 11tudy were ased in the weB intn the future. improvemenbl in our appeani to conJradict their earlier revised value-impact analysis performed knowledge are expected m be tBI3ely statement. for this issue {"Equipment Operability e'ffllutionmy be,,md thi9 point, in that The 1JOHll * *
- ftl IIOt ih11t reguhttiuM fflUllt Durillg Smti.oB Blackout E,vent,"
iliemejffl'phenomenaappear~h~e be prescriptive by their very niltmle, NUREG/CR--41H2). been accountied for, at lttst in a first- Prescriptive reptiODS, which outliqe in order fashien, botn in NRC 11.s well as detail exactl:y what steps are required by 10. Ar:ceptable Durotioo. for Coping with industry models. Resolution and licensees to satisfy a proposed regulation. a Station Blackoul are, iD many instaucea, -eaary and narrowing of lite remaining uncertainties counterproductill'I!, Cl1mlllBlts-Severai comments with would al.90 berie6t &om improved differing YieWB were directed at experiment& and analytieal model9 that Jlespo.rne-With resard Ca the proposed requiranent that each plant guidautz in the dmft regulatury guide on are libly k> become UT.!ilable gradually. acceptable station blackout coping For thue rea&Dl\8, 'lisnfficantly better determine its maximum. dmation for coping with statian 1:iackoat, the staff durations in order for plants ta comply soan:e terms than thoae presentty with the proposed mle.. availahle are likelJ to be forthooming agrees wiili 1he mdmtry oon:arneom. First only after a number of yean. Since the of an. it would be difficidt ta adequately W&11bmgton Public Power Supply range of. aeYen! accident sout"Ce tel'ms defim! '"maximam duration'" in tm. commented that "it should be possible and oomequences *usgeirted ah<Ml from ae:me. Second. if m:ensees determine for certain uti1itie11 lo demonstrate {an estimating .tatiDll btaclcout sequeaoes is that their plan-ta en. cope with a station acceptable) zero hour blackout." One sufficiendy broad ti, arvel' likely blackout fur a specif:ioo duration and individual recommended "that a 30 improvements in source tenn restore ac pawer through an acceptable minute period be a margin, and that no knowledge. the re!!Olutioo ofUSI A-44 coping BDB.lysill, the additional safety duration under 4 hours be accepted by should not be ~ayed. benefit gained from simplJ the the staff.* NucleDyne Engineerins kDowledge that a Janger, ar "maximum commented thut '"advanced reaetors
- 9. Specificity on the Extent of Required duration," copmg dm-atian exists is should require the capability to sal'-ely Copil'/6 Studies small Third. the coahl far auesllUlg withstand a 11tation blackout of at least C a m ~ r a l letteni by "maximum dtll'Btioa" will be higher 8 hours," and the IHinois Department of ind\lStry expre55ed concern that the since mme extensive analysea "MR be Nuclear Safety wrote that "the rult!
studies nece&sarJ to demonstrate that a required to anBlyze a transient which should require no le1111 than 20 hours 50-SC-46
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION decay heat removal capability instead of approach lalcen in {the proposed resolution). to pbmt-centered tMmts, and 1l &tight only 4 or 8 houri." however, will not permit taking credit for the improvement in aTerage diesel generator Response-Although diverse same diesel engine when used as a generator reliability from UJ78 throngh 1983. These commenta were received on this subject, t1iough the actual reliability for the machine factors have been taken into account in none provided supporting analysis or is the same. (Toledo Edison) the stafrs analyses and the resolution of information to back up the opiniona Response-The proposed regulation USI A-44.. However, data alao expressed. However, the staff did did not in1end to isnore the alternative demooatrate lhat there are practical
.reanalyze the estimated riak from of addi~ additional power sources or limits on ac power reliability. and die station blackout evems fur different takiQg credit for auch sources if they defense-in-aepth approach of being able plant- and Bite-related characteriatk:s already exist. For example, as specified to cope with a at.awm *Dlackuat is and .revised ita guidaooe on acceptable in the regulalo.ry guide. if a licensee WIU'l'anted. coping daratioe aa:ordingly based on a 11dded an emergency diesel generator to goal of .limitiDg the averaae cootrib111:ian one of its plant, that had minimum 13. Sharing of Emetgency Diesel to core damqe from &talion blackout to redundancy ill lhe onsite emergency ac Generaton, ~ UnittJ at Multi-Vnit about 10*5 pl!!' reactor-year. Most planta power system. the acceptable station Sita would still Deed a 4- or 8-hoUI" COp!Il8 blackout coping dUl"ation could be Cammeal.s-8everal letters from capability. Tlwee few plants with the reduced. For some plants, however, industry stated that same plants with most redmdant ontlite emergency ec addins a diesel generator wou1d not two unite on a site have the capability to power system, coincident with result in a .reduction in the aa:eptable crosstie electrical buae1 between units significantly lower than average coping duration, and !he point made by and therefore haYe improved flexibility expected frequeric:, of loss of offsite Toledo Edison is a valid one. The rule in providing ac power.. Smee the power, would need only a 2-hour and rll8ulatory guide have beeo revised magnitude af the electrical loadi capability to be acceptable. Any plant to clarify that alternate ac power necessary to provide core cooling during with minimum redundancy in the onsite sources are gi.ven credit to cope with a a station blackout is significantly less emergency ac power system coincident station blackout provided that certain than that required for a de&ip baais with low reliability and a significantly criteria Sl"e met le,g., independence, accident, it could be possible to provide higher than average expected frequency redundancy. high reliability, ac power to both um.ts at the site using of loss of offsite power would need to maintenance, and testing). only a single diesel generator. substantially improYe its ac power 12. Trends 011 the Reliability ofAC Response-The proposed rule and reliability or be able tu cope with a PmverSoarces draft regulatory guide do not prohibit station blackout for 16 hows. the approach discussed above.. U Comments-rive letters included licensees can demonstrate that sucll
- 11. Credit for Alternate or Diverse AC comments on the reliability of ac power Power Smm:es cross tie capability exists. procedw-es sources. Four letters from industry felt are in place to accampliah the crosslie Comments-Ten letters from the that improved ac power reliability and shed nonessential loads (if utility induatry commented that more should be factored into the staff's necessary), and no NRC regulations are credit should be allowed fOl" the technical analysis. Examples of these violated {such as separation, minimam availability of alternate power sources comment.a include the foUowing: redundancy,andindependence),then such as onsite gas turbines. The * *
- the feqnem:y of Ion af offsite power credit wouid be given fur this capability comment.a below represent the utilities' act.iritiea hu been decreasins * *
- as shown in Regulatory Guide L155 (i.e.,
viewpoint. (Waabington .Public PDWl!II' Supply System); reduced acceptable station blackout The station blm:kout rule should be * *
- offsile power availability in the coping duratitJrn1 for greater diesel clarified la allow aoedit for diverse and very abseRce of regulallon has significantly generatorrednndancyi reliable offsite power tlOllft:811 or d:ivene lllld improved lffer lhe past decade. (Southern very reliable ollllite electrical generation. Califomla Bdillon CumpanJ); 14. CJarifi:oJJtian of the DefinitiDDB -Of (Public Service Company of Colorado) {NUREG/CR-4341) ... *
- 1100W11 an
- Station Blackout and Diesel Generator
'Mte option of providing an additional improvement in dieael generator reliability Failures alternate source of ac power is eliminated by over that shown in the earlier document
[the propoaed reeolution). The inconsistency [NUREG/CR-29B9J (General Electric); and Comments-{A) Three cammenters in thi11 approach en best be underatood by Typically the reliability of ollllite power from the utility industry recommended considerins an example al a generic nuclear systems increases during the fir.t few yeara that the definition of station blackout in power 11tation. [Toledo Edison) followins startup. (Gulf States Ulilitiell) § 50.2 should be clarified to exclude ac If the li<;easee wera to provide an '.I'he 1Uinoi1 Department of Nuclear power from the station batteries through additional independence dieeel generalur Safety, on the other bend, felt that inverters.. This wun:e of ac power from capable of providing the necesaary ac power potential vulnerabilities etift exist in the station batteries would be available to prevent station blackout, the licensee * * . in the event of a loss of both the offsite would still be required to withstand at least 4 onsite emergency ac power systems, and hours without ac power. They wotdd receive licensees should demonstrate that they and onsite emef8enCY ac power 110urces no credit far the additional diesel generator haw taken steps to reduce the (i.e., diesel generatorsJ. in the copins analyllia. If the licensee -re to probability of loa of ac power. (B) Several from industry commented use that same dieael engine to power a Response-The staff and its that the definition of diesel generator charging pump. even thol.lJl!h it would bl! of contractors have extensively analyzed 'failnre 11h0111d be clarified, particularly lee, significance to mitigatioa al reactor core the industry experience and trends in ec with respect to the treatment of short-damage than the diesel senerator.. the power reliability as documented In term failurets that can be recovered licenaee could take credit for it in coping with NUREG-1032, NUREG/CR-2989, quickly. Sargeat and Lundy Engineers the blackout. [Toledo Edison) Since a diesel-powered clmrsmB pump wilt NUREG/CK-.3992, and NUREG/CR- commented that not provide for eq8ip111ent loading flexibility. ts41. Trend, have shown that two A definition of failure an demand for ligbtine, ventilation. in1trumentation, etc., it Is aspects of ac powei- reliability have emergency diesel generators needs to be obvionly of lower value than an additional improved aomewhat-the reduced provided. Umier the context of a station source of 11c power. The fixed category frequency of losses of offsite power due blackout. a die11el generator winch fails to 50-SC-47
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION start automatically upon de!eclion of an 18. Technical Comments on NUREG-. Coolant Pump Seal Failures). Other offsite power loss, but is successfully started 1032 related issues mentioned in the public manually from the main control room or from comments were A-30, Adequacy of the local control panel, should riot be Comments-In addition to comments on the proposed rule end draft Safety-Related DC Power Supplies, and
- considered a failure on demand. implementation of safe shutdown regulatory guide, se..veral letters Response-{A) The staff agrees with contained comments on the stafrs draft facilities to meet the fire protection comment A and revised the definition of technical report, NUREG-1032, requirements of Appendix R.
station blackout accordingly. "Evaluation of Station Blackout Response-The question that needs to Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants." be addressed is "should a requirement (B) Based on actual experience, Response-NUREG-1032 was issued be imposed now to reduce risk, or failures of diesel generators to start due should it be postponed until related to failures in the auto-start system make in draft form for public comment in May issues are resolved sometime in the up less than 20 percent of all diesel 1985 (50 FR 24332). The comments received were reviewed and considered future?" Potentially, this could result in generator failures. Therefore, substantial delays, thereby not resolving discounting these failures would not by the staff and resulted in a re-evaluation of the technical analysis. generic safety Issues in a timely manner. have a significant impact on overall De.tails of the specific comments and The staff has considered the resolution diesel generator reliability statistics. of USI A-44 in light of the related issues However, the staff agrees in principle responses are not presented here. Rather, NUREG-1032 was revised mentioned in the comments. Although with comment B and has clarified the these issues are identified es separate station blackout regulatory guide so that extensively over the past year to address the public comments. In general, tasks within NRC, they are all managed auto-start failures of diesel generators in a well established program that need not be counted in determining the the overall conclusions on the risk from station blackout events did not change coordinates all related issues. A brief failure rate if the diesel generator is discussion of the most relevant issues is capable of being started manually significantly as a result of the reanalysis. One of the major changes presented below. (Additional immediately*after it does not start information is provided in NUREG-1109, automatically. resulting from the reanalysis was a revision to the definitions of plant "Regulatory*Analysis for the Resolution
- 15. Specificity and Clarification of characteristics, especially the clustering of Unresolved Safety Issue A-44, Station Requirements
- of plants into site and weather-related Blackout.")
groups (Appendix A in NUREG-1032). Resolution of USI A-45 will occur at Comments-Public comments were some time following issuance of the received regarding the specificity and These changes are reflected in revisions to the guidance in the station blackout station blackout rule(§ 50.63) and after clarification of the proposed rule and plant-specific station blackout coping draft regulatory guide. These ranged regulatory guide to determine plant-evaluations have been performed by from general to specific comments as the specific acceptable station blackout licensees per NUMARC/NUGSBO following two excerpts indicate: coping durations. Initiative 5, utilizing guidelines provided We are concerned that, it the proposed rule 17. Relationship of US/ A-44 to Other in NUMARC-8700. Further, the is adopted, the staff will promulgate NRC Generic Issues resolution of USI A-45 is expected to be regulatory guidance criteria which will be Comments-The major public highly plant-specific and focused on loss unrealistic and excessive, i.e., compounding comment regarding the relationship of of decay heat removal considerations the event with other accidents, imposing USI A-44 to other NRC generic safety from other causes beyond station passive failure criteria, applying seismic, issues was that the proposed rule may blackout. Utilization will be made of A-environmental qualification and.other not be necessary or should be 44 evaluations (as applicable) and any qualifica lions to equipment that could postponed because of ongoing work to *plant equipment modification needs otherwise be used in response to such an resolve related ,generic issues. Some identified from A-45 will be carefully event, etc. {Maine.Yankee Atomic Power comments were general in nature such evaluated to maximize effective use of Company) as the following one from Southern previously identified A-44 equipment Definitions of Pl and P2 (in Table 3 of the California Edison Company: needs. draft Regulatory Guide) use frequency of Maintaining emergency diesel extremely severe weather and severe Promulgation of a rmal station blackout rulemaking at this time will unnecessarily generator reliability, the purpose of B-weather interchangeably, thus creating 56, iii an integral part of the resolution of confusion In the definition. (Washington complicate the final resolution of related generic technical issue * * *. The NRC must USI A-44. However, the Commission Public Supply System) believes that additional defense-in-develop end implement a program to Response-Some of the comments on coordinate the resolution of all power-related depth will achieve a substantial this subject relate to other subjects generic issues prior to finalizing any Increase in protection to public health discussed elsewhere in this section. individual proposed rule. and safety. Some comments were quite specific AIF suggested that the The resolution of GI 23 (reactor while others were general in nature or implementation of any requirements for coolant pump seal leakage) deals with expressed views that were not station blackout be deferred until the loss of reactor coolant system inventory substantiated with backup material. The requirements from USI A-45, Shutdown and associated degraded core staff has taken these comments into Decay Heat Removal Requirements, are conditions. USI A-44 deals with station consideration and revised and clarified known and until the effect of source blackout induced effects, which result in the rule and regulatory guide term changes can be evaluated. loss of ac power, thereby impacting a accordingly. Additional guidance is NUMARC mentioned specific broader spectrum of plant equipment provided in NUMARC-8700 which has proposed and existing regulatory end safety-related functions. Although been reviewed by the staff and requirements that should be considered the resolution of GI 23 will contribute to referenced in the regulatory guide as because they could reduce the need for establishing a higher level of assurance providing a method the staff finds a station blackout rule (e.g., B-56, Diesel that seal leakage will be minimized acceptable for meeting the rule. Generator Reliability, and GI 23, Reactor (thereby minimizing the need for power 50-SC-48
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION to repiace water inventory losses over merit the commct ami submittal of a be modified after lieensees have the station blackout duraooo and probabilistic IUIBes&ment U part of. determined a11 acceptable station recovery phase), resolution of GI 23 by achievq m.mpoance of § 50.63. The blackout copins duration and evaluated itself will not 11ddreas the broader scope Commiuklo's experience also indicat.es their plant's response to a station of USI A-44 safety cancem&. that probBbilistic asse11S111ents are blaclcout oI this duration.
Some licenseea have implemented 1"l:9UWQ!: intensm! .mt can be of (B)The staff agrees with the dedicated shutdown systems that are marginal utility if their only end result is comments related to operatar ac1iot111 indepeodem of normal and emergency to delay nle compliance- outsid!! fire control room. and the ac power to meet Appendix R regulatory guide was revised requirements. ff applicable, these 19. Procedures and Operator AcliOM During Stalion Blaakoul accordiugly_ features would be credited in the reeolution of USI A-44 by providing the Commeata--{A) Several letters from 20. Schedule 'Provisions in Proposed capability to cope with a staticn industry co.iunadl:d that. in response lo §50.63 blackout. Generic Lettm 81,-0t, '"Emetl!dilCJ Commem:s-Two lett.ers contained Thus, the resolution of USI A-44 is Procedures and 'li'ainiog for Station commentll on the proposed schedule in coordinated with related generic issues, Blackout Ewllbl." dated February 21, and implementation of a final resolution 1981. utilities already hav4! procedures I 50.63. OCRE fult the achedulins provisions in the propo1ed nde were far should not be delayed further. in place to prepare plant operations for {Response to comments on the effect of too generous. One iruijvkh1al ' station blackout events. Owners' groups recommended that the schedule be . source term chaoses is included in have established generic guidance for subject uumber 8.) modified to require licensees lo mbmit, station blackout opet"llting procedures within 9 months of the date of the
- 18. An Alternative ofPlanJ-Specific for licensees to 11t1e in developing plant- amendment, a liat of modifications along Probabilisuc Asseuments specific proceduree. A represent!! tiYe of with a proposed schedule to implement the Profemonal Reactor Operator those modificaUona. {According lo the Comments-Several utilities Society c,:,mmemed tht\t suggested that, in lieu of the . propoaed. rule, licensees would not haw requirements in the rule, licensees Generic procednres are med by most to submit a achedule for implementing operating faci!itie&. These procedures are not equipment modifications until aftff the should be permitted to submit plant- carried into adequate deptb ofspecific power specific evaluationa to demonstrate that staff received and reviewed lit:enees*
plant operations. The industry has relied too submittals on their planfs acceptable the frequeocy of COl'e damage from heavily on eeireric procedures and has not station blackout eveata ia 10- 5 per given a real look at what specific steps must station blackout duration.) reactor-year or len. In II similar vein, be laken. Extn!polation of these procedures Resp01f8E'-The trtaff agreed in part the suggestion was made that NRC mU.11 be required. Speaf1C maimemmce with these comments, and the schedule should specify a target te'l'el of procealll'e& must.be establiahed ud foilowed. was revised accordingly. Section reliability for ac pcrwer systems in CJ1'der (B) Otller comments an procedures 50.63(c)(1J(iii) now requires that to satisfy NRC's criteria for core damase related tu the timeliness of operator Hcemrees !l'llbmit within 9 montrnl after frequency. A few licensee. submitted actiam, both inside and outside the the role is nisued a list af equipment limited probabilistic assessments to control.room. Homton Lighting and modificati1ms and a proposed scbednle show that for some plants station Power sagsested that: for implementing tht!m. A final schedule blackout cowd have .a vecy small fflfflld be deTeiop1!d after NRC ha11 In Section 3.1 (Part 6) tof the regulatoiy probability of seven consequences. guide1, 1ffll first ~ente!ICt! -mould be revised lo reviewed the licensee11' submittal of Response-The Commission does not read, 'Cmaaidemtiaa should be given to their plant's acceptable station blackout preclude licensees from submitting . timely operator actions both inside and duration. *- pl.ant-specific probabimitic asS'l!Ssments outside of lite CUlllml n,on, that * * * ,' eo to support a determination that'station that indil can be &8ke& b exiatilQI 21. Industry mitiativs blad:out would have a very small equi.jameat that may not hne acbultiaD BDd Comments-In addition to comments probability for causing core damage. caotrol frWII tile c;oatrol .l'OOIII. 011 the proposed rule, NUMARC However, the requlrements of the role Illinois Power Compa.i,:y endorsed the following five initiallves 5 must be met. The Commi.ssioa would remmmended that:
- to address the more important olwerve that the use of probabilistic . contributions to station blackout:
* *
- Section C.:1.3, Item 3.a, of !he assessments was important a1 iDpUt to proposed regulatory guide llhould be modified the regulatory decisirmmaking that 1. Each atilitJ wiH review their site(s) lo t"e8d: 118-1iaat the criteria specified in NURF.G-1108, culminated m tne station bladtout rule a. The eydem should be <:apable of beiniJ and related guidance.* As expressed in aad ii the llite{a) fail int11 the ca tesory of an actuated aDd Olllltrulled from the coalNI eight-hour site after utilizing aH power the Commission's Safety Goal Policy room, ar ii other meam of cmtlml are reqwred (e.g., 1D211Wal jumpinJ of conm,l sources available, the utility will take actions statement of Ausust 1986 (51 FR 2.8044),
logics or manual operation of valftll}. it to reduce tlie eite(e) omrtribation to tbe the Commission has acquired 11 should be demonsttated that these lltep!I GaD overall risk of sta lion blackout. Nun-reasonable degree of confidence about hardware changes will be made within one the usefulness and value of probabilistic be carried out in a timely fashion. y!lal'. Hardware changes will be made within assessments in assisting regulatory Respoos~A} Licemees mar take a reasonable time thereafter. decisionmaking Oil complex safety credit for station blackout procedures
*issues.In short, such assessments are of alreadJ iD pace to comply with the
- NUMAllC initlall, p!UflDHd a set of fmr value in complementi!J8 aod focusing the station blackout rule. However, for the initiatives. The fitli illi1lali*e reaar&Ds tlae more traditional and deterministic most part, these procedures were performance of a copins assessment WBll provided defense-in-depth appro11ches. On the developed without having the benefit of in NUM.a.~'i'OII. which W1IS submitted by letter other hand, any licensee mwit decide a plant-specific asaeasment to detennine from J. Opelca (NUMARCl III T. Spei1 (RES! dated or whether not its plant-specific ac whether a plant comd withstand a November 23. 1111'7, A OOH ia available far pablic iniiptct.ion und copyias for a fae at tbe NRC i';.blic power configuration and other related station blackout for a specific duration. Document Room at 1717 H Street NW., W.ashlng1on.
equipment are sufficiently unique to Therefore. these procedures may need to DC. 50-SC-49
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
- 2. Each utility will implement procedures et additional radiological exposure to the Radiation protection, Reactor siting each of its site(s) for: general public or plant employees, and criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping
- a. Coping with a station blackout event, plant shutdown is not required so there requirements. .
- b. Restoration of ac power following a are no additional environmental impacts For the reasons set out in the station blackout event, end
- c. Preparing the plant for severe weather as a result of the need for replacement preamble and under the authority of the conditions (e.g., hurricanes and tornadoes) to power. The environmental assessment Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, reduce the likelihood end consequences of a and finding of no significant impact on the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, loss of offsite power end to reduce the overall which this determination is based are as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC risk of a station blackout event. available for inspection and copying for is adopting the following amendments to
- 3. Each utility will, if applicable, reduce or a fee at the NRC Public Document 10 CFR Part 50.
eliminate cold fast-starts of emergency diesel Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, genera tors 'for testing through changes to DC. Single copies of the environmental technical specifications or other appropriate Backfit Analysis means. assessment and the finding of no
- 4. Each utility will monitor emergency ec significant impact are available from Mr. Analysis and Determination That the power unavailability utilizing data utilities Warren Minner&, Office of Nuclear Rulemaking To Amend 10 CFR Port 50 provide to INPO on a regular basis. Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Concerning Station Blackout Complies .
- 5. Each utility will assess the ability of its Regulatory Commission, Washington, With the Backfit Rule 10 CFR 50.109 plant(s) to cope with a station blackout. DC 20555, Telephone: (301) 492-782~. The Commission's existing regulations Plants utilizing alternate ec.power for station blackout response which can be shown by Paperwork Reduction Act Statement establish requirements for the design test to be available to power the shutdown and testing of onsite and offsite This final rule amends information electrical power systems (10 CFR Part busses within 10 minutes of the onset of station blackout do not need to perform any collection requirements that are subject .50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria coping assessment. Remaining alternate ac to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 17 and 18). However, as operating plants will assess their ability to cope for 1 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These experience has accumulated, the hour. Plants not utilizing an alternate ac requirements were approved by the concern has arisen regarding the source will assess their ability to cope for 4 Office of Management and Budget reliability of both the offsite and onsite hours. Factors identified which prevent approval number 315CHJ011. emergency ac power systems. These demonstrating the capability to cope for the appropriate duration will be addressed Regulatory Analysis systems provide power for various through hardware and/or procedural changes safety systems, including reactor. core The Commission has prepared a decay heat removal and containment so that successful demonstration is possible. regulatory analysis on this final heat removal. which are essential for NUMARC previously opposed generic regulation. The analysis examines the preserving the integrity of the reactor rulemaking and felt that the first four costs and benefits of the alternatives core and the containment building, initiatives would resolve the station considered by the Commission. A copy respectively. In numerous instances blackout issue. of the regulatory analysis, NUREG-1109, emergency*diesel generators have failed Response-These five initiatives now * "Regulatory/Backfit Analysis for the to start and run during tests conducted include many of the elements that are Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue at operating plants. In addition, a included in the NRC resolution of USI A-44, Station Blackout," is available for number of operating plants have A-44. The staff has followed up on the inspection and copying for a fee at the experienced a total lOSII of offsite NUMARC initiatives through a series of NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H electric power, and more such meetings in 1986 through 1987. The result Street NW., Washington, DC 20555. occurrences are expected. Existing has been the development of NUMARC- regulations do not require explicitly that 8700 which provides guidelines and Regulatory Flexibility Certification nuclear power plants be designed to criteria acceptable to the staff. The As required by the Re*gulatory withstand the loss of all ac power for procedures in NUMARC'riJ700 have been Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 805(b)), the any specified period.
- referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.155 as Commission certifies that this rule does This issue has been studied by the providing guidance acceptable to the not have a significant economic impact staff as part of Unresolved Safety Issue staff for meeting the requirements of the on a substantial number of small . (USI) A-44, "Station Blackout." Both rule. Table 1 in Regulatory Guide 1.155 entities. The rule requires that nuclear deterministic and probabilistic analysea provides a cross-reference to NUMARC- power plants be able to withstand a were performed to determine the ti.mins 8700 and notes where the regulatory total loss of ac power for a specified and consequences of various accident guide takes precedence. NUMARC's time duration and maintain reactor core sequences and to identify the dominant previous concerns have been addressed cooling during that period. These factors affecting the likelihood of core in the development of Regulatory Guide facilities are licensed under the melt accidents from station blackout.
1.155 and NUMARC'riJ700. provisions of§§ 50.21(b) and 50.22 ofto Although operational experience showa CFR Part 50. The companies that own that the risk to public health and safety Finding ~f No Significant Environmental these facilities do not fall within the Impact: Availability Is not undue, these studies, which have scope of "small entities" as set forth in evaluated plant design features and site-The Commission has determined the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the 'dependent factors in detail, show that-under the National Environmental Policy small business size standards*set forth blackout can be a significant contributor Act of 1969, as amended, and the in regulations issued by the Small to the overall residual risk. Commission's rules in Subpart A of 10 Business Administration in 13 CFR Part Consequently, the Commission is CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a major 121. amending Its regulations to require that Federal action significantly affecting the plants be capable of withstanding a quality of the human environment, and List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part SO total loss of ac power for a specified therefore, an environmental impact Antitrust, Classified information, Fire duration and to maintain reactor core statement Is not required. There are not prevention, Incorporation by reference, cooling during that period. any adverse environmental impacts as a Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear An analysis of the benefits and costs result of the rule because there is no power plants and reactors, Penalty, of implementing the station blackout 50-SC-50
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION rule is presented in NUREG-1109, reactor risk. In general, active systems power plants. Station blackout*warrants "Regulatory /Baddit Analysis for the required for containment heat removal a high proiority ranking based on both.
Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue are unavilable during station blackout. its status as an "unresolved safety *
- A-44, Station Blackout. The estimated Therefore, the offsite risk is higher from issue" and the results and conclusions benefit from implementing the station a core melt resulting from a station reached in resolving this- issue. As noted blackout rule is a reduction in the blackout than it is from many other in the implementation section of the rule frequency of core damage per reactor- accident scenarios. . (§ 50.63(c)(4)), the schedule for
- year due to station blackout and the Although there are licensing* . equipment modification (if needed to
- associated risk of offsite radioactive requirements and guidance directed at .
releases. The risk reduction for 100 meet the requirements of the rule) shall providing reliable offsite end onsite ac
- be established by the NRC s~aff in operating reactors ii estimated to be power, experience has shown that there 145,000 person-rem and supports the consulation and coordination with the are practical limitations in ensuring the Commission's conclusion that I 50.63 reliability of offsite and onsite licensee. Modifications that CBIU\OI be provides a substantial improvement in emergency ac power systems. Potential *schedule for completion within two*
- the level of public health and safety wlnerabilities to common cause failures years after NRC accepts the licensee'.s.
protection. associated with design, operational, and specified station blackout durationmust* The cost for licensees to comply with environmental factors can affect ac he justified by the licensee. The NRC : the rule would vary depending on the power system reliability. For example, if retains the authority to determine the existing capability of each plant to cope potential common cause failures of schedules for modifications. with a station blackout, as well as the emergency diesel generators exist (e.g., In addition, some foreign countries, specified station blackout duration for in service-water or de power support including France, Britian, Sweden, tl11tt plant. The costs would be primarily systems), then the estimated core . Germany and Belgium, have taken steps for licensees (1) to assess the plant'* damage frequency from station blackout to reduce the risk from station blackout capability to cope with a station events can increase significantly. Also, events. These steps include adding blackout, (2) to develop procedures. (3) even though recent data indicate that *design features to enhance the to improve diesel generator reliability if the average emergency diesel generator the reliability falls below certain levels, capability of the plant to cope with a reliability has improved slightly since station blackout for a substantial period and (4) to retrofit plants with additional 1976, these data also show that diesel components or systems, as necessary, to of time and/or adding.redundant and . generator failure rates during unplanned diverse emergency ac power sources. ,
- meet the requirements. demand (e.g., following a loss of offsite The estimated total cost for 100 power) were higher than that during operating reactors to comply with the Analysis of §50.109(c) Factor!!
surveillance tests. resolution of USI A-44 is about $80 1. Statement of the specific objectives million. The average cost per reactor The estimated frequency of core damage from station blackout events i11 that the backfit is designed to achieve.
- would be around $000,000, ranging from directly proportional to the frequency of The NRC staff has completed a rev~ew.
$350,000. if only a station blackout assessment and procedures and training the initiating event. Estimates of station and evahiation of information develope~'
are necessary, to a maximum of about blackout frequencies for this USI were since 1980 on Unresolved Safety l!leue *
$4 million if substantial modifications based on actual operational experience (U~I) A-44, Station Blackput. As a* result .
are needed, includins requalification of with credit given for trends showing a of these efforts, the NRC is amending 1P a diesel generator.
- reduction in the frequency of losses of CFR Part 50 by adding a new I 50.63, , *.
The overall value-impact ratio, not offsite power resulting from plant- "Station Blackout." . . . . . . . _ . including accident avoidance costs, is centered events. This is assumed to be a The objective of the s.tation blackout: * *
- about 2,400 person-rem averted per realistic indicator of future performance.. rule is to reduce the risk.of severe *
- million dollars. If the net cost, which An argument can be made ~at the . * *
- accidents associated with station inchides the cost savings from accident future performance will be better than blackout. Specifically, the rule requires.
- avoidance (i.e., cleanup and repair of the past. For example, when problems with the offsite power grid arise, they all light-water-cooled nuclear power.
onsite damages and replacement power plants to be able to cope with a elation following an accident). were used, the are fixed and, therefore, grid reliability should improve. On the other hand, grid blackout for a specified duration.and to overall value-impact ratio*would have procedures and training for such improve significantly to about 8,100 power failures may become more frequent because fewer plants are being an event. A regulatory gulde,-to be- . *. person-rem averted per million dollars. issued aiong with the rule, provides an' These value-. which exceed the $1jm/ built, and more power is being person-rem interim goidance provided transmitted among regions. thus placing acceptable method I<> determine the .' . by the Commi11Sion. support proceeding . greater stress on transmission lines. station blackout duration for each plant. with the implementation of§ 50.6.1.. The factors discussed above support The duration is to be determined for.* The preceding quantitative value- the determination that additional each plant based .on* a ci>mpariso~. of th~ impact analysis was one of the factors defense-in-depth provided by the ability individua!'plant design wit~ factors that considered in evaluating the rule, but of plant to cope with station blackout have been identified as the mai~
- other factora also played a part in the for a specific duration would provide contributors to risk of core melt decision-making proceu. Probabilistic substantial increase in the overall
- resulting from elation blackout. These.'
risk assessment (PRA) studies protection of the public health and factors are (1) the redundancy of on11ite performed for this USL a11 well as some safety, and the direct and indire.ct costs .. *emergency ac power sources, (2) the plant-specific PRAa, have shown that of Implementation are justified in view reliability of onsite emergency ac power. station blackout can be a significant of this increased protection. Th~ sources, (3) the frequency of loBB of contributor to core melt frequency, and, Commission has considered how this offsite power, and (4) the probable time with consideration of containment backfit should be prioritized and needed to restore offsite power. failure, station blackout events can scheduled in light of other regulatory 2. General description of the activity represent an important contributor to activities ongoing at operating nuclear 50-SC-51
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION required by the licensee or applicant in ' significant increase in occupational 0.975 per demand for aach EDG for plant, in order to complete the backfit. exposure is expected from operation emergency ac Group D (see Table 2). These reliability levels will be considered minimum In order to comply with the resolution and maintenance activities associated target reliabilities and each plant should have of USI A-44, licensees will be required with the rule. Equipment additions and an EDG reliability program containing the to---:. modifications contemplated do not principal elements, or their equivalent,
* * ~aintain the reliability of ~nsite . . require work in and around the reactor* outlined In Regulatory Position 1.2. Plants emergency ac*power eo~rces at or above; coolant system and therefore are not that select a target EOG reliability of 0.975 sp*ecified acceptable reliability levels, *. expected to result in significant will use the higher level as the target in their
- Develop procedures and training to . radiation exposure. EOG reliability programs.
restore ac power using nearby power* . 5. In~tallation and continuing costs .The reliable operation of onsite emergency sources if the emergency ac power
- associated with the backfit, including ac power sources should be ensared by a sy!JtOm and the normal offsite power . . the cost of facility downtime or the cost reliability program designed to maintain and sources are unavilable.
- of construction delay. monitor the reliability level of eacla power
- Determine the duration that the source over time for assurance that the plant should be able to withstand a For 100 operating reactors, the total
- selected reliability levels are being achieved.
- station blackout based on the factors estimated cost associated with the An EOG reliability program would typically sp_ecified in§ so.63 , "Station Blackout," station blackout rule ranges from $42 to
- be composed of the following elements or
$94 million with a beet estimate of $60 activities (or their equivalent):
- and Regulatory Guide 1.155, "Station million. This estimate breaks down as Blackout." 1. Individual EOG reliability target levels
- If available, an alternate ac power follows: consistent with the plant category and coping source that meets specific criteria for Esti- Estimated total cost duration selected from Table 2.
independence and capacity can be used mated (million dollars) 2. Surveillance testing and reliability to cope with a station blackout. Activity num- monitoring programs designed to track EOG berol
- Evaluate the plant's actual reac- Best High Low
- performance and to support maintenance capability to withstand and recover tors activities.
- from a station blackout. This evaluation s. A maintenance program that ensures includes:
- Assess plant's that the target EOG reliability is being capability to cope achieYed and that provides a capability for
-Verifying the adequancy of station with station failure analysis and root-cause battery power, condensate *storage 100 25 40 20 blackout ***********-****** lnwstigations. tank capacity, and plant/instrument Develop procedures and training .............. 100 10 15 5 f, An information and data collection air for the station blackout duration.* Improve diesel system that services the elements of the -Verifying the operability of equipment' generator reliability program end that monitora needed to operate during a station reliability ................... 10 2.5 4 1.5 achieYed EOG reliability levels against tal!flt blackout and the recovery from the Requalily diesel value,. generator .......*-****** 2 5.5 11 ?-5
. blackout- for environmental conditions Install hardware to S. Identified responsibilities for the major . associated with total loss of ac power increase plant program elements and a management (i.e., loss of heating, ventilation, and capability to cope oversight program for reviewing reliability air conditioning). ** *
- with station levels being achieved and ensuring that the b!ackout ...........- ...... 27 17 24 13
- Depending on the plant's existing
- program is functioning properly.
capability to cope with a station Totals ................ .............. 60 94 42 The resolution of B-58 will provide blackout,.licensees may or may not need specific guidance for use by the staff or to backfit hardware modificatiomi'(e*.g.; 6. The J)(lte~tial safety impact of industry to review the adequacy of adding battery capacity) to comply with* changes in plant or operational . . . diesel genera~ reliability programs the rule. (See item 8 of this analysis for-. complexity, including the relationship to consistent with the resolution of USI A-, addltionaldiscussion.) Licensees will be propos~ and existing regulatory : 44. required to have procedures and training requirements. to cope with and recover from a station Generic Issue 23, Reactor Coolant Pump blackout.
- The rule requiring plants to,be able to Seal Failul'e8 cope with a station blackout should not
- 3. Potential change in the risk to the ... .add to plant or operational complexity, Reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal public from the accidental. offsite release The station blackout rule is closely integrity is necessary for maintaining of radioactive material.
- related to several NRC generic programs primary system inventory during station Implementation of the station and proposed and existing regulatory blackeut conditions. The estimates of blackout rule will result in an estimated requirements as the following discussion . core damage frequency for station total risk redudion to the public ranging* indicate9. *
- blackout events for USI A-44 assumed from 65,000 to 215,000person-rem with a best estim8;te of about 145,000 person.
Gene.~ic /s~ue Ii-ss. Diesel Ge;,~rator . that RCP seals would leak at a rate of 20 gallons per minute. Results of analyses Reliability, .. * . *
- performed for GI 23 will provide the rem.
The resolution of USI A-44 includes a information necessary to estimate RCP
- 4. Potential impact on radic~logical regulatory guide on station blackout that seal behavior during a station blackouL exposure of facility employees.. specifies the following guidance on,
- The industry coping analysis guidelines For 100 operating reactors. the* diesel generator reliability (Regulatory (NUMARC-8700) recognize the estimated total reduction in Guide 1,155, Sections*CU. *and C.1.2);,. possibility of leakages exceeding an occupational exposure resulting from* .
- The minln'uii!J eri1ei'gency dre~1il generator. assumed 25 gpm per pump and reduced core damage frequencies and . (EDGJ reliability should be ta'igilted al 0.95 *incorporate the need to reevaluate the associated postaccident cleanup and per demand for each EDG for plants In* plant-specific coping analysis if the repair activities is 1,500 person-rem. No, emergency ac Group* A, B. and C and at resolution of GI 23 identifies higher levels. '
50-SC-52
PART 60
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION US/ A-45, Shutdown Decay Heat be reevaluated before any actual 8. The potential impact of differences in Removal Requirements modifications are made 110 that any facility type, design, or age on the The overall objective of USI A-45 ia to contemplated design changes resulting relevancy and practicality of the backfit.
evaluate the adequacy of current from the resolution of USI A-45 can be The station blackout rule applies to all
- licensing design requirements to ensure considered at the Sf!me time. pressurized water reactors and boiling that the nuclear power plants do not Generic Issue A-30, Adequacy of water reactors. However, in determining pose an unacceptable risk as a result of Safety-Related DC Power Supply an acceptable station blackout coping failure to remove shutdown decay heaL capability for each plant, differences in The study includes an assessment of The analysis performed for USI A-44 plant characteristics relating to ac alternative mean11. of ahutdown decay assumed that a high level of de power power reliability (e.g., number of heat removal and of diverse "dedicated" system reliability would be maintained emergency diesel generators, the systems for thia purpose. Results will so that (1) de power system failures reliability of the offsite and onsite include proposed recommeodationa would not be a significant contributor to emergency ac power systems) could regarding the desirability of. and lo&1es of all ac power and (2) should a result in different acceptable coping possible design requirements for, station blackout occur, the probability of capabilities. For example, plants with an improvements in existing systems or an immediate de power system failure already low risk from station blackout alternative dedicated decay heat would be low. Whereas Generic Issue because of multiple, highly reliable ac removal method. A-30 focuses on enhancing battery power sources are required to withstand The USI A-44 concern for maintaining reliability, the resolution of USI A-44 ia a station blackout for a relatively short adequate core cooling under _station period of time; and few, if any, blackout conditions can be considered a aimed at ensuring adequate station battery capacity in the event of a station hardware backfits would be required as subset of the overall A-45 issue. a result of the rule. Plants with currently However, there are significant blackout of a specified duration.
Therefore, these two issues are higher risk from station blackout are differences in scope between these two required to withstand somewhat longer issues. USI A-44 deals with the consistent and compatible. duration blackouts; and, depending on .probability of loss of ac power, the Fire Protection Program their existing capability, may need some capability to remove decay heat using modifications to achieve the longer systems that do not require ac power, Section 50.48 of 10 CFR Part 50 states that each operating nuclear power plant station blackout capability. and the ability to restore ac power in a timely manner. USI A-45 deals with the must have a fire protection plan that 9. Whether the backfit is interim or final overall reliability of the decay heat satisfies GDC 3. The fire protection and, if interim, the justification for removal function in terms of response to features required to satisfy GDC 3 are imposing the backfit on an interim basis. transients, small-break loss-of-coolant specified in Appendix R to 10 CFR Part The station blackout rule is the final accidents, and special emergencies such 50. They include certain provisions resolution of USI A-44; it is not an WI fires, floods, seismic events, and regarding alternative and dedicated interim measure. sabotage. shutdown capability. To meet these Although the recommendatioruJ that 53 FR 24018 provisions, some licensees have added, Published 6/27/88 might result from the resolution of USI or plan to add, improved capability to Effective 7/27/88 A-45 are not yet final, some could affect restore power from offsite sources or the station blackout capability, while onsite diesels for the shutdown system. General Requirements for others would not. Recommendations Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities A few plants have installed a safe that involve a new or improved decay shutdown facility for fire protection that See Part 30 Statements of Consideration heat removal system that is ac power includes a charging pump powered by dependent but that does not include its its own independent ac power source. In 53 FR35996 own dedicated ac power supply would Published 9/16/88 have no effect on USI A-44. the event of a station blackout, this system can provide makeup capability Effective 10/17/88 Recommendations that involve an additional ac-independent decay heat to the primary coolant system as well as 10 CFR Part 50 removal system would have a very reactor coolant pump seal cooling. This modest effect on USI A-44. could be a significant benefit in terms of Emergency Core Cooling Systems; Recommendations that involve an enhancing the ability of a plant to cope
- Revisions to Acceptance Criteria additional decay heat removal system with a station blackout. Plants that have added equipment to achieve alternate AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory with its own ac power supply would Commission.
have a significant effect on USI A-44. safe shutdown in order to meet Appendix R requirements could take ACTION: Final rule. Such a new additional system would receive the appropriate credit within the credit for that equipment, if available,
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory USI A-44 resolution by either changing for coping with a station blackout event. Commission (NRC) is amending its
. the emergency ac power configuration regulations to allow the use of group or providing the ability to cope 7. The estimated resource burden on the NRC associated with the backfit and the alternative methods to demonstrate that with a station blackout for an extended the emergency core cooling system period of time. Well before plant availability of such resources. [ECCS) would protect the nuclear modifications, if any, will be The estimated total cost for NRC reactor core during a postulated design implemented to comply with the station review of industry submittals required basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). blackout rule, it i11 anticipated that the by the station blackout rule is $1.5
- The Commission is taking this action proposed techncial resolution of USIA- million based on submittals for 100 because research, performed*since the 45 will be published for public commenL reactors and an estimated average of current rule was written, has shown that Those plants needing hardware 175 person-hours per reactor. calculations performed using current
-modifications for station blackout could methods and in accordance with the current requirements result in estimates 50-SC-53
PART 50 ** STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION of cooling system performance that are solicit the public's comments on whether that they would not derive an economic significantly more conservative than the existing rule should be benefit by performing realistic analysis estimates based on the improved "grandfathered" indefinitely. That is: of ECCS performance. The position of knowledge gained from this research. 1. Should the conservative ECCS an additional commenter is unclear While the existing methods are evaluation method of Appendix K be concerning grandfathering. The conservative, they do not result in permitted indefinitely or should this remaining commenter was not opposed accurate calculation of what would aspect of the ECCS rule be phased out to grandfathering but thought the actually occur in a nuclear power plant after some period of time? question is premature. This commenter during a LOCA and may result in less Commissioner Asselstine requested believes that indefinite use of existing than optimal ECCS design and operating the public's comments on the following: ECCS evaluation methods should be procedures. In addition, the operation of 2. Should this rule change include an considered when significant experience some nuclear reactors is being explicit degree of conservatism that has been gained with the unnecessarily restricted by the rule, must be applied to the evaluation implementation of the new features of resulting in increased costs of electricity models? the rule but makes no recommendation generation. This rule, while continuing 3. This rule change would allow a 5 to as to what policy the Commission to allow the use of current methods and 10 percent increase in the fission should pursue in the meantime. requirements, also allows the use of product inventory that could be released The Commission agrees with the more recent information and knowledge from any core meltdown scenario. majority of the commenters that existing to demonstrate that the ECCS would Should this rule change explicitly Appendix K evaluation models should protect the reactor during a LOCA. This prohibit any increase in approved power be permitted indefinitely. The amendment, which applies to all levels until all severe accident issues Commission also believes that the applicants for and holders of and unresolved safety issues are decision to permit continued use of such construction permits or operating resolved? models can and should be made at this licenses for light water reactors, also 4. Should the technical basis for this time because it believes that both relaxes requirements for certain proposed rule change be reviewed by an methods provide adequate protection of reporting and reanalyses which do not independent group such as the the public health and safety. As contribute to safety. American Physical Society? described in the regulatory analysis, the EFFECTIVE DATE: October 17, 1988. Summary of Public Comments probability of a large break is so low, The comment period for the proposed that the choice of best estimate versus FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: rule revision and the draft regulatory Appendix K has little effect on public L.M. Shotkin, Office of Nuclear risk. The TMI action plan calls for Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear guide (52 FR 11385) expired on July 1, 1987. Twenty-seven letters addressing industry to improve their small break Regulatory Commission, Washington, LOCA evaluation models to be more DC 20555, telephone (301) 492-3530. the proposed rule were received by the expiration date, as well as nine realistic when evaluating the more SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: responses to the request for comments probable small break accident scenario. on questions in the regulatory guide. A This has been done within the context of Background § 50.46 and Appendix K compliance and .. number of late comments were also On March 3, 1987, the Nuclear received. These were also considered to was entirely appropriate since small Regulatory Commission published in the the extent that new and substantial breaks are not limiting in design basis Federal Register proposed amendments comments were provided. performance and a better understanding (52 FR 6334) to 10 CFR Part 50 and The public comment on the proposed of small break behavior is a desirable Appendix K. These proposed rule revisions have been divided into safety goal from a risk perspective. amendments were motivated by the fact thirteen categories and are summarized Therefore, the grandfathering provision that since the promulgation of § 50.46 of in the following paragraphs. Categories has been retained in the final rule. 10 CFR Part 50, "Acceptance Criteria for one through four represent the responses 2. Specification of Explicit Degree of Emergency Core Cooling Systems to the specific questions posed by the Conservatism (Question 2). The majority (ECCS) in Light Water Power Reactors," ACRS and Commissioner Asselstine. In of the responses to this question and the acceptable and required general, consideration of the public indicated that the proposed rule already features and models specified in comments resulted in no substantive contains conservatism in the required Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50, revision to the proposed rule. uncertainty evaluation. considerable research has been 1. Grandfathering of Conservative The use of additional conservatism performed that has greatly increased the EGGS Methods of Appendix K (Question would be inconsistent with the objective understanding of ECCS performance 1). of the rule which is to provide a realistic during a LOCA. It is now confirmed that Twenty-one of the commenters evaluation of plant response during a the methods specified in Appendix K, specifically addressed the ARCS LOCA. The NRC has not included an combined with other analysis methods question concerning the grandfathering additional explicit degree of currently in use, are highly conservative of the current Appendix K approach. conservatism in this rule. and that the actual cladding Seventeen of these commenters 3. Resolution.of all Safety Issues Prior temperatures which would occur during recommended indefinite grandfathering to Allowing Power Level Increases a LOCA would be much lower than of the existing Appendix K evaluation (Question 3}. Some commenters pointed those calculated using Appendix K models. Most cited the known out that fission product inventory is not methods. In soliciting the public's conservatism as the basis of their a direct function of total power, but comments on the proposed rule, the recommendation. In addition, several rather it is the rate of fission product NRC specifically requested its views on commenters stated that in light of the formation that is a direct function of questions posed by Commissioner known conservatisms not allowing power. Fission product inventory Asselstine and the Advisory Committee continued use of existing Appendix K available for release during a core on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The evaluation models would be unfairly meltdown would be a function of ACRS requested that the Commission burdensome to licensees who determine burnup, not total power. 50-SC-54
PART 50
- STATEMENTS*Qf'CONSIDERATION Actually, the inventory of fission audit tool, and to provide the necessary where errors are discovered in products is a complex function of both experience to audit licensee submittals. evaluation models, requests are made to time and power and not as simple as The staff does not believe that an NRC revise plant technical specifications, or described by the commenters. Short demonstration of the methodology is a some other questions regarding the lived isotopes, such as xenon and prerequisite to this rulemaking. analyses are raised. The NRC believes iodine, quickly reach an equilibrium Licensees wishing to'adopt the best that shared responsibility for evaluation inventory and total steady state estimate approach permitted as a result models would not be in the best interest inventory of these fission products is a of this rule are neither required to use of the public health and safety and direct function of power. Inventories of this methodology nor to model their own therefore has not implemented the long-lived isotopes, such as strontium methodologies after it. This methodology suggestion of this commenter.
and cesium, are functions of total fuel will play an important part in the best- The NRC recerved two requests for an burnup, as described by the estimate model review process. The extension of the comment period to commenters. Intermediate-lived isotopic NRC has determined through twenty allow time for review of NUREG-1230, inventories are complex functions of years of experience that independent which describes the research supporting time, power, and integrated power. In an analysis with independent the proposed rule revision. independent study, documented in methodologies is the most effective way The NRC believes the comment period chapter XII of NUREG 1230, the staff to intelligently review new vendor or was sufficient since most of the research determined that the change in risk due licensee methodologies. It is therefore is not new and has been extensively to a 5% power increase is negligible. The appropriate that this new methodology reviewed in the past. Both commenters arguments above do not alter the be subjected to stringent technical were contacted and told that comments Commission's position that the increase scrutiny, as directed by the Commission. received after the comment period in fission products available for release The NRC staff is committed to would be considered if time permitted. during a core meltdown caused by a 5% completing this demonstration by the Comments from both parties were power increase is negligible compared time that it will be needed to review received late and were indeed to the uncertainty in fission product licensee submittals and is confident that considered by the NRC. release. The Commission has decided such a demonstration will be successful. 6. Reporting Requirements. Some not to delay the proposed rule revision Based on the paucity of negative commenters viewed the proposed -pending resolution of all unresolved response concerning the technical basis reporting procedures as new safety issues or severe accident issues for the proposed rule revision and requirements needing consideration in and therefore will proceed with this generally favorable review of the NRC the backfit analysis while others stated final rulemaking, as planned. uncertainty methodology, the that they are a major relaxation and
- 4. Independent Review of Technical Commission plans no further review of clarification of existing reporting Basis {Question 4). Several commenters the technical basis. requirements.
indicated that the technical basis for the 5. General Comments on Proposed The NRC position is that the reporting proposed rule has had adequate review Rule. Twenty-one commenters made requirements are new in the sense that as the research was being performed. A comments of this nature. The majority of they will now appear in the Code of number of commenters stated that it the comments came from the nuclear Federal Regulations. However, in was the role of the ACRS to perform any industry of which 19 expressed support practice, these reporting requirements review of the proposed rule revision of the proposed rule. The industry also are indeed a clarification and relaxation because it is uniquely qualified due to strongly supports the specific ECCS rule over the current interpretation for the its familiarity with the research. approach proposed by the NRC. One existing requirements and therefore the The Commission agrees that the commenter neither supported nor net effect of these requirements will be opposed the proposed approach. One to reduce the frequency for reporting technical basis has had adequate and reanalysis. review, except for the uncertainty negative comment was received from an anonymous individual within the A number of commenters requested methodology which is new and untried that only significant errors or changes in except for the General Electric nuclear industry who implied, without specifics, that the ECCS rule is not the non-conservative direction or only Company's use of an uncertainty those that result in exceeding the 2200°F evaluation of their SAFER code. As a sound and that public comment is not a fair hearing because expert insiders limit be required to be reported. In proof of principle and demonstration of addition, a number of commenters feasibility, the ACRS and a second would be afraid to comment. Based on the absence of any suggested that the NRC require only independent peer group has reviewed supporting justification for the negative annual reporting of significant errors or
- the uncertainty methodology developed response and the unprecedented amount changes.
by the NRC for use in quantifying the of research supporting the rule revision, The NRC considers a major error or uncertainty of NRC developed thermal the NRC does not consider this comment change in any direction a cause for hydraulic transient codes. Both the to be valid and has proceeded with this concern because it raises potential ACRS and the peer group made rulemaking with no major revisions. questions about the adequacy of the generally favorable comments One commenter suggested that fuel evaluation model as a whole. Therefore, concerning the methodology; however, reload suppliers should not be required the NRC requires the reporting of both groups recognized that a complete to complete full LOCA/ECCS analyses significant errors or changes, in either demonstration (i.e., application to small because the hydraulics are not changed direction, on a timely basis so that the break LOCA and the reflood portion of by a fuel change. Commission may make a determination large break LOCA) has not yet been Although this point is valid, the of the safety significance. Thus, the final accomplished and certain reviewers Commission believes that it is an rule contains no change in this questioned whether such a unworkable situation to allow fuel requirement. demonstration could be performed suppliers to make use of previous One commenter recommended that successfully. The only objectives of the analyses performed by others. It is the word "immediate" be deleted from NRC methodology demonstration are to believed that serious questions of the requirement to propose steps to be demonstrate feasibility, to develop an accountability would arise in cases taken to demonstrate compliance in the 50-SC-55
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION event that the criteria in § 50.46(b) are The requirement, which states that the Commission did not give consideration exceeded. 50°F criteria applies to the sum of the to altering them in the final rule.
The Commission considers this a very absolute magnitudes of temperature 10. Cladding Materials. Three serious condition in which the plant is changes from numerous error commenters requested that the not in compliance with the regulations corrections or model changes was Commission consider broadening the and may be operating in an unsafe formulated specifically because the language of the rule to allow the use of a manner. The word "immediate" reflects Commission requires knowledge of range of zirconium based alloys for this seriousness and is further defined serious deficiencies in evaluation cladding material. by reference in other sections of Part 50. models in use by licensees. Allowing The Commission believes that this Several commenters questioned the errors or corrections which offset one modification is beyond the scope of the need to report minor or inconsequential another to relieve a licensee of the current rule revision and should be errors or changes, even on an annual thirty-day reporting requirement, would considered in a separate rulemaking basis, as required in the proposed rule. be counter to this objective. If this action in which it would receive recommendation were accepted, two appropriate public review and comment While errors or changes which result errors or changes, having a large impact prior to implementation. In addition, in changes in calculated peak clad on the calculated peak cladding zircaloy cladding material is specified in temperatures of less than 50°F are not temperature but in the opposite other portions of the Code of Federal considered to be of immediate concern, direction, would not be reportable if the Regulations, such as § 50.44. Making a the NRC requires cognizance of such net magnitude of their difference was change of this type is more suitable in a changes or corrections since they less than 50°F. For this reason, and the broader regulatory context. Therefore, constitute a deviation from what fact that no further action (beyond the Commission is not broadening the previously has been reviewed and
- reporting within thirty days] is required, definition of cladding materials within accepted. The proposed annual the Commission retained this this rulemaking.
reporting is believed to be a fair requirement in the final rule. 11. Other Suggested Expansions to compromise between the burden of 7. Continued Use of Dougall- Rule Scope. One commenter believes reporting and the Commission's need to Rohsenow. Five comments that that hydraulic loads occurring during a be aware of changes and error addressed this aspect of the proposed LOCA could cause steam generator corrections being made to evaluation rule were received. One commenter tubes to rupture and that the NRC models. Therefore, the annual reporting believed that this correlation should not should resolve steam generator tube of minor errors remains in the final rule. be permitted without further verification integrity safety issues prior to publishing One commenter interpreted the use of and should be phased out. Other this rule. the words "or in the application of such commenters supported continued use of Steam generator tubes are designed to a model" as requiring reporting when the correlation subject to the provisions withstand LOCA loads at allowed facility changes (already reportable of the proposed rule. thinning, and there is no evidence to under § 50.59), resulting in model input The NRC position is that no safety contradict this. If anything, the problem changes, occur. concern is created by continued use of would be with inspection techniques to The regulatory language referred to is the correlation, as long as the evaluation detect the actual tube thinning and intended to ensure that applications of model is overall conservative. whether there is an unacceptably high models to areas not contemplated during Therefore, the Commission can not probability that a tube rupture during a initial review of the model do not result justify the burden of requiring licensees LOCA due to tube thinning is in excess in errors by extending a model beyond to modify their evaluation models and to of the design basis. However, the risk the range that it was intended. The perform reanalysis. As discussed in from LOCA with concurrent tube Commission does not believe that SECY 83-472, current evaluation models rupture will not be greatly affected by further clarification of this requirement contain more conservatisms than just the proposed rule change. As a result of is necessary and has not done so in the those required by Appendix K. the commenter's concerns, this issue has final rule. However, error corrections or changes been assigned as a generic issue (GI-Several commenters requested a could alter the conservatism of the 141) to be prioritized by the NRC staff. further relaxation of the reporting model. Therefore, the Commission The results of the prioritization process requirement by changing the definition believes that it is necessary to ensure will determine if further action is of significant code errors from 50°F to continued overall conservatism in the required. 100°F. evaluation models as a basis for A second commenter believes that the While justification for the 50°F criteria continued use of the correlation. ECCS rule does not adequately address is largely judgmental, the NRC believes Therefore, the final rule does not modify a plant's long term decay heat removal that it is sufficiently large to screen the this requirement except for the capability, and recommends a "short/ code error corrections and changes correction of a typographical error long term integrative analysis which have little safety significance identified by one commenter. approach." Both the existing while providing a mechanism for timely 8. Uncertainty Evaluation. The requirements and the proposed rule reporting of more serious errors and comments received on the uncertainty contain the requirement to provide for changes. Since 50°F is a threshold for evaluation support the proposed rule, long term cooling subsequent to a reporting and no further action is particularly the flexibility provided by a LOCA. Small increases in power that required pending NRC determination of non-prescriptive requirement. Therefore, may result from the proposed rule safety significance, the Commission has the Commission is publishing the final should not greatly change decay heat retained this criteria in the final rule. rule without modification of this removal requirements following a LOCA One commenter requested requirement. or any other accident or transient. Thus, consideration for allowing that the 9. Acceptance Criteria. The three the issue of decay heat removal is not cumulative effect of several errors and comments received on this topic were materially impacted by this rulemaking. corrections be applied towards the 50°F all supportive of the existing criteria, as Moreover, any proposed increase in threshold. contained in § 50.46(b), and thus the power resulting from this rule 50-SC-56
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION promulgation would be approved only realistic evaluation of actual plant of technical review of the issues, after the licensee demonstrates that response. The large conservatisms of enhances public participation in the decay heat removal capacities remain Appendix K served the public well in process, and provides a complete public adequate. The Commission is planning 1974 when there was great uncertainty record. Therefore, the Commission has no further action with regard to this in ECCS performance. However, these decided to proceed with the rulemaking issue. conservatisms are nQw known to be as planned.
- 12. Acceptability of Models Approved very large, and there is no need to "over Finally, this commenter questions the Under SECY-83-472. One commenter regulate" by maintaining this experimental basis for this rule because requests that the rule language be unnecessary margin. This type of full-scale ECCS bypass data is not yet modified to state explicitly that ECCS activity can often result in the available.
evaluation models that have been expenditure of resources that would be The 2D/3D tests which will provide previously approved under SECY better spent improving safety in other this important data represent a small 472 continue to be acceptable under this areas. The benefits to safety, while portion of the total research upon which rule. difficult to quantify, are believed to be this rule relies. Significant research on SECY 83-472 provides an alternative, substantial. While cost savings may ECCS bypass has already been acceptable method for developing ECCS have been one factor resulting in the completed in small scale vessels and the evaluation models. Licensees were still rule change, the Commission believes full-scale work is required only to required, however, to demonstrate that that the conservatisms contained in the confirm the smaller scale results and evaluation models developed using the acceptance criteria themselves, as well quantify any uncertainty due to scale SECY-83-472 approach complied with as those required in the uncertainty effects. One full-scale ECCS bypass test the requirements of Appendix K to Part evaluation required in this rule, are has already been completed under the
- 50. This final rule explicitly finds that adequate to protect the health and 2D/3D program which showed that more ECCS evaluation models, which have safety of the public. margin exists than expected from the been previously approved as satisfying This commenter also cites portions of small scale tests. Completion of the full-the requirements of Appendix K, remain the 1975 General Electric Company's scale tests only affects the uncertainties acceptable. Therefore, the Commission Nuclear Reactor Study (Reed Report), in the calculations, and reduces them.
sees no need for further clarification of which claims that there is a lack of Uncertainties must be addressed by this issue. understanding of phenomena and small licensees in any analysis under the
- 13. Comments Received After safety margins. revised rule whether 2D/3D results are Comment Period. Six letters commenting Many of the conclusions of the "Reed available or not. The Commission on the proposed rule were received Report" were valid in 1975 when it was concludes that there is no need to delay subsequent to the end of the comment written and due to this fact it was the final rule, while awaiting these data.
period. The Commission considered difficult to show that sufficient safety margins existed. Most of the research Summary of Rule Changes these comments to the extent that the comments provided substantive discussed in NUREG-1230 has been Section 50.46 Acceptance Criteria for conducted since the "Reed Report" was Emergency Core Cooling Systems for information not previously considered. written and has resulted in significant One commenter believes that the Light Water Reactors. improvement in understanding LOCA proposed § 50.46(a)(2) expands the phenomena. We now know that Section 50.46(a)(l) is amended and discretion of the Director of the Office of significant margin to the ECCS redesignated § 50.46(a)(l)(i) to delete the Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) by acceptance criteria exists, particularly requirement that the features of Section allowing imposition of immediate for the BWR/6 which was of concern in I of Appendix K to Part 50 be used to effective restrictions on reactor the "Reed Report." The contents of this develop the evaluation model. This operation without a prior determination report have been reviewed by the section now requires that an acceptable that such action is required to protect Commission on several occasions, most evaluation model have sufficient the public health, safety, or interest. recently in NUREG-1285, and the finding supporting justification to show that the NRC's intent is not to alter the has been made that no new significant analytical technique realistically responsibilities of the Director of NRR safety issues are identified. For these describes the behavior of the reactor but to simply retain the description of reasons, the NRC is proceeding with this system during a LOCA. The NRC the scope of the authority that is rulemaking, as proposed. expects that the analytical technique currently found in§ 50.46(a)(l)(v). The same commenter also will, to the extent practicable, utilize
- Furthermore, the provisions of recommends that credit for ECCS realistic methods and be based upon
§ 50.46(a)(2) do not specify the margins be taken in the Individual Plant applicable experimental data. The procedure to be followed by the Director Examinations (IPE) and not through amended rule also requires that the of NRR. These procedures are set out in generic rulemaking. uncertainty of the calculation be Part 2 and remain unchanged by this The Commission agrees that plant estimated and accounted for when rulemaking. specific differences may justify the comparing the results of the calculation One commenter believes that the rule application of different margins and that to the temperature limits and other is illegal because it is based solely on these may be addressed through criteria of§ 50.46(b) so that there is a cost savings considerations and that Individual Plant Examinations. high probability that the criteria would there is nothing wrong with large However, the requirement for licensees not be exceeded. The Commission conservatisms. to evaluate ECCS performance and meet expects the realistic evaluation model to The Commission disagrees with this the acceptance criteria specified in 10 retain a degree of conservatism assessment. Safety factors are required CFR 50.46(b) is generic. The Commission consistent with the uncertainty of the to protect the health and safety of the believes that margins that may be calculation. The final rule does not public when uncertainties in plant reduced due to a better understanding of specifically prescribe the analytical response exist. As these uncertainties a reactor's response to a LOCA should methods or uncertainty evaluation are reduced, it is appropriate to modify be applied through a generic rulemaking techniques to be used. However, these safety factors to provide more action because it allows a broad range guidance has been provided in the form 50-SC-57
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSI.DERATION of a Regulatory Guide. 1 In SECY-83-472, replaced as described in the following report is to be filed within one year of the NRC has found acceptable an paragraphs. discovery of the error and must be approach for estimating the 95th Section 50.46(a][2) has been revised to reported each year thereafter until a percentile of the probability distribution. indicte that restrictions on reactor revised evaluation model or a revised This percential is considered adequate operation may be imposed by the evaluation correcting minor errors is to meet the high level of probability Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, approved by the NRC staff.
required by the rule. It is also recognized if the ECC cooling performance Significant errors require more timely that the probability cannot be evaluations are not consistent with the attention since they may be important to determined using totally rigorous requirements of§ 50.46(a][1) [i] and [ii]. the safe operation of the plant and raise mathematical methods due to the This section has been added to retain questions as to the adequacy of the complexity of the calculations. similar requirements that have been overall evaluation model. This final rule deleted from § 50.46(a)(l](i) by this rule defines a significant error or change as However, the NRC requires that any one which results in a calculated peak simplifying assumptions be stated so revision. This section does not specify the procedures to be followed by the fuel cladding temperature different by that the Commission may evaluate them more than 50 °F, or an accumulation of to ensure that they are reasonable. The Director. These procedures are found in Part 2 and are unchanged by this errors and changes such that the sum of NRC has independently developed and the absolute magnitude of the exercised a methodology to estimate the rulemaking. The current rule contains no explicit temperature changes is greater than 50 uncertainty associated with its own °F. More timely reporting (30 days] is thermal-hydraulic safety codes. This requirements concerning reporting and reanalysis when errors in evaluation required for significant errors or methodology is described in the changes. This definition of a significant models are discovered or changes are "Compendium of ECCS Research." 2 made to evaluation models. However, change is based on NRC's judgment This document also provides reference current practice has required reporting concerning the importance of errors and to the large body of relevant thermal- of errors and changes and reanalyses changes typically reported to the NRC in hydraulic research, documents NRC with the revised evaluation models. This the past. This final rule revision also studies on the effects of reactor power final rule explicitly sets forth allows the NRC to determine the increases on risk, and provides requirements to be followed in the event schedule for reanalysis based on the background information on the ECCS of errors or changes. The definition of a importance to safety relative to other rule. While this method has not been significant change is currently taken applicant or licensee requirements. reviewed for acceptability from the from Appendix K, Section 11.1.b which Errors or changes that result in the standpoint of safety licensing, it may defines a significant change as one calculated plant performance exceeding provide additional guidance on how the any of the criteria of§ 50.46[b] mean which changes calculated cladding that the plant is not operating within the uncertainty may be quantified. In temperature by more than 20 °F. addition to providing guidance to requirements of the regulations and The revised§ 50.46(a)(3) states require immediate reporting as required industry, this work was undertaken to specific requirements for reporting and provide a proof of principle and a tool to by § 50.55[e], § 50.72 and§ 50.73 and reanalyses when errors in evaluation immediate steps to bring the plant into independently audit submittals. models are discovered or changes are Appendix K, Section II, "Required compliance with § 50.46. made to evaluation models. It requires Documentation," remains generally that all changes or errors in approved Appendix K EGGS Evaluation Models applicable, with only minor revisions evaluation models be reported at least Amendments have been made to made to be consistent with the amended annually and does not require any Appendix K, Section I.C.5.b, to modify rule. further action by the licensee until the the post-CHF heat transfer correlations A new paragraph (ii] has been added error is reported. Thereafter, although listed as acceptable. The "McDonough" to § 50.46(a][1) to allow the features of reanalysis is not required solely because reference has been replaced with a more Section I of Appendix K to be used in of such minor error, any subsequent recent paper by the same authors evaluation models as an alternative to calculated evaluation of ECCS entitled "An Experimental Study of performing the uncertainty evaluation performance requires use of a model Partial Film Boiling Region With Water specified in the amended § 50.46(a)(l](i). with such error, and any prior errors, at Elevated Pressures in a Round This method would remain acceptable corrected. The NRC needs to be Vertical Tube" which is more generally because Appendix K is conservative apprised of even minor errors or available and which includes additional with respect to the realistic method changes in order to ensure that they data. proposed in the amended § 50.46[a][l)(i). agree with the applicant's or licensee's The heat transfer correlation of This would allow both current and assessment of the siguificance of the Dougall and Rohsenow, listed as an future applicants and licensees to use error or change and to maintain acceptable heat transfer correlation in existing evaluation models if they did cognizance of modifications made Appendix K, paragraph I.C.5.b, has been not need or desire relief from current subsequent to NRC review of the removed, because research performed operaih1g restrictions. evaluation model. Past experience has since Appendix K was written has In § 50.46, paragraphs (a) (2) and (3) shown that many errors or changes to shown that this correlation overpredicts have been revised to eliminate portions evaluation models are very minor and heat transfer coefficients under certain the burden of immediate reporting conditions and therefore can produce of those paragraphs concerned with cannot be justified for these minor nonconservative results. A number of historical implementation of the current applicants and licensees currently use file. These provisions have been errors because they do not affect the immediate safety or operation of the the Dougall-Rohsenow correlation in plant. The NRC therefore requires approved evaluation models. The NRC
'Regulatory Guide, "Best Estimate Calculations of periodic reporting to satisfy NRC's need has concluded that the continued use of Emergency Core Cooling Systems Performance," RG 1.157. to be apprised of changes or errors this correlation can be allowed. This is
'"Compendium of ECCS Research for Realistic without imposing an unnecessary appropriate (even though parts of the LOCA Analysis," NUREG-1230, TBP. burden on the applicant or licensee. This approved evaluation model, Dougall-50-SC-58
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Rohsenow, are known to be the conservatism required to account for either to tailor the power shape within nonconservative) because the existing overall uncertainties in the calculations. the reactor or to increase the total evaluation models are known to contain Appendix K, Section 11.1.b, has been power. Changing the power shape a large degree of overall conservatism removed since this requirement has without changing the total power has a even while using the Dougall-Rohsenow been clarified in the amended negligible effect on the environmental correlation. This large overall § 50.46(a)(3). Likewise, Appendix K, impact. The total power could also be conservatism has been demonstrated Section 11.5, has been amended to increased, but is expected to be through comparisons between account for the fact that not all increased by no more than about 5% due evaluation model calculations and evaluation models will be required to to hardware limitations in existing calculations using NRC's best-estimate use the features of Appendix K, *section plants. This 5% power increase is not computer codes. Thus, requiring that the I. These minor changes to Appendix K expected to cause difficulty in meeting applicants and licensees remove the do not affect any existing approved the existing environmental limits. The Dougall-Rohsenow correlation from evaluation models since the changes are only change in non-radiological waste their current evaluation models cannot either "housekeeping" in nature or are will be an increase in waste heat
- be justified as necessary to maintain changes to "acceptable features," not rejection commensurate with any safety. The stipulation that the Dougall- "required features." increase in power. For stations Rohsenow correlation will cease to be Availability of Documents operating with an open (once through) acceptable for previously approved cooling system, this additional heat will evaluation models applies only when 1. Copies of NUREGs 1230 and 1285 be directed to a surface water body.
changes to the model are made which may be purchased from the Discharge of this heat is regulated under reduce the calculated peak clad Superintendent of Documents, U.S. the Clean Water Act administered by temperature by 50 °For more. However, Government Printing Office, P.O. Box the U.S. Environmental Protection the requirement to report any changes or 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082. Agency (EPA) or designated state culmination of changes, such that the Copies are also available from the agencies. It is not intended that NRC sum of the absolute magnitudes of the National Technical Information Service, approval of increased power level respective temperature changes is 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA affects in any way the responsibility of greater than 50 °F, still applies. 22161. A copy is also available for the licensee to comply with the public inspection and/or copying at the requirements of the Clean Water Act. A new Section I.C.5.c has been added NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L to Appendix K to state the The environmental assessment and Street NW., Washington, DC 20555. finding of no significant impact on Commission's requirements regarding 2. Copies of SECY--83-472, an continued use of the Dougall-Rohsenow which this determination is based are information report entitled "Emergency available for inspection at the NRC correlation in existing evaluation Core Cooling Systems Analysis models. Evaluation models which make Public Document Room, 2120 L Street Methods," dated November 17, 1983, is NW., Washington, DC. Single copies of use of the Dougall-Rohsenow correlation available for inspection and copying at and have been approved prior to the the environmental assessment and the the NRC Public Documents Room, 2120 L finding of no significant impact are effective date of this rule may continue Street NW., Washington, DC 20555. to use this correlation as long as no available from L. M. Shotkin, Office of Single copies of this report may be Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. changes are made to the evaluation obtained by writing L. M. Shotkin, Office model which significantly reduce the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Washington DC 20555, telephone (301) current overall conservatism of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, evaluation model. If the applicant or 492-3530. Washington, DC 20555. licensee submits proposed changes to an 3. Regulatory Guide, "Best Estimate Paperwork Reduction Act Statement approved evaluation model, or submits Calculations of Emergency Core Cooling corrections to errors in the evaluation This final rule amends information Systems Performance, Task RS 701-4, collection requirements that are subject model which significantly reduce the may be obtained by writing to the existing overall conservatism of the to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 Division of Information Support (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These reporting model, continued use of the Dougall- Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Rohsenow correlation under conditions requirements were approved by the Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Office of Management and Budget where nonconservative heat transfer 4. The Paraphrased Summary of
- coefficients result would no longer be (Approval Number 3150-0011).
Public Comments on the ECCS Rule is acceptable. For this purpose, significant available for public inspection at the Regulatory Analysis reduction in overall conservatism has NRC Public Documents Room, 2120 L The Commission has prepared a been defined as a "net" reduction in Street NW., Washington, DC 20555. regulatory analysis for this final calculated peak clad temperature of at regulation. The analysis examines the least 50°F from that which would have Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability costs and benefits of the alternatives been calculated using existing considered by the Commission. The evaluation models. A reduction in The Commission has determined regulatory analysis is available for calculated peak clad temperature could under the National Environmental Policy inspection and copying for a fee at the potentially result in an increase in the Act of 1969, as amended, and the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L actual allowed peak power in the plant. Commission's regulations in Subpart A Street NW., Washington, DC. Single An increase in allowed plant peak of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not a copies of the analysis may be obtained power with a known nonconservatism in major Federal action significantly from L. M. Shotkin, Office of Nuclear the analysis would be unacceptable. affecting the quality of the human Regulatory Research, Washington, DC This definition of a significant reduction environment and therefore an 20555, telephone (301) 492-3530. in overall conservatism is based on a environmental impact statement is not judgment regarding the size of the required. The primary effect of the rule Regulatory Flexibility Certification existing overall conservatism in is to allow an increase in the peak local As required by the Regulatory evaluation model calculations relative to power in the reactor. This could be used Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b ), 50-SC-59
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSI.DERATION the Commission certifies that this rule Whether or not a licensee or applicant reduced. This effect is not expected to will not have a significant economic chooses to use realistic analysis, be very significant.
impact upon a substantial number of complete with an uncertainty analysis, 5. Installation and continuing costs small entities. This rule affects only the each licensee must comply with the associated with the backfit, including licensing and operation of nuclear requirement to report changes to their the cost of facility down times or the power plants. The companies that own evaluation models (i.e'., less than 50°F cost of construction delay. these plants do not fall within the scope change in calculated peak cladding LOCA considerations resulting from of the definition of "small entities" set temperature) annually to the NRC. In the present rule are restricting the forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or addition, significant changes (those optimum production of nuclear electric the Small Business Size Standards set which have a greater than 50°F change power in some plants. These restrictions out in regulations issued by the Small in calculated peak cladding can be placed into the following three Business Administration in 13 CFR Part temperature) have to be reported within categories: 121. Since these companies are 30 days. (1) Maximum plant operating power, dominant in their service areas, this rule 3. Potential change in risk to the (2) Operational flexibility and does not fall within the purview of the public from the accidental offsite operational efficiency of the plant, and Act. release of radioactive materials. (3) Availability of manpower to work The rule could result in increased on other activities. Backlit Analysis The effect of the rule will vary from local power within the reactor core and A backfit analysis is not required by possible increases in total power. Power plant to plant. Some plants may realize 10 CFR 50.109 because the rule does not increases on the order of 5 will have an savings of several million dollars per require applicants or licensees to make insignificant effect on risk. One effect of year in fuel and operating costs. a change but only offers additional increased power could be to increase Significantly greater economic benefit options and provides a clarification and would be realized by plants able to the fission product inventory. A five increase total power as a result of this relaxation of existing reporting percent power increase would result in a requirements. Nonetheless, the factors final rule. The regulatory analysis cited less than five percent increase in fission above indicates that the total present in 10 CFR 50.109[c) have been analyzed products. Thus, less than five percent for the entire rule. value of the energy replacement cost more fission products might be released savings for a five percent power upgrade
- 1. Statement of the specific objectives during core melt scenarios and that the backfit is designed to achieve. would vary between 18 and 127 million potentially released to the environment dollars depending on the plant.
The objective of the rule is to modify during severe accidents. 10 CFR 50.46 and Appendix K to permit Additional information concerning these The rule still requires the fuel rod potential cost savings are included in the use of realistic ECCS evaluation peak cladding temperature (PCT) remain models. More realistic estimates of the regulatory analysis. below 2200°F. Reactors choosing to The costs associated with the new ECCS performance, based on the increase power by about five percent reporting requirements are deemed to be improved knowledge gained from recent will be operating with less margin minimal. Although the existing research on ECCS performance, may between the PCT and the 2200°F limit Appendix K has no official reporting remove unnecessary operating than previously. The increased risk requirements, paragraph 11.1.b was restrictions. Also experience with the represented by this decrease in margin interpreted by the staff to require a previous version of § 50.46 has and increase in fission product reanalysis and report to NRC when demonstrated that a clearer definition of inventory is negligible and falls within significant changes are made which reporting requirements for changes and the uncertainties of PRA risk estimates. change the peak cladding temperature errors is very desirable. In addition, other safety limits, such as by more than 20 °F. Therefore, this rule
- 2. General description of the activity departure from nucleate boiling [DNBJ, change, by changing the definition of that would be required by the licensee and operational limits, such as turbine significant changes to 50 °F, is actually a or applicant in order to complete the design, will limit the amount of margin relaxation of current practices. The backfit. reduction permitted under the rule. The annual reporting of changes that are not The amendment allows alternative rule could also potentially reduce the significant is not viewed by the NRC as methods to be used to demonstrate that risk from pressurized thermal shock by a major burden since no other action is the ECCS would protect the nuclear allowing the reactor to be operated in a required.
reactor core during a postulated design manner which reduces the neutron 6. The potential safety impact of basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). fluence to the vessel. changes in plant or operational While continuing to allow the use of 4. Potential impact on radiological complexity including the effect on other current Appendix K methods and exposure to facility employees. proposed and existing regulatory requirements, the rule also allows the Since the primary effect of the rule requirements. use of more recent information and involves the calculational methods to be There are safety benefits derivable knowledge currently available to used in determining the ECCS cooling from alternative fuel management demonstrate that the ECCS would performance, it is expected that there schemes that could be utilized. The perform its safety function during a will be an insignificant impact on the higher power peaking factors that would LOCA. If an applicant or licensee elects radiological exposure to facility be allowed with the final rule provide to use a new realistic model they will be employees. Because of the reduced greater flexibility for fuel designers required to provide sufficient supporting LOCA restrictions resulting from the when attempting to reduce neutron flux justification to validate the model and new calculations it is possible for the at the vessel wall. This can result in a include comparisons to experimental plant to achieve more efficient operation corresponding reduction in risk from data and estimates of uncertainty. In and improved fuel utilization with pressurized thermal shock. accounting for the uncertainty, the improved maneuvering capabilities. As The reduced cladding temperatures analysis would have to show, with a a result, it is conceivable that there that would be calculated under the high level of probability, that the ECCS could be a reduction in radiological revised rule offers the possibility of performance criteria are not exceeded. exposure if the fuel reloads can be other design and operational changes 50-SC-60
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION that could result from the lower . 8. T~f:; potential impact of differences
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory calculated temperatures. ECCS m facility type, design or age on the Commission is amending its regulations equipment numbers, sizes or relevancy and practicality of the to establish more clearly what surveillance requirements might be back/it. . emergency planning and preparedness reduced and still meet the ECCS design The degree to which the rule would requirements are needed for fuel loading criteria (if not required to meet other affect a particular pl.ant depends on how and low power testing of nuclear power licensing requirements). Another option limited the plant is by the LOCA plants. The rule itself will now require may be to increase the diesel/generator restrictions. General Electric Company NRC findings on the licensee's start time duration. (GE) plants do tend to be limited in emergency plans for dealing with operation by LOCA restrictions and In summary, the effect of this rule on accidents that could affect persons on would benefit from relief from LOCA safety would have both potential site. The Commission's prior practice of restrictions. However, this relief is positive and negative aspects. The already available for most GE plants considering certain offsite elements of potential for reduction of ECCS system through the recently approved SAFER licensee's plans has been modified and capability in existing or new plants is evaluation model. Any additional relief codified in this regard to provide that present. However, several positive due to a rule change would be of little NRC findings will be required before aspects may also be realized under the further benefit. Westinghouse (W) fuel loading or low power testing in final rule. The net effect on safety would plants would appear to directly benefit coordination with offsite personnel and be plant specific. However, the from relaxation of LOCA limits. W agencies so that necessary resources probability of a large break LOCA is so plants represent the largest number of can be applied on site for mitigating and low that the choice of best estimate plants, with 47 plants operating and 10 containing accidents, and so that offsite versus Appendix K would have little additional plants being constructed. W agencies may be kept informed of plant effect on public risk. indicates that most of these plants are events. The rule will also change the
- 7. The estimated resource burden on limited by LOCA considerations. The prior practice, never included in the the NRG associated with the proposed potential benefit for plants of B&W and prior rule itself. of reviewing plans for back/it; and the availability of such CE design is uncertain at this time. prompt public notification in the event resources. 9. Whether the proposed back/it is of an accident. This practice of The major staff resources required interim or final and if interim, the reviewing an offsite element of licensee under the final rule are to review the justification for imposing the proposed emergency plans that has no onsite realistic models and uncertainty back/it on an interim basis. application is being discontinued as not analysis required by the revised ECCS The rule, when made effective, will be necessary for public safety. The rule Rule. Based on previous experience with in final form and not interim form. It will does not change the emergency planning the General Electric Company's SAFER continue to permit the performance of requirements that must be satisfied model and the learning that has resulted ECCS cooling calculations using either before full power operation can be from these efforts, it is estimated that realistic models or models in accord authorized. No new requirements are approximately one staff year would be with Appendix K. being imposed by the rule beyond those required to review each generic model that have been previously required by List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 rule and by prior NRC practice. The rule submitted. There are four major reactor Antitrust, Classified information, Fire makes clear that no offsite elements of vendors (GE already has a revised prevention, Incorporation by reference, the applicant's emergency plan, other evaluation model approved under the Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear than those set forth in this revised rule, existing Appendix K for both jet pump power plants and reactors, Penalty, and non-jet pump plants and may need be considered in connection with Radiation protection, Reactor siting low power licensing.
update their methodology under this crite ia, Reporting and Recordkeeping new rule) and several fuel suppliers and 7 reqmrements. EFFECTIVE DATE: October 24, 1988. utilities which perform their own For the reasons set out in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: analyses and potentially might submit preamble and under the authority of the Carole F. Kagan, Office of the General generic models for review. However, it Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory is expected that only 3 or 4 generic Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Commission, Washington, DC 20555; models would be submitted since not all Telephone (301) 492-1632, or Michael T. plants would benefit from this rule. as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear Thus, about 3-4 staff years would be Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear required to review the expected generic amendments to 10 CFR Part 50. Regulatory Commission, Washington, models. Once a generic model is DC 20555; Telephone (301) 492-3918. approved, the plant specific review is 53 FR 36955 very short. In addition, several vendors Published 9/23/88 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Effective 10/24/88 I. Background are currently planning to submit realistic models in conjunction with the use of 10 CFR Part 50 On May 9, 1988, the Commission
- SECY-83-472. Therefore, staff resources published in the Federal Register (53 FR would be expended to review these 16435) a notice of proposed rulemaking models in any event. Since these models Emergency Planning and Preparedness Requirements for which would establish more clearly would not change as a result of the what emergency planning and revised ECCS rule, there should be no Nuclear Power Plant Fuel Loading and Low-Power Testing preparedness requirements are needed net increase in resources required over for fuel loading and low power testing of that already planned to be expended. In nuclear power plants. As detailed in the summary, while it is difficult to estimate AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory notice of proposed rulemaking, 10 CFR accurately, it is expected that the rule Commission. 50.47(d) as promulgated on July 13, 1982 change will have a small overall impact (47 FR 30232) provided that only a on NRC resources.
- ACTION: Final rule.
finding as to the adequacy of an 50-SC-61
PART 50
- STATEMENTS Of CONSIDERATION applicant's onsite emergency planning rule indicated that the Commission saw on operation over a short time frame.
and preparedness is required for low no need to review those aspects of However, there is no time limit for low power. However, the provision in the applicants' plans that did not have a power testing. Statement of Considerations that direct relationship to onsite dose effects Response. For many years, systems for prompt notice to the public in light of the significantly less risk to. Commission policy has been to issue in the event of an accident would also offsite persons presented by fuel loadmg separate "low power" licenses which be reviewed before low power focused and low power testiJ;ig as contrasted allow a plant to load fuel and perform on protection of persons off site. The with full power operation. On testing and operator training at power Statement of Considerations for the 1982 reexamination in light of public levels up to 5 percent whenever to do so rule change gave no clear and consistent comment, the Commission has would expedite the licensing process rationale for why the particular element reaffirmed the safety conclusion that the without prejudicing the rights of any dealing with public notification should safety risk to the public from low power intervening parties. The purpose of the be included. The foundation for that testing is significantly less than the risk low power test program is to rulemaking was the Commission's to the public from full power operation. demonstrate that the overall plant determination, described in more detail Accordingly, the rule is being issued in performance conforms to the established below, that the degree of emergency final form substantially as proposed. design criteria and to confirm the planning and preparedness necessary to However, a number of changes have operability of plant systems and design provide adequate protection of the been made in the rule in response to features that could not be completely public health and safety is significantly public comments. tested during the preoperational test
- less than that required for full power II. Analysis of Public Comments phase. Tests that are performed during opera lion in light of the significantly the program are specific to the type of Nearly 1700 comments were received light-water reactor (boiling water lower risks associated with even low on the proposed rulemaking. The likelihood accidents at that stage (47 FR reactor versus pressurized water overwhelming majority were from reactor), but typically include_
30233 and note 1). Thus, the stated private citizens, mostly in the New rationale for the 1982 rule would seem to determination of in-core flux England area. Comments also came distribution, moderator temperature undercut the need for any prompt public from utilities, industry groups, State and notification requirement. coefficients, control rod worths and local government agencies and officials, adequacy of neutron instrumentation The Commission indicated in 1982 members of Congress, one Federal that, although at low power plant and associated protective functions. agency and several local and national Also, during this time operators obtain operators typically have less experience environmental groups. The comments and there is a greater potential for some valuable additional training ran approximately two to one in favor of manipulating the controls of the reactor undiscovered defects, the risk to public promulgation of the proposed rule. Of health and safety at low power is at low power levels. In practice, many of those opposed, approximately 500 were these tests and manipulations are significantly lower than at full power as form letters from residents of the area a result of several factors. Those performed with the reactor at less than 1 surrounding the Seabrook nuclear power percent of rated power, and those tests reasons were stated by the Commission plant. The remaining 60 to 70 comments as follows: First, the fission product and manipulations which are performed in opposition were from private citizens, with the reactor at "peak" low power inventory during low power testing is State and local government officials and much less than during higher power (typically 3 percent to 4 percent of rated environmental groups. The comments in power) are completed within a day or operation due to the low level of reactor favor came primarily from private power and short period of operation. two. Based on experience with U.S. citizens, with a sprinkling from utilities, Second, at low power there is a commercial power plant startup test nuclear industry organizations, one local significant reduction in the required programs, the period over which a government official and one Federal
- capacity of systems designed to mitigate reactor would actually operate at or agency.
the consequences of accidents compared Because of the large volume of near 5 percent power during the low to the required capacities under full comments received, it would be power test program is expected to be at power operation. impractical to discuss each individually. most a few weeks; likewise, operation at Third, the time available for taking The great majority of comments, both 5 percent power beyond these few actions to identify accident causes and for and against the proposed rule, turned weeks would not be economically mitigate accident consequences is much feasible. The safety evaluation on the commenter's opinion on the supporting this rule assumes that longer than at full power. This means impact of the rule on licensing the that operators should have sufficient operation under the rule would be Seabrook facility. Most of the consistent with this prior history and time to prevent a radioactive release individuals who wrote in support of the from occurring. In the worst case, the practice. To further clarify this point, rule expressed the opinion that the low power licenses issued under this additionaftime available (at least 10 facility was ready to be licensed, that rule will be for purposes of fuel loading hours], even for a postulated low the power the facility would generate and low power testing and operator likelihood sequence which could was needed, and that licensing should training only: steady-state operation at eventually result in release of the fission not be allowed to be held up by political or near 5 percent for the full license term products accumulated at low power into forces. Most commenters in favor of the would not be authorized. the containment, would allow adequate rule also expressed the opinion that the precautionary actions to be taken to risks to the public from low power Comment 2. The technical basis for protect the public near the site (47 FR testing were considerably less than both the current rule and the 1982 rule is 30233). those from full power operation, and flawed in that, at 5 percent power, The safety basis for the 1982 rule was that prompt emergency notification to substantial inventories of biologically reviewed as a necessary part of the the general public should not be significant fission products will be instant proposed rulemaking. The necessary at low power. developed in from eight to forty days. Commission reexamined the need at low Thus, while the inventory of all The significant comments against the power to review those aspects of rule fall within the scope of fifteen radionuclides developed during low applicants' onsite plans that seem separate major comments. These major power testing is reduced compared to relevant only to offsite protective full power operation, the inventory of comments and the Commission's radionuclides with public health measures that might be needed if there response to them are set forth below. were an accident with offsite dose significance still poses a substantial Comment 1. The risk assessments prompt public health hazard. In effects (53 FR 16436-7). The proposed upon which the rule is _based are based addition, the inexperience of the 50-SC-62
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION operators during low power testing and hypothetically that an offsite release which played a central role in the the newness of the system create a would occur: it is based solely on an accident at Chernobyl, are generally greater potential for undiscovered analysis of the likelihood that an offsite absent in U.S. reactors. Where they are defects and incidents. release could occur and of the possible present, they have a limited reactivity Response. Yes, there are some magnitude of that release. However, as insertion potential, which precludes biologically significant fission products an additional, separate consideration, their causing any significant reactivity generated in the reactor core during the the Commission al90 believes that, in transient and power level increase.
low power operation contemplated by the worst case, the additional time Substantial required shutdown this rule. But, although during low power available (at least 10 hours), even for a reactivity margins in conjunction with testing plant operators typically have postulated low likelihood sequence fast automatic insertion of control rods less experience and there is a greater which could eventually result in release on signals Indicative of unsafe potential for undiscovered defects, the of the fission products accumulated at conditions provide protection against risk at low power is still sufficiently low low power into the containment, would the occurrence of reactivity excursions, to provide reasonable assurance that allow notification of both onsite and such as that which took place at public health and safety is protected offsite emergency response Chernobyl, in commercial U.S. reactors. even in the absence of the requirement organizations. These organizations U.S. light-water reactors do not have the for a prompt notification system and would likely have adequate time to inherent potential to rapidly elevate other purely offsite elements of implement some offsite response should their reactor power to levels at which emergency plans. This is a result of that be necessary. Without a prompt plant risk becomes significant. three factors, which were stated earlier public notification system in place and Additionally, the Chernobyl reactor by the Commission and which the an approved and tested offsite operated at full power prior to its Commission reaffirms in this rulemaking emergency plan, there obviously cannot accident. Therefore, the buildup of as follows: First, the fission product be the same kind ofreasonable fission product inventory was much inventory during initial low power assurance of offsite protective measures higher than the buildup of fission testing is much less than during higher that there would be with a fully product inventory at U.S. reactor power operation due to the low level of reviewed and tested offsite emergency reactor power and short period of operating under a fuel loading or low plan should there be an offsite release at power testing license. operation at this power level. The low power. However, given the available inventory of fission products extremely low likelihood of any Comment 5. Low power licensing fails that are significant contributors to accident resulting in significant offsite the cost-benefit analysis required by public health consequences would be releases, the requirements for NEPA. reduced by about a factor of 20 for procedures to notify emergency Response. This issue falls outside the continuous operation at 5 percent power response organizations and the scope of this rulemaking, which is only compared to continuous full power additional time that will likely be designed to address the requirements operation. However, as explained available would provide sufficient time under the Atomic Energy Act for above, based on experience with emergency planning at fuel loading and for the emergency response commercial nuclear power plant startup low power. The establishment of these organizations to implement some form safety requirements does not have a test programs, operation at or near 5 of public notification and to carry out percent power is only expected for a some reasonably effective offsite significant environmental impact under NEPA. The question of the correct NEPA .
- maximum of a few weeks. This would emergency response, even if such a result in a further reduction in available analysis to be done in support of a low release were to eventually occur. power license for any specific facility is fission product inventory. Second, at Comment 3. Testing at low power is low power there is a significant made by case-by-case determination, riskier than full power operation and is not the subject of this rulemaking.
reduction in the required capacity of systems designed to mitigate the because it involves deliberately Comment 6. A low power license consequences of accidents compared to defeating safety systems. should not be issued where it is not the required capacities under full power Response. While some selected safety certain that a full power license will operation. For example, the coolant flow systems may be disabled during low ever be granted. The Shoreham reactor required to dissipate decay heat at 10 power testing, the heat load and fission was irradiated unnecessarily. hours following a loss of coolant product inventory are significantly less Response. This again is an issue that accident in a typical pressurized water than at full power. There are a number is not the subject of this generic reactor would be less than 10 gallons of methods available to remove this rulemaking. In the past the Commission per minute, which is well within the very low heat load generated at low has addressed this issue in individual capacity of normal make-up systems. power. In addition, special procedures adjudicatory opinions, e.g., Long Island Most of the regulatory requirements for are developed and followed for these Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear safety systems during reactor power tests, which are closely monitored by Power Station), CLl-85-12, 21 NRC 1587 operation, including containment plant personnel. Therefore, because of (1985), and does not believe that the integrity, emergency core cooling, and the reduced heat load, small fission issue warrants resolution generically by redundant power supplies, are the same product inventory and special attention rulemaking. for 5 percent power operation as they by plant operators, testing at low power Comment 7. The proposed rule states are for 100 percent power. Third, the does not place the plant at greater risk t_hat the safety analysis performed in time available for taking actions to and presents a significantly lesser risk 1982 is still valid. After performing that identify accident causes and mitigate than does full power operation. analysis, the NRC decided to require accident consequences is much longer that certain offsite aspects of emergency Comment 4. The Chernobyl accident plans be in place prior to low power than at full power. This means the occurred while the reactor was at low operators should have sufficient time to licensing. The NRC has given no power. Why does the NRC still say that rationale for changing the rule, while prevent a radioactive release from the risk of low power testing is low? occurring. admitting that the previous analysis is Response. The reactor physics valid. The above safety evaluation makes no characteristics of U.S. light-water assumptions about the time that would Response. One reason for this rule reactors are very different from those of change is to clarify language in the rule be needed to notify the public off site the.graphite-moderated RBMK type of itself that can easily be read to suggest and to implement an offsite emergency response if one would assume reactor at Chernobyl. Positive void (and that no offsite emergency planning moderator temperature) coefficients, elements need to be reviewed prior to 50-SC-63
PART 50
- STATEMENTS 0-F CONSIDERATION fuel loading or low power testing. The unnecessarily if an accident were to regulations (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 1982 safety analysis supported the occur at low power. It was in response 10 CFR 50.47(c), 10 CFR 50.54(q)) provide proposition that those offsite aspects of to this comment that the Commission that emergency plan requirements will emergency planning which are pertinent agreed to review, and will continue to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
to protecting persons on site need be review, certain offsite notification In making this determination the considered prior to low power. This rule elements of emergency plans prior to guidance of NRC Regulatory Guide 2.6 change will incorporate this important low power testing. In particular, prior to and American National Standards safety consideration. low power, means to keep state and Institute/ American Nuclear Society The provision in the 1982 rulemaking local response organizations informed in 15.16 is used. In accordance with this which is being reconsidered is the the event of an onsite accident will be guidance, and based on the relatively provision in the Supplemental reviewed and approved. These small risks posed by typical research Information that systems for prompt organizations, through. normal reactors, (i.e., less than 50 megawatts) notification of the public in the event of communication mechanisms, have the emergency planning involving offsite an accident should be in place and capability to inform the public, if state and local plans and public reviewed at low power. However, this needed, in order to avert panic. notification has not been required. The change is consistent with the 1982 safety However, the Commission has found guidance does, however, provide for analysis. Plans will still be required for that the immediate direct notification of consideration of more extensive notification of offsite planning and the pubiic call~d fo~ by the language in planning, including all or a portion of the
- response agencies so that these agencies the 1982 rule preamble is far in excess of requirements listed in section IV of 10 and licensees may, as appropriate, keep what is necessary to keep the public CFR Part 50, Appendix E for research the media and the public informed. But informed. reactors with power levels greater than given the relatively low risk to the Comment 11. The change in proposed 50 megawatts. This graded approach to
,public from low power operation, a § 50.47(d)(5) to modify the requirement required emergency planning is requirement for prompt notification of for provisions for monitoring offsite consistent with the current rule. the public is far in excess of what is consequences from "in use" to Comment 13. The Atomic Energy Act reasonably needed. Nothing in the 1982 "available" will create unacceptable prohibits authorization of low power rulemaking logically supports the delay in the identification of an actual testing prior to completion pf public contrary. or potential hazard to the public hearings on all issues material to full Comment 8. The NRC has previously stemming from a radiological power licensing. stated that review of the licensee's emergency. Response. This comment is more onsite response mechanism will Response. The final rule will retain properly addressed to § 50.57(c), which necessarily include aspects of some the phrase "in use". The wording change provides for low power licenses and offsite elements. Why is the NRC in the proposed rule was not intended to which is not being.amended here. That changing this position? change current NRC staff practice of section provides that a hearing is Response. See the Response to reviewing licensee onsite plans to required prior to low power on those Concern 7. The NRC is not changing its assure they meet the intent of contentions "relevant to the activity to expert conclusion as to the lower level § 50.47(b)(9) and Planning Standard I of be authorized"-that is, low power of risk from low power operation. NUREG-o654 prior to issuance of an testing, as opposed to full power However, this rulemaking is a more operating license limited to fuel loading operation. logical result of this expert conclusion and low power testing. While the safety Comment 14. The proposed rule was than the positions stated in the 1982 evaluation which supports the designed to allow 'the Seabrook facility Supplemental Information. elimination of the prompt public to receive its low power license. The Comment 9. The new rule does not notification requirement for low power Commission should promulgate a rule to address the risk of a terrorist attack or suggests that an offsite release is promote the public health and safety sabotage at low power. extremely unlikely, the Commission still and not one designed to license a Response. Prior to receiving a low considers it prudent to have release *specific facility. The issue should be power license, a licensee must fully _monitoring equipment in use on site so addressed in the pending Seabrook meet the requirements of.10 CFR 73.55. that, at a minimum, the licensee is in a adjudication, not in a rulemaking. These requirements assure the position to verify objectively that no Response. In the proposed rule, the implementation of an acceptable release has occurred. Commission stated that its attention security plan around a nuclear power Comment 12. The original rule was focused on the emergency planning plant. These are the same security justified retention of emergency requirements for low power testing requirements that a licensee must meet planning for research reactors, but not because of an Appeal Board decision in prior to receiving a full power license. for commercial reactors, since research reactors were perceived to be located in the Seabrook operating license While the risk from terrorism or proceeding,ALAB-883.And,forthe sabotage cannot be quantified, it is the areas of high population density. This near term, the only reasonably Commission's judgment that compliance contradicts the Commission's current posture that the relatively lower risks of foreseeable effect of the rule change will with § 73.55 will reasonably assure that be on the Seabrook low power the risk from terrorism or sabotage at low power testing justify elimination of offsite safety measures, since it application. But this does not make the low power is sufficiently low so as not use of rulemaking inappropriate. As the to undercut the conclusion that low concedes that there is an accident risk at low power serious enough that a Commission explained, the rule change power safety risks to the offsite public was proposed to correct a possible are relatively low. research reactor (much smaller than a power reactor) needs a full emergency discrepancy between the language of the Comment 10. The risks of an accident 1982 rule and the language of the at low power are not confined to those plan. Response. The premise for the Statement of Considerations which onsite. If an accident were to occur at potentially affects all license applicants, low power, public panic could ensue. comment that research reactors with power levels approximating those of not just the applicants for Seabrook. Response. The Commission responded Also, the questions involved in the to a similar comment in promulgating commercial nuclear power plants operating at 5 percent of full power are proposed rule are generic safety the 1982 rule. See Issue 6, 47 FR at 30234. questions and the Commission preferred The Commission is not unmindful that, required to have approved offsite emergency plans is incorrect. Rather to obtain (and, in fact, did obtain) a regardless of the objective lack of broad spectrum of public comment, danger, members of the public may be than requiring a "full emergency plan" for research reactors, the Commission's rather than just the comments of the made uneasy and could panic litigants in the Seabrook proceeding. 50-SC-64
PART 50
- STATEMENTS Of CONSIDERATION The Commission is free to address a Commission's regulations in Subpart A List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 generic issue generically, even if the rule 9f 10 CFR Part 51, this rule, if adopted, Antitrust, Classified information, Fire ch~~ge may currently apply only to one would not be a major Federal action protection, Intergovernmental relations, fac1hty. See, e.g., Siegel v. Atomic significantly affecting the quality of the Nuclear power plants and reactors, E1:ergy Commission, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. human environment and therefore an Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor Cir. 1968). Also see Securities and environmental impact statement is not siting criteria, Reporting record. keeping Exchange Commission v:*chenery, 332 required. The envir~nmental assessment requirements.
U.S.194, 202 (1947) (choice of how to and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are For the reasons set out in the proceed lies within the informed preamble and under the authority of the discretion of the agency). available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, The rule is not intended to overrule the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Public Service Company of New NW., Washington, DC 20555. as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, Hampshire, et al. (Seabrook Station, Paperwork Reduction Act Statement the Commission is adopting the Units 1 and 2), CLl-87-2, 25 NRC 267 or following amendments to Part 50. CLl-87-3, 25 NRC 875 (1987). This final rule does not contain a new Comment 15. Members of the public or amended information collection 53 FR42939 may need immediate medical attention requirement subject to the Paperwork
. Published 10/25/88 in the event of an accident at low Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et Effective 10/25/88 power. The new rule does not provide seq.). Existing requirements were that arrangements for medical services approved by the Office of Management 10 CFR Part 50 will be in place for those off site. and Budget, approval number 3150-0011.
Response. The purpose for the Licensee Announcements of Regulatory Analysis requirement in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12) that Inspectors arrangements for medical services be The Commission has prepared a made was described in the "
SUMMARY
" regulatory analysis for this final AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory section of the Commission's policy regulation. The analysis examines the 'Commission. statement on medical services (51 FR costs and benefits of the alternatives ACTION: Final rule. 32904) dated September 17, 1986, as considered by the Commission. The follows: analysis is available for inspection in
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory The Nuclear Regulatory Commission the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Commission is amending its regulations
- ["NRG" or "Commission") believes that 10 Street NW., Washington, DC. Single to ensure that the presence of NRC CFR 50.47(b](1Z) ("planning standard (b)(1Z)") copies of the analysis may be obtained inspectors on nuclear power reactor requires pre-accident arrangements for from Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of sites is not widely communicated or medical services (beyond the maintenance of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.
a list of treatment facilities) for individuals broadcast to licensee and contractor Nuclear Regulatory Commission, personnel without the expressed request who might be severely exposed to dangerous Washington, DC 20555; Telephone (301) levels of offsite radiation following an to do so by the inspector. This change accident at a nuclear power plant. 492-3918. will allow the NRC inspectors, badged
;However, it is highly unlikely that Regulatory Flexibility Certification at the facility, to observe ongoing
- members of the general public would be a~tivities as they are being performed This final rule will not have a without advanced notification of the exposed to dangerous levels of radiation significant impact on a substantial following an accident at 'low power. inspection to licensee and contractor number of small entities. The final rule Therefore, the safety premise for the full personnel. There is a need for this will reduce or at least postpone the power requirement that arrangements burden on NRC licensees by reducing change because of the possible altering
'be made for medical services does not the process required before a low power of attention and performance levels of a apply to fuel loading or low power licensee and/ or its contractors when the license may be granted. Nuclear power testing. plant licensees do not fall within the licensee is aware of NRC surveillance.
Past occurrences where site and/ or Conclusion definition of small businesses in section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. contractor personnel have been notified As indicated in the responses to the of NRC's presence on site have 632, the Small Business Size Standards comments, the Commission has decided heightened concern in this area. of the Small Business Administration in to proceed with the proposed rule 13 CFR Part 121, or the Commission's EFFECTIVE DATE: October 25, 1988. change with some clarifications and Size Standards published at 50 FR 50241 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ,coNTACT: modifications. The rule reconciles a (Dec. 9, 1985). Therefore, in accordance George Barber, Office of Nuclear discrepancy between the language of the with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Commission's 1982 emergency planning 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission ,Regulatory Commission, Washington, rule change and the language of the Supplemental Information and provides here by certifies that the final rule will pc 20555, Telephone (301) 4,92-1234. not have a significant economic impact SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: an interpretation of that rule which on a substantial number of small entities appears to be fully consistent with the I. Background and that, therefore, a regulatory Commission's goals and safety flexibility analysis need not be By clarifying the meaning and intent conclusions in 1982. The majority of the prepared. of 10 CFR 50.70(b)[3), this final rule public, as expressed in the comments, should ensure that NRC inspectors will supports the rule. The comments Backfit Analysis be granted immediate and unannounced opposing the rule have given no sound access to licensee facilities so as to The NRC has determined that the reasons for the Commission to alter its provide the inspector with unfettered backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not basic course. apply to this final rule, and therefore, access equivalent to that provided a Finding of No Significant Environmental that a backfit analysis is not required for regular plant employee following proper Impact: Availability this final rule because these identification and compliance with amendme_!l~S do not involve any applicable access control procedures. The Commission has determined that This rule provides that no access control under the National Environmental Policy provisions whi-ch would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1). measures or other means may be Act of 1969, as amended, and the employed by the licensee or its 50-SC-65
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION contractors to intentionally give notice that licensees are not acting properly. It regulation does not impermissively to other persons of the arrival and is human nature for an individual to be intrude upon freedom of speech presence of an NRC inspector at a more conscious of his or her protected by the First Amendment to the facility, unless the licensee is performance when the individual Cons ti tu lion. specifically requested to do so by the realizes he or she is being observed. The The regulation does not raise any . NRC inspector. There have been NRC inspection program evaluates significant Fourth Amendment . instances in the past at several facilities licensee performance on the basis of a considerations. The Atomic Energy Act that compromised the ability of properly sampling of its activities. It is critical creates a pervasive regulatory scheme badged NRC inspectors to inspect and .that the sampling portion of the that puts licensees on clear notice that access, on an unannounced basis, licensee's activities that are relied upon they will be subject to inspection, and activities related to the license or for this evaluation be representative of the granting of a license is conditioned construction permit when licensee its overall activities. Therefore, the rule on consent to reasonable inspections. employees or contractor employees is more prophylactic than proscriptive, Thus, NRC inspections of licensees' informed others at the facility of the although it does carry enforcement premises, activities and records do not presence of the NRC inspectors. This sanctions should it be violated. require a warrant under the Fourth change to 10 CFR 50.70 is to clarify that Recognizing the possibility of Amendment. United States Nuclear NRC inspectors, badged at the facility, inadvertent communication of an Regulatory Commission vs Radiation have immediate, unescorted access to inspector's presence, the NRC expects to Technology, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1266, ongoing activities as these activities are reserve enforcement action for 1288-91 (D.N.J. 1981): Union Electric Co. being performed without advanced significant intentional violations of the (Callaway Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-notification of the inspection. This is rule. An honest response by an 527, 9 NRC 126, 139-41 (1979). The new especially important during non-normal employee to an innocent inquiry that regulation is a reasonable exercise of business hours when operating he/she just saw an NRC inspector is not the Commission's inspection authority. personnel might assume NRC inspectors within the proscriptive perimeter of the Inspectors will continue to identify would not be on site. rule. Therefore, an employee would not themselves and comply with other be required to lie, in response to a .reasonable access control measures II. Summary of Comments question, about the presence of an NRC and, as always, inspections will be On March 18, 1988, the Commission inspector. Based on this discussion, conducted for purposes authorized published in the Federal Register (53 FR formalized training will not be under the Atomic Energy Act and the 8924) a notice of proposed' rulemaking necessary, and NRC Form 3 need not be Energy Reorganization Act. The on "Licensee Announcement of modified to reflect this requirement. regulation does not run afoul of the Inspectors." The Commission invited the The NRC does not agree that this rule Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. public to comment on the proposed rule will prevent management from performing its safety functions. It should Comment. A number of commenters and received six letters of comment by suggested that the rule be implemented April 18, 1988 (the specified closing date be noted the rule does not affect software security systems which only by written request of the NRC for public comments). After April 18, inspector. 1988, 26 additional letters of comments monitor the presence of persons in certain areas. Such systems should NRG Response. NRC rejects the were-received. All 3fietters of suggestion. With this suggested comments were considered in NRC's provide the licensee with needed jinformation on space occupancy in the modification, the rule would only apply review of this final rule. The comments to those individuals who had been given are discussed below. ;case of an emergency or evacuation. For those licensees who havl) these systems notice of the NRC inspector's presence Comment. A majority of the 1in place, or will put them in place, the on site. If implemented, this suggestion commenters believed the rule was lrule does not affect such systems. If a would defeat the intent of the rule.. unnecessary and characterized it as being too broad and vague. They 1licensee were, however, to design or Environmental Impact: Categorical asserted that it: was redundant with modify these systems (or use them) for Exclusion current regulations; would lead to unfair the purpose of monitoring the NRC and impractical enforcement; be inspector's movements in order to alert The NRC has determined that this impossible to implement; inhibit other plant personnel of the inspector's change is the type of action described in inspector assistance by plant personnel; whereabouts, those actions would categorical exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(c)(2). limit the ability of facility management violate the rule.
- Therefore neither an environmental to perform their safety functions; In sum, the licensee is prohibited from impact statement nor an environmental promote lying among the facility staff; taking affirmative action which would assessment has been prepared for this require formal training and compromise the NRC inspector's final rule.
. recordkeeping; and indicates a distrust mission of gaining unfettered access to Paperwork Reduction Act Statement of licensees. the plant and its various areas of NRG Response. NRC does not agree interest to the inspector. The final rule does not contain a new with the comments, but to ensure that Comment. Some commenters or amended information collection the intent of the rule is clear and expressed a concern that the rule could requirement subject to the Paperwork focused, adds the following clarification raise Constitutional questions under the Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et of the rule. The intent of this rule is to First and Fourth Amendments. seq.). Existing requirements were prevent site and contractor personnel NRG Response. As discussed above, approved by the Office of Management from widespread dissemination or the purpose of the rule is to enhance the and Budget approval number 3150--0011.
broadcasting the presence of an NRC credibility of the inspection process. Regulatory Analysis inspector. Broadcasting, as used here, is Inspections are specifically authorized defined as unsolicited one-way under section 1610 of the Atomic Energy This final rule will have no significant communications. Implementing or Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. impact on state and local governments enforcing this rule should be no more 2201(0). The regulation is narrowly and geographical regions. It may have a difficult than implementing or enforcing drawn to achieve a legitimate significant impact on health, safety, and any rule that involves personnel governmental interest (effective NRC the environment, but only in the sense of performance. inspections) without infringing on an preventing adverse impacts on health, Adopting this rule does not indicate a individual's right to express ideas and safety, and the environment through predisposition on the part of the NRC opinions on any subject. Thus, the more effective inspections. The rule will 50-SC-66
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION make it clear that NRC inspectors are to paragraph. In this enforcement action. 53 FR 43419 have a realistic picture of the actual over 30 licensee personnel, both Published 10/27/88 conditions at a site during the inspection management and staff were cited for Effective 10/27/88 process and, therefore. be better able to inattention to duty. The primary concern was sleeping on watch. It is not difficult Relocation of NRC's Public Document identify potentially dangerous Room; Other Minor Nomenclature conditions and/or practices for to envision accidents that could occur Changes corrective action and to ensure that because of this type of licensee licensees comply with laws, regulations, performance. See Part 1 Statements of Consideration and orders administered by the NRC. Coupling inattention to duty with This constitutes the regulatory analysis equipment failure adds a new dimension 53 FR 45890 for this final rule. to the risk of accidents occurring which Published 11/15/88 could lead to the off-site release of Effective 11/15/88 Regulatory Flexibility Certification radioactive material. In the enforcement 10 CFR Part 50 In accordance with the Regulatory action mentioned above, had the Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605!b), the licensee announced the presence of the Alternative Method for Leaka!~e Rate Commission certifies thut this final rule NRC inspector, the inattention to duty Testing does not have a significant economic would have gone unnoticed. It should be impact on a substantial number of small noted that the licensee facility where AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory entities. The final rule applies only to this incident occurred did, on one past Commission. licensees authorized to construct or occasion, announce the presence of NRC ACTION: Final rule. operate nuclear power reactors, who are inspectors.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory not small business entities within the * (4} Not appropriate. There is no Commission (NRC) is amending its meaning of the act or implementing radiological exposure of faci'ity regulations to modify the requirements regulations. Therefore, a regulatory employees resulting from the rule's applicable to the leakage testing of flexibility analysis has not heen implementation. containments of light-water-cooled prepared. (5) Very minor costs are associated
- nuclear power plants. The rule explicitly with the rule's implementation. There permits the use of a new statistical data Backfit Analysis are no training requirements or record analysis technique that the NRC The NRC has determined that the keeping requirements associated with considers to be an acoeptable method of backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does apply this rule. The only cost to the licensee calculating containment leakage rates in to this final rule. The backfit analysis for would be communicating this ru!e to its addition to previously acceptable announcement of inspectors rule in employees and contractors. methods.
accordance with each of the factors (6) Not appropriate. There is no EFFECTIVE DATE: November 15, 1988. specified in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(ii)(c) is potential safety impact of changes in as follows: FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CC:*NTACT: plant or operational complexity Mr. E. Gunter Arndt, Office of Nuclear (1) This rule provides that no means associated with this rule. may be employed by the licensee or its Regulatory Research, U.S. Nudear (7) Not appropriate. There is no Regulatory Commission, Washington, contractors to intentionally give notice resource burden on the NRC from the to other persons of the arrival and DC 20555, telephone 301-492-3814. implementation of this rule. presence of a NRC inspector at a SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATIO~I: facility, unless the licensee is (8) Not appropriate. There is no potential impact of differences in facility Background specificaily requested to do so by the NRC inspector. type. design or age on the relevancy and The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2) The licensee will have to practicality of the proposed backfit. is amending 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, communicate the requirements of this (9) The proposed backfit is final. "Primary Containment Leakage Testing rule to its personnel and to contractor Conclusion for Water-Cooled Power Reac:tors," to personnel working at its site. explicitly permit the use of the Mass (3) The purpose of this rule is to Based on the above analysis, the Point statistical data analysis method enhance the credibility of the inspection Commission concludes that there is a for calculating containment le!akage process. By requiring that the presence substantial increase in the overall rates. The Mass Point method involves of NRC inspectors (either resident or off protection of the public health and calculation of the air mass at a series of site) is not announced, the NRC. public safety or the common defense and points in time and the plotting of mass and licensees will have more confidence security to be derived from this backfit against time. A linear regression line is. that the activities inspectors are and that the direct and indirect costs of plotted through the mass-time points witnessing are representative of licensee implementation for facilities are justified using a least squares fit. The slope of performance. Ensuring that NRC in view of this increased protection. this line is divided by the int1ircept of inspectors are witnessing representative List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 this line, and the result is multiplied by. licensee performance could an appropriate constant to obtain the substantially increase the likelihood that Antitrust, Classified information. Fire calculated leakage rate. NRC inspectors will discover unsafe or protection. Incorpora lion by reference. This Mass Point method was potentially unsafe practices, bring about Intergovernmental relations. Nuclear incorporated in a newer ANB.I standard, corrective actions and thereby lower the power plants and reactors. Penalty, ANSI/ ANS-56.8-1981, "Containment risk of accidents occurring which could Radiation protection, Reactor siting System Leakage Testing Requirements" lead to the accidental off-site release of criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping (revised 1987) and in fact ha11 been radioactive material. requirements. accepted by the NRC staff as an It is not possible, without before and For the reasons set out in the improved alternative method of
.after data, to quantitatively evaluate the preamble and under the authority of the calculating containment leakage rates .
benefits of implementing this rule. Still. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 2menc!ed, However, it was recently rec.ognized by a recent significant enforcement action the Energy Reorganization Act cf 1974, the NRC staff that a strict interpretation concerning licensee employee's as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553. of the specific wording of Appendix' J, inattention to dutv demonstrates the the NRC is to adopt the following III.A.3, by referencing only tl1e older premise advanced in the above amendment to 10 CFR Part 50. ANSI standard, would preclude use of 50-SC-67
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION the newer, improved method. To keep the wording the same as in the
- If this comment were to be followed, alleviate this restriction on the use of an proposed revision. A brief summary of the effect would be to incorporate by improved alternative methodology, it is the comments received is set out in the reference into 10 CFR Part 50 the exact necessary to clarify the language in following paragraphs.
- Mass Point analysis as defined in ANSI/
Section III.A.3 to explicitly permit the ANS 56.S-1987, along with the portions use of the newer Mass Point method in Summary of Public Comments of that standard that are relevant to addition to the earlier methods covered Twenty-one comtnent letters were setting the conditions of use of this by ANSI N45.4-1972.1 received. In general, three principal analysis. The existence of proposed A proposed rule concerning the comments were presented. regulatory guide MS 021-5 demonstrates addition of the Mass Point method was
- First, all conimentors supported the that this degree of compatibility published for comment on February 29, addition of the Mass Point analysis to between ANS 56.8 and a position 1988 (53 FR 5985). The complete history the list of acceptable analysis methods. acceptable to the NRC staff does not and background for the proposed action Second, all but two commentors exist. Therefore, in order to define in were discussed in detail in the
- objected to requiring a 24-hour test detail a Mass Point analysis that would
- SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section duration in combination with the Mass be acceptable to the NRC staff, such an
!which accompanied the proposed rule. Point method. Jncorporation by reference would also \The effect of this amendment will be to !!!_ave to contain the portions of proposed As noted in the proposed rule of [~egulatory Guide MS 021-5 that modify ,permit licensees to use the Mass Point February 29, 1988, the position stated in analysis as an altern~tive to the Total the ANS 56.8 definition and use of the the text is consistent with the position Mass Point analysis. This approach Time and Point-to-Point analyses that has been taken by the NRC staff incorporated by reference into when granting exemption requests on l would be undesirably cumbersome, Appendix J by ANSI N45.4-1972. !inflexible, and restrictive in the ability this matter. In particular, the description Ito keep the legally acceptable Mass The final rule is identical to the of the Mass Point method and its proposed rule published for comment, Point analysis current with any future coupling with a test duration of at least 1 improvements, simplifications, or and adds the following wofds to Section ;24 hours reflect prior exemption 1 111.A.3: . ichanges in the state-of-the-art of
- approvals and maintain necessary !statistical reduction of test data to a In addition to the Total Time and Point-to- consistency. leakage rate.
Point methods described in that standard, the Mass Point method, when used with a test i The intent of this limited amendment !, An alternative perhaps could be to duration of at least 24 hours, Is an acceptable is not to endorse ANS 56.8, nor to :simply state that the Mass Point method method lo use to calculate leakage rates. A propose any of the changes and ibe defined in a manner acceptable to the typical description of the Mass Point method updating represented by the October 29, :NRC staff, and leave that definition to
'can be found in the American National 1986 proposed general revision to !the finalization of proposed regulatory .standard, ANSI/ ANS 56.8-1987, Appendix J (51 FR 39538). Instead, this iguide MS 021-5. However, this would "Containment System Leakage Testing action does no more than eliminate the :probably be a less acceptable Requirements", January 20, 1987. need for exemptions to the existing rule 'alternative because it would be more *. Also, as in the proposed rule, in order by permitting the use of a statistical method that has been generally /flexible than the current wording and to allow a change. in the methods now *would depend heavily on the as yet .
permitted, the final rule deletes the accepted for several years. This revision uniseued regulatory guide. following sentence from Section III.A.3 makes available to all reactor licensees Finally, as noted in the proposed rule of Appendix J: 'the use of the Mase Point method for 24- of February 29, 1988, the wording was hour tests. intentionally made instructive but The method chosen for the initial test shall Inclusion of the 24-hour duration is normally be used for the periodic tests. flexible in the event that the proposed considered necessary because a general revision to Appendix Jand its The NRC believes the wording of the considerable difference of opinion exists ,proposed associated regulatory guide revision as published for comment, and as to what is a sufficient test duration. [are not issued as final documents. as finally amended, clearly and Until an acceptable set of alternative 1Should that happen, then a clear need accurately represents the NRC's technical criteria is-developed to replace 'would exist for some flexibility in the position. All comments have been the 24-hour duration criterion, the NRC ;ability of Appendix J to keep up with reviewed. In spite of the objections staff intends to continue the 24-hour *changes to ANS 56,8 and potential raised in the comments to the wording criterion. Some alternative technical :future modifications to the Mass Point or content of the proposed rule, the :criteria were presented for public ;analysis.
- wording in the final rule is identical to ireview and comment in proposed that published for public comment. A ,regulatory guide MS 021-5, Effective Date Public Comment Resolution Memo has "Containment System Leakage Since the amendment set forth below been prepared and sent to all who Testing," 2 on October 28, 1986. These is intended lo provide relief from, rather commented. It is available for inspection
- criteria and others proposed are still than to impose, restrictions currently in and copying at the NRC's Public being evaluated in order to determine ,effect, the Commission.is, pursuant to 5
*Document Room at 2120 L Street, what is an appropriate set of test :U.S.C. 553(d)(1), making the final rule Washington, DC. The memo addresses termination criteria to include in the ;effective on November 15, 1988 without *in more detail the NRC's decision to final regulatory guide. * (the customary 30-day waiting period.
- Third, one objection was raised to the
!degree of flexibility permitted by the [Environmental Impact: Categorical 1 ANSI N45.4-1972, "Leakage Rate Testing of
- proposed wording in defining the Mass 1Exclusion Containment Structures* for Nuclear Reactors" (dated March 16, 1972). Incorporation of ANSI 'Point method. The Commission has determined that N45.4-1872 by reference was approved by the this rule is the type of action described Director of the Federel Register on October 30, 1972. 1 A free single copy of draft regulatory guide MS in the categorical exclusion in 10 CFR Copies of this standard, ea well ea ANSI/ ANS-56.8- 021-5, to t!ie extent of supply. may be obtained by 1987, "Containment System Leokoge Testing wriling to the Distribution Seclion. Document 51.22(c)[2). Therefore, neither an Requirements" (doted January 20, 1987] inay be Control Branch, Division of Information Support environmental impact stetemc*nt nor an obtained from the American Nuclear Society, 555 Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. environmental assessment have been *
;North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Perk, IL 60525. Washington, DC 20555. A copy ie also uveilable for prepared for this rule. !A copy of each of these atenderds*is eveileble for
- inspection, or copying for e fee, In the NRC Public
'inspection et the Commission's Public Document Docwnonl Room, Z120 L Street NW.. Weahington.
Room et 2120 L Street NW., WBBhington, DC.* DC. * .. 50-SC-68
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Paperwork Reduction Act Statement 54 FR7178 Summary of Public Comments Published 2/17/89 This final rule does not contain a new ,Effective 3/20/89 A summary of the public comments or amended information collection follows: requirement subject to the Paperwork 10 CFR Part 50 (1) Flexibility. One commenter, Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 *et writing on behalf of the nuclear power seq.). Existing requirements were Licensee Action During National industry, supported the proposetl approved under the Office of Security Emergencw amendment, stating that it provides Management and Budget approval AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory licensees with desirable regulatory number 3150--0011. Commission. authority and operational flexibility to Regulatory Analysis ACTION: Final rule. accommodate exigencies that may be associated :with a declared national The Commission hae prepared a emergency. regulatory analysie on this regulation.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations (2) Need for the amendment. One The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the.alternatives considered to allow a licensee to take action that commenter questioned the need for the by the Commission. Interested persons departs from approved technical proposed amendment. claiming that specifications in a national security § § 2.204, 50.54(x), and 50.103 offer more may examine a copy of the regulatory analysis at the NRC Public Document emergency. The amendment is than enough authority to permit a Room, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, necessary to specify in the regulations
- licensee to deviate from technical DC. that for a national security emergency a specifications during a national licensee is permitted to take a needed emergency when such action is needed Regulatory Flexibility Certification action although it may deviate from to implement na~ional security As req~ired by the Regulatory technical specifications. This objectives Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b ), amendment will allow the licensee to The fmal rule does not" duplicate the Commission certifies that this rule implement national security objectives existing requirements. Sectio11 2.204 does not have a significant economic as designated by the national command deals with the Commission's ability to impact on a substantial number of small authority through the NRC. issue an order for modification of a entities. This rule eff~cts only the EFFECTIVE DATE: March 20, 1989. licensee and § 50.103 deals with the licensing and operation of nuclear FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Commission's ability to suspend a power plants. The companies that own Joan Aron, Office for Analysis and *
- license, recapture special nuclear
.these plants do not fall within the scope Evaluation of Operational Data, U.S. material or order the operation of a *of the definition of"small entities" set* Nuclear Regulatory Commission, facility during a state of war or national *forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or Washington, DC 20555. Telephone (301) emergency. Paragraph (x).of I 50.54 ,the Small Business Size Standards set 492-9001 . grants authority to nuclear power plant .out in the regulations issued by the licensees to take reasonable action that SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: departs from a licenee condition or a ,Small Business Administration at 13 ,CFR Part 121. Background technical specification in an emergency when such action is necessary to protect !Backfit Analysis On April 1, 1983, the Commission public health and safety and no action
- The NRC has determined that a published in the Federal Register (48 FR consistent with license conditions and
'backfit analysis is not required for this 13966), a final rule that set out § 50.54 of technical specifications that can provide rule because, although the rule is 10 CFR entitled, "Conditions of adequate or equivalent protection is .
applicable to all current or future Licenses," that contains a provision immediately apparent. The amended
- operating nuclear power plants, the permitting a license to take reasonable rule provides the same flexibility to
;provisions of the rule codify and permit action that departs from a license licensees* but for the purpose of attaining the continuation of a previously condition or a technical specification national security objectivee during a accepted practice. This action will not (contained in a license issued under this declared national security emergency.
encumber those using this accepted part) in an emergency when this action (3) Implementation. One commenter practice with the a,dded burden of is immediately needed to protect the questioned the lack of di~cussion seeking exemptions to the existing rule. public health and safety and no action relative to implementation requirements consistent with license conditions and and suggested a delay in issuing the List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 technical specifications that-can provide final rule until proper implementation Antitrust, Classified information, Fire adequate or equivalent protection is guidance can be formulated. prevention, Incorporation by reference, immediately apparent. However, thie The final rule provides a basis for the Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear* provision does not apply to a national licensee to take action in accordance power plants and reactors, Penalty, security emergency. The final rule in this with governmental directives in a Radiation protection, Reactor siting notice allows a licensee to take action national security emergency, when this criteria. Reporting and recordkeeping that departs from approved technical action is immediately needed to requirements. specifications in a national security implement national security objectives emergency when this action is as designated by the national command For the reasons set out in the immediately needed to implement preamble and under the authority of the authority through the NRC and no action national security objectives as consistent with license conditions and Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, designated by the national command technical specifications that can meet
- the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, authority through the NRC and no action national security objectives is es amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, consistent with license conditions and. immediately apparent. Guidance the NRC is adopting 'the following
- technical specifications that can meet amendment to 10 CFR Part 50. concerning implementation will be national security objectives is formulated by the appropriate federal immediately apparent. The rule was agencies and will be issued some time in published for comment on July 19, 1988 the future.
(53 FR 27174). A thirty-day comment (4) Definitiun of a "national security period expired on August 18, 1988. emergency." One commenter requested Comments were received from four definition of a "national security respondents. emergency." 50-SC-69
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION NRG Manual Chapter 0601, Continuity operation of nuclear facilities in a trusteeship provisions of its property of Government Program, approved June national security emergency during insurance regulations. This delay in 30, 1988, defines a national security which some deviation from facility implementation is necessary because emergency as "any occurrence, technical specifications may be the insurers that offer property including nuclear attack, a national appropriate. This constitutes the insurance for power reactors have disaster, or other emergency, which regulatory analysis for this final rule. informed the Commission that they will seriously degrades or seriously be unable to include the stabilization Regulatory Flexibility Certification and decontamination priority and threatens the national security of the United States or has been declared by As required by the Regulatory trusteeship provisions in their insurance the Congress." A national security
- Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b ), policies within the date required by emergency is established by a law the Commission certifies that this rule current regulations. Concurrently, the enacted by the Congress or by an order will not have a significant economic extension of the effective date of the or directive issued by the President impact upon a substantial number of rule allows the NRC to consider three pursuant to statutes or the Constitution small entities. The final rule affects only petitions for rulemaking that propose of the United States. licensing and operation of nuclear
- changes to improve the efficacy of the (5) Reporting requirements. One power plants. The companies that own NRC's stabilization and commenter suggested that these plants do not fall within the scope decontamination priority and
§ 50.73(a)(2)(c) be revised to include the of the definition of "small entities" set trusteeship provisions.
forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or EFFECTIVE DATE: March 17, 1989. reporting requirements of the amended
§ 50.54(dd). the Small Business Size Standards set FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
At present, there is no reporting out in regulations issued by the Small Robert S. Wood, Office of Nuclear requirement include in§ 50.54(dd) and Business Administration at 13 CFR Part Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear none is comternplated for the immediate 121. Because these companies are Regulatory Commission, Washington, future. Thus, there is no need to revise dominant in their service areas, this rule DC 20555, telephone (301) 492-1280. 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(c). does not fall within purview of the Act.. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: .Environmental Impact: Categorical Backlit Analysis I. Background Exclusion . . . The NRC has determined that the On September 19, 1988, the The NRC has determined that this backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not Commission published a proposed rule final regulation is the type of action apply to this rule and, therefore, that a in the Federal Register (53 FR 36338) that described in categorical exclusion 10 backfit analysis is not required for this proposed to amend the implementation CFR 51.22(c)(2). Therefore, neither an rule, because these amendments do not schedule for the stabilization and environmental impact statement nor-an involve any provisions which would decontamination priority and environmental assessment has been impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR trusteeship provisions of its property prepared for this proposed regulation. 50.109(a)(l). *
- insurance regulations contained in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(5)(i) to change the Papenvork Reduction Act Statement* List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 effective date from October 4, 1988, to This final rule does not contain a new Antitrust, Classified Information, Fire April 4, 1990. As explained in the or amended information collection Protection, Incorporation by Reference, proposed rule, this implementation.
requirement subject to The Paperwork Intergovernmental Relations, Nuclear schedule was part of a final rulemaking Reduction Act of19BO (44 U.S.C. 3501 et power plants and reactor, Penalty, published on August 5, 1987 (52 FR seq.). Existing requirements were Radiation protection, Reactor siting 28963) which, for the first time, explicitly approved by the Office of Management criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping required power reactor licensees to and Budget approval number 3150-0011 requirements. * * , purchase on-site property damage For the reasons set out in the insurance policies in which $1.6 billion Regulatory Analysis of the proceeds from these policies are preamble and under the authority of the The Commission previously has Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to be used first for stabilization of a granted authority pursuant to 10 CFR the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, reactor after an accident end then for * .50.54(x) to nuclear power reactor
- as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC decontamination of the facility before licensees to take reasonable action that is adopting the following amendment to any other purpose. The 1987 final rule departs from a license condition or a 10 CFR Part 50. . also required that these insurance technical specification in an emergency proceeds be paid to an impartial trustee when the action is immediately 54 FR 11161 who would be required to disburse
- necessary to protect the public health Published 3/17/89 :funds according to the stabilization and and safety and no action consistent with Effective 3/17/89 decontamination priority.
license conditions and technical Subsequent to the publication of the specifications that can provide adequate 10 CFR Part 50 :1987 final rule, the NRC was informed or equivalent protection is immediately 'that the trusteeship provision and, to a apparent. This final rule will provide the Extension of Time for the '.lesser extent, the stabilization and same flexibility to licensees for the Implementation of the :decontamination priority provisions of purpose of attaining national security Decontamination Priority and that rule were sufficiently complex and objectives in accordance with Trusteeship Provisions of Property ,problematic that the insurers were governmental directives during a Insurance Requirements :unable to incorporate such provisions in declared national security emergency. AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 'their policies by the required October 4, The final rule docs not significantly Commission. 1988, date. impact state and local governments and ACTION: Final rule. As explained in the.September 19, geographic locations: health, safety, and 1988, proposed rule, the insurers and the environment: or costs to licensees, SUMP.,ARY: The Nuclear Regulutory their counsel gave two reasons why they the NRG, or other Federal agencies. The Commission is amending the were unable to comply with the date final rule is in the interest of the implementation schedule to change the specified in the final rule for adding the common defense and security of the effective date for the stabilization and stabilization and decontamination United States because it would facilitate decontamination priority and priority and trusteeship provisions. First, 50-SC-70
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION with respect to the trusteeship provision, sufficient to complete consideration of decontamination after an accident and counsel for insurers assured the NRC
- the issues raised in the three petitions provided for payment of proceeds to an staff that they had made a good-faith for rulemaking. Second if 18 months is independent trustee who would disburse effort to obtain trustees, but were insufficient, the Conunission can act to funds for decontamination and cleanup unsuccessful. They believed the reason further extend the implementation date. before any other purpose. Subsequent to for their lack of success was the Finally, the Commission imposed the
- publication of the August 5, 1987 rule, potential trustees' conflicts of interest stabilization and decontamination the NRC was informed by insurers who end reluctance to assume, on the one priority and trusteeship provisions for offer nuclear property insurance that the hand, responsibility for disbursing valid health and safety reasons. decontamination priority and potentially over $1 billion in insurance Indefinitely deferring these provisions trusteeship provisions would not be able proceeds and the resulting exposure to prior to a substantive reevaluation of to be incorporated into the policies by possible litigation for wrongful their efficacy could conflict with the the time required in the 1987 rule. In disl:iursement, while, on the other hand, Commisiiion's mandate to protect health petitions for rulemaking, insurers' being eligible for only modest fees for and safety. The proposed rule analyzed representatives further stated that the this service. why an 18 month delay would have trusteeship provisions might actually A second reason insurers gave for minimal health and safety impact. The have an effect counter to their intended being unable to comply with the
- NRC believes that analysis remains purpose by delaying claims payment effective date of the 1987 rule was valid. and thus possibly the. cleanup process.
essentially logistical. As a contract, an For the foregoing reasons, the By deferring implementation of these insurance policy can only *be modified ** Commission concludes that a delay froni provisions by 18 months, the with the consent of all affected parties. October 4, 1988, to April 4, 1990, in the Commission is allowing sufficient time Because the Conunission's mandated implementation schedule of the either to secure the required coverage or stabilization and decontamination stabilization and decontamination to reconsider the mechanism by which priority and trusteeship provisions priority and trusteeship provisions is accident cleanup funds may be assured adversely affect the current rights under .justified and is amending 10 CFR to be used for their intE;nded purpose. the policy of the bondholders' trustee, it 50.54(w)(5)(i) accordingly. Even without formal stabilization and is unlikely that policies could be legally Because the amendment to decontamination priority and changed before the end of the policy § 50.54{w)(5)(i) relates solely to trusteeship provisions, NRC has years. Because of insurers' policy extending the time for implementing the authority to take appropriate renewal procedures end the policy stabilization and decontamination enforcement action to order cleanup in anniversaries, these dates would have priority and trusteeship provisions of the the unlikely event of an accident. Thus, fallen after the effective date specified property insurance rule and therefore this rule will not have a significant in the rule. impact on public health and safety. provides relief from restrictions under II. Summary of Comments, NRC regulations currently in effect, the Furthermore, this rule will not have Response aod Conclusions Commission has found that good cause* significant impacts on state and local exists for making the rule effective on governments and geographical regions; By the end of the comment period on on the environment; or, create October 19, 1988, the NRC received five the date of publication in the Federal
- Register without the customary 30 day substantial costs to licensees, the NRC, comments. One of these was or other Federal agencies. The foregoing misdirected to this rulemaking. waiting period.
discussion constitutes the regulatory (Conunent 1 was directed to rescinding III. Environmental hnpact: Categorical analysis for this rule.
§ 50.54 (x) aod (y) rather than Exclusion I 50.54{w).) The remaining four either VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
,supported the proposed rulemeking The NRC has determined that this rule As required by the Regulatory
- (comment 4) or sought clarification of constitutes a minor corrective Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605[b ),
the applicability of 10 CFR 50.54(w){5)(i) amendment that does not substantially the Commission certifies that this final to specific licensees while the modify existing regulations and, rule does not have a significant
- rulemaking was being considered therefore, is the type of action eligible economic impact on a substantial (comments 2, 3, end 5). In addition, for categorical exclusion under 10 CFR nwnber of small entities. The final rule comment 4 suggested that, rather than 51.22{c)(2). Accordingly, neither an affects only those companies licensed lo provide a date certain in the rule, the environmental impact statement nor an operate nuclear powerplants. The stabilization and decontamination environmental assessment is required. companies that own these plants do not
,priority and trusteeship provisions of IV. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement fall within the scope of the definition of.
§ 50.54{w) (3) and (4) be suspended "small entities" set {orth in the indefinitely pending completion of This final rule does not contain a new Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small consideration of three petitions for or amended information collection Business Size Standa.rds set out in rulemaking (PRM-50-5~. PRM-50-51A, requirement subject to the Paperwork regulations issued by the Small Business and PRM-50-518; 53 FR 36335, .Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et Administration at 13 CFR Part 121. .
September 19, 1988). seq.). Existing requirements were The only issue of any controversy approved by the Office of Management VII. Backfit Analysis raised by commenters was whether the and Budget approval nwnber 3160--0011, The NRC has determined that the extension of time for implementing the V. Regulatory Analysis backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not stabilization and decontamination apply to this rule because this rule priority and trusteeship provisio.ns of On August 5, 1987, the NRC published would not impose a backfit as defined in
§ 50.54(w) should be for a date certain in the Federal Register a final rule § 50.109[a)(1). Therefore, a backfit (i.e., April 4, 1990) or indefinite until amending 10 CFR 50.54(w). The rule analysis is not required for this rule.
consideration of the above-cited increased the amount of on-site property damage insurance required to be carried List of Subjects In 10 CFR Part 50 petitions for rulemaking has been completed. The Commission continues by NRC's power reactor licensees. The Antitrust, Classified information, Fire to believe that an 18 month extension is rule also required these licensees to prevention, Incorporation by reference, more appropriate than an open-ended obtain by October 4, 1988, insurance Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear extension. First as commenter 4 policies that prioritized insurance powerplanto and reactors, Penalty, acknowledged, 18 months should be proceeds for stabilization and Radiation protection, Reactor siting 50-SC-71
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping Paperwork Reduction Act Statement For the reasons set out in the requirements.
- preamble and under the authority of the This rule does not contain a new or For the reasons set out in the amended information collection Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, preamble and under the authority of the requirement subject to the Paperwork the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, seq.). Existing requirements were the NRC is adopting the following as amended, and Ii U.S.C. 552 and 553, approved by the O!Jice of Management amendment to 10 CFR Part 50.
the NRC is adopting the following amendment to 10 CFR Part 50. and Budget under control number 3150- 54 FR 15372 0011. Published 4/18/89 54 FR 13361 Effective 5/18/89 Regulatory Analysis Published 4/3/89 Effective 5/3/89 Because this rule is of a clarifying Early Site Permits; Standard Design nature and does not substantially Certifications; and Combined Licenses 10 CFR Part 50 for Nuclear Power Reactors change existing regulatory requirernen ts, RIN: 3150-AC72 the regulatory analysis prepared for the See Part 52 Statements of Consideration
*final rule entitled "Reduction of Risk Flow Control Conditions for the from Anticipated Transients Without Standby Liquid Control System In Scram [ATWS) Events for Light-Water- 54 FR 50735 Boiling Water Reactors Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Published 12/11/89.
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory* . published June 26, 1984 (49 FR 26036) is still valid for this rule. The analysis is Early Site Permits; Standard Design Commission. Certifications; and Combined Licenses available for inspection in the Public ACTION: Final rule .. for Nuclear Power Reactors; Correction Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., -
SUMMARY
- The NRC is amending its Washington, DC, Lower Level. Sii1gle See Part 52 Statements of Consideration regulations to set forth conditions and copies of the analysis may be obtained considerations for determining reactivity from William R. Pearson, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. 55 FR 10397 control capacity for boiling waler. Published 3/21/90.
reactor standby liquid control systems. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Effective 4/20/90 The changes are necessary to clarify the* Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) existing regula lion.
- 492-3764. Preserving the Free Flow of EFFECTIVE DATE: May 3, 1989. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification Information to the Commission FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
William R. Pearson, Office of Nuclear In accordance with the Regulatory See Part 30 Statements of Consideration Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605[b)), 55 FR 12163 Regulatory Commission, Washington, the Commission certifies that this rule Published 4/2/90. DC 20555, telephone (301) 492-3764. will not have a significant economic Effective 4/2/90 impact on a substantial number of small SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On entities and that therefore a regulatory 10 CFR Part 50 Monday, October 24, 1968, the flexibility analysis is not needed. This Commission published in the Federal rulemaking action affects only licensees RIN 3150-AD19 Register (53 FR 41607) a proposed rule, that own and operate nuclear utilization entiiled "Flow Control Conditions for Stabilization and Decontamination facilities licensed under sections 103 Priority and Trusteeship Provisions the Standby Liquid Control System in and 104 of the Atomic Energy Act of Boiling Water Reactors," that proposed 1954, as amended. These licensees do AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory amendments to 10 CFR 50.62. Interested not fall within the definition of small Commission. parties were invited to submit written .... businesses set forth in section 3 of the comments within a 60-day comment ACTION: Final rule. Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632) or period, which ended on December 23, within the Small Business Size ,
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory 1988. One comment was received, which Standards set forth in the regulations. Commission (NRC) is amending the agreed with the proposed clarification. issued for the Small Business . provisions of its property/ accident No change to the proposed rule was Administration at 13 CFR P.art 121. recovery insurance regulations suggested in the public comment applicable to commercial power reactor received by the NRC. The Commission Backlit Analysis licensees. The changes (1) clarify the believes that the proposed rule scope and timing of the stabilization and adequately clarifies reactivity control The NRC has determined that the backfit rule,.10 CFR 50.109, does not decontamination processes after an conditions for boiling water reactor accident at a covered reactor; (2) specify standby liquid control systems (SLCS), apply to this rule, and therefore, that a backfit analysis is not required, because that the insurance is required to ensure thus, a final rule is being issued that commercial power reactor licensees adopting the proposed rule without these amendments do not involve any provisions which impose backfits as will have sufficient funds to carry out modification. their obligation to clean up and defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(l).
Environmental Impact: Categorical decontaminate after an accident; and (3) Exclusion List of Su_bjects in 10 CFR Part 50 eliminate the requirement that insurance The NRC has determined that this rule Antitrust, Classified information, Fire proceeds after an accident are paid to is the type of action described as a protection, Incorporation by reference, an independent trustee. This rule categorical ei:cc;:lusion in 10 CFR Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear responds to issues raised in three 51.22[c)(2). Thus, neither an power plants and reactors, Penalty, petitions for rulemaking. environmental impact statement nor an Radiation protection, Reactor siting *EFFECTIVE DATE: April 2, 1990. environmental assessment has been criteria, Reporting and record.keeping FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: prepared. requirements. Robert S. Wood, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) 492-1280. 50-SC-72
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 50.54(w). The rule was developed in specific studies using then-current I. Background response to the three petitions for technology. One commenter rulemaking discussed above. As of recommended using a simple formula After the receipt of three petitions for January 18, 1990, the NRC received based on the Consumer Price Index to rulemaking assigned Docket Nos. seven comments on the proposed rule. estimate future cleanup costs. (PRM50-51) from Linda S. Stein, Steptoe Six comments came- from electric Since publication of the proposed rule, & Johnson, counsel to American Nuclear utilities or their representatives. One the NRC's contractor has updated Insurers and MAERP Reinsurance comment came from the Association of NUREG/CR-2601 1 (hereinafter cited as Association (ANI/MAERP); (PRM-50-- the Bar of the City of New York. All 51A) from J.B. Knotts, Jr., Bishop, Cook, Addendum 1) which provided the basis commenters essentially supported the for the $1.06 billion in insurance Purcell & Reynolds, counsel to the Commission's rulemaking, although Edison Electric Institute (EEI), the currently required. The report found that some took issue with specific provisions. in 1989 dollars, approximately $1.03 Nuclear Utility Management and Two aspects of the proposed rule, in Resources Council (NUMARC) and billion would be needed for cleanup particular, were opposed by several after a severe accident at a reference several power plant licensees; and commenters. The first is the statement in (PRM-50--51B) from Peter D. Lederer, boiling water reactor. In addition, the preamble of the proposed rule that depending on whether a 4 percent or an Baker & McKenzie, counsel to Nuclear the NRC retains the authority to require Mutual Limited and Nuclear Electric 8 percent inflation rate is assumed, an an independent trustee to hold and to Insurance Limited (NML and NEIL-II), additional $186.5 million to $409.9 disburse insurance proceeds in the Commission published a notice of million would be needed to cover individual cases, if warranted. Further, receipt requesting public comment on incremental cost escalation during the the NRC expressed its intention that if the petitions in the Federal Register of cleanup process. In evaluating these the NRC obtains authority to receive September 19, 1988 (53 FR 36335). The and retain insurance proceeds itself, it costs, the contractor considered labor, petitions were filed in response to a will consider whether to exercise this energy, waste disposal, and nuclear final rule on changes in property authority and the best method of insurance as those cost components insurance requirements published by the implementing the authority (54 FR 46624, with the greatest potential effect on cost Commission on August 5, 1987 (52 FR at p. 46627). escalation. 28963). These petitions sought (1) Except for nuclear insurance, these clarification of the scope and timing of In support of their objections, the commenters refer to the case cited in the factors are the same as those used in the the stabilization process after an Commission's decommissioning rule, accident at a covered reactor; (2) proposed rule-In re Smith-Douglass (Nos. 87-1683, -1684 (4th Circuit, although the relative weights of the clarification of the procedures by which factors vary (53 FR 24018, June 27, 1988) the NRC determines and approves September 6, 1988))-and take issue with the Commission's conclusion that (See 10 CFR 50.75(c)(2)). The expenditures of funds necessary for Commission notes, however, that decontamination and cleanup, and the decision in this case justifies future reimposition of a trusteeship commenters had ample opportunity to clarification of how such procedures requirement. The Commission continues evaluate and comment upon the affect both insurer's needs to secure to believe that uncertainties remain with technical studies that the NRC used as appropriate proofs of loss and when respect to interpretation of this and the basis for its decommissioning payments may be made for non-cleanup purposes; (3) a change in the similar decisions. Consequently, if the requirements. No such opportunity has terminology of the required insurance Commission concludes that future been available heretofore for Addendum from "property" insurance to conditions warrant reinstitution of the 1. Consequently, the Commission "decontamination liability" insurance trusteeship requirement, it will reopen concludes that the public interest would so as to better forestall claims on this issue for reconsideration. If the best be served if the issue of whether insurance proceeds by a licensee's Commission does make such a decision, and to what extent the amount of bondholders; and (4) rescission of the however, it will provide ample accident cleanup insurance should provision that proceeds of the required opportunity for public comment at that increase is deferred pending public insurance are to be paid to an time. Because no provision of this final comment on Addendum 1. As part of its independent trustee, who will disburse rule is affected by these concerns, the conclusion, the Commission further the proceeds for decontamination and Commission proposes no further notes that most licensees already carry cleanup of the facility before any other discussion or action at this time. accident cleanup insurance in amounts purpose. The second issue raised by several that exceed the maximum amount Four comments were received on the commenters concerns how the predicted by the formula in Addendum petitions for rulemaking, all of which Commission might address possible 1. Thus, there is no compelling health or supported the amendments
- increases in accident cleanup costs safety reason to increase the required recommended in the petitions. The resulting from inflation or other factors. amount of insurance in advance of Commission responded to the comments Commenters expressed the opinion that public comment. Concurrently, the received on the petitions in a proposed there is insufficient experience from Commission believes that the public rule published on November 6, 1989 (54 which to develop an effective formula to comments on Addendum 1 will enable FR 46624). This final rule, in effect, estimate future accident cleanup costs. the Commission to make more informed grants these petitions and completes Furthermore, such a formula would not decisions in connection with any future NRC action in response to PRMs 50--51, be able to account for advances in 50--51A, and 50--51B. technology that might reduce future 1 "Technology, Safety and Costs of costs. Commenters suggest that rather Decommissioning Reference Light Water Reactors II. Analysis of and Response to than use a formula to estimate future Following Postulated Accidents-Addendum 1,"
Comments Pacific Northwest Laboratory, to be published. This cleanup costs and consequently On November 6, 1989, the Commission establish future insurance requirements, report will be available by approximately May 1990 for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing published in the Federal Register (54 FR the NRC reevaluate accident cleanup Office, P.O. Box 37082. Washington. DC 20013-7082. 46624) a proposed rule to amend 10 CFR costs every 3 to 5 years by conducting A notice of availability will be published. 50-SC-73
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION rulemaking proceeding to increase the suggested changes to the proposed rule Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, amount of required insurance. are not needed. DC. Individual commenters also have One commenter takes issue with the IV. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement raised specific concerns with the following statement in the Regulatory proposed rule. These concerns include Analysis published in connection with This final rule amends information the stabilization priority threshold, the the proposed rule: "Although the effect collection requirements that are subject 60-day priority period, and the cleanup of these formulas, if developed and to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 plan. One commenter indicates that, adopted, would be to increase the (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The final rule pursuant to proposed 10 CFR required amount of insurance for some has been referred to the Office of 50.54(w)(4)(i), insurance proceeds would licensees, there should be little impact Management and Budget for review and only be required to be dedicated to on insurance costs to licensees because approval. stabilization and decontamination if the almost all licensees buy the maximum Public reporting burden for this estimated costs exceeded $100 million. amount of insurance available" (54 FR collection of information is estimated to Further, this priority would initially 46624, at p. 46628, November 6, 1989). average 2,000 hours per response, apply to stabilization costs for 60 days This commenter states that, "This may including time for reviewing and could be extended in 60-day have been true in the past, however we instructions, searching existing data increments. Within 30 days after the do not agree with this assessment. In sources, gathering and maintaining the reactor is stabilized, the licensee is fact, we did not automatically purchase data needed, and completing and required to submit a cleanup plan which the maximum amount of insurance reviewing the collection of information. must be approved by the Director of the available this year following an increase Send comments regarding this burden Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. in available coverage." estimate or any other aspect of this This commenter also suggests that the Notwithstanding this commenter's collection of information, including rule should clarify (a) whether the NRC decision not to buy additional insurance, suggestions for reducing this burden, to or the licensee provides the cost the Commission notes that the maximum the Information and Records estimate, and (b) how the Director of the amount of insurance currently offered Management Branch (MNBB-7714), U.S. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation exceeds by a significant margin the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, determines the length of the amount that would be required if the Washington, DC 20555; and to the stabilization priority and the criteria for maximum figure suggested in Addendum Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-approving the cleanup plan. 1 were adopted. Most licensees 0011 ), Office of Management and The NRC believes that these and currently purchase substantially more Budget, Washington, DC 20503. than this maximum. Thus, the similar issues have been discussed in Commission stands by the statement in V. Regulatory Analysis previous rulemaking and that additional question. On November 6, 1989, the Commission specificity may be cumbersome and These amendments provide relief from counterproductive. The Commission published in the Federal Register (54 FR restrictions under regulations due to clearly intends to rely on licensees to take effect on April 4, 1990. Therefore, 46624) a proposed rule to amend 10 CFR prepare initial cost estimates of pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(l), the 50.54(w). The rule was developed in accidents, although it is conceivable that response to three petitions for Commission is making the rule effective the Commission could prepare its own on the date of publication in the Federal rulemaking. Notice of receipt of these confirmatory estimates if unusual Register without the customary 30-day petitions was published in the Federal circumstances warranted. Furthermore, waiting period. Register on September 19, 1988 (53 FR a cut-off figure of $100 million represents 36335). These petitions sought a relatively minor accident where the III. Finding of No Significant clarification of the stabilization and availability of funds would not, as a Environmental Impact; Availability decontamination priority provisions and practical matter, be at issue. Thus, it is Noting that the text of the final rule is rescission of the trusteeship provisions very unlikely that the Commission identical to that of the proposed rule, the currently contained in 10 CFR 50.54(w). would dispute estimates unless they Commission has reviewed the The petitions further stated that the significantly exceeded $100 million. environmental assessment and finding trusteeship provisions may actually Further, § 50.54(w)(4)(i) explicitly of no significant environmental impact have an effect counter to their intended defines what constitutes stabilization. published in the Federal Register on purpose by delaying the payment of Therefore, it is unlikely that serious November 6, 1989 (54 FR 46624, at 46627) claims and thus possibly the cleanup disagreements would arise concerning in connection with the proposed rule. process. The rule developed in response when a reactor is stabilized. On the basis of that review, and after to the petitions for rulemaking should However, if disputes over considering the public comments and help clarify the mechanism by which stabilization should arise, the determining that such comments do not accident cleanup funds may be Commission's Rules of Practice under 10 affect the conclusion reached in the guaranteed to be used for their intended CFR part 2 provide adequate procedures earlier finding of no significant impact, purpose. Even without formal to resolve them. Similarly, part 2 the Commission has concluded that this stabilization and decontamination procedures are also available to resolve amendment to 10 CFR 50.54(w) is not a priority and trusteeship provisions, the , disputes that may arise over the content major Federal action significantly NRC has authority to take appropriate of cleanup plans. The Commission notes affecting the quality of the human enforcement action to order cleanup in i that the proposed rule was drafted in environment, and therefore, an the unlikely event of an accident. By response to the suggestions of environmental impact statement is not rescinding the trusteeship requirement, petitioners representing most power required. the Commission would be eliminating reactor licensees and their insurers. The The environmental assessment and licensees' costs to obtain trustee petitioners did not raise these specific finding of no significant impact on services. Thus, the rule will not create issues in their petitions or in comments which this determination is based are substantial costs for licensees. on the proposed rule. Consequently, the available for inspection and copying at The rule will not have significant Commission concludes that the the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L impacts on State and local governments 50-SC-74
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION and geographical regions, on the environment, or create substantial costs to the NRC or other Federal agencies. The foregoing discussion constitutes the regulatory analysis for this rule. VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the Commission certifies that this final rule does not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities. The rule only . affects licensees of nuclear power plants. None of the holders of these licenses fall within the scope of the definition of "small entities" set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the
'Small Business Size Standards set out in regulations issued by the Small Business 56FR22300 Administration at 13 CFR part 121. Published 5/15/91 Effective 6/14/91 VII. Backfit Analysis The NRC has determined that the 1o cm Part so backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to this rule because this rule will RIM 3.150-AD01 not impose a backfit as defined in § 50.109(a)(l). Therefore, a backfit Fracture Toughness-Requirements for analysis is not required for this rule. Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock.Event&
- List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 AOENCY:-NucleM" Regu-l'atory Antitrust, Classified information, Fire protection, Incorporation by reference, -Commissiom :
- Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear ACTION: Finatrule.
power plants and reactors, Penalty,
SUMMARY
- The Nucl'ear Regulatory*
Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping Commission, (NRCJ'* is amending rt8' requirements. regulations*for*light-water nuclear For the reasons set out in the power plants*tochange the procedure preamble and under the authority of the fOl"calculatin1rthe*amount ofradiation Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, embrittlement that a* reactor vesse~ the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, reeeiws. Toe-pressunzed thermaFshock
.as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, rule-(P'l'Srule)'establfshes a screening the NRC is adopting the following criterion. This criterion limits the amendment to 10 CFR part 50. amount of embrittlement ofa:reactor vessef beltline1materiaV beyond' which .
. 55 FR 29181 the plant cannot contiilue:to.operate: 1Published 7 /18/90 without justifu:ation based:on a,pbmt-
.Ef(ective 8/17/90 specific: analysis. T-he final, amendment does not change-the screening criterion.
Storage of Spent Fuel in NRG- The E"l'S rnle,aht0: prescribe&', the-Approved Storage Casks at Power procedure. that must' be used. for Reactor Sites calculating: the,amount of. embrittlement. for, comparison to the-.screening See Part 72 Statements of Consideration criterion. The finalamendment*updates . 56 FR944 the pnocedure-.and*makes.it consistent Published 1/10/91 wi:th. the,one-gi*ven in Regulatory Guide
*Effective 1/10/91 1.99, Revision 2, published.in, Muy-1988.
EP.FECTIVE:DAiTE:: June 14..1991~ Operations Center Area Code FO~ll'JHl!R- INl'ORMATION' COllfT'AC'I': Telephone Number Change Allen t. Hiser; Jr;, Division-of Engineering; Office of Nuclear See Part 20 Statements of Consideration Regulatory Reseamh; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington;. DC 20555; Telephone: f301J *192-3988.
Background
*~.
SUPPLEMENTARY INF.ORMATION~ Pressurized thermal shock events are system transients in. a pressurized water reactor (PWRl that can cause severe overcooling followed by immediate 50-SC-75
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION repressurization to a high level. The provides that if RTPTs for the controlling developed for Revision 2, the results thermal stresses caused by rapid cooling material is predicted to exceed the * . were higher for approximately half the of the reactor vessel inside surface screening criterion before EOL,,the vessels, including three vessels where combine with the pressure stresses to licensee should *submit plans and a the value may be over 60°F higher than increase the potential for fracture if an schedule for flux reduction programs previously thought. This would increase initiating flaw is present in low that are reasonabll( practicable to avoid the probability of PTS-induced vessel toughness material. This material may reaching the screening criterion. Finally, failure by a factor of at least 30 for those exist in the reactor vessel beltline, the PTS rule requires licensees of plants plants. adjacent to the core, where neutron that would reach the screening criterion The NRC believes these changes in radiation gradually embrittles the before EOL despite the flux reduction the nonconservative direction are material during plant lifetime. The program to submit a plant-specific greater than can be absorbed by the degree of embrittlement depends on the safety analysis justifying operation uncertainties believed to exist and taken chemical composition of the steel, beyond the screening criterion. The into account by the NRG.when the especially the copper and nickel licensee must submit the.analysis at
- RTM's-based screening limit was set. (A contents. least 3 years before the plant is* margin of 48°F is added in the The toughness ofreactor vessel predicted to reach that limit. Regulatory calculation of RTPrs to cov:er not only materials is characterized by a Guide 1.154, "Format and Content of the uncertainty in the formula for "reference temperature for nil ductility Plant-Specific Pressurized Thermal .: . embrittlement but also the uncertainties transition" lRTNDTl, which is determined Shock Safety Analysis Reports for
- in the copper, nickel, and fluence values by destructive tests of material Pressurized Water Reactors" provides entered in the formula.) Based on this specimens. For many reactors now in guidance for the preparation of the new information, the probability of operation, toughness of the beltlinc report and describes acceptance criteria reactor vessel failure by fracture.during materials at room temperature is low. that the NRC staff would use. a PTS event is presently higher in some As temperature is raised, toughness In response to the PTS rule, the vessels than the probability based.on increases slowly at first; but at the licensees of operating reactors have the procedure for calculating RTPTs temperature defined* as RTNDT* toughness submitted the fluence predictions.1md which is given in the present PTS rule.
begins to increase much more rapidly. material composition data and these Moreover, a few of those reactor vessels. The transition in toughness from low have now been accepted. Of greater** will reach the screening criterion in the values to high th1,1.t takes place above importance are ~he flux reduction_ 1990.'s, Thus, the current PTS rule needs RTNDT means that vessel materials are programs that have b.een undertaken by to be amended. quite tough at normal operating licensees for those plants having high . A 75 day comment period expired on temperatures. Radiation embrittlement values of RTPrs* * * *
- March 12, 1990. Comments were moves RTNDT to higher temperatures. On December 26, 1989 (54 FR 52946), re.ceive!f from 15 respondents;
- Correlations based on test results for the Commission published the proposed unirradiated and irradiated specimens rule to change the procedure for*
- Summ~ry of Public Comments have been developed to calculate the calculating RTPTS to reflect recent The'proposed amendments have been shift in RT NDT as a function of neutron findings that embrittlement is occurring modified in response to the comments fluence for various material faster than predicted by the PTS rule for received and will be published in final compositions. The value of RTNDT at a some reactor vessel materials. Although form, as modified, to.become effective given time in a vessel's life is used in the PTS rule was adopted on July 23, 30 days after publication of this final fracture mechanics calculations to 1985, the procedure for calculating RTPTS* rule. Changes were made in response to determine whether assumed pre-existing was developed in 1981-1982 and not
- the public comments to introduce flaws would propagate as cracks when updated because a number of licensees flexibility and technical improvement in the vessel is stressed. were using the 1982 formulations as the the calculation of RTPl'S by requiring The Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) basis for flux reduction programs.
- consideration of the plant-specific rule, 10 CFR 50.61, adopted on July 23. Meanwhile, plant surveillance data surveillance data and operating 1985 (50 CFR 29937), establishes a were being added to the data base !lnd conditions when they would have a screening criterion. This screening there were extensive new and more significant effect on the date the cl'iteriori establishes a limiting level of accurate correlations made. These screening criterion would be reached.
embrittlement beyond which operation culminated in Revision 2 to Regulatory Another change was made to loosen the . cannot continue without further plant- Guide 1.99, "Radiation Embrittlement of reporting schedule for licensees whose specific evaluation. The screening Reactor Vessel Materials;"' published*in reactor vessels will not become highly criterion is given in terms of RTNDT* May 1988. Revision 2 provides the basis embrittled. A summary of the public calculated as a*function of the copper for pressure-temperature limit comments and staff responses follows; and nickel contents of the material and calculations. Peer review. of the new
- 1. Validity of a Limited Revision the neutron fluence according to the correiations was provided by the public procedure given in the PTS rule. and comments on Revision 2.
- Seve:al comments questioned broad called RTPl'S to distinguish it from other In the regulatory analysis prepared for issues in the PTS rule and urged that a procedures for calculating RTNDT* Revision 2, and repeated in the limited revision not be undertaken.
The PTS rule requires each PWR regulatory analysis for this amendment, Some comments said that the screening licensee to report the results of the the NRC evaluated the impact of criterion should be raised (made less calculations of predlcted RTns values amending the PTS rule to be consistent cons~rvative) because they.believed for each beltline material (including the with the Guide. Copper and nickel that the calculated probability of copper, nickel and fluence values that contents and fluence values for each fracture would be reduced if the new pmvided the basis for the calculations) PWR reactor vessel were taken from the embrittlement formula was substituted from the time he submits his report to PTS submittals from licensees. When for the old in those calculations. Other the expiration date of the operating the values of RTPl'S were recalculated comments pointed out changes in the license (EOI.). The PTS rule further using these.quantities and the procedure assumptions about flaw size and 50-SC-76
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION location, as weU as updated information strongest need for this, altemative is for The staff has rejected this suggestion in a bout the expected severity and plants nearing the screening criterion. In* an effort to keep* the implementation of frequency of PrS transients as. reasons the plant-specific PRA [probabilistic risk the PTS- rule. as.-simple as po&Sible. It is to revisit the* screening criterien. Still analysis} required as the basis. for anticipated that only*those* lli::ensees . other comments questioned tlie*use of a all owing a. plant t0. operate beyond the who11e vesselil areapproaching*the* single parameter; RT PTS* in the screening screening criterion, any embrittlement screening criterion: would make- use of criterion and asked for consideration of information may be'used if justification* paragraph (b)(3'). Its use requires. review a multiparameter criterion. is* given. Noting this, commenters said and approvat by*tlJe.staff.at, which time that the use of plant-specific the guidelines in: R.G. 1.99 may be Staff Response. surveillance data would in some cases appropriate. butnotnecessarily so. A general response to the comments is make the PRA result& favorable: 3. U&e of'Measured Values af RT= as follows. Fil'St, the- scope of-the therefore, lt-should'be permissible*to use* proposed'amendment ts-nan-ow: to such data in caleutating* RTm. thereby Sevei:al* comment& said: that the make technical- corrections in the avoiding the*time-and,expense of:the changes iii wordill8 of the.requirement embrittlement formula for calculation of PRA analysis.
- in paragraph (b)(2)(i) that "measure_d RTPTS values to*eompare*to the values mustbeusedifava+/-lable .....
Staff Response screening* criterion*, A general revision* of represented Bl change i.D! the rule, which tlte PTS-ruie mu&t wait until further The proposed amendment to the PTS reduced ifs flexibility; research is done. Second, the screening rule is prescriptive.on' the issue of calculating*RTPl'S* becrause not many Staff Response criterion is not: a, safety limit. It is a-tripwire which triggers* a plant--specific plants meet the criteria ,for- "credible" There is: !IO* change in intent. The safety* analysis; i.e., it: defines which surveillance data. given in. lil..G. 1.99-in all words, were* changed in the proposed* licensees need* to*do that analysis and respects and because- the criteria are rule ta remove any ambiguity: A further when it should be done,.Thi'rd, the somewhat. subjective, Lengthy disputes clarification wumade in the*fina-J.rule screening criterion is not linked directly over credibility are anticipated, based by adding the words*"if credible-values to a predicted frequency* of through-wall on experience' in- applying R.G. 1.99 are available.'.* The intent ilr. to,allow a cra11:king. Only when the plant-specific elsewhere .. Moreover. in many cases licensee. to offer justification for not. analysis is dene (using plant-specific there is a, difficult choice to. be made using, a. parlicular measured. value if he systems: and* fFacture parameters) is- the between reliance on,a very small does-not have confide.nee: indL criterion for continued operation* based amount of pla-nt-&pecific surveillance data, or a cali:ule\ed value,based on a 4. Only a Few Plants are Affected' on a through-wall crack*frequency of Significantly, burthe Proposed Rule sx10-* per reactor year. It is Regulatory large data base of specimens,most of Adds a Regulatory Burden on A1Iand a Guide 1.154, "Format' and Content of which were irmdiated in other reactors. Nevertheless, in response* to* the Public.Relations Burden Also-Plant-Specific Pressurized Thermal Shock Safety Analysis Reports for widespread comments, it:is agreed that The proposed. PTS rule "reordel'S" the Pressurized Water Reactors" (not 10 there is need for some flexibility in the list of reactor vessela*in: terms- of their CFR 50.61) which s.tates that this PTS*rule to permit consideration of all sensitivityfo:l?TS:events, and shoul&be frequency is the staff'a primary available information~A.new pw:agraph* revised to reduce these impact& by acceptance criterlon,for-continued (b)(~).has been. aElded and the existing. incmasing flexibiliqr in the requiJ:ements operation. paragFaphs (b){;J} through. (b)(J}).have- or by:*a:multiparameterapproack In specific response' to* the issue* of been,renwnbered. .The. intent of the new paragraph (b )(3,) is to provide ~xibility Staff Response conservatism, the-Regulatory Analysis for the proposed rule* summarized the fo[ use in two kinda of.special To limi.t:tbe effortrequired:by*the* resuttllo of some studies of the effects- on situations. Commenters dwelt on the industry, the PTS rule prescribes 11 through~waU crack frequency*when situation where surveillance data screening:criterion to,separate*out those calculated-using the*proposed showed. the vessel to, be sismficantl.y plants that should.do,the-PRA analysis, embrittlement formula, instead*of* the* less embrittled than indicated .by; the : based on,tludeveLof.embrittlement of one used:in* me, origina.t. P'J.'S",rule*and- proposed embrittlement formula. In the. the reacto11 vessels,.ii.e..: the.rule* Monte Carlo,analyses done*earlier; other situation.. there.is iruormation from describes,who:should do, the. analysis, These* studies showed tha-Mhe PTS rule* surveillance data or other. information, and when: they should do, it'.. Yet. the is more conservative* than previously such. as the operating; tempeira ture ohhe- foregoihg:comments, request*. that either thought-for some accident scenarios; but. reactor vessel that shows the vessel. some kind,oHntermediate*screening not for alt The results: did not justify may be significantzy IDOl!e:embrittled procedure ~establishi!d that considers raising the screening criterion. than calculated by the proposed rule. 2 several: pal'ameters, instead of. only Thus.. some*flexibility has been added,to RTm, or- that.the, objective should be
- 2. Alternative Use of P1a~t Specific 0
the rule to ensure that. significant acg?mpli.shedt b:,t intltoducing flexibility Survemance Data. information is not ignored. int!, the-rule, Several of the commenter& on this The: staffhanejected the,suggestion Eleven* out ofl fifteen comments urged issue recommended that Position C 2, of a "mini-PRA: as an.intennediate the addition ofthis alternative to the
*'Surveillance Data. Available," as well procedure,. because that opens; the door proposed RTrn* calculation method as the criteria for credibility of the to very misleading*coaclusions. When based on copper and- nickel contents sur.veillance data, given. in. R.G. 1.99, be the, P1'S rule. was-.in the, early formative and fluence, noting that this alternative incorporated in the PTSrule in total. stages, there,were proposala*.for:a is allowed in caTculating pressure-temperature limit1J usihg*RG. 1.99, 1 The deterministic-criterion.However. it.soon
~Tb& irradiation temp&fflture& represented in the became,clear that there wus,no way to data baae that. waa correlated ta obtain the,forraule
'Radiution E'mbritUement or Reactor Vessel' in the PTS.rute range,Hrom 525 to 590*degrees choose.the*design transient from,among Materiuls. Regulatory Guide 1'.99, Rcvi*ion 2. May. Fahrenheit. Operatio1J below thet*lemperature ranee the array of transients, of-increasing 1968. is considered to cause mare embrittl&ment. severity but lower frequency. Extending 50-SC-77
PART 50 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION this reasoning to PRAs, the staff rule updates the procedure for considered by the Commission in concludes that a partial PRA is calculating the level of embrittlement of deciding to propose this rule.- inappropriate. These comments have the reactor vessel beltline as a result of A copy of the regulatory analysis is been rejected, but paragraph (b)(l) has neutron radiation. Use of the updated available for inspection and copying for been modified to:reduce the reporting procedure will not result in any adverse a fee at the NRC Public Document burden for all plants except those changes in power level, effluents, or Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), expected to reach the screening criterion other operational' characteristics of a Washington, DC 20555. Single copies of* before the end of their operating life. nuclear power reactor. Therefore, this the analysis may be obtained from Allen These modifications are in addition to rule is not expected to have any L. Hiser, Jr., Office of.Nuclear the amendments to paragraph (b)(l) that significant effect on the environment. Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear were published in the proposed rule to Moreover, since the use of-the updated Regulatory Commission. Washington,* simplify the reporting. requil'ements. procedure is likely to result in more DC 20555,. Telephone*(301}492--3988.
*accurate and conservative predictions of
- 5. Use of "Adequate Protection" transition to nil ductility, the i:isk of an Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification Exception to the BackfitRule accident and attendant environmental One comment said that flexibility in consequences is likEly to be reduced As required by the Regulatory granting exemptions to the rule or under the new amended rule. Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the exceptions to the required submittal The environmental assessment and Commission certifies that this rule does schedules would be i'educ*ed if exception finding of 110 significant impact on . not have a significant economic impact was taken to the backfit rule (10 CFR which this determination is based are on a substantial number of small 50.109) on the basis that the available for inspection at the NRC entities. This*rule specifies minimum amendments to the PTS rule were Public Document Room, 2J.,20 L Street fracture* toughness properties of needed to provide adequate protection NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.. irradiated pressure vessel-materials to to the health and safety of the public. Single copies of the environmental ameliorate the effects of PTS events on assessment and the.finding of:no nuclear facilities licensed under the Staff Response provision*oflO CFR 50.21(b) and 10 CFR significant impact are available from The staff has continued to cite Allen L Hiser, Jr.,.Division of 50.22. The companies that own these "adequate protection," because it Engineering. Office of Nuclear facilities do not fall within the scope of believes that the amendment to the PTS Regulatory Research,.U.S. Nuclear the definition of"small.entities" as set rule is necessary*to assure that there is Regulatory Commission, Washington, forth. in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or no undue risk to public health and DC 20555, Telephone:,(301) 492.-3988. the Small Business* Size Standards in safety from pressurized thermal shock. regulations issued' by the Small'Businesil Characterizing the amendment as Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Administration at 10 CFR part 121.
"necessary lo assure adequate This rule amends information protection" does not preclude the NRC collection requirements that are subject Backfit Analysis from granting exemptions to the rule, so to the Paperwork Re~uction Act of ~80 The NRC has concluded, on the basis long as licensees propose alternatives (44 U.S.C:3501 et seq.). These of. the documented evaluation required which assure adequate protection. The information collection requirements by w CFR 50.109(a)(4), that the backfit staff also notes that the PTS rule, were approved by the Office of
- re(luiremente contained in this paragraphs (b)(5), (b)(6) and (b)(7), Managementand'Budgl!I AP,proval No. amendment are necessary to ensure that provides procedures for the kind of . 3150-0011. . the facility provides adequate protection case-by-case review that would Public reporting burden for this to the public health and* safety, and, normally be the basis for an exemption. collection of information is estimated to therefore, that a backflt analysis is not There is even what amounts to an average approximately 331 hours per required and the cost-benefit standards appeal procedure in paragraph (b)(7) response, including time for reviewing of 10 CFR 50.109(a){3) do not apply. The whereby a licensee whose plant-specific instructions, searching existing data documented evaluation given in the analysis and proposed corrective sources, gathering and maintaining the regulatory analysis includes a* statement actions are not approved can again data needed, and completing.and of the objectives of and reasons for the request consideration of additional reviewing the collection of information. backfits that would be required by the modifications to equipment, systems Send comments regarding thi's burden and operation or the facility in addition rule and sets forth the basis.for the estimate or any other aspect of'this NRC's conclusion that these*backfits are to those previously proposed. collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden. to not subject to the cost~benefit sta1Jdards Finding of No Significant Environmental oflO CFR 50.109(a)(3).
Impact the Information and Records Management Branch (MNBB-7714), List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 The Commission has determined Di vis ion of Infonna lion Support under the National Environmental Policy Services, Office of Information Antitrust, Classified information, Act of 1969, as amended, and the Resources Management. U.S. Nuclear Criminlfl penalties, Fire prevention, Commission's regulations in subpart A Regulatory Commission, Washington. Incorporation by reference, of 10 CFR part 51, that. this rule is not a DC 20555; and lo the Desk Officer, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear major Federal action significantly Office of Information and Regulatory power plants and reactors. Radiation affecting the quality of the human Affairs, NEOB-3019 (3150-0011), Office protection, Reactor siting criteria,. environment and therefore an of Management and Budget, Reporting and recordkeeping environmental impact statement is not Washington. DC 20503. requirements. required. For the reasons set *out in the The PTS rule is one of several Regulatory Analysis preamble and under the authority of the regulatory requirements the function of The NRG staff prepared a regulatory, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which Is to ensure reactor vessel analysis for the final rule, which the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, integrity. This amendment to the PTS describes the factors and alternatives and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR part 50. 50-SC-78
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION 56 FR 23360 should assess the total plant equipment" program for ensuring sustained Published 5/21 /91. that is out of service and determine the performance in the maintenance area.
Effective 6/20/91 overall effect on the performance of On May 25, 1990, the Commission Standards for Protection Against safety functions. approved these criteria and advised the Radiation EFFECTIVE DATE: The final rule will staff that additional factors which may become effective July 10, 1996. However, influence the Commission in See Part 20 Statements of Consideration the information collection requirements determining the need for maintenance contained in 10 CFR 50.65 are not rulemaking were: (1) The ability to effective until the NRC publishes the enforce maintenance programs or 56 FR 31306 Office of Management and Budget standards; (2) the presence of a Published 7/10/91 (0MB) clearance in the Federal Register. strengthened commitment by the Effective 7/10/96 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: industry to monitor equipment Robert Riggs, Office of Nuclear performance to identify problematic Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear components, systems, and functions, to Regulatory Commission, Washington, conduct root cause analysis, to track 10 CFR Part 50 DC 20555, (301) 492-3732. corrective actions, and to feedback information into the maintenance RIN 3150-ADOO program; and (3) provision of a SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: mechanism by which the NRC could Monitoring the Effectiveness of verify the effectiveness of the program. Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants Background On May 23, 1990, the Commission AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory On March 23, 1988 (53 FR 9430), the directed the staff to develop a second Commission. Commission published a final Policy proposed rule that would be reliability-ACTION: Final rule. Statement on Maintenance of Nuclear based. In addition, the Commission Power Plants. In the Policy Statement, directed the staff to develop two
SUMMARY
- The Commission is amending the Commission stated that it expected procedural approaches for its regulations to require commercial to publish a notice of proposed implementation of a rule. The first nuclear power plant licensees to monitor rulemaking and provided the general implementation approach, which the effectiveness of maintenance framework for the proposed rule. On allowed licensees to use an alternate activities for safety significant plant November 28, 1988 (53 FR 47822), the NRC approved maintenance standard, equipment in order to minimize the Commission published a notice of was incorporated into both rules. The likelihood of failures and events caused proposed rulemaking to require second approach was to include by the lack of effective maintenance. commercial nuclear power plant conceptual considerations for The Commission believes that, to 0
licensees to implement a maintenance application of a maintenance rule only maintain safety, it is ne cessary to program to reduce the likelihood of to licensees exhibiting poor performance monitor the effectiveness of failures and events caused by the lack in the maintenance area. maintenance, and take timely and of effective maintenance. In support of In SECY-91-110 dated April 26, 1991, appropriate corrective action, where this rule, the Commission published a the staff reported the results of the necessary, to ensure the continuing draft regulatory guide on maintenance stafrs evaluation of the need for effectiveness of maintenance for the on August 17, 1989 (54 FR 33988) for maintenance rulemaking. The evaluation lifetime of nuclear power plants, public comment. On December 8, 1989, was based upon an assessment of particularly as plants age. The final rule the Commission issued a revised policy licensee progress against the four requires that licensees monitor the statement on maintenance (54 FR 50611) Commission-approved criteria and the performance or condition of certain that stated the Commission's intention additional factors identified by the structures, systems and components to hold rulemaking in abeyance for 18 Commission. The staff also presented (SSCs) against licensee-established months while it monitored industry for Commission consideration options goals in a manner sufficient to provide initiatives and improvements and to and recommendations pertaining to: (1) reasonable assurance that those SSCs assess the need for rulemaking in the The issuance of a final policy statement; will be capable of performing their maintenance area at the end of the 18 (2) the issuance of a final "process-intended functions. Such monitoring month period. oriented" rule and accompanying would take into account industry-wide On April 13, 1990, in response to a regulatory guide, based upon the operating experience. Where monitoring Commission request, the staff forwarded November 1988 proposed rule, the proves unnecessary, licensees would be the following four proposed criteria to August 1989 draft regulatory guide, and permitted the option of relying upon an be used in determining the need for public comments received on both the appropriate preventive maintenance maintenance rulemaking: proposed rule and draft regulatory program. Licensees will be required to Criterion 1-Licensees have guide; (3) the issuance of a proposed evaluate the overall effectiveness of effectively implemented an adequate "reliability-based" rule and their maintenance programs on at least maintenance program or are committed accompanying draft regulatory_ guide; (4) an annual basis, again taking into to and proceeding towards this goal. the application of a maintenance rule account industry-wide operating Criterion 2-Licensees exhibit a only to poor performers. experience, and adjust their programs favorable trend in performance related where necessary to ensure that the Need for a Rule to maintenance. prevention of failures is appropriately Criterion 3-Licensees are committed The Commission's determination that balanced with the minimization of to the implementation of a maintenance a maintenance rule is needed rests first unavailability of SSCs. Finally, in performance standard acceptable to the on the conclusion that proper _performing monitoring and maintenance NRC. maintenance is essential to plant safety. activities which require taking Criterion 4-Licensees have in place As discussed in the Regulatory Analysis equipment out of service, licensees or are committed to an evaluation and the Backfit Analysis for this rule, 50-SC-79
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION there is a clear link between effective that a sufficient commitment by equipment availability is an important maintenance and safety as it relates to licensees to a maintenance standard measure of maintenance effectiveness.
such factors as number of transients and approved by the NRC has not been Regarding the additional factors challenges to safety systems and the received. considered by the Commission in associated need for operability, With regard to licensees having in determining the need for a maintenance availability and reliability of safety place or being committed to an rule, the Commission believes that there equipment. In addition, good evaluation program for ensuring exists a need to broaden its capability to maintenance is also important in sustained performance in the area of take timely enforcement action where providing assurance that failures of maintenance (Criterion 4), the industry, maintenance activities fail to provide other than safety-related SSCs that through NUMARC, indicated that all reasonable assurance that safety could initiate or adversely affect a licensees will perform a comprehensive significant SSCs are capable of transient or accident are minimized. assessment of their maintenance performing their intended function. With Minimizing challenges to safety systems programs against the performance regard to the presence of a strengthened is consistent with the Commission's objectives of INPO 90-008. These one- industry commitment to: Monitor defense-in-depth philosophy. time assessments were to be conducted equipment performance to identify Maintenance is also important to ensure over a four year period. Additionally, problematic components, systems and that design assumptions and margins in periodic INPO evaluations which functions; to conduct root cause the original design basis are either include the maintenance area will analysis; to track corrective actions; and maintained or are not unacceptably continue to be performed. However, the to feedback information into degraded. Therefore, nuclear power Commission believes that the industry's maintenance programs, the Commission plant maintenance is clearly important largely programmatic assessments and has determined, based upon the in protecting the public health and evaluations of licensee maintenance weaknesses identified by the MTis and safety. programs will not alone suffice. Instead, the lack of sufficient commitments by The results of the Commission's the Commission believes that the effectiveness of maintenance must be licensees to a maintenance standard, Maintenance Team Inspections (MTls] that additional regulatory attention to indicated that licensees have adequate assessed on an ongoing basis in a maintenance programs and have manner which ensures that the desired these matters is warranted. Concerning exhibited an improving trend in program result, reasonable assurance that key the provision of a mechanism by which implementation (Criterion 1). However, structures, systems, and components are the NRC could verify the effectiveness some common maintenance-related capable of performing their intended of maintenance programs, neither the weaknesses were identified, such as function, is consistently achieved. Commission nor the industry have been inadequate root cause analysis leading Further, there is a continuing need for able to develop overall performance to repetitive failures, lack of equipment feedback of the results of such indicators which would readily provide performance trending, and the assessments and to factor those results unambiguous indication of overall consideration of plant risk in the into programmatic requirements, where maintenance effectiveness at any given prioritization, planning and scheduling assessment results indicate ineffective plant. Thus, the Commission's of maintenance. In general, as evidenced maintenance. consideration of these additional factors by plant operational performance data Considering the above points, the also weighs in favor of promulgating a and the results of NRC assessments, the Commission is satisfied that the rule that requires the monitoring and industry has exhibited a favorable trend industry has been generally successful assessment of maintenance in maintenance performance (Criterion in bringing about substantial effectiveness. Additionally, 2). improvement in maintenance programs. consideration of these factors leads the With regard to licensee commitment Further, the improving trend established Commission to conclude that it is to an NRG-approved maintenance over the past several years has necessary for such a rule to include performance standard (Criterion 3), the continued. However, the necessity for requirements for corrective action to industry, through NUMARC, expressed ongoing results-oriented assessments of address instances of ineffective to the Commission its commitment, in maintenance effectiveness is indicated maintenance, and feedback of the general, to the goal of improving by the fact that, despite significant results of monitoring and assessment performance in the area of maintenance. industry accomplishment in the areas of into licensee maintenance programs. The industry asserted that all licensees maintenance program content and In consideration of the above, the are committed, by virtue of their implementation, plant events caused by Commission has determined that a membership in the industry-sponsored the degradation or failure of plant regulatory framework must be put in Institute for Nuclear Power Operations equipment continue to occur as a result place which provides a mechanism for [INPOJ, to meeting, or striving to meet, of instances of ineffective maintenance. evaluating the overall continuing the performance objectives contained in Additionally, operational events have effectiveness of licensee maintenance INPO 90-008, "Maintenance Programs in been exacerbated by or resulted from programs, particularly as the plants the Nuclear Power Industry." INPO 90- plant equipment being unavailable due continue to age. As noted previously, 008 is primarily a compilation of to maintenance activities. Under areas directly related to this issue were preexisting objectives and criteria existing requirements and industry identified as common weaknesses developed by INPO relating to maintenance initiatives, with relatively during the NRC's Maintenance Team maintenance. These objectives and few exceptions, the availabilities of Inspections. These areas included criteria largely relate to maintenance safety significant structures, systems, inadequate root cause analysis, lack of program content and programmatic and components are _not routinely equipment performance trending, and measures of performance. No written assessed. These events and lack of consideration of risk in the commitments were received from circumstances further attest to the need prioritization, planning, and scheduling licensees and the industry-wide for ongoing results-oriented assessment of maintenance. The Commission commitment which was received was at of maintenance effectiveness since, therefore concludes that a rule requiring best indirect. The Commission believes together with equipment reliability, that licensees monitor and assess the 50-SC-80
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION effectiveness of maintenance activities modifications "which may affect the functions of the structures, systems, and is necessary. functioning of safety-related structures, components [SSCs) described in In addition to all of the above systems, or components* * *." The paragraphs [b)[l) and (b)(2)(i) can be considerations, the Commission's Commission has previously interpreted performed; and (2) for the SSCs conclusion that a rule requiring that the its rules and guidance as requiring described in paragraphs (b)[2)(ii) and effectiveness of maintenance be licensees to address the safety aspects (b)[2)[iii), failures will not occur which monitored is also predicated on the fact of certain SSCs in the BOP. For example, prevent the fulfillment of safety-related that the Commission's current 10 CFR 50.34[g) requires applicants for functions, and failures resulting in regulations, regulatory guidance, and licenses after 1982 to evaluate their scrams and unnecessary actuations of licensing practice do not clearly define facility against the Standard Review safety related systems are minimized.
the Commission's expectations with Plan (SRP), NUREG-o800. The SRP Where failures are likely to cause loss of regard to ensuring the continued requires licensees to evaluate a number an intended function, monitoring should effectiveness of maintenance programs of SSCs in the BOP [this is further be predictive in nature, providing early at nuclear power plants. The discussed in the Commission's response warning of degradation. Monitoring Commission has many individualized to Question 7 in the summary of public activities for specific SSCs can be requirements relative to maintenance, comments). performance oriented (such as the including SSCs in the balance of plant Requirements and guidance for monitoring of reliability and (BOP), throughout the regulations. These monitoring maintenance effectiveness availability), condition-oriented include 10 CFR 50.34(a)(3)(i); 50.34(a)(7); and for taking corrective action when [parameter trending), or both. The 50.34[b)[6) (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv); maintenance is ineffective should results of monitoring are required to be 50.34(b)(9); 50.34(f)(l) (i), (ii), and (iii); enhance the Commission's capability to evaluated against the licensee-50.34(g); 50.34a(c); 50.36(a); 50.36(c) (2), take timely and effective action against established goals. Goals should be (3), (5), and (7); 50.36a(a)(l); 50.49(b); licensees with inadequate or poorly established commensurate with an 50.55a(g); part 50, appendix A, criteria 1, conducted maintenance in order to SSC's safety significance. Where 13,18,21,32, 36, 37,40, 43,45,46, 52,53; ensure prompt resumption of effective available, the assumptions in and maintenance activities. results of probabilistic risk assessments part 50, appendix B. More generally, 10 For these reasons, the Commission [PRAs) or individual plant examinations CFR 50.34(b)(6)(iv) requires licensees to concludes that a regulation that requires (IPEs) should be considered when address their plans for the conduct of all nuclear power plant licensees to establishing goals. The licensee is "maintenance, surveillance, and monitor the effectiveness of encouraged to consider analytical periodic testing of structures, systems, maintenance activities is warranted. techniques, such as system and components." However, there is no The rule provides for continued guidance on exactly what these "plans unavailability modeling studies, which emphasis on the defense-in-depth may be useful in developing goals; for the conduct of maintenance" should principle by including selected BOP include with regard to the monitoring of however, such analyses are not SSCs, integrates risk consideration into required. maintenance effectiveness. the maintenance process, provides an The Commission's rules, guidance, The purpose of paragraph (a)(2) of the enhanced regulatory basis for inspection and practice also require clarification as rule is to provide an alternate approach and enforcement of BOP maintenance-to what structures, systems, and related issues, and provides a for those SSCs where it is not necessary components should be subject to strengthened regulatory basis for to establish the monitoring regime maintenance requirements. Although ensuring that the progress achieved to required by (a)(l). For example, this
§ 50.34(b)[6)[iv) references maintenance date is sustained in the future. provision might be used where an SSC, for "structures, systems, and without preventive maintenance, has components" without further Description of Rule inherently high reliability and qualification, the guidance in Regulatory The objective of the final rule is to availability (e.g., electrical cabling) or Guide 1.70, "Standard Format and require the monitoring of the overall where the preventive maintenance Content of Safety Analysis Reports for continuing effectiveness of licensee necessary to achieve high reliability Nuclear Power Plants-LWR Edition," maintenance programs to ensure that: does not itself contribute significantly to (Revision 3, November 1978) is silent on (1) Safety related and certain non-safety unavailability (e.g., moisture drainage the scope of SSCs that the maintenance related structures, systems, and from an air system accumulator). The program should cover (see Regulatory components are capable of performing licensee is encouraged to consider the Guide 1.70, section 13.5.2). Regulatory their intended functions; and (2) for non- use of reliability-based methods for Guide 1.70 also refers to Regulatory safety related equipment, failures will developing the preventive maintenance Guide 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program not occur which prevent the fulfillment programs covered under this section of Requirements (Operation)." Regulatory of safety-related functions, and failures the rule; however, the use of such Guide 1.33, which implements portions resulting in scrams and unnecessary methods is not required.
of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B, indicates actuations of safety related systems are The purposes of paragraph (a)(3) of in appendix A that "maintenance that minimized. All references to the rule are the rule are two-fold: (1) This provision can affect the performance of safety- to the new § 50.65. requires that SSC performance or related equipment should be properly Two approaches, which are condition goals, performance or preplanned and performed in prescribed in paragraphs (a)(l) and condition monitoring, and preventive accordance with written procedures (a)(2) of the rule, are provided for maintenance activities implemented
* * *." The sample listing of assuring maintenance effectiveness. pursuant to paragraphs (a)(l) and (a)[2) maintenance operations requiring The intention of paragraph (a)(l) of be evaluated in light of SSC reliabilities procedures also is limited to safety- the rule is that the licensee establish a and availabilities. In the case of SSCs related equipment. Regulatory Guide monitoring regime which is sufficient in treated under paragraph (a)(l),
1.70 also endorses industry standards scope to provide reasonable assurance adjustments are to be made to goals, for nuclear power plant operations that that (1) intended safety, accident monitoring, or preventive maintenance are limited to maintenance or mitigation and transient mitigation requirements where equipment 50-SC-81
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION performance or condition have not met scrams and, where scrams due to return to treating the SSC under established goals. Conversely, at any equipment failures have been paragraph (a)(2).
time the licensee may eliminate problematic or where such scrams are Paragraph (al(3)-Assessing the monitoring activities initiated in anticipated, choose to monitor those Cumulative Impact of Out-of-Service response to problematic equipment initiators most likely to cause scrams. Equipment on Performance of Safety performance or industry experience It is not intended that this monitoring Functions-Use of PRA once the root cause of the problem has requirement duplicate activities been corrected or the adequacy of currently being conducted, such as Assessing the cumulative impact of equipment performance has been technical specification surveillance out-of service equipment on the confirmed. In the case of SSCs treated testing, which could be integrated with, performance of safety functions, as under paragraph (a)(2), adjustment of and provide the basis for, the requisite called for under paragraph (a)(3), is preventive maintenance requirements level of monitoring. Consistent with the intended to ensure that the plant is not may be warranted where SSC underlying purposes of the rule, placed in risk-significant configurations. availability is judged to be maximum flexibility should be offered to These assessments do not necessarily unacceptable. SSCs treated under licensees in establishing and modifying require that a quantitative assessment of
- paragraph (a)(2) which experience one their monitoring activities. probabilistic risk be performed. The or more maintenance-preventable Reliability and Availability of SSCs level of sophistication with which such failures, should become subject to the Subject to Either Paragraph (a)(1) or assessments are performed is expected requirements of (a)(1) (see discussion (a)(2) to vary, based upon the circumstances below) or, where this is not feasible, involved. The assessments may range may require other remedial action, such SSCs which are treated under anywhere from simple deterministic as modification or replacement. paragraph (a)(1) may have formally judgments to the use of an on-line living (2) This provision provides that the established reliability and availability PRA. It is to be expected that, over time, planning and scheduling of maintenance goals against which they are explicitly assessments of this type will be refined should consider the cumulative impact monitored, where goals of this nature based upon technological improvement of all equipment simultaneously out of are appropriate. In addition, and and experience.
service on plant safety. regardless of the nature of the A regulatory guide providing an monitoring and goals established to Derivation of the Final Rule acceptable methodology for satisfy paragraph (a)(1), reliability and The final rule is comprised of a subset implementing this rule will be developed availability over the longer term must be of the aspects of the proposed by the NRC staff and issued for public assessed periodically pursuant to the maintenance rule and its associated comment. To permit ample opportunity requirements of paragraph (a)(3), as part draft regulatory guide, which were for licensees to comply with the five of the evaluation of goals, monitoring issued for public comment on November year implementation schedule specified requirements, and preventive 10, 1988, and on August 17, 1989, in the rule, the regulatory guide is maintenance requirements. The reliability and availability of respectively. The final rule includes only expected to be available in final form those aspects that are "results-two years from the date this rule is SSCs which are treated under paragraph (a)(2) are required to be considered oriented", including those addressing promulgated. establishment of goals, monitoring and under the requirements of paragraph Additional Guidance (a)(3), as part of the periodic assessment assessment of maintenance of preventive maintenance effectiveness, feedback and corrective Scope of Monitoring actions, and, in a more* limited manner, requirements. It is not the intent of the Commission predictive and preventive maintenance. to require a monitoring program so Paragraph (a)(2) Is Not Intended To Be These aspects were detailed in extensive that it detracts from licensees' Used To Justify Continuing the Status Regulatory Positions C.3, C.5, and C.6 of ability to otherwise maintain equipment. Quo, Where the Status Quo Is Not the draft regulatory guide and were the The extent of monitoring may vary from Effective in Ensuring Acceptable Levels subject of considerable public comment system to system depending upon of Availability and Reliability in response to Questions 3, 9, 10, and 11 system importance to plant risk. Some Under the terms of paragraph (a)(2), posed by the Commission when it issued monitoring at the component level may preventive maintenance must be the proposed maintenance rule. These be necessary; however, it is envisioned demonstrated to be effective in comments are addressed in the that much of the monitoring could be controlling the performance or condition summary of public comments done at the system or train functional of an SSC such that the SSC remains accompanying the final rule. Details of level. For example, for less risk- capable of performing its intended the derivation are discussed below. significant systems, indicators of system function. Hence, it is expected that, Establishment of Goals and Monitoring reliability (where sufficient performance where one or more maintenance-data exist) and availability may be all preventable failures occur on SSCs Section 50.65(a)(1) requires the that is necessary. Some parameter treated under this paragraph, the monitoring of performance or condition trending, beyond that already required effectiveness of preventive maintenance of structures, systems, and components by NRC requirements to provide early is no longer demonstrated. As a result, (SSCs) against licensee-established warning of degradation, may also be the SSC would be required to be treated goals. These requirements were drawp necessary for critical components whose under the requirements of paragraph from the requirements of the proposed -
- unavailability causes a system train to (a)(1) until such time as a performance rule, in § § 50.65(c) (1) and (2), and be unavailable or whose failure is history is established to demonstrate elements (b) (1)(iii), (5), (10), and (17).
otherwise unacceptable. Rather than that reliability and availability are once The statement of considerations (SOC) monitoring the many SSCs which could again effectively controlled by an for the proposed rule also discussed the cause plant scrams, the licensee may established preventive maintenance process of establishing goals, choose to establish a performance regimen. Once such a demonstration has monitoring, and taking appropriate indicator for unplanned automatic been made, it would be acceptable to corrective action, see 53 FR 47825. 50-SC-82
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Comments on appropriate methods of subject to the proposed rule's Team Inspections identified weaknesses monitoring, the need for, form of, and maintenance requirements. See in some licensees' maintenance possible kinds of effectiveness criteria, proposed rule,§ 50.65(b). The regulatory programs, it is expected that each and the use of performance indicators guide indicated that the rule applies "to licensee will assess its program and for component reliability and all parts of the plant'that could take appropriate action to improve those maintenance performance were significantly impact safe operation and areas where weaknesses were requested, see questions 9 and 10, 53 FR security, including the BOP". See identified. The rule has a five year 47825. Comments on criteria and Sections B., C.1. Comments on scope of implementation schedule with quantitative goals were also requested SSCs were solicited in the SOC for the supporting regulatory guide in the Federal Register notice proposed rule at Question 7 (53 FR at development and promulgation expected accompanying the publication of the 47825), and in the proposed regulatory within the first two years. This schedule draft regulatory guide, see 54 FR 33983. guide at Question 2 (see 54 FR 33983). allows three years for licensee The draft regulatory guide discussed As shown by the above, all of the development beyond the time that final goal setting and monitoring in sections significant provisions of the final rule guidance is expected to be available.
C.1.1, C.1.3, C.3.2, C.4.6.4, C.5.2.2, C.5.2.3, were presaged in the proposed rule and Implementation and compliance with C.5.2.4, and C.6. in the proposed regulatory guide. The the rule is achieved through SSC Consideration of industry-wide final rule is not a significant departure performance or condition monitoring operating experience under § 50.65(a)(1) from NRC proposals offered for public against appropriate licensee-established as well as § 50.65(a)(3) of the final rule comment except that, as noted, the final goals or, as an alternative, through the were anticipated by: (1) The proposed rule is a subset of those proposals. Since conduct of preventive maintenance that rule's discussion of a draft NUREG all of the elements of the final rule were has been demonstrated to be effective. report which surveyed maintenance the subject of extensive public comment, Where the performance or condition of practices, 53 FR 47824, (2) a there is no need to publish the final rule SSCs is determined to be unacceptable, recommendation in the SOC concerning as a proposed rule for still more corrective action is required. use of the NPRDS, id., and (3) Questions comment. As noted, there will be further Additionally, compliance is achieved 10 and 11 of the SOC, 53 FR 47825. It comment on the rule's implementing through the periodic assessment of was also alluded to in section C.5.2.3 of guidance. Clearly, given the period monitoring, goals, and preventive the regulatory guide, and discussed in allowed for implementation, there can maintenance activities to ensure that the section C.3.2. be adjustments made to the rule before objective of minimizing SSC failures is it becomes effective should further being met, consistent with the objective Corrective Action developments so require. of minimizing SSC unavailability due to The final rule's requirements that monitoring and preventive maintenance. corrective action be taken in response to Industry Programs the results of monitoring, and that at The Commission encourages industry Summary of Public Comments least an annual evaluation of the initiatives and responsibility for The comment period for the proposed monitoring, goal establishment and problem identification and resolution. rule closed February 27, 1989, and for corrective action activities were Several guidelines exist in the industry the draft regulatory guide October 17, presaged by the proposed rule's (e.g., INPO 90---008, "Maintenance 1989. Thirty-five comments on the requirement in § 50.65(c)(2) for Programs in the Nuclear Power proposed rule were received during the assessment the effectiveness of the Industry," Institute of Nuclear Power official comment period and fifty-seven maintenance program and making Operations] that are directed toward were filed after the comment period appropriate improvements, Element providing performance objectives and closed. Thirty-six comments were (l)(ii) of the proposed rule, and the criteria for effective maintenance received on the regulatory guide. All regulatory guide's discussion on the programs. With regard to the programmatic aspects of maintenance, comment letters were considered in functioning of the maintenance process, the Commission encourages the industry formulation of the final rule. Comment e.g., sections C.1, C.1.3 and C.1.4, C.3.2, letters were also considered in arriving C.4, C.5.1, and C.6. to continue the development and improvement of such guidelines and to at the Commission's decisions to revise Preventive Maintenance standardize recommendations and the accompanying regulatory guide to Preventive maintenance, which is guidance for plant maintenance reflect the final rule's narrowed focus on endorsed by § 50.65(a)(2) of the final programs. In acknowledgement of the results, to provide an opportunity for rule, was one of the elements of the generally satisfactory state of public comment on the revised proposed rule, see 53 FR 47828, Element maintenance programs, the final rule regulatory guide, and to issue final 1(ii). The regulatory guide addressed provides great flexibility for the industry guidance well in advance of the date preventive (also referred to as to continue developing, improving and specified for rule implementation.
"proactive") maintenance in sections implementing recommendations and Of the 92 comments on the proposed C.2 and C.4.6.1. guidance concerning maintenance rule, 67 were filed by utilities, 11 by programs. The Commission encourages industry groups and trade ass,ociations, Scope of SSCs Subject to Maintenance 4 by individuals, 3 by vendors, 3 by such activities, especially as they The scope of SSCs subject to the final support improvements in the evaluation public interest groups, 2 by Federal maintenance rule includes safety-related of maintenance program effectiveness. Agencies, and 2 by state groups/
SSCs, and certain "non-safety" SSCs in individuals. Of the 36 comments on the the BOP which meet one or more of four Implementation and Compliance regulatory guide, 22 were filed by specific criteria. See final rule, The focus of the rule is on the results utilities, 5 by industry and professional
§ 50.65(b). The matter of scope was achieved through maintenance and, in groups, 1 by State, 5 by corporations, 2 addressed in the proposed rule, which this regard, it is not the intent of the rule by individuals, and 1 by a vendor. The suggested that all SSCs in a nuclear Iha t existing licensees necessarily Commission is appreciative of the time power plant, including those in the develop new maintenance programs. and effort expended by those who balance of plant (BOP) were to be However, because the Maintenance submitted comments. Maintenance is a 50-SC-83
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION matter of considerable priority and commenters felt that a prescribed set of maintenance standard should be importance, and the views expressed in maintenance performance indicators published initially as a guide and not as the comments have been very helpful to (MPis) cannot be used as the sole basis a rule that utilities should have the the Commission in its deliberation. for evaluating the effectiveness of a prerogative to organize in the most Many comments came from individual maintenance program. resource-effective manner their licensees, but most supported the NUMARC believes that the existing approach to meeting the key comments prepared by the Nuclear regulations do not establish components of the standard. The Management Resource Council requirements similar to the proposed Commission could then evaluate (NUMARCJ. rule, especially with regard to BOP experience under the regulatory guide to In summary, most of the commenters equipment. Therefore, licensees will be determine whether a rule is required.
on the proposed rule stated that there forced to modify their maintenance One individual was against a rule was no need for a separate rule on programs to satisfy new requirements, because the industry has a good safety maintenance for nuclear power plants which means the standards of a backfit record and the rule would be costly and because (1) the NRC already has analysis (10 CFR 50.109) apply. an unnecessary burden on the industry. regulatory authority and methods in NUMARC further stated that the The comments on the regulatory guide place to provide an overview of "adequate protection" standard of 10 raised many of the same issues as those maintenance program capability to CFR 50.109(a)(4) does not apply with comments associated with the proposed ensure adequate protection of the public regard to implementing the proposed rule. In general the issues addressed health and safety, (2) there has been no rule. They feel that this was not were the level of detail in the regulatory demonstration that the rule will increase supported by data provided in the guide; the scope of structures, systems, public safety and it may actually proposed rule or the accompanying and components covered by the guide; decrease safety by diverting industry regulatory analysis. They felt that the the criteria to be used to determine if a efforts away from maintenance to public risk reduction data used in the maintenance program is effective; the support activities directed toward regulatory analysis was outdated, that use of quantitative goals for determining demonstrating compliance, (3) good recent data by both the industry and the satisfactory level of performance for maintenance assessment indicators NRC should be used to evaluate public plant maintenance programs; the already exist for both industry and the risk reduction, and that the increased quantitative measures for such goals; NRC, such as the Institute of Nuclear costs associated with implementation the usefulness of NPRDS data for Power Operations (INPOJ performance were grossly underestimated. assessing effectiveness of plant indicators, Systematic Assessment of NUMARC further believes that maintenance programs; the usefulness of Licensee Performance (SALP) reviews, industry objectives and programs are PRAs for plant maintenance programs; the NRC Maintenance Inspection consistent with the NRC expectations the timeliness of corrective actions; the Program, and Licensee Event Reports stated in the March 1988 Policy definition of maintenance; the (LER's), and (4) the industry already has Statement on Maintenance of Nuclear documentation of the technical basis of maintenance initiatives under way and, Power Plants. NUMARC believes that a maintenance program; and the extent as a whole, the industry is improving in increased emphasis has been placed on of root cause analysis and feedback. the maintenance area. maintenance, improvements in These comments on the proposed rule Many commenters considered the performance and reliability have been were either repeated or expanded in the proposed rule unbounded in scope achieved, and therefore the commenters' responses to the 12 because there are no limits established* promulgation of a rule is now questions posed by the Commission in for the BOP. They were concerned that, unnecessary and unjustified. They the Statement of Considerations for the with such a broad and undefined scope, believe that the NRC should take action proposed maintenance rule. These the industry cannot assess the impact of against the few poor maintenance questions are listed below; and each the proposed rule. Therefore, it was performers, rather than promulgate a response contains a synopsis of the suggested that, at the very least, the rule across the whole industry. public comment and the Commission final rule should be postponed until Two individuals, three public interest response for that particular question. issuance of the regulatory guide. groups, and two State representatives Where appropriate, the responses reflect NUMARC and most utilities were supportive of a maintenance rule the revisions to the final version of the commented that, without measures of but were not necessarily in total maintenance rule. The responses also effectiveness stated in the proposed agreement with the way the rule was include consideration of the public rule, they did not know what formulated or how it should be comments received on the draft requirements or expectations would be implemented. They believed that regulatory guide. needed to implement the proposed rule nuclear power plant maintenance 1. Is it appropriate for the nuclear and determine regulatory compliance. directly affects the health, safety, and power industry to develop a There was concern that effectiveness, as economic well-being of the public and Maintenance Standard and, if so, would specified in the proposed 10 CFR that nuclear facilities not properly the industry develop such a 50.65(c), is a qualitative matter and maintained will be unsafe and Maintenance Standard? subject to different interpretation by uneconomical, even with the best Comments-Most commenters feel both licensees and the NRC. There was design, construction, and operation. that another maintenance standard is also concern that the lack of criteria They believe that improper not needed. They believe that the describing adequate programs places a maintenance, even of components not guidelines developed by INPO provide burden on the industry and public to previously associated with safety, can the basic framework of a standard and assess what is needed for the broad have adverse safety consequences. could be expanded to accommodate subject area defined in the proposed Furthermore, they believe that the NRC requirements. The Policy rule by the NRC and that the proposed superior performance of nuclear power Statement on Maintenance, existing rule establishes requirements for plants in other countries is attributed to industry standards, and the INPO specific program elements (10 CFR their maintenance program. One State Guidelines for the Conduct of 50.65[b)J that are not defined. Most representative believes that the Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants 50-SC-84
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION contain the information needed to 2. What level of detail should be action. The regulatory guide will be ensure effective maintenance programs. included in the Maintenance Standard? revised to reflect the rule's narrower If a standard is to be developed, all Comments-NUMARC and the focus on results and maintenance utilities prefer a standard developed by utilities believe that ,any maintenance program effectiveness, and will describe industry rather than by NRC with INPO guidelines or standard should provide a a means for meeting the requirements of or NUMARC taking the lead. One general description of the necessary 10 CFR 50.65 acceptable to the staff. The citizen's group stated that the NRC, not elements of a good maintenance rule and regulatory guide combination the industry, should develop the program, but the details for will provide a framework for evaluating maintenance standard. No commitment implementation should be left to the the continuing overall effectiveness of was received during the comment period individual utility. The emphasis should maintenance, focusing on the objective to develop a maintenance standard. be on meeting the intent so as not to of an effective maintenance program, Response-The Commission force a utility to change a well-working while at the same time permitting encouraged the industry to develop a individual program solely for the licensees broad discretion and maintenance standard because the purpose of standardization across the flexibility in the formulation and Commission believed that the industry. The standard should have a implementation of their individual development of a standard would allow balance of flexibility and specificity to maintenance programs.
maximum utilization of current industry avoid vague criteria that will lead to The rule does not require a monitoring initiatives toward developing and areas of varying interpretation and program so broad in scope that it implementing effective maintenance dispute. The current industry detracts from a licensee's ability to programs and that licensee participation performance objectives, criteria, and otherwise maintain its equipment. The in the development of the standard guidelines developed by INPO allow the extent of monitoring may vary from would provide additional incentive and flexibility for individual utilities to meet system to system, depending upon responsibility for improving plant the intent of the guidelines by meeting system importance to risk. Some maintenance programs. In addition, the the criteria directly or by other monitoring at the component level may Commission believed that the effort appropriate means. One utility feels that be necessary; however, it is envisioned would benefit from industry's expertise it would be counterproductive to that the majority of monitoring could be in this area and that it would be more develop a minimum standard that could done at the system or train functional likely that the maintenance practices potentially lower the level of level. This monitoring requirement is not from plants with good maintenance performance for the entire industry intended to duplicate activities currently programs would become part of the when only a few plants are experiencing being conducted which could be industry-developed maintenance problems. Another utility stated that a integrated with, and provide the basis standard. new rule or regulatory guidance will for, the requisite level of monitoring. The On April 17, 1990, NUMARC result in increased documentation, Commission response to Question 7 has submitted INPO 90-008, "Maintenance decreased flexibility to change and further details on scope and level of Programs in the Nuclear Power adjust programs as conditions or detail. Industry," as the industry maintenance technology change, and decreased 3. Is two years a reasonable time to standard. The Commission reviewed incentive for the maintenance staff to develop and implement a standard? this document and found that, with improve or enhance their maintenance Comments-NUMARC and the minor modification, it formed a capability. This could lead to a utilities feel that two years was enough comprehensive description of the diversion of utility resources from time to develop a standard depending necessary attributes of a maintenance safety-related activities and increase on the scope of the BOP SSCs and program. In acknowledgement of this costs with minimal benefits. components that need to be addressed. document, the generally favorable The commenters generally feel that They stated that the systematic results of the NRC's Maintenance Team any maintenance standard requiring an evaluation of all SSCs as described in Inspections regarding the adequacy of analysis of all SSCs for function and the proposed rule alone would require licensees' maintenance programs, and objective was practically unattainable more than two years. Most of the the many other industry initiatives in and would significantly divert technical industry agrees that it would take two this area, the Commission revised the resources necessary for safe and years to develop the standard and three rule to emphasize the effectiveness or reliable operation of a nuclear plant, to five years to implement it. One results of maintenance programs and de- with questionable benefit. Any citizen's group feels that two years is emphasize the programmatic aspects of standards, guidelines, or criteria should too long for developing and maintenance. Also, in acknowledgement be tailored appropriately to the safety implementing a standard; one year of the generally satisfactory state of significance of the equipment being would be more appropriate. maintenance programs the final rule maintained and the function being Response-During the time the provides great flexibility for the industry performed. Commission held rulemaking in to continue developing, improving and Response-As noted in the abeyance, the industry developed and implementing recommendations and Commission response to Item 1, the final submitted INPO 90--008 to the guidance concerning maintenance rule has been modified to establish a Commission. The Commission also programs. The Commission encourages framework for evaluating the developed a regulatory guide that such activities, especially as they effectiveness of maintenance programs. incorporated appropriate public support improvements in the evaluation As such, the rule describes the basic comments. Furthermore, the MTis found of maintenance program effectiveness. elements for measuring the effectiveness that licensee maintenance programs However, because the rule has been of maintenance and taking appropriate have improved, and there are programs modified to de-emphasize programmatic corrective action where maintenance is for improving maintenance developed requirements of maintenance, the found to be ineffective. These elements by the industry. Therefore, the Commission does not currently intend to include establishing goals, monitoring Commission believes that two years formally endorse an industry and assessment against these goals, was ample time to develop and maintenance program standard. feedback, and appropriate corrective implement a standard. 50-SC-85
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION The Commission acknowledges that a guide. An industry commitment to of the generally satisfactory state of systematic evaluation of SSCs could develop a maintenance standard, maintenance programs, the final rule require as much as two or more years. consistent with the Commission's provides great flexibility for the industry Consequently, the final rule has a five schedule to issue a final regulatory to continue developing, improving and year implementation schedule which guide by November 1989, would be implementing recommendations and allows at least three years for these necessary during this public comment guidance concerning maintenance evaluations beyond the time when final period. programs. The Commission encourages guidance is expected to be available. Comments-Most respondents believe such activities, especially as they
- 4. Is it appropriate for a designated that issuance of a rule without public support improvements in the evaluation third party to certify plant maintenance comment on a regulatory guide was of maintenance program effectiveness.
programs to comply with the inappropriate. Many feel that the most However, because the rule has been Maintenance Standard; if so, would an important NRC document concerning modified to de-emphasize programmatic organization be willing to perform such maintenance will be the regulatory requirements of maintenance, the certification? guide and not the maintenance rule. Commission does not currently intend to Comments-Of the comments that Industry feels that the current standards formally endorse an industry addressed this question, most stated as embodied in publications such as maintenance program standard. that it would be inappropriate for the INPO 85-038 are sufficient and that a The Commission does not agree with NRC to delegate certification rule and regulatory guide are commenters who suggested the issuance responsibility to a third party. The unnecessary. Several industry of a regulatory guide without a rule. The degree of opposition ranged from "not respondents said that they would be Commission desires to put forth necessary" to "vigorously opposed." willing to participate with the NRC in requirements for evaluating the Most comments stated that third party developing a standard but that the effectiveness of maintenance programs, certification would be unnecessary November 1989 time constraint was including the issuance of implementing because existing measures that unrealistic. Several respondents guidance, to clarify NRC regulatory accomplish this function such as appeared to feel that the proper way to purview and to provide additional maintenance inspections and INPO upgrade maintenance would be by first enforceability. The revised regulatory evaluations. Some comments indicated developing a regulatory guide and then a guide will reflect the narrower, results-that INPO could perform certification rule if use of the guide indicated that oriented focus of the rule. The details for but not if a rule existed since that would such a rule was needed. If the current the conduct of activities supporting place INPO in the position of a industry standards were not enough, maintenance will not be specified and regulator. One respondent clearly stated most feel that the NRC has the should be developed by the licensee to that INPO should not be allowed to responsibility to develop the regulatory ensure the adequate performance of perform maintenance certifications for guide, though the industry respondents plant equipment. Several guidelines the NRC. feel that they should have input to such exist in the industry (e.g., INPO 90-008 Response-It was the Commission's a guide. INPO's position is that use of "Maintenance Programs in the Nuclear intent to build upon industry initiatives INPO 8~38 as a basis for a regulatory Power Industry," Institute of Nuclear to encourage good maintenance guide would be inappropriate. Power Operations, and others sponsored practices and common standards. A Response-The Commission believes by ANS, ASME, and EPRI) directed certification process against a that, by clearly putting forth a standard toward providing detailed maintenance standard by a third party for an effective maintenance program in recommendations for the effective was raised as an option that would have one document, guidance and stability conduct of maintenance activities. The provided some degree of consistency would be provided to help ensure that industry is encouraged to continue the and independence without relieving the maintenance programs of all development and improvement of such NRC of its regulatory responsibility to licensed plants achieve and maintain a guidelines and to standardize oversee the process. satisfactory level of effectiveness. The recommendations and guidance for Because a viable third party Commission believes that the certification process was not offered by plant maintenance programs. development of a standard by industry the industry, the Commission is no would support industry's current 6. The Commission believes that the longer pursuing this as an option. initiatives toward developing and proposed maintenance rule should be Additionally, as noted in Question 1, implementing effective maintenance considered under 10 CFR 50.109(a)(4) of because the rule has been modified to programs, and that utility participation the backfit rule which would exempt the de-emphasize programmatic in preparing a maintenance standard maintenance rule from backfit requirements of maintenance, the would provide additional experience, requirements based on the precepts that Commission does not currently intend to incentive, and responsibility for effective maintenance is necessary to formally endorse an industry improving plant maintenance programs. assure adequate public protection and maintenance program standard. The Commission was encouraged by that the proposed rule codifies and
- 5. The Commission plans to issue by NUMARC's submittal of INPO 90-008 as standardizes previously existing November 1989, a regulatory guide an industry maintenance standard. In Commission requirements, both explicit establishing standards and criteria for acknowledgement of this document, the and implicit, in plant technical determining what constitutes an generally favorable results of the NRC's specifications, licensee safety analysis effective maintenance program. This Maintenance Team Inspections reports, and 10 CFR part 50, appendix B.
regulatory guide is being developed in regarding the adequacy of licensees' The Commission requests public parallel with the final rulemaking. The maintenance programs, and the many comment concerning the need for a Commission encourages the industry to other industry initiatives in this area, the backfit analysis for this rulemaking. develop standards and acceptance Commission revise the rule to Comments-The nuclear industry criteria. If an acceptable industry emphasize the effectiveness or results of commenters uniformly believe that a standard is available in this timeframe, maintenance programs and de- backfit analysis must be prepared for the Commission will consider endorsing emphasize the programmatic aspects of the maintenance rule. The most the industry standard in the regulatory maintenance. Also, in acknowledgement comprehensive responses were 50-SC-86
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION submitted by two nuclear industry basis of the criteria contained in the could divert resources that would be groups: The Nuclear Utility Backfitting backfit rule. more profitably spent on critical safety and Reform Group (NUBARGJ, and NUMARC followed and expanded on systems and components. The proposed NUMARC. Many utility commenters NUBARG's arguments. NUMARC rule did not define BOP SSCs, thereby endorsed NUMARC's response or asserted that a backfit analysis is not providing a meaningful opportunity repeated arguments made by NUMARC. necessary solely because the for public comment. NRC should A law firm, Conner and Wetterhahn. maintenance rule would impose withdraw the proposed rule and develop also provided substantial comments that substantial new requirements on a definition and a list of typical BOP were generally consistent with those licensees and require the expenditure of SSCs that .are related or important to from NUMARC and NUBARG. In significant resources by virtue of the nuclear safety. BOP systems were not addition, a number of utility commenters maintenance rule's expansion of built to the standards of safety-related joined in NUBARG's comments. The maintenance to the BOP. This argument equipment and will not be capable of U.S. Department of Energy also agrees was echoed by several other utility being maintained at the same level of with the industry on a need for a backfit commenters. Next NUMARC attacked readiness. For example, the proposed analysis. Only one commenter, Nuclear the Commission's assertion that the rule would require the proper Information and Resource Service maintenance rule codifies and maintenance of a component that is not (NIRS), supported the Commission's standardizes previously existing required to be properly installed.
position. requirements by pointing out that the However, if NRC proceeds with NUBARG contends that the rule would require maintenance for rulemaking and if BOP SSCs must be Commission "misapplied" the adequate SSCs in the BOP. NUMARC also considered, it should be on a graded protection exemption in the backfit rule followed the NUBARG reasoning that approach depending on a given BOP in four respects. First, NUBARG any redefinition of the standard of system's potential impact on safety asserted that the Commission prevented adequate protection to include functions. The utility must retain the the public from reasonably commenting maintenance must necessarily presume ability to determine the requirements on the backfit issue by failing to specify and admit that "all U.S. nuclear power applicable to specific SSCs based on whether it was relying on 10 CFR plants are currently operating at a level safety, reliability, and economic 50.109(a)(4)(ii), which exempts from below the 'adequate protection' baseline considerations. Instead of including all analysis those rules that are "necessary until they improve their maintenance BOP SSCs, the rule must focus on the to ensure that [a] facility provides program." maintenance of functions whose failure adequate protection to the health and Although NIRS agreed with the would threaten public health and safety. safety of the public," or the provisions of Commission that a backfit analysis need Comments in favor of including BOP
§ 50.109(a)(4)(iii), which exempts those not be prepared for the maintenance SSCs are summarized as follows: The rules that involve "defining or redefining rule, their agreement was partially maintenance rule should cover the what level of protection to the public couched on their position that the 10 whole plant. Unplanned reactor trips health and safety or common defense CFR 50.109 is an invalid rule. often originate in BOP systems.
and security should be regarded as Response-The Commission has Furthermore, seemingly irrelevant parts adequate." determined to prepare a backfit analysis of the plant can affect plant operations Next, after quoting from two passages for the final rule. in unforeseen ways-for example, at in the notice of proposed rulemaking for 7. The Commission believes that the Surry in the aftermath of the pipe break. the maintenance rule that suggest that inclusion of balance of plant (BOP) Response-The Commission does not the Commission is relying on both equipment in the proposed maintenance agree that maintenance of SSCs in the
§ 50.109(a)(4) (ii) and (iii), NUBARG rule is necessary and proper. However, BOP is beyond the statutory jurisdiction appeared to contend that such reliance the Commission also recognizes that of the Commission. Pursuant to section is logically inconsistent. No reasoned some licensee maintenance programs, as 161 and 182 of the Atomic Energy Act argument was presented by NUBARG in presently configured, apply to (AEA), the Commission has broad support of its contention, nor did structures, systems, and components authority to protect the public health
. NUBARG specifically criticize the that are without question, irrelevant to and safety, and the common defense Commission's reliance on protection of public health and safety and security and to minimize losses to
§ 50.109(a)(4)(ii). Rather, NUBARG from radiological hazards associated life and property. Maintenance of SSCs focused on§ 50.109(a)(4)(iii), arguing with the operation of the nuclear power in the BOP falls within this regulatory that the Commission's position that plant. The Commission requests public authority because such SSCs can and do effective maintenance is necessary for comment concerning what limitation, if have a significant effect on safety.
adequate protection must logically rest any, should be placed on the final With regard to safety, SSCs in the on the presumption that none of the maintenance rule to provide some BOP have initiated transients and currently operating nuclear power plants licensee flexibility in this regard. caused scrams and safety injection. do provide adequate protection. Comments opposing including BOP Probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) In any event, NUBARG also argued equipment are summarized as follows: confirm that, for many plants, dominant that the Commission's decision not to BOP equipment is outside the NRC's accident sequences are initiated by prepare a backfit analysis for the jurisdiction; the statutory jurisdiction of transients in the BOP such as loss of maintenance rule represents an the NRC to regulate BOP components is offsite power or loss of feedwater. unwarranted departure from the policies limited to those BOP structures, systems, Therefore, to ensure that licensees underlying the backfit rule-an and comments that are related or operate safely, NRC's regulatory "alarming retreat." Lastly, NUBARG important to nuclear safety; the program is intended to ensure both a argued that the Commission's reliance economic impact of including nonsafety low frequency of transients that on the "adequate protection" exemption BOP equipment would be staggering; challenge safety systems and a high of§ 50.109(a)(4) is in "logical conflict" and the resulting improvement to safe reliability of safety systems to respond with the Commission's alternative operation of the plant would be to these challenges. This approach to ground that the rule is justified on the disproportionate to the cost involved or regulation is part of the fundamental 50-SC-87
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PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION principle of defense-in-depth that shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a the worker. One respondent expressed a underlies all NRC regulation. Defense- safe shutdown condition, and the capability concern that a rule that included worker in-depth provides for both accident to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accountability would be interpreted as prevention and accident mitigation with accidents that could result in potential offsite punitive by workers.
exposure comparable to the 10 CFR part 100 principal emphasis on prevention. guidelines. Response-The Commission and Therefore, the Commission is well (2) Nonsafety related structures, systems, industry have both recognized the within its statutory jurisdiction in or components: importance of developing an attitude of requiring that all SSCs that can (i) That are relied upon to mitigate accountability on the part of each and significantly affect safety, including accidents or transients or are used in plant every worker in a nuclear power plant. those in the BOP, be properly emergency operating procedures (EOPs); or The Commission agrees with industry maintained. Indeed, the Commission's (ii) Whose failure could prevent safety- that regulation of this area would be related structures, systems, and components difficult to enforce objectively. The regulations already reflect the from fulfilling their safety-related function; or importance of maintenance of SSCs in (iii) Whose failure could cause a reactor Commission concludes that each ensuring adequate protection to public scram or actuation of a safety-related system. licensee should include considerations health and safety. Section 50.34(b][6)(iv) for emphasizing worker accountability This scope does not go beyond the based on local conditions; and the requires an FSAR to include the "plans jurisdiction of the NRC. This for conduct of normal operations, Commission will not attempt to deal clarification of the scope should bound including maintenance, surveillance, specifically with this issue in the rule or the scope, focus licensee resources on and periodic testing of structures, regulatory guide. SSCs with the most safety significance, systems, and components." The 9. The Commission desires to and reduce the cost impact projected by Standard Review Plan (SRPJ (NUREG- the comments. establish criteria within the 0800), against which applicants for The Commission recognizes that BOP maintenance rule which would form the licenses after 1982 are required to SSCs may have been designed and built basis for determining when a evaluate their facility (see 10 CFR with normal industrial quality and may maintenance program is fully effective 50.34(q]J, requires applicants to evaluate not meet the standards in appendix B to and additional improvement is not a number of SSCs in the BOP, including 10 CFR part 50. It is not the intent to warranted from a safety standpoint. design and installation as they affect require licensees to generate paperwork Such criteria might be either safety. For example, the pressurizer to document the basis for the design, quantitative or qualitative and could be relief tank system, which is "nonsafety fabrication, and construction of BOP based on specific measurable attributes, related," is addressed in section 5.4.11 of equipment not covered by appendix B. on overall plant performance, on the SRP. Of note is the rational for Instead, it is the intent to ensure that program results, or on other attributes. reviewing the design of the pressurizer each licensee's maintenance program The Commission requests public relief tank: minimizes failures in those BOP SSCs comment concerning the need for such "The review is primarily directed toward that affect safe operation of the plant. In criteria, the form of such criteria, and assuring that its operation is consistent with response to comments, security has the criteria themselves. transient analyses of related systems and been deleted from 10 CFR 50.65 as it is Comments-Of the commenters that that failure or malfunction of the system adequately addressed in § 73.46(g] and addressed this issue, most believe that could not adversely affect essential systems § 73.55(g). quantitative indicators could not be or components is accordance with applicable used solely to evaluate effectiveness criteria." 8. The Commission believes that individual worker accountability plays and that the determination of Thus, the Commission has previously an important role in an effective effectiveness was subjective. Further, recognized that certain SSCs in the BOP maintenance program. The Commission the commenters believe that sufficient can have a significant effect on safety is, therefore, soliciting comments on the tools already existed in the form of and has exercised its regulatory means for incorporating this SALP, QA assessments, regulatory authority by requiring the evaluation of consideration into a licensee's inspections, monthly operating report the potential effect of nonsafety-related maintenance program. data, and management reviews. SSCs on safety. This is the same Comments-Respondents consistently One commenter noted that rationale for requiring maintenance of agreed that worker accountability was effectiveness needs to be defined in SSCs, including those in the BOP, that an important and necessary part of a terms of a particular objective. Another can significantly affect safety. good maintenance program. Several of stated that performance goals such as The Commission agrees with the them gave examples for how their utility the number of maintenance-related comments that the scope of the rule holds its employees accountable for reactor trips, LERs, etc., should be should be narrowed; not all of the BOP their work. These examples all fell established. One individual commented has the same safety significance. within the broad context of the that effectiveness needs to focus on Accordingly, the scope has been personnel management system, i.e., functional failures affecting public modified to include only those BOP selection, training, performance health and safety; another suggested SSCs whose failure could most directly appraisal, supervision, promotional goals associated with general plant threaten public health and safety. policies, etc. Most feel that rulemaking safety performance measures. Therefore, the scope of the rule has been on worker accountability is impossible, Several commenters expressed modified as follows: unnecessary, or inappropriate. Several concern that the lack of defined The scope of the monitoring program * *
- cited the fact that worker accountability performance criteria could generate shall include safety related and nonsafety was a subject of negotiation between either complacency or a continuous related structures, systems, and components utility management and labor bargaining ratchet since there would be no criteria as follows: units. Several cited existing regulations for a "fully effective program."
(1) Safety related structures, systems, or Response-The Commission agrees components that are relied upon to remain (10 CFR part 2, appendix C, and 10 CFR functional during and following design basis 50.110) as already requiring worker that determination of effectiveness events to ensure the integrity of the reactor accountability. One respondent said that depends on many factors and that, with coolant pressure boundary, the capability to the licensee should be responsible, not regard to programmatic features, it is 50-SC-88
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION subjective. The rule provides flexibility Two utilities stated that there was no Response-The Commission agrees for each licensee to decide how to need to develop new performance that plant performance indicators that structure a maintenance program and indicators. One added that the have been developed and used by the conduct maintenance to achieve Commission should continue to evaluate NRC and industry are not appropriate as established performance goals. a given licensee using its current the sole indicators of maintenance Specifically, the rule addresses (1) the technology. The other suggested that the effectiveness. The Commission also development of licensee-established existing INPO Performance Indicators agrees that, because of individual plant goals for performance, (2) the use of be revised to meet the need for a variations, performance indicators are goals and other quantitative and maintenance standard. not appropriate for making absolute qualitative means as a measure of the NUMARC expressed the opinion that plant-to-plant comparisons. However, as effectiveness of maintenance programs, a good maintenance program would use recognized by commenters, indicators and (3) the use of monitoring and a combination of indicators based upon taken in context can be used as an assessment of equipment performance the condition, type, age, etc., of the plant indication of maintenance performance.
or condition against goals, or, and specific equipment in question. More importantly, indicators can be alternatively, the demonstration of NUMARC believes that prescribing a used by licensees as an effective preventive maintenance effectiveness. rigid set of indicators would not achieve management tool to assess the need for In general, the Commission does not necessary plant flexibility and may corrective actions within a maintenance intend to define specific parameters or preclude focusing on areas of more program. numerical criteria in either the rule or appropriate concern. Flexibility is Operating characteristics such as regulatory guide; each licensee is to needed to revise, delete, or add consistently high availability or low establish appropriate goals to assist in performance indicators as appropriate equipment-caused forced outage rates monitoring the effectiveness of to provide information to management over a number of operating cycles are maintenance. to fit circumstances, methods, and indicators of good maintenance
- 10. Are performance indicators that . conditions that may pertain to a given effectiveness. However, the plant are being used by industry, may be used plant in a specific situation. In this vein, material condition can degrade in the future, or have been used in the efforts to obtain consistent data would significantly before these indicators past, appropriate candidates as have questionable benefit for regulatory provide identification of degraded quantitative measures of maintenance purposes and may have deleterious maintenance effectiveness; thus these effectiveness? The Commission is effects on plant programs. indicators are not very timely. Based on particularly interested in experience or the results of extensive work on Another utility does not believe that analysis concerning indicators or the indicator development, the Commission any prescribed set of indicators can be use of indicators of component concludes that indicators that are based used to judge the effectiveness of a reliability as maintenance performance upon actual in-service component indicators. plant's maintenance program. It also stated that no indicator or combination reliability and failure history provide a Comments-In addressing this item, of indicators can give an overall useful measure of maintenance NUMARC and most utilities stated that measure of maintenance effectiveness. effectiveness. Also, these indicators can general plant performance indicators In its view, such a task must be left to be defined and implemented that have been developed and used by the industry were not appropriate for the judgment of the individual licensee, independent of the definitions and use as the sole maintenance- INPO, and the NRC. procedures that the licensee deems effectiveness indicators because of the One individual stated that necessary to manage the flow of number of nonmaintenance-related maintenance effectiveness is a measure maintenance work. Knowledge of data factors included in them. Many of the focused on economics. He went on to showing component failure in excess of proposed maintenance indicators are say that this view clouds the focus on the industry average has the desirable process indicators, which may or may public health and safety. According to property of alerting licensees to not accurately reflect the state of the this commenter, the proper focus of determine whether improved overall maintenance program. Such maintenance effectiveness is on maintenance performance is needed. In indicators are useful, .but only as one functional failures that threaten public general, the Commission agrees with tool for management evaluation of the health and safety. NUMARC that a good maintenance maintenance program. NUMARC warned that component program would use a combination of Although stating that there are reliability by itself is not a good indicators based upon the condition, presently no performance indicators in indicator of maintenance performance. type and age of the plant and the use by the industry that directly The reason given for this position was specific equipment in question.
measure performance, NUMARC and that component reliability may be an Accordingly, the Commission has the utilities recognized that some of the indicator of an application, design, modified the final rule to allow licensees current industry indicators, taken in the component, operating, or maintenance flexibility to determine the details of proper context, can provide an problem. NUMARC added that their individual maintenance programs. indication of maintenance performance. assessments by the plant staff or by the 11. Should an industry-wide Indicators can be used effectively by a corporate staff, including observation of component failure reporting system, e.g., specific utility as a management tool to work in the field, are necessary NPRDS, be used by all plants in order to assess the trend of performance within a ingredients in the measurement of support the sharing of generic given indicator or set of indicators. maintenance performance. NUMARC maintenance experience and facilitate However, NUMARC admonished that pointed out that a given component monitoring of maintenance there are individual plant variations that failure or degradation could be effectiveness? make absolute comparisons misleading, allowable based on engineering Comments-Of the commenters, even for plants with the same licensee. judgment without indicating an including NUMARC, who addressed this NUMARC also stated that the ineffective maintenance program, item, most recognized the usefulness of comparison of plant-specific indicators especially for cases involving redundant the NPRDS as a source of generic failure to industry averages can be misleading. or nonsignificant equipment. data. However, most of the commenters, 50-SC-89
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PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION including NUMARC, oppose the form but no substance. I believe it would be very issue. The Commission addressed this unqualified use of the NPRDS for more productive to delay issuance of this point in detail under the heading "Adequate monitoring maintenance effectiveness proposed rule until the draft regulatory guide Protection" in the Response to Comments on for a number of reasons. Some is available for comment. Only then can we the final 10 CFR part 50 Revision of Backfit receive meaningful comments on the Process for Power Reactors. Let us remember commenters, including NUMARC, rulemaking package. , that there had been concerns that in dealing perceive such use of the NPRDS as an I am concerned that this rule goes beyond with the backfit rule, the Commission would inappropriate regulatory intrusion into a our authority. I cannot agree with a rule that use the phrase "adequate protection" program designed to improve would have the NRG regulating maintenance arbitrarily. The Commission could communications regarding !!quipment on all systems, structures, and components unwittingly be giving credence to that view.
performance within the industry that regardless of whether they have a nexus to Additionally, it seems to me that the would tend to stifle the free exchange of radiological safety or not. I am troubled by Commission position on adequate protection information. NUMARC cited the the attitude demonstrated when we request is internally inconsistent. The Commission public comments on what limitations, if any, needs to recognize that when it states that necessary expansion of the reportable should be placed on the final rule to address this rule is needed to maintain adequate* scope of the NPRDS to cover the entire structures, systems and components that are protection, it is saying that the current BOP as a tremendous undertaking that "without question irrelevant (my emphasis) operating plants now pose undue risk to the could be prohibitively expensive. to the protection of public health and safety." public which we are presently tolerating. If I NUMARC, two utilities, and one This clearly abdicates our responsibility to believed that, I would suggest (as I'm sure individual believe that, although the show that a regulation is needed. We must would the rest of the Commission) that this NPRDS can be used to obtain gross ask ourselves: Are we proceeding with this rule become immediately effective. This is indications of a problem, its usefulness rulemaking for the sake of the rule itself? As clearly not the case. As the Commission in a !tested to by the cases where the the very same comment shows, "* *
- the is restricted because of plant-to-plant Commission cited licensees, the NRG already proposed rule codifies and standardizes differences in maintenance practices, has the authority to enforce compliance in the previously existing (my emphasis) component application, design, maintenance area. Commission requirements, both explicit and environment, and the detail with which The arguments advanced by both the staff implicit, in plant technical specifications, failures are reported. and the Commission in trying to comply with licensee safety analysis reports, and 10 CFR Response-The Commission generally the requirements of the backfit rule have part 50, appendix B." It seems to me that the agrees with the above comments. played a significant role in my decision not to Commission can't have it both ways.
However, the NPRDS may provide support this proposed rulemaking. The staff I request comments on my views. useful information for comparing plant- argument for the rule's compliance with Comments-Of the commenters who specific experience on equipment with a 50.109 has been made on the basis of cost. The staff states that the backfit analysis responded to this question, most agreed broader range of industry operating shows that"* *
- the rule will provide a with the views of Commissioner
- experience on similar equipment. The substantial increase in the protection of the Roberts, while only three commenters data does provide useful insights into public health and safety without any disagreed with the Commissioner. Some maintenance trends at an individual additional cost." I am skeptical of the commenters did not provide any basis plant. assumptions made in the backfit and for their agreement or disagreement.
- 12. Commissioner Roberts had the regulatory analysis and request comments on However, a number of commenters following views: both these documents. I also request expressed concerns beyond the views comments on the views of the ACRS. They I cannot join the majority in supporting the expressed in Question 12. These are state that"* *
- there are characteristics of proposed rulemaking on maintenance. In regulations, and especially the way in which summarized below.
order to have the benefit of the public's A majority of the utility commenters they are typically enforced, that lead us to comments, it has been my custom to agree to implicity agreed with Commissioner publication of proposed rulemakings. I cannot believe that, under a rule, a move toward do so in this instance. I have asked one uniformity would occur, and this is likely to Roberts that the proposed rule went fundamental question. What are we trying to decrease the effectiveness of some of the beyond the current authority of the accomplish with this rule that cannot more better existing programs." I share their Commission by requiring maintenance effectively and innovatively be accomplished concern that the existence of this rule could of all SSCs in the BOP. According to without a regulation? I have not received a make things worse and diminish rather than these commenters, since many SSCs.in satisfactory answer. I do not believe the case enhance the protection of the public. Regarding "adequate protection," the the BOP have no nexus to pubic health has been made that licensees do not have
- and safety, the maintenance rule would established maintenance programs. Most Commission appears to be saying that since importantly to me, there has been no effective maintenance is necessary to require licensees to spend their demonstration that this rule would improve maintain adequate protection, this rule resources on unimportant areas, implementation of existing programs. Neither should be excepted under 50.109(a)(4). This potentially decreasing the level of have I been provided with compelling exemption would prohibit staff from taking safety. One individual stated that documentation on what the problem is and implementation costs into consideration. regulators have a bias in favor of how, specifically, this rule will fix it. On the However, it would require that a documented overboard regulations, pointing to the contrary, the trends staff has provided show evaluation be prepared for public comment. FAA's regulations on air transportation.
continued improvement in the maintenance Therefore, my opposition to the exception is not to the exception itself but to the This commenter noted that, unlike the area. The proposed rule the Commission is now precedential nature of the use of the adequate scope of FAA's statutory charter which publishing fails to provide a basis for protection argument. Let me state that I, too, encompasses the development of the air determining when a maintenance program is strongly believe that effective maintenance is transportation industry, the NRC's effective or when improvements are necessary to assure that nuclear power authority is limited to the regulation of "appropriate." We are even delaying plants are safe and to provide adequate the nuclear industry to protect public publication of the accompanying regulatory protection to the public. I also believe, just as health and safety. Two utilities argued guide until the final rule. Without being strongly, that this rule is not necessary to that the maintenance rule fails to afforded the opportunity to review this provide that protection, and that as the ACRS implementation document, the Commission is provide meaningful definitions and noted, it may well have the opposite effect. I left in the position of approving a specious believe that we cannot afford to be careless standards of the activities required. In rule. It is no wonder that this rulemaking about the use of the "adequate protection" their view, this can lead to would elicit such widespread opposition. The argument for exception to the backfit rule. misinterpretation, arbitrary public is being asked to comment on a rule of The Commission is in litigation about this enforcement, and endless 50-SC-90
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION reinterpretations of the rule. One utility health and safety. Accordingly, as 1988), the Commission made it clear suggested that any industry standard on discussed in the response to the that-maintenance would be tailored to the comments on Question 7, the scope of [i]t is the objective of the Commission that lowest common denominator, and the rule has been modified to focus on all components, systems and structures of therefore there would be no net those SSCs whose failure could most nuclear power plants be maintained so that improvement in the level of safety. It directly threaten public health and plant equipment will perform its intended also argued that, once codified, a
- safety. function when required. To accomplish this regulatory standard of acceptance Finally, during the time the objective, each licensee should develop and maintenance would be difficult to Commission held rulemaking in implement a maintenance program which abeyance, the public had the provides for the periodic evaluation, and improve. Finally, NUMARC and the prompt repair of plant components, systems utilities also repeated their general opportunity to comment on the draft and structures to ensure their availability arguments why a maintenance rule is regulatory guide. Considering the * * *. [T]he program should include the not necessary, in particular, on the narrowing of the focus of the final rule feedback of specific results to ensure gradual improvement in the industry to a results/performance-oriented corrective actions, provisions for overall maintenance performance, and the INPO approach, the supporting regulatory program evaluation, and the identification of Self-Assessment Program. NUMARC also asserted that the Commission has guide will require revision. During the revision process, previous public ...
possible component and system problems sufficient authority to ensure adequate comments will be considered and An adequate program should consider protection. appropriately reflected in the regulatory guide. The regulatory guide will be
- Technology in the area of-A Commissioner on the Public Service Predictive Maintenance Commission of the State of Vermont revised to reflect the rule's narrower stated that there is safety significance in focus on results and maintenance
- Equipment history and trending the BOP, pointing out that recent NRC program effectiveness, and will describe [and]
staff and industry evaluations show that a means for meeting the requirements of
- Measures of overall program improper maintenance of components 10 CPR 50.65 acceptable to the staff. effectiveness not previously associated with safety Revision of the regulatory guide will The Commission went on to indicate has resulted in adverse safety again include the opportunity for public in that same 1988 Policy Statement consequences. In addition, the comment. Implementation of the rule is that-Commissioner indicated that superior to be delayed for five years after the The Commission expects to publish a performance of nuclear plants issuance date, with the regulatory guide Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the near internationally has been associated with expected to be available within the first future that will establish basic requirements maintenance programs that are stricter two years. This schedule will allow at for plant maintenance programs. We believe than those in the U.S., citing the least three years for licensee that the contents and bounds of the proposed experience of Japan and France. development beyond the time when rule will fall within the general framework Response-Two of the issues raised final guidance is expected to be described in this Policy Statement * * *. We available. encourage interested parties to provide their by Commissioner Roberts and by the views on this important subject to the majority of commenters are similar to Additional Comments of Commissioner Commission, even at this early stage of the those issues raised in response to Curtiss rulemaking process.
Questions 6 and 7. As discussed in the I believe that the approach adopted response to comments on Question 6, 53 FR 9430-31. by the Commission in this final rule is the Commission agrees that a backfit Thus, early on, the Commission began sound and appropriate. The entire analysis is required for the maintenance to consider the principal elements of the Commission agrees that it is important rule. Because the current regulations final rule adopted here by the for this agency to have a regulatory provide an assurance of adequate framework in place that will provide a Commission, called on licensees to protection of the public health and mechanism for evaluating the overall incorporate those elements into their safety, the Commission is no longer continuing effectiveness of licensees' maintenance programs, and solicited proposing to exempt the maintenance maintenance programs. This final rule public comment on such proposals. rule from the requirements of a backfit will provide that regulatory framework. In conjunction with the issuance of analysis. I strongly disagree with those who the Final Commission Policy Statement The Commission does not agree that contend that the Commission rushed out on Maintenance of Nuclear Power the maintenance rule will result in with this maintenance rule without the Plants, the Commission directed the decreased safety by requiring licensees benefit of public comment and with the NRC staff to develop a preferred to divert their resources away from attendant implication that the final rule maintenance rulemaking option SSCs and activities with greater was not well-considered. In point of requiring licensees to track certain importance to safety. The maintenance fact, the reliability-based aspects of maintenance performance indicators rule is being issued to ensure that the maintenance reflected in this final rule [See Staff Requirements Memorandum effectiveness of maintenance programs have been at the very heart of what the on COMKC-88-03, June 17, 1988). In is maintained for the life of the facility Commission has been considering in the response, the staff advised that the and is not expected to require maintenance area since as early as 1988. proposed rules should contain significant modifications to current Indeed, it is abundantly clear from even "provisions for performance assessment licensee programs. The regulatory guide a cursory review of the history of this which licensees would implement to will provide flexibility for a licensee to issue that considerable time and track the effectiveness of their structure its maintenance program in attention have been devoted to the basic maintenance programs" [See SECY-81::1-accordance with the safety significance concepts reflected.in this final rule. That 277, Amendment to 10 CPR part 50 of those SSCs. However, the history is briefly summarized below: Related to Maintenance of Nuclear Commission does agree with the In the Final Commission Policy Power Plants, p. 2, September 30, 1988). comments that not all SSCs in the BOP Statement on Maintenance of Nuclear Although the staff was not in a position are rela led to the protection of public Power Plants [53 FR 9430; March 23, to suggest the use of specific 50-SC-91
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION maintenance performance indicators, it in how they fashion their individual which require rote adherence, stifle formulated a proposed rule that- maintenance programs. initiatives and depend on punitive enforcement actions for compliance. There emphasizes that an integral part of a good Commissioner Remick's Separate Comments appears to be a near-unanimous consensus maintenance program is the monitoring and I respectfully differ with my colleagues that the agency and the industry have feedback of results. In this regard, the inasmuch as I do not believe that there is a stimulated initiatives which have produced maintenance programs should utilize demonstrated need for a rule in light of positive results, an outcome not necessarily quantitative indicators that are based upon significant improvements in maintenance assured even by result-oriented rulemaking.
actual component reliability and failure programs resulting from Agency attention I agree with the view that routine use of the history to provide the best measure of and licensee initiatives. The Commission staffs maintenance inspection approach, maintenance effectiveness. indicates in its decision to promulgate this utilizing the Maintenance Team Inspection SECY-88-289, Preliminary Results of the rule that"* *
- the Commission is satisfied (MTI) Criteria proposed in conjunction with Trial Program on Maintenance that the industry has been generally the revised policy statement, could ultimately successful in bringing about substantial lead to essentially the same prescriptive Performance Indicators, p. 5, October 7, improvement in maintenance programs."
1988. result as a process-oriented rule. In the Substantial improvements and favorable interest of ensuring that the responsibility for Indeed, the staff specifically noted results are the goals that the Commission improving, sustaining and verifying adequate that the goal of the recommendations should strive for in its regulatory activities by maintenance performance (using industry's contained in the proposed maintenance utilizing the most effective regulatory tools standard document INPO 90--008) remained rule was to provide the NRC staff and for accomplishing those goals. As I argue with the industry, I believe that the licensees "with a practical near-term below, I am not convinced that in this case a Commission should have directed the staff to method to track maintenance rule is the most effective regulatory tool for develop an approach to its routine accomplishing those goals. Further, I differ effectiveness * * *" (SECY-88-289, p. inspections which would have concentrated inasmuch as I strongly believe that this rule 5)-the very core of the proposal that should not be issued as a final rule. Although on inspecting for the effective results of the Commission endorses in this final the rule is a concept worthy of discussion, it maintenance programs rather than inspecting rule. should not have been rushed out but should the details of the process. The MTI approach have been issued for the benefit of public would then have been reserved for use as The resulting Notice of Proposed diagnostic inspection tool in those special Rulemaking on Maintenance and the comment. The Commission approved criteria to be cases where there was a perceived proposed rule published for comment on maintenance problem. In my approach, the used in determining when industry progress November 28, 1988 (53 FR 47822) contain in the area of maintenance would be staffs proposed final policy statement on the same equipment history and sufficient to obviate a need for rulemaking maintenance would have been revised to trending, effectiveness monitoring, and [SECY memorandum from S. Chilk to J. include these future activities. feedback elements as the Final Taylor, dated May 25, 1990). The staff I agree with the view that it is important for Commission Policy Statement on performed a detailed evaluation of industry this agency *10 have a regulatory framework Maintenance. They also contain clear progress and concluded that the criteria had in place that will provide a mechanism for indications that the Commission been satisfied (SECY-91-110, Staff evaluating the overall continuing Evaluation and Recommendation on effectiveness of the maintenance programs, intended to include requirements for particularly as the plants continue to age. I monitoring, trending, and feedback with Maintenance Rulemaking). Based upon its conclusions, the staff recommended that the believe that a revised final policy statement, regard to the effectiveness of Commission not proceed with a maintenance together with the development of results-maintenance in any maintenance rules rulemaking. The ACRS agreed with the staffs oriented inspection programs, would have that might ultimately be adopted. The recommendations. In general, I agree with the provided an effective regulatory framework need for, and details of, such provisions bases for the staffs conclusions. Therefore, I for such evaluation. I believe that the were emphasized in the draft Regulatory approved the staffs recommendation in performance-based rule that the majority of Guide that was subsequently published SECY-91-110 not to proceed with the Commission has approved has some for comment as part of this maintenance maintenance rulemaking, but instead to issue innovative features, and may be particularly rulemaking effort. 54 FR 33983. In turn, a a final policy statement on maintenance of appropriate for monitoring the effectiveness nuclear power plants. I also approved the of maintenance programs for the advanced number of commenters acknowledged reactors. However, I do not agree with the staffs recommendation to remove the the maintenance effectiveness view that the proposed rule in no way maintenance escalation factor and revise the measurement, trending, and feedback enforcement policy supplement of 10 CFR interferes with the process-related activities aspects of the proposed rule and part 2, appendix C to include a specific which the licensee community, to its provided their views on these matters. maintenance-related example. considerable credit, has undertaken In sum, it is abundantly clear from all Further, I agree with the staffs conclusion voluntarily. It may be argued that licensees of this that the Commission has long that the industry document, INPO 90--008, will not have to change their maintenance been considering maintenance "Maintenance Programs in the Nuclear Power programs to meet the provisions of the rule as effectiveness monitoring of the sort that Industry," delineates the necessary elements it is written. Nevertheless the focus of the a majority of the Commission now of effective maintenance programs. The NRC's attention on implementation of a new industry's commitment to monitor the rule almost always carries with it the strong adopts in this final maintenance rule, progress of maintenance implementation potential for impact on the licensees' and that the industry and the public using the performance objectives of INPO 91}- initiatives and programs and thus an inherent were given clear notice and the 008, and the staffs intention to assess disincentive to not innovate or participate in opportunity to comment on such industry performance and report to the new initiatives. considerations throughout this Commission after four years with an interim One way of determining the potential maintenance rulemaking process. The report after two years, are sufficient in my impact of this rule would have been to issue final rule that has resulted from this view to assure that there will be no it for public comment. I think that issuing the careful deliberation will provide the backsliding of the level of industry proposal for public comment would be good regulatory framework that all performance of maintenance. policy, and consistent with the Commission's In general, I support a regulatory approach Principles of Good Regulation, which state Commissioners agree this agency must which stimulates licensees' and industry's that all available facts and opinions be have in order to ensure the continuing initiatives, encourages innovation, permits sought openly from licensees and other effectiveness of maintenance efforts at self-management and produces positive interested members of the public. To rush a nuclear power plants, while at the same results, under agency monitoring, in contrast final rulemaking package that contains some time providing licensees broad latitude to prescriptive, process-oriented regulations fundamental changes from the direction the 50-SC-92
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Commission has taken over the past several maintenance program development and of the information requirements before years, without seeking all available facts and innovation. I fear that licensees will halt they will become effective. Notice of opinions, is likely to lead to implementation further development of their maintenance problems that the Commission may not be NRC submission of the information initiatives to await the development of the aware of now. regulatory guidance to implement the rule, collection requirements to 0MB, and The final rule represents a significant and that licensees will refrain from issuance of the required 0MB approval, departure from the proposed rule. The participating in future safety initiatives will be published by the NRC in the proposed rule issued in 1988 focussed on because they will interpret this Commission Federal Register.
what the Federal Register notice for the action as a significant retreat from its goals of proposed rule called "maintenance practices" achieving a stable regulatory environment. Regulatory Analysis and "the adoption of common maintenance The development of an industry maintenance The Commission has prepared a standards"-in a word, "processes", or program standard, the industry's commitment "systems" of maintenance (53 FR 47824). The to self-assessment against that standard, regulatory analysis on this final notice stated that "regulation [of INPO's evaluation of maintenance progress regulation. The analysis examines the maintenance] by outcomes rather than against the objectives of the standard, NRC costs and benefits of the alternatives processes" would be the subject of "follow- inspection programs which would considered by the Commission. The on rulemaking" (id.). The final rulerhowever, concentrate on effective results, and the analysis is available for inspection in is focussed on outcomes and thereby seems NRC's existing enforcement authority are the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L to have concluded the "follow-on adequate to ensure proper maintenance St., NW., Washington, DC. Single copies rulemaking" before it was begun. Although without a new rule. of the analysis may be obtained from the proposed rule contained monitoring and I would stress, however, the importance of the Commission's continuing to monitor the Robert Riggs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory trending components, they were only a few among seventeen maintenance activities industry's progress in this area. A policy Commission, Washington, DC 20555, covered by the proposed rule (see the statement would be a suitable approach for (301) 492-3732. proposed 50.65[b)), and so clearly were in no continuing the Commission's necessary emphasis on maintenance, and at the same Regulatory Flexibility Certification way intended as a surrogate for a process-oriented rule. However, monitoring is the time allowing for continuing improvement in In accordance with the Regulatory focus of the final rule. The significant shifts in maintenance through flexibility, diversity and Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the focus of the rule and in the role of innovation in the industry's programs. the Commission hereby certifies that monitoring in the rule deserved public Finding of No Significant Environmental this regulation does not have a comment. The notice of the proposed rule invite Impact: Availability significant economic impact on a responses to questions on monitoring, but the The Commission has determined that, substantial number of small entities. questions were confined largely to the issue under the National Environmental Policy This regulation affects licensees that of what specific measures might be used to Act of 1969, as amended, and the own and operate nuclear utilization assess the effectiveness of a maintenance Commission's regulations in subpart A facilities licensed under sections 103 program [see 53 FR 47825). Not addressed in of 10 CFR part 51, this rule is not a major and 104 of the Atomic Energy Act of the notice were certain matters which are 1954, as amended. These licensees do crucial to the final rule. These include, for Federal action significantly affecting the not fall within the definition of small example, the final rule's requirement to quality of the human environment and therefore an environmental impact business set forth in section 3 of the monitor "against licensee-established goals" Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, or which are "commensurate with safety". Also, statement is not required.
§ 50.65[b) of the final rule defines the Since this action is directed toward within the Small Business Size structures, systems, and components (SSCs) maintaining the level of maintenance Standards set forth in 13 CFR part 121.
to be included in the scope of maintenance effectiveness of existing plant SSCs to Backfit Analysis monitoring programs. This definition is both minimize the likelihood of failures and similar to and different from the definition of events caused by the lack of effective Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109(a)(2), the SSCs important to license renewal in part 54, Commission has prepared the following a final rule which the Commission affirmed maintenance and does not require any modification of the plant, it will not backfit analysis for the maintenance along with the final rule on maintenance. rule. The Commission has determined, Public comment might have addressed adversely affect the quality of the whether the differences between the human environment. on the basis of this analysis, that definitions of SSCs in these two The environmental assessment and backfitting of the requirements in the maintenance-related rules are justified or will finding of no significant impact on maintenance rule will provide a present interpretation and implementation which this determination is based are substantial increase in the level of problems. available for inspection at the NRC protection of public health and safety If I were convinced that a rule was needed Public Document Room, 2120 L Street beyond that currently provided by the to produce positive results, I could support Commission's regulations, and that the the majority's rule as a proposed rule, NW., Lower Level, Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmentai costs of implementing the rule are provided that I could see how the staff would justified in view of this increased implement the rule through the development assessment and finding of no significant of regulatory guides and inspection modules, impact are available from Robert Riggs, protection. and provided that the public was given an Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, The maintenance rule requires opportunity to comment before promulgation Telephone: (301) 492-3732, U.S. Nuclear licensees to monitor the effectiveness of of a final rule. But I am not convinced that a Regulatory Commission, Washington, maintenance activities for certain rule is needed to produce positive results. DC 20555. structures, systems and components The staff has shown that we're seeing based upon licensee-established goals substantial positive results of the industry's Paperwork Reduction Act Statement for performance or condition, and take maintenance program initiatives, and the This final rule amends information corrective action where necessary (the stafrs findings have been verified in my discussions with Regional staff and Resident collection requirements that are subject requirements of the maintenance rule Inspectors. Therefore, I have concluded that to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 are set forth in greater detail in the the Commission should not change its (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The information discussion below which addresses the direction now and that there is no need to requirements will be submitted by the nine factors of 10 CFR 50.109(c)). promulgate a maintenance regulation which NRC to the Office of Management and It is the Commission's judgement that could be counterproductive to further Budget (0MB) for review and approval maintenance, and in particular th~ goal-50-SC-93
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION setting, monitoring and corrective action To obtain a broader perspective on broad scope of .structures, systems and activities required by the maintenance maintenance, the Commission components also represents a safety rule, provide a substantial increase in performed a survey and assessment of concern because of the potential the safety of nuclear power plant maintenance practices in other countries adverse effect on the ability of the operation. This judgement is based on and industries to identify varying Commission to take timely and effective the direct impact of maintenance on the approaches to maintenance and to regulatory action against licensees with reliability and operability of nuclear determine if there was any linkage poor maintenance practices. It is true power plant safety systems, and its between safety and effective that there are a number of existing effect on the other plant structures, maintenance. Specifically, the aim of the Commission requirements that are systems and components that are study (NUREG-1333) was to: directly or indirectly relevant to important to the protection of the public
- Review various regulatory maintenance, including 10 CFR health and safety and common defense approaches and determine their 50.34(a)[3J[i); 50.34(a)(7); 50.34(b)(6) [i],
and security. applicability to the maintenance (ii), (iii) and (iv); 50.34(b)[9); 50.34[f)[l) rulemaking, and (i), (ii), and [iii); 50.34(g); 50.34a[c]; The Commission's judgement that
- Determine foreign and domestic 50.36[a); 50.36[c) (2), (3), (5) and (7);
effective maintenance is an important 50.36a[a)[l); 50.49(b); 50.55a(g); part 50, maintenance practices that contribute contributor to safety is confirmed by appendix A, Criteria 1, 13, 18, 21, 32, 36, significantly to effective maintenance. studies of maintenance practices for 37,40,43,45,46, 52,53;part50, appendix The study covered Japanese, French, domestic nuclear power plants, LERs, B. However, these requirements do not and German (FRGJ nuclear maintenance composite data from the Commission's apply uniformly to all "safety-related" regulations and practices; the Federal Systematic Assessment of Licensee structures, systems and components, Aviation Administration's regulatory Performance (SALPJ, and the and only occasionally apply to approach to the maintenance of U.S. Commission's inspections at domestic commercial aircraft; and the structures, systems and components nuclear power plants, as well as studies maintenance programs of the U.S. Navy which could adversely affect the of maintenance practices at foreign and Air Force. The results of the study functioning of safety-related structures, nuclear power plants, the military, and were used in formulating the proposed systems and components. Any attempt the aerospace industry. The Commission rule. These studies confirm the on the part of the NRC to take regulatory first began focusing on maintenance as a Commission's view that good action against a licensee with result of its observation that plant maintenance is correlated with high inadequate or poorly-implemented performance, as reflected in such reliability and minimization of plant maintenance must be pursued on an indicators as the number of transients, and therefore with nuclear individualized, case-by-case unanticipated scrams, was not power reactor safety. consideration of the adequacy of that improving in the early 1980s. The An additional concern of the licensee's maintenance practices and Commission had expected that as newly Commission is the need to assure their effect on safety. This regulatory licensed power plants gained operating effective maintenance at nuclear power approach is costly in terms of agency experience and took advantage of reactors throughout the terms of their resources. It also risks the possibility lessons learned and other information . operating licenses (and any renewed that the NRC will be unable to take distributed throughout the industry, operating licenses). While the current timely enforcement action in the event problems in plant operation would performance of the nuclear power of a finding of inadequate licensee gradually decrease to a relatively low in_dustry in the area of maintenance is performance in maintenance. By level. To understand why industry acceptable and improving in the contrast, timely regulatory action could performance was not improving as aggregate, the NRC Staffs Maintenance easily be taken if a licensee were found expected, the Commission performed an Team Inspections indicate that there are not to be implementing specific actions assessment of maintenance at domestic still common weaknesses in discrete required by a rule which addresses nuclear power plants in NUREG-1212, areas of maintenance at nuclear power maintenance. In sum, the Commission "Status of Maintenance in the Nuclear plants. Thus, while the Commission concludes that substantial safety Power Industry." The study found that acknowledges the increased emphasis benefits are to be achieved from in 1985, maintenance safety problems by licensees on maintenance and adopting the final maintenance rule. were evident to varying degrees across significant improvement in performance The Commission also concludes that the U.S. nuclear industry. Wide of maintenance programs in the the costs of implementing the variations were found in maintenance aggregate, additional attention is maintenance rule at all nuclear power practices and effectiveness, and a warranted. Moreover, in the absence of plants are justified in view of the safety significant proportion of operational a rule, there is no assurance that benefits identified above. A regulatory problems was found to be attributable licensees would not relax their analysis has been prepared to assist the to improper or inadequate maintenance. commitment to effective maintenance Commission in determining the benefits This finding was confirmed by an practices in the future. In this regard, the and costs of implementing the industry study of maintenance Commission notes that no licensee has maintenance rule through a quantitative conducted about the same time. This made a formal docketed commitment to approach. However, the quantitative industry study, which was performed by implement the Institute for Nuclear estimates in the regulatory analysis NUMARC Working Group 4, was Power Operations (INPOJ performance have proved to contain varying degrees discussed by the Working Group objectives and criteria on maintenance of uncertainty. Depending upon the Chairman during the July 1988 Public (INPO 90-008). By adopting a specific assumptions used in the Workshop on the Maintenance maintenance rule now, the Commission analysis, a broad range of values is Rulemaking [NUREG/CP-0099, pp. 1.21- will have a regulatory basis for possible for the estimated risk reduction 1.31). The industry study found that 38% preventing licensee "backsliding" in the attributable to the maintenance rule [the of the root causes of 650 significant area of maintenance. uncertainties and their effect on the events examined were maintenance The absence of Commission overall risk reduction and value/impact related. maintenance requirements covering a ratios are discussed in greater detail in 50-SC-94
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION the regulatory analysis). Because of that the costs of implementing the Establish goals for the performance or these uncertainties, the Commission has maintenance rule are justified. condition of certain structures, systems considered qualitative safety The Commission recognizes that and components to assure that they will considerations and benefits. Thus, the regulatory action in the area of meet their intended function, (ii) monitor regulatory analysis' quantitative maintenance should not be overly these structures, systems and estimates comprise a component of, but prescriptive, but rather be carefully components to determine whether the are not the primary factor with respect directed to ensuring that unnecessary licensee-established goals have been to the Commission's conclusions on the activities are not required, in view of the met, and (iii) take appropriate corrective safety benefits and costs attributable to large degree of uncertainty in action if the goals are not met. These the final maintenance rule. quantifying the costs and benefits of the goals are to be established by taking The regulatory analysis estimates that maintenance rule. Accordingly, the final into account industry-wide operating implementation of the final maintenance maintenance rule is carefully tailored to experience. Monitoring is not required, rule could result in a point estimate of eliminate prescriptive programmatic, however, where the licensee 52,000 person-rems avoided, with an procedural arid organizational demonstrates that preventive upper bound of 72,000 and a lower requirements. Rather, the final maintenance is sufficient to assure that bound of 7,300 person-rems. The net maintenance rule represents a results- the structures, systems and components costs associated with implementation of oriented approach to assuring that will remain capable of performing their the maintenance rule are estimated to maintenance is effectively conducted at intended functions. See § 50.65(a)(2).
entail a point estimate of 44 million nuclear power reactors.The licensee is Licensees will be required to evaluate dollars, with an upper bound of 2100 responsible for establishing goals for the effectiveness of their goal-setting, million dollars in cost savings and a structure, system and component monitoring and corrective action lower bound of 1500 million dollars. The performance or conditions, and the activities on at least an annual basis, resulting value/impact ratio is a point licensee is free to determine the taking into account industry-wide estimate of 1200 person-rems/million monitoring method, the need for operating experience, and adjust their dollars. corrective action, and the nature of that programs where necessary to ensure Furthermore, the regulatory analysis action. Furthermore, the maintenance that failure prevention is balanced for the maintenance rule also contains rule contains a provision(§ 50.65[a)(2)) against unavailability of structures, some conservatisms which the whereby licensees may forego systems and components. See Commission believes underestimates the monitoring. The Commission believes § 50.65(a)[3). In addition, when cost-effectiveness of the final that the final maintenance rule provides performing monitoring and preventive maintenance rule. In the regulatory the necessary flexibility for licensees to maintenance activities, an assessment analysis, it was assumed that the core- tailor their maintenance programs to of the total plant equipment out-of-damage frequency and forced outage their specific plant design and service should be taken into account to downtime reductions associated with configuration, organizational structure, determine the overall effect on the results-oriented rule would be the and personnel, thereby permitting performance of safety functions. See same as those for a process-oriented compliance with the maintenance rule in § 50.65(a)(3). The structures, systems rule. However, the Commission believes the most cost-effective manner. The and components which are subject to that the results-oriented approach, by Commission is confident that the the goal-setting, monitoring, and focusing to a greater extent on regulatory goal of maintaining safety corrective action requirements of the equipment performance, would be more has been achieved in the most rule are those which are safety-related, likely to achieve additional reductions reasonable and cost-efficient manner and certain non-safety related systems, in core damage frequency and forced and is consistent with the public structures and components as defined in outage downtime. The regulatory interest. § 50.65(b). analysis also assumed that licensees For the reasons set forth above, the 3. Potential change in the risk to the under the final results-oriented rule Commission concludes that, the public from the accidental offsite release would incur most of the costs of maintenance rule will result in a level of of radioactive material. implementing programmatic elements safety beyond that currently provided According to the Regulatory Analysis similar in scope to those contained in by the Commission's regulations and for the maintenance rule, a point the 1988 proposed maintenance rule in that is a substantial increase in the estimate of the potential risk reduction addition to the costs of implementing the overall protection of the public health to the public is approximately 52,000 results-oriented elements which were and safety, and that the net costs of the person-rem, with an upper bound of drawn from the proposed maintenance rule are justified in view of this 72,000 person-rem and a lower bound of rule and incorporated into the final rule. increased level of safety. 7,300 person-rem. The bases of these The Commission projects that because The nine factors listed in 10 CFR projections are provided in the the results-oriented rule is not a 50.109[c) are discussed below. discussion in the Regulatory Analysis. prescriptive programmatic rule, 1. Statement of the specific objectives However, as suggested by the range licensees will achieve some cost savings that the backfit is designed to achieve. between the upper and lower bounds of because they will have flexibility in The purpose of the maintenance rule risk reduction to the public, the determining the manner in which to is to maintain the effectiveness of estimates possess a certain relatively improve the programmatic elements of maintenance at operating nuclear power high degree of uncertainty. One factor their maintenance programs. reactors, thereby maintaining the level contributing to this uncertainty, and Accordingly, the Commission projects of safety at operating nuclear power which tends to suggest that the values that the costs for the performance-based reactors. for the results-oriented final rule are final maintenance rule will be somewhat 2. General description of the activity conservative, is that the core damage smaller than that assumed in the required by the licensee or applicant in reduction frequency [CDFJ and forced regulatory analysis. order to complete the backfit. outage downtime reductions associated In view of the safety benefits Under § 50.65(a)(1) of the maintenance with the results-oriented rule are discussed above, the Commission judges rule, licensees will be required to: (i) assumed to be the same as the process-50-SC-95
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
- oriented rule. However, it is believed For 110 operating reactors, the estimated 50.55a(g); part 50, appendix A, criteria 1, that the results-oriented rule, by net cost associated with implementation 13, 18,21, 32, 36, 37,40,43,45,46, 52, 53; focusing on equipment performance, of this rule is $44 million. This estimate part 50, appendix B. Licensees must would be more likely to achieve breaks down as follows: continue to comply with these additional reductions in CDF and forced requirements. However, 10 CFR 50.65 outage downtime. should provide added assurance that
- 4. Potential impact on radiological Millions Industry cost element of 1990 these requirements will be complied exposure of facility employees. dollars The goal-setting, monitoring, and with. No duplication of requirements is availability evaluation requirements of intended.
Implementation and operating .................... 1050 the maintenance rule are not likely to Power replacement due to increased 7. The estimated resource burden on result in any significant change, either availability................................................... (998) the NRC associated with the backfit and positive or negative, in occupational Onsite cleanup and power replacement.. .. f-------'(9--'-) the availability of such resources. exposures. Implementation of corrective Total industry cost............................. 44 The estimated resource burden to the actions, as required by § 50.65(a](l) of NRC associated with the maintenance the maintenance rule can affect rule can be divided into two elements: collective occupational exposures both The above cost figures are point (a) Development of a regulatory guide positively and negatively. Increases in estimates with a relatively large degree on maintenance effectiveness maintenance activity due to expanded of uncertainty. The cost estimates in monitoring ($800,000); and (b] inspection preventive maintenance or more parentheses represent cost savings. and enforcement to ensure compliance aggressive corrective maintenance (to 6. The potential safety impact of with the rule (assumed to be negligible reduce backlogs, for example] will tend changes in plant or operational over and above existing inspection to increase exposure, while productivity complexity, including the relationship to increases and reductions in the amount efforts.) proposed and existing regulatory With regard to enforcement, the of rework will tend to reduce exposures. requirements. The net effect of these positive and maintenance rule does not require As discussed above, the maintenance licensees to submit their maintenance negative trends is believed to be rule does not require any design beneficial but small compared to the program to the NRC for review and modifications. Therefore, safety impacts other costs and benefits of improved approval, and no agency resources have attributable to changes in plant design maintenance. Because of the uncertainty are not assumed to result from the been included in the cost estimates for in this projection and the relatively maintenance rule. With regard to this activity. NRC does not expect to small magnitude of the reduced changes in operational complexity, allocate any additional resources for exposures, the cost-benefit analysis of maintenance is often considered a part inspections as a result of this rule. the Regulatory Analysis does not of operations. The maintenance rule 8. The potential impact of difference account for any changes in occupational requires licensees to establish goals for in facility type, design, or age on the exposures. the performance or condition of certain relevancy and practicality of the backfit.
- 5. Installation and continuing costs structures, systems and components, The maintenance rule establishes associated with backfit, including the monitor the performance or condition of generic requirements that are applicable cost of facility downtime or the cost of those structures, systems and to all types of facilities and designs construction delay.
The Regulatory Analysis for the components, and implement corrective regardless of their age. These maintenance rule discusses the costs to action if the licensee-established goals requirements (and therefore the cost of the industry and the NRC associated are not met. It also requires an annual complying with these requirements] are with the maintenance rule. The evaluation of monitoring, goal- essentially the same regardless of the maintenance rule does not require any establishment and corrective action type or design of the facility. change in the design or construction of activities. In addition, in performing monitoring and maintenance activities, 9. Whether the backfit is interim or any nuclear power plant. Nor does the final and, if interim, the justification for rule apply to activities associated with the overall effect of equipment out-of-service on the performance of safety imposing the backfit on an interim basis. the planning, design, and installation of functions must be assessed. These The maintenance rule is a final plant modifications. Therefore, there maintenance activities should provide a requirement. Licensees will have up to will be no installation, downtime, or construction costs associated with the significant enhancement in safety by five years following publication of the rule. contributing to reduced operational final rule in the Federal Register to be in Rather, the maintenance rule will complexity as a result of fewer compliance with the requirements of the require licensees to establish goals for maintenance reworks, fewer unplanned rule. the performance or condition of certain transients, and higher reliability of structures, systems and components, safety-significant SSCs, thus reducing List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 monitor the performance or condition of the need for operator actions in Administrative practice and those structures, systems and response to events. Thus, operational procedure, Antitrust, Classified components, and implement corrective complexity is not likely to be adversely information, Fire prevention, action if the licensee-established goals affected. Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear are not met. It also requires an annual There are a number of existing power plants and reactors, Radiation evaluation of monitoring, goal- Commission requirements directly or protection, Reporting and recordkeeping establishment and corrective action indirectly relevant to maintenance, requirements. activities to take into account industry- including § § 50.34(a)(3)(i]; 50.34(a)(7); wide operating experience and to make 50.34(b)(6) (i], (ii], (iii] and (iv]; In consideration of the foregoing, the adjustments where necessary to balance 50.34(b)(9); 50.34(f](l) (i), (ii), and (iii); Nuclear Regulatory Commission amends failure reduction against structure, 50.34(g]; 50.34a(c]; 50.36(a]; 50.36(c)(2), part 50 of title 10 of the Code of Federal system, and component unavailability. (3), (5) and (7); 50.36a(a)(l]; 50.49(b]; Regulations as set forth. 50-SC-96
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION 56 FR 36081 for its implementation. EROS is a direct Public Document Room located at 2120 L Published 7 /31 /91
- electronic data link between computer Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, Effective 10/29/91 data systems used by licensees of DC. Upon consideration of the operating reactors and the NRC comments received, the Nuclear Criteria and Procedures for the Operations Center (NRCOCJ during the Regulatory Commission has adopted the Reporting of Defects and Conditions of declaration of an alert or higher proposed regulations, with certain Construction Permits emergency classification. The EROS modifications as set forth below.
supplements the voice transmission of See Part 21 Statements of Analysis of Public Comments Consideration information over the currently installed Emergency Notification System (ENS), 1. Comment. The EROS data would be 56 FR 40178 and is activated by a licensee when an subject to distortion by terrorists or Published 8/13/91 alert or higher emergency occurs at a computer hackers which could cause the Effective 9/12/91 licensed nuclear power facility. NRC to respond improperly in their. This rule applies to all licensed recommendations to the licensee, 10 CFR Part 50 nuclear power reactor facilities, except Federal agencies, and State and local Big Rock Point and those that are governments. If the EROS were RIN 3150 -AD32 permanently or indefinitely shut down. hardened, or essential data elements However, units shut down for were verified by voice communication, Emergency Response Data System maintenance, or authorized for fuel this potential problem would be AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory loading only, or low power opera lions, eliminated. Commission. are required to report under EROS. Big Response. It is highly unlikely that a ACTION: Final rule. Rock Point is exempt because computer hacker would be able to locate configuration of the facility does not EROS transmissions in the NRC's *
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory make available as transmittable data a communications network because of the Commission (NRC) is amending its
- sufficient number of parameters for limited access to this system. Also, the regulations to require licensees of all effective participation in the EROS communication protocol incorporated operating nuclear power facilities except program. for EROS transmission would make the Big Rock Point to participate in the The objective of the final rule is to data unintelligible without knowledge of Emergency Response Data System ensure timely and effective the specific site link configuration. Error (EROS) program. This action requires implementation of ERDS to provide NRC detection/ correction has been licensees to submit to the NRC timely increased assurance that a reliable and incorporated into the transmission and accurate data on a limited set of effective communication system that protocol which would, in all probability, parameters whose values indicate the will allow the NRC to monitor critical detect any alteration in the data. And condition of the plant during a parameters during an emergency is in finally, as stated in NUREG-1394, declaration of an alert or higher place at operating power reactors. "Emergency Response Data System emergency classification. This action Many of the elements of the rule are (EROS) Implementation," and in this will ensure that all licensees establish a currently implemented under the EROS final rule, the NRC will continue the definite schedule for implementation of voluntary program in which over half of requirement for the licensee to maintain the EROS program. the licensed units have volunteered to voice communication with the NRC EFFECTIVE DATE: September 12, 1991. participate. The EROS program is not during emergencies. Any data indicating ADDRESSES: Copies of all NRC expected to require any advancements in the state of the art, and the rapid unrealistic changes or unexpected documents are available for public conditions would be immediately inspection and copying for a fee at the configuration of most power reactors is such that the relevant parameter values suspect and subject to verbal NRC Public Document Room at 2120 L corroboration. Therefore, the NRC does Street NW., Lower Level of the Gelman are available as transmittable data.
Therefore, there should be no cause for not believe the probability for Building, Washington, DC. Copies of intentional data distortion is sufficiently NUREG documents may be purchased delay in timely implementation of this rule. large to justify resources for further from the Superintendent of Documents, countermeasures. U.S. Government Printing Office by Public Comments 2. Comment. There is inadequate calling (202) 275-2060 or by writing to Interested parties were invited to justification that implementing the EROS the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. submit comments on the proposed rule. would substantially increase the overall Government Printing Office, P.O. Box There were 113 comments made by 31 protection of the public health and 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082. commenters on the proposed rule: Two safety. This contention was made by Copies are also available from the from interested individuals. one from a nine commenters, in addition to the National Technical Information Service, citizens' group, one from a former Senior,. seven commenters who endorsed the 5285 Port Royal Road. Springfield, VA Reactor Operator and Emergency consolidated comments from NUMARC 22161. Director at a utility, one from the and NUBARG without further FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nuclear Management and Resources elaboration. The commenters stated that M.L. Au, P.E., Office of Nuclear Council (NUMARC), one from the if there was a substantial increase this Regulatory Research. Nuclear Nuclear Utility Backfilling and Reform should be quantitatively demonstrable. Regulatory Commission, Washington, Group (NUBARG), 20 from power They also stated that the utility is solely DC 20555, telephone: (301) 492-3749. reactor licensees, one from a non-power responsible for the protection of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: reactor licensee, and four from State public health. They argued that because authorities. Many of the letters this rule does not improve the manner in Background contained comments that were similar in which the emergency director makes On October 9, 1990 (55 FR 41095) the nature. These comments were grouped decisions, the claim of "unquantifiable Commission published a proposed rule and addressed as one issue. The NRC but significant increase" in the in the Federal Register that would identified 21 separate issues that cover protection of the public is invalid. One require licensees to participate in the the significant points raised by commenter stated the ERDS is an Emergency Response Data System commenters. Public comments received improvement to a system that has been (ERDSJ Program and to set a schedule on the proposed rule were docketed and deemed "adequate," and therefore is not may be examined at the Commission's necessary. 50-SC-97
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Response. Many have argued, as the availability, iimeliness, and reliability of and the ccsts of implementing those commenters have, that the NRC Dackfit key information about what is taking improvements are modest.
Rule (10 CFR 50.109) require9 place at the reactor during an accident, 3. Comment. One commenter believed quantitative evid,mce that r:ew NRC particularly during the critical early that the limited group ofreactor requirements will result in a substantial hours before the NR,C Site Team arrives, parameters monitored through EROS increase in the overall protection of the it is the judgment of the NRC that the would be inadequate to provide a sound public health and safety or the common implementation of ERDS will provide a basis for NRC recommendations and defense and security. The NRC does not gignificant improverner.t in the NRC's therefore requested modifications to agree with this interpretation and .ability to accurately and promptly ERDS. One commenter urged the NRC to believes that the safety enhancement assess the situation at the site. consider a continuous monitoring justification for a backfit can also be In emergency drills conducted by the system, e.g., the Nuclear Data Link met on the basis of qualitative NRC and power reactor licen.;ees, the considered by the Commission following considerations. In such cases, the NRC information on the status of the reactor the Three Mile Island accident. Other believes that the evidence that a is typically 15-30 minutes old by the commenters stated that the EROS design substantial increase in overall time it is received at the NRC uses cumbersome hardware and protection would occur must be clearly Operations Center when transmitted via software, that NRC's communication defensible and meaningful: The NRC has the existing Emergency Notification hardware should be able to accept dnta used this test in its assessment of the System [ENS). Moreover, inaccuracies from a multiple unit plant through one ERDS requirements. and errors have been found in that r.:odem, and allow state-of-the art The Commission has previously information which in some cases has led hardware. determined that there exists both a to confusion and misunderstanding of Response. Although the ERDS data regulatory and statutory basis for having the situation. does not portray every detail of a emergency planning as a cdtical element In drills which have employed a nuclear power reactor in an emergency in the protection of public health and prototype of the ERDS, there has been situation, the Commission believes it safety. In il.s July 17, 1979, Advance profound improvement in the does provide the data required by the Notice of Rulemaking, the following NRC to perform its role during an availability, timeliness, and reliability of statement is made: "The Nuclear emergency. The ERDS para!Ileter list the information transmitted. The actual Regulatory Commission, in discharging experience of the NRC using the existing was selected based on the information its statutory responsibilities to protect the public health and safety, has given ENS alone contrasted with drills where the NRC Technical Teams need to its primary attention to aspects of the beth ENS and a prototype ERDS were perform their emergency response reactor site and the facility design. In used is the basis for its conclusion, that functions. Moreover. the set of ERDS this regard, emergency planning, ERDS will provide significant data will not be the only input to the including evacuation planning, has been improvements in the NRC's ability to NRC. The Emergency Notification conceived of as a measure that adds to underntand what is taking place during System (ENS], a voice communication* the level of public protection * * *" an emergency, and thereby more system, will still be available to transmit The NRC, in its mandated role to effectively perform its role of monitoring data and any other relevant information protect public health and safety, has a and advising th.e licensee. More that is not available through ERDS. In respcnsibility in the event of a reactor impcrtantly, the improvement in combination, the NRC will receive the accident to monitor the actiona of the assessment performance significantly necessary information to develop timely licensee, who has the primary improved the NRC's ability to provide and appropriate evaluations of the event continuing responsibility for limiting the appropriate recommendations and and to develop the necessary support consequences of the accident. The NRG advice to the State and local officials actions to ensure protection to public also has an important role in assuring who are required to make the decisions health and safety. the flow of accurate information to regarding the offsite protective actions The ERDS is designed to transfer affected offsite officials and the public which are necessary to protect the needed reactor data from a nuclear regarding the status of the emergency public. power plant only during emergencies. It and, as requested or needed, giving Because the decision made by the is not a system to constantly monitor advisory support or assistance in State and local authorities with regard any licensee. The concept of constant diagnosing the situation, isolating to offsite protective actions could monitoring, such as the Nuclear Data critical problems and determining what significantly affect the public health Link, was considered after the Three remedial actions are appropriate. The con3equences of a reactor accident, it is Mile Island accident in 1979. But after NRC must be capable of providing to the judgment of the NRC that a much evaluation and deliberation, State and local authorities, and to other significant improvement in the NRC's Congress did not approve the concept Federal agencies, an independent ability lo provide the right for funding. assessment of protective actions recommendation at the right time The current protocol is already in use recommended by the licensee. provides a substantial improvement in at several reactors under the volunteer Given the regulatory and statutory the overall protection to the public. An program and is in the process of being basis, and given the importance of effective emergency response capability implemented at other facilities. The NRC emergency planning and response in the in the event of a reacior accident is an is not requiring additional redesign and defense-in-depth context, when an essential element of the defense-in- retest costs on voluntary licensees who accident has occurred, the NRC believes depth approach to protection of the already have an acceptable system that a significant increase in its ability public health and safety. The NRC's role inplace or have submitted an acceptable to perform its role would constitute a during an emergency is part of that implementation plan. substantial increase to the overe.ll capability. Because the ERDS wiil The EROS was designed to use protection of the public health and provide a significant improvement in the commercially available (off-the-shelf] safety. NRC's ability to perform that role in an computer3 which could effectively Since thP. principal effect of EROS will emergency, the proposed ERDS handle the data requirements, be a marked improvement in the improvements are therefore justified, establishing a single link with each unit. 50-SC-98
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION To group several units into a single link use of its resources in dealing with an Response. The NRC has no control or would result in a data base size emergency. The NRC acknowledges that authority over the State governments incompatible with the ERDS ERDS will impose small additional regarding their funding of ERDS configuration. The ERDS design has burdens on licensee resources during receiving equipment. Each individual been frozen in order to maintain periods of non-emergency and typically State government should determine its configuration control and involving non-operator personnel. These equipment and data requirements.
standardization in implementing the impacts are discussed in the regulatory However, through a Memorandum of ERDS volunteer program. analysis that accompanies this rule and Understanding [MOU) between the
- 4. Comment. Submittal of an ERDS include incremental licensee person- State and the NRC regarding the ERDS implementation plan should not be hours for development of the ERDS link, the ERDS data can be made required of licensees that have program and necessary software, available to a State. One of the implemented ERDS under the voluntary periodic testing, and the preparation of functions of the NRC is to provide program. Similarly, licem1ees that have configuration control reports. These appropriate support to the States during submitted the information required by incremental costs are judged a nuclear power plant emergency. This the voluntary program altJng with a commensurate with the enhanced responsibility exists independent of the proposed implementation schedule protection of the public attributable to ERDS, and in the stafrs view, the EROS should also be exempt foJm the schedule ERDS. Concern over the capability of interface between the NRC and the and system requirements contained in NRC staff to understand the ERDS data States should not result in additional 10 CFR part 50, paragrap11ls Vl.1, Vl.2 are unfounded. The NRC Operations costs to the NRC.
and Vl.4 of appendix E of the proposed Center staff are experienced 7. Comment. Implementing the EROS rule. professionals with extensive knowledge seems to imply some general concern Response. The NRC aErees that it is of reactors, sufficient to allow them to that the NRC neither trusts its abilities unnecessary for licensees that have use the data provided by the ERDS to nor those of the licensees to respond implemented the ERDS in an acceptable follow the course of the emergency, correctly to emergencies using current manner to submit an implementation chart and analyze trends, and support practices. plan. The final rule (appnndix E to part appropriate recommendations relating 50, section VI, paragraphs 4.c and d) has to the health and safety of the public. Response. ERDS is an enhancement of been modified so that licensees who Further, the NRC is aware that while not existing procedures that provides a have submitted all infonnation all States have the technical knowledge superior method of assembling and consistent with the timetable set in required to interpret raw ERDS data, transmitting to the NRC near real time paragraph 4.b of appendix E to part 50, some have developed significant data from a licensee during an alert or section VI, are not requked to submit an expertise in responding to emergencies higher emergency classification. . implementation plan. at nuclear power plants. The NRC Accurate and timely data assists the
- 5. Comment. (a) Ninet1~en of the believes that since the States are NRC in conducting informed analyses of commenters, including three that responsible for protective actions to the plant condition, and facilitates NRC endorsed the NUMARC comments, were ensure the health and safety of their consultation with State or local concerned that implementing the ERDS citizens, they should have available governments regarding action to ensure would increase the opentors' labor sufficient data upon which to base protection of public health and safety.
burden because the NRC, as well as decisions. 8. Comment. Will the time in the State or local government agencies (b) The ERDS link will be established header of the ERDS data packet be some receiving the ERDS data, would not be with a State government through a standard time such as GMT, EST, etc.? staffed by personnel with sufficient Memorandum of Understanding [MOU) Response. The time from the system specific knowledge to with the NRC. The proper use, control, licensee's plant computer will be used understand the data. This would result and dissemination of the ERDS data is with ERDS data. Included in each in extensive inquiries to. the licensees to one of the subjects addressed by the licensee's EROS implementation plan explain the data, thereby distracting the MOU. Under the MOU, the NRC will will be the time standards used in their operating staff from theiir primary provide a liaison to the State at the computers. This practice will ensure that functions of accident re,~ponse and NRCOC for EROS data interpretation if the particular licensee and all monitors emergency managemen:t. such help is requested. of ERDS data relating to a particular [b) Some of these commenters urged [c) The implementation of ERDS will emergency or test are using the same the NRC to limit the data provided to not alter the respective responsibilities time. There is no requirement for all States and local government and direct of the utilities and the NRC with respect licensees to adhere to a common them regarding the use ,of the ERDS to emergency management. The utility standard time. information to preclude the improper will retain primary responsibility for 9. Comment. Non-power reactors use or release of the da'ta. emergency management activities at the should be explicitly exempt from the [c) Other commenteru stated that with site locations. The NRC will continue to ERDS requirements. the availability of ERDB parametric monitor, inform, and upon request, reactor data, the NRC would modify its advise licensees and other local, State Response. Since 10 CFR 50.72 *of the oversight role into one 1:>f more active and Federal authorities who are regulations applies only to nuclear participation in event management, a responsible for the safety of their power reactors, it is not necessary to function, the commenters claimed, is citizens, as well as to provide timely explicitly exempt non-power reactors in solely the responsibilitir of the licensee. advice to the licensees as needed. the rule. Response. (a) The NHC does not 6. Comment. States may require the 10. Comment. Licensees are requested believe that ERDS will impose an licensee to pay for equipment required by Generic Letter 8~9 to ~ransmit a additional burden on Hcensees during an to receive and process the EROS data. significant number of data sheets to the emergency. Rather, the reduction in the Furthermore, providing ERDS data to the NRC during emergencies. With the potential for miscommunication and States and local governments would implementation of ERDS, this should be misunderstanding afforded by ERDS increase NRC costs beyond that relieved to allow better use of licensee should enhance the lic1msee's efficient estimated in the Backfit Analysis. resources to support ERDS. 50-SC-99
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Response. The information cited is an nuclear power industry, appears Technical Support Center (TSC)/
Information Notice (IN), and as such, it substantially correct. There is an Emergency Operating Facility (EOF), requires no action on the part of the economy of scale for those utilities that etc. One commenter suggested that data licensee. The form contained in IN 89-89 can combine submissions from multiple update frequency should be plant is a copy of the work sheet used by NRC reactor units that retluce the industry specific. Others argued that the wording Headquarters Operations Center average. in the proposed rule puts the licensee in officers in recording routine Event The basic guidance information for jeopardy of non-compliance in the event Reports over the ENS. IN 89-89 was configuration control of the EROS is of system or telecommunications line provided as information to licensees to contained in NUREG--1394. Based on the failure, and that considering the aid in structuring their normal event experience of the utilities that have conditions, the proper descriptor for the report. implemented ERDS voluntarily, the data is "near real time" instead of "real
- 11. Comment. The NRC should configuration control requirements time."
provide the software required for ERDS appear to be appropriate. Response. Originally the desired communications to the utilities. The proposed rule would require the update frequency for ERDS data was 15 Response. The NRC will develop licensee to change its data transmission seconds, but to minimize the use and software which may be used in a utility if the NRC changes its format, and the impact on the central processing unit provided personal computer (PC) staff agrees that this is an unreasonable (CPU), the minimum frequency was interface for ERDS. The NRC will requirement on the licensees. Therefore reduced by a factor of four, i.e., to at provide software and source code for a the final rule has been revised to require least every 60 seconds. Based upon the program that will perform ERDS all data transmission to conform to the experience of those manning the communications protocol and data initial format. As the ERDS matures, or NRCOC, the staff believes that less transmission functions. as technical advances increase frequent data collection would diminish
- 12. Comment. There were several capabilities, there may be some the NRC monitors' ability to adequately concerns regarding the configuration modifications. However, any such follow the course of the emergency.
control of ERDS hardware and software. changes will be coordinated with the Furthermore, allowing update Five commenters stated the requirement licensees. frequencies to range between 15 to notify the NRC within 30 days 13. Comment. The ERDS rulemaking seconds and 60 seconds should provide following changes in individual should clearly state that the ERDS is sufficient latitude to allow most parameters is overly prescriptive, and available to the States; and that all licensees to use th'eir existing computer they proposed extending the maximum future State and local government systems. Exceptions to this requirement allowable notification period to 90 days, requests for on-line data should be made will be considered on a case by case annually, or during Final Safety through the NRC. Furthermore, the basis by the NRC. Analysis Report (FSAR) updates. Two licensees should have access to the Consistent with the NRC's . commenters believed the time estimated same screens as those available to the enforcement policy, licensees are not to perform the configuration control NRC. cited for matters beyond their control, functions was low by a factor of two or Response. It is not within the such as equipment failures that are not three, and therefore the ERDS would be authority of the Commission to specify more costly to the utilities than to the States what data they may or may avoidable by reasonable licensee estimated. One commenter stated there not receive. However, the NRC does quality assurance measures or should be specific guidance provided for recommend that States desiring an management controls. Nonetheless, in the configuration control requirements emergency data link to nuclear power the wording of the final rule, the term of the utility/EROS interface; and two plants within their jurisdiction use an "near real time" has been used to were concerned that if the NRC changes ERDS connection from the NRC describe the ERDS data. its format the licensees are Operations Center. A Memorandum of 15. Comment. The requirement to automatically required to change their Understanding with the NRC will . activate the EROS at the time the NRC is transmission of data. They p'rovide the State with ERDS data. A notified of the declaration of an alert or recommended that the data should be provision allowing States to receive higher emergency classification should limited to an initial format with no later ERDS data should not be part of the rule be relaxed because.it places a heavy changes. since there is no NRC requirement labor burden on the plant operators at Response. In establishing the current imposed upon licensees to establish a this critical time. Several commenters reporting requirement for changes in the data link with a State. The concept of suggested a delay of one hour in order to ERDS Data Point Library, the staff providing each licensee with the same allow actuation from the. Technical balanced the time needed by the work stations as the NRC was Support Center, thus rei:noving the licensees for its design change-control considered. However, it was not deemed burden from control room personnel. and review processes against the staffs cost beneficial to expend in excess of Four commenters stated the ERDS need to know based on safety $900,000 for the sole purpose of sending should not be operated from an on-site considerations. The staff views the 30 back to the licensees that data which computer, and two suggested the rule days as reasonable for the licensees to they originally sent to the NRC. Any should allow the ERDS to be activated prepare such a report, and given that licensee desiring to do so may establish by computer operations personnel or a such changes can influence the NRC's their own work station based on NRC software switch. One commenter stated interpretation of ERDS data does not design. the licensee should be the only entity to view any further delay as warranted. 14. Comment. The requirement for the activate or deactivate the ERDS for a For some licensees, plant to plant reactor parametric data to be given plant. _ variation could result in a greater labor transmitted to the NRC Operations Response. There is no requirement for burden associated with configuration Center at time intervals of not less-than the ERDS to be activated from the control tasks than the 5-person days per 15 seconds or more than 60 seconds is control room or by control room reactor year used in the regulatory too prescriptive and may eliminate the personnel. The use of computer analysis. However, that value represents use of some existing computer systems operations personnel or a software an average that, considering the entire currently supporting the licensee's switch is acceptable to activate the 50-SC-100
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION*
ERDS. The only requirem,~nt is to month implementation schedule should 19. Comment. Three comrr:enters initiate ERDS data transn'iission as soon request an extension from the !\'RC. stated that this rule should impose no as possible but not later than one hour Extension requests will be reviewed on new isolation requirements, and after declaring an emergency class of a case-by-case basis. Extensions wiil suggested that references should be alert, site area emergency, or general not be granted in th!! absence of deleted to H potential requirement for emergency. This change i:~ reflected in reasonable and good faith efforts to additional isolation requirements. the final rule. The specific: methods meet the schedule. , Response. The reference to the selected to achieve this ri\quirement 17. Comment. The requirement in the potential need for isolation devices is should be fully described' in each 1 proposed rule contained in appendix E not a new requirement. It is intended licensee's ERDS impleme*ntation plan. to part 50, section VI .2, should be merely to serve to reinforce The notification requirement is valid in clarified to indicate that the licensee requirements as a design control order for NRC to fulfill ilf1 mandated role will provide data from each unit via an mechanism in 10 CFR 50.55a and adds to monitor the licensee dining an output port on.the appropriate data emphasis for adequate protection emergency. A delay of 011le hour or more system and necessary software to against spurious electrical sig..'1als. More could deprive the NRC of1vital assemble the data to be transmitted. recently constructed nuclear power information necessary to perform its Response. The staff agrees with this reactors have adequate isolation of their advisory and monitoring role. The clarification. This section of the final computer interfaces, but in some older licensee is currently required in 10 CFR rule will be modified appropriately. reactors it is conc*eivable the computer 50.72 to have a shift communicator 18. Comment. Quarterly testing of the assembling the ERDS data may not be maintain continuous contact with the EROS is too frequent. Testing on a semi- fully buffered, and as such. could NRC Operations Center. :This request is annual or peifodic but unspecified require appropriate isolation devices. not being changed. and this person schedule should be sufficient. One The statement alerts the licensees to the could be responsible for !initiating the commenter noted that the rule does not potential need for additional isolation ERDS link. address reporting requirements for devices. Similarly, the requirern'ent to use an system failures during testing. Also for 20. Comment. There should be more on-site computer does no;t mean this consistency between the discussion flexibility in acceptable quality equipment must be locat,~d in the section and the rule, the following indicators [tags) for the EROS data, thus control room. Any on-site~ location, such statement regarding the use of ERDS allowing greater use of existing plant as the Technical Support Center or a during emergency training exercises methodologies. Requiring the utilities to computer facility, which is capable of should be added to 10 CFR 50.72(a)(4) of use the quality tags prescribed by the meeting the requirement for notification the rule. Although there is no NRC would force major software is an acceptable location. However, off- requirement, the ERDS may also be changes and added costs for some site computers. e.g*., at sc,me central activated lr.f the licensee during licensees. location used to service more than one emergency drills or exercises if the Response. Using the data quality plant site could be prone to additional licensee's computer system has the indicators prescribed by the NRC should commercial link. vulnerability. This capability to transmit the data. necessitate, at the most, only very minor could potentially decrea1;e the ERDS Response. Quarterly testing during the availability and reliabi!ilty beyond initial year or 18 months of the ERDS licensee software changes. A simple acceptable limits. program is necessary for both the translation matrix that converts the The ERDS link will be activated or licensees and the NRC monitors to gain quality tags used by the licensee to the deactivated by the licen11ee to transmit experience and confidence with the form to be used by the NRC Operations the ERDS data to the NRC Operations system, as well as prove the availability Center is sufficient. This can be applied Center via the NRC-provided telephone and reliability of the system. An to the ERDS data prior to transmission. lines. In the event that NRC perceives established schedule allows both the There is no requirement for the the need to disconnect a plant from the NRC and licensees to plan and allocate utilities to change the quality tags used NRC Operations Center to allow time and resources for testing rather at their facility. However, if each utility another plant onto the system. for than trying to accommodate testing on transmits ERDS data to the NRC example, terminating th1i transmission an unregimented basis. After a period of Operations Center using their own of exercise data to allow a unit with a approximately one year of demonstrated quality tags, variation from licensee to real emergency to acces:~ the system, system performance, i.e.. proper licensee could cause confusion to the this capability must be s;vailable to the functioning during quarterly testing, the NRC monitors, thereby necessitating NRC. ' test frequency may be relaxed to semi- additional telephonic consultation with
- 16. Comment. The 18 month EROS annually. the licensee.
implementation scheduhi does not There are rio explicit repm:ting 21. Comment: Four commenters stated provide adequate flexibiility for all requirements for failures during testing that when ERDS is implemented the utilities to install the syi1tem. Adhering because the quarterly testing will be requirement for full time manning of the to that schedule will cause serious conducted with NRC. If there are Emergency Notification System (ENS) operational and cost impacts to some failures during these tests, the NRC, should be relaxed. Without this utilities because the system requires because of its participation in the tests, relaxation the affected utility will not be extensive hardware modifications. will be aware of them. It is unlikely able to redirect its efforts as claimed. Response. The volunt:ary program there will be any system testing of Response: It is not the intent to demonstrated that an iniplementation which the NRC is unaware, e.g., with replace the ENS with ERDS; rather, period of 18 months is g,enerally State or local governments, since the ERDS is a supplemental system adequate. However. the NRC realizes State links will most probably be specialized in automatic coilection and there are plant to plant variations through the NRC Operations Center. The transmission in near real time of a which, in certain cases, may require recommended additional statement selected set of parametric reactor data more extensive and tim,e conrnming regarding use of ERDS during emergency required by the NRC in its emergency modifications. Utilities 1;hat experience training exercises has been included in monitoring role. Although implementing exceptional difficulties iin meeting the 18 the final rule. ERDS will diminish the current ENS 50-SC-101
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION burden, not all functions of the ENS will the Commission certifies that this rule supplied ,communication link, provide be subsumed Into the EROS. Therefore, does not have a significant economic the necessary hardwar.e from the -in-telephone contact will still be required impact .on a substantial number .of small plant .computer to interface with the via the ENS. Ne\'ertheless, the effort entities. This.fin~ l'llle affects only the NRC-supplied communication link.
required by the licensee's personnel to licensing and operation of nuclear provide support for periodic testing af gather the data for periodic relay to*the power plants. The companies that own the EROS, and report any configuration NRC will be reduced, thus permitting these plants do not fall with.in the scope changes to the licensee's EROS-related their use of personnel in other
- of the definition of "small entities" set hardware and software. Initially, the emergency functions. forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or ERDS will be tested quarterly, unless Environmental Impact: Categorical the Small Business Size Standards set otherwise determined by NRC based on out in regulations issued by the Small demonstrated system performance.
Exclusion Business Administration at 13 CFR part Item 3: Potential change in the risk to The NRC has determined that this 121. the public from the accidental offsite final regulation is the type of action release of radioactive material. described in categorical exclusion 10 Backlit Analysis Response: The principal effect of CFR 51.22(c)(3)(iii). Therefore, neither an As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the EROS will be a marked improvement in environmental impact statement nor an Commi11sion has completed a backfit the availability, timeliness, and environmental assessment has been analysis for this rule. The Commission reliability of key information about what prepared for this final regulation. concluded that the rule will provide a Is taking place at the reactor during an substantial increase in the overall accident, particularly during the critical Paperwork Reduction Act Statement protection of the public health and early hours before the NRC*Site Team This final rule amends information safety by ensuring far more accurate arrives. Hence, ERDS will provide collection requirements that are subject and timely flow of data for the NRC to significant improvements in the NRC's to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 fulfill its role during an alert or higher ability to understand whatis taking (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These emergency. The direct and indirect costs place during an emergency, and thereby requirements were approved by the estimated for the implementation of this more effectively perform its role of Office of Management and Budget 1u1.der rule are justified in view of this monitoring and advising the licensee. approval number 3150-0011. increased protection. Further, the More importantly, the improvement in Public reporting burden for this implementation and maintenance collection of information is estimated to assessment performance will improve requirements of the rule will have no the 1'1'RC's ability to provide appropriate average 115 hours per response the first effect on occupational radiological year and 38 hours per response* recommendations and advice t.o the exposure. The backfit analysis on which State and local officials who are thereafter, including the time for this determination is based is as follows: reviewing instructions, searching Item 1: Statement of the specific required to make the decisions regarding existing data sources, gathering and offsite protective actions which are
- objective that the back/it is designed to maintaining the data needed, and achieve. necessary to protect the public.
completing and reviewing the collection Response: The objective of this Because the decisions made by the of information. Send comments rulemaking is the timely and effective State and local authorities with regard regarding this burden estimate or any implementation of EROS so as to to offsite protective actions could so other aspects of this collection of provide increased assurance that a significantly affect L'J.e public health information, including suggestions for reliable and effective communications consequences of a reactor accident, it is reducing this burden, to the Information systein, that will allow the NRC to the judgment of the NRC that a and Records Management Branch monitor available critical parameters significant improvement in the NRC's (MNBB-7714), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory during an emergency, is in place. The ability to provide the right Commission, Washington, DC 20555; availability of accurate, near re.al-time recommendation at the righttime and to the Desk Officer, Office of data depicting what is taking place at a provides a substantial improvement in Information and Regulatory Affairs, rel:lctor facility during an alert or higher t.li.e overall protection to the public. NEOD-::!019 (3150--0011), Office of emergency will improve the NRC's Because the EROS will provide that Management and Budget, Washington, understanding of the event as it is significant improvement in the NRC's DC 20503. happening, and thereby better enable ability to provide the right the NRC to perform its role of (i)
- recommendation at the right time, the Regulatory Analysis providing State and local authorities proposed ERDS requirements are The NRC has prepared a regulatory recommmendations and advice on justified.
analysis for the final rulemaking on this offsite action that they may need to take Item 4: Potential impact on subject. The analysis examined the to protect their citizenry; (ii) supporting radiological exposure of facility costs and benefits of the alternatives the licensees efforts to manage the employees. considered by the NRC. The NRC accident by providing technical analysis Response: The implementatiCln of the requested public comments on the and logistic support; (iii) keeping other proposed EROS rule would have no preliminary reguiatory analysis. Federal agencies ar.d entities informed effect on routine occupational Comments received were considered, of the status of the incident; and (iv) radiological exposure and would not but no changes to the regulatory keeping the media informed of the result in increased radiological exposure analysis are considered necessary. NRC's knowledge of the status of the of facility employees. Therefore, the preliminary regulatory incident. Item 5: Installation and continuing analysis is adopted as the final Item 2: General description of the costs associated with the backfit, regulatory analysis without change. activity that would be required of the including the cost of facility downtime licensee or applicant in order to or the cost of construction delay. Regulatory Flexibility Certification complete the back/it. Response: The cost impact of the rule In accordance with the Regulatory Response: All licensees or applicants was estimated to be approximately Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), would be required to install an NRC- $153,000 for one nuclear power reactor 50-SC-102
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION (one unit). This figure, expressed in 1990 parameters than are presently 56 FR 61352 dollars, represents the inc1~emental monitored at each facility.* Published 12/3/91 worth of installing and op13rating ERDS Item 9: Whether the proposed back/it Effective 6/20/91 for 30 years using a 5 percent discount is. interim or final and, if interim, the rate. The overall industry cost of justification for imposing the proposed Standards for Protection Against implementing the rule for '.l18 nuclear back/it on tin interim basis. Radiation; Correction power reactor units was estimated at Response: Implementation of the approximately $18 million. No downtime ERDS in accordance with the final rule See Part 20 Statements of costs were considered in the cost impact will require that all licensees develop Consideration estimates because the installation and and submit an ERDS implementation operation of the ERDS sho,uld have no plan to the NRC within 75 days of the 56 FR 64943 impact on the operation ol: a nuclear publication of the final rule in the Published 12/13/91 power plant. . Federal Register. The implementation Effective 1/13/92 Item 6: The potential safety impact of plan should provide a schedule which changes in plant or operaaonal identifies the earliest possible time Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal complexity, including the relationship to frame for ERDS implementation by the proposed and existing regulatory licensee as well as proposed alternate See Part 54 Statements of requirements. implementation dates. The NRC will Consideration Response: The ERDS rule should have establish an industry-wide ERDS little or no impact on the c1perational implementation schedule which will complexity of the nuclear power reactor take into account such factors as 57 FR 18388 units since the required modifications to planned computer modifications and Published 4/30/92 the hardware and softwaie are minor. scheduled outages. The ERDS must be Effective 6/1 /92 The redirection in the labor burden implemented within 18 months of the provided by the automatlu collection publication of the final rule in the Uranium Enrichment Regulations and transmission of selected reactor Federal Register. Licensees that have data would increase the efficiency and submitted the required information See Part 40 Statements of Consideration effectiveness of nuclear p,Jwer plant under the voluntary implementation operating personnel during an program will not be required to resubmit emergency. This rule is cl1Jsely this information. However, they will be associated with Generic Letter 89-15 required to meet the implementation and complements the ENS that exists at schedule of 18 months after the effective every nuclear power reaci:or. date of the final rule or before initial Item 7: The estimated n~source burden escalation to full power, whichever on the NRC associated wlth the backfit comes later. Licensees with currently and availability of such msources. operational ERDS interfaces approved Response: The impact on the NRC under the voluntary ERDS resulting from the implementation of the implementation program will not be EROS rule is anticipated to be a one- required to submit another time cost of about $200,000 for the implementation plan and will be current population of operational/ considered to have met the requirements licensed nuclear reactor units. This under this rule.
figure provides for initial 1reviews of licensees' implementation plan List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 57 FR 30383 submittals. After implementation. the Published 7/9/92 Antitrust, Classified information, Effective 8/10/92 NRC cost is estimated to be Criminal penalty, Fire protection, approximately $4.4 millio11 for 118 Incorporation by reference, nuclear power reactor units. This figure Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear represents the costs for pnriodic testing power plants and reactors. Radiation 10 CFR Part 50 and configuration control expressed as protection, *Reactor siting criteria, RIN 3150-AOS9 the present worth in 1990 dollars and Reporting and recordkeeping uses a 5 percent discount rate over 30 requirements. Decommissioning Funding for years. . Prematurely Shut Down Power Item 8: The potential impact of the For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Reactors differences in facility typ,~. design, or
- age on the relevancy and practicality of Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as ameI).ded, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory the backfit. Commission.
Response: The rule is independent of as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following ACTION: Final rule. the facility's type, design, or age. There are considerable variations in the amendment to 10 CFR part 50.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory instrumentation systems of the nuclear Commission (NRC) is amending its power plants, and the estiimated cost 56 FR 40664 Published 8/15/91 regulations on the timing of the impacts were based on an average value collection of funds for decommissioning for current nuclear power plants to Effective 9/16/91 for those nuclear power reactors that implement the ERDS. There will be no have shut down before the expected Revisions to Procedures to differences. however, in potential Issue Orders; Deliberate Misconduct ends of their operating lives. These impacts between the vari,~us facilities by Unlicensed Persons amendments require that the NRC on a yearly basis. The rule does not evaluate decommissioning funding ,;ilans require that licensees mo11itor more See Part 2 Statements of Consideration for power reactors that shut down 50-SC-103
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION i prematurely on a case-by-case basis. on a case-by-case basis. As part of its 1.159 1 and Appendix A to 10 CFR part The NRC's evaluation would take into decision, the Commission directed the 30.
account the specific safety and financial NRC staff to prepare a rulemaking that (8) A one-year trigger period is too
- situations at each nuclear power plant. would codify this case-by-catle short and may be disruptive.
EFFECTIVE DATE: August 10, 1992. approach. A proposed rule implementing (9) Possible adverse tax consequences FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: this approach was published in the may accrue if accelerated payments are Robert Wood, Office of Nuclear Reactor Federal Register on August 21, 1991 (56 required. Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory FR41493J. Response.: The NRC continues to
- Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Analysis of and Response to Comments believe that bond ratings can serve as telephone (301) 504-1255. one of several criteria to estimate the The NRC received 17 comments in SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: response to the proposed rule. Eleven ability of a licensee to pay future Background comments were from NRG-licensed decommissioning costs. The NRC did electric utilities; two from utility trade not intend that this rule set a mandatory On June 27, 1988 (53 FR 24018), the groups; one from a utility counsel; two . requirement that a minimum "A" rating NRC published a final rule that from bond rating/investment advisory must be met before the NRC would amended 10 CFR parts 30. 40, 50, 51, 70, companies; and one from a public approve funding into a shut down and 72. This final rule established interest group. reactor's safe storage period. Rather,
. several acceptable methods by which Except for the comment from the one reason the "A" rating criterion was power reactor licensees may provide public interest group, all comments proposed was to serve as a screening assurance that they will have sufficient supported that part of the proposed rule test of whether additional financial data . funds to decommission their plants by that would allow the period of funds was required to determine whether the
- the time the plants are permanently shut accumulation for a prematurely shut licensee should be allowed to fund doWll (53 FR 24043). In considering this down reactor to be determined on a decommissioning into s storage period.
final rule, the Commission case-by-case basis. However, most If a licensee met *this criterion, the
- acknowledged that, in certain instances, utilities and their representatives licensee would not have to prepare and reactors mtght be permanently shut opposed the guidance in the preamble to submit additional documentation of its
- down before completing the full term of the proposed rule that would use a bond financial situation to be allowed to fund
, their operating lives._However, because rating of "A" as a criterion for decommissioning into a storage period. the Commission determined that such
- determining the future solvency of and A benefit of the proposed screening test
'instances would be infrequent, it did not
- thus the extent of the funding period for was a potential saving of licensee and
' explicitly include remedies for this . a licensee with a prematurely shut down NRC resources to develop and review I situation in the final rule. power reactor. the additional financial data. In establishing the June 27,l988, final rule, the Coriuni!lsion recognized that 1. Comment: The use of bond ratings. With respect to the level of rating (i.e .. power reactor licensees generally have "A" vs "BBB" or equivalent), the The conunenters offered a variety of preamble to the proposed rule presented access to significant amounts of reasons why they considered bond financial capital and are closely a rating of "A" as a threshold below ratings, particularly at the "A" level, to which a licensee would be required, if regulated. Therefore, the Commission be inappropriate for judging a licensee's allowed these licensees the option of other criteria were not met, to accelerate ability to pay for deconunissioning for a payment of any decommissioning accumulating decommissioning funds prematurely shut down reactor. These over the projected operating life of the funding shortfall. The staff chose an "A" reasons included the following: rating because a downrating from "A" faci}jty rather than requiring that these (1) Bond ratings are too restrictive and funds be available or guaranteed prior to "BBB" would* allow a licensee to do not allow for variations in licensees . secure funds-or meet other criteria while to opera~on, or at some time before the situations as contemplated by the case-end of the.projected operating life of the Its rating was still Investment grade. To by-case approach. that extent, an "A" rating is not facility. The Commission recognized the (2) Bond rating may not be.an risk that, if some reactors did not inconsistent with the use of "BBB" accurate indicator of a licensee's future ratings in Regulatory Guide 1.159 and operate for their entire operating lives, ability to pay for decommissioning. those licensees might have insufficient appendix* A to 10 CFR part 30. In (3) Not all licensees issue debt that is Regulatory Guide 1.159, a "BBB" bond decommissioning funds at the time of rated. In the i;:ase of poser plants with permanent shutdown. rating was used as a minimum suggested several owners, owners will likely have standard for a mixed portfolio of After the NRC published the June 27, different ratings. 1988, final rule, .four power reactor (4) Bond ratings would likely decline investments in a decommissioning trust. facilities shu_t down prematurely: The by virtue of a premature reactor Because of investment diversification, a Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating shutdown, thus precipitating further "BBB" investment-standard represents a Station, the Yankee Rowe Nuclear financial problems and further 1 Power Station, the Rancho Seco Nuclear downratings.
- Regulatory Guide 1.159 is available for inspection and copying for a fee at the Generating Station, and the Shoreham (5) Differences in ratings by different Commission's Public Document Room 2120 L Street.
Nuclear Power Station. The NRC staff services or for different classes of debt N.W.. (Lower Level). Washington. D.C. Copies or sought the Commission's guidance on issues were not addressed. issued guides may be purchased from the the appropriate period for collecting (6) Reliance on bond ratings may . Government Printing Office at the current GPO funds to compensate for any shortfall of price. Information on current GPO prices mny be result in unsound business decisions to obtained by contacting the Superintendent or decommlssl.oning funds for plants such avoid accelerated fund accumulation or Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. as these that shut down prematurely: may discourage use of the SAFSTOR Box 37082. Waahington. D.C. 20013-2171. Issued The Commission elected to determine decommissioning opticµ. guidea may also be purchaaed from the National the appropriate collection period for any (7) A "BBB. rating, or equivalent, is Technical Information Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by decommissioning funding shortfall for still considered investment grade and is writing Nl1S. 5825 Port Royal Road. Springfield. VA prematurely shut down power reactors used as a criterion in Regulatory Guide 22161. 50-SC-104
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION relatively low level of financial risk. 2. Comment: It is not necessary to stage by creating incentives to "cut Similarly, appendix A of part 30 used a require that all funds should be comers." Thus, this requirement was not "BBB" rating as a minimum for a parent available in external funds or altered in the proposed rule on funding company of a licensee to uuarantee guaranteed by the tiine final for plants that shut down prematurely decommissioning costs. B11cause a dismantlement activities commence. and will remain in the final rule.
parent company is a separate legal A few commenters disagreed with the 3. ComIJ7ent: Accelerated funding when entity from its subsidiary, the NRC NRC's statement that all funds are there is a risk ofpremature shutdown. would potentially have access to two required to be available or guaranteed sources of funds (the licen'see and its in external funds by the time final One commenter asked the NRC to parent) thus red1,1cing the Iisk of dismantlement activities commence. allow accelerated funding in cases decommissioning funding shortfalls. For Some commenters hypothesized where there is a risk of premature this reason, the NRC disaurees that an , scenarios In which relatively small
- shutdown. This commenter specifically "A" bond rating standard .ls too funding shortfalls may be covered in referred to its reque.st for FERC to stringent as a screening test. rates already approved by a licensee's accelerate funding over a shorter period PUC or the FederalEnergy Regulatory than the fill remaining operating life so For these reasons, the NIRC will that adequate funds would be available continue to use the "A" bond rating as a Commission (FERC) prior to actual
*collection. In thls,situation, funds, at the time of permaneilt*shutdown. The screening test for determining the commenter also Indicated that its
- although not strictly available at the decommissioning funding period for request was denied by FERC.
time final dismantlement activities. prematurely shut down po,wer reactors. commence, would have a high degree of Response: The NRC.strongly supports If a power reactor licenset! cannot pass assurance of being obtained by the time any effort by its licensees to accelerate the initial screening test, cir if it has the licensee needed to complete the funding, especially when a serious . passed the screening test lout dismantlement activities. Another possibility of premature shutdown is . subsequently loses its "A. bond rating, commenter suggested that the NRC's anticipated. The NRC further believes this licensee could still be ,allowed to requirement of full funding prior to the that existing regulations (i.e., 10 GFR fund into the storage peric1d by meeting start of final dismantlement operations 50.75(e)) would allow accelerated other criteria as described: below. is inconsistent with a case-by-case funding and that, In appropriate These criteria include: . ' approach. This commenter recommends circumstances, accelerated funding (1) A licensee's financial history that licensees be required to provide could be ordered If necessary of including its past funding ,of reactor assurance that funds are available to desirable for safety. In any case, the safety expenditures: complete specific dismantlement NRC would defer to FERC or the activities, rather than the entire appropriate PUC for the appropriate rate (2) The local rate regulatory . treatment of accelerated* funding. environment and other relevant State dismantlement process. laws including public utility commission Response: The NRC disagrees with 4. Comment: Amending 10 CFR 50.82 to recommendations that the NRC should clarify issuance of possession-only (PUC) commitments; abandon its general policy of requiring licenses apd other procedural aspects of (3) The number of other genera ting all funds needed for decommissioning plants, both nuclear and non-nucTear, in be available prior to the start of final decommissioning. its system. This is anothe1: way of dismantlement. As described in the One commenter recommended that measuring the relative impact of proposed rule (56 FR 41493), the June 27, § 50.82 be amended to indicate the decommissioning costs on a particular 1988, final rule clearly requires funds at timing and procedures for licensee's finances: and ' the time of permanent end of operations. decommissioning. The commenter (4) Other factors that a !licensee can Section50.75(e)(1) defines the three requests th/lt the NRC specify when it demonstrate as being relevani. methods of financial assurance will issue a possession-only license or The NRC wishes to cla~ify that it acceptable for power reactor licensees. other license amendments to permits assumes that most license.es with "BBB" Two of the methods, prepayment and scaling back site operations. bond ratings would still hie able to
- surety or insurance, provide all funds by Response: The NRC is evaluating its obtain NRC approval of the time of.permanent shutdown. The* regulations concerning decommissioning decommissioning funding into the safe third acceptable method, an external and is considering issuing proposed
- storage period for a .prematurely shut sinking fund, is defined as "a fund amendments to clarify Us procedures in established and maintained by setting the areas suggested by the commenter.
down reactor. This is because most funds aside periodically in an account To expedite this rule, however, the NRC licensees will be able to successfully segregated from licensee assets and will consider the timing of possession-meet the other criteria deucribed above outside the licensee's administrative only licenses and other license even if they are unable to pass the "A" control in which the total amount of amendment procedures as part of a bond rating screening test. Recent funds would be sufficient to pay separate rulemaking action. exemptions issued to two prematurely decommissioning costs at the time shut down plants (Ranchc1 Seco and 5. Comment: The case-by-case approach termination of operation is expected." '1ails to provide sufficient protection to* Shoreham) intlicate that bond ratings This requirement was imposed to are only one of several fa1;tors that the avoid a situation where lack of funds the public's health and safety." NRC will use to determimi whether a could delay and degrade the A commenter argues that many p_lants licensee has demonstrated reasonable decommissioning process to the will shut down prematurely in the future assurance of Its ability to pay detriment of public health and safety. and safe storage is neither risk free nor decommissioning costs. Fiinally, this Although the dismantlement process can cheap. Thus, adequate funds for safe discuss.ion on the use of bond ratings is be completed in discrete stages, the storage must be assured, In addition to intended as non-binding EUidance only: potential unavailability of funds at a funds for actual decommissioning. this final rule includes no such detailed later stage may conceivably affect the Therefore, plants must have adequate . criteria. dismantlement process at an earlier funding available for the time of 50-SC-105
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION shutdown and not be allowed to fund financial situation changes, the licensee. agencies or persons were contacted for into the safe storage period. Further, this under NRC monitoring, would alter this action, and no other documents commenter asserts that "A" bond funding methods accordingly. related to the environmental impact of ratings are inadequate because "in For the reasons presented in the this action exist. The foregoing many instances, utility (and other) discussion of issues raised, the NRC is constitutes the environmental bonds have 0oone from investment
- grade issuing this final rule as proposed. assessment and finding of no significant status to junk or default status m one Finding of No Significant Environmental impact for this final rule.
step." In the event of a rrecip~~ating. Impact: Availability Paperwork Reduction Act Statement incident such as an accident, there 1s no likelihood at all that the derating This final rule clarifies This final rule does not contain a new process will be gradual * * * ." This decommissioning funding arrangements or amended information collection commenter concludes by stating that the for those licensees whose power requirement subject to the Paperwork NRC "should determine how to insure, reactors are shut down prematurely. Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et in each and every case, that adequate This action is required so that the seq.) Existing requirements were funds are available." . Commission may evaluate on a case-by- approved by the Office of Management Response: This conunenter makes case basis the unique financial situation and Budget, approval number 3150-0011. several assertions to support the . that could confront those licensees. The commenter's opposition to funding Commission would continue its Regulatory Analysis during a safe storage period. These requirements for assurance of On June 27, 1988 (5a'FR 24018), t~e assertions, however, are not supported decommissioning costs but could alter . NRC published in the Federal Register a by facts. It is not true that ~oat ~?~d the timing of ftmds collection ac_cording final rule* amending 10 CFR parts 30, 40, ratings, especially for electric ut1hties: to a licensee's individual financial 50, 51, 70 and 72 regardin~ g~ne~al move quickly through several categones situation. The Commission believes that requirements for decomnuss1omng of ratings. The process is almost always if utility licensees were required to have nuclear facilities. In that rule, the gradual and, therefore,. would almost all funds for decommissioning by the ' Commission provided the option that always give the NRC time to t~e steps. time of permanent shutdown as required power reactor licensees may collect to assure the adequacy of fundings by the existing rule, some utilities could funds for decommissioning over the during a storage period. In addition. this be unnecessarily financially stressed projected operating life of the facility commenter also ignores NRC's without significantly increasing the but required that all funds needed for requirement that its power reactor protection of the public health and decommissioning be accumulated by the licensees carry accident recovery safety and of the environment. . time of permanent shutdown: Under the insurance of at least $1.06 billion (10 Neither this action nor the alternative existing rule, power reactor licensees CFR 50.54(w)) to provide a source of of maintaining the existing rule would that shut down prematurely would no! funds for accident cleanup and significantly affect the environment. have the remaining term of the operating decontamination. This requirement Although changes in the timing.of_ . license to accumulate decommissioning reduces the likelihood that premature collection of funds for decomm1ss1omng funds and could be unduly b~dened decommissioning resulting from an prematurely shut down power reactors financially if required to raise all accident would be particularly may affect the financial arrangements of remaining decommissioning funds financially stressful. licensees and may have economic and shortly after shutdown. Consequently, More importantly, the NRC would, as social consequences, they would not the NRC will evaluate the schedule for stated, evaluate each instance of alter the effect on the environment of collecting decommissioning funds for premature decommis~io~ing _on a case- the licensed activities considered in the prematurely shut down facilities on a by-case Qasis. The cntena ~1scusse~ final rule published on June 27, 1988 (53 case-by-case basis. A case-by-case above provides the NRC with a vanety FR 24018) as analyzed in the Final approach allows the NRC to evaluate of measures to assure the adequacy of Generic Environmental Impact the particular financial cir.cumsta~ce_s of funding. The case-by-case approach that Statement on Decommissioning of each affected licensee while conhnmng is being adopted in this 1:11~ all_ows the Nuclear Facilities (NUREG-0586, August to ensure that the public health anil NRC to consider the parllc1pation 1988).
- The alternative to this action safety and the environment are financial situation for each licensee that would not significantly affect the . . adequately protected. This final.rule shuts down its power reactor before the environment. Therefore, the Comm1ss10n would generally reduce financial costs expected end of operation life. In spite
- has determined, under the National for those licensees allowed to extend of the commenter's assertions, the Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as the collection period of Commission does not expect this to be a amended, and the Commission's decommissioning funds.
frequent occurrence. When it do_es. regulations in subpart A oflO CFR pa1: This final rule would not create occur, in most situations ~e ma1onty of 51 that this final rule will not be a ma1or substantial costs for other licensees. The 0 decommissioning funds will have been Federal action significantly affecting the rule will not signficantly affect state and collected during the operating life of the quality of the human environment, and local governments and geographical shut down reactor. Most licensees therefore an environmental impact regions, or the environment, or. create currently have substantial amounts statement is not required. No other substantial costs to the NRC or other collected and would, at the least. be
- Copieo or NUREG--0586 may be pun:hased from Federal agencies. The foregoing able to fund activities necessary to the Superintendent or Doc:umenta. U.S. Government discussion constitutes the regulatory place a shut down reactor into safe Prinlill!! Offica. P.O. Box 3711112, ~a,hi113ton. D.C. analysis for this final rule.
storage. Whatever funding shortfall 20013-7082. Copies are also .available &om the National Technical Information Senrlce, 5285 Port Regulatory Flexibility Certification remains can be collected or guaranteed Royal Road. Springfield, YA 22161. A copy la all!IO in a time frame and through funding available for inspection and copying ror II fee In the As required by the Regulatory mechanisms commeI1cSurate with a NRC Public Document Room. 2120 L Street. NW~ Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. ~b), licensee's financial situation. As that (Lower Level). Wa11hington. DC. the Commission certifies that this final 50-SC-106
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
SUMMARY
- The Commission is amending rule will not have a significant impact its regulations to incorporate by upon a substantial numbe:r of small reference the 1986 Addenda, 1987 entities. The rule will pote,ntially affect Addenda, 1988 Addenda, and 1989 licensees of approximately 118 nuclear Edition of Section III, Division 1, of the power reactors. Nuclear p~wer plant American Society of Mechanical licensees do not fall wiH1i11 the Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel definition of small businenses as defined Code (ASME Code), and the 1986 in Section 3 of the Small Business Act, Addenda, 1987 Addenda, 1988 Addenda, 15 U.S.C. 632, the Small Business Size and 1989 Edition of Section XI, Division Standards of the Small Business 1, of the ASME Code. The final rule Administrator (13 CFR pa:rt 121), or the imposes an augmented examination of Commission's Size Stand;;1rds (50 FR reactor vessel shell welds and separates 50241; December 9, 1985). the requirements for inservice testing Backfit Analysis from those for inservice inspection by placing the requirements for inservice The NRC has determined that this testing in a separate paragraph. The final rule does not impose a backfit as ASME Code addenda and edition defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a1)(l). incorporated by reference provide Therefore, a backfit analysis is not updated rules for the construction of required for this rule. components of light-water-cooled List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50. nuclear power plants, and for the inservice inspection and inservice Antitrust. Classified information. testing of those components. This final Criminal penalty, Fire protection. rule permits the use of improved Incorporation by referenl:4~, methods for construction, inservice Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear inspection, and inservice testing of power plants and reactors, Radiation nuclear power plant components; protection, Reacttir siting 1c:riteria, requires expedited implementation of Reporting and recordkeeping the expanded reactor vessel shell weld requirements. examinations specified in the 1989 For the reasons set out in the Edition of Section XI; and more clearly preamble and under the authority of the distinguishes in the regulations the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. requirements for inservice testing from the Energy Reorganizatio111 Act of 19'74, those for inservice inspection.
as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, EFFECTIVE DATE: September 8, 1992. The the NRC is adopting the following incorporation by reference of certain amendment to 10 CFR part 50. publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Office of the Director of the Office of the Federal Register as cif September 8, 1992. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. G.C. Millman, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear
. Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone: {301) 492-3848.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On January 31, 1991 (56 FR 3796), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 57FR34666 published in the Federal Register a Published 8/6/92 proposed amendment to its regulation, Effective 9/8/92 10 CFR part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," to update the reference to editions and 10 CFR Part 50 addenda of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and RIN 3150-ADOS Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code). This proposed amendment would revise Codes and Standards for Nuclear § 50.55a to incorporate by reference the Power Plants 1986 Addenda, 1987 Addenda, 1988 AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Addenda, and 1989 Edition of Section Commission. III, Division 1, of the ASME Code, and the 1986 Addenda, 1987 Addenda, 1988 ACTION: Final rule. Addenda, and 1989 Edition of Section 50-SC-107
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION XI, Division l, of the ASME Code, with a since the 1975 Addenda. The commentor leakage and that the modification could specified modification. The modification believes that the expanded examination result in a valve having to be declared would require implementation of certain is unnecessary and that examination inoperable immediately, in spite of the requirements for containment isolation efforts should focus on the beltline fact that the total containment leakage valve (CIV) testing that appear in welds or welds that exceed a specified may be substantially less than Section XI Subsection IWV prior to the fluence level. The NRC agrees with the allowable. NUMARC suggested that, in 1988 Addenda, but which do not appear ASME action to expand the reactor lieu of reinstating requirements for in the later addenda. The amendment vessel examination on the basis that the specific valves, NRC recommend to the would impose an augmented importance of the reactor vessel. and ASME Operations & Maintenance examination of reactor vessel shell previous unexpected cracking of (O&MJ Committee that it perform a welds, and separate in the regulations primary coolant pressure boundary comprehensive review of the testing the requirements for inservice testing components, requires that the expanded requirements for containment isolation from those for inservice inspection by examinations be performed to ensure valves and acceptance standards for placing the requirements for inservice the integrity of the reactor vessel. The those tests. IDNS agreed with the NRC testing in a separate paragraph. importance of reactor vessel integrity in position that the requirements for Summary of Comments protecting the public health and safety leakage rate analysis and provisions for demands that periodic, comprehensive corrective action should be maintained, Interested parties were invited to inservice examinations of the reactor but believed that it would be less submit written comments for vessel be made to ensure that structural confusing for licensees if those consideration in connection with the degradation, if it occurs, does not go requirements were incorporated into the proposed amendment by April 16, 1991. undetected. Although the beltline welds existing requirements for Type C testing Comments were received from 29 do receive the highest radiation, there is in Appendix J. OCRE strongly supported separate sources. These sources simply no assurance that service the action by NRC to modify the Section consisted of 23 utilities, one service induced cracking would be limited to XI rules for CIV testing.
organization representing four nuclear those welds. An examination once every The NRC concern that resulted in the power plants, the Nuclear Management ten years of essentially 100 percent of all proposed modification to Section XI and Resources Council (NUMARCJ, one reactor vessel shell welds is both Subsection !WV sterns from the findings owners group (BWR Owners Group reasonable and necessary. of two reviews and a follow-on study of * (BWROG)), one state entity (Illinois The comments submitted by Appendix J leak test results. The overall Department of Nuclear Safety (IDNS)), NUMARC relate to: (1) The proposed findings show that valve leakage is the one public citizens group (Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy (OCRE)), and endorsement of a later edition and primary contributor to occurrences of one independent consultant. addenda of the ASME Code, which containment unavailability and that The submitted comments generally NUMARC considers to be a positive such occurrences generally involve addressed one of the following subject step; (Z) the proposed modification to small, rather than large, leaks. Risk to areas: (1) The incorporation by reference Section XI Subsection IWV (i.e., the the public from small leakage events is of the specified later addenda and reference to part 10 of ASME/ ANSI very low, but the NRC is concerned that edition of Section III, Division l, and OMa-1988 Addenda to ASME/ ANSI eliminating the existing Section XI Section XI, Division l, of the ASME OM-1987 (OM Part 10)), which requirement to analyze leakage rates Code into § 50.55a; (Z) the endorsement NUMARC considers to be inappropriate and to take corrective action in the of comments submitted by NUMARC; and unnecessary on the basis that 10 event of abnormally high leakage rates (3) the proposed modification to Section CFR part 50, Appendix J testing is for those CIVs that do not provide a XI Subsection IWV rules for CIV testing; adequate; (3) the proposed augmented reactor coolant system pressure (4) the proposed augmented reactor reactor vessel examination, which isolation function could reduce the vessel examination; (5) the separation of NUMARC recognizes to be important, ability to detect degrading valves and, the rules for inservice inspection and but suggests that more flexibility be thereby, could permit an unacceptable inservice testing; (6) the existing scope incorporated into the implementation reduction in the present safety margin of § 50.55a for pump and valve testing; provisions; and (4) the scope of§ 50.55a associated with the leak tight integrity and (7) the potential endorsement in which NUMARC believes should not be of those CIVs and, thereby, the
§ 50.55a of ASME/ ANSI OM part 4 on influenced by Generic Letter 89-04. containment.
snubbers. Approximately one-half of the utility It was specifically noted in the Those who commented on the cornmentors specifically endorsed the proposed rule that the NRC was updating of existing references to comments by NUMARC. In general, interested in receiving comments on the Section III and Section XI of the ASME comments from the other utilities were discussed basis for and content of the Code in § 50.55a generally noted their consistent with one or more of the proposed modification, and was approval. One commentor, however, comments from NUMARC. The particularly interested in receiving expressed significant concern with the comments from NUMARC are discussed comments that would provide insight new provision initially specified in the below, along with comments from others and justification, based upon plant Section XI 1988 Addenda which on the same subject. experiences, relative to the need for expands the existing requirement to Most of the comments addressed, in revising or possibly eliminating the examine one circumferential and one part, the proposed modification to proposed modification. Many comments longitudinal reactor vessel shell weld Section XI Subsection IWV rules for were received that express concern with during the Znd and subsequent containment isolation valve testing. the proposed modification. However, inspection intervals to essentially 100 Utility comments supported the these comments, which generally state percent of all reactor vessel shell weld NUMARC comment, which expressed the opinion that Appendix J during those intervals. Volumetric the belief that the current Appendix J requirements are adequate and examination of all reactor vessel shell containment leakage testing program sufficient with regard to ensuring welds during the first inspection interval already provides an adequate basis for containment integrity, are of a has been a requirement in Section XI assessing and controlling containment qualitative nature and no specific plant 50-SC-108
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION data or operational experiences were relaxed by permitting valve examinations should be revoked, and provided or referenced that updated the combinations rather than specific valves they should be revoked on a plant results of the earlier studies. No to be analyzed. This recognizes that, in specific basis; and (4) the NRC should additional substantive information was the past, requests for relief have been state its willingness to accept requests provided for the NRC to consider granted where design constraints for specific new exemptions, based on relative to the need for revising or necessitate testing-combinations of the availability of suitable equipment possibly eliminating the proposed valves with permissible leak rate limits and technology at the time of the modification. It has not been applied to valve groups. The specified scheduled inspection and the demonstrated, by analyt1is of more modification does not require the appropriate technical justification.
recent and comprehensive containment present practice of trending NPS 6 and Other comments on the augmented leakage test data, that containment larger valves because that requirement examination include those from: leakage integrity can be maintained at has not been carried from IWV-3427[b) BWROG, which noted concern for those an acceptable level without continued to OM part 10. plants close to the end of the current implementation of the existing Section XI Subsection IWV (1988 interval that could not practically Appendix Jvalve leak rate test program Addenda and 1989 Edition), Subsection incorporate the augmented examination in conjunction with the Section XI IWP (1988 Addenda and 1989 Edition), into the current interval and would have requirement for analysis of leak rates. and Subsection IWF (1987 Addenda, to perform that examination during the Consistent with the comment by 1988 Addenda, and 1989 Edition) first period of the next interval (Note: NUMARC, the NRC staff discussed the reference ASME/ ANSI OM part 10, The deferred augmented examination basis for OM part 10 CIV testing ASME/ ANSI OM part 6, and ASME/ may be used as a substitute for the requirements with repret1entatives from ANSI OM part 4, respectively. During reactor vessel shell weld examination the ASME O&M Committee. Based on preparation of this final rule, it was normally scheduled for the interval in these discussions and in concert with recognized that Table IWA-1600-1 in which the deferred examination was the O&M Committee organization, the the applicable Section XI addenda and performed(§ 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A){3}, O&M Committee has ini1iated action to edition specifies a nonexistent revision therefore, the impact of deferring the (1) perform a comprehensive review of for OM part 10 and part 6, and does not augmented examination will be OM part 10 CIV testing requirements specifically identify the applicable reduced); IDNS, which strongly supports and acceptance standards and (2) revision for OM part 4. The Section XI the NRC position regarding the develop a basis document that would Subcommittee on Inservice Inspection augmented examination of the reactor provide, as a minimum, ~! documented has taken action to correct the revision vessel; and OCRE, which also strongly basis for not including the requirements reference, which, for these standards, supports the augmented examination for analysis of leakage rates and should be the ANSI/ASME OMa-1988 and notes that the examination will not corrective actions in OM part 10 for Addenda to the ASME/ANSI OM-1987 only provide an additional assurance of those CIVs that do not pmvide a reactor Edition. To ensure that licensees are safety, but will aid in understanding coolant system pressure lsolation aware of the correct revision reference aging degradation phenomena which function. The NRC will mevaluate the to the OM standards, an additional will assist licensees that wish to pursue need for the modification to Section XI modification, § 50.55a[b)(2)(viii), has license renewal. Subsection IWV, following review of been added to specify that the OMa- The NRC position with regard to the this basis document. It is anticipated 1988 Addenda is the applicable revision augmented examination of the reactor that this will occur as pa1:t of a future to the OM-1987 Edition for OM part 4, vessel, as previously stated in the rulemaking proceeding that will address part 6, and part 10 when using the noted Supplementary Information to the the incorporation by refe:rence of the Section XI addenda and edition. proposed rule, is that degradation of ASME O&M Code into § 50.55a. The NUMARC comment relative to reactor vessel materials has become In the meantime, this final rule the proposed augmented examination of more of a concern recently, because: (1) incorporates by reference the 1988 the reactor vessel indicates an Results from irradiation surveillance Addenda and 1989 Edition of Section XI, understanding of the NRC position on material tests show that certain reactor Division 1, with a specifiHd modification the need for this examination, but notes vessel materials undergo greater for CIV testing that is provided in a new concern with the specifics of the radiation damage than previously
§ 50.55a(b)(2)(vii). The modification proposed implementation. Specifically, expected, (2) indications from substantially preserves the existing NUMARC expresses concern that: (1) operational data show that stress requirements for analysis of leakage Better utilization of available inspection corrosion cracking of BWR reactor rates and corrective actions that exist in resources could be accomplished by vessels is more probable than was Subsection IWV prior to the 1988 limiting application of the augmented thought several years ago, and (3)
Addenda. Specifically, th,e modification inspection program to the reactor vessel significant service induced cracking has requires that licensees implement the beltline shell welds, or by limiting occurred in large vessels (i.e., requirements of ParagrapJ1 4.2.2.3(e), implementation of the augmented pressurizer, steam generators) designed "Analysis of Leakage Rates," of part 10 examination to reactor vessel shell and fabricated to the ASME Code. It is and Paragraph 4.2.2.3(f), "Corrective welds that exceed a specific neutron the judgment of the NRC that, because Action," of part 10, in addition to the flux exposure (this comment differs from of new information and previous limited requirements of Paragraph 4.2.2.2 of part the one utility comment noted above examinations of reactor vessels, there 10, for all Category A valves that are relative to updating later edition and may exist a substantially greater CIVs, regardless of whether or not they addenda of Section XI in that it only potential for reactor vessel degradation, provide a reactor coolant system refers to the augmented examination); in all areas of the reactor vessel, than pressure isolation function. Because (2) tooling for the older Boiling Water previously considered and that paragraph 4.2.2.3( e) of part 10 is Reactors (BWRs) may generally not be maintenance of the level of protection specified in the modification rather than available in the time-frame needed; (3) presumed by the regulations requires the existing IWV-3426, th,~ existing only those reliefs which address the more than compliance to existing Section XI requirement is somewhat scope and extent of shell weld regulatory requirements. The NRC has 50-SC-109
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION determined that the augmented Welds," of Examination Category B-A, coverage for each weld. A clarification examination of reactor vessels will "Pressure Retaining Welds in Reactor has been included in this section to note result in a substantial increase in the Vessel," in Table 2500-1 of subsection that the augmented examination may be overall protection of the public health IWB, "Requirements for Class 1 used as a substitute for the reactor and safety, and that the costs of Components of Light-Water Cooled vessel shell weld examination in the implementation are justified in view of Power Plants." interval in effect when the rule becomes the increased protection. The backfit In order to ensure the applicability of effective when the augmented analysis required by § 50.109, the new augmented examination to all examination is not deferred. This is a "Backfitting," is provided as part of the licensees, § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A](l) revokes reinforcement of § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(3],
regulatory analysis that supports this all previously granted reliefs relating to as it appears in both the proposed and final rule. the extent of volumetric examination of final rule, which specifies that the However, the NRC agrees with the reactor vessel shell welds that apply deferred examination may not be used comments that additional flexibility and to examinations for the inservice as a substitute for the reactor vessel specificity will improve implementation inspection interval that is in effect when shell weld examination scheduled for of the augmented examination of reactor the rule becomes effective subject to a implementation during the inservice vessel examination. To this end, the specified modification. Limiting the inspection interval in effect when the augmented examination of reactor revocation of previously granted reliefs rule becomes effective. vessel shell welds specified in this final to those that deal with the extent of the The NRC recognizes that plants with rule includes the following new volumetric examination permits the fewer than 40 months remaining in the provisions and clarifications: (1) The retention of those approved reliefs that inspection interval when this rule revocation of previously granted reliefs deal with issues such as specification of becomes effective may find it is limited to those reliefs that deal with calibration blocks. Licensees that impractical to implement the augmented the extent of volumetric examination of choose to defer the augmented examination of the reactor vessel during reactor vessel shell welds; (2) the examination to the next interval in that inspection interval. Therefore, augmented examination will be accordance with § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(3] § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(AJ(3) permits plants performed in accordance with the should note that paragraph (iv) of that with fewer than 40 months remaining in section XI edition and addenda section modifies the revocation of the inspection interval when this rule applicable to the inspection interval in approved reliefs to permit retention of becomes effective to defer the which the examination is actually previously approved reliefs for the augmented examination until the first performed; (3) "essentially 100%" as current interval when the augmented period of the next inspection interval. used in § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) means examination in deferred. This provision However, this same paragraph "more than 90 percent of the recognizes that plants that previously specifically prohibits the use of the examination volume of each weld, received relief from the section XI deferred augmented examination as a where the reduction in examination reactor vessel shell weld examination substitute for reactor vessel shell weld volume is due to interference from and satisfy the condition to defer the examinations scheduled for the another component, or part geometry;" augmented examination may find it inspection interval in effect when the (4) licensees that defer the augmented impractical to implement the section XI rule becomes effective. The intent is to examination to the next interval are examination during the current ensure that the examinations are permitted to retain all existing approved inspection interval. deferred only when necessary and not reliefs for the current interval; (5) Section 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(2) requires to have the rule encourage a 40-month licensees with fewer than 40 months all licensees to implement the specified delay in reactor vessel shell weld remaining in the inspection interval in augmented examination of reactor examinations. Further, effect when the rule becomes effective vessels during the inspection interval in § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(3) permits using the are permitted to extend the interval in effect when this rule becomes effective, deferred examination, with a condition, accordance with the provisions of subject to conditions specified in as a substitute for reactor vessel shell section XI (1989 Edition] IW A-2430(d); § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(3) and (4). Section weld examinations scheduled for the (6) licensees that are unable to satisfy 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(2) specifically permits inspection interval in which the deferred completely the requirements for the the use of the augmented examination, examinations are performed. The augmented examination may request to when not deferred, as a substitute for condition is that subsequent reactor perform alternate examinations in the reactor vessel shell weld vessel shell weld examinations for accordance with § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A)(5]. examinations scheduled for the successive inspection intervals be These items are addressed individually inspection interval in effect when the performed in the first period of the in the discussion below regarding rule becomes effective, ancl. specifies inspection interval. This condition is provisions of the augmented reactor that, for the purpose of this rule, necessary to prevent a potential 160-vessel shell weld examination. "essentially 100 percent" as used in month gap between reactor vessel shell Section 50.55a(g)(6)(ii) addresses Table IWB-2500-1 means "more than 90 weld examinations. This gap would augmented inservice inspection percent of the examination volume of occur if a plant used the deferred programs for those systems and each weld, where the reduced examination performed in the first components for which the Commission examination volume is due to period as a substitute for the scheduled determines that added assurance of interference from another component, or examination and then deferred the structural reliability is necessary. For part geometry." This is consistent with examination for the next inspection that purpose, and consisent with the section XI Code Case N--460, which interval to the end of that interval as discussion in this final rule, previously has been approved for use in permitted by section XI. In addition, this
§ 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(AJ has been added to Regulatory Guide 1.147. It is recognized section specifies that licensees with require expedited implementation of the that it may be necessary to implement a fewer than 40 months remaining in the reactor vessel shell weld examinations combination of internal and external inservice inspection interval in effect specified in the 1989 Edition of section diameter examinations to achieve when the rule becomes effective may XI, Division 1, in item Bl.10, "Shell "essentially 100%" examination volume extend that interval in accordance with 50-SC-110
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION the provisions of section XI (1989 examination as specified in inservice testing will be fully justified Edition] IWA-2430(d] to permit § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii](AJ. For this reason, with a documented regulatory analysis implementation of the augmented § 50.55a(g)(6](ii](A)(5) has been added to that includes the appropriate backfit examination during the current interval. permit licensees that make a analysis. The intent of the NRC to It is not the intent of the NRC to permit determination that they are unable to perform the necessary backfit analysis licensees in the second period of an completely satisfy tbe specified is clearly demonstrated by the backfit inspection interval to red t1ce the interval 0
augmented examination to propose and analysis that was performed to require length for the purpose of "being within use alternatives that have been the augmented examination of the 40 months of the end of the interval" authorized by the NRC's Director of the reactor vessel that is specified in and, thereby, deferring the augmented Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) of this final rule. examination to the first p,~riod of the This final rule amends § 50.55a to Second, this final rule includes the subsequent interval. separate the requirements for inservice addition of introductory text to Section 50.55a(g](6](ii)(A)(4) specifies testing from those for inservice § 50.55a(g) which states that the that a licensee that has either completed inspection by moving the requirements requirements for inservice testing of or has scheduled an inspe'Ction of for inservice testing to a separate Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 pumps and essentially 100 percent of the length of paragraph. Previously, § 50.55a(g], valves are located in § 50.55a(f). This all Examination Category B-A shell "lnservice inspection requirements," change is necessary because the welds during the inservice inspection specified the requirements for (1) placement of inservice testing interval in effect when the rule becomes preservice and inservice examinations requirements into a separate § 50.55a(f), effective does not have to implement the for Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 as included in the proposed rule, would required augmented examination of the components and their supports, (2) have caused administrative reactor vessel shell welds. Primarily, system pressure tests for Class 1, Class inconsistencies with regard to existing this paragraph is intended. to permit 2, and Class 3 components, and (3) references to § 50.55a(g] for inservice licensees who are in the first inspection inservice testing of Class 1, Class 2, and testing in documents such as technical interval to use the essentially 100 Class 3 pumps and valves. In order to specifications, safety analysis reports, percent reactor vessel shell weld emphasize the importance of inservice procedures, and records. With this examination required for that interval testing and to distinguish more clearly change, existing references to § 50.55a(g] by section XI to satisfy the requirement its requirements from those of inservice for inservice testing will refer the user to for the augmented examination of the inspection, this final rule moves the § 50.55a(f), where the specific reactor vessel. The technical objective requirement for inservice testing from requirements for inservice testing are of the augmented examination will be § 50.55a(g], "lnservice inspection located. The NRC recommends that as accomplished under these conditions. requirements," to a separate (previously the governing documents are updated, These licensees will continue to apply reserved] § 50.55a(f), which is titled the direct reference to § 50.55a(f) be the current requirements of "lnservice testing requirements." All incorporated, as appropriate.
§ 50.55a(g](4) until the next inspection existing requirements for inservice Two editorial revisions, relative to the interval when future examinations will examination and system pressure previous § 50.55a(g], are included in the be performed based on ASME section testing are retained in § 50.55a(g]. new § 50.55a(f). These editorial XI, 1989 Edition, or later Code edition There is overall favorable acceptance revisions: (1) Reserve § 50.55a(f)(3] (i]
and addenda specified in !i 50.55a(b ]. of the separation of the requirements in and (ii) so that the structure of The augmented examination specified the regulation for inservice testing and § 50.55a(f) will parallel that of in § 50.55a(g)(6J(ii](A) is not an ASME for inservice inspection. It is generally § 50.55a(g) for the purpose of promoting Code requirement. It is a mquirement believed by the commentors, as it is easier cross-referencing between the specifically developed and additionally believed by the NRC, that the separation two paragraphs; and (2) modify the imposed by the Commission. Therefore, serves to clarify and emphasize the reference to 120-month inspection except for the specific provisions in requirements for inservice testing. Two interval in § 50.55a(g] to 120-month
§ 50.55a(g)(6)(ii](A)(2) and (3) that administrative changes were made in interval in § 50.55a(f), because the term permit using the augmented examination the development of § 50.55a(f) relative to "inspection interval," as used in Section as a substitute for section XI required existing § 50.55a(g]. First, XI, is used only in the context of reactor vessel shell weld examinations, § 50.55a(f)(6)(ii) has been added to inservice inspection. (The term "test the closing out of an inservice inspection indicate the Commission's intent to interval" was not used because, unlike interval is not dependent on completion impose an augmented inservice testing inspection interval, the 120-month time of the augmented examination. In the program if added assurance of frame does not designate a period of specific instance where the augmented operational readiness is deemed required actions for the testing program.
examination is deferred to the first necessary. This paragraph only The 120-month interval used in period of the next inspection interval. indicates intent and does not impose a § 50.55a(f) and the 120-month inspection the current inspection interval could be specific requirement. It does parallel the interval used in § 50.55a(g] are closed out relative to reactor vessel existing § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii] which specifies considered by the staff to be coincident shell weld examinations by that the Commission may require an for the purpose of 120-month updating implementing the regularly scheduled augmented inservice inspection program requirements.] reactor vessel shell weld examinations for systems and components for which it A number of comments were received as modified by previously a.pproved deems that added assurance of regarding the scope of § 50.55a as applicable relief requests for that structural reliability is necessary. One applied to pump and valve testing. interval. utility commentor expressed concern These comments ranged from The NRC recognizes that, as noted by that the addition of § 50.55a(f](6)(ii] recommending that the scope of§ 50.55a commentors, there may exiBt conditions would permit the Commission to impose be expanded to be consistent with the that prevent licensees from completely an augmented inservice testing program scopes of OM part 6 and part 10, which satisfying the requirements for the without further justification. This is not go beyond Class 1, Class 2, and Class 3 augmented reactor vessel shell weld the case. Any program for augmented components, to recommending that the 50-SC-111
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION scope of § 50.55a be limited to ASME snubber testing, into § 50.55a(f]. The entity capable of performing the Code classified components. One NRC will as a part of this future required action, "must" is used as the commentor expressed concern that the rulemaking determine the need for and mandatory form when the subject of the Supplementary Information in the acceptability of endorsing the ASME sentence is an inanimate object, and proposed rulemaking addressed Generic OM Code rules for snubber testing. "may not" is used to impose a Letter 89-04 in a way that seemed to However, in accordance with prohibition. The following paragraphs include the letter in the rulemaking. That requirements for examination of are amended solely to be consistent was not intended. To the contrary, the component supports specified in with this convention: The introductory intent of this rulemaking is to maintain § 50.55a(g), licensees are required to paragraph to the section; paragraphs the existing scope of § 50.55a for pump implement the rules for examination of (a](l), (a)(3), (b](2)(iii], (b][2)(iv], [g](1),
and valve testing. For plants whose snubbers that are provided in OM part 4 (g)(3](ii], (g)(3)(iii), (g)(3](iv], construction permits were issued on or as referenced in Subsection IWF Article introductory paragraph to (g)(4), [g)(4)(i), after January 1, 1971, that scope IWF-5000 in the applicable Section XI [g)[4)(ii], (g)(5)(i], (g](5)(iv], (g)(6](i], (h], constitutes Code classified components addenda and edition of this final rule. and footnote 8. Other paragraphs are as specified in existing § 50.55a(g] (2) Section 50.55a[g) provides amended for the same editorial reason, and (3) (i.e., § 50.55a(f] (2) and (3) by this requirements for selecting the ASME but they also contain technical revisions rulemaking). For those plants whose Code edition and addenda of Section XI relevant to other parts of this final rule. construction permits were issued prior to be complied with during the Section 50.55a(f] has been developed to January 1, 1971, that scope constitutes preservice inspection(§ 50.55a(g](3], for consistent with the noted convention. components of the reactor coolant plants whose construction permit was Subsection IWE, "Requirements for pressure boundary which must meet the issued on or after July 1, 1974); the initial Class MC Components of Light-Water-requirements applicable to components 10-year inspection interval Cooled Power Plants," was added to that are classified as ASME Code Class (§ 50.55a(g](4)[i]J; and successive 10- Section XI, Division 1, in the Winter 1, and other safety-related pumps and year inspection intervals 1981 Addenda. Since § 50.55a does not valves which must meet the (§ 50.55a[g)(4)(ii)J. As noted in the final currently address the inservice requirements applicable to components rule codifying the most recent inspection of containments and the that are classified as ASME Code Class amendment to § 50.55a (May 5, 1988; 53 scope of § 50.55a is not affected by this 2 or Class 3, as specified in e~isting FR 16051), paragraph IWA-2400 of final rule, the requirements of § 50.55a[g)(1) (i.e., § 50.55a(f][1) by this Section XI (as revised by the Winter Subsection IWE are not imposed upon rulemaking]. The reference to the 1983 Addenda] incorporated rules for Commission licensees by this generic letter has not been included in selecting the applicable edition and amendment. The incorporation by the final rule. addenda of Section XI during the reference of Subsection IWE into A number of comments were received preservice inspection (IWA-2411), the § 50.55a is presently the subject of a with regard to snubber testing which is initial 10-year inspection interval (IWA- separate rulemaking action. Section outside the scope of this rulemaking. 2412), and successive 10-year inspection 50.55a(b](2)(vi) is reserved for that Commentors generally suggested that intervals [IWA-2413). The criteria action. ASME OM part 4, "Examination and provided in the regulations and Section The NRC previously alerted all Performance Testing of Nuclear Power. XI are effectively the same for the holders of operating licenses or Plant Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers]," preservice inspection and the successive construction permits for nuclear power which is referenced in Subsection IWF 10-year inspection intervals, but differ reactors, through NRC Information in the 1987 Addenda, 1988 Addenda and for the initial 10-year inspection interval. Notice No. 88--95 (IN 88-95), "Inadequate 1989 Edition of Section XI, be In general, use of the Commission Procurement Requirements Imposed by incorporated by reference into § 50.55a. requirements will result in the selection Licensees on Vendors," to the potential Subsection IWF, "Component Supports," of a more recent edition and addenda that inadequate licensee procurement provides rules for the examination of than will use of the Section XI rules. requirements or implementation by component supports, and the testing of Satisfying the requirements of vendors in supplying components under snubbers. Prior to the 1987 Addenda, § 50.55a(g)(4J[i] for the initial 10-year the ASME Code could result in failure Subsection IWF provided self-contained inspection interval will, in general, also by these vendors to fully implement 10 rules for the testing of snubbers. Section satisfy the rules of Section XI. Although CFR part 50, Appendix B (Quality 50.55a does not specify requirements for the Section XI requirements for selecting Assurance Criteria]. The problem, which the testing of snubbers. This was editions and addenda remain unchanged was revealed during routine NRC clarified by the separation of in the 1986 Addenda, 1987 Addenda, inspections of vendors, resulted from the requirements for inservice testing and 1988 Addenda, and 1989 Edition, the belief by some vendors that if an item inservice inspection. lnservice testing Commission is reaffirming its intent that was exempted by the ASME Code from requirements specified in § 50.55a(f] in all cases the existing requirements in Code requirements, the item was exempt apply only to pumps and valves. The § 50.55a[g] be the basis for selecting the from all other regulatory requirements. testing requirements specified in OM edition and addenda of Section XI to be The apparent belief of some vendors part 4 and referenced in Section XI complied with during the preservice was that since NRC endorses the ASME Subsection IWF article IWF-5000 are inspection, the initial 10-year inspection Code in its regulations and has accepted not incorporated by reference into interval, and the successive 10-year the various exemptions, there are,
§ 50.55a. Requirements for the testing of inspection intervals. therefore, no other applicable regulatory snubbers are generally governed by This final rule makes a number of requirements. This belief is not plant technical specifications. NRC is in editorial changes to § 50.55a for the consistent with the NRC position. The the process of initiating a proposed purpose of adopting a standard NRC reaffirms its position which, as rulemaking that would, among other convention for imposing an obligation or previously put forth in IN 88-95, states things, address the incorporation by expressing a prohibition. In this that all safety-related items, even those reference of the ASME OM Code, which convention "shall" is used to impose an exempted from ASME Code contains rules for pump, valve, and obligation on an individual or legal requirements, are required to be 50-SC-112
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION manufactured under a quality assurance Regulatory Commission, Washington, Backfit Analysis program that meets the requirements of DC 20555, Telephone: (301) 492-3848.
10 CFR part 50, appendix B. The final rule incorporates by Paperwork Reduction Act Statement reference a later edition and addenda to Finding of No Significant Environmental This final rule amends information Section III, Division 1, and, with both a Impact: Availability collection requirements that are subject technical and nontechnical modification, The Commission has determined to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 Section XI, Division 1, of the ASME under the National Environmental Policy (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These Code; imposes an augmented __ Act of 1969, as amended, and the requirements were approved by the examination on reactor vessels; and. Commission's regulations in subpart A Office of Management and Budget separates the requirements for inservice of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not a approval number 3150--0011. inspection from those for inservice major Federal action that significantly The public reporting burden for this testing. affects the quality of the human collection of information is estimated to The incorporation by reference into environment and therefore an average 42 hours per response, including the regulations of later editions and environmental impact statement is not the time for reviewing instructions, addenda of Section III and Section XI of required. searching existing data sources, the ASME Code is not a backfit because This final rule is one part of a gathering and maintaining the data Section III requirements apply only to regulatory framework dirncted to needed, and completing and reviewing new construction, except as voluntarily ensuring pressure vessel i:11tegrity, and the collection of information. Send implemented* by licensees, and because the operational readiness of pumps and comments regarding this burden updated Section XI requirements are an valves. Therefore, in the general sense, estimate or any other aspect of this integral part of the longstanding this rule will have a positive impact on collection of information, including § 50.55a(g)(4)(ii) requirement to update the environment. This rule incorporates suggestions for reducing this burden, to inservice inspection and inservice by reference into the NRC regulations the Information and Records testing programs to reflect the improved rules contained in the ASME Management Branch (MNBB-7714), U.S. requirements of the latest edition and Code for the construction, inservice Nuclear Regulatory Commission, addenda of Section XI incorporated by inspection, and inservice testing of Washington, DC 20555, and to the Desk reference in § 50.55a(b) 12 months prior components used in nuclear power Officer, Office of Information and to the start of the 120-month inspection plants. In addition, this rule requires an Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019, (3150- interval, subject to specified limitations augmented examination of reactor 0011), Office of Management and and modifications. The technical vessel shell welds to further ensure the Budget, Washington, DC 20503. modification to part 10 of ASME/ ANSI structural integrity of the r,eactor vessel. OMa-1988 Addenda to ASME/ ANSI The occupational exposureis attributable Regulatory Analysis OM-1987 specified in§ 50.55a(b)(2)(vii) to the expanded reactor vessel The Commission has prepared a is not a backfit because it simply retains examinations contained in the ASME regulatory analysis for this amendment an existing Section XI requirement for Code and the augmented examination to the regulations. The analysis containment isolation valve testing that are not expected to be significant examines the costs and benefits of the licensees now are required to implement because exposures will be limited by the alternatives considered by the in accordance with § 50.55a(g). The use of remote examination equipment. Commission. Interested persons may nontechnical modification specified in Occupational exposures associated with examine a copy of the regulatory § 50.55a(b)(2)(viii) is not a backfit the augmented reactor ves!1el analysis at the NRC Public Document because it only serves to properly examination will be further limited by Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), identify an incorrectly referenced provisions in the final rule that permit, Washington, DC. Single copies of the standard in Section XI. under certain conditions, the licensee to analysis may be obtained from Mr. G.C. satisfy the requirement for the The NRC has concluded, based on the Millman, Division of Engineering, Office augmented examination by previously analysis required by § 50.109(a)(3) of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. scheduled or implemented reactor which is provided in the regulatory Nuclear Regulatory Commission, vessel examinations, or by deferring the Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301) analysis, that the backfit that will be examination to the next int,~rval and imposed by the augmented reactor 492-3848. using the deferred examination as a vessel examination specified in replacement for the previously Regulatory Flexibility Certification § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A) will result in a scheduled examination for that interval. In accordance with the Regulatory substantial increase in the overall The actions required by applicants and Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), protection of the public health and licensees to implement the final rule are the Commission hereby certifies that safety, and that the direct and indirect of an established nature tha.t should not this rule will not have a significant costs of implementation are justified in increase the potential for a negative economic impact on a substantial view of the increased protection. environmental impact. number of small entities. This rule The separation in the regulation of the The environmental asses!1ment and affects only the licensing and operation inservice inspection and inservice finding of no significant impact on of nuclear power plants. The companies testing requirements is an which this determination is based are that own these plants do not fall within administrative reorganization of § 50.55a available for inspection at the NRC the scope of the definition of "small that has no impact on existing technical Public Document Room, 2120 L Street entities" set forth in the Regulatory requirements and, therefore, has no NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Flexibility Act or the Small Business effect on backfitting. Single copies of the environmental Size Standards set out in regulations List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 assessment and the finding of no issued by the Small Business significant impact are available from Administration at 13 CFR part 121. Since Antitrust, Classified information, Gilbert C. Millman, Division of these companies are dominant in their Criminal penalties, Fire protection, Engineering, Office of Nucle.ar service areas, this rule does not fall Incorporation by reference, Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear within the purview of the Act. Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear 50-SC-113
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION power plants and reactors, Radiation and clarification and update of protection, Reactor siting criteria, regulations affecting certain material Reporting and recordkeeping licensees.
requirements. EFFECTIVE DATE: October 1, 1992. For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Mr. C.W. Nilsen, telephone (301) 492...: the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 3834 or Mr. Joseph J. Mate, telephone as amended, and 5 U.S.C .. 552 and 553, (301) 492-3795, Office of Nuclear the NRC is adopting the following Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear amendments to 10 CFR part 50. Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On January 28, 1992, the President of the United States signed e memorandum addressed to selected Federal Agency Heads who are concerned with energy production end protection of the environment. The memorandum requested the addressees work together to streamline the regulatory process end ensure that the regulatory community is not subject to duplicative or inconsistent regulatic;>n. On the same day, the President signed 57 FR 39353 a second memorandum entitled Published 8/31/92 "Reducing the Burden of Government Effective 10/1 /92 Regulation." This memorandum, which was sent to all Federal agencies, set aside a 90-dey period to review end 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50 evaluate existing regulations end RIN 3150-AE30 programs and to identify and accelerate action on initiatives that will eliminate Reducing the Regulatory Burden on any unnecessary regulatory burden. At Nuclear Licensees the end of the review period, agencies were to submit e written report AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory indicating the regulatory changes Commission. recommended or made during the ACTION: Final rule. review period end the potential savings
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory es e result of the changes.
- Commission (NRC) is amending its In response to the Presidential regulations to reduce the regulatory memoranda, the Commission-decided burden on nuclear licensees. This action that it would be consistent with its reflects an initiative undertaken by the policy to monitor the impact of Commission in response to a complying with NRC regulations by its Presidential memorandum requesting licensees to instruct its Committee to that selected Federal*agencies review Review Generic Requirements (CRGR)
- and modify regulations that would to review existing NRC regulations to eliminate any unnecessary burden of determine whether regulatory burdens governmental regulation and ensure that can be reduced without in any way the regulated community is not subject reducing the protection for the public to duplicative or inconsistent regulation. health and safety and the common In that spirit, the NRC's Committee to defense end security. In accomplishing Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) their review, the CRGR drew upon identified eight areas where regulations previous studies end solicited comments could be revised to reduce the from the public, other Federal agencies, regulatory burden on licensees without end the Commission's staff. A Federal in any way reducing the protection for Register Notice was published on the public health and safety or the February 24, 1992 (57 FR 6299) seeking common defense and security. The final public comment in connection with the amendments address unnecessary* review, end e second Federal Register regulatory requirements related to the Notice on March 23, 1992 (57 FR 9985) frequency of reporting information, discussed likely or possible candidates analysis of emergency core cooling for action, based on CRGR's preliminary systems for operating power reactors, evaluation of comments. An as8ocleted 50-SC-114
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION public meeting was held on March 27, subject contamination monitoring 5. Comment. One commenter 1992, in Bethesda, Maryland. requirements of the new part 20 questioned whether the monitoring After completing their s;pecial review, essentially the same as those contained requirements were applicable for the CRGR recommended 1:evising the in the existing part 20 (§ 20.205(b)(1)(iii) packages that show evidence of damage.
regulations in eight areas. The proposed and (c)(l)). Response. The wording of 10 CFR revisions met the criteria for reducing 2. Comment. One commenter opposed 20.1906(b)(3) has been revised to the burden without in any way reducing the rule on the basis that sealed sources indicate more clearly that packages with the protection for public health and routinely leak and, therefore, should not evidence of damage are to be monitored safety and common defense and be excluded from monitoring. for both radioactive contamination and security. The commenter cited an example for radiation levels. The Chairman of the NRC sent a where a driver and a truck were 6. Comment. Several commenters report to the President of the United contaminated because of a failure to requested that the proposed wording to States on April 27, _1992, which conduct a proper radiation sweep. 10 CFR 50.71(e)(4) concerning FSAR summarized NRC's activities concerning Response. The final rule does not updates be revised to decouple the the President's directive and advised the exempt licensees from monitoring or FSAR updates from the refueling cycle President that NRC would pursue the surveying any packages with evidence and that the 24-month requirement for CRGR's recommendations expeditiously of degradation of package integrity, updates is an unnecessary restriction. within the framework of the procedures including evidence of potential Response. The proposed changes and practices for rulemaking. contamination. Likewise, this revision were not accepted. The majority of On June 1, 1992, in respCtnse to a does not relax the preshipment facility design changes reflected in an memorandum from the President of the requirements for monitoring of packages updated FSAR are effected during the United States, dated April 29, 1992, the contained in 10 CFR part 71. The NRC refueling outage. The use of the refueling Commission directed the staff to strive does not have any evidence that cycle interval provides for a current to publish the proposed rule changes in supports the commenter's assertion that plant status document that is the eight areas identified by the CRGR sealed sources routinely leak and, thus, coordinated with plant changes. The in the Federal Register for comment as the NRC believes that the requirements wording of§ 50.71(e)(4) is not restrictive soon as possible, but not later than June in place are sufficient to detect potential to plants that will eventually increase 15, 1992, with a view to issuing the final abnormal situations. No amount of their refueling cycle to 24 months. rules in the Federal Registur no later regulation can, a priori, preclude all 7. Comment. Three electric utilities than August 27, 1992. On June 16, 1992 incidents involving leaking sources. requested that the proposed wording in (57 FR 27167), the NRC published the proposed rulemaking in thn Federal However, these incidents can be dealt 10 CFR 50.36(a)(2) concerning Register- for comment. The comment with through followup inspection and radiological effluent reporting be revised period expired on July 20, 1992. enforcement under the present to specify a particular date. One regulatory scheme. commenter suggested: "The report must Summary and Analysis of li>ublic 3. Comment. Several commenters be submitted as specified in § 50.4 prior Comments addressed in general terms the need for to March 31 of each year." Thirty comment letters were received the NRC to continue its efforts to reduce Response. The wording of 10 CFR on the proposed rule and a,:e available any unnecessary regulatory burden on 50.36(a)(2) gives the licensee maximum for public inspection, and copying for a licensees through amendments to 10 flexibility for scheduling submission_ of fee, at the Commission's Pu1blic CFR chapter I. radiological effluent reports with the Document Room located at 2120 L street, Response. The NRC will continue its only restriction being that the interval NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. efforts to identify additional between reports must not exceed 12 The comments on the proposed rule amendments that will provide for a months. The reporting requirements came from a variety of sources. These reduction in regulatory burden while remain as proposed. included private citizens, publicly-held still assuring adequate protection of the 8. Comment. Two commenters corporations, citizens' groups, the armed public health and safety. suggested that the amendments indicate forces, industry representatives, electric 4. Comment. One commenter that the changes in reporting power companies or their questioned the basis for exempting from requirements of the new regulations representatives, and legal firms. Eleven external monitoring for radiation levels take precedence over the existing significant points were rais11d by the only nuclear material that was either in license technical specifications or commenters. Of the 30 comment letters the form of a gas or in a special form license conditions where there may be a received, 26 letters were favorable and 2 since the external radiation levels are conflict. letters were partially opposed to the dependent upon radionuclides, quantity, Response. The proposed amendments regulation changes. The comments end shielding, and distance between are generic and licensees may request their resolutions are discuss,ed below. radioactive material and the point of administrative amendments to any
- 1. Comment. One commenter interest rather than material form. conflicting license condition or technical suggested that the Commission not only Response. The NRC agrees with the specification as needed.
amend§ 20.190B(b) concem:ing commenter that the requirement to 9. Comment. Two commenters contamination monitoring, but also issue survey, upon receipt, the radiation levels suggested that NRC reconsider the need a statement that those licemiees still on the package exterior should be based for licensees to submit 10 CFR 50.36a(2) operating under the old part 20 not be on the potential radiation hazard. effluent release reports and 10 CFR 50.59 required to monitor packages for Therefore. the requirement specified in reports concerning annual design contamination that meet the conditions 10 CFR 20.1906[b)(2) that monitoring of changes. The commenters noted the of§ 20.1906(b). radiation levels be.performed on labeled requirement for these reports was issued Response. The NRC does not believe packages is being revised to delete the before the Final Safety Analysis Reports that the suggested change by the exemption that the radioactive material were required to be updated periodically commenter is necessary bec,ause the be in the form of a gas or in special form and before resident inspectors were amendment of§ 20.1906(b) will make the as defined in 10 CFR 71.4. assigned to all reactor sites. The 50-SC-115
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION commenters also observed that these maximum of 6 months prior to the date 2. Contamination Monitoring of reports are now available on site for of filing." . Packages {10 CFR 20.1906{b))
review by inspectors at any time and During the comment period on this This action clarifies the regulations that most design changes are reflected proposed rule, Yankee Atomic Electric and reduces the monitoring burden for In the FSARs. Further, the commenters Co. stated that the period between packages containing radioactive did not believe that these reports are successive FSAR upaates should not be routinely reviewed by the NRC staff. material in the form of a gas or in a limited to 24 months as proposed. Their. special form as defined in 10 CFR 71.4. The commenters believed that if the rationale was that the restriction of 24 requirements to submit such a report The estimated savings to licensees is months was unnecessary. $10.1 million. were eliminated, there would be no Response. Upon receipt of the Yankee impact on safety, the required Atomic Electric Co. comment letter of 3. Frequency of Radiological Effluent evaluations could continue to be Reports (10 CFR 50.36a} performed, and the reports would July 20, 1992, the NRC again reviewed continue to be available for review. The the petition (PRM 50-55) submitted by This action reduces the requirements commenters believed that the deletion Yankee Atomic Electric Co. and the for the submission of reports concerning of these requirements would contribute comments submitted in response to the the quantity of principal nuclides to significant increased savings by Notice of Receipt. Based on this review, released to unrestricted areas in liquid licensees. the NRC believes that the current action and gaseous effluents from Response. The consequence of being taken to reduce the burden on semiannually to annually. eliminating the requirements for these nuclear licensees is substantially similar The estimated savings for this action, reports requires significant additional to the relief requested in the petition. assuming an average remaining plant assessment. Thus, the proposed The 24-month interval for successive life of 26 years, is $16,600,000 for revisions have not been modified in FSAR updates is addressed in comment licensees and $360,000 for the NRC. order not to delay the benefit of burden number 6 above. It should be noted that 4. Use of Fuel with Zirconium-Based reduction. Although this proposal will the petition did not contain. a specific (Other than Zircaloy} Cladding (10 CFR not be addressed in the current reference to a number of months 50.44, 50.46, and Appendix K to Part 50} rulemaking, these suggested revisions regarding successive FSAR updates. will be evaluated as part of an ongoing With respect to the petitioner's concern This action revises the acceptance NRC effort. about multiple facilities sharing a criteria In 10 CFR 50.44 and 50.46,
- 10. Comment. One commenter common FSAR, licensees will have relating to evah,iations of emergency questioned whether the changes in maximum flexibility for scheduling core cooling systems and combustible reporting frequency of facility changes updates on a case-by-case basis. This gas control applicable to zircaloy clad under 10 CFR 50.59, FSAR updates, and final rule does not address multiple fuel to include ZIRLO clad fuel. This radiological effluent reports would facilities. revision to include ZIRW as an impair the ability of the NRC to review This final rule is considered by the acceptable zirconium based cladding the information in a timely manner. NRC to grant the petition submitted by material along with zircaloy will reduce Response. The resident inspector the Yankee Atomic Electric Co. This the licensee burden but will not reduce program along with regional regulatory final rule constitutes final NRC action the*protection of the public health or programs provide timely and in some on the petition. safety. The NRC will address, through cases day-by-day review of facility an appropriate separate rulemaking, the operations. The changes being made will Discussion use of other similar zirconium based not impair NRC's ability to review the cladding materials when all of the The Nuclear Regulatory Commission . necessary safety evaluations for those information. is amending 10 CFR parts 20 and 50 to
- 11. Comment. One commenter materials have been completed.
(Yankee Atomic Electric Co.) stated that implement the eight proposed actions The estimated savings for eliminating the FSAR update changes discussed in identified below end also identified in the need to process recurring Action Item 1 in the proposed rule and the report on "Special Review of exemptions to the regulations to In Action Item 7 of this document Existing NRC Regulatio.ns" that was licensees is $2 million end the savings lo emanated from a petition for rulemaking completed by the CRGR and that was the NRC is $50,000. This estimate is that they submitted to the NRC on attached to Chairman Selin'e letter to based on six plants per year requesting February 9, 1990 (PRM 50-55). The the White House dated April 27, 1992. the use of ZIRLO clad fuel over the next notice of receipt for this petition was These actions will not reduce the 8 years. published in the *Federal Register on protection of the public health and May 3, 1990 (55 FR 18608). The petitioner safety or the common defense and 5. Receipt Back of Processed Low Level originally requested that nuclear power security. Each of the eight actions is Waste (10 CFR 50.54) plant licensees be allowed to file FSAR discussed below. This action is addressed in*a separate reports at periods greater than annually. 1. Posting of Rooms Occupied by rulen;iaking. For additional information, They suggested that § 50.71(e)(4) be Diagnostic Nuclear Medicine Patients see the proposed rule entitled "Receipt revised to read as follows: "Subsequent (10 CFR 20.190.1/h,1) of Byproduct and Special Nuclear revisions shall be filed no later than 6 Material" published in the Federal months after completion of each The revision reduces the posting Register on April 24, 1992 (57 FR 15034). planned refueling outage for a licensee's requirements for rooms in hospitals facility. If two or more facilities share a occupied by patients administered 6. Annual Design Change Reports {10 common FSAR, the licensees shall radioactive materials who might CFR50.59} designate the refueling outage schedule otherwise be released from confinement This action revises the requirements on one of the multiple facilities to under the provisions of 10 CFR 35.75. for the annual submission of reports for establish the schedule for revisions of The estimated savings to licensees is facility changes under§ 50.59 (Changes, the common FSAR. The FSAR revisions $300,000 for elimination of the need for tests, and experiments) to confm:m with shall reflect all changes up to a posting. the proposed change for updating the 50-SC-116
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION FSAR (see Item 7). This action does not response for operating power reactors 6. Annual Design Change Reports-to affect the substance of the evaluation or and 1 hour per response for certain change the frequency of reporting the documentation requimd for§ 50.59 materials licensees, including the time changes at power reactors from once per type changes. It only affec:ts the interval for reviewing instructions, searching year to once per refueling cycle (10 CFR for submission of the info:rmation to the existing data sources, gathering and 50.59(b)).
NRC. Instead of submitting the maintaining the data needed, and 7. Frequency of Final Safety Analysis information annually, the information completing and reviewing the collection Report Updates-to change the can be submitted on a refueling cycle of information. Send comments frequency of safety analysis report basis, provided the interval between regarding this burden reduction or any updatesJrom once per year to once per successive reports does not exceed 24 other aspect of this decrease in the refueling cycle (10 CFR 50.71 ). months. collection of information including 8. Elimination of unnecessary event The estimated savings for this action, suggestions on this reduced burden to reports-separate rulemaking (10 CFR assuming an average remaining plant the Information and Records 50.72 and 50.73). life of 26 years, is $1,500,0l)O for Management Branch (MNBB-7714), U.S. Each of these actions considers the licensees and $400,000 for the NRC. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, elimination or relaxation of regulatory Washington, DC 20555; and to the Desk requirements currently imposed on NRC 7, Frequency of Final Safety Analysis Officer, Office of Information and Report (FSAR) Updates (W CF_R 50.71} licensees. Action Items 1 and 2 would Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019 (3150- affect material licensees while Action This action provides licensees with an 0011, 3150-0014), Office of Management Items 3 through 8 would affect power option from the current requirements for and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. reactor licensees. For each regulatory the annual updating of the Final Safety Regulatory Analysis action, the NRC has evaluated the Analysis Report (FSAR). In lieu of an health and safety implications and the annual submission, licensues may The NRC is amending its regulations to reduce the regulatory burden on cost impacts relative to a status quo choose to provide the required alternative. The NRC finds that each information once per each refueling nuclear licensees. This action reflects an initiative on the part of the NRC and would result in a reduction in burden outage. Updates to the FSAR can*be without reducing protection of the public submitted 6 months after each refueling responds to the spirit of President Bush's memoranda of January 28, 1992, which health and safety. The public health and outage, provided the inter\l'al between safety determination appears in a successive updates to the FSAR does requested that selected Federal agencies review and modify regulations that will document entitled "Report on Special not exceed 24 months. Thi11 action does Review of Existing NRC Regulations by not affect the substance of FSAR reduce unnecessary burden of governmental regulation and ensure that the Committee to Review Generic updates. Requirements" issued on April 13, 1992. The estimated savings for this action. the regulated community is not subject to duplicative or inconsistent regulation. Additionally, an analysis of the safety assuming an average remaining plant implications of Action Item 4 is life of 26 years. is $11,100,000 for The NRC has identified eight rulemaking actions that would eliminate duplicative available in a U.S. NRC letter to licensees and $910,000 for the NRC. Westinghouse Corporation dated July 1. or inconsistent regulatory requirements.
- 8. Elimination of Unnecess,Ji"y Event Six of the actions arc included in this 1991, entitled "Acceptance For Reports (10 CFR 50.72 and 60.73} package. Two of the eight actions are Referencing of Topical Report WCAP-This action is addressed in a separate being processed as separate 12610 "Vantage+Fuel Assembly rulemaking. For additional information, rulemakings and are not discussed here. Reference Core Report" (TAC NO.
see the proposed rule entitled "Minor The eight actions are as follows: 77258)." Modifications to Nuclear Power Reactor 1. Posting of Rooms Occupied by The cost savings to both the licensee Event Reporting Requirements" Diagnostic Nuclear Medicine Patients- population and the NRC appear below. published in the Federal Register on to include exceptions for posting Dollar impacts are expressed on a 1992 June 26, 1992 (57 FR 28642). requirements for rooms in hospitals for present worth basis in 1992 dollars. The patients administered basis for these cost estimates is Environmental Impact: Cattigorical radiopharmaceuticals for diagnostic available in a report entitled "Analyses Exclusion tests (10 CFR 20.1903(b)l. of Potential Cost Savings for Selected The NRC determined that the final 2. Contamination Monitoring of NRC Reforms" dated June 10, 1992. regulation is the type of action described Packages-to eliminate certain in categorical exclusions 10 CFR 51.22(c) provisions for contamination monitoring TOTAL DISCOUNTED I COST SAVINGS AS* (2) and (3). Therefore, neither an of packages containing certain types of SOCIATED WITH PROPOSED REGULA-environmental impact statement nor an radioactive material (10 CFR 20.1906(b)). TORY REVISIONS environmental assessment has been 3. Frequency of Radiological Effluent prepared for this final regulation.
- Reports-to change the frequency of [In millions of 1992 dollars]
reports on power reactor radiological Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Regulatory revision Licensees NRC effluents from twice per year to once per This final rule amends ink,rmation year (10 CFR 50.36a). 2 -0.100 Item 1................................... 0.3 collection requirements that are subject 4. Use of Fuel with Zirconium-Based llem 2................................... 10.1 2 -0.100 to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 Cladding-to eliminate the need to Item 3 ................................... 16.8 0.360 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These obtain exemptions in order to use Item 4 ................................... 2.0 0.050 requirements were approved by the certain fuel cladding material not Item 5 ................................... 0 N/ A
- NIA llem 6................................... 1.5 0.400 Office of Management and Budget presently addressed in the regulations llem 7................................... 11.1 0.910 approval numbers. 3150-QOH and 3150- (10 CFR 50.44, 10 CFR 50.46 and 10 CFR llem B ...................................
- NI A *NIA.
0011. part 50, appendix K). The reduction of the publi,c reporting 5. Receipt Back of Processed Low
- Assumes en annual real discount rate of 5%
' Negative cost savings represent a cost expendi-burden for this collection of .information Level Waste-separate rulemaking (10 ture.
is estimated to average 208 hours per CFR 50.54).
- Not applicable-separate rulemeking.
50-SC-117
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION The NRC concludes that each of these Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as proposed regulatory revisions is justified amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the .
due to the net cost savings that will NRC is adopting the following 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73-Clarification of accrue without reducing public health amendments to 10 CFR parts 20 and 50. NRC Systems and Guidelines For and safety. Reporting." Following resolution of Regulatory Flexibility Certification 57 FR41378 public comments, the NUREG will be Published 9/10/92 issued in the final form. The NUREG As required by the Regulatory Effective 10/13/92 will contain improved guidance for Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b). the event reporting. Commission certifies that, this rule will not have a significant adverse economic 10 CFR Part 50 NRC's reviews of operating impact on a substantial number of small experience and the patterns of licensees' RIN 3150-AE12 entities. The NRC has adopted size reporting of operating events since 1984 standards that classify a small entity as Minor Modifications to Nuclear Power have indicated that reports on some of a small business or organization, one Reactor Event Reporting these events are not necessary for the whose gross annual receipts do not Requirements NRC to perform its safety mission and exceed $3.5 million, or as a small that continued reporting of these events AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory would not contribute useful information governmental jurisdiction whose Commission. supporting population is 50,000 or less. to the operating reactor events ACTION: Final rule. database. Additionally, these The first two issues involve the relaxation of requirements which will unnecessary reports would have
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory continued to consume both the affect approximately 5,000 material Commission (NRC) has amended its licensees. Although many of these licensees' and the NRC's resources that regulations to make minor modifications could be better applied elsewhere. The licensees may be small entities, there to the current nuclear power reactor should be no adverse impact on these NRC has determined that certain types event reporting requirements. The final of events, primarily those involving small licensees because the regulations rule applies to all nuclear power reactor are being relaxed. The remaining six invalid engineered safety feature (ESF) licensees and deletes reporting actuations, are of little or no safety issues affect 112 power reactor requirements for some events that have licensees. The companies that own these significance.
been determined to be of little or no plants do not fall within the scope of the safety significance. The final rule Valid ESF actuations are those definition of "small entities" set forth in reduces the industry's reporting burden actuations that result from "valid the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the and the NRC's response burden in event signals" or from intentional manual NRC Size Standards. review and assessment. initiation, unless it is part of a preplanned test. Valid signals are those Backfit Analysis EFFECTIVE DATE: October 13, 1992. signals that are initiated in response to FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: actual plant conditions or parameters The NRC has determined that the Raji Tripathi, Office for Analysis and backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not satisfying the requirements for ESF_ Evaluation of Operational Data, U.S. initiation. apply to this final rule and, therefore, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that a backfit anaiysis is not required Invalid actuations are by definition Washington, DC 20555. Telephone (301) those that do not meet the criteria for because these amendments do not 492-4435. involve any provisions that would being valid. Thus, invalid actuations SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: include actuations that are not the result impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)[1). Background of valid signals and are not intentional manual actuations. Invalid actuations List of Subjects The Commission is issuing a final rule include instances where instrument that amends the nuclear power reactor drift, spurious signals, human error, or 10 CFR Part 20 event reporting requirements contained other invalid signals caused actuation of Byproduct material, Criminal penalty, in 10 CFR 50.72, "Immediate Notification the ESF (e.g., jarring a cabinet, an error Licensed material. Nuclear materials, Requirements for Operating Nuclear in use of jumpers of lifted leads, an error Nuclear power plants and reactors, Power Reactors," and 10 CFR 50.73, in actuation of switches or controls, Occupational safety and health, "Licensee Event Report System." The equipment failure, or radio frequency Packaging and containers, Radiation final rule is issued as part of the interference). protection, Reporting and rccordkeeping Commission's ongoing activities to NRC's evaluation of both the reported requirements, Source material, Special improve its regulations. Specifically, this events since January 1984, when the nuclear material, Waste treatment and final rule amends 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii) existing rules first became effective, and disposal. and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv). On June 26, the comments received during the Event 1992 (57 FR 28642), the Commission Reporting Workshops conducted in Fall 10 CFR Part 50 issued a proposed rule requesting public of 1990 identified needed improvements Antitrust, Classified information, comments on these amendments. in the rules. The NRC determined that Criminal penalty, Fire protection, Over the past several years, the NRC invalid actuation, isolation, or _Incorporation by reference, has increased its attention to event realignment of a limited set of ESFs Intergovernmental rel a lions, Nuclear reporting issues to ensure uniformity, including the systems, subsystems, or power plants and reactors, Radiation consistency, and completeness in components [i.e., an invalid actuation, protection, Reactor siting criteria, reporting. In September 1991, th~ NRC's isolation, or realignment of only the Reporting and recordkeeping Office for Analysis and Evaluation of reactor water clean-up [RWCU) system, requirements. Operational Data (AEOD) issued for For reasons set out in the preamble comment a draft NUREG-1022, Revision 1, 1 "Event Reporting Systems 10 CFR Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC and under the authority of the Atomic 20555. A copy is also available for inspection or Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document
- Free single copy may be requested by writing to Room, 2120 L Street, NW., (Lower Level),
the Distribution and Mail Services Section, U.S. Washington, DC 20555. 50-SC-118
~--r
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION the control room emergency ventilation ventilation system, auxiliary building This rule excludes three categories of (CREV) system, the reactor building ventilation system, or their equivalent events from reporting:
ventilation system, the fuel building ventilation systems). The actuation of (1) The first category excludes events ventilation system, or thE: auxiliary the standby gas treatment system in which ah invalid ESF or RPS building ventilation system, or their following an invalid actuation of the actuation occurs when the system is equivalent ventilation sy:,tems] are of reactor building v~tilation system is already properly removed from service little or no safety signific.mce. However, also exempted from reporting. In if all requirements of plant procedures these events are currently reportable
- addition, the final rule excludes invalid for removing equipment from service under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)[ii) and 10 CFR actuations of these ESFs (or their have been met. This includes required 50.73 (a](2](iv). equivalent systems) from signals that clearance documentation, equipment The final rules for the current event originated from non-ESF circuitry. and control board tagging, and properly reporting regulations, 10 CFR 50.72 and positioned valves and power supply 10 CFR 50.73 (48 FR 3903E1; August 29, However, invalid actuations of other ESFs would continue to be reportable. breakers.
1983, and 48 FR 33850; July 26, 1983, (2) The second category excludes respectively), stated that ESF systems, For example, emergency core cooling system isolations/ actuations; events in which an invalid ESF or RPS including the reactor protection system actuation occurs after the safety (RPS), are provided to mitigate the containment isolation valve closures that affect cooling systems, main steam function has already been completed consequences of a significant event. (e.g., an invalid containment isolation Therefore, ESFs should (1) work flow, essential support systems, etc.; containment spray actuation; and signal while the containment isolation properly when called upon and (2) valves are already closed, or an invalid should not be challenged frequently or residual heat removal system isolations (or systems designated by any other actuation of the RPS when all rods are unnecessarily. The Statements of full inserted). Consideration for these final rules also names but designed to fulfill the function similar to these systems and (3) The third category excludes events stated that operation of an ESF as part in which an invalid ESF actuation of a pre-planned operational procedure their equivalents), are still reportable. If an invalid ESF actuation reveals a occurs that involes only a limited set of or test need not be reported. The ESFs [i.e., when an invalid actuation, Commission noted that EBF actuations, defect in the system so that the system failed or would fail to perform its isolation, or realignment of only the including reactor trips, are frequently RWCU system, or any of the following associated with significant plant intended function, the event continues to be reportable under other requirements ventilation systems: CREV system, transients and are indicative of events, reactor building ventilation system, fuel that are of safety significance. At that of 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. If a condition or deficiency has (1) an building ventilation system, auxiliary time, the Commission alsc, required all adverse impact on safety-related building ventilation system, or their ESF actuations, including the RPS equivalent ventilation systems, occurs]. actuations, whether manual or equipment and consequently on the automatic, valid or invalid-except as ability to shut down the reactor and Invalid actuations that involve other noted, to be reported to the NRC by maintain it in a safe shutdown ESFs not specifically excluded, (e.g., telephone within 4 hours c,f occurrence condition, (2) has a potential for emergency core cooling system followed by a written Licensee Event isolations or actuations; containment significant radiological release or Report (LER) within 30 days of the isolation valve closures that affect potential exposure to plant personnel or incident. This requirement on timeliness cooling systems, main steam flow, the general public, or (3) would of reporting remains unchanged. essential support systems, etc.; compromise control room habitability, containment spray actuation; residual The reported information is used by the event/ discovery continues to be the NRC in confirmation of the licensing heat removal system isolations, or their reportable. equivalent systems), continue to be bases, identification of precursors to Invalid ESF actuations that are severe core damage, identi:fication of reportable. excluded by this final rule, but occur as Licensees continue to be required to plant specific deficiencies, generic a part of a reportable event, continue to lessons, review of management control submit LERs if a deficiency or condition be described as part of the reportable associated with any of the invalid ESF systems, and licensee performance event. These amendments are not assessment. actuations of the RWCU or the CREV intended to preclude submittal of a systems (or other equivalent ventilation Discussion complete, accurate, and thorough systems) satisfies any reportability The NRC has determined that some description of an event that is otherwise criteria under § 50.72 and § 50.73. events that involve only invalid ESF reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73. The Commission relaxed only the Impact of the Amendments on the actuations are of little or no safety Industry and Government Resources significance. However, not all invalid selected event reporting requirements ESF actuations are being exempted from specified in this final rule. Relaxing the requirement for reporting reporting through this rule. The Licensees are still required under 10 of certain types of ESF actuations relaxations in event reportiing CFR part 50, appendix B, "Quality reduces the industry's reporting burden requirements contained in the final rule Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power and the NRC's response burden. This apply only to a narrow, limited set of Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," to reduction is consistent with the specifically defined invalid ESF address corrective actions for events or objectives and the requirements of the actuations. These events include invalid conditions that are adverse to quality Paperwork Reduction Act. These actuation, isolation, or realignment of a whether the event is reportable or not. amendments have no impact on the limited set of ESFs including systems, In addition, minimizing ESF actuations NRC's ability to fulfill its mission to subsystems, or component!: (i.e., an (such as RWCU isolations) to reduce ensure public health and safety because invalid actuation, isolation, or operational radiation exposures the deleted reportability requirements realignment of only the R\IVCU system, associated with the investigation and have little or no safety significance. or the CREV system, reactor building recovery from the actuations, are It is estimated that the changes to the ventilation system, fuel building consistent with ALARA requirements. existing rules will result in about 150 (or 50-SC-119
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION 5-10 percent) fewer Licensee Event their concerns about eliminating the average 50 hours per licensee response, Reports each year. Similar reductions selected event reporting requirements. including the time required reviewing are expected in the number of prompt These commenters believe that the instructions, searching existing data event notifications reportable under 10 elimination of these event reporting sources, gathering and maintaining the CFR 50.72. Some respondents, in their requirements may adversely affect the data needed, and reviewing the comments on the proposed rule, dated NRC's information database and collection of information. Send June 26, 1992, submitted an estimate of ultimately affect the agency's ability to comments regarding the estimated approximately 15 percent reduction in carry out its mission to protect public burden reduction or any other aspect of their reporting burden. health and safety. For many years, the this collection of information, including NRC staff has been systematically suggestions for reducing this burden, to Summary of Comments reviewing information obtained from the Information and Records The NRC received 19 comments-2 Licensee Event Reports. These Management Branch (MNBB--7714), U.S.
from individuals, 3 from industry- assessments of reactor operational Nuclear Regulatory Commission, supported organizations, and 14 from experience have included data on the Washington, DC 20555; and to the Desk utilities. Except for two respondents, all types of events included in the three Officer, Office of Information and commenters welcomed the categories that the NRC is deleting from Regulatory Affairs, NEOB--3019, (3150-Commission's efforts to reduce the reporting. The staffs reviews and 0011 and 3150-0104), Office of licensee burden and to save the assessments of nearly 1000 reactor-agency's resources in event review and Management and Budget, Washington, years of operational experience have DC 20503. processing. The utilities and the identified essentially no safety industry-supported organizations significance associated with the type of Regulatory Analysis expressed their desire for a broader events included in the aforementioned relaxation to include all invalid ESF three categories. The Commission has The Commission has prepared a actuations from reporting. reviewed the scope of these regulatory analysis on this final rule. Other comments from the respondents amendments, and on the basis of the The analysis examines the costs and concerned the following: clarification of staffs assessment of the past reactor benefits of the alternatives considered the definition of "invalid" actuations; operational experience, has by the Commission. The analysis is examples of events being exempted subsequently concluded with a available for inspection in the NRC from reporting; consideration of plant- reasonable confidence that relaxation Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, specific situations; exemption from from reporting of events in the three NW., Lower Level, Washington, DC reporting of the actuation of the standby categories does not affect the agency's 20555. Single copies of the analysis may gas treatment system following an ability to protect public health and be obtained from: Raji Tripathi, Office invalid actuation of the reactor building safety. for Analysis and Evaluation of ventilation system; and possibly Based on the input from the utilities, Operational Data, U.S. Nuclear extending relaxation of invalid these amendments will reduce the Regulatory Commission, Washington, actuations/isolations of RWCU from industry's reporting burden by about 15 DC 20555. Telephone (301) 492-4435. reporting to include those of the percent. The estimated savings of the chemical and volume control system in Regulatory Flexibility Certification NRC's response burden in event review a pressurized water reactor. The and assessment is about 5-10 percent. In accordance with the Regulatory Statement of Considerations for this Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605 (Bl), final rule addresses most of these Environmental Impact: Categorical the Commission certifies that this rule concerns. Other issues and clarifications Exclusion does not have a significant economic concerning event reportability will be The NRC has determined that this impact on a substantial number of small addressed in NUREG-1022, Revision 1. final rule is the type of action described entities. The final rule affects only the However, it is not practical to address a in categorical exclusions 10 CFR 51.22 event reporting requirements for plant-specific situation unless it relates (c)(3)(ii) and (iii). Therefore, neither an operational nuclear power plants. The to a generic concern. environmental impact statement nor an companies that own these plants do not The Commission stresses that only environmental assessment has been fall within the scope of the definition of certain specific invalid ESF actuations prepared for this final rule. "small entities" set forth in the are being exempted from reporting Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small through the present amendments. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This final rule amends information Business Size Standards set out in NUREG-1022, Revision 1 will contain specific examples and additional collection requirements that are subject regulations issued by the Small Business guidance on events which are presently to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 Administration Act in 13 CFR part 121. reportable as well as those which are (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These Backfit Analysis being exempted from reporting through amendments were approved by the these amendments. In the future, the Office of Management and Budget As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission will give due consideration approval numbers 3150-0011 and 3150- Commission has completed an to other proposed relaxations from 0104. assessment of the need for Backfit event reporting after the NRC staff has Because the rule will relax existing Analysis for this final rule. The had an opportunity to reassess the data reporting requirements, public reporting proposed amendments include needs of the agency and performed burden of information is expected to be relaxations of certain existing safety assessments to justify initiating a reduced. It is estimated that about 150 requirements on reporting of information separate general rulemaking. Until such fewer Licensee Event Reports (NRC to the NRC. These changes neither time, all events not specifically Form 366) and a similarly reduced impose additional reporting exempted in these amendments continue number of prompt event notifications, requirements nor require modifications to be reportable. made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72, will be to the facilities or their licenses. The two respondents who opposed required each year. The resulting Accordingly, the NRC has concluded the proposed amendments expressed reduction in burden is estimated to that this final rule does not constitute a 50-SC-120
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION backfit and, thus, a backfit analysis is 57 FR 47978 facilities. These companies providing not required. Published 10/21/92 off-site treatment and volume-reduction List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 Effective 11/20/92 services may have several reasons for needing to return treated LLW to the Antitrust, Classified information, generator, rather than shipping it to a Criminal penalty, Fire prevention, 10 CFR Part 50 disposal site. First, access to LLW Incorporation by reference, RIN 3150-AED4 disposal facilities may be restricted for Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear the generator whose waste has been power plants and reactors, Radiation* Receipt ;Of Byproduct and Special treated. Under the Low-Level protection, Reactor siting 1;riteria, Nuclear Material Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Reporting and recordkeep;ing. Act of 1985 (LLRWPAA), States with For the reasons set out in the AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory operating disposal facilities may deny preamble and under the authority of the Commission. access to generators in other States.
Atomic Energy Act of 1964, as amended, ACTION: Final rule. Second, the licensee offering off-site the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, services may not have adequate as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 1552 and 553,
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations capacity for storing the waste until the Commission is adopting the disposal. Finally, the legal relationships following amendments to 10 CFR part governing the condition of licenses for production and utilization facilities to among States and regions, established
- 50. under the various compacts ratified by allow a reactor licensee to receive back byproduct and special nuclear material Congress, in conjunction with the that is produced by operating the reactor LLRWPAA, may force return of treated after that material has been sent off-site LLW to the generator in order to ensure for processing, such as compaction or that the waste is disposed of at the incineration. appropriate disposal facility.
Accordingly, although a reactor licensee EFFECTIVE DATE: November 20, 1992. may send its LLW off-site to another FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: licensee for treatment (e.g, compaction, LeMoine J. Cunningham, telephone (301) or incineration), the licensee treating the 504-1086, or Paul H. Lohaus on (301) waste will have a need to return the 504-2553. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory waste to the generator, but may not do Commission, Washington, DC 20555. so because the generator lacks authority SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: to receive it. Contents The Commission identified two I. Background. principal options for addressing this II. Response to Public Comments on the issue. The first option was to use a case-Proposed Rule. by-case licensing-action approach, either by amending each facility license, I. Background or by issuing a separate license under 10 On April 24, 1992 (57 FR 15034), the CFR part 30. This action would require Commission published a proposed rule each facility licensee either to request that would amend its regulations in 10 an amendment to its operating license, CFR 50.54, "Conditions of licenses." This authorizing the receipt of processed addition to the regulations is needed LLW, or to request a separate license. primarily because of changing However, addressing the issue for each circumstances surrounding the licensee individually would be treatment, storage, and disposal of low- inefficient, requiring both the licensee level radioactive waste (LLW) generated and NRC to expend significant by operating nuclear power reactors. At resources. the time when most operating licens\!s The second option, adopted by the-
- were issued, the Commission expected Commission as the final rule, amends 10 that LLW would be promptly treated CFR 50.54, "Conditions of licenses," to and sent off-site for disposal in a allow reactor licensees to receive back licensed LLW disposal facility. LLW generated at the plant and shipped Therefore, licensees were not authorized off-site for processing. This approach to receive byproduct or special nuclear not only resolves the authorization material except in the form of sealed issue, but also eliminates the need for sources for analysis, calibration, or significant NRC and licensee efforts to other special purposes, in the form of complete and approve the amendment fuel for use in the reactor, or associated requests to part 50 licenses, and ensures with radioactive apparatus or that a uniform approach is applied in all components. cases.
Except for LLW generated in The Commission considers the final Michigan, where generators have been rule a minor amendment that does not denied access to LLW disposal capacity represent any change in Commission since November 10, 1990, companies regulatory policy regarding radioactive providing nuclear power reactors with waste. On October 16, 1981, the off-site LLW processing and volume- Commission published its policy reduction services currently transfer statement on LLW volume-reduction (46 treated waste directly to one of three operating commercial LLW disposal 50-SC-121
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION FR 51100), in which it called upon all Of the 31 letters received, 26 endorsed received back under the license of any generators of radioactive waste to adoption of the proposed rule. Many of of the units at that site. The Commission reduce the volume of LLW for disposal, these commenters cited the benefits has revised the final rule to reflect this to extend the life of disposal sites and from off-site waste processing change. The following language is added alleviate storage concerns. The final rule technology that alloi,vs operating reactor to modify § 50.54(ee)(1) of the final rule:
will further enhance licensees' options licensees to maximize current storage "Each license issued under this part to reduce the volume of waste, by using capacity and minimize radioactive authorizing the possession of byproduct services performed off-site and waste volumes. They emphasized that and special nuclear material produced permitting the return of the treated implementation of the rule is an efficient in the operation of the licensed reactor waste to the generator. The Commission and cost-effective solution to a practical includes, whether stated in the license anticipates that many reactor licensees problem, and several favorably cited the or not, the authorization to receive back will take steps to process or reduce the rule's timeliness and potential benefits that same material, in the same or volume of generated LLW, typically by in light of future uncertainties altered form or combined with off-site compaction and incineration, concerning LLW disposal capacity. One byproduct or special nuclear material before storing the waste at their commenter, after endorsing the produced iri the operation of another facilities, on an interim basis. proposed rule, encouraged NRC to reactor of the same licensee located at However, the Commission does not become more involved in the licensing that site * * *" look favorably on long-term on-site process for new disposal sites. Both Comment: One commenter suggested storage. The final rule is intended to Illinois and Arkansas, the only states to that the proposed rule be modified to ensure that licensees will have adequate provide comments concerning the authorize the receipt back of byproduct short-term on-site storage capacity for proposed rule, endorsed the rule. or special nuclear material from a non-self-generated LLW, until permanent Approximately 20 specific questions licensed entity that is authorized to disposal capacity is available. The or suggestions were received that possess the radioactive material, but is commission does not believe this minor address the proposed rule. The majority not "a licensee of the Commission or an amendment represents a change in the of comments received may be grouped Agreement State," as the proposed rule stated Commission position that it into one of four basic categories that had originally stipulated. The
"* *
- does not look favorably on long- include: commenter suggested that a common or term on-site storage." The Commission (1) Clarification and enhancement of the contract carrier transporting source or expects licensees to ship generated proposed rule, byproduct radioactive material may not wastes for disposal to the extent (2) Waste accountability at the be able to return such material to the possible. Storage of LLW should be used processor licensee, reactor licensee generating the material, only for the short-term management of (3) Radioactive waste transportation although this may be necessary in LLW, when disposal is interrupted or concerns, and several situations, such as the return of unavailable. (4) Worker health and safety. waste because of ineffectual waste The final rule applies to both power packaging. Similarly, the commenter and non-power reactor licensees. The Public comments and NRC responses follow: contended, a non-licensed government final rule does not authorize the receipt agency, such as the Department of of any material recovered from the Comment: Six commenters requested that the rule be clarified to authorize Energy, may be unable to return treated reprocessing of irradiated fuel. waste to a reactor licensee if a strict In addition to publishing the proposed reactor licensees to receive back processed waste originally generated by interpretation of the proposed rule were rule in the April 24, 1992, Federal any reactor or reactors located at the adopted.
Register NRC sent a copy of the proposed rule to all Agreement and non- same site. Commenters pointed out that Response: The Commission agrees Agreement State radiation control some plants do not distinguish one unit's that the rule should permit receipt back, program directors, all State liaison waste from an adjacent unit's waste by a reactor licensee, of byproduct and officers, and those organizations on the when shipping off-site for treatment, and special nuclear material produced by the low-level waste compact distribution that oftentimes, wastes generated at a reactor licensee from a non-licensed list, on May 26, 1992. The comment particular site with multiple operating entity that is authorized to possess the period ended on July 8, 1992. Various reactors will be commingled. They material. The Commission has revised comments were received, all of which argued that the proposed rule, if strictly the final rule to reflect this were evaluated in developing the final interpreted, would not allow a reactor enhancement. In § 50.54(ee)(1) of the rule. licensee to receive back processed final rule, authority has been granted to waste containing waste from another power and non-power reactor licensees II. Response to Public Comments on the reactor located at the same site. Three to receive back byproduct and special Proposed Rule commenters explicitly requested that nuclear material produced in the The Commission received a total of 31 NRC change the proposed rule to permit operation of the reactor "from a non-comment letters on the proposed rule. wastes generated at a single site to be licensed entity authorized to possess the Responses were received from utilities consolidated. Two of the three, Edison material," as well as from Commission or their counsel (19); nuclear power and Electric Institute and the law firm of or Agreement State licensees. nuclear material user-groups (2); State Winston & Strawn, provided NRC with Comment: One commenter suggested departments of health and radiation specific language for such clarification. ' that NRC modify the proposed rule to protection agencies (2); public interest Three other commenters concurred with authorize the transfer of byproduct or groups (2); disposal facility operators this recommendation by citing Edison special nuclear material for volume-and developers (2); and private citizens Electric Institute's submittal to NRC reduction or decontamination purposes (4). Copies of these letters are available concerning the proposed rule. . among reactor sites with a common for public inspection and copying for a Response: The Commission agrees licensee. The commenter stated that fee at the NRC Public Document Room that the rule should permit radioactive "* *
- under the Commission's at 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), waste from multiple units of one restrictive interpret\ltion of the scope of Washington, DC. licensee at a particular site to be reactor operating licensees, a reactor 50-SC-122
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION licensee may not receive LLW for a small increase in doses [that are facility fulfills the criteria of the new processing that was produced in the already small) from transportation rule and any other applicable operation of a reactor for which it also activities. Further, all waste shipments regulations. Processors who choose to has licensee responsibilities." must meet the applicable regulatory accept reactor waste intended for return Response: The Commis11ion believes requirements of the U.S. Department of back to the reactor site licensee authorization permitting a reactor Transportation ancf the U.S. Nuclear currently satisfy a host of substantive licensee to receive byproduct or special Regulatory Commission. The regulations requirements governing transfer and nuclear material, at one reactor site, that require the packaging to be recordkeeping of radioactive waste cited is produced at another reactor site for commensurate with the potential hazard in 10 CFR 20.311, "Transfer for disposal which it also has licensee of the contents. and manifests," or appendix F to new responsibilities for the purpose of Comment: Two commenters suggest § § 20.1001 through 20.2401, performing decontamination or volume- that off-site processing creates health "Requirements For Low-Level-Waste reduction services, is beyond the scope risks to "additional attending Transfer for Disposal at Land Disposal of this rulemaking. The Commission personnel." One commenter, therefore, Facilities and Manifests." These rules does not agree that the proposed rule advocates on-site processing of waste. require that manifests accompanying should be modified to allow transfer of This commenter contends that on-site radioactive waste shipments to licensed byproduct and special nudear material processing minimizes the number of waste processors and land disposal among reactor sites for thfo purpose. As people exposed to the hazards of facilities. The manifest must indicate the a matter of policy, the Commission radiation; additional handling, storage, identification of the waste generator, the opposes practices at reactor facilities and transportation will result in higher physical description of the waste, waste that may divert the attention of licensee exposure to personnel and greater risks volume, waste radionuclide identity and management from the primary task of of harmful effects to the public. quantity, total radioactivity, and the safe operation of the powe1: reactor. Response: All processing, storage, and principal chemical form of the waste. In Accordingly, the Commission believes transportation of LLW must meet addition to .the manifesting that such situations should continue to regulatory requirements. This minor rule requirements, licensed waste processors be reviewed and authorized on a case- change, which authorizes receipt of who treat or repackage waste must also specific basis. waste, does not change any of the fulfill waste classification, identification Comment: One commenter suggested requirements concerning waste and labeling requirements found in 10 that NRC clarify that, if the proposed processing, storage, and transportation. CFR 61.55, 61.56, and 61.57.
rule is adopted, the final rul.e will also The collective occupational exposure The final rule exclusively authorizes authorize the transfer of [dose) would be essentially the same for reactor licensees to receive back LLW decontamination equipment that is the waste processing whether the sent off-site for treatment. The final rule slightly contaminated with '.byproduct or processing were done on-site or off-site, does not allow a reactor site to accept special nuclear material among reactor assuming that the same process were any waste that is not originally sites with a common license. used in either location. Additional generated at the*site, and the processor Response: The Commission believes handling for shipping and receiving of must fashion its operations to comply this suggestion is beyond the scope and wastes sent off-site for processing is with this condition. The individual intent of the rulemaking. Accordingly, needed; however, this incremental dose processor licensee, when receiving the Commission does not agree that the from this activity would be a small waste intended for return to the reactor proposed rule should addrens this issue. fraction of the dose for waste processing site, may have to perform individual However, part 50 licenses typically and other shipping and receiving "batch" processing, for the reactor contain conditions that permit transfer activities. The corresponding doses to licensee to accept processed waste in of decontamination equipmeint among members of the public would also compliance with the rule. reactor sites with a common license. represent a very small incremental Comment: One commenter pointed out Licenses which permit the licensee to increase in doses that already are very
"* *
- receive, possess * *
- any that waste processing may result in small. changes to waste classification, and in byproduct, source or special nuclear Comment: Several comments were fact, may concentrate radioactivity material * *
- associated with received about accountability of waste radioactive apparatus or components," at the waste processor, and subsequent enough to approach or exceed greater-may authorize the receipt of transferred changes to the waste as a result of than-class-C waste concentrations. This decontamination equipment. waste processing activities. Specifically, commenter was concerned that these Comment: Three commenters two commenters suggested that the potential shifts in waste classification expressed concern that the mle will possible intermingling of wastes at the might go unreviewed. This commenter result in an increase in the m1mber of processor facility would make difficult also expressed concern that waste miles traveled by radioactive waste on the task of ensuring that waste received processing operations may produce our nation's highways, and that this is from a particular generator is returned waste products containing mixed waste not in the public interest. One to that generator alone, as required by and may result in the release of gases or commenter suggested that po,tential the rule. Another commenter expressed particulates into the atmosphere. Waste hazards are greater from the concern that accompanying waste processing operations may increase the transportation of radioactive waste on manifests may become inaccurate as a toxicity or concentration of the waste, the return leg from a processor to a result of changes to the waste by the this commenter argued, suggesting that generator, because the radioactive processor licensee. this is an undesirable outcome from the material within the waste han been Response: An individual reactor perspective of the Host State concentrated. licensee's decision to ship waste off-site responsible for ultimate disposal of the Response: The proposed rule may for processing, with the intention of treated waste.
result in an increase in the number of receiving back such LLW for temporary Response: If a reactor licensee intends miles radioactive waste is transported. storage, will require the reactor licensee to receive back LLW shipped off-site The additional dose associatl!d with this to coordinate with the waste processor, from its facilities and is to comply with transportation, however, represents only to ensure that waste shipped back to the the rule, the processor licensee will have 50-SC-123
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION to segregate wastes by individual radioactive waste title transfer Comment: One commenter inquired as reactor licensee. Excluding this originating from promulgation of the to the actions to be taken if a generator segregation operation, the rule will not final rule. refuses to accept waste back after affect waste processor licensee Comment: One commenter asked processing.
generated waste product or operations. whether the languag_e in the proposed Response: NRC does not consider this The final rule will not result in changes rule prohibiting receipt back of material a likely scenario. Both the generator and to waste product currently generated by "recovered from the reprocessing of the processor involved in the transfer of waste processors. The final rule may irradiated fuel" could be applied to LLW waste for treatment will likely have lead processors to treat some reactor- containing fuel fines from damaged fuel agreed, by contract, on the terms of generated wastes in individual rods. The commenter questioned treatment and transfer of the LLW. If the "batches," to allow return of the waste whether NRC prohibits off-site waste, on return to the generator, is not back to the reactor licensee, but treatment of such wastes, and whether accepted by the generator, the processor otherwise, processor licensees will the generator of such wastes may refuse licensee would have grounds to seek simply continue performing LLW to accept back such wastes once legal recourse to force the generator to volume-reduction activities, as they processed. The commenter asked take possession of the treated LLW. have before promulgation of the final whether the term "reprocessing of However, if a threat to the public health rule. NRC and Agreement State irradiated fuel" is "narrowly" and safety were to present itself at any regulations are in effect which authorize interpreted by the NRC to refer only to time as a result of a reactor licensee's treatment and handling operations at the reprocessing of spent fuel rods. refusal to accept waste from a processor waste processor licensee facilities and shipped off-site for processing, NRC Response: The proposed rule contains ensure that these operations are would use its authority to compel the no new authorizations for, or conducted safely .and without adverse appropriate party to take possession of prohibitions against, LLW processing. effects on the environment. These the waste, and store it safely. The term "material recovered from the conditions are not affected by the final Comment: One commenter suggested rule, and will continue in force after reprocessing of irradiated fuel" does refer to the reprocessing of "spent fuel that a loophole in the Low-Level promulgation of the final rule. Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 rods" and does not apply to LLW Comment: One commenter expressed allows a licensee to forward a shipment containing fuel fines from damaged fuel concern that it was unclear what of radioactive material to another State rods. NRC does not prohibit off-site authority had responsibility to oversee to be stored or treated, and then avoid treatment of LLW that may contain very waste processing and enforcement at all responsibility for disposal of the small quantities of fuel fines from material by declaring the material a the processor. This same commenter damaged fuel rods. The rule authorizes, waste. The 1980 Act places the receiving questioned whether waste ownership or title to the waste may, in fact, become but does not require, the receipt of State in an untenable position by obscured as a result of waste being waste. Reactor licensees are not requiring it to provide disposal capacity shipped and managed by several authorized to reprocess irradiated fuel for wastes its licensees become licensees. or to possess the wastes from such burdened with in this manner. reprocessing. (Wastes from fuel Response: The 1980 Act encourages Response: NRC will continue to reprocessing are, by regulatory States to form regional compacts to license and inspect processor licensees definition, high-level wastes, not LLW.) collectively provide for disposal in non-Agreement States, and the The intent of the proposed rule is to capacity ofLLW. These compacts, Agreement State authorities will continue to license and inspect their allow reactor licensees to receive the authorized by Congress, were allowed licensees. Tracking and manifest radioactive materials that they produce to exclude waste generated outside their requirements will continue to apply to and that they already are allowed to borders, beginning January l, 1986. This reactor-generated wastes, and title to possess. The sentence in question, date was later extended to January 1, the waste and waste ownership can be concerning fuel reprocessing, was added 1993, when Congress approved the Low-adequately communicated and to the proposed rule to make it clear that Level Radioactive Waste Policy documented between reactor licensees reactor licensees are not authorized to Amendments Act of 1985. The 1985 Act and processor licensees. Before the final receive materials that they are not further authorizes that each State shall rule, waste processors have received already authorized to possess provide disposal capacity for LLW waste from reactor licensees, have (reprocessing wastes). "* *
- generated within * * *"the processed the waste to reduce its Comment: One commenter expressed State. Accordingly, generators who ship volume, and have repackaged and concern that by allowing all reactor radioactive material out-of-state for shipped for disposal the final, volume- licensees to receive back waste after processing, and then declare that reduced waste product. The transfer of processing, many States will simply material to be LLW, will likely be waste from generator to processor and/ require these licensees to store all other unable to shift responsibility for the or broker, and from processor and/ or LLW generated within the State. disposal of their waste. Therefore, the broker to a disposal facility licensee, Response: The Commission does not Commission does not consider this to be has not resulted in a significant number believe this issue is germane to the final a significant issue, nor one which is of disputes concerning transfer of title or rule. The final rule affects license affected, in any way, by the final rule.
possession of radioactive wastes, among conditions allowing receipt of Comment: One commenter suggested licensees. The contractual arrangements radioactive material, but does not alter that the rule clarify considerations for between licensees and the laws of the conditions concerning storage of non-reactor licensees concerning receipt various States pertaining to transfer of radioactive waste. The rule addresses of waste back at their facilities after ownership continue to provide licensees the receipt back of LLW generated only processing. with the means by which they can at reactor sites, and shipped off-site for Response: The Commission has negotiate the transfer of title to the processing. The rule does not authorize drafted the final rule to apply to reactor waste. The Commission does not the storage of LLW, generated licensees, only. Reactor licensees have envision any difficulties concerning throughout the State, at reactor sites. reported that processor licensees are 50-SC-124
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION unwilling to accept reactor-generated Comment: One commenter in Florida highways. The environmental waste without some assurance that expressed concern that the proposed assessment and finding of no significant reactor licensees will be authorized to amendment would allow nuclear power impact on which this determination is receive back processed LLW initially plants, including Turkey Point in Florida, based are available for inspection and/
generated at the reactor facility. to store LLW on-site for an indefinite or copying for a fee at the NRC Public Currently, no problems have been period. The commenter believes that Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. identified concerning parts 30, 40, and 70 South Florida's unique hydrology and [Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single licensees and the return of processed geology raise serious questions about its copies of the environmental assessment LLW to their facilities. Tbe Commission suitability for storage of LLW. The and the finding of no significant impact can address this issue in the future if commenter states that any decisions by are available from Richard H. Turtil, parts 30, 40, and 70 licensees encounter NRC to allow LLW to be stored at reactor sites should be made on a site- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, problems in this area. Washington, DC 20555, (301) 504-3447. Comment: One commenter noted that specific basis and that an environmental currently available on-sit,~ volume- impact statement [EIS) should be Paperwork Reduction Act Statement reduction technology is more cost- prepared under the National effective than the "double*-handling" Environmental Policy Act [NEPA) for This final rule does not contain a new mandated by off-site processing. Turkey Point, because the original EIS or amended information collection Response: This rule does not mandate [in 1972) did not address storage of requirement subject to the Paperwork off-site processing. The licensee is free LLW. One commenter, from Michigan, Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et to evaluate the cost effectiveness of a expressed concern that, given the seq.). Existing requirements were given technology or proce.ss and choose
- importance of the Great Lakes, nuclear approved by the Office of Management either on-site or off-site prncessing. power plants in the Great Lakes area be and Budget approval number 3150---0011.
Comment: Two commeuters suggested phased out so that no further waste accumulates. Regulatory Analysis that the rule be decided in conjunction with the proposed rule on export and Response: Current reactor license The Commission has considered import of radioactive waste. conditions allow licensees alternatives to, as well as the costs and Commenters were concerned that to store wastes generated in the benefits of, the final regulation. There is wastes may be imported for disposal operation of the reactor. While the rule no alternative to amending the from NRC licensees operal!ing abroad. authorizes reactor licensees to receive regulations that would satisfy questions Response: The Commission does not back waste shipped off-site for concerning the legality of transfer on a agree that these concerns 1ire applicable processing, the final rule makes no changes to existing requirements generic basis. The final regulation will to the final rule. The Commission does not impose any additional cost nor not believe the final rule v;il] have any concerning storage of LLW, nor does it modify waste processing or burden on a licensee or other individual. impact on the proposed rule on export The final rule is intended to facilitate transportation requirements. Site-and import of radioactive waste, nor actions necessary to ensure that will the proposed rule on export and specific concerns associated with storage of wastes authorized under licensees will have adequate short-term import of radioactive wast,~ impact this on-site storage capacity for LLW, until terms of existing licenses should be rulemaking. permanent disposal is available. The addressed on a case-specific basis. Comment: Two commenters argued Commission does not look favorably on that the implications of the rule are Finding of No Significant Impact: long-term on-site storage. The foregoing uncertain in the aftermath of the Availability constitutes the regulatory analysis for Supreme Courfs decision rejecting the The Commission previously "Take Title" provision of the the final rule. determined that the selected action was LLRWPAA. One commente-r asked of the type described in the categorical Regulatory Flexibility Certification whether States, under the proposed rule exclusion of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(2). After and in light of the Supreme Court's As required by the Regulatory having received several comments Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605[b)), the decision in New York v. United States, addressing the transport and storage of could refuse to allow interim on-site Commission certifies that this rule does processed LLW, however, the LLW storage. Commission has chosen to conduct an not have a significant economic impact Response: On June 19, 19!32, the U.S. environmental assessment pertaining to on a substantial number of small Supreme Court issued its d1!cision on the these environmental concerns and the entities. The rule does not affect small New York challenge to the consequences of the proposed rule. entities. The final regulation is entirely constitutionality of the LLRWPAA. The Commission has determined, permissive in nature and will Although the Supreme Court decision, in under the National Environmental Policy predominately affect large entities, this case, is currently being evaluated Act of 1969, and the Commission nuclear power reactor licensees, and for its possible general impact on the regulations in subpart A of 10 CFR part persons who provide volume-reduction management ofLLW in this country, the 51, that this rule would not be a major services to these licensees. Supreme Court decision dous not impact Federal action significantly affecting the the final rule. quality of the human environment and Backfit Analysis Comment: One commenter expressed therefore, an environmental impact The Commission has determined that concerns that volume reduction of a statement is not required. The handling the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not "source" containing some intrinsic value and temporary storage of concentrated apply to this final rule, and therefore, would lose its remaining value after waste will not significantly increase that a backfit analysis is not required for being compacted to reduce the volume risks to workers or the public. Similarly, this final rule, because these of the waste. this rule will not pose significant risks to amendments do not involve any Response: The Commission does not the public or the environment resulting provisions that would impose backfits, believe this issue is pertinent to the final from additional miles traveled by as defined in 10 CFR 50.109[a)[1). rule. radioactive wastes on our Nation's 50-SC-125
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 57 FR 61785 plant in a safe manner in all modes of Published 12/29/92 operation. This action is being taken to Antitrust, Classified information, Effective 12/29/92
- Criminal penalty, Fire protection, meet the directives of section 306 of the Incorporation by reference, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.
Material Approved for Incorporation by Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear Reference; Maintenance and EFFECTIVE DATE: May 26, 1993. power plants and reactors, Penalty, Availability ADDRESSES: Copies of all referenced Radiation protection, Reactor siting NRC documents are available for public criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping See Part 35 Statements of Consideration inspection and copying for a fee at the requirements. NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L For the reasons set out in the Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, preamble and under authority of the DC 20555. Copies ofNUREG documents Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, may be purchased from the the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Superintendent of Documents, U.S._ as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, Government Printing Office by calling NRC is adopting the following (202) 275-2060, or by writing to the amendment to 10 CFR part 50. Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082: Copies are also available from* the National Technical Information Service, 57 FR 53191 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA Published 11/6/92 22161. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:*Dr. Rajender Auluck, P.E., Office of Nuclear 10 CFR Part 50 Regulatory Research, telephone: (3Q1) 492-3794 or Mary Ann Biamonte, Office [3150-AE04] of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, telephone: (301) 504-1073, U.S. Nuclear* Receipt of Syproduct and Special Regulatory Commission, Washington, Nuclear Material DC20555. Correction SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In rule document 92-25504 beginning Background. on page 47978 in the issue of 58FR21904 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1*982 Wednesday, October 21, 1992, make the Published 4/26/93 following corrections: Effective 5/26/93 In section 308 of the Nuclear West~ Polley Act of 1982 (NWPA), Public Law
- 1. On page 47979, in the 3d column: 97-425, the NRC was "directed to
- a. In the 14th line, "of' should read 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52 promulgate regulations, or other "or". appropriate Commission regulatory
- b. In the second complete paragraph, RIN 3150-AD80 guidance for the training and in the 15th line, "authority" should read Training and Qualification of Nuclear qualifications of civilian nuclear power "authorized". plant operators, supervisors, technicians Power Plant Personnel
- 2. On page 47980, in the first column, and other operating personnel. Such in the 4th line, "license" should reaq AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory . regulations or guidance shall establish "licensee". Commission. * *
- instructional requirements for
- 3. On page 47982, in the second ACTION: Final rule. civilian nuclear power plant licensee column, in the second paragraph, in the personnel training programs." In order SUIIIIARY: The Nuclear Regulatory to meet this directive, on March 20, second and third lines, delete "to store Commission (NRC) is amending its 1985, the Commission published a wastes" the first time it appears. regulations to require each applicant for - Policy Statement on Training and and each holder of a license to aperate Qualification of Nuclear Power Plant a nuclear power plant to establish, ;[ Personnel (50 FR 11147). The policy implement, and maintain a training statement endorsed a training_'
57FR55062 program for. nuclear power plant , accreditation* program managed by the Published 11/24/92 personnel based on a systems approach ' Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Effective 12/24/92 .to training (SAT). The training program (INPO). It encompaesed the elements of will provid~ qualified personnel to effective performance-based training Clarification of Statutory Authority for operate and maintain the nuclear .power and provided the basis to ensure that Purposes of Criminal Enforcement See Part 11 Statements of Consideration 50-SC-126
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION personnel have qualifieli:tions court, which was denied on June 19, , the NRC baa included a summary of the commensurate with the .Performance 1990. On November 26, 1990, the comments received and an analysis and requirements of their jobs. Supreme Court denied certiorari on response to those comments.
In addition to endorsing the INPO- petition by the Nuclear Utility . managed training accreditation program, Management and Resource Council. See, i. Responsibility for Training and the 1985 Policy Statement also Nuclear Management arid Resources Acceptability of Third-Party Troining-recognized the INPO-managed Council, Inc. v. Public Citizen 111 S. Ct. Accreditr,rtion Programs accreditation of utility tr!rlnihg 536 (1990). Comment. Several commenters programs for the following categories of indicated that the ~C should clarify Actions Taken in R.esponse to the Court. who under the proposed requirements nuclear power plant pen:onnel: Decision (1) Non-licensed operator; . wiUhave responsibility for training (2) Control room operator.
- In response to the court decision; the amtnctor personnel. Given the
* (3) _Senior control roon1 operator/shift ' NRC developed the proposed rule that . proposed rule'a requirement that supervisor. " would amend 10 CFR parts 50 and 52, training programs be b8.86d on a systems (4) Shift technical advisor. entitled "Training and Qualification of approach to training, they indicated that (5) Instrument and control technician. Nuclear Plant Personnel." The proposed* the-NRC should clarify its intention (6) Electrical niaintenaJJce personnel. rule was published in the Federal * .
- reg~ding the acceptability of licensees (7) Mechanical maintenance Register on January 7; 1992 (57 FR 537). re.lying on third-:,party training programs J)_i!r&onnel.
- The amendments would *require that other than INPO-managed training (8) Radiological protection technician. each applicant for and each.holder oh* ~aeditation-certification programs in (9). Chemistry techniciah. license to operate a nuclear power pll$t evaluating the training needs and (10) On-site technical staff and establish, implement, and maintairi _a . qualifications of personnel. The managers. training program for nuclear power
- Radiation Protection Association's plant personnel that provides qualified program of registration-certification of While issuing the policy statement, personnel to operate and maintain the Health Physics Technicians was cited as the Commission decided to defer facility in a safe manner in all modes of en example of an other than INPO-rulemaldng in this area for a minimum operation. The proposed rule met the
- maneged training acczeditation-of 2 years in order to allo,v the industry directives contained in section ~06 of . certification program that the to continue its initiatives to upgrade the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 Commission should explicitly endorse*.
training programs .through the INPO- (NWPA), Public Law 97-425, as Commenters also indicated that the NRC managed training accreditation program. interpreted-by the U.S. Court of Appeals should clarify that if the evaluation of Following issuance of the policy for the District of Columbia Circuit, that ~cmnel does not indicate that statement, the NRC evalm1ted the INPO- mandatory requirements be established additional training is needed (i.e.* they managed training accreditation program for the training and qualification of are already qualified), then additional over a 2-year period and concluded that personnel at civilian nuclear power training ia not required. Finally, it was an effective program. On plants. commenters questioned whether the November 18, 1988 (53 FR 466073), the The proposed rule would require NRC has developed acceptance criteria NRC published an amendod policy training programs that are derived from for licensees to use in determinin~ the statement in order to: a systematic analysis of job perfonnance acceptability of vendOMieveloped and (1) Provide additional ir:iformation requirements that can include botli site- . other third-party training programs. and regarding the NRC's exper:ience with specific and industry-wide experiences. if the NRC anticipated cwriving such
- industry accreditation, Current industry training programs have criteria &om NUREG-1220. .
(2) Change the policy regarding been developed consistent with this . .
- Response. The intent of the rule is to enforcement to eliminate discretion in approach. Based on monitoring industry ~ that nuclear power plant inspection and enforcement in the areas training programs since the 1985 Policy ~ l have the necessary .
covered by the 1985 Polle,* Statement, Statement went into effect. the NRC has ,' mowledge, skills, and abilities to and - concluded that these programs have perform their assigned jobs (3) Reflect current Commission and been generally effective in ensuring that competenUy; i.e., they 8l'8 qualified to industry guidance. personnel have qualifications
- independenUy perform specific The NRC continues to perform commensurate with the performance activities. Therefore, it is the inspections at differe~t utilities to requirements of ~eir jobs. responsibility of each licensee and ensure that these training p,rograms applicant to ensure that personnel remain effective. * ' Summary and Analysis of Public specified by the rule, regardless of Comments whether they are employees or U.S. Court of Appeals Decigion The comment period for the proposed contractors. are qualified.
On April 17, 1990, the U.S. Court of rule expired March 9, 1992. Public The mquirement that each licensee or Appeals for the District of Columbia comment letters received on the applicant develop, implement, and Circuit concluded that the proposed rule are available for public maintain a SAT-based training program Commission's Policy Statei:111ent did riot inspection and copying for a fee at the iu*pplicable only to licensee personnel, meet the-intent of the Congi,issional Commission's Public Document Room. nol contractors, and establishes a directive to create mandatot1' Comments were received from 30 process that provides a high degree of requirements for personnel training individuals and corporate entities, assunmce that personnel will be programs at civilian nuclear power virtually all of whom are directly qualified to perform their assigned plants. The Court remanded'. the issue involved in the nuclear power industry.* duties. This assurance arises from the back to the NRC for action consistent Many of the letters contained_ simJlar . five.major elementA of the SAT process: with*the. Court's findings. Sne, Public comments and have been grouped . (1) Aoalyaia of job perlormance Citizen v. NRG, 901 F.2d 14'.7 (DC Cir. together and addressed as a single issue. iequlnmlenl$ and training needs; (2} 1990). The Commission requested a All comments have been grouped into* derivaUon of learning objectives; (3} rehearing of the decision by 'the full eight broad issues. For each broad issue, design and implementation of the 50-SC-127
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION training programs: (4) trainee INPO guidance. Finally, one commenter the paraomiel CC>Vered by*tha p12posed evaluation: and (5) program evaluation
- noted that SAT-based training is i,de was too narrow while* otliers and revision. Training is onlyrequired inconsistent with the requirements in 10 beiiavad it was too broad; Some *
- when a comparison of job performance CFR part 55 for licensed operators and commentera recommended that the requirements for tasks being assigned requested that the NRC explain why it
- proposed i,de cover all penonnal who and the skills and knowledge of a hes determined that only SAT-based perform or oversea design, operaUon, or specific Pl?ll'son indicate a training need. treinin~ fo 11cceptable. maintenance activiUes regardless of Third-party (including vendor- Response. The Commission shares the whether they ere physically located on~
developed) training programs, although concern that SAT-based training not be site or off-site. At the same time, the not specifically endorsed by the NRC. treated in a "cook.book" manner. It is commenters*iDdicated that the proposed are acceptable provided that the not the intent of the NRC that the rule should explicitly exclude all licensee has evaluated the programs to iDdustry simply approach the SAT- personnel who, regardless of location. ensure that they will ISSult in pro~ based program in a "cookbook" manner, only perform support services. In qualification. Because the acceptallility since Ute NRC does not intend to addiUon, the commenter& iDdicated that of vendor-developed programs will vary discourage licensees from imposing personnel worlting under direct
- based on individual f~cilit¥. needs, the additional requirements above thos!3 supervision, such as short-tenn NRC is not providing spec1fic , developed from the SAT-based training contractor personnel, should be acceptance criteria. Licensees should program. The decision to require SAT- excluded from these trahiing evaluate vendor-4eveloped training based training programs reflects both . requirement$. More concretely, programs against the facility's job and the industry's success with this numerous commenter& requested that task analysis results to ensure that the approach and the fact that the process the proposed rule be clarified in terms vendor programs will m.eet the has the advantage ofincorporating of personnel to be trained. For example:
licensee's specific qualification ongoing review and revision of the
- rs a ."Radwaste Operator" to be requirements. program to reflect changing needs. considered a "Non-Licensed Operator"?
Additional rigorous job and task Does "Shift Supervisors" iDclude *
- 2. Appropriateness of SAT-Based analysis will not be required for any of "Assistant Shift Supervisors"*? While Training the positions listed in this rule. The the job Utle "l&C Technicians" is Comment. Numerous commenters NRC has monitored and evaluated the precise, "electrical personnel" and questioned the appropriateness of development and implementation of the "mechanical personnel" ar,pear to be, requiring SAT-based training. *At the current industry programs. The NRC broader than "electricians.' and most basic level was a concem* that the believes that the*job, task, and needs "mechanics." Which functions or NRC has not placed sufficient emphasis analyses underlying the currently personnel are included in on-site on the fact that the required SAT-based accredited programs 81'8 adequate, as are technical staff?
- training is not intended to be a simple the criteria that are used in determining Finally, a number of commenters "cookbook" approach and that the acceptability of programs for future noted that to be consistent with INPO's personnel should be encouraged to accreditation. In order to clarify its current eccreditaUon program, managers acquire additional knowledge, training, position that additional jab and task should not be included in the rule. This and academic instruction to gin them analyses are not being required, thir NRC could be accomplished by amending e deeper understanding of the technical has revised Inspection Procedure 41500 § 50.120(b) so that the'::C!Fonnel principles underlymg their trainine, A and NUREG-1220 to make them designated as (9) T cal Staff and more widely held coocem was that the consistent with this regulation. . Managers" be designated "Engineering proposed rule could be construed as The NRC recognizes that 10 CFR part Support Personnel." Almost a11 the requiring additional rigorous Job and 55, which only applies to licanaed commenters seeking clarification of tlie **
taslt analysis, particularly smcB NRC operators, allows non-SAT based personnel to be trained recommended Inspection Procedure 41500 is more approaches to training. This provision that the regulatiqn e~licitly state that it restrictive in this area then the current was necessary to accommodate existing applies only to the training programs requirements for INPO-managed industry programs for training licensed currently included in the.INPO training accreditation. These operators at the time part 55 was accreditation program.
- commenter& noted that the job and task promulgated, because industry-wide Response. The scope of the list of analysis is not necessarily appropriate implementation of SAT-based trainiDg personnel is consistent with and or sufficient for all of the types of was not complete. At this time, SAT- -incorporates those posiUons that are personnel covered .by the rule. They based training bas been broadly currently covered by*accreditetion and requested that the NRC explicitly implemented by the industry for both exisUng- industry practice. The NRC acknowledge that varying degrees of licensed operators and other plant believes that the exisUng training rigor in the- performance of fob* and task personnel. Virtually all of the initial and programs for the personnel listed are analysis are appropriate for differing requalification programs for licensed saUsfactory. For these.reasons, the NRC as types of positions, are analyses operators ere SAT-based. The NRC does not believe it is appropriate to completed through cooperative generic believes that, based on SAT's success revise the scope of the regulation. The industry efforts. Specifically, it was and its wide use by industry, that it is shift supervisor posiUori is the only recommended that training programs appropriate to incorporate SAT-based supervisory function included within affecting the Shift Supervisor, Shift training es _a requirement in this rule. the scope of the rule end does not Technical Advisor, end Technical Staff include the assistant shift supervisor.
and Managers be allowed BDd 3. Defmition of Personnel To Be Trained However, the regulation has been encouraged to rely on additiooal bases Comment. A number of both general revised to reflect a change from the title for deteimining training needs and that and specific commenta were n,ceived of the "on-site technical staff and Inspection Procedunt "1500 and that addNlssecl the issue of the managers" category to "engineering NUREG-1220, Training R&view definition of the penonnel that would support personnel," which is now Criteria and ProceduJea~" be wvised to be awered by the pJ1>POll8CI rule. Seme consistent with the name for the make them fully consistent with cummt held the view that the specification of corresponding lNPO accredited training 50-SC-128
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION program. The scope of the personnel Therefore, no changes were made to the guidance provided by the NRC and covered by that progr&Jll to be trained in rule-in.response to this comment. INPO is consistent. Specifically, it was accordance witn*this_re,gulaUon,
- recommended that the Commission however, is 1,1Dchanged, . *.
- s. Applicability of the Rule carefully monitor the implementation of
. The NRC does not beilieve that a Comment. Several commenters the final rule to ensure a consistent ch.anse to the rule is nettded in. order to expressed the opinion that the understanding of the regulatory goals es clarify the applicability of this rule to applicability of the rule was too broad was identified in SECY-91-172, short-term contractor pursonnel. . with respect to licensees who are "Regulatory Impact Survey-Final" In Contractor personnel Brit not cove)'.8d_ by undergoing decommissioning or are part addition it was suggested that the this rule unless they occ:upy regular. *. 52 applicants. Specifically, they
- principles in the Staff Requirements positions working inde11endenily within recoi:nmended that the rule apply only Memorandum dated December 20, 1991, the licensee's orgenization. However, if to applicants for or licensees with en regarding the Systematic Assessment of short-term contractor pe,rsonnel are
- operating license .. The commenters Licensee Performence (SALP) program assigned to work indepe,ndently, they
- suggested that facilities engaged in should be applied to this traini,ng rule.
must be qualified to per:rorm the
- decommissioning where all fuel has Commission monitoring of the training assigned tasks; Finally, lhe issue of been permanently removed from the rule would ensure that there is intra-including off-site persoD1Del in the final reactor vessel or those with a possession
*rule has been considered. The NRC h8' only license (POL) should not be subject and inter-regional consistency in the to this rule._Additionally, they requirements, evaluation *criteria, and concluded that the requirements apply results, and would preclude the
- to Job functions in the id'.entified
- questioned why part 52 needed to be imppsition of additional requirements categories of personnel relating to on- . amended to include the requirements of
§ 50.120(b), since the.provisions of part based on rising expectations.
site activities regardless of the lcicatio~ Commenters indicated that the NRC of the personnel. 52 already automatically incorporate ell*
- of the standards in part 50 that _ere . should clarify the process that INPO and
- 4. Relationship BetM--een Troining and technically relevant. the NRC will use to avoid giving Qualification Response. The NRC believes that licensees conflicting guidance.
Comment. One commEnter expressed making the provisions of the rule Commenters indicated that the NRC
.concern that the relation:,hlp between applicable to all pert 50 licensees and should explicitly state that maintenance training and qualification has been .
- app_licants is appropriate. The SAT- of en accredited training program will blurred. The commenter indicated that process ensures that as plant conditions be construed es complete compliance while the proposed rulit" l.s entitled change, training programs will be with these training requirements. Other "Training and Qualificatlion of Nucleill' revised to reflect these changes. These commenters indicated that NRC should Power Plent Personnel," the revisions could include*the consider.delaying the effective date of requirements appear to n,late to training development of new programs or the the rule until it hes completely only. It was recommended that the tenn elimination of obsolete programs. reviewed implementing guidance (e.g.,
qualification be eliminattid, or, However, the process also ensures that Reg. Guide 1.8,-Rev. 2) and made it alternatively, that necessury * . the modification of the program to consistent with the final rule. qualifications be explicitly listed. The reflect the changed environment is Response. The NRC believes that the commenter also indicated that the NRC performed in. an orderly fashion. If requirements and implementation of should clarify that successful permanent changes in the condition of this rule will be consistent with the completion.of a training 11rogram is-not the plant (i.e., decommissioning or POL) accredited programs already developed in end of itself sufficient, in lieu of eny
- make some_ or all existing .training and implemented by the industry.
specific qualifications Imposed by other programs unnecessary, the licensee Therefore, the p9licy the Commission* regulations, for a.particulnr position. would obtain relief from these expects to follow in implementing the Response. The NRC disigrees that the requirements by applying for an . rule is that continued accreditation distinction between training and *
- exemption eliminating or modifying the along with effective implementation of qualification hes been blumd by the affected programs. Also, the reason that the accredited program is considered to rule. As stated in the preamble for the 10 CFR part 52 needs to be amended is be an acceptable means of proposed rule,qualificetietn in the to ensure that .part 52 applicants have demonstrating compliance. This .
context of this rule meens Job task considered the requirements of-10 CFR conclusion is based on staff inspections qualification. The propoSEd rule 50.120(b) in their applications. contained the requirement-that licensees which have found the accredited end applicants develop, iE11plement, end 6. Implementation of the Rule programs to be generally acceptable, and maintain a SAT-based training program Both general and specific concerns the NRC review of documents that to ensure that nuclear power personnel were raised regarding implementation of provide the industry program objectives are qualified to perform the tasks of the rule, the time periods allowed for
- and criteria. An applicant or licensee .
their Jobs. Because licensees and
- implementation, and the means to be could also comr ly with the .
applicants must comply with ell used by licensees to demonstrate requirements o this rule withoµt being applicable regulations, there should be compliance of a training program that is accredited. Inspection Procedure 41500 no ambiguity concerning the fact that not accredited by the INPO-managed end NUREG-1220 have been revised to
. successful completion of a training . training accreditation program. make them consistent with this program does not obviate the need to regulation. This guidance will be used *comply with any other training or (a) General Concerns by the NRC staff when monitoring qualification requirements imposed by Comment~ Numerous commenters implementation of this rule or other regulations or licenSE,, conditions. expressed concerns regarding the inspecting training programs and is This means that nuclear power plant manner in which the NRC will monitor intended to ensure consistent personnel must also meet the-licensees' implementation of the rule to ensure interpretation of training criteria by an initial Job qualification req11irements that it is consistent with the NRC regions. The NRC, therefore, does imposed as part of initial employment. Commission's intentions and that the not intend to revise Reg. Guide 1.8.
- 50-SC-129
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION (b) Implementation Period having the S.AT-based training program 7. Recommend That the Commission Comment. With regard to the specific in place prior to fuel load allows T,y One More Time To Reverse the time frames allowed for significant benefits in terms of program Court Decision implementation, several commenters review and revisions based upon Comment. Most commenters expressed the opinion that if the rule is experience gained prior to fuel loading. expressed their strong opinion that the truly consistent with established The NRC concurs that linking the rule is unnecessary given the industry's programs, that an implementation program review-revision cycle to initiatives in developing and period of 180 days was reasonable. existing practice (i.e., a 4-year implementing effective training However, other commenters stated that accreditation-renewal cycle) is programs, but accept the rule as additional time should be granted to unnecessarily prescriptive, therefore necessary given the Court's decisions.
accommodate the industry's reference to specific 4-year review cycle However, one commenter requested implementation date of December 31, has been deleted from the that, given the President's January 28, 1993, for the new "Engineering Support
- supplementary information section of 1992, directive that agencies are to Personnel" accredited program and for the final rulemaking notice. "identify and accelerate action on the review and documentation activities (c) Review and Recordkeeping initiatives which will eliminate any that are believed by the commenters to Requirements
- unnecessary regulatory burden," the be necessary to demonstrate compliance Commission seek, through the Executive with the rule. Similarly, many believed Comment. Several commenters Branch, if necessary, a judicial review of that the requirement in § 50.120(b) that requested that the NRC clarify the the Court's ruling. .
applicants must have established and requirements for recorclkeeping and for Response. The Commission believes
- implemented the required training program reviews and revisions. that the President's directive does not program 18 months prior to fuel load is Specifically, the NRC was requested to supersede the Court's ruling and the not reasonable, given that the clarify (1) what records need to be NRC has exhausted all reasonsble accredit~tion process for training maintained in order to meet the avenues of judicial review..
programs provides for verification and requirements of § 50.120, (2) whether revision of training programs based on any special retention periods apply to 8. Reconsideration of Other Training experience gained from operations. It these records, and (3) what "associated Requirements in Ught of This Rule was recommended by several programs" must be readily auditable, or Comment. One commenter requested commenter& that applicants simply be that this language be dropped from the that the NRC review part 55 in its required to have training programs discussion. They also requested that entirety to ensure that it is consistent established and reedy for accreditation NRC clarify the rule so that it is clear with this rule, stating that it is possible prior to initial fuel load. Finally, several that the ,periodic reviews of training that many of the prescriptive commenters poted that linking the. programs are to be conducted by requirements in existing part 55 could required program review and revision appropriate functional managers, not be eliminated if it were amended to cycle to the industry's current 4-year just training managers. reflect existlng industry practice for schedule is unnecessarily prescriptive. Response. The records the licensees identifying the need for and developing* Response. The NRC bas considered will need to maintain to meet the training programs. . the issues raised by the commenters requirements of§ 50.120 are the same Response. Part 55 currently states that regarding the appropriate records currently being maintained by a SAT-based training program and a implementation time periods for both. licensees for their existing training certified simulator is an acceptable licensees and applicants. For licensees, programs. The prorosed rule does not alternative to the prescriptive the Commission believes that the 180- impose any specie retention periods for requirements of part 55 and would meet day implementation period is sufficient, these records; The words "associated the existing requirements for licensed because all licensees have developed, programs" will be deleted from the operator training. In fact, 'most of the implemented, and are maintaining discussion related to being readily initial and requalification programs for accredited programs. Implementation of auditable. The final rule does not licensed operators are based on SAT. the new "Engineering Support . require clarification since the proposed Thus, part 55 is consistent with this Per:sonnel" program, which replaces the rule notes "licensee management," rule. Furthennore, some programs retain current "Technical Staff and Managers" which NRC talces to include functional elements of the prescriptive portion of program or other future accredited
- line managers:. . 10 CFR part 55 and to eliminate these program changes*, does not negate the (d) bemonstratioµ.ofCompliance elements would create an unnecessary fact that SAT-based training is perturbation to these programs.
continuing for the personnel covered by Comment. The NRC should clarify how compliance with the rule is to be Discu111,ion the rule, therefore, compliance with the regulation would ba maintained. . demonstrated by facilities without an The safety of nuclear power plant The requirement that applicants accredited program. operations and the assurance of general establish and implement the training Response. An accredited program is public health and safety depend on program 18 months prior to fuel load is considered to be an acc!3ptable means of personnel performing at adequate
- also considered appropriate. The NRC .demonstrating compli!lJlce with the
- perfonnance levels. The systematic realizes that an applicant would not . rule. Facilities that do not have an determination of qualifications and the have a training program accredited 18 accredited program would demonstrate provision of effective initial training and months prior to fuel load, and this rule complimce with the final rule through periodic retraining .will enhance does not require accreditation. The rule the development of training programs confidence that workers can perform at only requires that a training program be
- using the systems approach to training adequate performance levels.
established for those portions of the as defined in 10 CFR 55:4. The NRC will Qualification in the context of this rule plant programs nece~sary to support conduct' inspections of non-accredited means that nuclear power plant
- ongoing activities covered under the facility programs to ensure tha~ the
- personnel have completed the training rule. In addition, the NRC believes that requirements of the final rule are meL program, or parts thereof, as evidenced 50-SC-130
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION by meeting the job.perfonnance (1) Deterrtilrie training and This rule would provide for the requirements, end are pem1itted to
- qualification requirements for all training and qualification of the independently perform spocific appropriate personnel:
- following nuclear power plant
. activities. The Commission has taken en (2) Develop training programs to personnel: approach in this rule that would specify ensure that each licensee has trained (1) Non-licensed operator. the process to be impleniented by and qualified personnel to operate and (2) Shift supervisor. applicants an<J. licensees through*which maintain the facility in a safe manner: (3) Shift technical advisor. job performance criteria 8IJ1d associated and (4) Instrument and control technician. personnel training would. he derived. (3) Implement and maintain these (5) Electrical maintenance personnel. This approach provides foir' flexibility , pro~ams effectively on a continuing (6) Mechanica.l maintenance and site-specific edaptatio111s in the
- basis. *
- personnel. .
training programs. No additional c*ost is
- Paragraph (a), "Applicability," (7) Radiological protection technician.
indicates that the rule applies to each (8) Chemistry technician. anticipated with this approach for (9) Engineenng support personnel. licensees with accredited programs applicant for and each holder of an operating license for a nuclear power Licensed operators, sucli as C!'.>ntrol because th11 rule is believed to be room operators and senior control room consistent with existing industry . plant.
- Paragraph (b), "Requirements," operators, are not covered by this rule.
practice for personnel training. requires that each applicant or licensee They will continue to be covered by 1 O Summary of Final R.ule establish, implement, and maintain a CFR part 55 for both initial and
- program for training nuclear power requallfication training. Because some Each applicant for and each holder of senior control room operators may also an operating license for a imclear power plant personnel which addresses all be shift supervisors, only those aspects plant shall: . modes of operation and is derived from (1) Establish a training p,rogram for . a systems approach to training (SAT). of training r~leted to their shift certain nuclear power plant personnel The SAT process was selected because supervisor function would be covered who perform operating, m,aintenance, : it has the followin~ characteristics:
- by this rule.
and technical support activities; * * (1) Training design ~d content are This rule would require that training (2) Use a systems approach to . derived from job performance programs be periodically evaluated and training: ' requirements: revised as appropriate, and also be (3) Incorporate instructkmal * (2) Training is evaluated and revised periodically reviewed by management requirements to provide trained and , in terms of job performance . for effectiveness. Current industry
- qualified personnel who cm safely '. requirements end observed results on objectives in this regard involve the operate the facility in all modes of the job: . evaluation by management of individual
. (3) Success in training can predict training programs on a continuing or operation: . ' satisfactory on-the-job performance; and (4) Periodically review, evaluate, and periodic basis to identify program (4) A training program can be audited strengths, weaknesses, and revise the training progra111i: and . because it involves clearly delineated (5) Maintain sufficient records, effectiveness. These evaluations are
' process steps and documentation. . norm11lly completed within a 3- to 6-available for NRC inspection, to verify
- The SAT process contains five ma1or the adequacy of the trafning program.
- month period following completion of elements and is intended to require a training within the programs. The sum Although no written response is training system that will ensure required, licensees are exi1ected to of these evaluations results in a
- successful performance on the job by comprehensive review. Periodic review their license conditions and trained individuals. The elements ere:
other commitments for co:nsistency with evaluations of the overall training (1) Analysis of job performance programs are being performed by the this rule. requirements and training needs; The Commission has alno developed (2) Derivation of learning objectives; industry as part of accreditation conforming amendments to 10 CFR (3) Design and implementation of the renewa_l. The Commission expects this . parts 50 and 52 to accompany this rule. training l?rograms: practice to continue. Pert of these amendments to perts 50 (4) Tramee *evaluation: Determination of job performance and 52 are considered minor. The other (5') Program evaluation end revision. requirements and training needs is part
-change to pert 52 is more substantive The SAT process also provides a of the analysis in the SAT process and and has been developed t1l ensure that . sequential method of generating the is reflected in qualification applicants for a combined. license type of documentation needed for requirements. The facility applicant or (construction and operation) will treinlng review. Use of SAT will obviate licensee will be responsible for ensuring establish, implement, and maintain a the need for additional documentation that all personnel within the scope of training program In accordance with the for NRC review. this rule.have the training end resulting requirements in 10 CFR 50.120. This The SAT process is a generic process, qualffications commensurate with job rule is not intended to pn1elude vendor and its application is not limited to a performance requirements for their training programs developed in certain subject matter or to specific assigned tasks. Initial and continuing.
conjunction with standardization of licensee personnel. Training programs training, as appropriate, is expected to design. based on job perfo~ance requirements be provided t~ job incumbents in have been successfully used by the positions covered by this rule. Discussion of Final R.ule military for over 20 years and by the Each applicant and licensee.is A new 5 50.120, hes beon added to 10 nuclear industry for much of the past Jequired to maintain and keep available CFR part 50, entitled "Tr11ining and decade. Furthermore, the Commission for NRC inspection the materials used to qualification of nuclear p11JWer plant has recognized the appropriateness of establish and implement required
- personnel."
- using this approach to training in its training progrenis for the affected This section establishe11 the requirements for operator licensing personnet Current industry practice in requirements for and the ;8ssential . . prescribed in § 55.31(a)(4), and for this regard involves retention of tltose elements of the process tu be used by operator requalification prescribed in records necessary to support applicants and Ucensees to: * § 55.59(c}.
- management 'information needs .end to 50-SC-131
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION provide required historical da~. In document "The Objectives and Criteria S50.120 do not prevent a vendor from general, these include records of for Accreditation of Training in the training personnel or from developing a program development, evaluation, and Nuclear Power Industry" (ACAD 91- training process. However, it is revision related to the existing training 015);1 and . important to note that vendor training program. The NRC has found through (e) Verifying licensee programs programs are not governed by this rule inspections of training programs that through the NRC inspection process. and that the licensee is ultimately sufficient records are being retained for As noted above, the NRC lies the responsible for ensuring that personnel periods that are adequate for regulatory ability to verify compliance with this are qualified.
purposes. The Commission believes that regulation through the inspection no additional guidance for program and will do so as appropriate. Applicants for a Combined License recordkeeping is necessary. In its inspections, tho NRC staff will use Part 52 is being emended to require No written response is required by Inspection.Procedure 41500, "Training that applicants for combined licenses . this rule. However, applicants and and Qualification Effectiveness," which establish, implement, and maintain licensees would be expected to compare references the guidance in NUREG- training programs in accordance with their current training commitments and 1220, Revision 1, 2 "Training Review the requirements in 10_.CFR 50.120. licensing bases with the requirements of Criteria and Procedures." Based on NRC this rule. Licensees should use the inspections conducted to date, the Criminal Penalties results of this comparison to evaluate Commission believes that the objectives As a result of the addition of§ 52.78 and revise, as appropriate, existing developed by the industry provides by this rulemaking, the criminal penalty technical specifications or previous sufficiently clear guidance to allow provision, § 52.113, is being modified to commitments. This approach will applicants and licensees to implement add§ 52.78 to the list of sections in ensure a common understanding effective training programs in subsection (b), since the new section is between applicants, licensees, and the compliance with this rule. Therefore, not identified es substantive, 88 that NRC staff of training commitments the Commission does not believe it is criterion is expressed in the Federal when future inspections are conducted. neoossary to issue e regulatory guide to Register Notice: Clarification of provide additional guidance for Statutory Authority for Purposes of Impact of This R.ule on Existing complying with this rule. Criminal Enforcement, 57 FR 55062 Industry Training Programs. (November 24, 1992). In addition, This rule would supersede the Policy Vendor-Developed Programs for S52.101 ls deleted and S52.103 is Statement on Training and Qualification Standardized Plants added to the list, to reflect changes of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel. The In 10 CFR part 52, the Commission made to part 52 in a previous Commission believes that this rule articulated the goal of safety through rulemeking, 57 FR 60978 (December 23, would not result in any change t.o standardization of design. The 1992). accredited training programs. The NRC Commission believes that the benefits of has found through inspections that the standardization could involve the Finding of No Significant programs are generally acceptable. The standardization of some types of Environmental Impact: Availability Commission expects that training training associated with the 10 CFR part The Commission hes determined programs accredited and implemented 52 design certification. Therefore; under the National Environmental . consistent with the industry program nothing in this rule is intended to Policy Act of 1969, as emended, e n ~ ' objectives would be in compliance with preclude standard training programs Commission's regulations in subpart A
- the requirements of this regulation. being developad or implemented by a of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not \
An existing Memorandum of vendor. For example, the initial training a major Federal action significantly l Agreement between INPO and the for instrument and control technicians affecting the quality of the human ; Commission assures that the NRC will related to a particular standard design environment and, therefore, an be made aware of any modifications or may be conducted by a vendor. As a environmental impact statement is not updates to the industry's program result, there could be a pool of required. Numerous studies have shown objectives and criteria. Having seen technicians trained by the vendor on the that In complex man-machine systems, such modifications, the NRC will review certified design available for hire at a human error has often been the to determine if they warrant any nuclear power plant site. These overriding contributor to actual or modification in the Commission's personnel, however, would need to potential system failures that may be position expressed above. The NRC will complete site-specific training related to precursors to accidents. With this continue to monitor.the industry the administrative end operating rulemaking, the NRC is emphasizing the accreditation 1;>rocess by.: philosophy of the site as well.as any need to ensure that industry personnel (a) Nominating individuals who are other specific requirements of. the training programs are based upon job not on the NRC staff to serve as licensee. performance requirements. Personnel members of the National Nuclear Thus, the requirements for personnel who are subjected to training based on Accre~iting Board with full voting training programs prescribed by job performance requirements should be privileges; 1 A copy of ACAD 91--015 Is available for public able to perform their jobs more
. (b) Having an NRC staff member effectively, and with fewer errors.
lnspec:Uon or copying et the NRC Public Document attend and observe selected National Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Levell, Therefore, the environmental effect of Nuclear Accrediting Board meetings Washington, DC. implementing this rule would, if with the .INPO staff or the utility 2 Copies of NURF.G-1220, Rev. 1 may be anything, be positive because of the representatives; . purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, reduction in human error. The (c) Having NRC staff observe ~lected Washington, DC :zopt:1-7082; Cople, ere also environmental assessment and finding INPO accreditation team site visits;
- available from the National Technical Information of no significan*t impact on which this (d) Reyiewing any subsequent *
- Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA determination is based are available for revisions to the program objectives and 22161. A copy Is also available for public lnspecUon or copying at the NRC Public Document inspection et the NRC Public Document criteria es currently described in the . Room, :ZlZO L Slr9et, NW. (Lower Level), Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower National Academy for Nuclear Training Washlnston, DC. Level), Washington, DC 20555; Single 50-SC-132
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION copies of the environmental assessment Business Administration in 13 CFR part end finding of no sign~ficant impact are 121.
available from Rajender Auluclc, Office Backlit Analysis of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, The Commission has determined that: Washington, DC 20555, telephone: (301) the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not 49i-3794. apply to this final rule because these amendments are mandated by section Paperwork R.eductio~ Act Statement 306 of the Nuclear Waste Polley Act of This final rule amends information 1982, 42 U.S.C. 10226. Therefore, a collection requirements that are subject . backfit analysis is not required for this to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 , rule. (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These : List of Subjects requirements were approved by the Office of Management end Budget . 10 CFR Part 50 approval numbers 315~011 and 3150- Antitrust, Classified information, 0151. Criminal penalty, Fire protection,. 58 FR 33993 Public burden for update end Incorporation-by reference, Published 6/23/93 maintenance of information is estimated Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear Effective 7/10/96 to average 780 hours per utility per year, power plants and reactors, Radiation including the time for reviewing the . protection, Reactor siting criteria, present program, searching existing data
- Reporting end recordkeeping 10 CFR Part 50 sources, gathering and maintaining the : requirements.
data needed, end co~pleting and RIN 3150-AE55 reviewing the collection ofinformation. i 10 CFR Part 52 Send comments regarding this burden . Administrative practice end Monitoring the Effectiveness of estimate or any other aspect of this : procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting, Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants collection- of information, including Combined license, Early site permit, suggestions for reducing this burden, to
- Emergency planning, Fees, Inspection, AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory the Information and Records Limited work authorization, Nuclear Commission.
Management Branch (MNBB-7714), power plants and reactors, Probabilistic ACTION: Final rule. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, risk assessment, Prototype, Reactor Washington, DC 20555; and to the Desk
- siting criteria, Redress of site, Reporting
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Officer, Office of Information end and recordkeeping requirements, Commission (NRC) is emending its Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019, (3150- Standard design, Standard design regulations for monitoring the 0011), Office of Management and certification. effectiveness of maintenance programs Budget, Washington, DC 20503. For the reasons set out in the at commercial nuclear power plants.
R.egulatory Analysis : preamble and under the authority of the The current regulations require that
, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, nuclear power plant licensees evaluate A regulatory analysis has been : the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, performance and condition monitoring prepared for this final regulation. The : as amended, the Nuclear Waste Policy activities and associated goals and analysis examines the values (benefits) , Act of 1982, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, preventive maintenance activities at and impacts (costs) of implementing the
- the NRC is adopting the following least annually. This amendment regulation for personnel training and ' amendments to 10 CFR parts 50 and 52 changes the time interval for conducting qualification. This analysis is available
- as follows: evaluations from a mandatory once for inspection in the ,-:Re Public every year to at least once every Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW., refueling cycle, but not to exceed 24 (Lower Level), Washington, DC 20555. months.
Single copies of the analysis may be EFFECTIVE DATE: July 10, 1996. obtained *rrom Rajender Auluck (see ADDRESSES heading). ADDRESSES: Copies of comments R.egulatory Flexibility Certification received on the proposed rule may be inspected and copied for a fee at the As required by the: Regulatory Public Document Room localed at 2120 Flexibility Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), L Street, NW. (Lower Level), the Commission certifies that this rule Washington, DC. will not have a significant economic Singh~ copies of the environmental _impact on a substantial number of small assessment are available from Joseph J. entities. This final rule primarily affects Mate, Office of Nuclear Regulatory
- the companies that own and operate Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory light-water nuclear power reactors and Commission, Washington, DC 20555, the vendors of those 'reactors. The Telephone: (301) 292-3795.
companies that own 'and operate these reactors do not fall within the scope of FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: the definition of "small entity" set forth Joseph J. Mate, Office of Nuclear in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Small Business Size Standards set out in Regulatory Commission, Washington, regulatiqns issued by the Small DC 20555, telephone (301) 492-3795. 50-SC-133
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: data, changes to maintenance programs maintenance evaluations. This would Background will likely not be made because there address those licensees that have would not be sufficient information extended their refueling cycle beyond On July 10, 1991 (56 FR 31324) the available for spotting trends or doing 24 months for any reason including NRC published the final rule trend analysis. * . numerous short outages or extended "Requirements for ?vfonitoring the Second, the NRC conducted e shutdown periods. Although the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear regulatory review to eliminate or revise Commission believes that it is generally Power Plants" (§ 50.65). The final rule, unnecessarily burdensome regulations the case that maintenance evaluations which will become effective July 10,* and published a final rule on August 31, will be more effective if conducted in 1996, requires commercial nuclear 1992 (57 FR 39353) that amended conjunction with refueling outages, power plant licensees to monitor the several regulations identified by its licensees would still have the option of effectiveness of maintenance activities . Committee to Review Generic conducting them more frequently.
for safety-significant plant equipment in Requirements (CRGR). One of those In light of the above discussion, the order to minimize the likelihood of amended regulations was 10 failures an*d events caused by the lack NRC is changing the requirement for CFR 50.71 (e) (Final Safety Analysis evaluation of the Qverall effectiveness of of effective maintenance. Section 50;65
- Report Updates) where the frequency of (a)(3) requires nuclear power plant maintenance activities to be performed licensee reporting to the NRC was . once per refueling cycle provided the licensees to evaluate the overall changed from annually to once per effectiveness of their maintenance interval between evaluations does not refueling cycle. The change was made exceed 24 months.
activities on an annual basis. An because the use of e refueling cycle industry consensus guidance document interval provided a more coordinated Summary and Analysis of Public and a regulatory guide to provide an and cohesive update since a majority of Comments acceptable methodology for design changes end major modifications On March 22, 1993 (SB FR915303), the implementing the final rule are were performed during refueling NRC published II notice of the proposed expected to be published by June 30, outages. In addition, it had no adverse rulemaking for public commenL The 1993. impact on the public health and safety comment period expired on May 6, Discussion and reduced the regulatory burden on 1993. The NRC received 17 comments Since the Maintenance Rule was the licensees. on the proposed rule. All of the published in July 1991, two events have The Commission is now changing the comments except for one favored the occurred that led the Commission to required frequency of maintenance change identified 'in the proposed rule. reconsider the annual evaluation activity evaluations from annually to The comments on the proposed rule requirements in § S0;65(e)(3). once per refueling outage.*Evaluation of came primarily from public utilities I:irst, in the Summer of 1991, the do.ta collected over the period of e with comments also received from a Nuclear Management Resources Council refueling cycle wiU provide a public utilities representative end a (NUMARC) Steering Group was formed substantially better basis for detecting private citizen. The NRC has identified to develop an industry guide for problems in degraded performance of and grouped all comments into six implementing the Maintenance Rule. structures; systems, and components broad issues. For each broad issue, the While developing the guide, the (SSC's) and weakness in maintenance NRC has included a summary of the. Steering Group suggested to the. NRC in practices. Evaluations conducted on e comments received and their resolution a public meeting held on February 26, refueling cycle basis would also as follows: 1992, that instead of annual assessment consider and integrate data available 1. Comment. One commenter stated requirements, the NRC should consider only during refueling outages with the that the proposed change in the rule assessments based on e refueling cycle data available during operations; under would unfairly require nuclear plants interval. The NUMARC Steering Group the existing requirements this may not on an annual refueling cycle to perform stated that: occur depending on whether .the annual twice es many evaluations es plants on (1) Significantly more date would be assessment coincides with the refueling a 24-month cycle. *The commenter available during refueling cycles than is outage. Furthermore, evaluations of date believes that the NRC should consider a available on an annual basis; accumulated over the period of e fixed maximum period of 2 years and (2) Key date from some surveillance refueling cycle, es opposed to the give the utilities the latitude to menage tests can only be obtained during shorter annual period required by the the timing of the evaluation within that refueling outages and is not available on rule, will provide e more meaningful framework. an annual basis; and ho.sis for the recognition and Response. The intent of the propo.sed (3) Adjustments to maintenance interpretation of trends. The modification of the maintenance rule is activities that may be made after such Commission understands that a normal to allow sufficient flexibility in the an evaluation would be typically frequency of refueling outage ranges scheduling of Maintenance Programs performed after e refueling outage. from 15 to 18 months; however, the evaluations so that the additional The NUMARC Steering Group further conditions may vary from plant to plant. information available from the refueling added that the evaluation process is a In order to ensure that an indefinite activities could be factored into the time consuming* activity and that with period of time does not occur between evaluation. The refueling cycle hes also limited data available, the annual maintenance evaluations, the been adopted as the basis for FSAR evaluation would not provide for Commission is establishing en upper updates. It is recognized that those meaningful results. With only limited limit of 24 months between the licensees who refuel more frequently will have to conduct these activities more frequently than others. The Commission believes that this is neither
- an undue burden nor one that is outside the control of the licensee to impact by reducing the frequency of refueling.
50-SC-134
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
- 2. Comment. Some commenters stated available only during refueling outages Response. The NRC agrees that that, as a result of the verificetlon and with the data available during effective maintenance is an ongoing yalidation I!rog~am to test the proposed operations; under the existing duty and need. The NRC does not &g!ee, industry gu1delmes, it was determined requirements this may not occur however, that tho rule change allows that several systems are neither risk* depending on whether the annual licensees to_ put off monitoring the significant nor able to be monitored for assessment coincides with the refueling effectiveness of maintenance. Section performance by currently known plant outage; and (3) Evaluation of data 50.65 (a)(1) which is not being changed, level performance criteria. Some accumulated over the p!;!riod of a requires licensees to monitor the commenters believe that these systems refueling cycle, as opposed to the performance or conditions of SSC's have no public healt~ or safety shorter annual period required by the against licensee-established goals, in a significance end that they should be rule, will provide a more meaningful manner sufficient to provide reasonable excluded from the scope of the rule end basis for tho recognition and assurance that these SSC's are capable the rule modified ecc~rdingly. interpretation of trends. In addition, of fulfilling their intende4 functions. It Response. The suggestion to change adjustments to maintenance activities also requires appropriate corrective the scope of the rµle to exclude those* that may be made after such a review action to be token when the systems that hove no 'public health or and evaluation would be typically performance of the SSC does not meet safety significance or* that hove no performed after o refueling outage. established goals. The only thing that is current plant level performance criteria Periodic evaluation of maintenance being changed is the frequency of the is clearly beyond the scope of the rule, activities is a time consuming process periodic evaluation of the maintenance and cannot be considered et this time. end with limited data available, the program. Tho NRC does care about However, if, es a result of any further annual evaluations not conducted in safety and it does not awoe with the verification and validation programs. conjunction with a refueling wc;iuld not commenter that changing the evaluation changes to the rule or regulatory provide for as meaningful a result. cycle sends the wrong message to the guidance are warranted, the NRC will These conclusions havo been reached industry. The NRC believes that this consider such changes at that time. bnsed on tho NRC's independent additional flexibility will not reS\Jlt ln
- 3. Commen(. One commenter stated, assessment. Therefore, the commontor any increase in risk to public health ond "one of the clear lessons learned from incorrectly implies that the NRC simply safety, and In fact, should result in a the recently comple(ed verification and accepts NUMARC's suggestions without more effective maintenance and validation program is that the major independent review and consideration. improved plant s..1.fety.
expense of the rule's implementation Another reason for changing the 6. Comment. One of the commonters will be the detailed documentation.(for stated that the amendments' maximum annual assessment of plant maintenance time period of24 months would ho
- NRC audit purposes) of performance monitoring * * *" '
- concerned a change made by the NRC in restrictive for tho/IC plants planning to Response. The documentation August of 1992. As part of the regulatory Increase their refueling cycle to 24 developed by a licensee in response to review to eliminate or revise months. The commenter explained that 10 CFR 50.65 is that level which the unnecessary burdensome regulations, the Standard Technical Specification, licensee determines necessary to the NRC revised the frequency of Revision 0, retains the option for support the progra~ developed by the licensee reporting of the Final Safoty performance of surveillance licensee to monitor performance of a Analysis Reports from annually to once requirements within 1.25 times the structure, system or component. The por refueling cycle. This change was interval specified and thus, could purpose of this rule modification is not made because the NRC believes that the extend the refueling outage inter\'al of to address the level of documentation use of a refueling cycle interval ploilts with a 24-month refueling cycle required for NRC audit purposes. It is provided a more coordinated and by upwards of 6 months. Accordingly, merely to provide more flexibility iµ the cohesive update since the majority of the refueling cycle for these plants timing of Maintenance Program the design changes and modifications would not meet the maximum time evaluations. were made during refueling outages. period of 24 months allowed by the
- 4. Comment. One commenter stated This was not a rationale relied upon by amendment. Another commenter stated that "The NRC is mesmerized by a NUMARC and further contradicts the that this rule could be further improved suggestion by NUMARC (Nuclear *commenter's view that the NRC accepts by the elimination of the requirement Management and Resources Council), to the suggestions of NUMARC without for a specific time Interval.
extend the annual assessment of plant indepundent consideration. Response. The NRC believes that it is maintenance from 'an annual schedule In summary the Commission necessary to assure that maintenance to a refueling outage schedule." The disagrees with the commenter's view effectiveness is periodically assessed commenter further stated that the thot the extension does not improve and that this period is not unacceptably extension does not provide an safety. The change In requirements will long nor.indefinite. Thus, e balance was improvement in Sl!fety end mey help improve the quality of assessments by necessary between obtaining the hide maintenance .that was improperly ensuring that each assessment will Improved reviews associated with deferred. include a review of all maintenance assessments conducted during refueling Response. As stated earlier, the NRC activities conducted during the outages and the extended or indefinite decided to make the proposed change in refueling cycle including the refueling periods associated with plants with the assessment requirement for the outoge. extended plant cycles or experiencing following reasons: (1) Evaluation of data 5. Comment. One commenter stated extended plant shutdown or outages. In collected over the'period of a refueling that effective maintenance is an ongoing weighing this balance, the Commission cycle will provide o substantially bettor duty and need and that allowing estaolished an upper limit of 24 months basis for detecting problems in degraded licensees to put off monitoring the between maintenance evaluations in performance of SSC's and weakness in effectiveness of maintenance from order to obtain improved evaluations for maintenance practices; (2) Evaluations annually to 18 to 24 months sends the the maiority of the plants having e conducted on a refueling cycle basis wrong message that the NRC does not frequency of refueling cycle from 15 to would also consider and integrate data care about safety. 18 months, and yet not allow SO*SC-135
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION maintenance effectiveness to continue burden for this collection of information "small entities" as set forth In the without being assessed for periods in is expected to be reduced by 150 hours Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small excess of 2 years. The NRG does not per licensee. This reduction Includes Business Size Standards set out In the agree that the rule could be improved the time required for reviewing regulations issued by the Small further by elimination of the Instructions. searching existing doto Business Administration at 13 CFR part requirement of a specific time interval. sources, gathering and maintaining the 121.
Finding of No Significant data needed.and completing end Backlit Analysis Environmental Impact: Availability reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding the estimated The NRG has determined that the The Commission has datermined that, burden reduction or any other aspect of backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not under the National Environmental this oollection of information, Including apply to this rule and, therefore, that a Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the suggestions for reducing this burden. to backfit analysis is not required for this Commission's regulations in subpart A the Information and Records final rule because this amendment does of 10 Cf'R part 51, that this rule, is not Management Branch (MNBB-7714), Involve any provisions which would a major Federal action that significantly U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Impose backfits as determined in 10 affects the quality of the human Washington, DC 20555; and to the Desk CFR 50.109.
- environment end therefore en Officer, Office of Information end environme~tal impact statement is not Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-3019, (3150- List of Subjects in 10 CFR. Part 50 required. 0011), Office of Management and Antitrust, Classified Information, The final amendment does not require Budget, Washington, DC 20503. Criminal penalties, Fire protection, any change to nuclear power plant Incorporation by reference,.
design or require any modifications to a Regulatory Analysis Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear plant. Nor does the rule change the The Nuclear Regulatory Commission power plants and reactors, Radiation scope of the maintenance rule or affect hes considered the costs and benefits of protection, Reactor siting criteria, the nature of the activities to be the final rule. With rasped to benefits. Reporting and recordkeeplng performed, e.g., monitoring. corrective the amendment will allow those requirements. action, end assessments of compJiance. licensees who choose to exercise the The final rule change only extends the option to perform evaluations of their For reasons set out in the preamble time period for performing evaluations maintenance program in conjunction and under the authority of the Atomic of the effectiveness of licensees' with refueling outages but no less Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the maintenance program from at least once frequently than evmy 24 months. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as a year to at least once every refueling Commission beUevM that thio , amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552, 553, the cycle, not to exceed 24 months. The additional 0exJ1Jillty will not result In NRG ls adopting the following extension should not result in any any Increase In risk to the public health amendment.to 10 CFR part 50. significant or discernible reduction In and safety, and may result in a more the effecUveness of a licensee's effective maintenance and improved maintenance program: rather the change plant safety. . will increase the meaningfulness and Under tlie rule, the frequency of quality of the maintenance evaluations. periodic assessments would change For these reasons, the Commission finds from annually to et least once per .that the final amendment will not result refueling.cycle but not to exceed 24 58 FR39092 in any significant increase in either the months. Because most refueling outages Published 7/21/93 probability of occummce of an accident normally occur In the 15* to 18-month or the consequences of an accident and range, the time between periodic therefore concludes that there will be no assessments assuming a *16-month 10 CFR Part 50 significant effect on the environment es average would be Increased by about 33 RIN 3150-ADBO a result of the amendment. percent. Therefore, the licensee staff The environmental assessment is hours to accomplish a periodic
- Training and Qualification of Nuclear available for inspection at the NRG assessment under the proposed rule Power Plant Personnel Public Document Room, 2120 L Street would be reduced from approximately .
NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. 460 staff hours to about 310 staff hours Correction Single copies of the environmental per plant. This would save the licensee . In rule document 93-9651 beginning assessment are available from Josep;h J. approximately 150 staff hours per plant. on page 21904 in the issue of Monday, Mate, Office of Nuclear Regulatory There are-no additional changes in costs April 26, 1993, make the followin{ Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory lo be incurred by the NRC. The *corrections: Commission, Washington, DC 20555, foregoing constitutes the regulatory telephone: (301) 492-3795. analysis for this final rule. § 50.120 [Corrected] Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Regulatory Flexibility Certification On page 21912, in the first column, in This final rule amends the In accordance with the Regulatory § 50.120(b)(1). beginning in the second Information collection requirements that Flexibility Act of 1980, (5 U.S.C. and sixth lines, "(October 25, 1993, are subject to the Paperwork Reduction 605(b)), the Nuclear Regulatory publication]" should read "November Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Commission *certifies that, this rule will 22, 1993" each time it appears.* These requirements were approved by not have a significant economic impact the Office of Management and Budget, on a substanUal number of small approval number 3150-0011. entitles. This rule affects only the
- Because the rule relaxes existing operation of nuclear power plants. The requirements related to the assessment companies that own these plants do not of maintenance activities,the public fall within the scope of the definition of 50-SC-136
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION 58 FR 45243 regulation, 10 CFR 50.71(e), not the. Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3051 Published 8/27/93 specific requirements of the regulation. et seq.). Existing requirements were Effective 9/27/93 Licensees with a QA program approved by the Office of Management description that is common to multiple and Budget approval numbers 3150-units or several sites may submit 0011 and 315CHl155.
changes to the common quality , Regulatory Analysis 10 CFR Parts 50 and 54 assurance (QA) pro~am description that The Commission has prepared a
- RIN 3150 -AE63 do not reduce commitmen~ annually or regulatory analysis on this final 6 months after each.refueling outage at regulation. The analysis examines the FSAR Update Submittals only one of the sites if the interval costs and benefits of the alternatives
. between submittals does not exceed 24 considered by the Commission. The AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory months end all applicable dockets ere analysis is available for inspection in Commission.
- referenced. This would allow licensees the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 with multiple plants to tie the submittal L Street NW. (Lower Level), .
ACTION: Final rule .. of changes to the common QA program Washington, DC. Single copies of the to the refueling outage schedule of only analysis may be obtained from Claudia
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory one plant end would eliminate the need M. Craig, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its for a separate submittal for each plant. Commission, Washington, DC 20555, regulations on power reactor safety in The amendment will eliminat?~e (301) 504-1281.
order to consistently apply the confusion cau~ed ~y the confl.1cting R ul t Fl 'bility Certification requirement that n~clear power pl~t requirements m different sections of the eg a o~ exi licensees submit final safety analysis regulations. As reqmred by the Regulatory report (FSAR) updates annually or six . Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), months after each refueling outage. Summary of Pubbc Comments the Commission certifies that this These amendments eliminate confusion On May 14, 1993 (58 FR 28523), the regulation will not have a significant regarding two references to an existing NRC published a proposed rule that economic impact on a substantial reporting requirement. The final rule. would delete the references to the number of small entities. This does not require additional reporting annual submittal of updates in 10 CFR regulation affects only the licensing and requirements. 50.54(a)(3) and 10 CFR 54.37(b). The operation of nuclear*power plants. The comment period ended on June 14, companies that own these plants do not EFFECTIVE DATE: September 27, 1993. 1993, and the NRC received five letters fall within the scope of the definition of FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: of public comment on the proposed "small entities" as given* in the . rules. Four commenters fully supported Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the Small Claudia M. Craig, Office of Nuclear the proposed changes; one commenter Business Size Standards promulgated in Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear submitted s.tatements f~r § 50.54(a)(3) to the regulations issued.by the Small Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 504-1281. further clanfy the reqwrem~nts and Business Administration at 13 CFR part recommended that NRC revise 10 CFR 54.37(c) to duplicate the reporting 121
- SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: frequency of§ 50.59(b)(2); one Backfit Analysis Background commenter also recommended that NRC The NRC has determined that the consider extending the reporting backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not In February 1993, the Commission frequency associated with 10 CFR apply to this final rule. The rule affects approved the establishment of a 50.59(b)(2) to be consistent with the recordkeeping end reporting regulatory review*group (RRG) to FSAR update submittal. The requirements which have been deemed conduct a comprehensive and Commission agrees with the proposed not subject to the batjcfit rule and the disciplined revie~ of p*ower reactor statements for 10 CFR 50.54(a)(3) end changes are voluntary relaxations of regulations end related NRC pr?cesses, has incorporated the statements into the requirements which are not being programs, and practices for their final rule. All other sections of the final imposed upon licensl!es. Therefore, a implementation. J'he RRG found two rulemaking remain unchanged. Copies backfit analysis is not required for this areas in the regulations that may cause of those letters and the NRC staff final rule because these amendments do confusion regarding a recent response to the*public comments ere not involve any-provisions that would amendment to another section of the available for public inspection an.d impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR regulations. On August 31, 1992, the copying for a fee at the NRC Public 50,109(a)(l).
- Commission amended 10 CFR 50.71(e) Document Room at 2120 L Street NW.*
to allow nuclear power reactor licensees (Lower Level), Washington, DC. List of Subjects to submit FSAR updates either annually or 6 months after each refueling outage. Environmental Impact: Categorical 10 CFR Part 50 The RRG discovered that 10 CFR Exclusion Antitrust, Classified information, 50.54(a)(3) and 10 CFR 54.37(b) still The NRC has determined that this Criminal penalties, Fire protection, referenced the previous requirement for final rule is the type of action described Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear annual FSAR submittals. This conflict as a categorical exclusion in 10 CFR power plants end reactors, Radiation may confuse licensees in determining 51.22(c)(3) (i) and (iii). Therefore, protection, Reactor siting criteria, how often quality assurance pro~am neither en environmental impact Reporting end recordkeeping changes and FSAR updates for license statement nor an environmental requirements. renewal should ~e submitted. assessment has been prepared for this final rule. 10 CFR Part 54 Description The amendments delete the references Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Administrative practice and to the annual submittal of updates in 10 This final rule does not contain a new procedure, Age-related degradation, CFR 50.54(a)(3) .and 10 CFR 54.37(b). or amended information collection Backfitting, Classified information, The amended sections reference the requirement subject to the Paperwork 50-SC-137
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Criminal penalties, Environmental 59 FR 5519 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
protection, Incorporation by reference, Published 2/7/94 Background Nuclear power plants and reactors, Effective 2/7/94 Reporting and recordkeeping On June 30, 1993, the NRC published requirements. Minor Clarifying Amendments in the Federal Register a notice of proposed ruleniaking to clarify the For the reasons set out in the See Part 21 Statements of Consideration timing of notification to the NRC of preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, spent fuel management and funding plans by licensees of those nuclear the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, power. reactors that have been shut as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC down prematurely (58 FR 34947). is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR parts 50 and 54. 1. Comments Received The NRC received four comments on the proposed rule. Three of the four comments crone from licensees or their representatives and supported the rule 58 FR52406 as proposed. These commenters agreed Published 10/8/93 with the NRC assessment that the Effective 11/8/93 proposed rule is administrative in Whistleblower Protection for nature and would produce consistency Employees of NRG-Licensed Activities with the decommissioning rule. 59 FR 10267 However, each of the three See Part 19 Statements of Consideration Published 3/4/94 recommended that the rule amendments Effective 4/4/94 *should apply only prospectively; that is, the rule. should not apply to licensees whose power reactors have already 58 FR54646 10 CFR Part 50 permanently ceased operating. The Published 10/22/93 commenters requested that the NRC RIN 3150-AE46 allow licensees of these plants to submit Whistleblower Protection for spent fliel management funding plans Employees of NRG-Licensed Activities: Notification of Spent Fuel Management on a case-by-case schedule. One Correction
- and Funding Plans by Licensees of commenter recommended that the NRC Prematurely Shut Down Power add a statement to this effect to the final See Part 19 Statements of Consideration . Reactors rule .
A fourth commenter supported the AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory concept of requiring the submittal of Commission. spent fuel management and funding 58 FR 67657 . ACTION: Final rule. plans soon after permanent shutdown, Published 12/22/93 but recommended that licensees be Effective 1 /1 /94
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory required, to submit these plans within 60 Commission (NRC).is amending its days after permanent shutdown.
Standards for Protection Against regulations to clarify the timing of The three commenters representing Radiation; Removal of Expired Material notification to the NRC of spent fuel licensees also supported the NRC intent . management and funding plans by to initiate rulemaking on including See Part 20 Statements of Consideration spent fuel costs as part of licensees of those nuclear power reactors that have been shut down decommissioning costs only after before the expected end of their careful consideration of the database operating lives. The final rule requires that the NRC is developing in this area. that a licensee submit such notification In a related area, one of these 58 FR 68726 commenters noted that the NRC Published 12/29/93 either within 2 years after permanently ceasing operation of its licensed power currently has regulations in place in 10 Effective 1 /28/94 reactor or no later than 5 years before CFR part 72 to ensure a licensee's Self-Guarantee as an Additional the reactor operating license expires, financial qualifications for the safe Financial Assurance Mechanism whichever event occurs first. Licensees construction, operation, and of nuclear power reactors that have decommissioning of an independent See Part 30 Statements of Consideration already permanently ceased operation spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). by the effective date of this rule are The fourth commenter supported required to submit such notification rulemaking. on funding assurance for within 2 years after the effective date of spent fuel storage costs that would be this rule. similar to, but separate from, 59 FR 1618 decommissioning costs. EFFECTIVE DATE: April 4, 1994. Published 1112/94 2. NRC Response to Comments Effective 1/28/94 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Wood, Office of Nuclear Reactor The NRC responds as follows to the Self-Guarantee as an Additional Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory issues raised by the commenters: Financial Assurance Mechanism;
- Commission, Washington, DC 20555, (1) The role should only apply Correction telephone (301) 504-1255. prospectively.
See Part 30 Statements of Consideration 50-SC-138
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION NRG response: The NRC disagrees that licensees ha,ve adequate funds to assessment and finding of no significant that this rule should not apply to construct, operate, and decommission impact for this final rule.
licensees of plants that have already ISFSis. Spent fuel management and Paperwork Reduction Act Statement permanently ceased ~perating. This rule funding plans submitted in compliance should be consistent:with the provisions with the amended§ 50.54(bb) need not This* final rule does-not contain a new* of 10 CFR 50.82(a), which requires all cover spent fuel wh1le it is being stored or amended information collection power plant licensees to submit in an ISFSI in compliance with part 72. requirement subject to the Paperwork decommi_ssioning plans no later than 2 The NRC will consider whether these Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 years after permanently*ceasing provisions are adequate when it et seq.). Existing requirements were operations regardless of how long the evaluates whether it is necessary to approved by the Office of Management plant operated. The ~C recently include spent fuel management and and Budget, approval number (3150-amended 10 CFR 50.82(a) to allow the funding as part of decommissioning 0011). collection period of any shortfall of costs. Regulatory Analysis decommissioning funds to be Finding of No Significant determined on a case-by-case basis for On August 31, 1984, the NRC Environmental Impact: Availability . published a final rule, "Requirements plants that had been, shut down prematurely (57 FR 30383, July 9, 1992). This final rule clarifies the timing of fc;>r Licensee Actions Regarding the
- However, even licensees of these plants the submittal of plans for managing and Disposition of Spent Fuel Upon must subm~t their decommissioning providing funding for managing all Expiration of Reactor Operating plans' within the 2-year time* frame, irradiated fuel for those licensees whose Licensees." (49 FR 34689). As part of notwithstanding the collection period power reactors are shut down this rule, the NRC required power ultimately adopted. : prematurely. This action is required to reactor licensees to submit for NRC To maintain consistency, the NRC coordinate the submittal of spent fuel review and approval, no later than 5 believes that the 2-year limit should be management and funding plans with the years before expiration of the reactor applied to plants already shut down. submittal of decommissioning plans for operating license, their plans for However; to assure that the NRC does prematurely shut down reactors. managing spent fuelat their site until not impose unnecessary burdens on Because management and funding of title to the spent fuel is transferred to these licensees, the final rule has been spent fuel can have a significant impact the Department of Energy (DOE). These modified to allow these licensees 2 on the method and timing of plans are to include plans for funding of years from the effective date of the rule decommissioning, licensees should spent fuel management before transfer to submit their spent fuel management submit their plans for spent fuel to DOE.
and. funding plans.*. management and funding to be On June 27, 1988, the Commission (2) Submittal of spent fuel consistent with the timing provisions promulgated its final decommissioning management and funding plans should for decommissioning plans in § 50.82(a) rule (53 FR 24019). Section 50,82 of this be required within 60 days of permanent (i.e., no later than 2 years after rule provides that licensees of all power shutdown of the fac.ility, rather than permanent shutdown). reactors that permanently cease with}n 2 years. Neither this action nor the alternative operation after July 27, 1988, including NRG Response: The NRC disagrees of maintaining the existing rule would those that shut down prematurely, must with this comment. Sixty days is too significantly affect the environment. apply to *the NRC to decommission their short a period in which to develop a Changes in the timing of the submittal facilities within 2 years following meaningful spent fuel management and of spent fuel management and funding permanent cessation of operations. funding plan. Because licensees will for prematurely shut down power Section 50.82(b)(l)(iii) further provides normally develop these plans in reactors would not alter the effect on the that the proposed decommissioning conjunction with their environment of the licensed activities plan*submitted by the licensee should decommissioning plans, the NRC considered in either the final spent fuel consider such factors.as the should maintain consistency by disposition rule (49 FR 34689; August "unavailability of waste disposal req.uiring the same 2-year limit for both 31, 1984) or the final decommissioning capacity and other site-specific factors spent fuel management and funding rule (53 FR 24018; June 27, 1988) as affecting the licensee's capability to plans and the overall decommissioning analyzed in the Final Generic carry out decommissioning safely plan, which includes decommissioning Environmental Impact Statement on * * *." The Commission requires funding. Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities licensees to submit decommissioning (3) Costs associated with the (NUREG--0586; August 1988). The plans iii a timely manner after they construction, operation, and alternative to this action would not permanently cease operations at their decommissioning of JSFS1s are already significantly affect the environment. facilities. The NRC's regulations assured by provisions in 10 CFRPart 72. Therefore, the Commission has recognize that a licensee's ability to plan
*
- NRG Response: The NRC agrees that determined, under the National prop!;!rly and safely for part- 72 contains provisions to ensure Environ.mental Policy Act of 1969, as decommissioning depends on a amended, and the Commission's licensee's ability to manage and dispose
*.In practice, licensees, of most of the nuclear regulations in subpart A of 10 CFR part of its spent fuel. Thus, the timing of power plants that have already permanently shut down have developed plans for the management 51, that this rule will not be a major requirements for submittal of plans for and funding of the disposition of spent fuel at their Federal action significantly affecting the spent fuel management and storage sites.. For example, Fort St. Vrain has either shipped quality of the human environment and, should be consistent with the timing for
. spent fuel offsite to DOlj or moved It to an ISFSI therefore, an environmental impact submittal of decommissioning plans, onsite. Shoreham *1s shipping Its fuel to Limerick. Yankee-Rowe and Rancho Seco have developed statement is not required. No other including those for power reactors that plans for ODsite storage facilities. Humboldt Bay agencies or persons were contacted for have been shut down prematurely. end LeCrosse are maintainiDg fuel hi their spent this action, and no other documents Therefore, the NRC is amending 10 CFR fuel. pools. Dresden 1, San Onofre 1, and Indian related to the environmental impact of Point 1 are maintaining fuel ln their spent fuel 50.54(bb) to require each power reactor
- pools or.In pools of other unita still operating et the this action exist. The foregoing licensee to notify the NRC of its program site. Peach Bottom 1 has no fuel _onsite. constitutes the environmental to manage and provide _funding for 50-SC-139
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION management of the irradiated fuel at its protection, Reactor siting criteria, SUPPLEMENTARY INliORMATION:
reactor either within 2 years after the Reporting and recordkeeping Background licensee permanently ceases operation requirements.
*or its reactor or no later than 5 years For the reasons given in the preamble On August 19, 1980 (45 FR 55402),
before its reactor operating license and l!llder the authority of the Atomic the NRC published a final rule that expires, whichever occurs first. Energy A.ct of 1954, as amended, the revised its emergency planning Licensees of nuclear power reactors that Energy Reorganization Act of 1974; as regulations. The final rule became have already permanently ceased amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the effective on November 3, 1980. On July operations by the effective date of this NRC is adopting the following 6, 1984 {49 FR 27733), the NRC rule are required to submit such amendmentto 10 CFR part 50. amended its emergency planning notification within 2 years after the regulations to relax the frequency of effective date of this rule. participation by State and local Although the timing of preparation governmental authorities in emergency and submittal of.plans for management preparedness exercises at nuclear power and funding of spent fuel would be reactor sites. The amendments were formally advanced for licensees that based on the NRC's experience gained shut down their power reactors 59 FR 14085 in observing and evaluating emergency prematurely, these licensees typically Published 3/25/94 preparedness exercises since 1980. Effective 5/31/94 would have already evaluated spent fuel Further experience has shown that the management and funding "issues before NRG Operations Center Commercial language setting forth the requirements submitting decommissioning plans . Telephone Number Change in 10 CFR piu-t 50, Appendix E, Section required under 10 CFR 50.82. This rule IV.F.3 concerning full or partial merely makes 10 CFR 50.54(bb) See Part 20 Statements of Consideration participation by State or local submittal schedular requirements governments in the bieQDial (offsite) consistent with 10 CFR 50.82. Thus, exercise is wmecessarily complicated. there should be no.substantive impact The NRC published a notice of proposed on power reactor licensees.
- rulemaking in the Federal Register on This final rule would not create June 28, 1993 (58 FR 34539). Public substantial costs for other licensees. comments were requosted by September This final rule also will not significantly 13, 1993. The proposed rule did not affect State and local governments and seek to change the requirements set geographical regions, or the forth in Appendix E, Section IV.F.3 (a),
59 FR 14087 (b), and (d) but to clarify and simplify environment, or create substantial costs Published 3/25/94 to the NRC or other Federal agencies. Effective 6/23/94 the text of the regulation. Offsite The foregoing discussion constitutes the . authority responsibilities remain regulatory analysis for this final rule.
- unchaDged.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification Under the proposed rule the offsite 10 CFR Part 50 plans for each site were to be exercised As required by the Regulatory biennially with full participation by Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), RIN: 3150-AD40 each offsite authority having a role the Commission certifies that this final under the plan. Further, where the rule will not have a significant impact Emergency Planning and offsite authority has a role under the upon a substantial number of small Preparedness Exercise Requirements plan for more than one site, it would be entities. The rule will potentially affect for Nuclear Power Plants required to participate in one exercise approximately 115 nuclear power fully every two years and partially reactor operating licenses. Nuclear AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory participate in other offsite plan
- power plant licensees do not fall within Commission. exercises in this period. The only the definition of small businesses as ACTION: Final rule. amended requirements were those set defined in section 3 of the Small forth in Appendix E, Section IV.F.3(e)
Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, the Small
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory where the interval for an ingestion Business Size Standards of the Small Commission (NRC) is amending its exposure pathway exercise was changed Business Administrator (13 CFR part emergency planning regulations in order from 5 to 6 years, and Appendix E, 121), or the Commission's Size to update the Commission's emergency Section IV.F.3(c) where the requirement Standards (56 FR 56671, November 6, planning exercise requirements for that all States within the plume 1991). exposure pathway emergency planning nuclear power plants and clarify Backfit Analysis ambiguities that have surfaced in the zone (EPZ) for a given site fully implementation of the regulations. participate in an offsile exercise for that The NRC has determined that this site at least once every 7 years was final rule does not impose a backfit as These amendments also make the NRC regulations consistent with FEMA deleted.
defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(l). Therefore, a backfit analysis is not regulations. Public Comments required for this final rule. EFFECTIVE DATE: June 23, 1994. A total of 12 comment letters were List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: received, of which 5 were from utilities, Antitrust, Classified information, Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of 6 were from State emergency Criminal penalty, Fire protection, Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. management agencies and one from Incorporation by reference, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUMARC. All commenters generally Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301- agreed with the proposed rulemaking power plants and reactors, Radiation 492-3918). except for one Stale agency. 50-SC-140
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Comment: The one commentor that pathway portion of exercises at least deletion of the return frequency opposed the rule change noted that, once every six years. In States with requirement can be justified."
We do not believe, however, the. NRC has more than one site, the State should The Commission now believes that substantiated its claim that the seven-yell!' rotate this participation from site to sufficient experience has been gained in return requirement Is ~nnecessary. SimilBr site." the observation and evaluation of arguments have surfaced in previous Response: The Commission agrees emergency preparedness exercises at emergency planning is~ues, and our response with the suggested wording and has nuclear power reactor sites to conclude is the same: The high level of industry incorporated this comment in the final that the 7 year return frequency should sensitivity to emergency preparedness is a rule.
- be deleted.
direct result of comprehensive requirements
- The Commission has found that for emergency preparedness programs end Discussion multi-site States, when not fully * .
exercises. Elimination of those requirements The Commission finds that the participafing in an exercise at a specific runs the risk of returning the industry to pre* current regulation has resulted in a TMI levels of preparedness. site will usually partially participate at relatively complicated description of the a significant level of activity every 2 Response: The Coin.mission does not requirements for exercise participation years at that specific site in order to agree that deleting the 7 year return by State and local governments who support the participation of the frequency "* *
- runs the risk of have offsite planning responsibility for appropriate local governments. The returning the industry to pre-TMI levels more than one nuclear power plant. Commission has found that this level of of preparedness." The Commission is This final rule simplifies and clarifies exercise participation provides adequate confident that this will not occur this requirement. In addition, Appendix emergency response training for State because the Commi~ion has foWld that E is revised to reflect that the interval and local governments. Additionally, a multi-sites states, when not fully for an Ingestion exposure pathway provision still exists in the regulation participating in an exercise at a specific exercise be changed from at least once which permits State or local government site will usually piu:tially participate at every 5 years to at least once every 6 participation in any licensee's drills or a significant level of activity every 2 years (FEMA's ingestion pathway exercises. A State or local government years et that specific site in order to exercise requirement is at least once may consider its response capability to support the participation of the every 6 years). The change in the be less than optimal because of an appropriate local governments. The interval would match the biennial unusually large personnel turnover or Commission has found that this level of frequency required for exercises of because there have been limited exercise particlpati(?n provides adequate offsite plans. Further, Appendix E is responses to real emergencies in the
' emergency response training for State also revised to eliminate the 7 year community. The regulation still requires and local govemme,nts. The return frequency requirement because it the licensees to provide for State or Commission believes that this bas proven to be unnecessary to achieve
- local government participation if they rulemakiug does nqt have an adverse the underlying purpose of the rule as indicate such a desire. This final impact on public h~lth and safety well as being burdensome to states revision does not have any adverse because State emergency response which are within the plume exposure impact on public health and safety personnel continuously respond to pathway for multiple sites (FEMA does because State emergency response actual emergencies :and experience hes not have a return frequency personnel continuously respond to shown that states through a combination requirement). Both changes assure actual emergencies and experience has of full and partial participation compatibility with FEMA requirements shown that states through a combination exercises maintain an adequate level of and thus avoid confusion among of full and partial participation
. response capability. A formal licensees and State governments. exercises maintain an adequate level of requirement for a State to return to a Notwithstanding elimination of the 7 response capability. A formal specific site every 7 years to participate year return frequency requirement, the requirement for a State to return to a in an exercise has proven to be Commission.believes that offsite specific site every 7 years to participate unnecessary. Nonetheless, nothing authorities should rotate their full in an exercise has proven to be prevents a State from returning to a participation in exercises among sites if *unnecessary.This rulemaking deletes specific site to participate in an exercise they are within the plume exposure that unnecessary, unwarranted and whenever it deems warranted.
- pathway for more than one site. burdensome requirement. Nonetheless, Comment: Several comments The Commission codified the 7 year nothing prevents a State from returning suggested additional clarification to the return frequency in the July 6, 1984 (49 to a specific site to participate in an emergency planning regulations. FR 27733), amendment to the exercise whenever lt deems warranted.
Response: Although the Commission emergency planning regulations. This
- Lastly, this revision deletes past due always appreciates: suggestions on amendment provides that at least once dates (see section F(2) (a)) because they clarifying its reguhi-tions, the every 7 years, all States within the are now meaningless. .
Commission at this time believes that all plume exposure pathway EPZ of a given FEMA concurs with .the amendments of the suggested changes would be site must fully participate in an offsite in this rulemalcing. inappropriate to include in this exercise for that site. In doing so, the rulemaking proceeding because the Commission noted that "the final rule is Finding of No Significant suggested revisions are beyond the not totally consistent with FEMA*s final Environmental Impact: Availability scope of this ruleniaking. regulation (44 CFR part 350). This The Commission has determined Comment: Several commenters noted inconsistency lies in the area of return under the National Environmental that the proposed wording for the frequency of multiple-site states as Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the ingestions pathway exercise was not previously discussed. The FEMA Commission's regulations in subpart A consistent with the FEMA requirement position on return frequency is a of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not and could be interpreted differently significant departure from the NRC's a major Federal action significantly than intended. They suggested the proposed regulation ofJuly 21, 1983 (48
- affectirig the quality of the human following requirement, "A State should FR 33307). The Commission oolieves environment; and therefore, an fully participate in the ingestion that more study is needed before et: vironmental impact statement is not 50-SC-141
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION required. This regulation updates and deletes the requirement that all states clarifies the emergency planning within the plume exposure pathway regulations relating to exercises. It does EPZ for a given site fully participate in not involve any modification to any an offsite exercise for that specific site plant or revise the need for or the at least every 7 years. It also relaxes the standards for emergency plans, and requirement to perform an ingestion there is no adverse effect on the quality exposure pathway exercise from every 5 of the environment. The environmental years to every 6 years. These changes 60 FR 13615 assessment and finding of no significant would permit, but do not require, Published 3/14/95 impact on which this determination is licensees to change their emergency Effective 4/13/95 based are available for inspection at the plans and procedures. Therefore, these NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L changes are not considered backfits as 10 CFR Parts 50, 55, and 73 Street NW (Lower Level), Washington, defined in 10 CFR 50.109 (a)(l).
DC 20036. RIN 3150-AF18 List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Antitrust, Classified information, Reduction of Reporting Requirements This final rule does not contain a new Criminal penalties, Fire protection, Imposed on NRC Licensees or amended information collection Incorporation by reference, AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory requirement subject to the Paperwork Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear Commission. Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 power plants and reactors, Radiation ACTION~ Finai rule. et seq.). Existing requirements were protection; Reactor siting criteria, approved by the Office of Management Reporting and recordkeeping
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory and Budget approval number 3150- requirements. Commission (NRC) is amending its 0011. For the reasons set out in the regulations to reduce reporting preamble, and under the authority of the requirements cUITently imposed on Regulatory Analysis Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, water-cooled* nuclear power reactor, The Commission has prepared a the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, research and test reactor, and nuclear regulatory analysis on this regulation. as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, material licensees. This rule reduces the The analysis examines the costs and the NRC is adopting the following regulatory burden on NRC licensees; benefits of the alternatives considered amendments to 10 CFR part 50. and partially implements a recent NRC by the Commission. The analysis is initiative to revise or eliminate available for inspection in the NRC duplicative or unnecessary reporting Public Document Room, 2120 L Street requiremerits. The amendments will:
NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC 59 FR 50688 . Eliminate the current requirement for 20036. Single copies of the analysis may Published 10/5/94 licensees to submit summary reports of be obtained from Michael Jamgochian, Effective 10/5/94 *containment leakage rate tests to the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC (10 CFR Part SO-Appendix J), but U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRG Library; Address Change preserve the*reqtiirements:in §§ 50.72 Washington, DC 20555. Telephone: and 50.73 under which licensees See Part 35 Statements of Consideration (301) 492-3918. currently report any instances ,of leakage Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification exceeding authorized limits in the technical specifications of the*license; The regulation does not have a revise 19 CFR 55.25 to refer licensees to significant impact on a substantial a similar reporting requirement in 10 number of small entities. The final rule CFR 50.74(c) and require notification of updates and clarifies ambiguities in the operator incapacity only in case of emergency planning regulations relating permanent disability or illness; and to exercises. Nuclear power plant eliminate the requirement for quarterly licensees do not fall within the submittal of safeguards event logs definition of small business in Section presently contained in 10 CFR 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 73.71(c)(2) and Appendix G to Part 73. 632, the Small Business Size Standards EFFECTIVE DATE: April 13.1995. of the Small Business Administration in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 13 CFR part 121, or the Commission's. Naicm S. Tanious, Office of Nuclear Size Standards published at 56 FR Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear 56671 (November 6, 1991). Therefore, in Regulatory Commission, Washington, accordance with the Regulatory DC 20555. Telephone (301) 415-6103. Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: this final rule, will not have a Background significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities and On January 7, 1994, the Executive that, therefore, a regulatory flexibility Director for Operations (EDD) sent to analysis need not be prepared. the Commission SECY-94-003, "Plan for Implementing Regulatory Review Backfit Analysis Group Recommendations.'.' The This regulation does not impose any Commission .approved these new requirements on production or recommendations for reducing utilization facilities. The regulation regulatory burden on its Hcensees. This 50-SC-142
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
-final rule is one of several rulemakings the background section of this rulemakings in depriving the public of and other regulatory actions currently rulemaking, the NRC has underway access to licensee information that.was being developed by the NRC staff to several regulatory activities to previously avaiiable from the NRC. In implement the Regulatory Review implement the Regulatory Review that regard, OCRE has directly presented Group recommendations to eliminntc Group's recommendations to eliminat,i
- this issue to the Commission through its duplicative or unnecessary reporting duplicative or unnecessary reporting petition for rulemaking referenced requirements. The NRC believes that requirements. This rulemaking is above and the NRC finds that this this action will reduce the regulatory limited to tlm requirements set out in generic issue is better addressed in the burden on NRC licensees without the proposed rulemaking. context of that petition, rather .than in causing adverse effects on the protection individual rulemakings such as this one.
of public health and safety. Licensees do not Need to Assemble ihe 2:
- On November 1994 (59 FR 54843), Summary Report The NRC also finds that the effect of this rulemaking will be to reduce the the NRC published the notice of One commenter from the nuclear administrative burden on licensees and proposed rulemaking that reduces- power industry states that the that the loss of the information in this reporting requirements on licensees requirement to generate but not submit particular case will not adversely affect tinder Parts 50, 55, and 73. Specifically, a summary report for the containment the public interest in access to the proposed amendments were leakage tests provides no additional information regarding adequate intended to: (1) Eliminate the current , benefit and is an unnecessary burden protection of the public health and requirement for licensees to submit since the summary report contains data safety.
summary reports of containment leakage readily available from other sources. Having considered all comments rate tests to the NRC (10 CFR part 50- The commenter suggests that the received and other input, the NRC has appendix J), but preserve the requirement to generate the summary determined that the following final rule requirements in§§ 50.72 and 50.73 report be eliminated. should be promulgated. under which licensees currentty report The NRC disagrees. The NRC believes any instances of leakage exceeding that the results of containment leakage Written Reports authorized limits in the technical tests, the licensee analysis verifying the This final rule would not require specifications of the license; (2) revise acceptability of the results, as well as additional written reports. On. the 10 CFR 55.25 to refer licensees to a any necessary interpretations of the contrary, under this final rule, reporting similar reporting requirement in 10 CFR results, is necessary information which will be reduced for all licensees under 50.74(c) and require notification of might not be documented absent this 10 CFR Parts 50. 55, and 73. operator incapacity only in case of documentation requirement. permanent disability or illness; and (3) Furthermore, the assembly of a Criminal Penalties eliminate the requirement for quarterly summary report will provide access by For purposes of Section 223 of the submittal of safeguards event logs NRC inspectors and auditors to this Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, presently contained in 10 CFR information in a more timely fashion. relating to willful violations of 73.71(c)(2) and Appendix G to Part 73. requirements notice is hereby given that The public comment period expired Public.Participation in the NRG Regulatory Process Will Diminish these amendments are being adopted December 19, 1994._ and promulgated pursuant to Sections _OCRE opposes the proposed rule 161 b, 161i, or 1610 of the Act. Analysis of Public Comments on the because it believes that adoption of the Proposed Rule rule will diminish the public"s access to Environmental Impact: Categorical The NRC received seven comments: information. OCRE states that the Exclusion one from Nuclear Energy Institute (NE!), public's health and safoty is not the only The NRC has determined that this an organization that represents the factor to consider when NRC proposes final rule is the type of action described nuclear power industry, five from the to eliminate some licensee reports. in the categorical exclusion 10 CFR nuclear power industry, and one from Access to these reports, OCRE states, is 51.22(c)(3)(iii). Therefore, neither an Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, vital for effective public participation in environmental impact statement nor an Inc. (OCRE). The comments from NEI the regulatory process. envirnnmental assessment has been and the nuclear power industry are To that end, OCRE has filed a petition prepared for this regulation. supportive of the proposed rule to for rulemaking with the NRC (59 FR reduce the reporting requirements. 30308, June 13, 1994). The purpose of Paperwork Reduction Act Statement OCRE opposes the proposed rule.* the petition is to establish public right- This final rule amends information However, all coinmenters believe that to-know provisions which would ensure col-lection requirements that are subject elimination 9f these reports will not public access to licensee-held to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 adversely impact public health and information. (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These safety. The following section addresses ln each case where the NRC considers requirements were approved by the
- the public comments received and eliminating a reporting requirement, the Office of Management and Budget, provides NRC's response to them. NRC first considers the public health approval numbers 3150-0011, -0018, Of the six comments received which and safety impact of the proposed and-0002.
favor the proposed rule, several of those elimination. If there is no direct impact Because the rule will relax existing endorsing the nile pointed out that the on public health and safety, the NRC information collection requirements, the proposed -changes eliminate also considers the reduced annual public burden for this collection
*unnecessary or redundant requirements administrative burden on the licensee of information is expected to be reduced and conserve both NRG and licensee and the extent to which the proposed by approximately 20 hours per licensee.
resources. Two of the commenters felt elimination will deprive the public nf This reduction includes the time that the NRC sliould assess additional important health and safety infomrntion. required for reviewing instructions. reporting requirements to determine OCRE's comments have raised the searching existing data sources, whether they can be eliminated or . generic issue of the incremental and gathering and maintaining the data reduced.in frequency. As discussed in cumulative P.ffect of this and similar needed and completing and reviewing 50-SC-143
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION the collection of information. Send 10 CFR Part 55 60 FR 36953 comments regarding the estimated Published 7/19/95 Criminal penalties, Manpower Effective 8/18/95 burden reduction or any other aspect of training programs, Nuclear power plants this collection of information, including and reactors, Reporting and.
suggestions for reducing this burden, to 10 CFR Part 50 recordkeeping req~irements. the Information and Records RIN 3150-AF06 Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. 10 CFR Part 73 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Technical Specifications _ Criminal penalties, Hazardous
- Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the materials transportation, Export, Import, AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Desk Officer, Office of Information and Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants Commission.
Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0011. -0018, -0002), Office of and reactors, Reporting and ACTION: Final rule. Management and Budget, Washington, recordkeeping requirements, Security DC 20503. measures.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory
- Commission (NRC) is amending its:
Regulatory Analysis regulations pertaining to technical The Commission has prepared a specifications for nuclear power regulatory analysis on this final rule. reactors. The rule codifies criteria for The analysis examines the costs and 60 FR 24549 determining the content of technical benefits of the alternatives considered Published 5/9/95 specifications. Each licensee covered by by the Commission. The Commission Effective 5/9/95 these regulations may voluntarily use* requested public comment on the draft the criteria as a basis to propose the regulatory analysis, but no comments Changes to NRG Apdresses and relocation of existing technical* . were received. Therefore, no changes to , Telephone Numbers specifications that do not meet any of the draft regulatory analysis have been - See Part 2 Statements of Consideration the criteria from the facility license to made. The draft regulatory analysis is. licensee-controlled-documents. The adopted as the final regulatory analysis vol~tary conversion of current without change. The analysis is .--
- technical specifications in this manner available for inspection in the NRC is expected to produce an improvement Public Document Room, 2120 L Street in the safety of nuclear power plants NW. (Lower Level), Washington.DC._ through a reduction in unnecessary plant transients and more efficient use Regulatory Flexibility Certification of NRC and industry resources.
In accordance with the Regulatory EFFECTIVE DATE:,August 18, 1995. Flexibility Act of 1980, (5 U.S.C. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 605(b)), the Commission certifies that
. Christopher I. Grimes, Chief, Technical this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial Specifications Branch, Division of number of small entities. This final rule Project Support, Office of Nuclear . affects the nuclear power reactors, Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear
- research and test reactors, and some Regulatory Commission*, Washington, material licensees. The companies and DC 20555;..ooo1, Telephone: (301) 415-.
organizations that own these plants do 1161. not fall within the scope of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: definition of "small entities" set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act of the size Background standards established by the NRC (56 FR Section 182a. of the Atomic Energy 56671; November 6, 1991). Act of.1954 (Act), as amended (42 U.S.C. 2232), mandates the inclusion of Backfit Analysis technical specifications in lli:enses for*
- The NRC has determined that the the operation of production and backfit rule,. 10 CFR 50.109, does not utilization facilities. The Act requires apply to this final rule because these
- that technical specifications include amendments do not involve any - information concerning the amount, provisions which would impose backfits kind, and source of special nuclear
. on licensees as defined in § 50_.109(a)(l). material; the place of use; and the In addition, information collection and specific characteristics of the facility. reporting requirements are not subject to That section also states that technical the backfit rule. specifications shall contain information List of Subjects the Commission requires through regulation to enable it to find that the 10 CFR Part 50 utilization of special nuclear material Antitrust, Classified information, will be in accord with the common Criminal penalties, Fire *protection, defense and security and will provide Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear adequate protection of public health and power plants and*reactors, Radiation safety. Finally, that section requires
- protection, Reactor sitin'g'criteria, technical specifications to.be made a Reporting and recordkeepirig part of any license issued; requirements. *
- The Commission promulgated § 50.36, "Technical Specifications," which 50-SC-144
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION implements section 182a. of the Atomic
- general category of specifications would The new STS should place greater Energy Act on December 17, 1968 (33 have been the same as that currently emphasis on human factors principles FR 18610). This rule;delineates performed for technical specification in order to make the text of the STS requirements for determining the changes; which are amendments to the clearer and easier to understand. The contents of technical: specifications. operating license. For the second new STS should also improve the bases Technical specifications, at a minimum, category, "supplemental specifications," section of technical specifications, must set forth the specific the licensee would have been allowed to . which gives the purpos~ for ~ach characteristics of the facility and the . make changes within specified requirement in-the specification.
conditions for its operation that are conditions without prior NRC approval. (2) A parallel program of short-term required to provide adequate protection The- NRC :would have reviewed these improvements in both the scope and of the health and safety of the public. changes when they*~ere made an~ : . substance of the existing technical Specifically, § 50.36 ,requires the would have done so m a manner similar specifications should be initiated in following: : to that currently used for reviewing addition to developing new STS as Each license authorizing operation of a
- design changes, tests, and experiments *stated in recommendation 1.
production or utilization facility of a type ' performed under the provisions of On February 6, 1987* (52 FR 378~). the described in§ 50.21 or§ 50.22 will include : § 50.59. Because of difficulties with NRC published in the F.~dera~ Reg1S!er technical specifications. The technical ' defining the criteria for dividing the for public comment an Intenm*Pohcy specifications will be derived from the
- technical specifications into the two Statement. on Technical Specification analyses and evaluation included in the categories of the p~oposed. ru~e and safety analysis report, and amendments Improvements for Nuclear Power because of other higher pnonty Reactors" (interim policy statement) thereto submitted pursuant to § 50.34. The Commi~sion may include such additional ' licensing work, the proposed
- containing proposed criteria in,response technical specifications as the Commission amendment was deferred. . to recommendation 1. These cntena finds appropriate. 1n the early 1980s, the nuclear were generally derived from the criteria industry and the NRC staff began proposed in the AIF and TSIP reports.
Technical specific;:ations cannot be changed by licensees without prior NRC studying whether the existing system of and were modified slightly on the basis establishing technical. specification of discussions between the NRC staff
- approval. However,:since 1969, there requirements for nuclear power plants has been a trend to~ard including in and the industry. The public comm(lnt technical specifications not only those needed improvement. During this. period for the interim policy statement period, an*NRC task group known as the* expired on March 23, 1987. .
requirements derived from the ana~yses Technical Specifications Improvement and evaluation in the safety analysis The criteria were developed with the Project (TSIP) and a Subcommittee of intention that they would apply to report but also essentially all othe~ ; the Atomic Industrial Forum's (AIF's) Commission requirements governing the limiting conditions for operation
- Committee on Rea'Ctor Licensing_and (LCOs). The NRC staff belie".ed that the operation of nuclear power reactors.
This extensive use of technical Safety performed two studies of this safety limits needed to ~emam . specifications was due in part to a lack issue,t The overall conclusion of these unchanged in the technical . . of well-defined criteria (in either the studies was. that many improvements. in specifications because of their more body of the rule or in some other the scope and content of technical
- direct link to protection of the physical specifications were.needed and*that a barriers that guard against the . .
regulatory document! for wh~t sho~ld joint NRC and industry program should be included in technical specifications. uncontrolled release of radioactivity. At be initiated to implement these the time the criteria*were developed, the
- Since 1969, this use has contributed to improvements. Both groups made the volume of technical specifications industry did not wish to addres~
specific*recommendations; these are administrative controls and design and to the several-fold increase in the summarized as follows: . number of license amendment features in the effort to improve the . (1) The NRC should adopt the criteri'a STS. Later, however, both the industry applications to effect changes to _the : for defining the scope of technical . technical specifications. It has diverted and the NRC staff realized that it would
; specifications proposed in the AIF and. be beneficial to include upgraded both NRC staff and licensee attention
- TSIP reports. Those criteria should then from the more important requirements administrative controls and design be used by the NRC and-each of the features in the improved STS, and these in these documents to the extent that it *
- nuclear steam supply system vendor*
has resulted in an adverse but were handled separately from the
- owners groups to completely rewrite application of the criteria to the LCOs.
unquantifiable impact on safety. and streamline the existing standard On March 30, 1982 (47 FR 13369), the The NRC bas developed a program for NRC published in the Federal Register technical specifications (STS). This short-term improvements as. described process would result in the transfer of in recommendation 2 (above). These are a proposed amendment to Part 50. The many requirements from control by proposed rule would have revised known as ".line-item" improvements
- technical specification requirements to and are generic improvements
§ 50.36, "Technical Specifications," to
' control by other mechanisms (e.g., the developed and promulgated by the NRC establish a new system of specifications divided into'two general categories. final safety analysis report (FSAR),
staff for voluntary adoption by Only those specifications contained in . operating procedures, quality assurance licensees. the first general category as technical (QA) plan) that would not require a Subsequently, improved vendor-specifications would have become part license amendment or prior NRC specific STS were developed and issued of the operating license and would have approval when changes were needed. by the NRC in September. 1992. The required prior NRC approval for any improved STS were pubhshed as the 1 SECY-86-10, "Recommendations for Improving changes. Those specifications contained Technical Specifications," January 13, 1986, following NRC reports: in the second general category would contains both "Recommendations for Improving
- NUREG-1430, "Standard Technical have become supplemental Technical Specifications," NRC Technical Specifications, Babcock and Wilcox specifications and;would not have : Specifications Improvement Project, September 30, Plants"
* *19e5, end "Technical Specifications required prior NRC approval for most improvements," AIF Subcommittee on Technical
- NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical changes. The NRC, review of the first Speclficetionll Improvements, October 1, 1985. Specifications, Westinghouse Plants" 50-SC-145
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
- NUREG-1432, "Standard Technical The interim policy statement.also to meet the principal operative standard Specifications, Coinbustion Engineering stated that, in addition to structures, in Section 182a. of the Atomic Energy Plants" systems, and components captured by Act, that is, that adequate protection is
- NUREG-1433, "Standard Technical the three criteria, it was the provided to the health and safety of the Specifications, General Electric Plants, Commission's policy that licensees public. .
- BWR/4" retain in the technical specifications The Commission recognizes that the
- NUREG-1434, "Standard Technical LCOs for a specified list of systems that four criteria carry a theme of focusing Specifications, General Electric Plants, operating experience and probabilistic on the technical requiJ:ements for BWR/6" risk assessment (PRA) had generally features of controlling importance to Copies of these NUREGs, as revised,* shown to be important to public health safety. Since many of the requirements may be purchased from the and safety. In the final policy statement, are of significance to the health and Superintendent of Documents, U.S. the Commission retained this thought as safety of the public, this rule reflects the Government Printing Office, by calling a fourth criterion as follows: subjective statem~nt of the purpose of (202) 275-2060 or by writing to the Criterion 4: A structure, system,.or technical specifications expressed by Superintendent of Documents, U.S. component which operating experience the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Government Printing Office, PO Box or probabilistic risk assessment has Board in Portland General Electric 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082. shown to be significant to public health Company (Trojan Nuclear Plant),
Copies are also available from the and safety. ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263 (1979). There, National Technical Information Service, As stated in the final policy the Appeal Board interpreted technical 5825 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA. statement, if a requirement meets any specifications as being reserved for 22161. one of the four criteria, it should be tht1se conditions or limitations upon These improved STS were the result retained or included in technical reactor operation necessary to obviate of extensive technical meetings and specifications; the possibility of an abnormal situation discussions among the NRC staff, The final policy statement also or event giving rise to an immediate industry owners groups, yendol'l!, and .addressed comments received on the, threat to the public health and safety . interim poli~y statement and described The Commission wishes to emphasize the Nuclear Management and Resources that this rule is intended to be Council (NUMARC).
- th~ Commission's intent with regard to*
use of the criteria and their codification consistent with the language of section On July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132), the 182a. of the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission published a "Final Policy through rulemaking.
- This .final rule codifies the four current § 50.36 rule, and previous Statement on Technical Specifications interpretations of the regulations. This Improvements for Nuclear Power criteria contained.in the final policy statement for defining the scope of LCOs rule merely clarifies the scope and Reactors" (final policy statement), purpose of technical specifications by which incorporated experience.and in technical specifications. These criteria are intended to be consistent identifying criteria which can be used to lessons learned since publication of the establish, more clearly, the framework interim policy statement. The with the scope of technical specifications as st!l,ted in the Statement for LCOs in technical specifications.
Commission has decided not to The Commission believes that withdraw the final policy statement* of Consideration for the final rule issuing § 50.36 (33 FR 18610, o*ecember amending§ 50.36 to.include the four because it contains detailed discussions criteria contained in the final policy of the four criteria and guidance. on how 17, 1968). The Statement.of Consideration discussed the scope of statement will codify a viable, the NRC staff and licensees should potentially safety-enhancing and cost-apply the criteria. technical specifications as including the following:
- saving method for technical The interim policy statement specification improvement. The identified three criteria to be used to In the revised system, emphasis is placed Commission *continues to encourage define which of the current technical on two general classes of tech.nice! matters: licensees to use the improved STS as specification requirements should be (l) Those related to prevention of acciden\J;,
and (2) those related to mitigation of the the basis for plant-specific technical retained or included in technical specifications. As stated in the final consequences of accidents. By systematic specifications and which LCOs could be analysis and evaluation of a particular policy statement, the Commission will relocated to licensee-controlled facility, each applicant is required to identify place the highest priority on requests documents, as follows: at the com1truction pennit stage those items based on the criteria for individual Criterion 1: Installed instrumentation that are directly related to maintaining the license amendments that are used to thatis used to detect, and indicate in integrity of the physical barriers designed to evaluate all of the LCOs for an the control room, a significant abnormal contain radioactivity. Such items are individual*plant to determine which degradation of the reactor coolant expected to be the subjects of Technical LCOs should be included in the pressure boundary. Specifications in the operating license. technical specifications. Related Criterion 2: A process variable, design The first of these two general classes surveillance requirements and actions feature, or operating restriction that is of technical matters to be included in would be retained for each LCO that an initial condition of a design basis technical specifications is captured by remains in the technical specifications. accident or transient analysis that either Criteria 1, 4, and, to some extent, Each LCO, action, and surveillance assumes the failure of or presents a Criterion 2, in that they.address systems requirement should have supporting challenge to the integrity of a fission and process variables that alert the bases. Such requests would constitute product.barrier. operator to a situation when accident complete conversions to the improved Criterion 3: A structure, system, or initiation is more likely. The second STS. component that is part of the primary general class of technical matters is In addition, the Commission will also success path and which fuI).ctions or explicitly addressed and captured by entertain requests to adopt portions of actuates to mitigate a design basis Criteria 2, 3, and 4. By applying the four the improved STS, _!3ven if the licensee accident or transient that either assumes criteria contained in thi~ rule, a licensee does not adopt all STS improvements. the failure of or presen.ts a chalienge to should capture the conditions for These portions will include all related the integrity of a fission product barrier. operation of its facility that are required requirements and will be developed as 50-SC-146
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION line-item improvements by the NRC including the use of on-line risk such that it justified including the staff when they are clearly generic in assessment tools. In addition, the constraints in the technical nature, when*there is evidence that a industry and the NRC staff are using specifications to ensure adequate significant number of licensees could PRA to explore further improvements in protection of the public health and benefit from the improvement, and technical specifications by examining safety or that the addition of such when the industry expresses interest in the risks during shutdown and during constraints provides substantial the improvement. The Commission the transition between modes of additional protection to the public encourages all licensees who submit operation. As a part of this ongoing health and safety. *
- technical specification related program of improving technical The Commission identified four submittals based on these criteria to spi;icifications, the Commission will systems that meet Criterion 4 in the emphasize human factors principles to continue to consider methods to make final policy statement based on previous the extent practical consistent with the better use of risk and reliability qualitative reviews of operating fol'IIltlt and content of their current information for defining future generic experience and risk. They are reactor technical specifications. technical specification requirements. core isolation cooling/isolation LCOs that do not meet any of the During technical specification condenser, residual heat removal, criteria, and their associated actions arid conversions, the staff will apply the standby liquid-control, and recirculation surveillan~e requirements, may be. backfit rule (§ 50.109) when adding new pump trip. The Commission recognizes, proposed for relocatiQn from the requirements from the improved STS to however, that other structures, systems, technical specifications to licensee- individual plant technical or components may meet this criterion.
controlled documents, such as the specifications, provided the licensee Plant- and design-specific PRAs have FSAR. The criteria may be applied to does not voluntarily accept the new yielded valuable insight to unique plant either standard or custom technical requirements. If, however, the staff *vulnerabilities not fully recognized in specifications. The' Commission will suggested additional changes are needed the safety, design basis accident, or
- also consider the criteria in evaluating to make the licensee requested changes transient analyses.
- future generic requirements for acceptable from the standpoint of The NRC's current regulatory inclusion in technical specifications. adequate protection or compliance with requirements are largely based on The Commission expects that NRC regulations, § 50.109(a)(2) and deterministic engineering criteria licensees, in-preparing their technical § 50.109(a)(3) do not apply and the involving the use of multiple barriers specificati1;,n subntjttals, will utilize-any .request may be denied without the and defense in depth. Recently, the NRC plant-specific PRA or risk survey and additional items. staff has formulated a comprehensive any available literature on risk insights plan for the application of PRA and PRAs. This material should be Summary of Public Comments technology and insights throughout the employed to strengthen the technical The Commission received three letters agency. It is expected that the PRA bases for-those provisions that remain in commenting on the proposed rule. Each Implementation Plan will serve as the technical specifications, when letter contained several comments. framework for continued and future applicable, and to indicate whether the One commenter representing the applications of PRA at the NRC.
provisions to be relocated contain commercial nuclear industry expressed Implementation ofthis plan will
- constraints of importance in limiting the concern that there is insufficient increase the systematic use of risk likelihood or severity of the accident regulatory guidance *on how the NRC nssossll)ent techniques. To ensure sequences that are commonly found to staff intends to implement this rule with consistent and appropriate decision-dominate risk. Similarly,.the NRC staff respect to the fourth criterion
- making that incorporates PRA methods has and will contipue to employ risk (§ 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(D)). The commenter and results,it is important that coherent insights in evaluating technical believes that this rule should not be and clear application guidelines are specifications subµiittals. modified until the NRC and the industry applied. As part of the PRA *
~11 actdition to the use of PRA in have reached a common miderstanding Implementation Plan, such guidelines*
Criterion 4 to determine the scope of . of the application, tlueshold, and intent will be established (incorporating safety. technical specifications, PRA has been of Criterion 4. The commenter stated, It goals and backfit rule consi_derations)
.used as a*basis for a number of is our view, and the Commission that address the interdependence of ~h~vements to the content of apparently recognizes, that this criterion probabilistic risk and deterministic t cal specifications over the last gc,>es beyond the adequate protection engineering principles. The process of several years. The NRC staff bas standard for publi~ health and safety developing these guidelines will involve appro:ved several relaxations in and license compliance purposes
- communications among the NRC staff, technical specification allowed outage embodied in the first three criteria." the nuclear industry, and the public to times and surveillance test intervals Similar to this comment on the ensure that all parties understand the which. were based on PRA. In addition, proposed rule, the Advisory Committee role of PRA methods and results in the NRC staff used PRA to develop on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) NRC's risk management efforts. The screening criteria to evaluate all of the* commented in a June 18, 1993, letter to NRC staff anticipates that, as it gains changes in allowed outage times and the Chairman that the NRC staff needs experience with the development and surveillance test intervals that were to provide more detailed guidance on use of such PRA application guidelines, made during the development of the the definition of "significant to public it will be better able to refine such-improved STS. The industry and the health and safety," as it is used in phrases as "significant to public health NRC staff have used PRA to an even Criterion 4. and safety," and other phrases that are greater.extent in the development and Criterion 4 is intended to capture used in many of the Commission's review of the tecJ:mical specifications for those constraints that probabilistic risk regulations.
advanced reactor designs. *assessment or operating experience The Commission could delay The industry and the NRC staff are show to be significant to public health publication of this final rule until the. currently exploring several new .and safety, consistent with the PRA application guidelines are in place . approaches to utilizing PRA for Commission's PRA Policies. The level of However, the Commission believes that technical specification improvements significance either would need to be the experience gained while using the 50-SC-147
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION criteria under the interim and final fourth criterion should be deleted , clear on how the proposed criteria policy statements combined with the because it is subjective and because no would be used to determine if new limitations imposed on the NRC staff by equipment would satisfy only that requirements are to be incorporated into the backfH rule provide assurance that, portion of the fourth criterion arid none technical specifications.
in the interim, the stafrs use of Criterion of the other criteria. The Commission believes that the 4 to apply PRA to technical While operating experience is an improved STS, the final policy. specification content will be properly important part of PRA, not all PRA statement, the backfit rule(§ 50.109), controlled. The Commission has
- models are sophisticated enough to and the statement of consideration for concluded that it is appropriate to capture all operating experience. The this rule contain sufficient guidance on publish this final rt,1le, which provides Commission believes* that operating implementation of the criteria. The staff' the framework for technical experience can play an important role in will also ensure that application of the specifications, at this time. determining the safety significance of criteria to new requirements is
*One commenter stated thai the PRA structures, systems, and components consistent with the guidance in the draft portion of the fourth criterion should be and that there will be no adverse impact "Regulatory Analysis Guidelines,"
clarified to include only those by including operating experience as . Revision 2, published in August 1993 equipment items important to risk- part of Criterion 4. (NUREG/BR-0058), and the final significant sequences as defined in One commenter emphasized that the version of Revision 2 when it is Generic Letter 88-20, "Individual Plant development of implementation approved by the Commission. In Examination for Severe Accident guidance, especially with respect to addition.the NRC has recently Vulnerabilities," Appendix 2, and Criterion 4, should be consistent with published NUREG/CR-6141, reported in licensees' individual plant the implementation guidance of the "Handbook of Methods for Risk-Based examination (IPE) reports. maintenance rule.
- Analyses of Technical Specifications,"
The IPE program nas resulted in As stated previously, the Commission December 1994, which summarizes commercial reactor licensees using risk- believes that the improved STS, the systematic risk-based methods to assessment methods.to identify plant- final policy statement, the backfit rule improve various aspects of technical specific severe accident vulnerabilities. (§ 50.109), and the statement of specification requirements. The Since submittal of their IPE reports, .. consideration for this rule contain handbook was developed through many licensees have enhanced their sufficient guiqance on implementation research sponsored by the NRC and will plant-specific PRAs and have gained of the criteria to proceed with be used as a reference document to additional insights into unique plant rulemaking. Supplementary guidance assist the NRC staff in reviewing vulnerabilities. These additional will continue to be provided to the NRC licensees' risk-based analyses submitted* insights from PRAs are being used by staff that will support the process for as part of the bases for proposed *
- licensees in such areas as - implementing the four criteria on both changes in facility technical implementation of the maintenance a generic and plant-specific basis, and specifications. This guidance will be .
rule. will be publicly available. The NRC staff updated periodically to incorporate As stated in the Commission's will ensure that any guidance lessons learned and changes in the state * "Proposed Policy Statement.on the Use documents that relate to the of the art, will help ensure the criteria of Probabilistic Risk Assessment *
- implementation of the four criteria will are applied in a consistent and Methods in Nuclear Regulatory be consistent with the implementation controlled manner, and will be publicly Activities," the'use of PRA technology guidance of the maintenance rule along available. As stated above, as part of the should be increased in all regulatory with the guidance for other rules PRA Implementation Plan, PRA matters to the extent supported by the promulgated by the Commission. application guidelines ~ill be.
state of the art in PRA methods and data One commenter expressed a concern established (incorporating safety goals and in a manner that complements the With respect to the level of PRA and backfit rule considerations) that NRC's deterministic approach and information necessary to support the address the interdependence of supports the NRC's traditional defense- relocation of existing technical probabilistic risk and deterministic in-depth,philosophy. The Commission specifications which do not meet the engineering principles. As these will continue to apply PRA to technic;al first three criteria. application guidelines develop, they specifications in accordance with its If a technical specification provision will progressively be used to provide proposed policy statement on the use of does not meet any of the first three guidance to the NRC staff on the use of PRA. In addition, guidance for specific criteria, and if the current PRA the criteria contained in this rule and applications cir classes of applications . knowledge or operating experience does the application of the backfit rule to will be developed under the PRA * . not identify the structure, system, or new regulatory requirements. Implementation Plan. The Commission component as risk significant, the NRC One commenter stated that the same believes this is a more appropriate staff will not preclude relocating such or similar criteria to those in the rule means to define how Criterion 4 will be technical specifications. The level of should also be applied to 10 CFR used in practice, rather than to limjt the PRA information necessary to support 50.36(c)(3), (4), and (5), so that structures, system.s, and compo:nents relocation would be considered as part surveillance requirements, design captured by Criterion 4 to those items of the overall review of the supporting features, and administrative controls important to risk-significant sequences basis for the proposed change. The which do not provide the necessary as defined in Generic Letter 88-20, Commission expects that licensees will "adequate protedtion of the health and Appendix 2, and reported in licensees' utilize PRA insights to indicate whether safety of the public" can be relocated to IPE reports; The Commission belie.ves the provisions to be relocated contain other licensee-controlled documents. that this process will provide the NRC constraints of importance fn litniting the With respect to§ 50.36 (c)(3), staff and the industry with additional likelihood or severity of the nccidont "Surveillance Requirements," the risk insights, beyond those identified sequences that are commonly found to Commission stated in the final policy through the IPE program. dominate risk. statement that appropriate surveillance The same commenter said that the One commenter stated that the reqµirements and actions should be operating experience portion of the implementing guidance needs to be retained for each LCO which remains or 50-SC-148
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION is included in the technical When a licensee elects to apply these The commenter found it curious that specifications. criteria, some requirements are an industry and an agency that claim to The criteria in § 50.36(c)(2) apply to relocated from technical specifications be able to quantify the risks of nuclear safety functions. Therefore, the to tlre FSAR or to other licensee- power are unable to quantify this impact Commission does not believe that these controlled documents. Licensees are to on safety, and stated, "Perhaps if it is
- criteria can be appropriately applied to operate their faoilities in conformance unquantifiable, the alleged adverse the 'types of requirements found in the with the descriptions of their facilities impact does not really exist."
"design features" and administrative and procedures in their FSAR. Changes The Corrmission agrees that there are controls" sections of the technical to the facility or to procedures described limitations and uncertainties in the specifications. The NRC staff has, in the FSAR are to be made in ability to quantify the impact on safety however, been pursuing separate accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. The described above. Uncertainties exist in improvements to these requirements, in Commission will talce appropriate any regulatory approach and these cooperation with industry, using the enforcement action to ensure that uncertainties are derived from intent of the criteria to identify the licensees comply with 10 CFR 50.59. knowledge limitations. A probabilistic optimum set of requirements in each of Changes made in accordance with the approach has exposed some of these these areas and to eliminate redundancy provisions of other licensee-controlled limitations and yielded an improved to other regulations consistent with the documents (e.g., QA plan, security plan) framework to better focus and assess minimum requirements of§ 50.36 and are subject to the specific requirements their significance and assist in the Atomic Energy Act, as amended. for those documents. Nothing in this developing a strategy to accommodate One commenter stated that the rule limits the authority of the NRC to them in the regulatory process. The removal of items from plant technical conduct necessary inspections and to Commission does not intend, however, specifications may decrease take appropriate enforcement action to let these limitations prevent it from enforceability and licensee attention to when regulatory requireme1~ts or talcing steps to improve the regulations safety. commitments are not met. in a manner that will have substantial The same commenter stated that the The Commission does not agree that removal of items from plant technical safety benefits. The Commission the removal of items from plant specifications will diminish public believes the public will be better served technical specifications will decrease participation rights in the regulation of by focusing both NRC and industry licensee attention to safety. On the operating nuclear power plants by attention on the most safety-significant contrary, the Commission believes that items.
- diminishing the universe of potential implementation of the criteria contained oporatin_g license amendment cases. The NRC staff has made three changes in this rule will produce an Any changes to a licensee's technical to this rule since it was published in its improvement in the safety of nuclear specifications to apply these criteria proposed form. The first change was power plants through.the Use of more will be made by the license amendment made in order to maintain consistency operator-oriented technical process before implementation. The with other NRC staff end Commission specifications, i~proved technical review of each license amendment will documents that have been issued since specification bases, reduced action involve an opportunity for public this rule was publishe~ in its proposed statement induced plant transients, and participation. One of the goals of the form. In § 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(D), the term more efficient use of NRC and industry technical specifications improvement "probabilistic safety assessment" hes resources. Clarification of the scope and program was to make more efficient use been changed to "probabilistic risk purpose of technical specifications has of NRC and industry resources by assessment.
provided useful guidance to both the focusing attention on those plant NRC and industry and has resulted in The second and third changes are in conditions most important to safety and, § 50.36(c)(2)(iii). The beginning of the improved technical specifications that in turn, reducing the number of license first sentence was changed to read, "A are intended to focus licensee and plant amendment requests. Since 1969, there licensee is not required to propose to operator attention on those plant has been a trend toward including in modify technical specifications * * *" conditions most important to safety. technical specifications not only those rather than "A licensee is not required The Commission also does not agree requirements derived from the analyses to modify technical specifications that the removal of items from plant and evaluations included in the safety technical specifications will have any * * *" This change was made to clarify analysis report but also essentially all that a licensee would be required to adverse impact on the NRC's ability to other Commission requirements take enforcement action on safety- modify their technical specifications if governing the operation of nuclear significant issues. The improved STS the Commission determined that a new power reactors. This extensive use of are intended specifically to focus on the requirement was necessary in technical specifications is due in part to accordance with the. backfit rule and the operating plant parameters and a lack of well-defined criteria (in either . associated surveillance criteria of safety new requirement met one of the four
- the body of the rule or in some other criteria contained in § 50.36(c)(2)(ii).
significance. The Commission requires regulatory document) for what should compliance with technical be included in technical specifiGations. The third change is the deletion of the specifications, and expects adherence to This has contributed to the volume of last sentence in § 50.36(c)(2)(iii). The commitments contained in licensee- technical specifications and to the sentence read, "However, for technical controlled documents. Violations and several-fold increase, since 1969, in the specification amendments a licensee deviations will, as in the past, be number of license amendment proposes after August 18, 1995, the handled in accordance with tho NRC applications to effect changes to the criteria in paragraph (c)(2)(ii) of this enforcement policy in 10 CFR Part 2, technical specifications. It has diverted section provide an acceptable scope for Appendix C. Any changes to a licensee's both NRC staff and licensee attention limiting conditions for operation." This technical specifications to apply these from the more important requirements sentence was deleted because it did not criteria will be made by the license in these documents to the extent that it add or modify any requirements and the amendment process prior to has resulted in an adverse but thought is adequately expressed in this implementation. unquantifiable impact on safety. statement of consideration. 50-SC-149
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Finding of No Significant publish the criteria in the final policy List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 Environmental Impact: Availability statement but also to codify the criteria Antitrust, Classified information, through rulemaking. Appropriate Criminal penalties, Fire protection, The Commission has determined under the National Environmental alternative approaches to this action Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear Policy Act of 1969: as amended, and the have been identified and analyzed over power plants and reactors, Radiation Commission regulations in Subpart A of the life of the Technical Specifications protection, Reactor siting criteria, Part 51, that this final rule is not a major Improvement Program, beginning with Reporting and recordkeeping Federal action significantly affecting the an earlier attempt to define the content requirements.
quality of the human environment and of technical specifications through For the reasons given in the preamble will not degrade the environment in any rulemaking. As described in the and under the authority of the Atomic way. Therefore, the Commission background discussion, the Commission Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the concludes that there will be no published a proposed amendment to Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as significant impact on the environment § 50.36 (47 FR 13369) on March 30, amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the from this rule. This discussion 1982. However, because of difficulties NRC is adopting the following constitutes the environmental with defining criteria for technical amendment to Part 50. assessment and finding of no significant specifications and because of other impact for this rule; a *separate higher priority licensing work, the rule assessment has not been prepared. change was deferred. In February 1987, the Commission published an "Interim Paperwork Reduction Act Statement Policy Statement on Technical This final rule does not contain a new Specification Improvements for Nuclear or amended information collection Power Reactors," and in July 1993, requirement.subject to the Paperwork published the final policy statement. Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 During its review of the final policy et seq.). Existing requirements were statement, the Commission concluded approved by the Office of Management that the four criteria should pe codified and Budget, approval number 3150- in a rule. Thus, alternative approaches 0011. . to regulatory objectives have l:ieen identified and analyzed, and the Regulatory Analysis Commission has decided that there is no The Commission has determined that preferable alternative to codifying the a regulatory analysis is not required for four criteria in a rule. With regard to this rule. The Commission believes that evaluation of values and impacts of the intent of the regulatory analysis has alternatives, the Commission believes been met through the extensive there is no difference in the values or consideration given to the development impacts of applying the criteria under of the "Final Policy Statement on the final policy. statement or through a Technical Specifications Improvements rule, *except that the criteria are more for Nuclear Power Reactors" and the readily available to future users in a rule improved STS, both of which gave the rather than in a policy statement. public an opportunity for comment. In 60 FR 49495 addition, the determination that no Regulatory Flexibility Certification Published 9/26/95 regulatory analysis is necessary was Effective 10/26/95 In accordance with the Regulatory noted in the FederalRegister Notice for Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the proposed rule, and the NRC received the Commission certifies that this final 10 CFR Part 50 . no comments on this issue. rule does not have a significant RIN 3150-AFOO The criteria being added to § 50.36 are economic impact on a substantial the same as those contained in the final number of small entities. This rule Primary Reactor Containment Leakage policy statement and have been used by affects only the licensing and operation Testing for Water-Cooled Power the NRC and the nuclear power industry of nuclear power plants. The companies Reactors to define the content of technical that own these plants do not fall within specifications since September 1992. AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory the scope of the definition of"small The rule does not impose any . Commission. entities" as given in the Regulatory requirements but, rather, allows nuclear Flexibility Act or the Small Business . ACTION: Final rule; . power reactor licensees to voluntarily Size Standards in regulations issued by use the criteria to relocate existing
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory
- the Small Business Administration at 13 Commission is* amending its regulations technical specifications that do not meet CFR part 121. to provide a performance-based option any of the criteria to licensee-controlled documents, The NRC staff also uses Backfit Analysis for leakage-rate testing*of containments these criteria to determine whether of light-water-cooled nuclear power
- technical specifications arc. appropriate The NRC has determined that the plants. This option is available for_
to provide regulatory control over new backfit rule, § 50.109, does not apply to voluntary,'adoption by licensees in lieu requirements or positions that have this final rule and, therefore, a backfit of compliance with the prescriptive been justified consistent with the backfit analysis is not required for this final
- requirements contained in the current
- rule. rule because these amendments do not regulation. This action improves the.
The Commission considered the need involve any provisions that would focus of the regulations by eliminating for and consequences of this action impose backfits as defined in prescriptive requirements that are ..
- when it made the decision not only to § 50.109(a)(l). marginal to safety. The final rul~ allows 50-SC-150
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION tes(intervals to be ~d-on system and.
- list also selected Appendix J a~ a program. A more comprehensive component performanCl!*&nd provides . potential candidate for modification. proposed rule than that proposed in licensees greater flexibility for cost- The NRC published in the Federal 1986 that accounts for the latest effectiye implementation methods of Register, for cOJnment, a proposed technical information and regulatory regulatory safety obje~ves. * * * . .revision to Appen4ix J on October 29, framework, using performance-oriented 1986 (5 l FR 3Q538),to update and risk-based approaches, was EFFECTIVE DATE: Oct_.ober 26, 1995. .
- published by the NRC in the Federal.
. . acceptance criteria and test methods
. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. based o~ experience in applying the Register on February 21, 1995. The Moni Dey, Office of Nuclear_Regulatory existing requirements and advances in public comment period for the proposed Research/U.S. Nuclear Regulatory co_ntainment leak testing methods, to rule closed May 8, 1995. CommiB8ion;Washington, DC 20555, ~solve interpretive questions, and to NRC's Regulatory Improvement Program telephqne (301) 415-6443,*e-mail reduce the number of exemption requests. This proposed *rule was The NRC's marginal-to-safety nikd~.gov .* * **
- initiative is part of a broader NRC 1 withdrawn from further consideration
- SUPPLEMENTARYlNFORMATION: . and superseded with a more initiative for regulatory improvement.
Through its Program for Regulatory B41ckground.,-Developnient of Proposed comprehensive revision of Appendix J. Improvement, the NRC has Rule *
- Tlie NRC published a notice in the Federal Register on February 4, 1992 institutionalized an ongoing effort to NRC's Marginal-to-~afety Program (57 FR 4166), presenting its conclusion eliminate requirements marginal to that Appendix J was a candidate whose safety and to reduce the regulatory In 1984, the NRC staff initiated a requirements may be relaxed or burden on its licensees. The NRC stafrs program to make regulatory eliminated based on cost-benefit plan, summarized in SECY-9~90, requirements more efficient by considerations. On the basis of NRC dated March 31, 1994, satisfies the
- eliminating those with marginal impact staff analyses of public comments on the requirement for a periodic review of on safety. The NRC'~ initiative to proposal, the Commission approved and existing regulations given in Executive eliminate requirements marginal to announced on November 24, 1992 (57 Order 12866 of September 30, 1993.
safety recognims both the dynamic FR 55156) its plans to initiate This plan was approved by: the nature of the regulatory process and that rulemak.Qig for developing a Commission on May 18, 1994. The the importance and safety contribution performance-oriented and risk-based Regulatory Improvement Program is of some existing regulatory regulation for containment leakage- aimed at the fundamental principle requirements may not have been testing requirements. On January 27, adopted by the Commission that all accurately predicted when adopted or. 1993, (58 FR 6196) the NRC staff regulatory burdens must be justified and may have diminished With time. The . pu~lished a general framework for that its regulatory process must be availability of new technical
- developing pepormance-oriented and efficient. In practice, this means the information and methods justify a . risk-based regulations and; at a public elimination or modification of requirements for which burdens are not review and modification of existing workshop on April 27 and 28, 1993, commensurate with their safety
- requirements. ' invited discussions of specific.proposals significance. The activities of the The NRC solicited comments from for modifying*containment leakage- . Regulatory Improvement Program industry on specific regulatory testing ~ a n t s . Industry and. . should result in enhanced regulatory requirements iµid associated regulatory*
- public commenl!> on the proposals, and.: focus in areas that are more safety positions th~ needed l'etlValuation. The,. oth~rmcommendatimis and*innovative significant. As a result, an overall net
- Atomic Industrial Forum conducted a .
- ideas raised at the. public workshop; *. increase in safety is expected from the survey providing:most of-industry's. were documented in the.proceedings of program. *
.input, publishe~ fo~ the NRC as *the workshop (NUREG/CP-0129, The Regulatory Improvement Program NUREG/CR-4330 1, "Review of Light September 1993). ~pecifically, the NRC
- will include, whenever feasible and Water Reactor Regulatory
- concluded that the allowable appropriate, the consideration of Requirements,".Vol. 1, April 1986. A containment leakage rate utilized in performance-oriented and risk-based list of 45 candidates for potential
- containment testing may be increased approaches. The program will review regulatory modification were identified. and other Appendix J requirements requirements or lice~e conditions that The NRC's.review of the list selected
- need not be as prescriptive a.s the* are identified as a significant burden on Appendix J a~ one of seven areas current requirements. To increase licensees. If review and arialysis find requiring further analysis (NUREGiCR- flexibility, the detailed and prescriptive that the requirements are marginal to 4330, Vols.. 2 and 3; dated June 1986 technical requirements contained in safety, they will be eliminated or
- and 1$.y 1987). The NRC also,
- Appendix J regulations could be . relaxed. By performance-oriented, the conducted a survey ofits staff on.the improved .and replaced with . NRC means establishing regulatory same issue. The NRC staff survey
- perform~ce-based requirements. and objectives without prescribing the identified 54 candi\lates for regulatory supporting regulatory guides; The . methods or hardware necessary to modification, a number of which were
- regulatory guides would allow
- accomplish the objective, and allowing previously identified in the industry
- alternative approaches, although licensees the flexibility to propose cost-survey. The NRC's assessment of this * *compliance with existing regulatory effective methods for implementation.
- requirements would continue to be By risk-based, the NRC me~s
'Copies of NUREGs may be purchased from the*
acceptable; The performance-based regulatory approaches that use Superintendent of Doc11111ents, 'U.S. Government requirements would reward superior probabilistic risk analysis (PRAr as the Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082, Washington, DC operating practices.
- systematic framework for developing or 20013-7082. Copies are also available from the The. present rulemaking is part of this modifying requirements.
National Technical Information Service. 5285 Port overall effort and initiative for . Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy is . In institutionalizing the Regulatory available for inspection and/or copying in the NRC eliminating requirements that are Improvement Program and adopting a Public Document R09m,'2120 L Street, NW. (Lower marginal to safety and is guided by.the performance-based regulatory approach, Level), Washington, rx;:. * .. . . . policies,.framework and criteria for the 50-SC-151
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION the NRC has formulated the following (1) Measurement of the containment acceptance criteria, after which time the framework for revisions to its integrated leakage rate (Type A tests, regular retest schedule may be resumed.
regulations: often referred to as ILRTs). Type B Tests (1) The new performance-based (2) Measurement of the leakage rate regulation will be less prescriptive and across each pressure-containing or * (1) Except for airlocks, Type B tests will allow licensees the flexibility to leakage-limiting boundary for various must be performed during reactor adopt cost-effective methods for primary reactor containment shutdown for refueling, or other implementing the safety objectives of penetrations (Type B tests). convenient intervals, but.in no case at the original rule. (3) Measurement of the containment intervals greater than 2 years. If opened (2) The regulatory safety objectives isolation valves leakage rates (Type C following a Type A or B test, will be derived, to the extent feasible tests).
- containment penetrations subject to and practical, from risk considerations Type B and C tests are referred to as Type B testing must be tested prior to with appropriate consideration of returning the reactor to an operating local leakage-rate tests (LLRTs).
uncertainties, and will be consistent mode requiring containment integrity. with the NRC's Safety Goals. Leak-Tightness Requirements For primary* reactor containment (3) Detailed technical methods for Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, penetrations employing a continuous measuring or judging the acceptability Appendix J, requirements is determined leakage monitoring system, Type B tests, of a licensee's performance relative to by comparing the measured except for tests of airlocks, may be tho regulatory safety objectives will be, containment leakage rate with the performed at every other reactor* to the extent practical, provided in maximum allowable leakage rate. shutdown for refueling but in no case at industry standards and guidance . Maximum allowable leakage rates are intervals greater than 3 years. (2) Airlocks must be tested prior to documents which are endorsed in NRC calculated in accordance with 10 CFR initial fuel loading and at six-month regulatory guides. Part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria," and are intervals thereafter. Airlocks opened (4) The new regulation will be incorporated into the technical during periods when containment optional for current licensees so that specifications. Typical allowable integrity is not required by the plant's . licensees can decide to remain in leakage rates are 0.1 percent of technical specifications must be tested compliance with current regulations. containment volume per day for at the end of such periods. Airlocks (5) The regulation will be supported pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and one volume percent per day for boiling opened during periods when by necessary modifications to, or containment integrity is required by*the development of, the full body of water reactors (BWRs). plant's technical specifications must be regulatory practice including, for Tes.t Freqw;mcy Requirements tested within 3 days after being opened. example, standard review plans, inspection procedures, guides, and Schedules for conducting For airlock doors opened more containment leakage-rate tests are frequently than once every 3 days, the other regulatory documents. specified in Appendix J for both airlock must be tested at least once (6) The new regulation will be every 3 days during the period of formulated to provide incentives for preoperational and periodic tests. Periodic leakage-rate test schedules are frequent openings. For airlock doors innovations leading to improvements in having testable s.eals, testing the seals safety through better design, as follows: fulfills the 3-day test requirement. construction, operating, or maintenance Type A Tests Airlock door-seal testing must not be practices. substituted for the 6-month test of the (1) After the preoperational leakage-Current Appendix J Requirements rate test, a set of three Type A tests must entire airlock at not less than P., the be performed at approximately equal calculated peak containment pressure Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50,
- related to the design basis accident.
"Primary Reactor Containment Leakage intervals during each 10-year service Testing for Water-Cooled Power period. The third test of each set must Type CTests Reactors," became effective on March be conducted when the .plant is shut Type C tests must be performed 16, 1973. The regulatory safety objective down for the 10-year plant in-service during each reactor shutdown for of reactor containment design is stated inspection. refueling, but in no case at intervals in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, *. (2) The performance of Type A tests greater than 2 years. "General Design Criteria for Nuclear must be limited to periods when the There have been two amendments to Power Plants," Criterion No. 16, plant facility is nonoperational and this Appendix since 1973; The first "Containment Design." GDC Criterion secured in the shutdown condition amendment, published September 22, 16 mandates "an essentially leak-tight under administrative control and in 1980 (45 FR 62789), modified the Type barrier against the uncontrolled release accordance with the safety procedures B penetration test requirements to of radioactivity to the environment defined in the license. conform to what had become accepted
* * *" for postulated accidents. (3) If any periodic Type A test fails to practice through the granting of
- Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 meet the applicable acceptance criteria, exemptions. The second am!Jndment, implements, in part, General Design the test schedule applicable to published November 15, 1988 (53 FR Criterion No. 16 and specifies subsequent Type A tests will be 45890), incorporated the Mass Point containment leakage-testing reviewed and approved by the Statistical Analysis Technique as a requirements, including the types of Commission. If two consecutive permissible alternative to the Total tests required. For each type of test periodic Type A tests fail to meet the Time and Point-to-Point techniques required, Appendix J specifies how the app1icable acceptance criteria, a Type A specified in Appendix J.
tests should be conducted, the test must be performed at each plant frequency of testing, and reporting shutdown for refueling or In~ernational Experience requirements. Appendix Jrequires the approximately every 18 months, . A combination of Type A tests and an following types of containment leak whichever occurs first, until two on-line monitoring (OLM) capability is tests: consecutive Type A tests meet the being actively pursued in Canada and 50-SC-152
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Europe, notably in Frimce and Belgium, and that control of containment leakage A public workshop on the subject was and is currently being considered in at the current low rates is not as risk held by the NRC on {\pril 27 and 28, Sweden. OLM is used to identify a significant as previously assumed.23 1993. 4 "normal" containmei;it pressurization In August of 1992, the NRC initiated Febru.ai-y 1995 Proposed Revision pattern and t.o detect deviations from a rulemaking to modify Appendix Jto that pattern. With on7line, low-pressure Based on several advance notices for make it less prescriptive and more rulemak.ing and significant public testing, Hydro-Quebec's Gentilly-2 performance-oriented. The Commission station is able to mo~itor the change in comment and discussion, evaluation of also initiated. a plan to relax the risks and costs, and consideration of containment leaktightness between allowable containment leakage rate used Type A tests. The Belgians conduct a, which modifications have become to define performance standards for feasible and practical, in the February leakage test using OLM during reactor containment tests. In the Federal operation after each cold shutdown 21, 1995, Federal Register the NRC Register ofJanuary 27, 1993 (58 FR longer than 15 days with the objective 6196), the NRC indicated the following proposed two phases for modifications of detecting gross lea).<s. The objective of potential modifications to Appendix J of of requirements to containment leakage the Belgian apprQach to Type A testing 10 CFR Part 50 would be considered: testing. The first phase allowed leakage-is to reduce the*frequency and duration rate testing intervals to be based on the (1) Increase allowable containment performance of the containment system of the tests. The Typi:i A test is leakage rates based on Safety Goals and conducted at a containment pressure structures and components. The second PRA technology (i.e., define a new phase will further examine the needed (P,) not less than half of the peak performa~ce standard); and pressure (0.5 P.). It i~ performed once requirements of the containment every 10 years. In France, containment (2) Modify Appendix J to be a function (i.e. structural and leak-tight leaktightness is continuously monitored performance,based regulation: integrity of containment system during reactor operation in all of the A. Limit the revised rule to a new structures and components, and French PWR plants using the SEXTEN regulatory objective. In order to ensure prevention of inadvertent bypass), and system. It is also bei~g evaluated by the the availability of the containment include consideration of the potential Swedes for their PWR units. Leaks may during postulated accidents, licensees for on-line monitoring ofcontainment bo detected during t~o positive or should either: integrity to verify certain functions. .
negative pressure periods in the (i) Test overall containment leakage at Public comments were solicited to guide containment by evaluating the air mass intervals not longer than every 10 years, this future work. balance in the contai,nment. Type A and test pressure-containing or leakage- The February 21, 1995, proposed rule tests are conducted at containment peak limiting boundaries and containment. applies to all NRC licensees who pressure (loss-of-coo.lant accident isolation valves on an interval based on operate light-water-cooled power pressure) before init~al plant startup, the performance hist_ory of the reactors. The proposed rule allows during the first reful!ling, and thereafter equipment; or licensees the option of continuing to every 10 years unless a degradation in (ii) Provide on-line (i.e., continuous) comply with the current Appendix J or containment leaktightness is detected. monitoring of containment isolation to adopt the new performance*based In that case, tests are conducted more status. standards. frequently. .
- i B. Remove prescriptive requirements The NRC's analyses are based upon Further details of international from Appendix J and preserve useful the insight gained through the use of approaches to containment testing are pcirtiims as guidance in an NRC probabilistic risk assessment techniques provided in NUREGl-1493. regulatory guide. and the significant data base of Advance Notices fo~*Rulemaking C. Endorse industry standards on: practical, hands-on operating .'
experience gained since Appendix J was Over time, it has become apparent (i) Guidance for calculating plant- promulgated in 1973. This operating that variations in plant design and specific allowable leakage rates based experience provides solid evidence of operation frequently make it difficult to on new NRC performance standards; the activities necessary to conduct meet so~e of the requirements (ii) Guidance on the conduct of Appendix J testing, and the costs of cQntained in Appendix Jbecause of its containment tests; and those activities both in monetary terms prescriptive nature. Economic and (iii) Guidance for on-line monitoring and occupational radiation exposure. occupational expostire costs are directly of containment isolation status. The proposed rule is based on related to the frequency of containment D. Continue to accept compliance analytical efforts documented in
- testing: Containment integrated leakage- with the current detailed requirements NUREG-1493 which, like NUREG-1150, rate tests (Type A) preclude any other in Appendix J (i.e., licensees presently confirms previous observations of reactor maintenance' activities and thus in compliance with Appendix J will not insensitivity of population risks from are on the critical path for return to need to do anything if they do not wish severe reactor accidents to containment service from reactor:outages. In addition to change their practice). leakage rates.
to the costs of the tests, integrated leak The current Appendix J requirements tests impose the ad~ed burden of the 2 "Severe Accident Risks: An assessment for five continue to achieve the regulatory cost of replacement power.. U. S. Nuclear Power Plants, Final Summarv criterion of assuring an essentially leak-Containment-penetration leak tests Report." NUREG-1150, December 1990. C~pies of tight boundary between the power (Type B and C) can be conducted during NUREGs may be purchased from the reactor system and the external reactor shutdowns in parallel with other Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P. 0. Box 37082, Washington, DC environment (General Design Criterion activities and thus tend to be less costly; 20013/7082. Copies are also available from the 16). Costs associated with complying however, the large number of National Technical Information Service. 5285 Port with current Appendix Jrequirements penetrations impose a significant Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy is available for inspection and/or copying in thr. NRC are estimated to be $165,000 for a burden on the utilities. Additionally, Public Document Room, 2120 L Street. NW. (Lower risk assessments pe~formed to date Level), Washington, DC. * "Workshop on Program for Elimination of indicate that the allowable leakage rate >"Performance-Based Containment Leak Test Requirements Marginal lo Safety," NURE~/CP-from containments can be increased, Program," NUREG-1493, July 1995. 0129. September 1994. 50-SC-153
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- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION complete battery of Type B/C tests and and restructuring of the current inerted BWR containments, or
$1,890,000 for Type A tests. Over the licensing basis and a more complete subatmospheric PWR containments, average reactor's remaining lifetime of understanding of the uncertainties could possibly detect gross leakages that 20 years, the present value of all asso_ciated with the threat of severe develop during normal operation. remaining containment leakage testing accidents to the containment, and Given that the application of on-line at a 5 percent discount rate is estimated therefore, the NRC planned to develop monitoring is specific to containment to be about $7 million per reactor. a modification of the performance design, and generic application can not Estimates of the remaining industry- standard (allowable leakage level)-in the be justified solely on i;isk wide costs of implementing current second phase separate from considerations, the NRc;: did not propose Appendix J requirements ranged from modifications of testing requirements. a requirement for OLMs. However, $720 to $1,080 million, approximately This modification would be part of a licensees with such a capability (e;g. 7s* percent of which could be averted broader effort to further examine the inerted BWR containments, and with a performance-based rule. risk significance of various attributes of subatmospheric PWR containments) The Regulatory Analysis.for the containment performance, i.e., were encouraged to propose plant-proposed rule finds that by allowing structural and leak-tight integrity of specific application of such a capability, requirements to remain in effect.with containment-system structures and and to take credit for any added marginal impact on safety, but which components, *and- inadvertent bypass. assurance of containment integrity impose a significant cost on li_censees, is provided by such a system compared to On-Line Monitoring (OLM) Systems other testing methods. The NRC to have missed an opportunity to
- improve regulatory coherence and to Currently, there is no NRC proposed _to reconsider the role of OLM focus NRC's regulations to areas where requirement for systems which in the second phase of modifications in the return in terms of added public continuously monitor the containment this area along with the allowable safety is higher. to detect.unintentional breaches of leakage rate.
Specific alternatives for modifying the containment integrity. Studies discussed in NUREG-1493, . Proposed Modification of Type A, B, current Appendix J_were identified by and C Test Intervals the public in response to the NRC's "Performance-Based Containment Leak Federal Register notice published* on Test Program," found that, based on In the February 1995 proposed rule, January 27, 1993 (58 FR 6196). Those operating.experience, OLM would not the NRC proposed a new risk-based whose characteristics matched the significantly reduce the risk to the regulation based on the-performance NRC's established criteria-for the .public from .nuclear-plant operation history of components (containment, marginal to safety program were and, thus, could not.be justified solely penetrations, valves) as the means to selected for further review. on the basis ofrisk-based justify an increase in the inferval for considerations; Specific findings Type A, 8, and C tests. The revised Modifications of Advance NRG Proposal* include: regulation requires tests to be conducted Allowable Leakage Rate 1. Existing continuous monitoring on an interval based on the performance methods appear technically capable _of of the containment structure, The NRC had initially planned to detecting leaks in reactor containments penetrations and- valves without establish, by rulemaking, a risk-based within 1 day to several weeks. OLM specifying the interval in the regulation. allowable leakage rate commensurate systems are in use or planned in several Currently, three Type A tests are with its significance to total public risk. European countries and Canada. conducted in every 10 year period. Type Specific findings from-NUREG-1493 on* 2. OLM systems are, capable of 8 (except airlocks, which are tested the allowable leakage rate include: detecting leaks only in systems that are more frequently) and C tests are
- 1. Allowable leakage could be ..open*to the ccintainment atmosphere conducted on a frequency not to exceed increased approximately two orders of during normal operation (approximately 2 years.
magnitude (100-200 fold) with marginal 10 percent of the mechanical The NRC proposed to base the impact on population dose estimates penetrations). frequency of Type A tests (ILRTs) _on the from reactor accidents. 3. The.technical and administrative historical performance of the overall
- 2. Calculated risks to.individuals are objectives of OLM systems and Type A containment system. Specific findings several orders of magnitude below the tests are different. documented in NUREG-1493 that NRC's Safety Goals for all reactors 4. OLM could not be considered as a justify the*proposal include:
- considered. complete replacement for Type A tests 1. The fraction of leakages detected 3 .- Increases in the allowable leakage because it cannot challenge the only by ILRTs is small, un the order of rate are estimated to ha_ve a negligible structural and leak-tight integrity of the . a few percent.
impact on occupational exposure. containment:system at elevated 2.- Reducing the frequency of ILRT Relaxing the allowable leakage rate is pressures.
- testing from 3 every 10 years to 1 every estimated to reduce future_industry 5. Analysis of the.history of operating 1O years leads to a marginal increase in testing costs by$50 to $110 million, a experience indicated a limited need for, risk.
10 percent decrease in overall-leakage- and benefit of, OLM in the*u.S. 3. ILRTs also test ths strength of the rate testing costs. Although OLM can not be justified containment structure. No alternative to
. A risk-based allowable leakage rate solely based on risk considerations, a ILRTs has been identified to provide would be based on an evaluation, using plant already possessing such a system assurance that the containment PRA, of the sensitivity and significance has a greater assurance of achieving structure would-meet allowable leakage.
ofcontainment leakage to-risk, and the certain attributes of containment rates during design-basis accidents. determination of an appropriate containment leakage limit commensurate with*its significance to integrity. Therefore, OLM systems could contribute towards an overall leakage-monitoring scheme. Some capability for
- 4. At a frequency of 1 test every 10 years, industry-wide occupational exposure would be reduced by 0.087 I
the risk to the public and plant control- on-line monitoring already exists as a person-sievert (8.7 person-rem) per year. room *operators. However, this would byproduct of specific containment Based on specific, detailed analyses of have entailed a major change in policy designs. For example, licensees with <lata from the North Anna and Grand 50-SC-154
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Gulf nuclear power plants, and data containment leakage but pursue its Hill and Mr. Barkley). This group is very from twenty-two nuclear plants (see modification as a separate action. supportive of the Commission's risk-
- NUREG-1493), performance-based Type A Test Interval (1) Based on the based regulatory program. and supports alternatives to current LLRT methods limited value of integrated leakage-rate proceeding with the rule in an are feasible with marginal impact on tests (lLRTs) in detecting significant expeditious manner, despite having risk. Specific findings include: leakages from penl'ltrations and isolation reservations about three specific
- 1. Type B and C tests are capable of valves, establish the test interval based provisions. The issues ofmost concern detecting over 97 percent of on the performance of the containment to this group are: (1) Licensee containment leakages. system structure; (2) The performance commitments to certain requirements of
- 2. Of the 97 percent, virtually all criterion of the test will continue to be the regulatory guide implementing leakages are identified by LLRTs of the allowable leakage rate (La); (3) The Appendix Jtesting via use of the containment isolation valves'.(Type C industry guideline allows extension of technical specifications (industry would tests). the Type A test interval to once every prefer using a plant's final safety
- 3. Based on the detailed evaluation of 10 years based on satisfactory analysis report); (2) requirements to performance of two previous tests, conduct visual internal and extmnal the experience of a single two-unit inclusive of the pre-operational ILRT; inspections of the containment on a station, no'Correlation of failures with type of valve or plant service could be (4) In the regulatory guide, the NRC frequency of 3 times per 10 years found. takes exception to industry guidance for (industry would prefer once per 10
- 4. For the 20 years of remaining the extension of the interval of the years to coincide with Type A tests); (3) operations, changing the Type B/C test general visual inspection of the making Option B of the proposed rule frequency to once every 5 years for containment system, and limits the mandatory (industry would prefer to .
good-performing components is interval to 3 times every 10 years, in retain the optional feature); and (4) Type estimated to reduce industry-wide accordance with current practice. C test frequency (industry would prefer
- occupational radiation exposure by o.n Type B Fr C Test Interval (1) Allow a 10-year test interval for certain Type local leakage-rate test (LLRTs) intervals C valves). Industry supports a future person-sievert (72 person-rem) per year.
to be established based on the rulemaking to increase the allowable
. If 20-year license extension is assumed, performance history of each component; leakage rate.
the estimate is 0.75 person-sievert (75 (2) The performance criterion for the Two private citizens (Mr. Arndt and person-rem) per year. tests will continue to be the allowable Dr. Reytblatt) are opposed to the
.Future industry testing costs are leakage rate (La); (3) Specific proposed rule. The issues of most reduced by approximately $330 to $660 performance factors for establishing concern to these citizens are: (1) Type million ifILRT tests*are conducted once extended test intervals (up to 10 years A test frequency (Mr. Arndt would every 10 years rather than the current 3 for Type B components, and 5 years for prefer that frequencies be held at per 10 years. ILRT savings represent Type C components) are contained in current levels); (2) Type A test about 65 percent of the remaining costs the regulatory guide and industry methodology (Dr. Reytblatt wants to halt of current Appendix J. requirements. guideline. In the regulatory guide, the Type A testing until the test accuracy is . Performance-based LLRT alternatives NRC has taken exception to the NE! improved); (3) Type C test frequencies are estimated to reduce future industry guideline allowing the extension of (Mr. Arndt believes the existing testing costs by $40 million to $55 Type C test intervals up to 10 years, and database does not support 10-year test millio_n. LLRT savings represent about 5 ..limits such extensions to 5 years. intervals, and suggests 5-years as an percent of the total remaining costs of upper limit at the present time); and (4)
Appendix J testing. Summary of Public Comments Leakage rate (a future rulemaking to Therefore, based on the risks and Twenty-six letters were received that increase the allowable leakage rate costs evaluated, and- other addressed the policy, technical, and cost should not be undertaken). considerations discussed above, a aspects of the proposed rulemaking, Two organizations are opposed to the
*performance-based Appendix J was including the nine questions posed by proposed rule. The Bureau of Nuclear proposed which encompnssed tho the NRC in the February 21, 1995 Engineering of the state of New Jersey following principles, which differ .proposed rule. All comments, including and the Ohio Citizens for Responsible .moderately from those first described in the ones received by the NRC after the Energy (OCRE, represented by Ms.
the Federal Register (January 27, 1993 deadline were considered. The Hiatt). a public interest group, expressed 58 FR 6197). commenters included 4 private citizens, skepticism in the risk-based approach to
- General (1) Make Appendix J less 1 public interest group, 18 utilities, 1 regulation as embodied in the prescriptive and more performance- nuclear utility industry group, 1 State philosophy of the Marginal-to-Safoty oriented; (2) Move details of Appendix regulatory agency. and 1 foreign l'rngram. The issuns of most concorn to Jtests to a regulatory guide as guidance; regulator.
- this group are that: (1) Increases in (3) Endorse in a regulatory guide the Although the proposed rule did not public risk are not acceptable, no matter industry guideline (NEI 94--01) on the generate a significant number of public how marginal; and (2) A future conduct of containment tests (The comments, the commenters did align rulemaking to increase the allowable methods for testing are contained in an themselves into twa distinct groups: leakage rate should not be undertaken.
industry .standard (ANSI/ ANS 56.8- those who supported publishing the NRC Position. With respect to the 1994) which is referenced in the NE! rule and those against. Those who areas of disagreement between the NRC guideline); and (4) Allow voluntary supported publishing the rule comprise and those who generally support the adoption of the new regulation, i.e., the vast majority of the commenters (22) proposed rule, no new information has current detailed requirements in and included the Nuclear Energy been provided in the public comments Appendix Jwill con.tinue to be Institute (NE!). which represents the that was not already addressed in acceptable for compliance with the nuclear utility licensees, eighteen ongoing dialogue. Accordingly. the NRC modified rule. individual nuclear power plant licensee has not made any substanti\'e changes to Leakage Limits Acknowledge the Jess respondents, a Spanish regulatory its proposed regulation. Specifically, the risk-significant nature of allowable authority and two private citizens (Mr. NRC has retained: (1) Its position of 50-SC-155
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION requiring the use of technical an appropriate basis to adjust the 2. Can the regulatory/safety objective specifications; (2) The intervals Appendix J testing in~ervals which were (qualitative or quantitative) be established for visual examinations of established over 20 years ago on the established in an objective manner to containment; and (3) The 5-year Type C basis of engineeriFlg.judgment. Further, allow a common understanding between test interval. these comrnenters believe that a licensees and the NRC on how the With respect to the optional feature of significant reductiun in occupational performance or results will be measured the rule, the NRC agrees with the exposures can be achieved with reduced or judged?
industry and has retained this feature .. testing frequency.
- To avoid repetition, the NRC With respect to Mr. Arndt and Dr.
- Mr. E. Gunte;i-Arndt, a private citizen, incorporated responses to this question Reytblatt, the NRC agrees in part with believes that the NRC has neither with those of Question 3.
Mr. Arndt and has decided not to.alter sufficient objective data nor perspective :I. Can t hu regulation and the LLRT test interval as noted in item to jusUfy.inq-easing containment implementation documents be (3). The other issues raised by Mr. Arndt leakage rates, decreasing test developed in such a manner that they and Dr. Reytblatt contain no information frequencies, relaxing testing criteria, can be objectively and consistently that has not been considered previously and reducing containment-system inspected and enforced against? in a public forum. Therefore, the NRC maintenance standards. Dr. Reytblatt, a Approximately 20 commenters has decided to make no substantive private citizen, believes that Type A expressed opinions on Questions #2 and changes to its proposed rule as a result testing must be immediately suspended #3. The majority of the commenters
- of the issues raised. With respect tci the bl:lcause the.current testing methodology believe that regulatory/safety objectives two organizations opposed to the is flawed. Mr .. Kent W. Tosch, Manager can be established objectively, and can proposed rule (OCRE and the NJ Bureau of New Jersey,'s Bureau of Nuclear be consistently enforced, although of Nuclear Engineering), neither has Engineering, points out that the opinions differ on the optimum provided new information or a containment is an extremely important enforcement mechanism. Mr. Fernando compelling reason to abandon the risk- barrier to a release ofradioactivity, but Robledo of the Spanish nuclear based approach to regulation. the.philosophy reflected in this regulatory agency states that the use of In its preliminary criteria for rulemak.ing is that this barrier can be probabilistic risk assessment in the developing performance-based allowed to become less reliable, even regulatory process provides a more regulations, the NRC identified several . when some nuclear plants are showing realistic and objective assessment of issues to be addressed by the signs of aging. Ms. Susan L. Hiatt, nuclear safety, and thus supports its rulemak.ing process as a measure of the Director of Ohio Citizens for viability of the revised rule. These Responsible Energy, notes that relaxing increased use in the regulatory process.
issues were addressed in the proposed the frequency of Appendix J tests leads The NEI believes the use of technical rule and the NRC sought further public to an increase in overall reactor risk of specifications for inspection and input on them. Comments were received approximately 2 percent and, while the enforcement is neither necessary nor on these topics in addition to other NRC may deem.this to be marginal, it warranted and that, rather than a areas of interest to the public. The
- nonetheless is an increase in risk: licensee commitment in the plant following is a summary of comments The NRC believes it has.collected technical specification, future licensee received on these issues and areas, and sufficient subjective and independent commitments to implement Option B NRC's response. A complete discussion data to conduct its risk analysis. should be provided by documentation of all comments is included in the Detailed data from two independent in the updated Final Safety Analysis Public Comment Resolution Document. 5 power plants, representing four units, Report.
- 1. Can the new rule and its data supplied by the NEI representing To assist in the common implementation yield an equivalent approximately 30 additional units, and understanding of new methods of level of, or would it only have a approximately 180 ILRT and licensee establishing Type A, 8, and C test marginal impact on safety? *event reports .were analyzed. These data frequencies between the NRC and power Twenty-four commenters addressed produced consistent resu_Jts. Dr. reactor licensees, the NRC has had this issue, offering a wide variety of Reytblatt's views, while technically ongoing discussions with licensees.
opinions. Twenty comrnenters believe corrl)ct, have been opposed by several These discussions included that implementation of the proposed technically competent organizations participation in workshops designed to rule will provide an equivalent level of including the American National elicit a common understanding. Also, safety to that provided by the current Standards Institute, and Oak Ridge the NRC wishes to retain the current rule. A majority of commenters, National Laboratory because the practice which requires its review and representing for the most part nuclear improvements he suggests will have an approval of changes to Appendix J utilities, believe that the proposed insignificant effect on measured performance limits and surveillance regulation will reduce the testing containment leakage rates in practice requirements. Therefore, the NRC has burden currently imposed on the and thus have no safety significance. required that the regulatory guide nuclear industry, and will result in The NRC believes there has b'een ample should be specified in the technical more efficient use of utility resources, opportunity for public discussion of the specifications, an approach not while ensuring the health and safety of basis for the Appendix J revisions. inconsistent with the Commission's the public. They believe that the Based on the foregoing, Jhe NRC policy on technical specifications. practical experience gained from more reaffirms its prior conclusion (stated in* Based on the foregoing, the NRC than 1,500 reactor-years of commercial the February 21, 1995, Federal Register reaffirms its pricir conclusion (stated in nuclear power-plant operation provides notice) that its safety objective for the February 21, 1995, proposed rule) containment integrity can be maintained that it expects that its activities to date,
'Copies are available for inspection or copying while at the same time reducing the the review and endorsement of a for a fee from the NRC Public Document Room at burden on licensees. Additionally, the industry guideline in a regulatory guide, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC; the PDR's final rule provides a greater level of and the general reference of the mailing address is Mail Stop LL-6, Washington, DC 20555; telephone (202) 634-3273; fax (202) 634- worker safety than that provided by the regulatory guide in plant technical 3343. previous rule. specifications, will provide a common 50-SC-156
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION understanding on the measures of should not be waived. Several utilities to pursue a rulemaking to alter compliance. have no objection to waiving a back.fit allowable leakage rates using risk-based
- 4. Should the proposed revision be analysis when clear relief is available, analysis, believing that a firm technical made even less prescriptive? but are concerned with the generic basis exists for relaxing leakage rates up Except for Mr. Hill and Mr. Barkley, implications of waiving the to two orders of magnitude with only a commenters did not t?xplicitly address applicability of th!! backfit rule. The NE! marginal impact on population risk this question, which was directed at the believes that while the proposed estimates. It was also suggested that a possibility of reducing. even further, the Appendix J revisions would provide review of the present source terms, dose testing frequency of ILRTs based on the much needed performance-based projection models, and associated fact that there does seem to be a strong improvements to the existing Appendix assumptions against the revised source statistical link hntwi,nn passing or J, it would also impose new terms and dose methodologies should failing successivn lLRTs. Mr. I !ill requirements; thus, the proposed rule also be performed to determine if relief believes that there is no need to make constitutes a backfit. Further, this can be achieved while assuring public the rule less prescriptive, and it may be
- commenter believes that, as a matter of health and safety. Three commenters inferred that is no desire on the part of administrative law, an agency lacks discouraged the NRC from relaxing industry to further increase the testing authority to depart from its own rules, containment leakage rates ranging from interval between ILRTs or to eliminate thus, it cannot waive its own the opinion that little benefit would them completely. Rir.hard Barkley, regulations. result (Mr. E. Gunter Arndt) to an although strongly supporting an The NRC believes that if the rule were unequivocal belief that such a move adjustment to tlrn frequency of Type A made mandatory, all licensees would would violate a plant's licensing basis testing to once every 1 ll years, also incur costs setting up the procedures for by eliminating the protection provided discourages the NRC: from adopting a implementing the rule's requirements for the nearest public individual by the Type A surveillance inti:rval any longer following the guidance provided in the 10 CFR Part 100 siting criteria (Ms. S.
than 10 years because of aging regulatory guide and the NE! guidance Hiatt). Ms. Susan Hiatt, representing the considerations. document. For those utilities whose Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, The NRC has decided. in general, to circumstances (e.g., remaining plant believes that containment leak rates maintain the present level of life) would lead them to follow the should be periodically reexamined, not prescriptiveness in the proposed rule current Appendix J, costs would be for the purpose of relaxing them, but to and, in particular, to not decrease incurred with no additional benefit. determine whether they should be made further the test frequency for ILRTs. The Thus, the NRC agrees with the opinions more stringent given increasing NRC's position is guided by the desire expressed by the NE! and has decided population density around operating to maintain some conservatism to to retain the proposed rule in its present nuclear power plants. address uncertainties and adopt an form, which provides a non-mandatory The NRC has decided to continue to evolutionary approach wherein alternative to the current Appendix J pursue further reductions in regulatory incentives remain for good performance. requirements. Because the NRC has burden with marginal impacts on safety
- 5. Should the proposed revisions be decided to retain the optional feature of and will address the complexities noted made mandatory? the proposed rule, the question of in the public comments in its future To avoid repetition, the NRC backfit is not addressed. efforts to relax the allowable leakage incorporated responses to this question 8. Should NRC pursue a fundamental rate.
with those of Question 7. modification of its regulations in this 9. If the allowable leakage rate is
- 6. Was the definition of "backfit" in area by establishing an allowable increased, could on-line monitoring of
§ 50.109(a)(1) intended to encompass leakage rate based on risk analysis (as containment integrity replace other rulemakings of the type represented by presented in draft NUREG-1493, current containment tests? Could the this proposed rule? Chapter 5), as compared to the current results of the on-line monitoring be used To avoid repetition, the NRC practice of using deterministic design to establish a new performance basis for incorporated responses to this question basis accidents and dose guidelines* containment integrity involving less with those of Question 7. contained in 10 CFR Part 100; or should stringent reporting requirements if there
- 7. Is it appropriate for the the NRC modify the allowable leakage is high assurance there are no large Commission to waive the applicability rate within the current licensing basis leakage paths in containment (> 1 in.
of the Backfit Rule? by revising source terms and updating diameter). The majority of the 20 comnwnters regulatory guides (R.G.s 1.3 and 1.4) 6 The 18 commenters who responded to believe that compliance with the for calculating doses to the public? this question consist of the NE! and the performance-based Appendix J program What are the advantages and utilities endorsing the NE! position, and should not be made mandatory. The NE! disadvantages of the two approaches? Mr. Richard Barkley. The commenters believes that rulemakings that provide What are some other considerations do no~-believe that on-line monitoring relief from a current regulation but than risk to public, e.g., plant control (OLM) of containment integrity can would also contain one or more new room habitability, that might limit the replace many of the current requirements (as is the case here) would allowable leakage rate? containment tests, and state that OLM be subject to the backfit rule. These The 20 commenters who responded to systems have very limited abilities to commenters believe that application of this question consist predominantly of identify breaches in containment the backfit rule would be necessary the utilities endorsing the NE! position. integrity. In the experience of Mr. before the NRC could promulgate the These respondents encourages the NRC Barkley, such systems add unnecessary performance-based Appendix J program plant complexity and cost. as a requirement, believing some 6 Copics may be purchased at current rates from The NRC acknowledges the public licensees might select, for reasons of the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Go\'ernmcnl comments rendered and will be guided cost, to continue to comply with the Printing Office. P.O. !lox 37082. Washington. DC by them in decisions yet to be made 20402-9328 [telephone 202-512-2249 or 202-512-existing Appendix J. 2171); or from the National Technical Information regarding the Phase 2 effort. The majority of commenters believe Service by writing NTtS al Port Royal Road. 10. Are there any other regulatory that the backfit rule would apply and Springfield. VA 22161. approaches and tech_nical methods by 50-SC-157
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION which the NRC can adopt a complete Several commenters also expressed Test Pressures performance and, risk basis to its opinions on the NRC's position on LLRT Two commenters expressed opinions regulations for containment leak-tight testing frequency. Mr. Fernando on the magnitude of the pressures used integrity? What are some of the Robledo, while agreeing in general with in conducting Type A leakage tests.
attributes for performance, and what the test frequency for"type B and C tests Northern States Power Company_: risk-based methods can be used to proposed in the draft regulatory guide, believes that Type A testing at full analyze these attributes? believes that certain.mechanical pressure is unnecessary and believes The NEI. speaking for all other penetrations particularly important for that visual inspection coupled with a utilities, addressed this question by plant safety should be leak tested every reduced pressure test will adequately stating that it had*not conducted any 24 months. Mr. E. Gunter Arndt's view assure that the containment structural analyses to determine whether any other is that the testing history of members are leak-tight, especially since.* regulatory approaches and technical penetrations, and especially of valves, reduced pressure Type A tests are methods by which the NRC can adopt does not support leaving them untested legally acceptable tests as prescribed in a complete performance and.risk basis for 10 years and suggested that an upper the current 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J. to its regulations for containment leak- limit should be once every 5 years. One Mr. E. Gunter Arndt states that while tight integrity. utility in particular, and the Nuclear Type* A tests performed at reduced
- 11. Rulemaking Documents.
- Energy Institute in.general believe that pressure rather than peak accident Seventeen commenters expressed the NRC does not go far enough in citing pressure are economically advantageous opinions about NRC's regulatory policy that several sets of data justify 10-year to the industry, the results of these tests decisions and/or specific language in LLRT intervals. In contrast, Mr. Richard are not necessarily indicative of leakage the rule or its supporting documents. Barkley, who also endorses Type B & C rates during accidents.
Mr. Hill believes that the NRC's and the testing frequency based on performance, The NRC believes that extrapolating NEl's guidance documents are not strongly supports the NRC's proposal to low pressure leakage-test results ,to full developed to the point of establishing a . prohibit the adoption of Type C pressure leakage-test results has turned common understanding of how to rieet surveillance intervals longer than 60 out to be unsuccessful. The NRC
- NRC's regulatory and safety objectives m_onths. believes that the peak*calculated (e.g., while NEI 94-01 contains a lot of In establishing the 5-year test interval accident pressure: (1) Is consistent with information and solid guidance, it also for LLRTs, the NRC has designed a the typical practice for NRC staff .
contains inconsistencies, contradictions cautious, evolutionary approach as data evaluations of accident pressure for the and unclear passages). The. NEI, whose are compiled to 111inimize the first 24 hours in accordance with comments were endorsed by most uncertainty .now believed to exist with Regulatory Guides 1.3 and 1.4; (2) responding licensees, proposed respect to LLRT data. The NRC's Provides at least a nominal check for modifications to several of the judgment, based on risk assessment and gross leak paths which might exist at rulemaking documents, including the deterministic analysis, continues to be high test pressures, but not at low test Federal Register notice and its own that the limited database on pressures; and (3) Directly represents guidance document. unquantified leakages and common technical specification leakage-rate The NRC has amended its rule and mode and repetitive failures introduces limits, and provides greater confidence accepts most of the revisions to the significant uncertainties into the in conta,inment system leak-tight, implementing documents to clarify
- probabilistic risk analysis; The NRC will integrity. .
language and achieve consistency be open to submittals from licensees as Based on the foregoing, the. NRC has between the rulemaking documents; more performance-based data are decided to retain the calculated design
- 12. Technical Issues.
- developed. The extension of LLRT test basis loss-of-coolarit accident peak interval to 5 years is a prudent first step. pressure as the ILRT test pressure.
Testing Frequency By allowing a 25 percent margin in Twenty-four commenters expressed testing frequency requirements, the NRC *containment Inservice Visual opinions on test frequency, the majority has provided the flexibility to Inspection were supportive of 10-year intervals for accommodate longer fuel cycles. With Eighteen commenters expressed both Types A, B and C tests. Regarding respect to the 10-year interval for ILRTs, opinions *on this issue._The NEI and ILRTs, the Nuclear Energy Institute, the NRC believes its technical support most utilities oppose the NRC'.s. several individual utilities, and Mr. document (NUREG-1493) is persuasive proposal to require visual examination Howard Hill expressed views that the by demonstrating that testing intervals of containment be performed 3 times proposed rule provides an acceptable could be increased up to once every 20 every 10 years. These commenters testing frequency for ILRTs. Mr. years with an imperceptible increase in suggest that this issue be taken up in a Fernando Robledo, of the Spanish risk, using actual ILRT data which
- parallel rulemaking.
nuclear regulatory agency, believes that accounted for random and plant-specific The NRC finds the industry's , 10 years is too long a time interval failures and plant aging effects. arguments for relaxing the frequency of between Type A containment tests. Mr. Based on the foregoing discussion, the containment visual inspections to be E. Gunter Arndt's view is that a NRC has decided to retain the 60-month unpersuasive ..Because the visual . preoperational test should not count as Type C test interval and the 120-month examination is not integral to the ILRT one of the two successful ILRT tests *interval for Type A and B tests. In (i.e., may be performed independently) required to go to a 10-year test interval response to public comments, the NRC and because the NRC sees benefits to.the because preoperational conditions are -has revised the regulatory guide to limit early detection of unknown aging not at all representative of operating the extension of test intervals for main mechanisms which may be active, the conditions. The citizens' group, Ohio steam and feedwater isolation valves in NRC considers it prudent to conduct Citizens for Responsible Energy, BWRs, arid containment purge and vent visual inspections on a frequency believes the frequency of containment valves in PWRs and BWRs beyond 30
- greater than the ILRT. Further, the NRC leak-rate testing should remain months given their operating experience believes it is inappropriate to defer a unchanged from the current practice. and/or safety significance. requirement pertaining to containment 50-SC-158
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION strudural integrity to an ongoing activity if it could affect a valve's leak- obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port rulemaking to incorporate ASME tightness. "Alternate test or analysis" Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
Section XI, IWE and IWL until its form are not endorsed as appropriate Regulatory guides are not copyrighted, and substance is finalized. substitutes for an as-found test, since and Commission approval is not Based on the foregoing, the NRC has the latter provides clear and objective required to reproduce them. decided to retain its frequency for the evidence of performance of isolation inservice visual inspection. Implementation components; and (3) limitation of the Reporting Requirements extension of test intervals for main The proposed Option B to Appendix
. Only one comment was received on steam and feedwater isolation valves in J will become effective 30 days after BWRs, and containment purge and vent publication. At any time thereafter, a this issue. Dr. Z. Reytblatt noted that the valves in PWRs and BWRs beyond 30 licensee or applicant may notify the proposed rule's reporting requirements months given their operating experience NRC of its desire to perform consist only of a c"over letter to the NRC and/or safety significance. containment leakage-rate testing and suggested this is intended to conceal information from the public. Dr. Regulatory Guide; Issuance, according to Option B. Accompanying Reytblatt suggests that utilities should Availability *this notification, a licensee must submit be required to submit ull computer files proposed technical specifications The Nuclear Regulatory Commission related to testing to the NRC changes which would eliminate those has issued a new guide in its Regulatory immediately after the tests have been Guide Series. This series has been technical specifications which completed to prevent their alteration or developed to describe and make implement the current rule and propose destruction. available to the public such information a new technical specification It is not the intent of the NRC's as methods acceptable to the NRC staff referencing the NRC regulatory guide or, reporting requirements to conceal for implementing specific parts of the if the licensee desires, an alternative information from the public; if tests fail, Commission's regulations, techniques implementation guidance.
the information is required to be used by the staff in evaluating specific Implementation must await NR<;: review reported to the NRC, and the NRC will problems or postulated accidents, and and approval of the licensee's proposal. make such data avaiJable to the public. data needed bv the staff in its review of The NRC anticipates that a generic The NRC has decided to retain its applications for permits and licenses. communication will be issued shortly reporting requirements as stated in the Regulatory Guide 1.163, which will provide the implementation proposeq rule. "Performance-Based Containment procedure to all power reactor licensees. Leakage-Test Program," endorses an Modifications to the Proposed Rule in Finding of No Significant industry standard which contains Response to Public Comments Environmental Impact: Availability guidance on an acceptable performance-The NRC has decided to amend its based leakage-test program, leakage rate The Commission has determined proposed rule and its implementing test methods, procedures, and analyses under the National Environmental docu~ents tci clarify language. The NRC that may be used to implement the final Policy Act of 1969. ns amended, and the
- has concluded that its regulatory regulation published in this notice. Commission's regulations in Subpart A analysis and its technical support Comments and suggestions in of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if document, NUREG-1493, do not require connection with items for inclusion in adopted, would not be a major Federal corrections to its technical or cost guides currently being developed or action significantly affecting the quality analyses or its findings. Modifications to improvements in all published guides of the human environment, and all documents will be restricted to are encouraged at any time. Written therefore an environmental impact clarifications and enhancements to comments may be submitted to the statement is not required. There will be assist in communications with the Rules Review and Directives Branch, reader, specifically in areas discussed in a marginal radiological environmental Division of Freedom of Information and the public comments. impact offsite, and the occupational Publications Services, Office of The proposed rule has been modified Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory exposure onsite is expected to decrease by changing "Acceptance criteria" to Commission. Washington, DC 20555. by about 0.8 person-rem per year of "Performance criteria" in Section II, The NRC staff's response to public plant operation for plant personnel if Definitions, and various conforming text comments received on the draft version licensees adopt the performance-based changes to reflect consistent use of that of this guide (DC'~1037. issued in testing scheme provided in the revised term. Other similar redundant terms in Februar\' 1995) are available for rngulation. Alternatives to issuing this the proposed rule, e.g. goals, have been inspect(on or copying for a fee in the revision of the regulation were deleted to establish clear and concise NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L considered. One alternative would also language in the rule. Street NW .. Washington, DC. entail complex revisions to other NRC Specific changes to the draft Regulatory guides are available for regulations and therefore the NRC has regulatory guide, Section C, Regulatory inspection at the Commission's Public: decided to pursue it separately in the Position, include (1) in paragraph Document Room. 2120 L Street N\V .. future. A third alternative would add number 2, the inclusion of the rationale Washington. DC. Single copies of regulatory burden without a for denying the "3 refueling cycle" regulatory guides may be obtained frP.e commensurate safety benefit and change requestec:l in the public of charge by writing the Office of therefore was found not to be comments; (2) the inclusion of a new Administration. Attention: Distribution acceptable. The environmental paragraph number 4, taking exception to and Services Section. U.S. Nuclear assessment is available for inspection or the NE! Industry Guideline, Section Regulatory Commission. Washington. copying for a fee in the NRC Public 10.2.3.3, which provides guidance that DC 20555-0001; or bv fax at (301) 415- Document Room, 2120 L Street NW, an as-found Type C test or an alternative 2260. Issued guides rnay also be (Lower Level). Washington, DC; the test or analysis (emphasis added) shall purchased from the National Technical PDR's mailing address is Mail Stop LL-be performed prior to any maintenance. Information Service on a standing order 6, Washington, DC 20555; phone (202) repair, modification, or adjustment basis. Details on this service may be 634-3273;fax (202) 634-3343.
50-SC-159
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Paperwork Reduction Act Statement as defined in 10CFR 50.109(a)(l). inspections, audits and any other means This final rule amends information Therefore, a backfit analysis is not to be used to demonstrate compliance collection requirements that are subject necessary. with the regulations.
The two-part format is restrictive and to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 has no regulatory advantage. Existing (44 lJ.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These Antitrust, Classrned information, licensees with physical security plans requirements were approved by the Criminal penalties, Fire protection, approved before the effective date of the Office of Management and Budget, final rule will not be required to adopt approval number 3150-0011. Incorporation by reference, . Becau~e the rule will relax existing Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear the new format. These licensees, mformat10n collection requirements by power plants and reactors, Radiation however, may revise their plans on a protection, Reactor siting criteria, voluntary basis, pursuant to the rules providing an option to the existing Reporting and recordkeeping that permit licensees to make changes in requirements, the public burden for this security plans that do not decrease the collection of information is expected to requirements. effectiveness of the plans. This final rule be reduced by approximately 400 hours For the reasons set out in the will not change any of the substantive per licensee per year. This reduction preamble and under the authority of the content currently required in the !nclude~ the time required for reviewing Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, physical security plans. mstruct1ons, searching existing data the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, The benefit of this rulemaking is the sourctis, gathering and maintaining the as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, elimination of an unnecessary
- data needed and completing and the NRC is adopting the following requirement and there are no expected*
reviewing the collection of information. amendments to 10 CFR Part 50. Send comments regarding the estimated adverse impacts. For those licensees burden reduction or any aspect of this who desire to revise their physical collection of information, including security plans, the staff has revised suggestions for reducing this burden, to Regulatory Guide, 5.52, "Standard Format and Content of a Licensee the Information and Records 60 FR 53505 Physical Protection Plan for Strategic Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Published 10/16/95 Special Nuclear Material at Fixed Sites Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Effective 11 /15/95 (Other than Nuclear Power Plants)," for Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the use as guidance. NRC encourages Desk Officer, Office of Information and 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, and 72 applicants or licensees to follow such Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, guidance in order to allow for a quicker (3150-0011). Office of Management and RIN 3150-AF27 and more efficient review of the plans. Iludgnt, Washington. DC 20503. Physical Security Plan Format Summary of Public Comments Regulatory Analysis Changes The Commission has prepared a final The comment period for the proposed regulatory analysis on this regulation. AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory rule published April 17, 1995 (60 FR The analysis examines the costs and Commission. 19170), closed on May 17, 1995. Two benefits of the alternatives considered ACTION: Final rule. comments were received. The following by the Commission. The analysis is comment summary and resolution
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory address these comments.
available for inspection or copying for a fee in the NRC Public Document Room, Commission (NRC) is amending its Comment. This commenter 2120 L Street NW, (Lower Level), regulations to eliminate the requirement complimented NRC for eliminating Washington, DC; the.PDR's mailing for applicants for power reactor, . unnecessary requirements and address is Mail Stop LL-6, *washington, Category I fuel cycle, and spent fuel commented on one statement, in the DC 20555; phone (202) 634-3273; fax storage licenses to submit physical "Supplementary Information" section, (202) 634-3343. security plans in two parts. This action that says licensees may"* *
- revise is necessary to allow for a quicker and their plans on a voluntary basis Regulatory Flexibility Certification more efficient review of the physical pursuant to the rules that permit In accordance with the Regulatory security plans. licensees to make changes in security Flexibility Act of 1980, (5 U.S.C. EFFECTIVE DATE: November 15, 1995. plans that do not decrease the 605(b)), the Commission certifies that effectiveness of the plan." The this rule will not, if promulgated, have FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
commenter discussed a Generic Letter a significant economic impact on a Carrie Brown, Office of Nuclear Material that is being developed by the Office of substantial number of small entities. Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Nuclear Reactor Regulation entitled, This rule affects only the licensing and Regulatory Commission, Washington, "Standardization of Security Program operation of nuclear power plants. The DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-8092. Reviews," and encouraged the issuance companies that own these plants do not of the draft Generic Letter for comment fall within the scope of the definition of SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under as soon as possible. "small entities" set forth in the current NRC regulations, applicants for Response. The Generic Letter was Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Size power reactor, Category I fuel cycle, and published in the Federal Register on standard adopted by the NRC (10 CFR spent fuel storage licenses must submit June 14, 1995 (60 FR 31326), with a 30-2.810). physical security plans in two parts. day comment period. Applicants for power reactor, Category I Comment. This commenter noted that Backfit Analysis fuel cycle, and spent fuel storage a similar requirement to submit physical This final rule amends a current licenses are required to address, in Part security plans in two parts in 10 CFR regulation by establishing alternative 1 of their plans, how they will comply 72.180 was not addressed and indicated requirements which may be voluntarily with the applicable regulations of 10 that it should be included. adopted by licensees. Therefore, the CFR Parts 11 and 73. They are required Response. NRC agrees with the final rule does not constitute a backfit to list, in Part 2 of their plans, any test, 50-SC-160
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION comment and 10 CFR 72.180 has been control and accounting, Nuclear 60 FR 65456 amended. materials, Packaging and containers, Published 12/19/95 Radiation protection, Reporting and Effective 1/18/96 Environmental Impact: Categorical recordkeeping requirements, Scientific Exclusion equipment, Security measures, Special 10 CFR Part 50 NRC has determined that this final nuclear material.
rule is the type of action described as a RIN 3150-AD57 categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 10 CFR Part 72 51.22(c)(2). Therefore, neither an Manpower training programs, Nuclear Fracture Toughness Requirements for environmental impact statement nor an materials, Occupational safety and Light Water Reactor Pressure Vessels environmental assessment has been health, Reporting and recordkeeping AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory prepared for this final rule. requirements, Security measures, Spent Commission. fuel. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement ACTION: Final rule. For the reasons set out in the This rule does not contain a new or preamble and under the authority of the
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory amended information collection Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Commission (NRC) is amending its requirement subject to the Paperwork the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501, regulations for light-water-cooled as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, nuclear power plants to clarify several et seq.). Existing requirements were NRC is adopting the following approved by the Office of Management items related to the fracture toughness.
amendments to 10 CFR Parts 50, 70, and requirements for reactor pressure and Budget, approval numbers 3150- 72. vessels (RPV). The amendments will 0009, 0011, and 0132. clarify the pressurized thermal shock Regulatory Analysis (PTS) requirements, make changes to The Commission has not prepared a the Fracture Toughness *Requirements regulatory analysis on this regulation and the Reactor Vessel Material because the amendment does not Surveillance Program Requirements, involve a question of policy, will have and provide new requirements for thermal annealing of a reactor pressure no impact on public health and safety, vessel. and will require no additional burden on current licensees. EFFECTIVE DATE: January 18, 1996. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Regulatory Flexibility Certification Alfred Taboada, Division of Engineering In accordance with the Regulatory Technology, Office of Nuclear Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear the Commission certifies that this final Regulatory Commission, Washington, rule does not have a significant DC 20555-00001, telephone: (301) 415-economic impact on a substantial 6014. number of small entities. This final rule SUP.PLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On affects applicants for power reactor, October 4, 1994 (59 FR 50513), the NRC Category I fuel cycle, and spent fuel published in the Federal Register a storage licenses. Because these licensees proposed amendment to clarify several are not classified as small entities, as items related to fracture toughness defined by NRC's size standards (10 requirements.for reactor pressure CFR 2.810), the Commission finds that vessels (RPV) and to add a new section this final rule does not have a on thermal annealing of a reactor vessJl significant economic impact on a to 10 CFR Part 50. substantial number of small entities.
Background
Backfit Analysis Maintaining the structural integrity of NRC has determined that the backfit tho reactor prossuro vessel of light-rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not apply to water-cooled reactors is a critical this final rule, and thereTcire: tluif a - . concern related to the safe operation of backfit analysis is not required, because nuclear power plants. To assure the this amendment does not involve any structural integrity of RPVs, NRC provisions that would impose backfits, regulations and regulatory guides have as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(l). been developed to provide analysis and measurements methods and procedures List of Subjects to establish that each RPV has adequate 10 CFR Part 50 safety margin for continued operation. Structural integrity of a RPV is generally Antitrust, Classified information, assured through a fracture mechanics Criminal penalties, Fire protection, evaluation, including measurement or Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear estimation of the fracture toughness of power plants and reactors, Radiation the materials which compose the RPV. protection, Reactor siting criteria, However, the fracture toughness of the Reporting and recordkeeping RPV materials varies with time. As the requirements. plant operates, neutrons escaping from 10 CFR Part 70 the reactor core impact.the vessel heltlino materials (e.g. the materials thut Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Material 50-SC-161
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION surround the reactor core), causing Tho final rule requires, prior to Thermal Annealing Plan, and prior to embrittlement of those mntorials. The initiation of thermal annealing, restart, )he NRG shall: (1) Briefly NRC's regulations and regulatory guides submittal of a Thermal Annealing document whether the thermal *
- related to RPV integrity provide.the ** * . Report containing: (1) A.Thermal annealing was perfornt'ed in corilplilince*
criteria and methods needed to estimate. Annealing Operating Plan, (2) a with the licensee's Thermal Annealing the extent of the embrittlement, to Requalification IQspectiori and Test Operating Plan and the Requalification evaluate the consequences of the Program, (3) a Fracture Toughness {nspection and Test Program, with ihe
- erilbrittlement in temis of the structural Recovery and Reembrittlement Trend documentation to be placed in the NRC
~o integrity.of the RPV, and provid11. Assurance Program, arid (4) public document room, and (2) hold a methods to mitigate the deleterious
- Identification of Unreviewed Safety . public meeting to: (1) permit the effects of the embrittlement. Questions and Technical Specifications licensee to explain the results of the
- The NRC has several regulations and . Changes. The report must be subltiitted reactor vessel annealing to the NRC and regulatory guides that establish criteria at least 3 years before the date at which the public, (2) allow the NRC to discuss and procedures for assuring the . the limiting fracture toughness criteria its inspection of the reactor vessel structural integrity of RPVs. With the in 50.61 and Appendix G*to Part 50 annealing, and (3) provide an
- addition of the thermal annealing would be exceeded. This 3*year period opportunity for the public to comment requirements in this rule and several . is specified to provide the NRC stuff to the NRC on the. ilierina\ annealing. . .
regulatory guides, the regulatory
- with sufficient time to review the The licensee may. restart_ its teactor.af\er documents contribute to a thermal annealing program. Under the meeting has been completed, unless comprehensive set of regulations and . § 50.66(a); the NRC will, within three the NRC orders otherwise. Within 45 regulatory guidance pertaining to RPV . years of submission of a licensee's days of the licensee's written integrity. .Thermal Annealing Report, document confirmation that the themial annealing This final rule adds requirements for its views*on the plan; including whether was completed in accordance with the thermal annealing of the RPV as a , thermal annealing constitutes.an Thermal Annealing Operating plan and method for mitigating the. effects of unreviewed safety question. . the Requalificatfon Inspection and Test neutron irradiation (10 CFR 50.66) and In order to provide for public Program, the NRC staff shall complete amends the following: participation in the regulatory process, full documentation of the NRC's * *
- 1. The Pressurized Thermal Shock Section 50.66(f)(1) requires that the NRC inspection of the" licensee's .annealing (PTS) rule (10 CFR 50.61). hold a public meeting a minimum of 30
- 2. Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50, days before the licensee starts t~ thermal process and place the documentation in anneal the reactor vessel. The the Public Document. Room *.
"Fracture Toughness Requirements."
- 3. Appendix H of 10 CFR Part 5Q, Commission will notify and solicit If the thermal annealing was comments from cognizant local and completed but not performed in "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance accordance with the*Thermal Annealing Program Requirements." . . state governments, and will publish a notice in the Federal Register and in a Operating Plan and the Requalification Overview of the Final Rule . forum, such as local newspapers, which Inspection.and Test Program, including is readily accessible to ip.dividuals in the bounding conditions of the PTS Rule (1o'CFR 50.61) the vicinity of the-site, in order tQ solicit temperature and times as discussed This arilend~ent to the PTS ruie
- above, the licensee must submit a
- makes three changes: .
comments from the public. The thermal annealing operating plan summary of lack of corlipliance and a.
- 1. The rule incorporates in total, and must include an evaluation of the effects j\lstification for subsequent operations. **
therefore makes binding by rule, the of temperature, and of mechanical and The licensee must also identify any method for determining the reference thermal stresses on the reactor and changes to the facility which ere temperature, RTNDT, *including
- associated equipment such as attributable to the-noncompliances .
treatment of the unirradiated RTNDT .
- containment1 the biological shield, and which constitute unreviewed safety value, the margin term, and the explicit *. attached piping, to.demonstrate that the questions and any changes to the definition of "credible" surveillance ' *operability of the reactor will not be technical specifications which are data, which is currently described.in . *
- detrimentally affected. The bounding required for operation as a result of the Regulatory Guide i.99, Revision 2. . . *.* conditions of the temperatures and noncompliances: This identification
- 2. The section is restructured to * . times used in this. analysis define the does not relieve the licensee from improve clarity, with the requirements proposed annealing conditions. If these complying with applicable requirements section giving only the requirements for conditions are exceeded during the of the Commission regulations and the the value for the refe~ence temperature
- vessel annealing, then the evaluation operating license, and if,.as a result of for end of life fluence, RTPTs* The would no longer be valid, and the . the annealing operation, *these method for calculating RTPTS is m*oved acceptability of the actual vessel requirements cannot be met, the to a new paragraph of the rule .. annealing would have to be licensee must obtain the appropriate
- 3. Thermal annealing is i.dentified as demonstrated as discussed below in the exemption per 1'0 CFR 50.12. If a method for mitigating the effects of *next paragraph. unreviewed safety questions or changes .
neutron irradiation, thereby reducing
- Upon completion of the thermal . to technical specifications are not
- RTPTS*. . . . annealing, the li.censee must confirm in
- identified as necessary for resumed writing to the Director, Offil:;e of Nuclear operation, the licensee may restart after Thermal Annealing Rule (10 CFR 50.66) Reactor Regulation (NRR), that the the NRC staff places e summary of its The thermal annealing rule, 10 CFR thermal annealing was performed in inspection of the thermal annealing in 50.66, provides a consistent set of . accordance with the Thermal Annealing the Public Document Room, and the requirements for the use of thermal. Operating Plan and the Requalification NRC holds a public meeting on the annealing to mitigate the effects of . Inspection and Test Program. Within 15 thermal annealing. On the other hand, if neutron irradiation and replaces the days of the licensee's written urireviewed safety questions.or changes requirements for annealing in the . confirmation that the thermal annealing to technical specific;ations are identified current Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50. was completed*in accordance with the as necessary for resumed operation, the 50-SC-162
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION licensee may restary only after the Two items of particular importance to geometry of the pressure vessels, the Director of NRR authorizes restart, the the overall annealing are .the recovery of attached piping, and the surrounding summary of the NR:C staff inspection is fracture toughness and the degree of structures. The staff has observed one of placed in the public document room, reembrittlement of the RPV beltline these annealing operations. While and a public meeting on the thermal materials. This final rule provides informative, the East European and annealing is held. ;
- alternative metlwds for detennining Russian experience does not provide The fimd Thermal Annealing Rule these values, ranging from assessments answers to all of the potential questions also sets forth the requirements that a using plant-specific materials to an related to annealing of U.S. designed licensee must follow if the thermal assessment using u generic computation. pressure vessels.
annealing was terminated prior to Two methods provided for evaluating Research analyses performed completion. In general, the process and annealing recovery are experimental previously indicated the potential for requirements for partial annealing are methods to determine plant-specific plastic deformation of the main coolant analogous to the situations where the annealing recovery.and a third method piping for a typical U.S. plant design .. thermal annealing was completed; viz., is a generic computational method. and anticipated annealing conditions. where the partial aµnealing was Experimental methods and the There are also questions regarding how otherwise performed in compliance computational method are-also provided thermal growth of the pressure vessel is with the Thermal ~nnealing Operating *for estimating recovery of RTNDT and treated, and the adequacy of the thermal Plan and relevant portions of the Charpy upper-shelf energy of the and stress analyses used to predict Requalification Inspection and Test beltline materials. The experimental response of the overall system under Program, the licenl!ee submits written methods for estimating recovery of thermal annealing conditions. confirmation' of such compliance and RTNDT*and the Charpy upper-shelf Additionally, there may be questions in may restart following, inter alia, holding energy utilize either surveillance other areas such as temperature limits of a public meeting on the annealing. By program specimens or material removed for the concrete structures, and potential contrast, where the partial annealing from the vessel beltline. The radiological hazards associated with was not performed, in accordance with experimental methods provide a plant- removing and storing the reactor the Thermal Annealing Operating Plan. specific estimate of recovery, rather than
- internals during the annealing process, and relevant portions of the the generic value evaluated from the and fire hazards associated with heating Requalification Inspection and Test computational method. This final rule the vessel.
Program, the licensee is required to re'luires that surveillance specimens Recognition of Lhe numerous complex submit a summary of lack of compliance from "credible" surveillance programs technical questions related to thermal and a justification for subsequent must be used to develop plant-specific annealing, and of the potential benefits operations, and identify any changes to recovery data, if such specimens are for operating nuclear power plants, has the facility which ii.re attributable to the available. This final rule does not resulted in a cooperative effort, funded noncompliances which constitute require the removal of material from the by the U.S. Department of Energy and unreviewed safety questions and RPV beltline to permit plant-specific the industry, to perform Annealing changes to the technical specifications evaluation of recovery. Demonstration Projects. Projects are which are required for operation as a As described previously, the planned t_o demonstrate two different result of the nonci>mpliances with the computational method requires annealing processes, evaluating heater Thermal Annealing Operating Plan and appropriate justification. designs and vessel designs. It is relevant portions of the Requalification Post anneal reembrittlement trends of anticipated that the annealing Inspection and Test Program. If both the RTNDTand the Charpy upper demonstration projects will answer Unreviewed Safety Questions and/or shelf energy must be estimated and many of the generic questions regarding changes to technical specifications are monitored using a surveillance program thermal annealing of U.S. pressure identified as necessary for resumed described in the Thermal Annealing vessel and piping designs. operation, the licensee may restart only Report. The thermal annealing report, after the Director of NRR authorizes The reactor pressure vessel is perhaps required by the thermal annealing rule; restart and the public meeting on lhe the most important single component in is designed to facilitate a detailed thermal annealing, is held. the reactor coolant system. As such, review by the licensee of plant-specific Every licensee that either completes a ensuring its integrity is a fundamental questions and considerations in thermal annealing or terminates an element of plant safety. Thermal . performing a thermal annealing. The annealing but elec,ts to .take full or annealing is a positive action that could proposed rule specifically discusses the partial credit for the annealing shall be taken to reduce the level of potential for unreviewed safety provide a Thermal Annealing Results embrittlement in the pressure vessel questions and technical specification Report detailing: (1) The time and beltline and, thereby, improve the changes that may result from or be temperature profile of the actual thermal ability of a pressure vessel to withstand related to thermal annealing of the anneal, (2) the post-anneal RTNDT and accident loadings. While thermal reactor pressure vessel. With Charpy upper shelf energy values of the annealing is a positive action, there are* completion of the demonstration reactor material to be used in numerous complex technical questions projects and as the staff and industry subsequent operations, (3) the projected regarding its application in the U.S. that gain experience with thermal annealing, post-anneal reembrittlement trends for are unanswered. many of the issues related to annealing both RTNDT and Cherpy upper-shelf Thermal annealing of a commercial will be better understood and related energy, end (4) the projected values of reactor pressure vessel has never been questions will be answered. However, RTP"Ts and Charpy upper-shelf energy at accomplished in the United States. until this experience is realized, the the end of the proposed period of Thermal annealing has been staff will critically review licensee operation addressed in tho application. successfully employed in Eastern determinations regarding unreviewed The report must be submitted within Europe and Russia on Russian-designed safety questions and the need for three months of C(?mpleting the thermal pressure vessels. However, there are technical specification changes anneal, unless an extension is significant differences between the U.S. associated with each proposed thermal authorized by the:Oirector, NRR. and Russian designs in terms of the annealing. 50-SC-163
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION The thermal annealing rule has been
- required by Section XI of the American requirements for integrated surveillance structured to provide time. for. the staff Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler programs, to thoroughly review the licensee's & Pressure Vessel (B&P.V) Code (ASME The other principal change to annealing plan and determination. Code) must be *completed before the Appendix H clarifies the version of regarding unreviewed safety questions core is critical. ASTM Standard E 185 that applies to and the need for technical specification The requirement that all pressure and the various portions of the surveillance changes. If the staff identifies an leak tests of the RPV required by Section programs. Appendix H recognizes the unreviewed safety question or the need XI of the ASME Code must be need to separate surveillance programs for a technical specification change, the completed before the core is critical is into two essential parts, specifically the licensee would be so notified and the intended to prohibit the use of nuclear design of the program and the *
- existing NRC regulatory prnctice*s would heat, i.e., core criticality, in tho conduct subsequent testing and reporting of be invoked to address the issues. of ASME, Section XI pressure and leak *results from the surveillance capsules.
tests. The use of nuclear heat before the Because the design of the surveillance .Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50 completion of such tests is not program cannot be chariged once the
. Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50 consistent with basic defense-in-depth pi:ogramjs in place, the requirements specifies fracture toughness . nuclear safety principle for several for design of the surveillance program requirements for ferritic materials of reasons, including the hindrance of are static for each plant. However, the pressure-retaining components of the finding leaks with the vessel at such a testing and reporting requirements are reactor coolant pressure boundary of high temperature an_d the potential for updated along with technical light-water-cooled nuclear power exacerbating the consequences of a improvements made to,ASTM standard reactors. These requirements provide vessel rupture (in the extremely E 185.
adequate margins of safety during any unlikely event that it should occur) by condition of normal operation, having the core critical. The *explicit Request for Public Comments including anticipated operational prohibition of nuclear heat in these At the request of the Commission, the occurrences and system hydrostatic cases was discussed in a letter to proposed rule contained a request for tests. The amendments to Appendix G Messi:s, Reynolds and Stenger of the public comments on the following are principally of a clarifying or a Nuclear Utility Backfilling and Reform specific issues related to the proposed restructuring nature. Requirements for Group from James M. Taylor, Executive regulation on thermal annealing:
"volumetric inspection" and Director of Operations, dated February 1. The technical adequacy of the "additional evidence of fracture 2, 1990. staffs guidance;
- toughness" have been removed because The current requirements in 10 CFR 2. The sufficiency of the guidance and they were unnecessary, given the Part 50, Appendix G, Section V. D. with criteria to support a: certification that if inspection and performance respect to reactor vessel thermal satisfied, a plant with an annealed
- demonstration programs currently annealing are being replaced by a vessel can safely resume operation; required under 10 CFR 50.55a. The sentence which references the new 3. Whether health and safety concerns "additional evidence of fracture Thermal Annealing rule, 10 CFR 50.66 .. are best served by approval of the toughness" requirement in Section Appendix Hof 10 CFR Part 50 thermal annealing plan or of readiness V.C.2 is incorporated in the "equivalent for restart; margins" analysis in Section IV.A.1 as Appendix H of lo CFR Part 50, 4. The preferred regulatory process a provisional method for developing "Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance (including opportunities for public fracture toughness data needed for thiat Program Requirements" provides the participation) and the commenter's analysis. rules for monitoring the changes in the basis for recommending a particular The pressure-temperatu~ and fracture toughness properties of the RPV process; and minimum permissible temperature beltline materials due to irradiation 5. Whether there are health and safety requirements in Section IV have been embrittlement using a surveillance issues concerning thermal annealing restructured. The principal feature is the progr_am. Appendix H references that cannot be addressed generically addition of a table which summarizes American Society for Testing and and would warrant plant-specific the pressure-temperature limit Materials (ASTM) standard E 185 consideration.
requirements and minimum ("Standard Practice for Conducting The supplementary information temperature requirements as a function Surveillance Tests for Light-Water section of the proposed rule also of the plant operating condition, the Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessels") discussed the issue of opportunity for vessel pressure, whether fuel is in the for many of the detailed requirements of public participation in regulating vessel, and whether the core is critical. . surveillance programs, and permits the thermal annealing of pressure vessels; In addition, Section IV has been use of integrated surveillance programs, The response to the request for public reworded to clarify the minimum wherein surveillance program capsules comments on the.se -issues, along with permissible temperature requirement by for one reactor are irradiated in another other items, are summarized below. indicating the criteria for use in reactor. determining the location in the Integrated surveillance programs are Summary of Comments component or material which must permitted under Section II.C of The following includes a summary of satisfy the minimum temperature Appendix H of 10 CFR Part 50. One the comments receiv.ed on the proposed requirement. This minimum provision of this section is that "the rule, on the five issues identified by the temperature is defined in Section IV as amount of testing may be reduced if the Commission, and ~n the options for the metal temperature of the controlling initial results agree with predictions." public participation in thermal material in the region which has. the This provision was deleted, although ann.ealing. least favorable combination of stress and previous authorizations granted by the Comments were received from nine temperature for the appropriate plant Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor separate sources. These sources consist condition. An explicit statement has Regulation, continue in effect. of five utilities, the Nuclear Energy
- been added to require that pressure and A second change to Appendix H Institute (NEI), the Nuclear Utility leak tests of the reactor pressure v~ssel restructures Section 11.C to clarify the Backfitting and Reform Group 50-SC-164
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION (NUBARG) represented by the firm procedure for calculating the reference changes in RT PTS are appropriate and Winston & Strawn, one public citizens temperatures in the preservice should not be modified.
group (Ohio Citizens for Responsible condition, RT NOT, and, at end of reactor Thermal Annealing Rule (10 CFR 50.66) Energy (OCREJ), and one nuclear steam life, RT PTS* One comment noted that the system supplier (NSSS). proposed rule omitted part of the Twelve individual comments were NEI provided detailed comments on procedure in Regulatory Guide 1.99, received on the proposed Thermal 10 CFR 50.61, 10 CFR 50.66, Appendix presently being applied by the NRG, that Annealing Rule, 10 CFR 50.66. These G to 10 CFR Part 50, and Appendix H permits adjustments for differences in comments included a number of to 10 CFR Part 50; responded to the chemistry between surveillance material suggestions for clarification of details of request for comments on the five issues and the vessel material when using the proposed rule. Three of the related to thermal annealing and credible surveillance data to calculate a comments addressed the requirements included detailed comments on the best fit chemistry factor for transition that, after the annealing operation, the opportunities for public participation. temperature shifts due to irradiation. reembrittlement rate of the reactor The five utilities and the NSSS Several comments proposed changes in vessel due to neutron irradiation must endorsed the NEI comments. Three of the criteria for establishing whether be estimated and must be monitored the five utilities provided additional surveillance material data is credible using a surveillance program which comments on 10 CFR 50.61; one of the that would result in a less restrictive conforms to Appendix H of 10 CFR 50, five utilities provided additional basis for using surveillance data in "Reactor Vessel Materials Surveillance comments on 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix determining the transition temperature Program." The comments are G; two of the utilities provided shift. The comments argued that the summarized as follows: additional comments on 10 CFR Part 50, proposed rule is ambiguous with respect (1) The supplementary information Appendix H; and one of the five utilities to the use of information from other section for the proposed rule is silent on disagreed with the NEI position on the sources that contain limiting material what is acceptable if limiting material is opportunity for public participation and for a specific plant and that the NRC not available.The rule should provide submitted a separate comment. OCRE must have the flexibility to approve use appropriate requirements on the method provided comments on the opportunity of such information on a case-by-case for monitoring reembrittlement after for public participation. NUBARG basis. Several comments proposed annealing for those plants that do not provided comments on the backfitting limiting the basis for making changes of have limiting material for their aspects of the proposed rule and the RTPTS subject to the approval of the surveillance program and the stafrs backfit justification. Director,* NRR. monitoring plans should be consistent NEI and one of the utilities included The NRC recognizes that 10 CFR with the preannealing surveillance comments on the Draft Regulatory. 50.61 contains an unusual amount of program approved by the NRC staff; Guide DG-1027, "Format and Content .prescriptive material and that the (2) Appendix H does not define an of Application for Approval for Thermal comments proposing simplification acceptable post-anneal surveillance Annealing of Reactor Pressure Vessels," have merit. Some changes to the rule program, the reference to Appendix H that was discussed in the proposed rule. have been made to provide flexibility, should be deleted, and the post-anneal These comm.ants on Draft Regulatory where.appropriate. The NRC staff is surveillance program should be defined Guide DG-1027 are being reviewed by evaluating subsequent changes that in the annealing plan that is approved the NRC staff and will be addressed would be more performance based. by the staff; and separately in the resolution of However, the NRC staff believes that (3) The term reembrittlement rate is comments on the regulatory guide. this rule, as written, is needed to ensure unclear as to the period of time to be The NRC reviewed the comments that plants apply the appropriate used for its determination, and a received on the proposed rule, the method for determining RTPTS and that wording change is proposed for the comments on the five questions related the appropriate reference to the thermal requirement that would relate change in to thermal annealing and the issue of annealing rule be applied for the toughness to fluence accumulated after opportunities for public participation. pressurized thermal shock situation. the anneal. . The resolution of these comments is A number of clarifications were made Three of the comments addressed the presented below. to the rule. The paragraphs dealing with requirements in the proposed rule that the determination of RTPTS were the Thermal Annealing Operation Plan PTS Rule (10 CFR 50.61) include time-temperature profiles which modified to make clear that RTPTS is a Sixteen specific comments in the unique, end of life, case of RT NOT and represent the annealing conditions that. submittals from NEI and three utilities to clarify the procedure for determining may not be exceeded during the addressed 10 CFR 50.61. A general these values. As suggested, the annealing operation and are to be used comment argued that both the existing adjustment procedure was added to the for determining the.amount of recovery 10 CFR 50.61 and the proposed rule to permit accounting for differences of the fracture toughness of the material modifications contained an excessive in chemistry between surveillance due to annealing. The comments amount of prescriptive technical detail materials and reactor vessel materials suggested that, instead of a single time-that limits licensee compliance when calculating chemistry factors. temperature profile, bounding time and flexibility. The commenters prqposed With respect to the plant specific temperature conditions be established that these prescriptive technical details material surveillance data that is , for the maximum values that would be . be removed from the rule and placed in permitted to be used in a surveillance used for thermal and stress analysis and a regulatory guide. These commenters program, the rule was modified to make to verify the re-qualification inspection suggested that the rule not be issued clear that such data includes results and test program, and the minimum until it has been written to contain only from other plant's surveillance programs values that would be used to establish those requirements essential to regulate and test reactors. Several clarifications
- the amount of recovery of fracture reactor pressure vessel embrittlement. A were made to the criteria for toughness and for reembrittlement rate number of comments suggested changes determining credible material. The NRC estimates. The bounding values would that were clarifications to the proposed determined that the requirements for be based upon the estimated rule, including proposals to clarify the approval by the Director, NRR, for uncertainties in the times and 50-SC-165
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION temperatures and the actual annealing The NRC reviewed the comments limitations and permitted variations in conditions should fall within these received on the proposed rule _in detail. temperature, time, hentup and bounds. After consideration, the NRC reached cooldown rate. For clarification, the Two comments addressed the section the conclusion that most of the final rule has been modified to use the on Certification of Annealing comments are notinconsistent with the terms "bounding conditions for till!e*s Effectiveness. One comment suggested intent of the proposed rule and in some and temperatures and heatup and deleting the requirement in the cases reflect a need for clarification of cooldown schedu.les" to describe _
proposed rule for certification of the the rule. In these cases, alterriative conditions that may.not be exceeded annealing effectiveness and instead wording that clarified the intent of the during the annealing operation, and the - adding a provision in the Thermal rule was substituted in the text. With lower limit time and temperature of the Annealing Operating Plan that approval respect to the comments on the actual anneal is used for determining prior to subsequent power operation be requirement that_reembrittlement rate the projected recovery of fracture . required i:mly if the anneal was not after annealing must be monitored using toughness by annealing. .- performed in accordance with the a surveillance program, the NRC is The NRC considers that the intent of approved plan. The comment also aware that some plants do not have paragraphs (c), Completion or" suggested that, if the licensee terminates limiting materials.for their existing Termination of Thermal Annealing, and the annealing before achieving the preannealing surveillance programs. For (d), Thermal Annealing Results Report, specified time but otherwise maintains
- these situations the staff has approved of the final rule to be consistent with the the annealing envelop such that no alternative surveillance plans on a case- two comments on that subject. The final concern exists for stress or thermal by-case basis. Clearly, these plants will rule .does not require that the NRC damage, no additional constraints be not have limiting material for approve restart following the annealing imposed on subsequent operations and surveillance programs for use in operation if the Thermal Annealing no credit be given for annealing. The determining reembrittlement rates afte,r Operating Plan and the Requalification second comment suggested that (1) the
- annealing. ' . Inspection and Test Program was
- staffs review of the annealing report The NRC recognizes that Appendix H complied with. The NRC accepts the (certification report) need not be of 10 CFR Part 50, which is referenced suggestion that the rule should be more completed prior to reinitiating power in this rule, does not specifically specific on the items the licensee should operation if the anneal was performed _ address the surveillance of an annealed include in the report and has included in accordance with the approved _ reactor vessel. However, the.
- the list "in the final *rule; Thermal Annealing Operating Plan, (2) . requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Finally, the NRC agrees with the reporting and quantification of the Part 50 apply to all reactors including* suggestion to *make clear that a report is actual recovery results need not be the specific case of an annealed reactor not required if:
reported unless the vessel was at or_ vessel. To clarify the surveillance * (1) The licensee terminates the anneal above the PTS screening criteria when requirements of an annealed plant, the prior to completion; _ annealing was started, and (3) the final rule has been µiodified to include, (2) The partial anneal was otherwise Thermal Annealing Operating Plan as suggested, that the post-anneal in accordance with the Thermal should specify the_minimum content reembrittlement is to be monitored Annealing Plan;
- and *a schedule for reporting the using a surveillance program defined in (3) The licensee does not elect to take annealing results. The commenter the Thermal Annealing Report and that credit for any recovery. A statement was provided a proposed list of criteria, the surveillance program must conform added to the Final Rule to cover the content, and schedule for reporting the to the intent of Appendix H to 10 CFR early termination situation.
- Part 50. The NRC has accepted the suggested annealing results. clarifications of what constitutes an The term reembrittlement "ra:te" in One comment stated that no guidance the proposed rule was intended to mean "affected" component and the was provided in the .proposed rule on the projected amount of reembrittlement qualification on the requirement to what constitutes components "affected" over a specific fluence period. It is evaluate changes in properties on by tho annealing operation that ore recognized that reembrittlomont is not n reactor vessel insulation if these are required to be reported in the Thermal straight line function of fluence. negligible. The NRC considers it Annealing Operating Plan. The Deterinination of reembrittlement rate is unnecessary to ini::lude a reference in comment suggested :11ternative wording . discussed in more detail in Draft the rule to data from integrated that components to be reported should Regulatory Guide 1_.162, "Format and surveillance programs as an optional be structures and components that are Content of Report for Thermal
- part of the computational methods to expected to experience significant Annealing of Reactor Pressure Vessels." determine fracture toughness recovery.
temperature gradient or stress variations In Regula~ory Guide 1.162, the approved Generic computational methods for this. during the thermal annealing operation. method for estimating the purpose are provided in the Regulatory One comment suggested qualifying the reembrittlement rate, the lateral shift Guide 1.162. However, the final rule provision in the proposed rule that the method; results in the same does not prohibit use of alternative effects of localized high temperatures embrittlement trend as that used for the methods if adequate justification is must be evaluated for changes in pre-anneal operating period. To avoid provided. thermal and mechanical properties of confusion the term "rote" hos been the reactor vessel insulation for those changed to "trend" in the final rule and Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 coses where such changes may be the regulatory guide. Two comments were received on the negligible at annealing conditions. One The NRC agrees with the comments Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 of the comment suggested that the use of
- that the time and temperature profile proposed rule. The NEI comment, applicable material data, such as data required in the annealing operating plan which was endorsed by five utilities and from integrated surveillance programs, should be bounding values. In this one NSSS organization, included a table be an optional part of the computational regard, Regulatory Guide DG-1027 calls with six.items on Appendix G. The methods for determining fracture
- for the thermal annealing operating plan other comment on Appendix G was tough~ess recovery. to include identification of the received from one of the five utilities.
50-SC-166
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Two of the comments identified Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 specimen types, and number of typographical errors and suggested a Three comments were received on specimens per reactor; the other change in organization to improve Appendix H to 10 CFR 50. The addresses amount of testing.
clarity. One of the comments suggested comment from NEI was endorsed by the Request for Comments on Issues Related revising the rule to change the five .utilities and the NSSS. Two of the to Thermal Annealing definition of reference temperature, five utilities submitted additional RTNoT, for cases where plants do not Comments were received from NEI on comments. NEI and one utility the five issues on thermal annealing that have data to comply with code commented that the proposed change to procedures for determining RT NOT* One were included in the proposed rule at Paragraph III.B.1, which establishes the the Commission's direction. In addition, comment suggested a change in the title applicable edition of ASTM standard E of Table 1., "Pressure and Temperature OGRE and one utility, Pacific Gas and 185 for a reactor surveillance program, Electric, submitted comments on Issue Requirements," by adding to the title constituted a backfit that would require "For the Reactor Pressure Vessel" to 4, concerning the preferred regulatory a substantial design change in the process (including opportunity for make clear that this table does not apply *survei1lance program for those plants to other components in the reactor public participation). Public Comments fabricated to a code edition prior to on the five issues are summarized coolant pressure system and proposed 1973. The other two commenters adding a footnote to the table for the below:
- suggested new changes to Appendix H Issue 1: The technical adequacy of the same purpose. One comment identified to 10 CFR Part 50. One of the an error in the minimum temperature NRC staffs guidance.
commenters noted that an existing Comment: The detailed comments requirements for the hydrostatic and provision -in Appendix H to 10 CFR Part leak testing of the pressure vessel submitted on 10 CFR 50.66 are 50, not part of the proposed rule change, summarized in the Summary of without fuel when the vessel pressure is dealing with requirements for attaching equal or below 20 percent of the vessel Comments section on the Thermal capsule holders to the vessel wall is a Annealing Rule. In addition, NEI design pressure. One of the comments reiteration of a requirement in the suggested that draft Regulatory Guide, suggested that two of the entries in the ASME Code and should be removed. DG-1027, be revised to include table were new requirements when the The other commenter suggested a new acceptance criteria where an action is table was intended to provide change to Appendix H to 10 CFR Part required, but the acceptance criteria was clarification. The utility's comment 50-to add a statement to the criteria for not defined. NEI further commented disagreed with the proposed rule change approval of an integrated surveillance that the re-embrittlement rate equation to prohibit the use of nuclear heat for program that would permit the use of (DG-1027, Equation 1) appeared to be the performance of vessel leak and surveillance specimens for extension of very conservative and would result in a hydrostatic testing. The utility license purposes. The commenter also post-anneal operating life that is less contended that using nuclear heat, by suggested that there is an apparent than industry believes justified. providing a significant temperature conflict between Paragraph III.C.2. and Re.~ponse: The NRC is concurrently margin above the pressure and Paragraph 111.C.3. that address revising the noted draft regulatory guide temperature limit curves, greatly requirements for an integrated and will address this comment in the reduces the probability of brittle fracture surveillance. resolution of comments for the guide. and should be allowed. The provision in the proposed rule Issue 2: The sufficiency of the The NRC corrected the typographical was changed and reference to ASTM E guidance and criteria to support a errors and corrected the minimum 185 73 was deleted to make clear that certification that if satisfied, a plant temperature requirement for the the surveillance programs must be with an annealed vessel can safely hydrostatic and leak testing of the designed to the edition of ASTM 185 resume operation. pressure vessel at low vessel pressures that is current on the issue date of the Comment: NEI noted that "The and without fuel. The title to Table 1 ASME Code to which the reactor vessel reactor pressure vessel thermal was changed, es suggested, for was purchased or to a later epition annealing rule and guide address clarification. through 1982. The Commission agrees appropriate issues to assure public The NRC does not agree with the with the industry comments that health and safety and that the annealed proposal to change the definition of imposing the ASTM E 185 1973 edition reactor pressure vessel may be safely RT NOT* The situation described in the is impractical because vessels operated. The prior NRC staff approval comment, when data is not available to purchased prior to 1973 could not of the reactor vessel annealing plan comply with code procedures, is necessarily comply with all of the assures a clear process and criteria to presently handled on a case-by-case surveillance requirements in the 1973 restart following the vessel anneal. The basis in accordance with MEB Branch edition of the ASTM standard. The NRG licensee needs only to attest to position, MEB 5-2. The NRC staff does staff believes that the provision in the compliance with the approved plan not agree with the comment that the two present rule on requirements for prior to resuming operations. The requirements cited are new attaching capsule holders to the reactor resumption of operations should not be requirements. Item 2.2.c. and Item 2.2.d vessel wall is required for clarity and needlessly delayed while a report of Table 1 are in the existing ASME should not be deleted. The comments documenting performance of the vessel code requirement and in Paragraph related to the requirements for an anneal and recovery of the embrittled IV.A.3. in the rule. The NRC also does integrated surveillance program were material properties is confirmed, not agree with the utility's comment not persuasive to the NRC staff. The because the vessel anneal will only that using nuclear heat greatly reduces existing provisions of the rule do not improve the material properties. The
- the probability of brittle fracture. The preclude the application of the final report should be submitted on a reasons for this are set forth in the integrated surveillance program for schedule that considers when the vessel February 2, 1990, letter to Messrs. extension of license purposes. The two would have exceeded the RT PTs or Reynolds and Stenger of NUBARG from paragraphs purported to be in conflict' uppershelf energy (USE) screening James M. Taylor, Executive Director for address separate items; one addresses criteria without an anneal. The material Operations. the number of materials to be irradiated, property recovery will document prior 50-SC-167
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION to the time when *the vessel would have additional details that support this . . (3) Required opportunity for hearing exceeded the screening criteria, thereby : industry position." Additional detailed under rule as proposed, but. ~ork could assuring that the vessel is safe to Operate . comments by NEI and the co_mments on commence if the .NRC were to make a
- at restart and for the duration justified this subject. by QClIB are discussed * "no significant ha~d determination!'.
by the material embrittlement * : under the Opportunities for Public on the*pro~osi:id thennal annealing; and recovery." * . *. .* . Participation heading. . _(4) Modify th~ proposed rule to * .* Response: NRC agrees with the NEI Response: The rule provides for require suspension of license prior and
- comment, except NRC believes it is. public participation in the regulatory during the thermal annealing at which necessary for the licensee to submit the process by "incorporating a public time no hearing wo.uld be afforded and final report within three months of meeting on the Licensee's Thermal the license would only be reinstated if completing pr terminating the anneal, Annealing Report a minimum of 30 days the licensee demonstrates thatit has unless an extension is authorized by the before the start of thei:mal annealing, addressed the reactor embrittlement Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor and a public meeting after the licensee such that. it is acceptable to operate the Regulation.
- plant. *.. ' ..
completes the anneal but before the Issue 3: Whether health and safety reactor is restarted. The opportunity for Three comments were submitted ori concerns are best served by approval of public hearings in thermal annealing the subject. OCRE and NEI addressed all the thermal annealing plan or of should be limited to those cases whore of the alternatives in detail and they; \is readiness for restart. there is an unreviewed safety question well as one utility, identified and Comment: NEI noted that "The discussed individual preferred
- performance of a reactor pressure *vessel or a change to the Technical Specifications or where the licensee did alternatives.
anneal in accordance with an approved NEI commented thaf each of the four annealing plan improves the public . not comply with the Thermal Annealing alternatives has a sufficiently serious health and safety by reducing the Operating Plan and Requalification flaw to prevent adoption. With respect probability of core melt frequency. This Inspection and Test Program .. Expanded to the no hearing alternative, NEI agrees improvement occurs because of the discussion on this issue is provided that annealing is presently subject to increase in reactor vessel material below under the Opportunities for approval by the Director of NRR in
- ductility. The amount of recovery .Public Participation heading. accordance with Part 50 Appendix G achieved by a thermal anneal "'.ill be Issue 5: Whether there are health and rather than being the* subjec~.of a license documented prior to the original date safety issues concerning thermal amendment as an u*ni:eviewed safety
- when the reactor vessel would have annealing that cannot be addressed question under§ 50:59 . .However, NEI
- exceeded the PTS or USE screening generically and would warrant plant- believes that annealing is an important limit. Therefore, a demonstration for specific consideration. process from* a regulatory standpoint "restart readiness" is an extra burden Comment: NEI noted that "Thermal and that public participation, in the that will not provide any further annealing to reduce material irradiation form of.informal hearings, is improvement of the public health and embrittlement is a well understood appropriate. NEI objected to a safety." * . inetallurgical phenomenon. The discretionary opportunity for a hearing Response: T)le NRC's determination supporting thermal and stress analysis because it provides significant
- as to the procedures for NRC review of used to demonstrate that the vessel is uncertainty in the process for licensees the Thermal Annealing Operation Plan, not damaged during the anneal are and members of.the j>ublic. NErs Requalification Inspection and Test standard technologies used at nuclear objection to requiri}!g* a *hearing, as Program and justification for restart plants. Because thermal annealing uses discussed in.staff Option 3, is thatit discussed below in further detail in the well understood technology, public would aHow* those who object to the Opportunities for Public Participation health and safety is reasonably resumption of operat\on, on other- than section. assured." technical ground!!, to 'use hearings to Issue 4: The preferred regulatory Response: The NRC agrees with this delay restart. Option 4 is objectionable, process (including opportunities for comment. to NEI because it does not provide the public participation) and the Opportunities for Public Participation licensee with any stability or commenter's basis for recommending a predictability since the licensee would particular process*. The Supplementary Information be required to demonstrate compliance Comment: NEI noted that "The section of the proposed rule discussed after the annealing was performed, and industry recommends that a hearing the four options the Commission does not provide the public with any opportunity be provided, but that it be considered for structuring the regulatory opportunity to express its views ..
a non-adjudicatory, 10 CFR Part 2, process related to public participation NEI further commented that a license Subpart L type hearing on the docketed in the NRC's review and approval of a amendment is not necessary to approve record. The essential features of the licensee's proposal for thermal a thermal annealing plan because hearing process proposed are as follows. annealing of a reactor vessel. The annealing will not change the reactor The NRC would at time of receiving the proposed rule, at the Commission's vessel or*other cm;nponents in a manner licensee proposed annealing plan issue direction, requested comments on the inconsistent with the facility technical a Federal Register announcement that preferred regulatory process (including specifications nor will it require . staff is performing the review per 10 opportunities for public participation).
- changes in the FSAR, and further, that CFR 50.66. A Subpart L hearing could The four options included: a licensee is not required to modify its be held, if requested by an intervener, (1) No hearings under the rule as procedures to address or accommodate after the NRC staff has issued a safety proposed; the annealing process. NEI noted that, evaluation report on the licensee (2) Discretionary opportunity for while there is an incentive for the annealing plan, but prior to hearing under rule as proposed in licensee to obtain credit for its improved commencement of the reactor vessel which *situation the Commission would P/T <:urves, and could seek a licensee thermal an~ealing unless the NRC staff decide on a case-by-case basis to amendment to do so, the licensee's makes a "no significant hazards determine whether a hearing should be existing P/T curves could remain in determination." Enclosure 4 provides held; force.
50-SC-168
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Despite the conclusion that a license adjudicatory hearings required by the . report shall contain four sections: (i) amendment .is not necessary for. thermal Atoinic Energy Act (AEA) and do not Thermal Annealing Operating Plan, (ii) annealing, NEI recommended that a give the interveners the same rights as Requulificution Inspection und Test hearing opportunity be provided, but they would have in a Section 189a Progrnm, (iii) Program for determining that it be a non-adjudicatory, Sul:>part L hearing. OGRE found Option 2 Fracture Toughness Recovery and type hearing oil the record. NEI gave the pi:eferable to ha~ing no hearing. Reembrittlement Trend, and (iv) a following advantages for this approach: However, OCRE contended that this section identifying any changes to the (1) The NRC would be provided with a option is flawed by the assumption that description of the facility as described clear understanding of the licensee's "Section 189a of the AEA does not
- in the updated final safety analysis annealing process, and the NRC's afford an interested me.mber of the report (FSAR) which constitute .
hearing process; (2) a Subpart L hearing public a right to request a hearing." unreviewed safety questions (USQs} is held on the .written record and They contend that approval by the under §'50.59, and changes to the typically does not include the discovery Director, NRR to anneal the reactor facility's technical specifications, which or live testimony _associated with pressure vessel or to restart after' are necessary either to perform the adjudicatory hearings, but allows the annealing does constitute a de facto thermal annealing, or to operate public to participate.in a meaningful .operating licensing amendment for following completion of the .annealing. way without consuming the vast NRC, which the opportunity for a hearing is Section 50.66(a) provides that the NRC licensee, and public resources required required. OCRE found Options 1 and 4 will. within three years of submission of for an adjudicatory hearing; and (3) it
- unacceptable in that they do not provide a licensee's annealing report, document .
would provide predictability and the opportunity for a formal its views on whether the plan for stability by ensuring that all issues adjudicatory hearing. conducting thermal annealing which could be subject to a hearing are The comment from tho utility constitutes an unreviewed safety* addressed prior to restart. Any suggested that Option 1 is the question or otherwise requires a change inspection or test performed in order to appropriate approach as long as the to the plant's technical specifications. restart would be for the purpose of annealing process to be implemented is Such a determination is the threshold
-confirming compliance with the rule. approved in advance by the NRC staff *determination for whether NRC OCRE supported the proposed rule
- and the utility certifies that they have approval is required before undertaking provided that the public hearing rights com,plied with the approved annealing the activity. In the event the NRG were were preserved with regard to reactor process during the annealing operation, to conclude, contrary to the licensee, pressure.vessel annealing. It is OCRE's as provided for in the proposed rule. that an unreviewed safety question is position on the request for public The utility further commented that if present or a change to the technical comment that, based on the Sholly Technical Specifications ,changes or specifications is necessary, the NRG decision, the NRC must offer the amendments to the operating license are would, as a discretionary enforcement opportunity for a formai adjudicatory required in order to perform tho matter, issue an appropriate order to the hearing on the application for annealing annealing then the opportunity for licensee prohibiting annealing prior to and on the licensee's justification for hearings would be required due to the issuance of a license amendment. An subsequent operation where the licensee normal license amendment process and opportunity for formal adjudicatory cannot certify that the thermal if the final safety analysis report (FSAR) hearing would be provided in annealing was performed in accordance were required to be updated to reflect connection with the license with the approved application. OCRE the thermal annealing process, the amendment; however, if the NRG makes commented that approval by the
- provisions of 10 GFR 50.59 would a finding that the proposed change to Director of NRR of the application for apply. The utility suggested that if those the FSAR description or technical annealing and restart of the reactor, if changes did not constitute an specification constitutes a "no the licensee cannot*certify that "unreviewed safety question," no amendment would be needed and the significant hazards consideration" annealing was performed in accordance pursuant to Section 189.(a)(2)(A), the with the approved application, will.give license amendment process shou Id not be invoked and that if a member of the licensee may conduct the thermal the licensee the authority t~ operate in annealing prior to completion of any ways in which-they otherwise could public is c*oncerned about a licensee's compliance with the NRC approved hearing. In any event, at least 30 days not, and is thus, a de facto licens.e before the licensee starts to thermal amendment. OCRE fully supported thermal annealing plan, those concerns Option 3 which requires opportunity for could be addressed pursuant to the 10 anneal and before the NRG completes its hearing under the rule as proposed. CFR 2.206 petition process. The utility review, the NRG will hold a public OCRE suggested that the adequacy of commented that, under its proposal, meeting on.the licensee's proposed the thermal annealing plan, as well as existing regulatory provisions for. public Thermal Annealing Plan and the vessel's ability to perform its safety participation would apply as Requalificatfon Inspection and Test function after annealing, could be raised appropriate and no new prescriptive Program.
in the hearing on the thermal annealing requirements would be necessary. Following the completion of the plan and that the licensee's The Commission has considered the annealing operation, the licensee must implementation of the thermal public comments and has modified the confirm in writing to the Director, Office annealing plan could not commence proposed rule as follows. A licensee that of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, that the until any hearing is concluded. or unless seeks to utilize thermal annenling to thermal annealing was performed in the NRC makes a "no significant mitigate the effects of neutron accordance with the Thermal Annealing hazards determination" with respect to irradiation of the nuclear reactor vessel Operating Plan and the Requalification thermal annealing. must, at least three years prior to the and Inspection Test Program. In support With respect to Option 1, OGRE date at which the limiting fracture of this confirmation, the licensee must concluded that the informal hearings or toughness criteria in § 50.61 or submit a report, within three months of public meetings*proposed by the Appendix G to Part 50 would be completion or termination of the anneal, . Commission for the initial thermal exceeded, submit a Thermal Annealing that presents the results of the annealing annealing are not a substitute for. Report to the NRC staff for review. The operation. Within two weeks of the 50-SC-169
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION licensee's. written confirmatiori that the noncompliances, would also be subject nny distinction (in terms of safety thermal *annealing was completed ~n
- to an opportunity for a formal implications) betweon the subject matter accordance w,ith the Thermal Annealing adjudicatory hearing in accordance with of hearings under this rule, as compared Plan, and prior to restart, the NRC shall: the Commission's* regulations governing with other actions under Part-50 which, (1) Place in its public document room a license amendments. However, the would require formal hearings.
- summary of the NRC stafrs inspection licensee may rest11rt prior to completion As discussed earlier in the .
of the licensee's thermal annealing
- of the hearing if the Director makes a supplementary information. pre'(iously .
process to confirm that the thermal finding that such restart constitutes a performed research analyses indicated annealing was completed in accordance "no significant hazards consideration," the potential for plastic.'defomiation of with the Thermal Annealing Operating as provided uncl.er Section 189.(a)(2)(A) the main coolant.piping (or a typical Plan and the Requalification Inspection of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as U.S .. plant design and anticipated and Test Program, and (2) hold a public . amended.
- annealing conditions. There are also meeting'with the licensee to permit the The regulatory process for thermal questions regarding how' thermal growth licensee to explain the results of the annealing and the associated hearing of the pressure vessel is treat~d. a_nd the react~r vessel annealing .to the NRC and opporturiitles are com;istent with long- adequacy of the thermal and stress the pu~lic, for the NRC to discuss its standiµg NJ{C regu~tory practices analyses used to predict response of the inspection of the reactor vessel
- defining thos.e matters which present .overall system under thermal annealing*
annealing process,*and*to provide an .s1c1fficient potential effect on public conditions.-Additionally, there may be opportunity for the public to.comment health and safety (e.g., are unreviewed questions in other areas such as
- to the NRC on the annealing operation safety questions) to justify both prior temperature limits'for the concrete and the results of the Starrs inspection. NRC review of the change, and an structures, and potential radiological ..
Witltin 45 days of the licensee's written confirmation that the thermal opportunity for hearings (with the hazards associated with removing and annealing was completed, the NRC shell associated time and resource impacts on storing the reactor internals.during the complete full documentation. of the both the licensl;le and the NRC). With annealing process, and fire hazards NRC's inspection of the .licensee's respect to lhe thermal anneaHng review associated with.heating the vessel. annealing process to confirm that the*. pro~ss, the Commission reassessed the Recognition of the numerous complex annealing was*completed.in accordance
- reguJatory requirementi;. and processes technical questions related to 4 thermal with the Thermal Annealing Operating for*assuring safety. The-Commission annealing and of the potential benefits Plan and the Requalification Inspection determined that the most important for operating nuc,ear power plants has.
- and Test Program.*.. safety matters are normally addressed ln resulted in a cooperative effort, fonded The licensee may resume operation if: license conditions, technical* by the U.S. Department of Energy and (1) The licensee concludes that the specifications, and the FSAR. The the industry, to p81'form.Annealing .
thermal annealing operation was regulatory process for NRC Demonstration. Projects. Projects are -. performed in compliance with the consideration of licensee-initiated planned to demonsb'&te two different Thermal Annealing Operating Plan, the. changes concerning these matters, and . annealing processes, _evaluating heater Requali~cation Inspection and Test the associated opportunities for hearings designs and ves.sel designs. It is P.rogram, and the provisions of Section .is in tO CFR 50.59. In view of this well~ anticipated that the*anhealing 50.a&{b), (2) a summ:ary of the NRC's established regulatory process fm;- demonstration projects will answer inspecthm of the thermal anne1ding is iinportant safety information, the many of the generic questions regarding placed in the NRC public document Commission determined that a thermal annealing ofU.S_. pressure room as required by Section 50.66(c) (2) regulatory. process re.quiring NRC vessel and piping designs. and (3) the NRC holds the public -approval of a thermal annealing plan is The Thermal Annealing Report, meeting required by Section 50.66(£)(2), not necessary, because the licensee is required by the thermal ahnealing rule, unless the staff takes action against the already required to comply with its . is designed to facilitate a detailed licensee. Since NRC approval to resume license conditions, technical
- review by the licensee of plent~specific operation is not necessary, an specifications, and FSAR. Important questions and considerations in **
opportunity for hearing would not be . changes to license conditions, technical performing a: thermal annealing. The . provided in this situation. If, however, specifications, and FSARfrom a safety proposed rule specifically discusses the the licensee cannot conclude that the standpoint are subject to both prior NRC potential for unreviewe,hafety thermal annealing was performed in. review and approval and an opportunity questions and technical specification
- compliance with the Thermal Annealing .for hearing. With respect to restart . changes that may result from or be Operating Plan or the RequaUfication
- following comph1tion of the annealing, related to thermal annealing of the Insp_ection and Test Program, the the 15-day delay period should be reactor pressure vessel. With licensee.must submit a justification for
- sufficient time for review of the completion of.the demonstration**
continued operation to .the Director. If licensee's input given the NRC stafrs projects and as the staff and industry the noncompliance presents an understanding of the annealing gain experience With therinal annealing, unreviewed safety question, es operation plan prior to implementation, many of the issues related to annealing determined by the licensee or directed ongoing resident inspections and will be better understood and related by the NRC following its review of the headquarters inspections of the questions will be answered. However, report, then the plant may not restart implementation of thermal annealing until this experience is realized, the unti~ the Director has approved restart. *operating plan. The Commission did not staff will critically review licensee Those failures to comply with the adopt NEI's suggestion for informal determinations regarding unreviewed Thermal Annealing Operating Plan and hearings where the Director must safety questions and the need for
- the Requalification Inspection and Test approve-restart if the Thermal technical specification- changes Program; which either (1) Are* Annealing Operating Plan and associated with each proposed thermal considered to be unreviewed safety Requalificatfon Inspection and Test annealing. The level of staff effort is questions or (2) require changes to the Program .were not complied with, _ expected to be significantly greater technical specifications as a result of the. because the Commission does not see during its review of the initial proposed 50-SC-170
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION vessel annealings than that which will* NUBARG also commented on the impact on the environment. Therefore, be required after experience is gained. amendment to Appendix H lo 10 CFR in all cases these individual actions will The thermal annealing rule has been Part 50 regarding surveillance that not have an adverse impact on the*
structured to provide time for the staff would preclude reducing the amount of environment. to thoroughly review the licensee's testing if the initial test results agreed PTS !,ule (10 CFR 50.61) annealing plan and determination with predicted results. Although regarding unreviewed safety questions NUBARG recognizes the change would The inclusion of thermal annealing as and the need for technical specification be prospective, it believes that NRC an option for mitigating the effects of changes. If the staff identifies an should provide flexibility to allow neutron irradiation serves to decrease unreviewed safety question or the need continue.cl relief for any licensee who the environmental impact of plant for a technical specification change, the lacks such on authorization but has operation by enhancing the safety of the licensee would be so notified and the relied on the provision. The reactor pressure vessel. existing NRC regulatory practices would Commission believes that sufficient The incorporation of the Regulatory be invoked to address the issues. flexibility already exists in that Guide 1.99, Revision 2, method for licensees who do not have an determining RT NOT into the PTS rule Backfitting Issues
- authorization may seek an exemption has no impact on the environment Comments were received on
- under 10 CFR Part 50.12. because this change will result in values backfitting issues from the Nuclear Another aspect of the backfitting of RTPTS which are consistent with Utility Backfitting and Reform Group concern raised by NUBARG addresses those currently used in plant operation.
(NUBARG). NUBARG commented that the proposed amendment to § 50.61 The restructuring of the PTS rule. is they do not object to the new NRC which, based on the adequate protection the type of action described iri position in Appendix G to 10 CFR Part exception, would impose a uniform categorical exclusion 10 CFR 50 which prohibits core criticality methodology for calculating the 51.22(c)(2). Therefore, an environmental before completion of hydrostatic reference temperature. NUBARG asses*sment is not necessary for this pressure and leak tests as a conservative contends that to rely on the adequate change. measure to *enhance safety. However, protection exception is arguably they are concerned that amending Thermal Annealing Rule (10 CFR 50.66) erroneous because the change in Appendix G on the basis of a methodology is not likely an adequate The thermal annealing rule (10 CFR compliance exception may set a bad protection issue (i.e., for most plants, 50.66) permits and provides precedent for avoiding backfilling the screening criteria will not be requirements for the thermal annealing analyses. NUBARG stated that "The approached for many years). As of a reactor vessel to restore fracture logic of the proposed rule would seem discussed further under Backfit properties of the reactor vessel material to allow the NRC to avoid a backfitting Analysis, the Commission believes that which have been degraded by neutron analysis by (1) invoking the intent of a new backfit analysis is not required for irradiation. This final rule only applies one requirement.to override the explicit this conforming change, which corrects when a licensee elects to use it. The provisions of another, (2) using the an inadvertent omission from the final rule provides an alternative for compliance exception when the practice previous rulemaking. Therefore, the assuring compliance with the being eliminated seems specifically Commission concludes that the requirements in 10 CFR 50.61 and contemplated by and specified in the adequate protection basis for tho backfit Appendix G of 10 CFR Part 50. pertinent regulation; and (3) overlooking continues to apply from the previous The application of thermal annealing the fact that the NRC has apparently rulemaking (56 FR 22300; May 15, 1991) to a reactor vessel improves the accepted this position in practice by to §50.61. condition of the reactor vessel material. some licensees* * *" In NUBARG's In addition, this rule establishes view, this proposed amendment should Criminal Penalties requirements to avoid damaging the be supported by a backfit analysis. The* For purposes of Section 223 of the reactor system and to p*rotect against Commission has reviewed this comment Atomic Energy Act (AEA), the accidents during the annealing and has concluded that use of the Commission is issuing the final rule operation. qimpliance exception under§ 50.109 under one or more of Sections 161b, This rule is one of several regulatory for the changes in Appendix G to 10 161i or 1610 of the AEA. Willful requirements that will function to CFR Part 50 is appropriate. The Backfit violations of the rule will be subject to ensure reactor vessel integrity. In that Analysis section contains further criminal enforcement. sense, this rule has a positive impact on discussion on this subject. The issue of the environment by reducing the explicitly prohibiting core criticality Finding of No Significant potential for vessel failure. For th.ese before completing pressure and leak Environmental Impact reasons, the Commission has tests has been addressed previously The Commission has determined determined that there is no significant (letter from J.M. Taylor, EDO, to N. S. under the National Environmental impact and, therefore, an environmental Reynolds and D. F. Stenger, NUBARG, Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the statement is not required. dated February 2, 1990) and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A NUBARG comment did not provide new Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule is not information. The Commission hes a major Federal action significantly The prohibition of core criticality concluded that any backfit requirements affecting the quality of human before completion of the required in this amendment are necessary to environment and, therefore, an pressure and leak tests will serve to bring the facilities-into compliance with environmental impact statement is not reduce the potential for vessel failure, licenses, or the rules and orders of the required. and thereby decrease the potential Commission, or into conformance with The individual actions covered in this environmental impact of plant written commitments by the licensees. final rule would either serve to enhance operation. . Therefore, a backfit analysis is not safety of the reactor pressure vessel, The restructuring of Sections IV and required pursuant to 10 CFR thereby decreasing the environmental V of Appendix G is clarifying or 50.109(a)(4)(i). impact of plant operation, or have no corrective in nature, and is the type of 50-SC-171 I
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION action described in categorical Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Backfit Analysis .
exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(0)(2). Therefore, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an environmental assessment is not PTS Rule (10 CFR 50.61)
- Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the necl;lssary for this change. .
- Desk Officer, Office of Information and The revision to *§ 50.6i requires:
The changing of the reference from . Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, licensees to calculate RTPTS using the Appendix G of Section III of the ASME (3150-0011), OfficeofMan!lgement and same methodology. specified in
- Code to Appendix G of Section Xl of the Budget, Washington, DC ~0503. Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, for.
- ASME Code has no impact on the determining RTNDT* This change*was environment because the requirements Public Protection Notification
- logically e requisite part of the previous in the Appendices ere identical. rulemaking (56 FR 22300; May 15, 1991)
Therefore, there is no adverse impact on The NRC may not conduct or sponsor,. to § 50.61 that set forth a unified method the environment from this change. and a *person is not required to respond for calculating radiation embrittlement The referenc~ng of the thermal to, e collection of information unless it of the reactor beltline materials in Pert annealing rule results in no adverse displays a currently° valid 0MB control 50. However, the Commission, at that impact .on the environment because . . number. t.ime, inadv!3rtently failed to make the Appendix G currently permits the use of .Regulatory .Analysis *conforming change'to*.§ 50.61. The thermal annealing to reduce fracture Commission believes that .the backfit toughness loss of the RPV materials due The NRC staff has prepared a . statement for the previous amendment, to irradiation embrittleIIient. regulatory analysis for*the amendments which determined that the backfit was Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 ,- to 10 CFR 50.61; Appep.dix G of 10 CFR . necessary to ensure that the facility Concerning the amendments to , Part so. and Appendix H of 10 CFR Part
- continues to provide adequate.*
- *50 that describes the factors and protection to the public health and Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 in the safety, is applicable to this conforming final rule, the requirement that all : alternatives considered by the
' Commission in.deciding to issue these change to § 50.61 ..
irradiation surveillance tests be made The restructuring of the P.TS rule does (i.e., no reduction in testing is amendments. A copy of the regulatory not impose any backfits as defined in 10 permitted) will have e*positive impact : analysis is available for inspection_ and CFR 50.109(e)(l) because there is no on the environment in helping to assure copying for a fee at the NRC Public change in requirements due to this the integrity ofthere11ctor pressure Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. restructuring. . ** : * . vessel.** * . : * *(Lower Level), Washington, DC 20555- The inclusion of thei:mel annealing in
- The restructuring of Section II.C is the 0001 .. Singl13 copies of the analysis may . § 50.61 does not constitute a backfires type of action described in categorical be obtained from Alfred Taboada, Office defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1) because exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(c)(2). Therefore, of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. the .decision to perform annealing is an environmental assessment is not Nuclear Regulatory Commission, voluntary, no annealing has been**
- necessary for this change. . Washington*.. DC. 20555-0001, telephone conducted in this country, and there are The clarification oftlie applicable (301)°415-6014. . no staff positions or* Commission version of ASTM Standard E 185 will requirements r.elied upon by licensees result in no adverse impact to the j Regulatory Flexibility ~ct Certification that are being.changed.
environment since there will be no As required by the Regulatory change _to current *surveillance Thermal Annealing Rule (10 CFR 50.66) Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the programs. Changes to future ; Commission certifies that ,this final rule The final thermal annealing rule surveillance programs will make the : ,will not have a.significant economi~ establishes requirements with respect to programs more effective in assessing irradiation embrittlement effects to the a
. imp11ct on substa.ntial number of sipell applications for thermal annealing.
However, the Commission hes
- entities ..The rules which ai:e affected by RPV materials, thereby helping to assure the amendments will: (1) Preclude determined that. the rule does not the integrity of the* reactor pressure brittle fracture of enibrittled vessels impose a "backfit" as defined in 10 CFR vessel
- 50.109(a)(1). The thermal annealing rule
. during PTS events, (2) provide the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement general fracture toughp.ess requirements does not require any licensee to perfonp.
for RPVs, including ductile fracture thermal annealing. Under existing
- This*final rule amends information requirements, all licensees are required collection requirements that are subject toughness requirements and pressure-temperature limits, (3) provide the to evaluate whether they *exceed the PTS to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 screening limits in 10 CFR 50.61 and the (44 U:S.C. 3501 et seq.): These requirements for. s*urveillance programs to monitor irradiation embrittlement of Cherpy tipper shelf screening limits in requirements were approved by the Appendix G of CFR Part 50. However, Office of Management and Budget,
- RPV beltline materi11ls, and (4) provide .these rules provide an alternative means approval number 315CH>011. *
- for a method for*.re~toring the *fracture . for meeting these screening limits (e.g.,
The public reporting burden for this toughness of RPV beltline materials performing thermal**annealing). No* collection of information is estimated to used in nuclear facilities licensed under licensee currently has pending before
.averag(;l 6,000 hours per response, the provision of 10 CFR 50.21(b) and 10 the NRC an application for thermal including. the time for reviewing CFR 50.22. The companies that own *annealing, nor has any current licensee .
instructions, searching existing data these facilities do not fall within the been granted permission*to conduct sources, .gathering and maintaining the scope of the definition of "small .. thermal annealing. The rule does not data needed, and completing and entities" as set forth in the Regulatory reflect any new or different NRC staff reviewing the collection of information. Flexibility Act, the Small Business Size position which conflicts with a prior . Send comments regarding the burden Standards in regulations issued by the . NRC staff position .or Commission rule. estimate or any other aspect of this Small Business Administration at 13 Thus, the final rule will have a purely collection of inforp10tion, including CFR Part 121, or the size standards prospective effect on future applications suggestions for reducing the burden, to established by the NRC at 10 CFR 2.810 for thermal annealing. The Commission the Information and Records * *. * * (60 FR 18344; April 11, 1995). has stated in other rulemakings 50-SC-172
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION establishing prospective requirements assurance that GDG-14 is met. GDC-14 The Commission has concluded that *
(10 CFR Part 52 and the License inter alia requires RCPB testing in order any backfit requirements in this *
- Renewal Rufe, 10 CFR Part 54) that the to provide an extremely low probability amendment are necessary-to bring.the*
Backfit Rule was not intended to protect of RCPB failure, in terms of abnormal facilities into compliance with licenses;. the future applicant from current leakage, rapidly propagating failure, and or the rules and orders of the
- changes in Commission requirements. gross rupture. Using heat produced by a Commission, or into conformance with:,
Accordingly, the Commission concludes critical reactor core to perform such written commitments.by the licensees. that the rule does not impose backfits testing essentially undercuts the basic Therefore, a backfit analysis is not* and a backfit analysis need not be safety principle embodied in GDC-14 required pursuant to 10 CFR prepared for the final thermal annealing that testing should be completed prior 50.109(a)(4)(i). r.ule. to nuclear reactor operation. It makes Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix G to 10 CfR Part 50 little sense to allow core criticality-thereby allowing the reactor to be in an The amendments to Appendix H to 10 The restructuring 'of Sections IV and CFR Part 50 are either prospective in V of this appendix, referencing of the operational condition where a loss of coolant could have significant nature or of a clarifying nature, and thermal annealing rule, changing the hencu do not involve any provisions reference from App~ndix G of Section consequences-prior to successful completion_.of tests that are intended to whkh would impose backfits as defined III of the ASME Code to Appendix G of in 10 CFR *50.109(a)(1). .
- Section XI of the. ASME Code, and ensure that the probability of such deleting the "design to perinit
- coolant losses during such an List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 annealing" requirement do not impose operational condition are extremely Antitrust, Classified information, any backfits as defined in 10 CFR low.1 The ASME Code, Section XI, Criminal penalties, Fire protection, 50.109(a)(l), because they are either req1.1ires that the System Leakage Test be Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear prospective in nature or are of a performed prior to plant startup power plants and reactors, Radiation clarifying nature. 1 following each refueling outage (Table- protection, Reactor siting criteria,*
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G,. 2500-1, Examination Category B-P, Reporting and record keeping Paragraph IV.2.d. of the final rule Note.2). The only way to interpret the requirements. explicitly prohibits core criticality ASME Code as permitting core For the reasons set out in the before completion ofASME Code criticality prior to completion of the preamble and under the authority of the hydrostatic pressure and leak tests. This hydrostatic tests is to read the term, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; is intended to make clear that licensees "plant startup" as referring to something the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, may not use nuclear heat in order to other than reactor criticality. This is as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553; perform ASME Coqe hydrostatic tests. neither the normal industry practice, the NRC is adopting the following This amendment can be construed as a nor has it been the NRC staffs amendments to 10 CFR Part 50. backfit, inasmuch as the prior version of longstanding interpretation of this 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, Paragraph provision of the ASME code. Indeed, it IV.A.5 could be read to permit core does not appear that the NRC staff has criticality during ASME hydrostatic construed either Appendix G, Paragraph tests and Section XI of the ASME Code IV.A.5 nor Section XI of the ASME Code does not explicitly ,prohibit core . as permitting core criticality prior to criticality prior to completion of these successful completion of ASME Code tests. However, the* Commission never hydrostatic tests. Moreover, the vast intended the disputed language-in . majority of nuclear utility licensees do Paragraph IV.A.5 of Appendix G to
- not use nuclear heat to perform ASME permit core criticality before successful code hydrostatic tests. This suggests that completion of the required ASME most licensees hold the same hydrost_atic tests. The scope of interpretation of Appendix G and Appendix G is "fracture toughness Section XI of the ASME Code as the requirements" only; that scope is stated Commission. In sum, the Commission clearly in the title of Appendix G, and 61 FR 232 believes Section XI of the ASME Code, Published 1/3/96 Appendix G was n~t intended to specify which is endorsed by 10 CFR 50.55a, system operational requirements; It is implicitly prohibits core criticality prior not correct, therefore, to interpret 10 CFR Part 50 paragraph IV.A.5. as permitting nuclear to successful completion of hydrostatic testing. Therefore, the Commission RIN 3150-AD57 hydrotesting. The final phrase in IV.A.5, "depending on whether the core is . concludes that the change in the Fracture Toughness Requirements for critical during the test," was included in language of Appendix G, Paragraph Light Water Reactor Pressure Vessels the rule for the sake of completeness, to* IV.2.d. is necessary to assure specify appropriate fracture toughness compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a and the Correction requirements in th;e event that a licensee ASMECode. In rule document 95-30665 beginning for some reason wanted to have the core on page 65456 in the issue of Tuesday, critical during hydrotest, and was given 'The Commission is aware that NUBARG has December 19, 1995, make the following approval to do so (e.g., as in the case of presented ail argument to the NRC that per£ormance correction:
the Hatch units, where nuclear 0£ ASME Code hydrostatic tests are more e££ective at the higher temperatures. achieved when using PART 50-[CORRECTED] hydrotesting was allowed one last time nuclear heat, as compared with the heal sources as an approved exception.) The ASME normally employed by utilities in per£orming the On page 65468, in the first column,.in Code's hydrostatic testing provisions for .hydrostatic tests. However, for the reasons set £orth the authority citation for Part 50, in the the reactor.coolant pressure boundary In the 1990 letter froin James M. Taylor, EDO to N.
. S. Reynolds and D.F. Stenger, NUBARG, the *first paragraph, in the fourth line, "83 (RCPB) provides the necessary
- Commission reje_cts this argument. Stat. 1444" should read "83 Stat. 444".
50-SC-173
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION 61 FR 6762 With this amendment, the Commission provoking and constructive comments.
Published 2/22/96 is granting, in part, a petition for The Commission's evaluation of and Effective 4/22/96 rulemaking submitted by the Virginia response to these comments is Electric Power Company on December presented in the following section. Employee Protection Policies; Minor 9, 1992 (PRM-50-58).
- Issue 1. While the biennial exercise Amendments EFFECTIVE DATE: July 15, 1996. provides the opportunity for broad FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: Contact based State and local participation in See Part 19 Statements of Consideration exercising offsite plans and procedures, Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. the annual graded utility exercises Nuclear Regulatory Commission, enhance the biennial exercisP. process Washington, DC 20555 (301--415-6534); by providing State liaison personnel and E-mail MTJ1@nrc.gov. their utility counterparts the opportunity to remain proficient. A 2-SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: year gap will lessen proficiency.
Backgrotmd Response. It is clearly not the Commission's intent to lessen the The NRC received a petition for proficiency .at any level of the rulemaking submitted on December 9, emergency planning organization 1992, by the Virginia Electric Power (onsite or offsite) with .the rule change. Company that was assigned Docket No. The Commission believes that PRM-50-58. The petitioner requested interaction and training problems*tbat that the NRC amend, Section IV.F.2., of might arise as a result of deleting the 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, annual onsite exercise*would be 61 FR 30129 "Emergency Planning and.Preparedness resolved by requiring licensees to enable Published 6/14/96 for Production and Utilization any State or local Govermnent to Effective 7/15/96 Facilities," to change ..the requirement participate in the licensee's di:ills when that each site exercise .its emergency requested by the State or local plan biennially rather than annually. Government;The Commission is 10 CFR Part 50 The petitioner's proposed amendment confident that, if a.State governmental* RIN 3150-AF20 would have required each licensee to emergency response agency feels the conduct a biennial full participation need to participate in*a drill that would* Production and Utilization Facilities; exercise of the emergency plan at each require specific offsite interaction and Emergency Planning and site and to take actions necessary to decisionmaking capability, the licensee Preparedness Exercise Requirements ensure that its emergency response would accommodate the State agency's AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory capability is maintained during the 2- request within the framework of the Commission. year interval. The petitioner believes. drills that the licensee conducts that the annual gradecj. exercise is but throughout the 2-year period between. ACTION: Final rule. one of many indicators designed to the biennial full participation exercise.
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory provide reasonable assurance that In fact, a State.who was originally Commission (NRG) is revising its . actions can and will be taken during an against granting the petition for emergency planning regulations. This emergency situation that will provide rulemaking because of similar concerns amendment allows greater flexibility in for the health and safety of the public. stated the following in their comment the licensee's emergency preparedness The NRC published.a notice of receipt on the proposed rule.
training activities in the 2-year period for the petition on March 4, 1993 (58 FR "We were among those initially opposed to between biennial full-.participation 12341). A total of 32 comment letters the Virginia Electric Power Company petition exercises. The amendment preserves the were received and considered when that prompted this rule change,. primarily requirement that each licensee, at each developing a proposed rule concerning because of a perceived potential for a site, conduct an emergency the issues raised by the petitions. diminution of emergency preparedness preparedness exercise biennially, with A notice of proposed rulemaking was capability on the part of licensees. However, full participation by State and local published in the Federal Register on we acknowledge that the compromise governments that are within the plume April 14, 1995 (60 FR 19002). Public embodied in the Commission's proposed rule . comments were requested by July 13, change offers adequate assurance that exposure pathway emergency planning ongoing licensee emergency preparedness zone (EPZ); reduces the required 1995. A total of 18 comment letters were activities will continue at a reasonable level. frequency of exercising the licensee's received, of which 12 utilities, 2 State Because of the number of licensees and the onsite emergency plan from annual to emergency management agencies, and capacity of the State's emergency response biennial; requires licensees ,to ensure the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) organizations, when appropriate (this State) that adequate emergency response supported the proposed rule change. will invoke the language of the proposed rule capabilities are maintained between One State emergency management change that requires licensees to " '*
- biennial exercises by conducting drills, agency and an environmental group enable any State or local government located at least one of which must involve some opposed the proposed rule change. One within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to participate in the licensee's drills when of the principal functi anal areas of the letter received from a State emergency requested by such State or local licensee's onsite emergency response management agency had no comment government.'"
capabilities; and requires licensees to on the proposed rule change. continue enabling State and local Issue 2. County, State, and utility NRC Response to Public Comments emergency preparedness will degrade governments that are in the plume exposure pathway emergency planning The comment letters that were under a biennial schedule. Mini-drills zones (EPZs) to participate in drills. received provided many thought- will not take the place of annual 50-SC-174
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION exercises as now constituted. Further, as an acceptable level of emergency Issues Raised by Petitioner States have been encouraging more response capability is maintained .. . The petitioner characterizes the Federal exercise participation by the Response. The Commission disagrees. present requirement as one that is Federal Emergency Management Agency .The Commission believes that the resource intensive but of marginal (FEMA) and NRC. The proposed change proposed rule would accamplish the importance to safety. The petitioner has would cut back on the opportunities to commenter's objective without the identified grounds for change for a test current personnel and train new extensive.NRC.resources that number of issues associated with the personnel. . *
- implementing the commenter's current requirement to conduct an .
Response. The Commission.disagrees. suggestion would require. emergency plan exercise annually. The The rule change does not require "mini- Issue 5. The Commission does not issues presented by the petitioner drills" to replace anb.ual exercises. The appear to have addressed the follow:
- rule change does require that "the quantitative question about expected (1) The requirement to conduct an licensee shall take actions necessary to turnover rates that would be important integrated annual exercise is* not clearly ensure that adequate emergency in determining whether biennial defined. Therefore, the regulation
- response capabilities are maintained exercises could substantially reduce should be clarified.
* *
- by conducting drills, including at local team skills. (2) The existing regulation; 10 CFR
- least one drill involving a combination Response. Please see the response to part 50, appendix E, is inconsistent.with of some of the principal functional areas other regulations that govern the Issue 1. Additionally, the Commission of the licensee's onsite emergency frequency of offsite response _*
has always been .and continues to be. response capabilities." (10 CFR part 50, organization integrated exercises (i.e., committed to the principle that there appendix E, IV.F.2.b.) exists "reasonable assurance that 44 CFR part 3110).
- Additionally, the.opportunity to test adequate protective measures can and (3) The performance ofoffsite * ,,
and train new perso~el is provided by will be taken in the event of a response organizations during biennial requiring that "Licensees shall enable radiological emergency." If, this finding exercises has confirmed. that a biennial any State or local Government * *
- to is jeopardized either at the State or local frequency is sufficient to provide*the *
- participate in the licensee's drills." (Id governmental level, additional training* reasonable assurance finding. * * * .
at IV.F.2.e.) would be warranted and would be (4) The existing regulation:, 10 CFR ** Issue 3. There is a need for clarity provided by participating in the drills 50.54(t), provides for an incj.ependent regarding State and local participation the licensee conducts between biennial review of the adequacy of the program. in the exercises and drills that are exercises. (5) The existing requirement to proposed to replace .the annual NRC conduct an annual exercise is not graded exercise. At 60 FR 19002; dated Issue:B. The Commission has not adequately addressed local Government . necessary to achieve the underlying .. April 14, 1995, licensees are charged to purpose of the rule. A biennial exercise "enable" States* and,local governments comments on the importance of regular
.exercises for improving coordination is sufficient to provide an acceptable
- to participate in these exercises and formal confirmation of capability.
drills, but at 60 FR 19006, activating all and communication. * (6) Reconsideration of the .* response facilities (Technical Support Response. The Commission*did not requirement is warranted in light of the
- Center, (TSC); Operations Support
- receive any cpmmimts from local completion and implementation of *
- Center (OSC), and tl;te Emergency governments relating to this petition for enhanced emergency preparedness
- Operations Facili,tylEOF)) is not , rulemaking. Nonetheless, the. facilities, the current level of industry necessary. Because State.and local Commission is confident that if a local proficiency and performance, and the governments* coordinate interaction* * . Government wished to improve its increased industry sensitivity to through the EOF ann Media Centers, coordination and communication emergency preparedness. , * .
- clarification is required. For example, capabilities, licensees would welcome (7) Personnel could be utilized more perhaps the utility would be charged its participation in one o,r more of the effectively in their normal professional with exercising the EOF and Media , onsite drills thatwill be conducted function rather than by participating in Centers as a part of at least one exercise between the biennial exercises. a resource-intensive integrated test that and/or drill each year.
- Issue 1. The Commission has not only serves to confirm the already Response. Based on the extensive addressed the FEMA concern that existing level of the response capability.
coordination and cooperation between regular cooperation with offsite teams (8) Emergency planning resources licensees and State end local may.play a critical role in their
- could be utilized more effectively to governments over the last 15 years, the
- prep!!fedness, which niay be especially further the development and Commission is confident that, if a State important in view of the potential role maintenance of emergency preparedness or locai governmental emergency such teams may play as first responders activities.
response agency felt the .need to in actual *emergencies. participate in a drill that included Response. Prior to publishing the . Commission Response interaction at the EOF end Media proposed rule, the Commission received The Commission believes that it is Centers, the licensee would FEMA's assurance that their concerns important;inlight of public comment, .* accommodate the request within the with the petition for rulemaking had as well as the discussion provided in framework of the drills that the licensee been resolved. Nonetheless, regular the petition, to clarify* NRC's intent conducts throughout the 2-year period cooperation between offsite and licencee (µnder the existing rule) that licensees between the bienniiµ full participation. emergency response* teams will be need not conduct annual exercises with exercises. * , ensured by the requirement that scenarios that progress to*severe core Issue 4. Rather than eliminating any licensees enable any state or local . damage or result' in offsite releases. requirements, it is suggested that each Government within the plume exposure Historically, these scenarios were used a site initially be granted waiver for pathway emergency planning zone to in both the biennial full-participation*
"off-year" integrated exercises. The participate in the licensee's drills upon exercise ofoffsite emergency plans and waiver would. be effective only as long request.
- the annual exercise of the licensee's 50-SC-175 June 28, 1996
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION onsite emergency plan; this is no longer thus, preserving their training (success paths) rather than have necessary for ~e _currently required opportunities. controllers intervene, and the drills annual exercises of the licensee's onsite The Commission believes .that the could focus on onsite training emergency plan. Information Notice (IN) final rule may result in the reallocation objectives.
87-54, "Emergency Response and more effective utilization of The final rule relieves licensees from Exercises," was issued to clarify NRC resources in some Ycensees' emergency the current requirement to conduct a intent in this regard arid to provide preparedness (EP) programs as they full formal exercise of the licensee's detailed guidance, specifically on the further the development and onsite emergency plan annually, and types of "off-year" training activities maintenance of emergency preparedness gives licensees the flexibility to choose that licensees can perform during the capabilities during the "off-year" the activities to be conducted in the 2-interval between the biennial full periods. However, it is not clear that year period between biennial full-participation exercises to maintain these changes will result in significant participation exercises in order to adequate EP response capabilities and to overall cost savings. The Commission maintain their emergency response satisfy the rule. cautions specifically against capabilities. Greater flexibility in the Some licensees have availed expectations that the final rule will training of the onsite emergency themselves of the flexibility afforded by necessarily result in significant response organization can provide the IN 87-54 guidance to conduct reductions in NRC inspection activity significant benefits to some licensees. realistic, interactive "off-year" training concerning licensees' "off-year" EP For example, licensees can eliminate the activities that simulate less severe maintenance activities. Also, licensees practice of developing scenarios that events, such as a minor fire, loss of will, upon request, submit scenaEios for proceed to severe core damage, offsite electric power, or equipment failure, NRC review as may be deemed releases, or to higher emergency and focus on the capability of the onsite necessary by NRC in support of future classification levels. Licensees will have emergency response organization to inspections. greater opportunity to conduct realistic diagnose problems and develop actions Conclusion emergency response training with to successfully mitigate the scenario supervised instruction that allows the event. However, as noted in the petition, Having considered the arguments operating staff to consider accident many licensees continue to employ presented by the petitioner as well as* management strategies, diagnose severe accident scenarios in annual evaluating all public comments problems, and be given credit for exercises of their onsite. emergency received, and based on a further actions thaLwould mitigate scenario plans. understanding-of the issues involved events. Accordingly, the Commission is gained from 14 years of experience This approach is also responsive to revising Section IV.F.2.b. of 10 CFR part evaluating licensee emergency public commenters who expressed 50, appendix E, to (1) reduce from preparedness exercises, the Commission concern about a possible decrease in annual to biennial the frequency of concludes that (1) the required licensee training and readiness in the exercising the licensee's onsite frequency for exercising the licensee's period between biennial exercises; emergency plan (which may be onsite emergency plan should be Under this approach, licensees *wm still included in the biennial full reduced from annual to biennial, (2) the be required to conduct emergency participation exercise specified in means by which licensees are expected response training and drills of the onsite IV.F.2.c.) and (2) require licensees to to train and maintain their emergency emergency response organization, as conduct training drills, including at response capabilities and readiness in well as provide training opportunities to least one drill involving a combination the 2-year interval between evaluated State and local Government personnel of some of.the principal functional areas exercises should be changed to require during the interval between biennial of the licensee's onsite emergency licensees to conduct drills, including at exercises. The final rule completes NRC response capabilities. This drill would least one drill involving a combination action in response to PRM-50-58. The be conducted between biennial full of some*of the principal functional areas final rule grants the petitioner's request participation exercises to ensure that of the licensee's onsite emergency that the frequency of required onsite adequate emergency response response capabilities, and (3) emergency response*plan exercises be capabilities are maintained. The opportunities for training of State and reduced from annual to biennial. principal functional areas of emergency local Government personnel must be Additionally, 10 CFR 50.47(a)(l) is response include activities such as preserved. being revised in order to correct a management and coordination of The principal functional areas of typographical error that appeared in the emergency response, accident emergency response include 1993 edition of Title 10, Parts Oto 50 assessment, protective action management arid coordination of of the Code of Federal Regulations. In
- decisionmaking, and plant system repair emergency response, accident the 1993 edition, the word "protection" and corrective actions. assessment, protective action. was substituted for "protective This approach is consistent with a decisionmalcing, and plant system repair measures" in 10 CFR 50.47(a)(l). This comment from one State that favored and corrective.actions: action corrects this paragraph to read as the petition for rulemaking but preferred During the specified drills, activation follows:"* *
- reasonable assurance that some guidelines be included in of all of the licensee's emergency that adequate protective measures can appendix E requiring plant specific response facilities (Technical Support and will be taken * * *"
internal exercises during the "off-year" Center (TSC), Operations Support to ensure plant personnel familiarity Center (OSC); and the Emergency Finding of No Significant with their response plans rather than Operations Facility (EOF)) would not be Environmental Impact: Availability the vague expectancy that this activity necessary. Licensees would have the The Commission has determined will be done. Furthermore, licensees opportunity to consider accident under the National Environmental would continue to enable State and management strategies, supervised Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the local governments in the plume instruction would be permitted, Commission's regulations in 10 CFR exposure pathway EPZs to participate in operating staff would have the part 51, subpart A, that this rule is not drills in the interval between exercises, opportunity to resolve problems a major Federal action significantly 50-SC-176
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION affecting the quality of the human Backfit Analysis . on the decommissioning procedures environment and ther~fore, an that lead to the termination of an
*environmental impact statement is not The final rule clarifies the intent of operating license for nuclear power required. The rule will update and the existing regulation and facilitates reactors. The final amendments clarify clarify the emergency!planning greater flexibility in licensees' conduct ambiguities in the current rule and regulations relating tci exercises. It does of "off-year" emergency response codify procedures that reduce the not involve any modification to any training activities. This action does not regulatory burden, provide greater plant or revise the need for or the seek to impose any new or increased flexibility,:.and allow for greater public standards for emergency plans. There is requirements in this area. The changes partici patfon in the decommissioning no adverse effect on the quality of the permit, but do not require, licensees fo process. Some minor amendments environment. The environmental change their existing emergency plans pertain to non-power reactors and are .
assessment and findi~g of no significant and procedures to employ scenarios in for purposes of clarification and impact on which thisidetermination is "off-year" training or drills that do not procedural simplification. The based are available for inspection at the go to severe core damage or result in offsite exposures. No backfitting is Commission believes that the final NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L amendments will enhance efficiency Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, intended or approved in connection and uniformity in the regulatory process DC. I with this. final rule change. of decommissioning nuclear power List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 plants. Paperwork Reductiof Act Statement EFFECTIVE DATE: August 28, 1996. This final rule does not contain a new Antitrust, Classified information, FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. or amended information collection Criminal penalties, Fire protection, Carl Feldman, Office of Nuclear requirement subject tp the Paperwork Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 . power plants and reactors, Penalty, Regulatory Commission, Washington, et. seq.). Existing reqtiirements were Radiation protection, Reactor siting DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-approved by the Offii:e of Management criteria, reporting and record keeping 6194; or S. Singh Bajwa, Office of and Budget approval 1Number 3150- requirements. Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. 0011. For the reasons set out in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, R~gulatory Analysis ; pr,eamble, and urider the authority of the Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; (301) 415-1013. The* Commission ~as prepared a the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: regulatory analysis on this final as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC regulation. The analjsis examines the Background is adopting the following amendments costs and benefits of the alternatives to 10 CFR part 50. On June 27, 1988 (53 FR 24018), the considered by the Commission. The Commission promulgated analysis is available for inspection in decommissioning regulations. On July the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 20, 1995 (60 FR 37374), the Commission L Street, NW. (Lowei Level), issued proposed amendments to these _Washington, DC. Single copies of the regulations. A discussion of the current analysis may be obta.ined from Michael requirements and proposed T. Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear amendments follows. Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, Current Requirements DC 20555-0001; Telephone: (301) 415- Within 2 years after a licensee 6534. i permanently ceases operation of a Regulatory Flexibility AcfCertification nuclear reactor facility, it must submit a detailed decommissioning plan to the The final rule does not have a NRC for approval, along with a significant impact on a substantial supplemental environmental report that number of small entities. The final rule addresses environmental issues that updates and clarifies the emergency have not already been considered. Based . planning regulations relating to on these submittals, the NRC reviews exercises at nuclear power plants. the licensee's planned activities, Nuclear power plant licensees do not 61 FR 39278 prepares a Safety Evaluation Report fall within the definition of small Published 7/29/96 (SER) and an environmental assessment business in Section 3 of the Small Effective 8/28/96 (EA), and either makes a negative Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632), the Small declaration of impact (the usual case) or Business Size Standards of the Small 10 CFR Parts 2, so, and 51 prepares an environmental impact Business Administr4tion in 13 CFR part statement (EIS). Upon NRC approval of 121, or the Commiss'ion's Size RIN 3150-AE96 the decommissioning plan, the Standards published at 56 FR 56671 Commission issues an order permitting (November 6, 1991).: l).s required by the Decommissioning of Nuclear Power the licensee to decommission its facility Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 Reactors in accordance with the approved plan. . U.S.C. 605(b), the Commission hereby- AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory As part of the approval process, the certifies that the final rule will not have Commission. .- opportunity for a hearing under subpart a significant economic impact on a ACTION: Final rule. G of 10 CFR part 2, is made available to substantial number bf small entities. the public. Once the decommissioning Therefore, a regulatory flexibility
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory process is completed and the NRC is analysis is not required. Commission is amending its regulations satisfied that the facility has been I
50-SC-177
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION radioactively decontaminated. t-0 an amounts of heat. Safe control of the contaminated materials facility and does unrestricted release level, the NRC nuclear reaction involves the use and not require the oversight that an terminates the license, operation of many complex systems. operating reactor would require.
If the licensee chooses to place the First, the nuclear reaction must be Based on the preceding discussion, it reactor in storage and dismantle it at a carefully controlled through neutron should be noted that during the later time, the initial decommissioning absorbing mechanisms. Second, the heat operating stage of the reactor a nuclear plan submittal need not be as detailed generated must be removed so that the reaction must be sustained that has the as a plan for prompt dismantlemef).t; ', fuel and its supporting structure do not potential during an accident to generate However, before the licensee can begin overheat. Third, the confining structure significant amounts of energy and dismantlement, a detailed plan and and ancillary systems must be radiation whose consequences can be environmental report must be submitted maintained and degradation caused by severe. Moreover, the nature of and approved by the Commission. radiation and mechanical and thermal maintaining and controlling a nuclear Before the decommissioning plan is stress ameliorated. Fourth, the reaction and the complexity of systems approved, the licensee cannot perform radioactivity resulting from the nuclear and operations requirements necessary major decommissioning activities. If a reaction in the form of direct radiation to prevent and mitigate adverse licensee desires a reduction in (especially near the high neutron flux consequences requires considerable requirements because of the permanent areas around the reactor vessel), oversight by the NRC. During the cessation of operation, it must obtain a contaminated materials and effluents decommissioning stage of the reactor, license amendment for possession-only (air and water) must be minimized and the potential for consequences that status. This is usually granted after the controlled. Finally, proper operating could result from an inadvertent nuclear licensee indicates that the reactor has procedures must be established and reaction are highly unlikely. The permanently ceased operations and fuel maintained with appropriately trained systems required for maintaining the has been permanently removed from the staff to ensure that the reactor system is spent fuel in the spent fuel pool as well reactor vessel. properly operated and maintained, and as the operations required to contain the A licensee is required to provide that operating personnel minimize their remaining residual contamination in the assurance that at any time during the exposure to radiation when performing facility and spent fuel pool are relatively life of the facility, through termination their duties. Moreover, emergency simple. Consequently, the activities of the license, adequate funds will be response procedures must be performed by the licensee during available to complete decommissioning. established and maintained to protect decommissioning do not have a For operating reactors, the amount of significant potential to impact public decommissioning funding required is the public in the event of an accident. health and safety and these require generically prescribed in 10 CFR 50.75. During the decommissioning stage of considerably less oversight by the NRC Five years before license expiration or a nuclear power reactor, the nuclear than during power operations. cessation of operations, a preliminary fission reaction is stopped and the fuel The amendments proposed in July 20, decommissioning plan containing a site- (spent fuel assemblies) is permanently 1995 (60 FR 37374), were intended to specific decommissioning cost estimate removed and placed in the spent fuel provide licensees with simplicity and must be submitted and the financial pool until transferred offsite for storage flexibility in implementing the assurance mechanism must be or disposal. While the spent fuel is still decommissioning process, especially appropriately adjusted. Finally, the highly radioactive and generates heat with regard to premature closure. The decommissioning plan, submitted caused by radioactive decay, no neutron proposed amendments were intended to within 2 years after permanent cessation flux is generated and the fuel slowly clarify ambiguities in the current of operations, must provide a site- cools as its energetic decay products regulations, codify procedures and specific cost estimate for diminish. The spent fuel pool, which terminology that have been used in a decommissioning and a correspondingly contains circulating water, removes the number of specific cases, and increase adjusted financial assurance decay heat and filters out any small opportunities for the public to become mechanism. For delayed dismantlement radioactive contaminants escaping the informed about the licensee's of a power reactor facility, an updated spent fuel assemblies. The spent fuel decommissioning activities. The decommissioning plan must be pool system is relatively simple to amendments were designed to establish submitted with the estimated cost of operate and maintain compared to an a level of NRC oversight commensurate decommissioning and the licensee must operating power reactor. The remainder with the level of safety concerns appropriately adjust the financial of the facility contains radioactive expected during decommissioning assurance mechanism. Before approval contamination and is highly activities. of the decommissioning plan, licensee contaminated in the area of the reactor A. Initial activities. The use of these funds would be determined vessel. However, because the spent fuel decommissioning process outlined in on a case-specific basis for premature is stored in a configuration that the proposed amendments was similar closure, when accrual ofrequired precludes the nuclear fission reaction, in approach to that in the current decommissioning funds may be no generation of new radioactivity can decommissioning rule, but included incomplete. occur. Safety concerns for a spent fuel flexibility in the type of actions that can pool are greatly reduced regarding both be undertaken without NRC approval. Proposed Amendments control of the nuclear fission process Once a licensee permanently ceases The degree of regulatory oversight and the resultant generation of large operation of the power reactor, no major required for a nuclear power reactor amounts of heat, high neutron flux and decommissioning activities (as defined during its decommissioning stage is related materials degradation, and the in the proposed rule) could be considerably less than that required for stresses imposed on the reactor system. undertaken until the public and the the facility during its operating stage. Contaminated areas of the facility must NRC were provided information by the During the operating stage of the reactor, still be controlled to minimize radiation licensee. Information required from the fuel in the reactor core undergoes a exposure to personnel and control the licensee in a Post-Shutdown controlled nuclear fission reaction that spread of radioactive material. This Decommissioning Activities Report generates a high neutron flux and large situation is now similar to a (PSDAR) consisted of the licensee's 50-SC-178
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION proposed decommissioning activities objectives were considered in the comment and incorporated into the and schedule through license proposed rule as follows. proposed-rule. Currently, licensee use of termination, an assessment of whether (1) The proposed rule would clarify, these funds is determined on a case-such proposed activities are bounded by modify, and extend certain licensing specific basis for prematurely shutdown existing analyses of environmental conditions to decommissioning plants. However, the proposed rule impacts, and a general decommissioning activities.
- eliminated the requirement for a cost estimate for the proposed activities. (2) Aside from changes to part 50, the decommissioning plan and instead The PSDAR would be made available to final safety analysis report (FSAR), required a PSDAR submittal, which the public for comment. which is a licensing basis document for requires a decommissioning cost Ninety days after the PSDAR performing activities under § 50.59, estimate. The proposed rule permitted submittal to the NRC and approximately would need to be updated to cover some small percentage (3%) of the 30 days after a public information decommissioning activities. generically prescribed decommissioning meeting is held in the vicinity of the (3) A PSDAR would be submitted to funds to be available to the licensee for reactor site, the licensee could perform the NRC that would contain a schedule planning purposes ("paper studies")
major decommissioning activities if of planned decommissioning activities before permanent cessation of power NRC does not offer an objection. Before and provide a mechanism for timely reactor operations. Moreover, to permit undertaking these activities, the licensee NRC oversight. The licensee would the licensee to accomplish major must provide certifications to the NRC prqvide written notification to the NRC decommissioning activities promptly, that operations have permanently before performing any decommissioning an additional generic funding amount ceased and fuel has been permanently activity that is inconsistent with or would be made available (20%) before removed from the reactor vessel makes significant schedule changes a site-specific cost estimate, which must (elements not formally addressed in the from the PSDAR. be submitted to the NRC within 2 years C. License termination. A licensee after permanent cessation of operations current rule). Once these certifications wishing to terminate its license would have been provided to the NRC, the (as in the current rule). The remainder
. submit a license termination plan for of the funds would be made available licensee could no longer operate the approval similar to the approach that is reactor. after submittal of the site-specific cost currently required for a estimate, as in the current rule. When Part 50 technical requirements would decommissioning plan. However, the also be amended to properly cover the the licensee submits the license plan would be less detailed than the termination plan, the same financial transition of the facility from operating decommissioning plan required by the to permanent shutdown status (which considerations as those in§ 50.82(c) of current rule, because it would not need the current rule would be required to also is not explicitly covered in the to provide a dismantlement plan, and current rule). Thus, a licensee who has provide assurance that the licensee has could be as simple as a final site survey adequate funds to complete permanently ceased operations and plan. The approval process*for the removed fuel from the reactor vessel decommissioning and terminate the termination plan, as in the current rule, license.
would no longer need to obtain a license would provide for a hearing opportunity E. License extension. The proposed amendment to proceed with certain under 10 CFR part 2. The proposed rule rule clarified that a license that has decommissioning activities within recognized that, if the spent fuel is expired is not terminated until the established regulatory constraints. either offsite or in an independent spent Commission terminates it and further B. Major decommis~ioning activities. fuel storage facility (ISFSI), that is clarifies what conditions prevail under A major change from the current rule is covered under a part 72 license, the such circumstances. that power reactor licensees would no remaining facility licensed under part F. Grandfathering. The proposed rule longer be required to have an approved 50 is similar to a materials facility and applied to power reactor licensees who decommissioning plan before being a less formal hearing, under subpart L do not have an approved permitted to perform major rather than subpart G of part 2, is more decommissioning plan on the effective decommissioning activities. Under the appropriate. As in the current rule, a date of the final rule. Licensees that proposed rule, licensees would be supplemental !c)nvironmental report already have an approved plan could, at allowed to perform activities that meet would be required from the licensee that their option, follow the provisions of the the criteria proposed in § 50.59. Section considers environmental impacts that proposed rule. 50.59 would be amended to include are not already covered in existing EISs. G. Non-power reactors. There were additional criteria to ensure that An additional requirement, proposed for some minor clarifications and concerns specific to decommissioning the purpose of keeping the public procedural simplifications in the are considered by the licensee. Based on informed, is that a public meeting be proposed rule for the non-power reactor NRC experience with licensee held, after the licensee submits the decommissioning process. Otherwise, decommissioning activities, the license termination plan to the NRC, the current rule remained essentially Commission recognized that the § 50.59 similar to the one held after the PSDAR unchanged. process used by the licensee during submittal. reactor operations encompassed routine D. Financial assurance. The proposed Response to Comments activities that are similar to those rule would continue the same degree of Thirty-four comment letters were undertaken during the decommissioning financial assurance as the current rule, received on the proposed rule from process. The Commission concluded but provide more flexibility by allowing power reactor licensees, contractors, that the § 50.59 process could be used licensee's limited early use of Government agencies, Agreement States, by the licensee to perform major decommissioning funds. This provision citizens groups, and individuals. The decommissioning activities if licensing was presented in a draft policy comment letters have been categorized conditions and the level of NRC statement entitled "Use of into two groups representing oversight required during reactor Decommissioning Trust Funds Before commenters generally in favor of the operations are continued, Decommissioning Plan Approval" (59 proposed rule and those generally not in commensurate with the status of the FR 5216; February 3, 1994) that was favor of the proposed rule. The facility being decommissioned. These published by the Commission for commenters in favor of the rule (24) 50-SC-179
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION consisted of power reactor licensees, powers to regulate themselves; that NRC clear that the PSDAR is a high-level contractors, Government agencies, and was abdicating its responsibility for summary, and that there should be an Agreement State. The commenters protecting the health and safety of consistency in the criteria for assessing not in favor of the rule (10) consisted of workers and the public; that, in environmental impacts between the citizens groups, individuals, and an allowing the decommissioning plan to PSDAR and the proposed § 50.59 Agreement State. The comments have be included in the 'Final Safety Analysis requirements. A few comments been summarized and addressed Report (FSAR) it could be revised suggested making the reporting through issue categories based on the without license amendment, thereby requirements more efficient by proposed rule. excluding the public from the process; combining them and updating the Issue 1-Proposed Rule Approach. and that major component removal PSDAR and FSAR together, requiring Comments. Commenters in support of should not be allowed before the updates no more than once every 36 the proposed rule were, to varying decommissioning plan is approved by months, or using a single PSDAR for degrees, supportive of the proposed the NRC. These commenters expressed multi-reactor sites. Several comments rule. There were a few commenters in a variety of views indicating that the suggested that the updating requirement this group who fully supported the existing rule should be left alone or that for the PSDAR be eliminated because proposed rule because it would the current rule should be left basically § 50.59 already requires annual facilitate efficient decommissioning of in place but made more efficient reporting requirements, that the term power plants by reducing regulatory through better implementation and "significant" used in the proposed burden, clarifying the applicability of should include greater opportunities for § 50.82(a)(6) should be tied to the regulations originally intended for a public participation. Finally, few § 50.59 safety evaluation, and that the operating reactors, allowing a phased commenters indicated that significantly extent of deviation in the PSDAR approach to decommissioning, and greater public participation and schedule that is permissible without allowing early partial use of the oversight are necessary than that notice to the NRC should be clarified.
decommissioning trust fund. A few prescribed in the proposed rule. Finally, there was a comment that the commenters supported the use of Response. The proposed rule was final rule should make it clear that, if lessons learned from ongoing developed to allow more flexibility in prompt decommissioning decommissioning projects, expanding dealing with premature closures, the (dismantlement) is being pursued by the public participation, and providing the decommissioning process in general, licensee, the PSDAR and license rationale behind less formal NRC and the experience gained from recent termination plan should be permitted to policies and practices in a way that decommissioning activities such as be the same document. satisfies the requirements of the Atomic those at Fort St. Vrain, Shoreham, and Commenters not in favor of the rule Energy Act (AEA), Administrative Rancho Seco, as well as early did not specifically address Issue 2. Procedure Act (APA), and National component removal at Yankee Rowe However, those commenters believed Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). and Trojan. The justification and intent that the current rule requirements While many commenters were of the final rule is unchanged. The should be followed and that an generally supportive of the general NRC's primary concern, as the licensee approved decommissioning plan should concept of the proposed rule, they transitions to decommissioning, is that be required before a licensee is indicated that the proposed rule did not the licensee will have sufficient funds to permitted to perform major go far enough in reducing unnecessary complete decommissioning and that the decommissioning activities. regulatory burden. They noted that the activities undertaken by the licensee Response. The purpose of the PSDAR existing NRC requirements regarding will protect the public and the is to provide a general overview for the operating reactors were more than environment. The intent of this final public and the NRC of the licensee's adequate to encompass rule is to streamline some of the proposed decommissioning activities decommissioning activities and, if decommissioning requirements for until 2 years before termination of the anything, should be relaxed rather than power reactor licensees, especially in license. The PSDAR is part of the expanded. These recommended approval of the decommissioning plan mechanism for informing and being relaxations pertained to such items as a before major decommissioning activities responsive to the public prior to any more liberal attitude toward collection can be undertaken and in early use of significant decommissioning activities and use of decommissioning trust funds, decommissioning trust funds. taking place. It also serves to inform and elimination of unnecessary criteria Specific issues addressed in the final alert the NRC staff to the schedule of concerning the use of the proposed rule are discussed in greater detail licensee activities for inspection
§ 50.59, elimination of proposed below. planning purposes and for decisions mandatory public meetings, elimination Issue 2-PSDAR, FSAR, and update regarding NRC oversight activities.
of the proposed Post-Shutdown requirements. Because the final rule eliminates the Decommissioning Activities Report Comments. Commenters in favor of need for an approved decommissioning (PSDAR) submittal, and elimination of the rule had various comments plan before major decommissioning
- the proposed license termination plan concerning the PSDAR, its required activities can be performed, the or eliminating its inclusion into the update, and the proposed update to the requirement to submit a PSDAR is less license by amendment, including FSAR. Several commenters indicated stringent than existing requirements for elimination of the accompanying that the PSDAR requirement should be power reactor licensees.
proposed Subpart L or G hearing eliminated because it is more stringent The information required to be in the opportunity. than requirements imposed on operating PSDAR is less detailed than the Comm enters not in favor of the reactors, that the PSDAR should only information required in the FSAR. proposed rule were not supportive of require information (detailed schedule) Therefore, the PSDAR should not be the proposed rule to varying degrees. pertaining to the current phase of combined with the FSAR because the Many of these commenters were decommissioning because two documents have different purposes. strongly opposed to the proposed rule dismantlement and site restoration may The final rule requires a written and indicated that it allowed nuclear not occur for many years, that the word notification if activities are anticipated power generators to have discretionary "synopsis" should be used to make it that would be inconsistent with the 50-SC-180
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION PSDAR activities previously described. health and safety concern and that there redundant to the proposed requirements The licensee's consideration of such are potentially high costs associated in § 50.82; the PSDAR content plus inconsistency would include any with such a delay because licensees update and the 90-day waiting period milestone scheduling changes of could do a lot of dismantlement during envelopes issues addressed by these dismantlement tasks and significant this time that would be more efficient criteria. These commenters believed that increases in decommissioning costs and cost advantageous. These if§ 50.59(e) criteria were kept they from those described in the PSDAR. The commenters emphasized that all should be in a regulatory guide and not final rule will explicitly include the activities could be carried out under in a rule. Comments specific to the four requirement that activities that would § 50.59 and the current licensing basis. criteria and why they should be result in significant increases to They further stated that, if the 90-day eliminated follow.
decommissioning costs from those hold is retained, clarification is needed Section 50.59(e)(1)(i) concerning presented in the PSDAR must be a regarding the NRC's opportunity to foreclosure of the site for unrestricted consideration in the notification interpose an objection to proceeding release. It was noted that any event that requirements of§ 50.82(a)(7). It is with major decommissioning and that detracts from this effort would be intended that regulatory guidance the NRC review should be based on accidental in nature, and that the addressing the PSDAR Standard Format areas of significant safety. Finally, one proposed rule provided no explanation and Content will be issued soon after commenter expressed a concern that the of the types of activities that could the final rule is published. 90-day waiting period would not allow result in foreclosing the site for Currently, FSAR updates are required enough time for public participation, unrestricted use. annually or 6 months after a refueling including consideration of comments Section 50.59(e)(1)(ii) concerning outage provided the interval between received from the public after NRC significantly increasing updates does not exceed 24 months. notices the licensee's PSDAR submittal decommissioning costs. It was noted Because the FSAR is the basis for the and during a public meeting. that cost estimate information is use of§ 50.59, the updates will need to Commenters not in favor of the rule required prior to and through the be timely, so the final rule specifies a did not specifically address Issue 3. decommissioning process, making this 24-month FSAR update for However, those commenters believed requirement unnecessary. Moreover, it decommissioning activities for those that the current rule requirements was asserted that there is no logical nuclear power reactor licensees that should be followed and that an correlation between the cost of a have submitted the certifications of approved decommissioning plan should decommissioning activity and whether a permanent cessation of operation and be required before a licensee is license amendment should be required permanent removal of the fuel from the permitted to perform major for that activity and that costs have reactor vessel. decommissioning activities. never been a consideration in If prompt decommissioning is desired Response. The commenters have determining whether a proposed by the licensee, the licensee could elect correctly noted that the 90-day waiting activity is consistent with the licensing early submittal of the PSDAR, before period does not just address a health basis for a plant. It was also noted that cessation of operation, and then use of and safety issue. The NRC has chosen a other regulatory bodies such as Public
§ 50.59 would be permitted at cessation 90-day waiting period prior to allowing Utility Commissions and the Federal of operation, provided the certification major decommissioning activities to Energy Regulatory Commission, as well of permanent fuel removal from the occur as the minimal time necessary for as economic pressure, will force a reactor vessel has been received and the the NRC to evaluate the licensee's licensee to perform decommissioning public meeting had been held in proposed activities and to conduct a cost effectively. It was recognized that advance. Although the PSDAR and public meeting. The public meeting is actions taken by a licensee may license termination plan serve different informational and may be chaired by a diminish the decommissioning fund purposes, and a formal approval process local official, with a presentation of the and it was suggested that the wording be is required of the latter, the PSDAR and regulatory process for decommissioning changed to deal with actions that would license termination plan can be by the NRC, presentation of planned "significantly inhibit the ability to fund combined. If a licensee chooses to decommissioning activities by the decommissioning costs which would combine the PSDAR and the license licensee, and participation by State prevent successful decommissioning."
termination plan, the requirements for representatives. A question and answer Section 50.59(e)(1)(iii) concerned both would apply to the combined period would follow the presentations. environmental impacts not previously document, including the requisite By submitting the PSDAR before reviewed. It was noted that compliance waiting period, public meeting, and cessation of operation, a licensee could with the operating license, technical approval by amendment of the license reduce the need for a waiting period specifications, and § 50.59 regarding termination plan. The procedure for (see the response to Issue 2 for an unreviewed safety questions adequately
- approval of a license termination plan is additional discussion on ways that the preclude having significant adverse similar to that currently required for waiting period may be reduced). environmental impact that have not approval of a decommissioning plan. Issue 4-Proposed Rule Modifications been reviewed. Moreover, the For a multi-reactor site, the PSDAR to§ 50.59. requirement is redundant to the could address the activities for all the Comment. Many commenters requirement concerning unreviewed reactors at the site if decommissioning approved of some form of the proposed environmental impacts required in the of each will be undertaken at the same modifications to§ 50.59. Many of these content of the PSDAR specified in time. commenters noted that § 50.59(e) in the § 50.82.
Issue 3-Ninety-Day Time Period proposed rule is more stringent than the Section 50.59(e)(1)(iv) concerned Prior to Undertaking Major existing requirements for operating violating the terms of the existing Decommissioning Activities. reactors. These commenters believed license. It was noted that this Comment. Several commenters noted that the existing § 50.59 criteria are requirement is redundant with language that the proposed 90-day waiting period adequate. Several commenters stated in § 50.59(a) that allows licensees to before major decommissioning activities that the four proposed constraints proceed with an activity so long as it could be undertaken did not address a contained in § 50.59(e) are somewhat does not violate technical specifications 50-SC-181
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION or constitute an unreviewed safety use of§ 50.59 activities to perform with, or making any significant question as defined by § 50.59(a)(2). decommissioning activities is that schedule change from, those actions and Also, it was noted that a license environmental impacts have already schedules described in the PSDAR and amendment is required for changes in been considered and that such states that this notification include technical specifications under the consideration was for an unrestricted consideration of significant increases in current § 50.59(c). release condition where the licensee has decommissioning costs (§ 50.82(a)(7)).
Most commenters who opposed the sufficient funds to complete The NRC intends to maintain an use of proposed § 50.59 were not in decommissioning (see final generic active inspection program to provide the favor of the rule. One commenter stated environmental impact statement requisite level of oversight of licensee that the analysis of the dismantlement (FGEIS). NUREG-o586).1 The major activities during decommissioning. The activities proposed under§ 50.59 to considerations of licensee PSDAR and any written notification of determine whether or not the activity decommissioning activities that could changes required of a licensee will be generates any unreviewed safety issue significantly affect the environment are used to schedule NRC inspection should be provided to the NRC, rather at the license termination stage when resources for significant than rely on an NRC audit as existing the licensee submits a license decommissioning activities. regulations provide. This analysis termination plan for approval. In addition to continuing would also provide this information to If a licensee contemplates requirements that the licensee must the public for examination. Several of decommissioning activiti~s that would comply with, such as 10 CFR part 20, the commenters indicated that an after- violate these requirements, the licensee regarding protection of workers and the the-fact review of§ 50.59 activities may not use the § 50.59 process public from radiation, and appendix B would provide insufficient regulatory delineated in this rule to perform the to 10 CFR part 50 regarding quality protection. Finally, a commenter stated activities. The licensee would then be assurance, the final rule explicitly that the presence of an NRC inspector is required to obtain a license amendment extends certain technical requirements essential during decommissioning to perform the activities. to cover decommissioning activities activities. The final rule prohibits licensees from (e.g., §§ 50.36, 50.36a, 50.36b, and Response. The Commission performing any decommissioning Appendix I regarding technical concluded that the proposed activities that foreclose release of the specifications for surveillance
§ 50.59(e)(1)(iv) is redundant and site for possible unrestricted use, result requirements, administrative controls, should be eliminated from the final rule. in significant environmental impacts control of effluents, and conditions to The Commission reconsidered the need not previously reviewed, or result in protect the environment). Thus, there for the remaining§ 50.59(e)(1) there no longer being reasonable will be a licensing basis appropriate to requirements and determined that assurance that adequate funds will be the activities undertaken using the placing them in § 50.82 would be more available for decommissioning § 50.59 process during appropriate. The Commission also (§ 50.82(a)(6)). Prior to the licensee's use decommissioning. By maintaining concluded that the requirement of the § 50.59 process to perform major certain requirements throughout the ensuring that no major decommissioning activities, the PSDAR decommissioning process, licensees will decommissioning activities occur that submittal and public information be able to use the existing § 50.59 would significantly increase process must be completed. The process to perform decommissioning decommissioning cost could be overly licensee is required to include a activities and thus provide comparable burdensome. Instead, an appropriate discussion that provides the reasons for assurance that protection of the public constraint would be to prohibit any health, safety, and the environment will concluding that the environmental decommissioning activities that result not be compromised.
impacts that might occur during in there no longer being reasonable decommissioning activities have already Issue 5-Environmental Impact assurance that adequate funds will be Considerations During the Initial Phase available for decommissioning. been considered in site-specific or of Decommissioning. However, the NRC needs to be aware of generic environmental impact Comments. Many commenters in changes in decommissioning activities statements, and to estimate the amount favor of the rule fully supported the that would result in significantly of funds necessary to complete environmental impact considerations increasing decommissioning costs and decommissioning (see§ 50.82(a)(4)). delineated in the proposed rule for the would require written notification of The licensee is also required to PSDAR submittal, with no mandatory such intended actions. The other submit a site-specific cost estimate ER or subsequent EA requirement. A paragraphs in § 50.59(e) were placed in within 2 years after permanent cessation few commenters suggested that no
§ 50.82(a) to ensure that they will be of operations. Use of decommissioning environmental impacts for considered as overall constraints on the trust funds are subject to the decommissioning need be addressed licensee's decommissioning activities, requirements (in§ 50.82(a)(8)) that further because the FGEIS for the 1988 rather than separately for each adequate funds will be available to decommissioning rule (NUREG-0586, contemplated activity as proposed in ultimately release the site and terminate August 1988) 1 and subsequent §50.59(e). the license. Moreover, the final rule environmental assessments (for various The purpose of retaining these requires the licensee to notify the NRC actual power reactor decommissioning
- requirements is to ensure that no in writing before performing any situations) demonstrate that decommissioning activities can occur decommissioning activity inconsistent decontamination and dismantlement do that result in: (1) Eliminating the not significantly affect the human 1 NUREG-0586. "Final Generic Environmental potential for unrestricted release, (2) environment and have beneficial effects Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear significant environmental impacts not Facilities,"" USNRC. August 1988. Copies are in restoring the site to an previously considered in EISs, and (3) available for inspection or copying for a fee from environmentally acceptable condition.
there no longer being reasonable the NRC Public Document Room 2120 L Street NW. A few commenters suggested that assurance that adequate funds will be (Lower Level). Washington. DC; the PDR's mailing address is Mail Stop LL-6. Washington. DC 20555- decommissioning should be considered available for decommissioning. The 0001; telephone (202) 634-3273; fax (202) 634- a categorical exclusion as defined in 10 basis for this final rule permitting the 3343. CFR 51.22. 50-SC-182
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Most of the commenters who were not At the license termination stage, the before allowing licensees to undertake in favor of the rule believed that the Commission must make decisions on major decommissioning activities may NRC should define decommissioning as the licensee-proposed actions described not allow enough time for adequate a major Federal action requiring an EA in the license termination plan. The public participation.
or EIS. They further indicated that a Commission must consider: Most commenters who did not favor generic environmental impact statement (1) The licensee's plan for assuring the rule believed that the public cannot substitute for a site-specific EA that adequate funds will be available for participatory role proposed was because the FGEIS does not consider all final site release, inadequate. These commenters stated possibilities. A few of these commenters (2) Radiation release criteria for that NRC should retain the possession-further stated that the proposed license termination, and only license amendment (POLA) and environmental impact consideration (3) The adequacy of the final survey decommissioning plan approval process is NRC's attempt to streamline required to verify that these release required in the current rule to truly the process for utilities and deregulate criteria have been met. enhance public participation. Public NRC current requirements. A few Therefore, the NRC has determined meetings were considered helpful, but commenters stated that the process that submittal of the license termination no substitute for an adjudicatory hearing outlined in the proposed rule abdicates plan should be treated as a license that includes the rights to discovery, to NRC's responsibility to protect the amendment. In addition, under 10 CFR present evidence, and to cross examine. health and safety of the workers, the part 51, an environmental assessment or Along these lines, a commenter stated public, the environment, and it also impact statement would be required at that a meeting does not afford citizens undermines citizen's due process. the time the license is amended. the level of institutional accountability Response. While the FGEIS (NUREG-- Following resolution of another ongoing necessary, given the dangers of 0586) 1 for the 1988 decommissioning NRC rulemaking activity that is environmental-toxic contamination rule concluded that only minor negative considering adoption of radiological inherent in reactor decommissioning environmental impacts would result release criteria, a categorical exclusion activities and that citizens must have a from decommissioning in addition to may be adopted that would eliminate substantive role in the decommissioning substantial positive environmental the requirement for an environmental process in order to clarify, negotiate, impacts, it did not address site-specific assessment or impact analysis, except in and protect their community's interest. situations that could differ from the the case of a restricted release of a site. A few commenters suggested that site-assumptions used in the FGEIS analysis. Issue 6---Public Participation. specific advisory boards (SSABs) should However, it is expected that any site Comment. Most commenters be established early in the supporting the rule commented on the decommissioning process and that impacts will be minor. Any site impact public participation aspects of the should be bounded by the impacts meaningful public involvement should proposed rule. They believed that the be required at every stage of the evaluated by previous applicable GEISs as well as any site-specific EIS. To participatory role given to the public decommissioning process, not only at was appropriate, excessive, or in need of the final termination stage. account for site-specific situations that may occur outside these environmental further clarification. Several questioned Response. As discussed previously, impact considerations, the final rule the need for expanded public initial decommissioning activities participation on matters of public health (dismantlement) are not significantly prohibits major decommissioning and safety because the NRC regulatory activities that could result in significant different from routine operational environmental impacts not previously framework already provides for such activities such as replacement or reviewed. The review process for the participation (e.g., license amendment refurbishment. Because of the PSDAR and the approval process for the process). These commenters also noted framework of regulatory provisions license termination plan requires that the purpose of the public meeting embodied in the licensing basis for the licensees to review the existing following the PSDAR submittal was not facility, these activities do not present documents and address any properly explained and that the final significant safety issues for which an discrepancies in their submittals. rule should clearly state that the NRC decision would be warranted. The environmental assessment meeting is intended for exchange of Therefore, it is appropriate that the conducted for this rulemaking relied on information only. Many commenters licensee be permitted to conduct these the FGEIS for the decommissioning rule indicated that the NRC should limit the activities without the need for a license (NUREG---0586, August 1988) 1 and scope of these meetings and hearings to amendment. However, the information determined that, insofar as the rule issues that are related to health and meetings will be beneficial in keeping would allow major decommissioning safety during the decommissioning the public informed of the licensee's activities (dismantlement) to proceed process. These commenters also decommissioning activities. Although without an environmental assessment, indicated that the supplementary the primary purpose of these meetings application of the rule will not have a information should include a clear is to inform the public of the licensee's significant impact on the environment. statement of the purpose and planned activities, the NRC will Although not required by NEPA, NRC participation guidelines for these consider public health and safety has required in this final rule that meetings and clearly identify NRC's role comments raised by the public during licensees indicate in the PSDAR the at these meetings (which should be the 90-day period before the licensee reasons for concluding that the planned significant). A comment stated that it is undertakes decommissioning activities. activities are bounded by the FGEIS and essential that adequate mechanisms be A more formal public participation previous site-specific environmental developed for addressing issues of process is appropriate at the termination impact statements. This requirement is concern raised by members of the public stage of decommissioning because the consistent with one of the primary goals and that, absent such closure, the final disposition of the site is of the PSDAR process, which is to meeting would only compound determined at that time. Under the promote public knowledge and provide frustrations felt by the interested public. current rule, the Commission issues an an opportunity to hear public views on Finally, there was a comment that the order permitting the reactor to be decommissioning activities before 90-day waiting period (after the decommissioned, based on the licensees commence decommissioning. submittal of the PSDAR to the NRC) approved decommissioning plan, which 50-SC-183
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION amends the license. NRC administrative licensees of shutdown plants (e.g., the licensee being permitted to use any procedures, in subpart G of 10 CFR part Yankee-Rowe and Trojan). Once the funding in excess of previously 2, now provide an opportunity for NRC has received the site-specific stipulated amounts. This could be persons to request a hearing regarding decommissioning cost estimate, a interpreted to mean that the NRC must the NRC's decision. A similar procedure licensee would have access to the approve the additional expenditures. If will be followed in the final rule for the balance of trust fu'nd monies for the this paragraph is retained, the intent of license termination plan once the remaining decommissioning activities. this "permitting" should be made clear.
licensee has permanently removed fuel Because the timing of the submittal of Expenditures made in accordance with from the site. However, the hearing will a site-specific cost estimate is within the the PSDAR and the decommissioning be less formal because it will follow the control of the licensee, the Commission cost estimate should not require any procedures in Subpart L of 10 CFR part believes that unwarranted restraints on additional NRC authorization.
- 2. The role of the SSABs will be access to funds are not imposed by the Response. The NRC's intent in the evaluated when the rulemaking final rule. proposed rule was not to use a formal regarding radiological release criteria for Comment b. The scope of approval mechanism for license termination is finalized. decommissioning-related activities that decommissioning expenditures once the Issue 7-Establishment and Use of the licensees may collect funds for should licensee submits its site-specific Decommissioning Trust Fund. include disposal of low-level waste decommissioning cost estimate. The Most of the comm enters on this issue generated during operations, final rule has been modified as were in favor of the rule. These maintenance and storage of spent fuel suggested by the commenter.
commenters requested greater flexibility after cessation of operations, costs to Comment d. More guidance should be in what costs can be included in the maintain an independent spent fuel provided regarding what constitutes a fund, such as disposal costs of storage installation, and non-radioactive decommissioning "planning" radioactive waste from plant operations, demolition or "greenfield." State Public expenditure. Changes in the proposed and greater flexibility in the use of the Service Commissions and the Federal rule regarding expenditure of funds trust funds prior to and during Energy Regulatory Commission have from the NRC Draft Policy Statement on decommissioning. Specific comments authorized funding for these activities use of decommissioning funds before that reflect the full range of comments in some cases because it is in the best decommissioning plan approval (59 FR on financial issues are: interests of the utilities' customers. The 5216; February 3, 1994), should be more Comment a. The proposed NRC regulation should not require fully explained. § 50.82(a)(7) proposes to regulate a segregation of these funds in separate Response. The term "planning" used licensee's use of, and rate of withdrawal accounts; restrictions on the withdrawal in § 50.82(a)(8l(ii) specifically means from, the decommissioning trust fund. of trust funds in the proposed rule could "paper" studies, not equipment While NRC oversight is warranted to lead utilities to create separate trust removal. Percentages are used in the ensure that decommissioning activities accounts for each nuclear facility final rule rather than specific dollar can be funded, regulating the rate of funding component (e.g., amounts, as used in the Draft Policy withdrawal from the trust fund may decommissioning, spent fuel Statement, to better allow for inflation unnecessarily impede the efficiency of a management, and greenfield). Finally, of costs in the future. Other changes to licensee's decommissioning activities. the rule should allow for the prudent the Draft Policy Statement are based on Because the NRC's generic estimates of and economic use, at the utility's the response to comments, developed decommissioning costs are substantially discretion, of decommissioning trust prior to this rulemaking activity, and lower than most recent site-specific cost funds during the years of normal plant presented in the section on the estimates, licensees would be operation even before end of life. "Resolution of Comments on the Draft constrained to withdraw small fractions Response. The NRC's authority is Policy Statement." of an unrealistically low estimate. limited to assuring that licensees Comment e. If a plant shuts down Response. Limiting initial adequately decommission their facilities early, not only will there be insufficient withdrawals to 23 percent of the generic with respect to cleanup and removal of funds to pay for planned cost estimate (using the§ 50.75 radioactive material prior to license decommissioning (because not all requirements), until the licensee has termination. Radiological activities that payments will have been made), but the submitted a site-specific go beyond the scope of actual cost of decommissioning can be decommissioning cost estimate, decommissioning, as defined in § 50.2, 2 to 3 times higher than planned. The preserves the integrity of the such as waste generated during NRC should require external funds in decommissioning trust accounts. The operations or demolition costs for the amount necessary to complete final rule permits licensees to withdraw "greenfield" restoration, are not decommissioning upfront. Moreover, up to 3 percent of the generic formula appropriate costs for inclusion in the the NRC does not have a procedure in amount for planning at any time during decommissioning cost estimate. Funds place for "replacing" a reactor licensee the decommissioning planning process, for interim spent fuel storage and that goes bankrupt. Finally, the NRC including planning that occurs while a maintenance are addressed in should specifically allow the total plant is still operating. This amount § 50.54(bb). financial approach to be made along the should be ample based on current The final rule does not prohibit lines of industry self-insurance. planning costs for licensees recently licensees from having separate sub- Response. The revised regulations undergoing decommissioning. Likewise, accounts for other activities in the preserve the integrity of the allowing withdrawals of 20 percent of decommissioning trust fund if decommissioning funds by tying the the generic amount for minimum amounts specified in the rule rate of expenditure to specific parts of decommissioning activities would allow are maintained for radiological the decommissioning process. At the funding of certain activities before decommissioning. same time they allow broad flexibility receipt of a site-specific cost estimate. Comment c. Section 50.82(a)(7)(ii) of once a licensee submits its site-specific This amount is consistent with costs of the proposed rule specifies that a site- decommissioning cost estimate. large component removal activities specific decommissioning cost estimate The issue of bankruptcy, as well as undertaken or contemplated by must be submitted to the NRC prior to the requirement for power reactor 50-SC-184
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION licensees to have the total amount of a notice of proposed rulemaking and decommissioning activities continue to decommissioning funds upfront, was solicitation of comment (July 20, 1995; be enveloped by the assessment of considered during the development of 60 FR 37374), the Commission environmental impacts in prior the current rule and found to be addressed the reasoning underlying the environmental reviews. Any activities adequately addressed in current proposed decommissioning process and not meeting the environmental criteria requirements. Bankruptcy does not allowed public review and comment on would require the licensee to file an necessarily mean that a power reactor that reasoning. application for amendment to the licensee will liquidate. To date, the The final rule includes a public notice license and a supplement to its NRC's experience with bankrupt power and meeting process, prompted by the environmental report under 10 CFR part reactor licensees has IJeen that they file licensee's submission of a report 51. Finally, the rule requires a formal under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy describing planned decommissioning license termination plan by the licensee.
Code for reorganization, not liquidation activities, to hear public views before The activities in the licensee's plan (e.g., Public Service Company of New the licensee undertakes major which do not meet the environmental Hampshire, El Paso Electric Company, decommissioning activi.ties. This criteria must be approved by the NRC by and Cajun Electric Cooperative). In process specifically provides that a license amendment that follows NRC these cases, bankrupt licensees have licensees may not begin major procedures for amendments, including continued to provide adequate funds for decommissioning activities until after applicable hearing rights (under either safe operation and decommissioning, they have submitted a PSDAR. The subpart L or subpart G of 10 CFR part even as bondholders and stockholders PSDAR will be made available to the 2, as specified in the rule) and the suffered losses that were often severe. public for written comment and a public preparation of environmental Because electric utilities typically meeting will be held to hear public assessments. provide an essential service in an views. Finally, the licensee is required The court perceived that the agency exclusive franchise area, the NRC staff to submit a license termination plan "approval" of the expenditure of funds believes that, even in the unlikely case before release of the site. The final rule from the decommissioning funds may of a power reactor licensee liquidating, specifies that the license termination be a basis for triggering both NEPA its service territory and obligations, plan be approved by the NRC through reviews and hearing rights (59 F3d at including those for decommissioning, the license amendment process. This 292-95). The final rule addresses this would revert to another entity without process provides the public with issue by providing generic guidance as direct NRC intervention. However, the hearing opportunities and ensures that to what expenditures can be made out NRC believes that with electric utility any hearing on that plan must be of the decommissioning fund for deregulation becomi:i;ig more likely, it completed prior to release of the site. decommissioning activities before may need to require additional This procedural framework assures that submittal of a site-specific cost estimate. decommissioning funding assurance for those citizens living near the site, The revised regulations use generic those licensees that are no longer able potentially for years or decades after the criteria for expenditures from the to collect full decommissioning costs in facility is shut down, will be provided decommissioning funds and do not rates or set their own rates. Thus, the with information regarding the require prior NRC approval of site-NRC proposed a rulemaking plan to, in licensee's planned decommissioning specific expenditures meeting the part, evaluate these developments in activities, have an opportunity to ask generic criteria (see § 50.82(a)(7)). These SECY-95-223 (September 1, 1995). questions regarding those activities at a new provisions specifically require Issue 8--Court decision. public meeting early in the process, and licensees to maintain sufficient funds Comment. Most commenters who have timely input into the decision to for release of the site and termination of were in favor of the rule indicated that release the site. the license. The licensee will have to the proposed rule did not conflict with In its decision, the court also also include an updated, site-specific the recent court decision regarding the specifically addressed a concern about analysis of remaining costs in the Yankee Rowe decommissioning decommissioning activities taking place license termination plan submittal. (Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. prior to any NEPA analysis (59 F.3d at In publishing this final rule, the NRG, 59 F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 1995)). Most 292-93). The final rule addresses this Commission has explained the rationale of the commenters who were not in issue in several respects. First, the final for the new decommissioning process, favor of the rule believed that the rule explicitly prohibits the licensee and has concluded that nothing in the proposed rule violated the court's from performing any major court decision dictates that the decision, or the spirit of the decision, decommissioning activity that results in Commission take a specific approach to regarding Yankee Rowe. significant environmental impacts not this issue or otherwise raises questions Response. A significant basis for the previously reviewed or forecloses concerning the validity of the approach court's decision was that it perceived possible unrestricted release of the site. adopted in this rulemaking. that the Commission had not adequately Also, when the licensee submits the Issue 9-Definitions. provided the reasoning for the NRC PSDAR, the licensee must specifically Comment. Regarding the definitions decision to allow decommissioning include a section discussing how the in § 50.2, a few commenters indicated activities before NRC approval of a planned activities fit within the that the definition of decommissioning licensee-submitted decommissioning envelope of environmental effects should include the concept of restricted plan (59 F.3d at 291...:292), a decision included in either the FGEIS (NUREG-- release to accommodate the proposed that the court considered to be a 0586, August 1988) 1 or the facility's rulemaking on acceptable residual modification of the Commission's site-specific environmental impact radioactive criteria for decommissioning regulations. The court statement. Moreover, the licensee must decommissioning. Several commenters noted that the Commission had failed to provide written notification if the noted that the definitions of "major provide either a rulemaking proceeding intended decommissioning activities are radioactive components" and "major or a hearing to address what the court inconsistent with the PSDAR. This decommissioning activities" were perceived to be NRC approvals of requirement helps ensure that, after unnecessary because the use of the licensee decommissioning activities (59 submittal and public comment on the existing § 50.59 process does not require F.3d at 291-92, 294-95). By initiation of PSDAR, any changes to the planned these considerations and is adequate to 50-SC-185
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION deal with decommissioning activities. pertaining to spent fuel management specifications will be developed for the However, if a definition of "major and storage. plant decommissioning phase, are radioactive components" must be kept, Response. This rulemaking is redundant and should be eliminated the definition should only be relevant to primarily directed toward the because§ 50.51(b)(2), the requirement to any components, that when dismantled procedural process for conduct activities in accordance with for shipment, contain greater than class decommissioning', with particular the specific part 50 license for the C waste. During decommissioning emphasis on premature closure facility, is sufficient to ensure activities, these waste disposals have situations. The modifications to effectiveness of the technical the greatest significance regarding technical requirements in the final rule specifications.
environmental impacts and adequate are based on a consequence analysis Response. As a reactor facility funding and are unrelated to the that either leads to elimination of the transitions from operational to physical size of components. requirement or extends its applicability decommissioning status, numerous Response. When the residual to decommissioning. changes to technical specifications are radiation criteria rule is final, the The modifications to the technical expected. The regulatory experience definition of decommissioning in § 50.2 requirements in the final rule are with revisions to the technical will address use of the restricted release. incomplete, as noted in the proposed specifications during this transition It is necessary to have definitions of rule, and as the information base period has entailed case-specific "major radioactive components" and continues to develop, additional evaluations of individual licensee "major decommissioning activities" to rulemaking actions to modify other requests. This has resulted in some clarify what decommissioning activities requirements will be conducted. In the inconsistency and variability of may not occur before the end of the 90- interim, licensees that no longer have expectations among shutdown reactor day waiting period. However, the fuel onsite may continue to request facility license requirements. This definition of "major radioactive exemption for specific requirements on revision provides the basis for components" in the final rule has been a case-by-case basis. The information developing a consistent framework for clarified so that large components, other base will address the storage of high- the development of "standardized than those named, are not prohibited density packaging of hot spent fuel in technical specifications for § 50.59 activities if they contain small the spent fuel pool with special decommissioning," as well as addresses amounts of radioactivity. consideration given to potential the uncertainty regarding the Dismantlement of these components is radiological consequences that could applicability of the existing regulation considered part of routine operating occur from loss of coolant in the pool. to permanently shutdown reactors. nuclear power reactor activities. Consideration for amending rule Section 50.51 specifically addresses the Issue 10--Modifications to Specific requirements is also being given to continued effectiveness of expired Technical Requirements. situations in which the fuel is in dry licenses and limitation of licensee Comment. Most of the commenters storage at an Independent Spent Fuel actions during any continued addressing this issue were in favor of Storage Installation (ISFSI). effectiveness period. As such, § 50.51 the rule and indicated that there should Comments on specific amendments does not, nor is it intended to, provide be additional elimination or were: specific license conditions and modification of requirements beyond Comment: Part 26. The final rule requirements. Section 50.36 addresses those presented in the proposed rule. should explicitly state that the fitness this issue. There was a spectrum of views on this for duty program does not apply to a Comment: Section 50.36a(a){1}. This issue: if a risk analysis were performed, permanently shut down and defueled requirement should be clarified and it would demonstrate that the proposed facility. If it must apply, then it should revised because radioactive waste rule would impose unnecessary burden apply to persons with unescorted access systems will have to be removed prior on NRC licensees and NRC resources to the fuel storage building or buildings to license termination, and the present without commensurate benefit to health containing equipment necessary for the wording appears to require that these and safety; appropriate technical safe storage and handling of spent fuel. systems be used and maintained. specifications for decommissioning Response. Consideration of this issue Moreover, temporary systems are would be for those activities for which is ongoing and may result in future typically used for effluent treatment and there is a significant hazard; the final rulemaking. However, until a decision is the rule should be modified to describe rule should include a discussion of the made, part 26 continues to be only those systems that are appropriate. logic (i.e., philosophy) in making applicable. Response. Section 50.36a(a)(l) is conforming revisions to part 50, Comment: Section 50.36. Criteria are intended to ensure that operating especially with respect to provisions needed to ensure that technical procedures for any waste treatment that did not change (e.g., §§ 50.55a, specifications are appropriate for the systems used to control effluents be 50.63, 50.72, and 50.73 applicability); conditions of a plant in a defueled state. maintained and used to existing release the study and survey by the NRC The four criteria specified in § 50.59(e) criteria, and not that the systems be concerning additional amendments for would be appropriate additional used and maintained when no longer non-applicability should be completed guidance. necessary. However, in response to the before this rule is finalized (one Response. Consideration will be given comment,§ 50.36a(a)(l) has been commenter); and that the proposed rule at a later time to the development of modified from the proposed rule so that appears geared to permanently shut additional guidance in the form of systems that are no longer necessary can down reactors with fuel onsite and does standardized technical specifications for be eliminated from compliance not differentiate among th(:) aspects that decommissioning. However, licensees requirements. apply once fuel is removed from the may apply for modification of their Comment: Section 50.47. A defueled site, and the rule should consider such technical specifications on a case-by- plant that has ceased operation warrants situations. Finally, one commenter case basis. a material reduction in the scope of its requested that environmental Comment: Section 50.36 (c){6) and (e}. offsite emergency planning qualifications remain in place for These requirements, which appear to requirements because the credibility of equipment important to safety imply that a new set of technical any offsite consequences are reduced. 50-SC-186
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Beyond the spent fuel pool, there is not when the operating license of one Comment: Section 50.54(w). Onsite sufficient source term to justify reactor has been terminated at a multi- property damage insurance for a facility emergency plans. This also pertains to reactor site. Section 50.51(b)(1) should undergoing decommissioning should be appendix E to part 50 and the be clarified to indicate that, at sites that eliminated or substantially modified.
requirements in § 50.54(t) concerning have an intervening reuse but do not Response. Consideration of the periodic review (frequency and scope) require decontamination to unrestricted potential radiological consequences of of the licensee's emergency release, decontamination would not hot, high-density packaged fuel in the preparedness program. need to occur until the end of the reuse spent fuel pool is still ongoing. Response. Consideration of the period. Modifications to this requirement, if potential radiological consequences of Response. Section 50.51(b) is not made, will be developed at a later time. hot, high-density packaged fuel in the redundant and will not be deleted. This Comment: Section 50.55a. Pertaining spent fuel pool is still ongoing. section in the final rule has been to codes and standards requirements, it Modifications to this requirement, if modified to clarify that an expired should be noted that §§ 50.55a (a), (f), made, will be developed at a later time. license for a nuclear reactor facility that and (g), inservice testing requirements, Comment: Section 50.48. While some has permanently ceased operations is do not apply to permanently defueled commenters agreed with the concept of not terminated until the Commission reactors because the plant is not a fire protection plan through the end of terminates it. This provision further operating and there is no need to apply decommissioning, one found the clarifies what conditions prevail under the regulation. proposed language overly restrictive, such circumstances. At a multi-reactor Response. No change is necessary vague, and ambiguous. This commenter site, each reactor is individually because these requirements provide stated that once the permanently licensed and actions are applied assurance that relevant portions of the removed spent fuel is certified to no accordingly. The final rule addressing facility are maintained functional or longer be a fire protection concern, an the radiological criteria for operational to adequate standards so industrial fire protection program could decommissioning will address the issue they are operationally capable. be adequate in most cases. Several other of restricted release options. Under the Comment: Section 50.63. The commenters noted that there are other proposed rule, such restrictions would requirements on the loss of all ac power ongoing NRC activities to improve have to ensure that members of the should not apply to decommissioning current fire protection regulations, and public, in the event the restrictions fail, because the potential for significant if actions are taken now, they should would not receive a dose in excess of radiological consequences is very low only be based on "significant hazards" 100 mrem per year. Unless the facility (there is a low probability of incident considerations. remained under license, individuals and long recovery time). Response. These modified having access to the facility would be Response. Consideration of the requirements have been coordinated considered members of the public. potential radiological consequences of with ongoing NRC activities regarding Comment: Section 50.54(g). The hot, high-density packaged fuel in the the improvement of fire protection antitrust law requirements for a reactor spent fuel pool is still ongoing. regulations. Also, see the response to that has permanently ceased operations Modifications to this requirement, if § 50.47 regarding spent fuel and permanently defueled should be made, will be developed at a later time. considerations. As presently configured, reevaluated for applicability. Comment: Section 50.65. Monitoring fire protection regulations apply only to Response. Section 50.54(g) simply maintenance for a permanently operating reactor facilities. The need for provides that the issuance of an NRC shutdown and defueled facility on any an ongoing fire protection program, license does not relieve the licensee of its structures, systems, or components albeit a modified one, remains after the from compliance with the antitrust laws (SSC) to levels required by the current facility has ceased reactor operations. specified in Section 105 of the Atomic maintenance rule is unnecessary. The final rule provides a performance- Energy Act, and that the NRC may take Permanently shutdown and defueled based program that can readily be appropriate action, including facilities can no longer experience the modified during the decommissioning suspension or revocation of the license, levels of mechanical stresses associated process to address residual hazards. if a court finds the licensee to have with an operating plant. Therefore, the Comment: Section 50.49. Electric violated any provisions of such antitrust industry interprets the proposed rule to equipment required for protection of laws. This subsection of the regulation mean that the maintenance program spent fuel outside the reactor does not is sufficiently flexible that there is no only applies to the safe storage of fuel. meet the definition of equipment reason to modify or delete it with The relative risks from a shutdown defined by§ 50.49(b). The discussion in respect to a facility that has ceased plant allow requirements in existing the final rule should be corrected to operations or is permanently defueled. technical specifications and other note that the environmental Comment: Paragraphs (k), (]}, and (m) administrative programs to provide qualifications regulations apply to of§ 50.54. The requirement for licensed adequate assurance for safe fuel storage. selected safety and non-safety related operators should be eliminated or Response. The maintenance rule, equipment as described in § 50.49(b). reduced because reactivity changes can § 50.65, requires that the performance or Response. No modifications to the only occur during the initial stages of condition of all structures, systems, and proposed rule are necessary. However, decommissioning in connection with components (SSCs) described in the environmental qualifications repositioning fuel assemblies in the § 50.65(b) be included in the scope of regulations apply to selected safety and spent fuel pool. With reference to the rule. Under the current rule, non-safety related equipment as § 50.54(i), the scope of the operator licensees are permitted flexibility in the described in § 50.49(b). requal_ification program and limitations goals that are established and the Comment: Section 50.51. Section on a licensee's freedom to modify it monitoring that is performed for these 50.51(b) should be deleted because it is should he reduced at facilities SSCs. The NRC agrees that the stresses redundant. If it is kept, the requirements undergoing decommissioning. on most SSCs in an operating plant are on the continuation of a license should Response. Consideration of these greater than those associated with a be clarified to affirm that other issues is ongoing and may result in shutdown and defueled plant. The final operating reactors would be unaffected future rulemaking. rule allows the scope to he limited to 50-SC-187
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION those SSCs associated with the storage, Most of the commenters in favor of Specific comments concerning the control, and maintenance of spent fuel the rule supported the decommissioning license termination plan were provided in a safe condition in a manner that requirements for termination of the by several commenters.
- provides reasonable assurance that the license in the proposed rule. However, Comment a. The timing of the license SSCs are capable of performing their several of these commenters stated that termination plan is not explicit in the intended function. approval of the license termination plan proposed rule, § 50.82(a)(8), and it is not Comment: Section 50.72. The should not require an amendment or clear whether the rule permits immediate notification requirements for opportunity for a hearing. They believe dismantlement activities before operating nuclear power reactors should that if the plan is made available for submittal or approval of the license not apply to permanently defueled public comment, existing regulations termination plan.
reactors or, if applicable, should be provide ample opportunity for public Response. The final rule permits significantly modified. Regarding participation and the AEA does not dismantlement activities 90 days after
§ 50.72(a)(i), there should be no require a hearing. Another commenter PSDAR submittal unless the NRC requirement to use the Emergency noted that once the spent fuel is off the interposes an objection. The license Notification System or Emergency site, the hazard is reduced so there is no termination plan must be submitted Response Data Systems. safety, technical, or legal basis for NRC within 2 years of the licensee's expected Response. The NRC did not adopt this date of license termination (the date comment. Notification requirements for approval of a detailed decommissioning plan or PSDAR. A commenter pointed specified in the PSDAR or supplement).
events such as abnormal releases and Comment b. The NRC does not overexposures are examples of required out that the use of the proposed § 50.59, which includes the four criteria explain or support the need for the reports that are necessary. elements of the plan, discussed in Comment: Section 50.111. Criminal (§ 50.59(e)), addresses the unique circumstances associated with the proposed § 50.82(a)(8)(ii) (A)-(G). The penalties should not be imposed for current rule, under§ 50.82(d), simply decommissioning activities because decommissioning activities. If some activities do not satisfy the requirements requires updated, detailed plans before they are not so important to public the start of decommissioning. health and safety that licensees need be of§ 50.59 and a license amendment is subject to them. Decommissioning required, interested parties would have Response. The final rule permits activities for reactor licensees should an opportunity to request a hearing. The major decommissioning activities not be treated any differently than for approval of the plan by amendment and (dismantlement) to be performed using other radioactive material licensees. the opportunity for a hearing are not for the § 50.59 process. Because a Response. The Commission believes reasons of health and safety; moreover, decommissioning plan is no longer that certain actions are essential in any interested party could always required, the requirements for the initiating the decommissioning process petition for a hearing under§ 2.206. license termination plan are less (e.g., certifying to permanent cessation Another commenter made similar complex than those that are currently of operation and permanent removal of comments and went even further in required for a decommissioning plan. fuel from the reactor vessel, and stating that if standards for radioactive The license termination plan provides submitting a PSDAR) and should, release are clear, meeting the objective documentation on the remaining therefore, be treated as substantive with of terminating the license should be activities necessary to terminate the respect to the criminal penalty easily demonstrated without the need license and includes consideration of provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. for approval of a plan or license remediation aspects that could involve Decommissioning actions, when amendment; and that the plan should be license termination under either initiated improperly, have a potential available to the NRC for information unrestricted or restricted release for significant consequences regarding conditions (once the rulemaking on only. health, safety, and the environment. acceptable residual release criteria is Response. The requirement for final). The site characterization, Willful violations of, attempted submittal of a termination plan is violations of, or conspiracy to violate, description of the remaining retained in the final rule because the dismantlement activities and plans for
§ 50.82 would, therefore, be a matter of NRC must make decisions, required in significant concern to the NRC. Thus, site remediation are necessary for the the current rule on the NRC to be sure that the licensee will the NRC is retaining the addition of decommissioning plan, regarding (1) the § 50.82 to the list of regulations to have adequate funds to complete licensee's plan for assuring that decommissioning and that the which criminal sanctions apply. adequate funds will be _available for Comment: Section 140.11. Concerning appropriate actions will be completed Price Anderson financial protection, final site release; (2) radiation release by the licensee to ensure that the public permanently shutdown and defueled criteria for license termination, and (3) health and safety will be protected. The facility licensees should be permitted to adequacy of the final survey required to language of§ 50.82(8)(a)(ii) (B) and (F) withdraw from the secondary financial verify that these release criteria have in the proposed rule, now protection layer, and single units should been met. A public meeting is § 50.82(a)(9)(ii) (B) and (F) in the final be given a reduction in the primary considered necessary at the license rule, has been changed to more clearly level of coverage (e.g., $100,000,000). termination stage to inform the public reflect the intent of these requirements.
Response. Consideration of the about the licensee's proposed Thus, element (A) now requires potential radiological consequences of termination activities and to provide an identification of remaining hot, high-density packaged fuel in the opportunity for public comment on dismantlement activities, and element spent fuel pool is still ongoing. those proposed activities. The NRC has (F) now requires an updated site-Modifications to this requirement, if also made the determination that license specific estimate of remaining made, will be developed at a later time, termination is an action of sufficient decommissioning costs. as will considerations of fuel stored in significance as to warrant an Comment c. One commenter an ISFSI. opportunity for a public hearing on questioned how multiple sites will be Issue 10-Termination of License NRC's decision regarding the licensee's addressed. Another commenter stated Requirements. proposed termination activities. that a single license termination plan 50-SC-188
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION should be encouraged for multi-reactor subpart L applicability into§§ 2.700 and that the first sentence of the first sites. 2.1201 are unnecessary because the rule paragraph of§ 51.53(b) should be Response. Reactors at a multi-reactor already addresses these considerations. deleted to be consistent with the site are individually licensed and Comment. Many commenters concept that "a license amendment licensing actions are applied to the expressed confusion on when a subpart authorizing decommissioning activities" individual licenses. A licensee would L or subpart G hedring would be is no longer required. Revised wording not be prohibited from submitting a appropriate. One commenter noted that should begin with "each applicant for a single license termination plan for the once fuel is out of the reactor vessel and license amendment approving a license multi-reactor site, but the NRC would in dry storage, there is no difference termination plan or decommissioning address terminating each license between storage on or off site and that plan." Another commenter stated that separately. reference to the subpart G hearing § 51.53 should be revised to reflect the Issue 11-License Termination: should be deleted. Another commenter fact that the proposed rule, if adopted, Additional comments. wanted a clarification of what is meant would not require an amendment that Comment. A commenter stated that by removing fuel from the site (i.e., authorizes the conduct of the need for a hearing when the licensee under a part 72 license). Another decommissioning activities, because submits the license termination plan for commenter suggested that the wording neither the existing nor the proposed approval should be reconsidered. If the to § 2.1201(a)(3) be clarified concerning decommissioning process requires a licensee meets the requirements of the permanent removal of fuel from the site license amendment to approve a termination plan and applicable to an authorized facility. One decommissioning plan. Therefore the regulations, there would be no issues to commenter inquired as to whether a first paragraph of this section should be adjudicate. Another commenter stated license could be terminated if the reworded as "[E)ach applicant for that, concerning the subpart L licensee removed the fuel to an onsite license termination upon submittal of proceedings, the NRC should issue a ISFSI. the license termination plan under clear statement of policy to eliminate Response. The final rule clearly § 50.82 of this chapter either for the potential for significant litigation. indicates that once the fuel is removed unrestricted use or based on continuing Several commenters stated that if from the licensed part 50 facility the use restrictions applicable to the site, subpart L is to be used for hearings, it power reactor facility can be treated as * *
- shall submit* * *"Asimilar appears necessary to change the title of a materials facility where a subpart L change was stated to be needed in subpart L to include Part 50 licensees. hearing is appropriate. If fuel remains at § 51.95 for the same reasons. Finally, a Finally, a commenter stated that the the facility, a subpart G hearing is commenter noted that § 51.53(b) as well applicability of Subpart L hearings appropriate. If the fuel is in an ISFSI, as § 51.95(b) refer to "applicants * *
- should be incorporated into§ 2.700 as that part of the affected site is regulated for a utilization facility," which does well as § 2.1201. under a part 72 license and would no not seem to be an element of the Response. With respect to the longer be regulated under the part 50 proposed rule and should be deleted; termination plan, the Commission license. The wording in§ 2.1201(a)(3) also, § 51.95(b) does not mention recognizes that ongoing rulemaking has been changed to "removal of fuel approval of a license amendment for proceedings may result in establishing from the part 50 facility," rather than license termination or a criteria for the restricted release of sites. "from the site," and means either decommissioning plan, which is an Even if a hearing is not legally removal offsite to an authorized facility omission and should be consistent with mandated at the termination stage as or to an onsite facility (ISFSI) not under § 51.53(b).
argued by some commenters, the the part 50 license. Response. No change was made to Commission views it as appropriate to Comment. Many commenters did not this section because the non-power use the amendment process for approval see the need for an environmental reactor facilitie's are still required to of termination plans, including the review at the license termination stage, submit a decommissioning plan. For associated opportunity for a hearing, to and one suggested that it be considered non-power reactors, the current rule allow public participation on the a categorical exclusion. Another remains essentially unchanged and specific actions required for license commenter stated that if there were to requires submittal of a decommissioning termination. In particular, the be an environmental review, its scope plan that is approved through license Commission has determined that, if a should be restricted to whether the amendment. The non-power reactor hearing is requested on the termination licensee's controls and methods for licensee must also submit an plan, the hearing must be completed mitigation of radiation will meet the appropriate supplemental before release of the site. This action standards adopted in § 20.1405 of the environmental report and the NRC must will help ensure meaningful public proposed residual radiation criteria rule. do an EA as part of the input on any proposal for restricted Response. At the license termination decommissioning plan approval release of the site. Given that a lengthy stage, an environmental assessment or process. period (up to 60 years) may pass impact statement will be required when Comment. Most of the commenters between the PSDAR stage and the the license is amended. Following who were not in favor of the rule termination stage, and given that final resolution of another ongoing NRC supported the license termination phase release criteria are still being developed rulemaking activity that is considering requirements but believe that these that may include restricted release of a adoption of radiological release criteria, requirements were not timely and site, the Commission views a license a categorical exclusion may be adopted should be implemented in some manner amendment process as appropriate, that would eliminate the requirement at the initiation phase of along with the associated opportunity for an environmental assessment or decommissioning. for a hearing, whether or not such impact analysis, except in the case of a Response. During the initial phase of hearings are mandated by legislation. restricted release of a site. decommissioning, the requirements in Finally, the changes proposed by the Comment. A few comments addressed the final rule are designed to provide commenters concerning the change of proposed changes to§ 51.53 concerning oversight commensurate with the level title of subpart L to include part 50 requirements for environmental impact of safety concerns experienced in licensees and the incorporation of considerations. One commenter stated decommissioning, while providing 50-SC-189
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION additional opportunity for public the POLA the NRC would eliminate the immediately dismantle, except for comment on the licensee's proposed amendment process that expressly extenuating circumstances, and are not activities. The final rule requirements provides for State consultation permitted a storage period (because are based on NRC's experience with (§ 50.91(b)) and that no subpart G there is no significant health, safety or licensees' use of the § 50.59 process hearing process would occur that would environmental reason for delay-see during operations and consideration of allow for discovery by parties to the FGEIS, NUREG 0586). 1 the types of activities that licensees proceeding and provide a mechanism Issue 14-"Grandfathering" would undertake during the for intervention. The State commenter Considerations.
decommissioning process. Where held that the proposed rule delays the Comment. There were several appropriate, licensing requirements are need for amendment to the license commenters who were concerned that continued through decommissioning termination stage when it is too late; it the proposed rule did not significantly and the NRC is informed of each is needed before major address nor provide necessary guidance licensee's planned decommissioning decommissioning activities are for "grandfathering" issues. Specific activities. (Additional discussion can be undertaken. Moreover, at the license comments in this area were that found in the response to Comment 5). termination stage, only a subpart L recognition should be given to those Issue 12-Regulatory Guides. hearing is proposed (no discovery). plants whose decommissioning plans Comment. Several commenters Finally, a few commenters asked why have been approved on a case-by-case requested regulatory guidance in the non-power reactors, which are less basis; that if existing facilities are form of regulatory guides. These hazardous facilities (smaller and less grandfathered from any part of the requests pertained to a standard format contaminated), can still request a POLA proposed rule, it should clearly identify and content for the PSDAR and license and still require decommissioning plan this; that the proposed rule does not termination plan as well as to transition approval while power reactors no longer adequately implement the guidance for licensees who are shut have this option or requirement. grandfathering option because the down and choose to adopt the new current§ 50.82 would disappear from process. Additional guidance was also Response. If fuel is removed from the the rule and no explicit provisions requested for a regulatory guide that licensed part 50 facility, the activities would exist to rely on. It is suggested dealt with the decommissioning undertaken during decommissioning are that the NRC keep the old provision as process, such as a revision to Regulatory more like the kinds of activities well as an applicable alternative and; Guide 1.86, "Termination of Operating undertaken at a typical materials facility that for grandfathering, an Licenses for Nuclear Reactors," that where the subpart L process applies. implementation provision should be would include such topics as the The final rule requires that certain added to the rule in a fashion similar to objective and implementation aspects of procedures be satisfied before a licensee § 20.1008. Several commenters also public meeting and hearings, guidance can perform major decommissioning noted that guidance needs to be given to on issues the NRC would consider in activities. These procedures include those licensees who are in various not giving negative consent approval to requiring a PSDAR submittal, aspects of decommissioning based on the PSDAR after the 90-day waiting conducting a public meeting, and the current rule requirements and wish period, guidance on interpretation and allowing a specified time period for to switch to the proposed rule development of technical rule NRC review of the licensee's intended requirements. requirements, and guidance, on the actions. Other final rule requirements Response. The Commission has particulars of "grandfathering." prohibit the licensee from performing reconsidered the issue of Additionally, several commenters any major decommissioning activity "grandfathering" and modified the requested additional financial guidance, that could result in significant language in the final rule to provide through a regulatory guide, on the environmental impacts not previously more specific guidance for nuclear development and use of the reviewed or foreclose the release of the power reactor licensees whose facilities decommissioning trust fund. site for unrestricted use. Written are currently at certain stages of Response. The NRC intends to issue notification to the NRC is required for decommissioning. The Commission has regulatory guidance on the initial phase licensee decommissioning activities that decided to eliminate the provision in of decommissioning. Guidance on the are inconsistent with those described in the proposed rule that would give those standard format and content of the the PSDAR, including significant licensees that have an NRC approved PSDAR will be issued after the final rule changes in decommissioning costs. decommissioning plan, before the date is published. Other guidance on the Finally, the final rule extends certain when a final rule became effective, the license termination phase is also being regulatory requirements to option of either complying with the developed. decommissioning. Thus, licensee final rule requirements or continuing Issue 13-Elimination of the activities that would require approval with the requirements of the currently Possession-only License Amendment under a POLA are no longer necessary. existing rule. All licensees will be (POLA). The affected State(s) will be notified required to comply with the Comment. Generally, commenters in about the public information meeting as decommissioning procedures specified favor of the rule agreed with eliminating well as consulted on the licensee's in the provisions of the final rule, when the POLA. Objections to POLA planned decommissioning activities by it becomes effective. The final rule elimination from other commenters the NRC prior to the public meeting. addresses the process for converting were that distinct categories between The final rule requires that a copy of the from the existing rule requirements to reactor operation and cessation of PSDAR and any written notification of those in the final rule for those nuclear operation should be maintained and inconsistent PSDAR activities be sent to power reactor licensees whose facilities that eliminating the POLA process the affected State(s). In response to the are already at certain stages of would eliminate a hearing opportunity comment concerning why non-power decommissioning. prior to reactor decommissioning. reactors are still given the option of For power reactor licensees who, Reflecting the views of many submitting a POLA and still require a before the effective date of this final commenters against POLA elimination, decommissioning plan, it is noted that rule, either submitted a a State commenter said that by deleting such reactors are required to decommissioning plan for approval or 50-SC-190
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION possess an approved plan, the plan will analysis does not accomplish the storage of the reactor facility to be be considered as the PSDAR submittal objective of ensuring that all regulatory longer than 60 years and does the 60-and the licensee will be required to burdens are needed, justified, and year completion date for perform decommissioning in minimal. decommissioning specified in the conformance with these final rule Response. The regulatory analysis did current rule consider storage of fuel in requirements. However, for power evaluate the alterdatives to the proposed an ISFSI. One commenter stressed that reactor licensees who are involved in new regulatory requirements. The spent fuel should not be separated from subpart G hearings of 10 CFR part 2, license termination plan is not a new any of the phases of decommissioning conversion to the new rule will not be requirement because, under the existing because this is a piecemeal approach permitted until the hearing process is rule, licensees are required to submit a and inappropriate. Another commenter completed. The public meeting and 90- proposed decommissioning plan for stated that the licensee should be day hold on decommissioning activities approval within 2 years of permanent required to maintain capability to required in § 50.82(a) (4)(ii) and (5) will shutdown. Currently, licensees who handle the fuel for dry cask storage.
not apply. Those licensees will be plan to delay decommissioning by Response. The primary considerations subject to any orders arising from these including a period of storage must of the proposed rule were procedural, subpart G hearings, absent any orders submit a final decommissioning plan for with emphasis on the issue of premature from the Commission. approval before starting closure. Other aspects of the existing For nuclear power reactor facility decommissioning. Current NRC policy rule were unchanged. A 60-year period licensees whose licenses have been is to approve the decommissioning plan for completion of decommissioning is modified, before the effective date of by license amendment. Because the still imposed, subject to other this rule, to allow possession but not proposed rule would permit the licensee considerations delineated in the current operation of the facility, the use of the § 50.59 process to perform rule requirements. The existing rule, as certifications required in § 50.82(a)(l) major dismantlement activities, the well as the proposed rule, consider the will be considered to have been license termination plan is less complex than a decommissioning plan and storage and maintenance of spent fuel as submitted. an operational consideration and With regard to extending current rule covers the remainder of activities requiring completion to terminate the provide separate part 50 requirements requirements for "grandfathering" for this purpose. Regarding maintaining considerations, no current rule license, other than dismantlement activities. The changes adopted in the the capability to handle the fuel for dry requirements need be .retained because the "grandfathering" provision in the rulemaking primarily provide additional cask storage, these requirements are
- proposed rule has been eliminated in flexibility to licensees that reduces maintained in 10 CFR part 72.
the final rule. The final rule covers burden without reducing safety by Comment. Several commenters noted conversion from the existing allowing licensees to undertake the that the requirements of this proposed requirements for approval of a majority of decommissioning activities rule and the proposed residual submitted or approved without first obtaining NRC approval. radiological criteria rule should be decommissioning plan, as described Comment. Several commenters coordinated to avoid redundancy. above, and is specific to existing wanted the option of entombment to be Response. The two rules will be licensee decommissioning plan allowed because restricted release will coordinated. situations. be allowed when the residual radiation Comment. A few commenters noted Issue 15-Miscellaneous Comments. criteria rule is final. Aside from the that a complete site characterization Comment. Several commenters stated difficulty of disposal, the money not should be included at the initiation of that the backfit rule, § 50.109, should spent on LLW burial is substantial. The decommissioning activities and that apply to decommissioning because a interest on this money would be more mandatory site radiological surveys proper reading of the intent of that rule than adequate to provide for the should be required before issuing a new should cover rulemaking dealing with maintenance and surveillance required license to establish background decommissioning. Otherwise, additional for the entombment option. The public, conditions. requirements could be imposed without including local communities, may be interested in not transporting waste Response. These considerations are a benefit cost analysis. being addressed during finalization of Response. The Commission has across state boundaries and in keeping the residual radiological criteria rule. concluded that the provisions addressed funds that would otherwise be spent on in this rulemaking do not involve a disposal within the community. Comment. Finally, several backfit because they address only Response. The issue of entombment commenters requested that the NRC reactors that have permanently ceased was not addressed in this rule. The NRC consider the impacts of the proposed operations and § 50.109 only applies to position on entombment is the same as "safeguards for nuclear fuel or high design, construction and operation of a in the current rule. Entombment would level radioactive waste" rule (60 FR facility. These regulations are primarily only be permitted for very special 42079; August 15, 1995) (which affects procedural in nature and, to the extent circumstances but would involve a parts 60, 72, 73, and 75) on this rule they address nonprocedural matters, continued license on a case-by-case when that proposed rule is issued in they are a codification of existing basis. The concept of restricted release final form. process. . included in the proposed rule on Response. This rule is primarily Comment. A few commenters noted residual radiation criteria would involve directed toward the procedural that the regulatory analysis for the termination of the license with requirements necessary for power proposed rule did not evaluate the restrictions in place to limit the use of reactor decommissionings. Therefore, alternatives to the proposed new the facility by the public, but certain the requirements imposed by this rule regulatory requirements and existing radiological criteria for restricted release can be treated independently from the requirements do not require a license would have to be met. other "safeguards" rule under termination plan or a license Comment. Several individual development. That rule, when final, amendment to approve a license commenters wanted to know whether may modify some of the technical termination plan. The regulatory NRC rules allow the optional period of requirements imposed by this final rule. 50-SC-191
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Resolution of Comments on the Draft without waiting 60 days for NRC Response. This final rule addresses Policy Statement approval. Provisions should be in~luded the process that licensees are to use for for decommissioning nonradioactive post-shutdown decommi~si?ning On February 3, 1994 (59 FR 5216), the structures associated with the reactor activities, as well as the hm1ts on the NRC published in the Federal Register (Commenters 1 an,d 4). amounts to be withdrawn from a draft policy statement and Response. The policy statement and decommissioning trust funds.
accompanying criteria relating ~o J?O"'.er this rule were not intended to address reactor licensee use of decomm1ss10mng By permitting a lJce1:1see to_p~~form this issue. This issue is being addressed certain decommiss10nmg achv1hes and trust funds before NRC approval of separately (see SECY 95-223; September licensees' decommissioning plans. The to withdraw funds for those activities 1, 1995). As provided in 10 CFR 50.75, through use of the PSDAR submittal proposed rulemaking to amen~ t~e . financial assurance for procedural aspects of decomm1ss10nmg process required in the final !ule will decommissioning includes the cost of allow the licensee to reduce its overall (60 FR 2210; July 20, 1995) codifie? the disposal of LLW associated with rea~t?r position embodied in the draft pohcy decommissioning costs by taking decommissioning. If a temporary fac1hty advantage of lower low-~eve~ radioac~ive statement. Based on the NRC's is built to store LLW under the Part 50 resolution of comments on the proposed waste disposal costs. This will b~nefit reactor license, the trust agreement the licensee and its ratepayers without rule and incorporated into this final should have been structured to include rule, the criteria in the draft policy adversely affecting public health and these costs. Although the NRC safety. statement have been modified. No final definition of decommissioning excludes policy statement will be issue?. _Other* Comment 3. The NRC should develop interim storage of spent reactor fuel, a a similar policy for operating plants and changes in the final rule pertammg to licensee is required to provide for the licensee use of decommissioning trust should allow licensees to withdraw cost of interim spent fuel storage under decommissioning trust funds to dispose funds were discussed earlier in the 10 CFR 50.54(bb). section on Response to Comments. of structures and equipment no longer With respect to the issue of waiving being used for operating plants The NRC received comments on the the 60-day NRC approval period for draft policy statement from th~ . (Commenters 7, 8 (by reference), and withdrawals to pay for LLW shipments, 14). following individuals or orgamzat10ns: this final rule eliminates the procedure
- 1. Michigan Department of Commerce to which this comment referred. Footnote 2 of the policy statement
- 2. Citizens Awareness Network Comment 2. The NRC should not should be revised to clarify that the
- 3. Mary P. Sinclair allow decommissioning trust fund policy statement does not apply "to
- 4. Detroit Edison Company withdrawals before an environmental licensee withdrawals from
- 5. Committee for a Safe Energy Future assessment is performed while the decommissioning funds for operating
- 6. Jon Block reactor licensee has a possession-only plants" rather than stating that t~,e
- 7. Nuclear Energy Institute license because: (1) It will allow large- policy statement does not apply to
- 8. Yankee Atomic Electric Company scale decommissioning activities licensees with operating nuclear
- 9. Virginia Power Company without a resident NRC inspector on- reactors" (Commenter 11).
- 10. New England Coalition on Nuclear site during the removal of irradiated Response. The NRC has concluded Pollution components; (2) it is inconsistent with that allowing decommissioning trust
- 11. Winston & Strawn the mandate of the NRC, which is to fund withdrawals for disposals by
- 12. Consolidated Edison Company implement a submitted, reviewed, nuclear power plants that continue to
- 13. Maryland Department of the publicly evaluated, and approved operate is not warranted. T~ese Environment decommissioning plan before large-scale activities are more appropriately
- 14. TU Electric Company decommissioning activities begin; (3) considered operating activities and The public interest group, individual health and safety of the workers and the should be financed in that way.
commenters, and one State oppose public can not be adequately served by Footnote 2 is not included in this allowing any withdrawals from the experimental process of the final rule. decommissioning trust funds before the component removal process, and (4) NRC approves a licensee's Comment 4. The policy statement existing NRC regulations sta!e ~hat a may become obsolete if the l;lR~ a?opts decommissioning plan, a procedure that licensee may only conduct hm1ted this final rule has discontinued. The a new definition of decomm1ss10mng as activities prior to approval of the proposed on February 2, 1994 (59 FR other commenters generally supported decommissioning plan (e.g., the draft policy statement, although they 4868). This definition states, decontamination, minor component "Decommissioning means to remove a disagreed with certain provi~ions or.. disassembly, shipment and storage of took issue with the need for 1t. Specific facility or site safely from service and spent fuel). Reasonable interpretation of reduce residual radioactivity to a level comments and observations, and the the rules does not require expansion of NRC analysis of arid response to them, that permits use of the pr~per~y for 10 CFR 50.59 and/or activities permitted unrestricted use and termmahon of the are discussed below. under a license (Commenters 2, 3, 5, 6, license, or (2) release of the property Specific Comments and 10). under restricted conditions and Comment 1. The trust agreements may There could be insufficient financial termination of the license." To avoid need to be modified to include low-level resources remaining to decommission obsolescence of the policy statement as Nuclear Power Plants thus, creating a a result of changes in the definition of radioactive waste storage and disposal potential burden on the State and, serious (LLW) and interim spent fuel storage as decommissioning, the commenters impairment of radioactive material licensee's recommend replacing all references to allowable decommissioning costs when ability to complete decommissioning. Most these costs are incurred as part of existing decommissioning 'certifications and release of the site for unrestricted use additional, temporary facilities at funding plans' are generally acknowledged with "decommissioning of the site particular sites. LLW disposal cos~s, in by the NRC to already be severely consistent with the definition in§ 50.2" particular, should be able to be paid UNDERFUNDED. This rule would exacerbate (Commenters 7, 8 (by reference), and from the decommissioning waste fund that situation (Commenter 13). 11). ; 50-SC-192
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Response. The NRG agrees with this factoring the first three criteria into as permanently shut down plants.
recommendation and has changed this criterion 4. However, issuance of the Permission from the NRG to use these final rule accordingly. policy statement based on criterion 4 (or funds in de minimis amounts is Comment 5. Two commenters the other criteria) is premature in that unnecessary as long as the amount and disagree with a statement in the draft the NRG is curren,tly considering more purpose of the withdrawal is policy statement, "If a licensee of a definitive guidance on acceptable pre- documented. permanently shut down facility spends p Ian-approval decommissioning With respect to Commenter 13's decommissioning trust funds on activities (Commenter 11). concerns, the NRG has specified a legitimate decommissioning activities, Response. The NRC agrees that some maximum limit for de minimis the timing of these expenditures, either confusion may have arisen by including withdrawals. If a licensee were to before or after NRC approves a criterion 4 in the policy statement. The exceed this limit or use funds for non-licensee's decommissioning plan, NRG included this criterion to provide decommissioning purposes, it would be should not adversely affect public guidance on the allowed subject to NRG enforcement action. health and safety, provided adequate decommissioning activities as opposed Comment 8. "* *
- The NRG has funds are maintained to restore the to the use of decommissioning trust neither articulated the reasons why this facility to a safe storage configuration in funds for those activities. Criterion 4 is detailed level of oversight (discussed in case decommissioning activities are a quote from Commission guidance in the policy statement) is needed, nor has interrupted unexpectedly" (Commenter the SRM of January 14, 1993, and, to the NRG provided specific examples of 7's emphasis). The commenters state some degree, overlaps the other criteria potential waste and misuse of funds that that maintaining a viable SAFSTOR of the policy statement. The NRG has would warrant their proposed oversight option beyond plan approval should not removed criterion 4 as a separate * *
- Absent an appropriate be required for cases where another criterion in this final rule. justification for the implementation of option has been approved by NRG Comment 7. The "ancillary issue" in this policy statement, * *
- this policy (Commenters 7 and 8). the draft policy statement should be statement represents regulation without The draft policy statement misuses expanded to include a number of benefit (and that NRG concerns the term "SAFSTOR" to mean expenses that are paid out of expressed in the policy statement) are maintenance of a site in a safe storage decommissioning trusts by operating not tangible for decommissioning."
condition prior to receipt of plants well in advance of licensee Thus, the policy statement should not Decommissioning Plan approval and preparation and submission of the be issued (Commenter 9). commencement of decommissioning decommissioning plan. These expenses Also, "the draft policy statement rather than a specific decommissioning include, but are not limited to, trust provides no basis for the NRC's alternative defined in NRG regulations fees, investment manager fees, income conclusion that prior NRG review of (Commenters 11 and 14). taxes, and periodic site-specific studies pre-plan-approval decommissioning Response. Commenter 7 has (Commenters 7, 8 (by reference), 11, and fund expenditures should be required." misinterpreted the intent of this 14). The draft policy statement may satisfy statement. First, this part of the policy The policy statement should be the Commission's directive to the NRC statement was drafted to make the point revised to state specifically that if a staff to develop a policy without that any expenditures for licensee determines that it meets the including an approval mechanism decommissioning activities normally criteria for de minimis withdrawals, it (Commenter 11). viewed as necessary would not be The draft policy statement is not clear need not request permission from the detrimental to public health and safety, as to the purpose of the NRC review of NRG to use these funds (Commenter 8). notwithstanding the timing of these decommissioning expenditures before expenditures, unless they were large * *
- The section dealing with 'de decommissioning plan approval. The enough to prevent the licensee from minimis' withdrawals for developing the only reason for the review, given in the decommissioning plan also seems to be statement of policy, is to ensure the returning its facility to a safe storage outside the original intent for use of these configuration if the decommissioning funds. These withdrawals may seem to be a health and safety of the general public.
process were to go awry. This is not the minor portion of funds allocated for There are other regulatory mechanisms same as requiring a licensee to switch decommissioning, but it starts a process that for evaluating the activity for which the from DEGON (immediate would allow utilities to tap these funds, if funds are withdrawn without reviewing dismantlement) to SAFSTOR after the they can fit activities into the definition of the actual withdrawal from the fund. NRG has approved the licensee's decommissioning or simply request to use The expenditure of decommissioning decommissioning plan. these funds for other purposes * *
- Other trust funds for legitimate This final rule modifies use of the uses are unacceptable, even if they are decommissioning activities is an above-referenced criterion for subject to prior regulator approval economic and not a safety concern (Commenter 13).
decommissioning trust fund (Commenter 14). withdrawals. However, the rule corrects Response. The intent of the ancillary Response. Although the NRC did not any references to SAFSTOR when it issue was to allow de minimis include specific examples of waste and means to address the general ability of withdrawals from decommissioning misuse of funds in the policy statement, a licensee to return its reactor to safe trust funds of up to $5 million for as with any industrial process, costly storage while awaiting further decommissioning-related administrative mistakes can conceivably occur in decommissioning. and other expenses without prior NRC decommissioning. The NRC also Comment 6. Criterion 4 is redundant consent notwithstanding the operating disagrees that codifying of the other criteria (Commenters 7 and status of the plant. The final rule has decommissioning trust fund 8). At a minimum, the statement should changed this withdrawal amount to up withdrawals represents regulation indicate that items (c) and (d) of to 3 percent of the generic amount without benefit. The NRG has criterion 4 do not require NRC approval specified in§ 50.75(c). This withdrawal specifically promulgated before a licensee undertakes the amount is for purposes of planning for decommissioning requirements in 10 proposed activities (Commenter 8). decommissioning (paper studies) and CFR 50.82 that include licensee PSDAR Redundancies can be eliminated by pertains to licensees of operating as well submittal process that is intended for 50-SC-193
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION keeping the NRC and public informed of Comment 12. "The 'tacit consent' to maintain the status quo' could be the licensee's planned decommissioning approach for reviewing licensee construed inappropriately to require activities. The intent of the regulations expenditure plans is inappropriate" and that licensees include funding for that is to require licensees to maintain the unsupported by the reasons the NRC purpose in their decommissioning funds entire amount of funds needed for stated for its policy. By expressly * *
- If this criterion is retained, the decommissioning in a specified preserving the possibility that it would language regarding provisions for this assurance mechanism until the funds take action to prevent a fund contingency should be deleted from the are used for their intended withdrawal, the NRC blurs its asserted policy statement" (Commenter 11).
decommissioning activities. distinction between review and Response. This terminology has been The PSDAR is closely tied to a approval. Also, it is not clear that "tacit eliminated in this final rule. licensee's provision of assurance to fund consent" and "approval" are legally Comment 15. "It does not seem the decommissioning activities distinguishable for purposes of necessary that NRC approve requests for adequately. Without any NRC criteria determining whether the NRC is the 'withdrawal of decommissioning for expenditures before the PSDAR engaged in a "licensing action" that funds for early equipment removal, submittal process is completed, the could involve public participation and prior to approval of the utilities[') decommissioning trust fund could environmental review (Commenter 11). decommissioning plans. This does not become a shell and thus defeat the Response. The NRC does not use seem in concert with the intent of the purpose of NRC decommissioning "tacit consent" in this final rule. Thus, sample statement under Background funding assurance regulations. Because the concerns expressed in this comment '* *
- the fund trustee should only of the safety implications of inadequate should be assuaged. Telease funds upon certification that decommissioning funds, the NRC Comment 13. "Criterion 1 * *
- decommissioning is proceeding believes it has responsibility for should be revised to eliminate the pursuant to an NRC-approved plan'"
specifying withdrawal rates, provision that withdrawals must be for (Commenter 13). notwithstanding the reviews that rate activities 'that would necessarily occur Response. This final rule does not regulators may perform. under most reasonable continue the language in question. Comment 9. Trust fund withdrawals decommissioning scenarios."' This Comment 16. "* *
- This ruling may should also be permitted for early phrase adds nothing to the preceding be judged as an item of Compatibility decommissioning-related activities that, provision that the withdrawal must be (for Agreement States). Because although not themselves directly for "legitimate decommissioning Maryland regulations, policies, etc., are reducing radioactivity at the site, will activities." Because licensees may face expected to closely follow Federal rules significantly facilitate such activities decommissioning expenditures for and procedures, we would be forced to when they subsequently occur activities that are within the NRC's adopt and allow our licensees to use the (Commenters 11 and 12). definition of decommissioning but same principle" (Commenter 13).
Response. In this final rule, nonetheless unique to their plant(s), the Response. The NRC does not believe withdrawals for planning activities are proposed provision is inappropriately that this is an issue of State allowed before completion of the restrictive (Commenter 11). compatibility because this final rule PSDAR process. only applies to power reactor licensees, Comment 10. The NRC should clarify Criterion 1 is overly restrictive and burdensome* *
- If the NRC wants to which are exclusively NRC licensees.
footnote 2 to indicate that it applies to prevent activities that preclude release of the Summary of Changes in the Final Rule licensees of multi-unit sites. "So long as site for (un)restricted use or are not in usage of trust withdrawals is support of decommissioning efforts it should Based on the response to comments, identifiable with the shut down reactor require review of the activity itself through a few changes were made in the final and does not diminish decontamination any of the other available mechanisms such rule. Otherwise, the final rule funding subsequently available for as 10 CFR 50.59 or special rulemaking * *
- provisions are the same as those reactors which are continuing to The basic premise is that in the event that presented in the "background" section operate, there is no reason why multi- there are circumstances or conditions which under the section titled proposed reactor licensees should be treatecr* delay or preclude proceeding with the amendments. Specific changes made to decommissioning effort there will be funds differently than single-reactor licensees available to place the plant in a storage the proposed rule in the final rule are for purposes of this policy statement" condition until the event or circumstance is summarized as follows:
(Commenter 12). resolved. Thus, as long as the value of the (1) Section 50.2. The definition of Response. The NRC agrees with this fund does not fall below the regulatory "major radioactive components" has statement. However, footnote 2 is not required amount in effect at the time of the been clarified. included in this final rule. request the withdrawal should be allowed. (2) Section 50.36a(a)(l). The Comment 11. "If the NRC believes Thus, the only requirement should be that amendment has been changed to that NRC review and approval of pre- the utility document that [the] activity was a exclude systems that are no longer plan-approval decommissioning legitimate decommissioning activity and the necessary for compliance. expenditures is necessary, it should act expenditure was reasonable (Commenter 14). (3) Section 50.59. Proposed§ 50.59(e) through rulemaking rather than policy Response. The NRC did not mean to was eliminated. However, three of the
- *
- Since prior NRC review of imply that decommissioning activities proposed rule requirements contained decommissioning fund withdrawals is unique to one site would not be eligible in § 50.59(e) were moved to § 50.82(a) not currently required, if the NRC for early trust fund withdrawals. (6) and (7). Placing these requirements wishes to impose such a requirement, it However, because we agree that the in § 50.82 as overall constraints, rather should initiate rulemaking to revise its phrase, "legitimate decommissioning than specific requirements for each decommissioning regulations activities," is sufficient, the NRC has § 50.59 activity, required modification accordingly" (Commenter 11). eliminated the phrase from this final of the constraint that the Response. This final rule codifies rule. decommissioning activities not result in criteria for decommissioning trust fund Comment 14. "* *
- The explicit significantly increasing withdrawals. Thus, this commenter's characterization as a decommissioning decommissioning costs. Thus, the final concerns have been addressed. 'contingency' of the funding 'necessary rule (§ 50.82(a)(6)(iii)) prohibits 50-SC-194
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION decommissioning activities that would sentence of§ 51.53(b) has been rewritten existing data sources, gathering and result in there no longer being from that found in the proposed rule to maintaining the data needed and reasonable assurance that adequate correspond with the language found in completing and reviewing the collection funds will be available to complete § 51.95(b) of the proposed (and existing) of information. Send comments on any decommissioning. In addition, the final rule.
- aspect of this collection of information, rule requires in § 50.82(a)(7) that (11) To improve clarity, including suggestions for further changes from those specified in the § 50.82(a)(9)(ii) (B) and (F) have been reducing this burden, to the Information PSDAR that would result in rewritten. and Records Management Branch (T-6 significantly increasing F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory decommissioning costs require written Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability Commission, Washington, DC, 20555-notification to the NRC. The fourth requirement that the terms of the The Commission has determined 0001, or by Internet electronic mail to existing license not be violated was under the National Environmental BJSl@NRC.GOV; and to the Desk eliminated. The requirement to consider Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Officer, Office of Information and environmental impact in the PSDAR, Commission's regulations in subpart A Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202,
§ 50.82(a)(4) was modified to explicitly of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if (3150-0011), Office of Management and require the reasons for concluding that adopted, would not be a major Federal Budget, Washington, DC 20503. any environmental impacts will be action significantly affecting the quality Public Protection Notification bounded by existing analysis. of the human environment and (4) Section 50.71. Section 50.71(e)(4) therefore, an environmental impact The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, was revised to permit nuclear power statement is not required. The final rule and a person is not required to respond reactor licensees that have submitted clarifies current decommissioning to, a collection of information unless it the certifications required under requirements for nuclear power reactors displays a currently valid 0MB control § 50.82(a)(1) to update the FSAR every in 10 CFR Part 50 and presents a more number. 24-months. efficient, uniform, and understandable (5) Sections 50.82(a)(4)(i) and (6). The process. The Commission has analyzed Regulatory Analysis licensee is required to send a copy of the major environmental impacts the PSDAR and written notification of associated with decommissioning in the The NRC has prepared a regulatory departure from the PSDAR to the NRC Generic Environmental Impact analysis for this final rule. The analysis and affected State(s). Statement (GEIS), NUREG-0586, August qualitatively examines the costs and (6) Section 50.82(a)(8)(ii). The phrase 1988,1 published in conjunction with benefits of the alternatives considered "being permitted to use" was removed the Commission's final by the NRC. In the response to from this section to avoid any incorrect decommissioning rule (53 FR 24018; comments, the NRC concluded that only interpretation that the NRC must June 27, 1988). some minor changes to the draft explicitly approve decommissioning Insofar as this rule would allow major regulatory analysis were necessary, funding expenditures. decommissioning (dismantlement) to corresponding to some minor (7) Section 50.82. Specifies that once proceed without an environmental procedural changes in the final rule. the rule is effective, all power reactor assessment, the environmental impacts The regulatory analysis is available for licensees must comply with it. Power of this rule are within the scope of the inspection in the NRC Public Document reactor licensees that possess an prior GEIS. The environmental Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), approved plan as well as licensees that assessment for the final rule and finding Washington, DC 20555-0001. Single applied for plan approval before the rule of no significant impact on which this copies of the analysis may be obtained took effect would have the plan determination is based are available for from Dr. Carl Feldman, Office of considered a PSDAR submittal, and inspection and photocopying for a fee at Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. licensees would be permitted to perform the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, decommissioning activities in L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone accordance with § 50.82. However, for Washington, DC. Single copies of the (301) 415-6194. power reactor licensees who are environmental assessment and the involved in subpart G hearings of 10 finding of no significant impact are Regulatory Flexibility Certification CFR part 2, conversion to the new rule available from Carl Feldman, U.S. will not be permitted until the hearing In accordance with the Regulatory Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), process is completed and those Washington, DC 20555-0001, (301) 415-licensees will be subject to any orders the Commission certifies that this rule 6194. will not have a significant economic arising from these hearings absent any orders from the Commission. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement impact on a substantial number of small (8) Section 50.82(a)(1)(iii). Specifies This final rule amends information entities. The final rule modifies that once the rule is effective, power collection requirements that are subject requirements for timely reactor licensees whose licenses have to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 decommissioning of nuclear power been modified, before the effective date (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These plants. The companies that own these of this rule, to possess but not operate requirements were approved by the plants do not fall within the scope of the the facility, will be considered to have Office of Management and Budget, definition of small entities as given in submitted the certifications required in approval number 3150-0011. the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the § 50.82(a)(l). Because the rule will relax existing Small Business Size Standards (9) To improve clarity, the first information collection requirements, the promulgated in regulations issued by sentence in§ 2.1205(d)(l) has been public burden for this collection of the Small Business Administration (13 rewritten from that proposed to that information is expected to be decreased CFR Part 121). This discussion found in the existing regulation. hy 12,202 hours per licensee. This constitutes the analysis for the (10) To improve clarity and maintain reduction includes the time required for regulatory flexibility certification parallelism of requirements, the last reviewing instructions, searching requirement. 50-SC-195
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 61 FR 41303 tensioning systems of Class CC Fairness Act Published 8/8/96 components. Licensees will be required _
Effective 9/9/96 to incorporate Subsection IWE and In accordance with the Small Subsection IWL into their inservice Business Regulatory Enforcement inspection (ISI) program. Licensees will Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has 10 CFR Part 50 also be required to expedite
- determined that this action is not a implementation of the containment major rule and has verified this RIN 3150-AC93 examinations and to complete the determination with the Office of expedited examination in accordance Information and Regulatory Affairs, Codes and Standards for Nuclear with Subsection lWE and Subsection 0MB Power Plants; Subsection IWE and IWL within 5 years of the effective date Subsection IWL of this rule. Provisions have been - -
Backfit Analysis included that will prevent unnecessary The Commission has determined that AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory duplication of examinations between the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does not Commission. the expedited examination and.the apply to these final amendments, and ACTION: Final rule. routine 120-month ISI examinations. therefore, a backfit analysis has not been Subsection IWE and Subsection IWL prepared for this rule. The scope of the
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory have not been previously incorporated backfit provision in 10 CFR 50.109 is Commission (NRC) is amending its by reference into the NRC regulations.
limited to construction and operation of regulations to incorporate by reference
- The final rule specifies requirements to reactors. These final amendments would the 1992 Edition with the 1992 assure that the critical areas of
- only apply to reactors that have Addenda of Subsection IWE, containments are routinely inspected to permanently ceased operations and, as "Requirements for Class MC and detect and take corrective action for such, would not constitute backfits Metallic Liners of Class CC Components defects that could compromise a under 10 CFR 50.109. of Light-Water. Cooled Power Plants," containment's structural integrity.
and SubsectionlWL, "Requirements for List of Subjects EFFECTIVE DATE: September 9, 1996; The Class CC Concr_ete Components of Light-Water Cooled Power Plants," of Section* incorporation by reference of certain 10CFRPart2 . publications listed in the regulations is **. Administrative practice and XI, Division 1, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and approved by the Office of the Director procedure, Antitrust, Byproduct of the Office of the Federal Register as material, Classified information, Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code) with Environmental protection, Nuclear specified*modifications and a limitation.
- of September 9, 1996.
-Subsection IWE of the ASME Code FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
materials, Nuclear power plants and W. E. Norris, Division of Engineering
- reactors, Penalties, Sex discrimination, provides rules for inservice inspection, repair, and replacement of Class MC Technology, Office of Nuclear Source material, Special nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear material, Waste treatment and disposal. pressure retaining components and their integral attachments and of metallic Regulatory Commission, Washington, 10 CFR Part 50 shell and penetration liners of Class CC DC 20555, telephone (301) 415-6796.
Antitrust, Classified information, pressure retaining components and their SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The NRC Criminal penalties, Fire protection, integral attachments in light-water is amending its regulations to Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear cooled power plants. Subsecti.on IWL of incorporate by reference the 1992 power plants and reactors, Radiation the ASME Code provides rules for Edition with the 1992 Addenda of protection, Reactor siting criteria, inservice inspecUon and repair of the Subsection IWE and Subsection IWL to Reporting and recordkeeping reinforced concrete and the post- assure that the critical areas of requirements. 10 CFR Part 51 Administrative practice and procedure, Environmental impact statement, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. For reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR parts 2, 50, and 51. 50-SC-196
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
*cqntainments are routinely inspected to licensee design and licensing bases. the various stressors and degradation detect and take corrective action for GDC 16, "Containment design," requires mechanisms which act on it. The liners
.. defects that could compromise a the provision of reactor containment of concrete containments provide a leak-containment's structural integrity. The , and associated systems to establish an tight barrier. rate of occurrence of degradation in essentially leak-tightbarrier against the These requirements for minimum containments is increasing. Appendix J uncontrolled releAse of radioactivity design wall thicknesses and prestressing to 10 CFR part 50 requires a general into the environment and to ensure that . forces as provided in these industry visual inspection of the containment but the-containment design conditions . standards used to design co.ntainment does .not provide specific guidance on* important to safety are not exceeded for structures are reflected in license how to perform the necessary as long as required for postulated co~ditions, technical specifications, and containment examinations. This has accident conditions. licensee commitments (e.g., the Final resulted in a large variation with regard Criterion 53, "Provisions for Safety Analysis Report). to the performance and the.effectiveness containment testing and inspection,"* None of the .existing requirements, of containment examinations. The rate requires that the reactor containment however, provide specific guidance on of occurrence of corrosion and design permit: (1) Appropriate periodic how to perform the necessary . degradation..of containment structures inspection of allimportant areas, such containment examinations. This lack of
-has been increasing at operating nuclear as penetrations; (2) an appropriate guidance has resulted in a large .
power plants. There have beeri 32 surveillance program; and (3) periodic variation with*regard to the performance reported occurrences of corrosion in testing at *containment design pressure and .the effectiveness*of licensee metal containments and the liners of of the leak-tightness ofpenetrations containment. examination programs. concrete containments. This is one- which have resilient seals and Based on the results of inspections and fourth of all operating nuclear power expansion bellows. Appendix J, audits, as well as plant.operational plants. Only four of the 32 occurrences "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage experiences, it is clear that many
\Vere detected by clirrent containment Testing for Water-Cooled Power licensee containment examination inspection programs. Nine of these Reactors," of 10 CFR part 50 contains programs have not detected degradation specific rules for leakage testing of that could ultimately result in a occurrences were first identified,by. the
- NRC through its inspections or
- containments. Paragraph m. A. of* compromise to the pressure-retaining Appendix Jrequires that a general. capability. Some containment structures structural audits. Eleven occurrences inspection of the accessible interior and have been found to have.undergone a
.were detected by licensees after they exterior surfaces of the containment significant level of degradation that was were alerted to a degraded condition at structures and components be not detected by these .programs.
another site or 'through activity other performed prior to any Type A test to The Nuclear Management and than,containment inspection. There uncover any evidence of structural Resources Council (NUMARC) (which have,been 34 reported occurrences of deterioration that may affect either the has since become the Nuclear Energy
. degradation of the concrete or of the Institute (NEI)) developed irnumber*of post-tensioning systems* of concrete containment structural integrity or leak-tightness (Type A test means tests industr.y reports.to address,license containments. This is nearly one-half of renewal issues. Two of those, one for intended to measure the primary reactor these*types of containments. It is clear containment overall integrated leakage Pressurized Water Reactor. (PWR).
that current licensee containment
- rate: (1) after the containment has been containments and the other for Boiling .
inspection programs have not proved to completed.and is ready for operation, . Water Reactor (BWR) containments; be adequate to detect the types of* and (2) at periodic.intervals thereafter). were developed for the purpose of degradation which have..been reported. The metal containment structure of managing age-related degradation of Examples of degradation not found by operating nuclear power plants were* containments on a generic basis. The
. licensees; but initially detected at*plants designed in accordance with either . NUMARC.plan for co~tainments relies.
throµghNRC inspections include: (1) Section m, Subsection NE, ~*class MC on the examinations contained in Corrosion of steel containment shells in Components," or Section vm, of the Subsection IWE and Subsection IWL .to the drywelLsand cushion region,
- ASME Code. These subsections contain manage age-related degradation, and ...
nisulting in.wall'thickness reduction to provisions for the design and this plan assumes that these
- below the minimum design thickness; construction of metal containment examinations are '.'in current and (2) corrosion of the torus of the steel structures, including methods for - effective use." In thaBWR Containment.
- containment shell (wall thickness below determining the minimum required wall Industry Report, NUMARC concluded
- minimum design. thickness); (3) thicknesses .. The minimum wall that "On account of these available and corrosion:of the liner ofa concrete thickness is that thickness that would established methods andtechniques to containment to-approximately half-
- ensure that the metal containment adequately manage potential depth; (4) grease leakage from the structure would.continue to maintain its degradation due to general corrosion of tendons-of prestressed concrete structural integrity under the various freestanding metal containments, no containments; and (5) leaching as well . stressors and degradation mechanisms additional measures need to be as excf;!ssive cracking in concrete which could act on it. developed and, as such, general containments. The prestressed concrete corrosion is not a license renewal There are several General Design containments of most operating nuclear concern if the Containment minimum Criteria (GDC) and ASME Code sections reactors were designed in accordance wall thickness is maintained and which establish minimum requirements with ACl-318 provisions taking into. verified." Similarly;,in the PWR.
.for the design, fabrication, construction, consideration their unique features in Containment 'Industry Report, NUMARC testing, and performance of structures, the design of the post-tensioning system concluded that potentially significant systems, and components important to and in determining the prestressing degradation of concrete surfaces, the safety in water-cooled nuclear power forces. The post-tensioning system is. posMensioning system, and the liners of plants. The GDC serve as fundamental designed so that the concrete concrete containments could be underpinnings for many of the most containment structure will continue to managed effectively if periodically* . safety important commitments in maintain its structural-integrity under examined in accordance with the 50-SC-197
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
.requirements contained in Subsection comprehensive set of rules for the (OCRE)), three individuals, and one IWE and Subsection IWL. The NRC examination of post-tensioning systems. consulting finn (VSL Corporation). agrees with NEI that these ASME As originally published in 1981, Comments received could be divided standards, which the industry has Subsection IWE preservice examination into three groups. The first group participated in developing, would be an and inservice examination rules focused contains those comments which.address effective means for managing age-related on the examination of welds. This weld- the administrative aspects of the rule containment degradation. Thus, the based examination philosop,hy* was (e.g., backfit considerations,
- NRC believes that adoption of these established in the 1970s as plants were effectiveness of current containm*ent
- standards is the best approach. being constructed. It was based on the examinations), and the modifications premise that the welds in pressure specified by the NRC in the proposed Background vessels and piping w:ere the areas of rule. The second and third groups On January 7, 1994 (59 FR 979), the greatest concern.. As containments have contain those comments which address NRC published in the Federal Register aged, degradation of base metal, rather the.technical provisions of Subsection a proposed amendment to its regulation, than welds, has been found to be the IWE, and Subsection IWL, respectively.
10 CFR part 50, "Domestic Licensing of issue of concern. The 1991 Addenda to The summary and resolution of public Production and Utilization Facilities," the 1989 Edition, the 1992 Edition and comments and all of.the verbatim to incorporate by reference the 1992 the 1992 Addenda to Section XI, comments which were received Edition with.the 1992 Addenda of Subsection IWE, have promoted the (grouped by subject area) are contained. Subsection IWE, and Subsection IWL, of . incorporation of base metal in the Summary of Documented Section*Xl, Division 1, of the ASME examinations. Evaluation. Code with specified modifications and a The proposed rulemaking The majority of comments generally limitation. incorporated a provision for an addressed one of the following subject Five modifications were specified in expedited examination schedule. This
- areas: (1) The incorporation by reference the proposed rule to address two expedited e?(amination schedule .is of Subsection IWE and Subsection 1WL concerns of the* NRC. The first concern necessary to prevent the delay in into § 50.55a; (2) the development of is that four recommendations for tendon
- implemen~ation of Subsection IWE and guidance documents -instead of .
examinations that are included in Subsection IWL (the Summary of regulatory requirements; (3) the Regulatory Guide 1.35, "Inservice Documen!ed E;valuation lists each *plant rationale for the proposed backfit; (4) . Inspection of Ungrouted Tendons in and the delay in implementation which endorsement of the BWROG comments; Prestressed Concrete .Containments," w.ould be encountered if the subsections
- and (5) the 5-year expedited Rev. 3, are notaddressed*in Subsection were implemented through routine
- implementation. These subject areas *
.IWL (this involves four of the updates of.the' ISi programs). Provisions .encompass the comments submitted by modifications, (§ 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(A)- were incorporated in the proposed rule NEI and NUBARG, and their comments, (D)). Regulatory Guide 1.35, Rev. 3, to ensure that the expedited if any, are discussed separately in each describes a basis acceptable to the NRC examination which would be completed subject area.
staff-for developing an.appropriate within 5 years from the effective date of The comments on subject area inservice inspection and surveillance the rule and the routine 120-month number one from those that approve of program for ungrouted tendons in examinations did not duplicate the incorporation by reference of prestressed concrete containment. examinations. Subsection IWE and Subsection IWL structures. The four recommendations On March 4, 1994, the NRC received into § 50.55a, can be -summarized as contained in Regulatory Guide 1.35, a request from the Nuclear Management follows: (1) There is a need for the
- Rev. 3, whic;h are not.addressed by and Resources Council (which has since periodic examination of containment Subsection IWL, provide positions on become part of the Nuclear Energy structures to assure the containment's issues such as failed wires and tendon Institute (NEil) to extend the public pressure-retaining and leak-tight sheathing filler grease conditions. (The comment period from March 23, 1994
- capability; (2) Section XI requirements ASME Code has considered the four until April 25, 1994, to enable NEI to define concise, technically sound issues involved and is in.the process of "provide necessary and constructive programs to assure continuing adopting them into addenda of comments on the proposed rule containment integrity; and (3) input in Subsection IWL). The second NRC change." This was granted, and on the development of .these rules was concern ,is that if there is visible March 28, 1994 (59 FR 14373), the NRC provided by all interested parties evidence of i:iegredation of the concrete published in the Federal Register a involved in containment inservice (e.g., leaching, surface cracking) there notice of extension of the public inspection-users, regulators, may also be degradation of inaccessible comment period. manufacturers, engineering areas. The fifth modification organizations, and enforcement Summary of Comments
- (§ 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(E)) requires that organizations. .
inaccessible areas be evaluated when Comments were received* from 25 The comments on the other four visible conditions exist that suggest the separate sources. These sourc;es . subject areas are summarized below. possibility of degradation of these areas. consisted of 15 utilities, one service The resolution of public comments The limitation which was included in organization (Entergy Operations, Inc.) contains. all of the comments which the proposed rule specified the 1992 representing five nuclear plants, the were received. Some of the comments Edition with the 1992 Addenda of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the resulted in modifications to the rule, Subsection IWE and Subsection IWL as Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform and some of the comments have been the earliest version of the ASME Code Group (NUBARG) represented by the transmitted to the ASME for their the NRC finds acceptable. This is finn of Winston & Strawn, one owner's consideration. A discussion of the . because this is the first edition group (BWR Owner's Group (BWROG)), comments which led to modifications including addenda combination one architect and engineering firm follows the summary of comments on acceptable to the NRC staff that (Stone & Webster Engineering subject area number *five. The resolution incorporates the concept of base metal Corporation), one public citizens group of public comments pack.age contains
- examinations and also provides a (Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy those comments transmitted to the 50-SC-198
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION
-ASME. Those comments asked for Institute (NEI) (which were endorsed by would have been identified and interpretations of the ASME Code rules. other commenters) regardi_ng the properly addressed by the licensees in Regarding subject area number twci, incorporation by reference of Subsection the absence of additional regulatory eleven commenters believe that IWE and Subsection IWL which are requirements._Based on the: (1) Number
.additional specific guidance in the form similar in nature. The first comment is of occurrences of containment of a guidance document" would be more that the application of the compliance degradation; (2) increasing rate of appropriate than a regulation. They exception to this rulemaking is containment degradation; (3) locations concur with NEI that current regulatory inappropriate, and that the proposed of the degradation; (4) two instances requirements for containment integrity rule constitutes a backfit for which a where containment wall thicknesses and examinations are already provided cost-benefit analysis should be were below minimum design wall *by existing regulations (GDC 16 and 53 performed. The NRC agrees that the thickness; (5) number of corrosion paths and Appendix J) ari.d licensee rulemaking is a backfit. However, as which have been reported; and (6) commitments. If more detail on how to discussed under the Backfit Statement,. higher than anticipated corrosion rates perform containment examinations is the NRC believes that the compliance in many of the occurrences, the NRC needed, the commenters (including NEI) exception to the backfit rule is believes that containments are state that the details could be provided. appropriate. experiencing corrosion or degradation in a regulatory guide, Information The second comment was a citation of that_is unanticipated and excessive.
Notice, Generic Letter, or In an industry a paragraph from the Statement of Further, based upon factors (1) to (6) developed guidance document. The Considerations to the 1985 final backfit above, the NRC concludes that NRC does not believe that existing rule which addressed the compliance additional criteria are necessary to
. regulations and licensee commitments exception. That paragraph addressed ensure that compliance with existing are adequate. Existing regulations and "Section 50.109(a)(4) which creates requiremepts for minimum accepted licensee commitments have not proved exceptic;ms for modifications necessary design wall thicknesses and prestressing to be adequate to detect the types cif to bring a facility into compliance or to .forces are maintained (and thereby the problems which have been experienced ensure through immediately effective ability of the containment to continue to .
in operating reactors. This-is evidenced regulatory action that a licensee meets a perform its intended safety function). by the large number of instances of
- standard of no undue risk to public The fourth comment by NUBARG and degradation that were found by the NRC health and safety."*Both NEI and NEI suggested that it is part of the through its inspections or audits of . NUBARG assert that the proposed rule anticipated process for the industry to plant structures, or by licensees because is a new interpretation of how to rely upon NRC inspections and audits to th~y were alerted to a degraded demonstrate compliance with*existing identify problems and then alert the condition at another site .. Licensee standards and therefore constitutes a industry through NRC documents such containment inspection programs have backfit under 10 CFR 50.109(a)(l). The as information notices and generic generally not detected the types of NRC does not believe that the use of the letters. During the presentation to the degradation being reported (only four of compliance exception must be confined ACRS*on February 10, 1995, NEI th_e 32 reported instances of corrosion in only to the situation addressed in the asserted that "[i)t really doesn't matter Class MC containments were discovered Statement of Consideration to the 1985 how the utilities identify these instances as a result of the Appendix Jgeneral . final backfit rule-"omission or mistake of degradation." The NRC believes that inspection). Further, the NRC does not of fad." In any event, the current inspections conducted by licensees believe that providing guidance through unsatisfactory status of containment should be adequate to ensure that a regulatory guide or industry report inservice inspections can be containment degradation is identified would generally improve containment characterized fairly as, in retrospect, a without reliance upon NRC inspections.
examination practices. Licensees were mistake about and omission from the The fifth-NEI and NUBARG comment made aware of containment degradation necessary elements of a satisfactory is that to ensure compliance the NRC through several industry notices, and inspection program. could take individual enforcement yet the staff is still detecting many of The third comment is that action rather than endorse ASME occurrences of degradation. The containments must experience corrosion standards. The NRC believes that the increasing.rate of occurrence of or degradation that is so unanticipated best *approach is to adopt the industry containment degradation, the number of and excessive so as to constitute a consensus standards (i.e., endorse occurrences, the extent to which some genuine compliance concern. Another ASME Section XI Subsection !WE and containments were degraded.-the high commenter expressed the idea Subsection IWL). Containment number of instances discovered through somewhat differently believing that a corrosion and degradation have been NRC inspections or by licensees because broad-based concern with the reported since 1986. The patterns of they were alerted to a degradation operability of containment-structures d'egradation and the corrective actions condition at another site, the time- through the industry must be were not immediately obvious. Given
. dependent mechanisms, and- the results demonstrated to be a compliance issue. the number and the extent of the of the survey performed by the NRC The NRC agrees with those criteria and occurrences, and the variability among Regional Offices regarding current concludes, in fact, that there is a broad- plants with regard to the performance containment inspections all point to the based concern regarding the structural and the effectiveness of containment necessity of imposing additional integrity of containment structures. The inspections, the NRC believes that the requirements to ensure that- NRC's approach focuses on two best course of action is to endorse IS!
containments comply with design wall questions: (1) Is the corrosion such that requirements to ensure that thicknesses and prestressing forces. This there is a basis for reasonably containments comply with desi_gn wall is a compliance backfit.
- concluding that additional instances of thicknesses and prestressing forces.
With regard to subject area number noncompliance with the relevant GDCs, The sixth comment is that GOC 16 three, six general comments were Appendix J, and/or licensee required containments to be designed received- from the Nuclear Utflfty commitments at numerous plants; and and constructed with an allowance for Backfitting and Reform Group (2) whether there is a basis for corrosion or degradation of the (NUB/\RG) and from the Nuclear Energy reasonably believing that the corrosion containment wall over the projected 50-SC-199
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION design life of the plant. NEI and conducting the periodic examinations interval in 5 years, which was not the NUBARG assert that "[i]t is therefore set forth in Subsection IWE and
- intent. § 50.55a(g)(6)(H)(B) has been hardly surprising that, as noted in the Subsection IWL. changed to clarify that for Subsection Statement of Considerations, '[o]ver With regard to subject area number IWE, the baseline inspection will be the one-third of the containments have four, six commenters believe that the inservice examinations which are. to be experienced corrosion or other . Boiling Water Reattors Owner's Group performed during the first period of the.
degradation.' " Therefore, they believe (BWROG) containment fospection plan . first interval. For Subsection IWL, the*. there is not a broad-based concern with (CIP) will adequately address baseline inspection will be the required operability of containment structures. examinations for the primary inservice*examinations which *
- The NRC rejects the argument that containment when used in conjunction correspond to the year of operation for
- because containments have corrosion with other existing examination each unit. The result of the clarification allowances and corrosion was expected requirements such as Appendix J. The is that § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(B)(1) addresses to occur that, ipso facto, further staff does not believe that the CIP is a Subsection IWE and .
comprehensive containment .§ 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(B)(2) addresses inspections are not necessary and the examination program. In the CIP, there compliance exception is inappropriate. Subsection IWL. § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(B)(2) is a comparison between the CIP and in the proposed rule has become As previously pointed out, in many Subsection IWE. The CIP dismisses cases, the corrosion rate has been found § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(B)(3) and seven of the eighteen identified § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(B)(3).has become. to be greater than.that for which the . Subsection IWE examinations as not containment was designed (in some § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(B)( 4) 'in the final rule. being justifiable even_ though some of There was one additional comment cases the rate was twice that predicted). these areas are likely to experience . Some of the more extreme cases of wall
- accelerated corrosion. The*CIP submitted by NEI. The proposed rule thinning occurred in plants with discussed NEl's (then NUMARC)
- enumerates the conservatisms and corrosion allowances. The existence of a position on the role ofSubsection lWE margins against failure in the design of corrosion allowance at any given plant Mark I and II containments and and Subsection IWL in license renewal.
is, of course relevant, but only in the concludes that in a typical plant Subsections IWE and IWL were context of determining whether a . probabilistic*r!sk 11,ssess.ment of failure, referenced many times as one relevant requirement or commitment is the contribution to failure of the acceptable* approach for managing age~ likely to be violated during the OL term. containment steel structure is negligible. related degradation. The plan for A corrosion allowance simply increases The NRC believes that the managirig age-related degradation the tolerance (time period) for corrosion. conservatisms and margins referred to assumes that these examinations are '.'in However, once the allowance is ercided, are not additional tolerances which current and effective use.NEI then concern with compliance.becomes .allow areas of containments to go commented on the above statements in , relevant. Based upon the staffs finding unexamined. These conservatisms and the proposed rule;_.Although the BWR of the number and extent of corrosion to margins were required allowances in the and PWR containment IRs [Industry .
- date, and the lack of activities to manage design because of the uncertainties in Reports) do reference Subsections IWE the degradation by many licensees, the loadings, in material properties, in and IWL, their identification in the IRs NRC concludes that it is likely that analysis*, and in the variation of steel should not be misrepresented to imply those licensees will be in violation of thicknesses. Examination of large areas that Subsections IWE and .IWL. are being applicable requirements for of the containment cannot be dismissed implemented or that they are requi~d containment structural integrity and as being non-critical based on* for operating plants.during thefrinitial leak-tightp.ess during the OL term, conservatisms and margins when licensing term." The NRC agrees that absent the imposition of Subsections corrosion has clearly eroded the margin the IRs were nofto be represented as a IWE and IWL. Because licensees have of safety in some cases. In addition,* requirement for operating licensees to .
been unable to ensure compliance with given that o.1ly four of the 32 implement Subsection IWE and current regulatory requirements, the occurrences of corrosion in metal Subsection IWL or their equivalent, and NRC believes that more specific ISi containments and the liners of concrete that these subsections were referenced requirements, which expand upon containments were detected during the as one acceptable approach of managing
- existing requirements for the pre-integrated leakage rate test age-related degradation for the license examination of containment structures examination, the NRC does not believe renewal period. However, present in accordance with GDC 16, 53, that the CIP used in conjunction with licensee containment examination Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50; and other existing examination requirements programs have nor proved to be effective Appendix Jto 10 CFR part 50, are such as Appendix J will adequately in detecting the. types of degradation *
. needed and are justified for the purpose address examinations for the primary which have been reported. The number of ensuring that containments continue containment as asserted. The industry of occurrences and the extent of
- to maintain or exceed minirnwn initiative that allows a decrease in the degradation (which includes cases of accepted design wall thicknesses and frequency of Appendix J leakage rate noncompliance) leads to the conclusion .
prestressing forces as. provided for in
- testing further erodes confidence in the that additional requirements are needed industry standards used to design acceptability of the BWROG approach. for managing containment degradation containments (e.g., Section ill and Comments were received from.ten during the operating term. Because Section VIII of the AS.ME Code, and the sources on proposed § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(B) Subsections IWE and IWL were American Concrete Institute Standard which would require a 5-year expedited developed by the ASME with industry ACI-318), as reflected in license examination. schedule (subject area input and found to be acceptable by NEI.
conditions, technical specifications, and number five). Most of these comments for managing age-relate.d degradation for written licensee commitments (e.g., the asked for clarifications of the NRC staff the license renewal period, the NRC Final Safety Analysis Report). The NRC intent of this provision. Some believes that adoption of those programs believes that the occurrences of commenters interpreted this provision at this tim,e is the best approach. The corrosion and other degradation would as a requirement to perform all of the NRC also believes that with have been detected by licensees when examinations specified for a 10-year * . implementation of Subsections !WE.and 50-SC-200
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION IWL, the detrimental effects of examinations required by both the examinations of Subsection IWE, containment aging will be managed periodic routine and expedited Examination Category E-B (pre~sure during the current operating term, as examination programs. This provision is retaining welds) and Subsection IWE, well as during the license renewal term. intended to be useful to those licensees Examination Category E-F (pressure As a result of the comments received, that would be required to implement the retaining dissimilar metal welds) there is one editorial change,. two expedited examination during the first optional. The NRC siaff concludes that clarifications, and four modifications in periodic interval that routine requiring these examinations is not the final rule. With respect to the containment examinations are required. appropriate. There is no evidence of editorial change, a commenter suggested Paragraph (g)(6)(ii)(B)(4) allows problems associated with welds of this
- that the wording of licensees to use a recently performed type under the given operating
§ 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(D)(2) in the proposed examination of the post-tensioning conditions. In addition, the rule be revised to be consistent with . system to satisfy the requirements for occupational radiation exposure that § 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(D)(1) and the expedited examination of the would be incurred while performing § 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(D)(3) of the same containment post-tensioning system. these examinations cannot be justified.
paragraph. § 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(D) This situation would occur for licensees It is estimated that the total addresses the sampling of the grease who perform an examination of the occupational exposure that would be contained in post-tensioning systems, post-tensioning system using Regulatory incurred yearly.in the performance of and conditions, which if found, are Guide 1.35 between the effective date of the containment weld examinations in reportable. The suggested wording has . this rule and the beginning of the accordance with Examination Categories
- been adopted in the final rule. expedited examination. E-B and E-F would be 440 person-rems.
- One of the clarifications was to The four modifications are: (1) The fourth modification,
.proposed § 50,55(g)(6)(ii)(B). This . § 50.55a(b)(2)(x)(A) expands the § 50.55a(b)(2)(x)(D), provides an change was discussed previously in evaluation of inaccessible areas of alternative to the ASME Section XI subject area number five. concrete containments (Class CC) to requirements for "additional § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(B)(1) and metal containments and the liners of examinations" (note: additional § 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(B)(2) require that concrete containments (Class MC); (2) examinations*~ are required during the licensees conduct the first containment § 50.55a(b)(2)(x)(B) permits alternative same outage when acceptance criteria examinations in accordance with lighting and resolution requirements for
- are exceeded). The alternative would Subsection IWE and Subsection IWL remote visual examination of the allow. licensees to determine the number (1992 Edition with the 1992 Addenda), containment; (3) § 50.55a(b)(2)(x)(C) of additional components to be
- modified by § 50.55a(b)(2)(ix) and makes the examination of pressure examined based on an evaluation to
§ 50.55a(b)(2)(x) within 5 years of the retaining welds and pressure retaining determine the extent and nature of the effective date of the final rule. This dissimilar metal welds optional; and (4) degradation. Five commenters believe expedited.examination schedule is § 50.55a(b)(2)(x)(D) has been added to that the requirements for additional necessary to prevent possible delays in provide an alternative sampling plan.* examinations used in other subsections the implementation of Subsection IWE Section 50.55a(b)(2)(x)(E), a of Section XI is inappropriate for by as much as 20 years and Subsection clarific.ation, more clea,rly defines the containment components. Additional IWL by as much as 15 years. Subsection frequency of the Subsection IWE general examinations are incorporated into IWE, Table IWE-2500-1, permits the . visual examination. Section XI to determine the extent to deferral of many of the required The first modification, which degradation found in one examinations until the end* of the 10- § 50.551i(b)(2l(x)(A), which expands the
- component exists in other similar.
year inspection interval. Adding the 10 evaluation of inaccessible areas* of components. In some instances, a large years that could pass before some concrete containments (Class CC) to number of additional examinations utilities are required to update their ISI . metal-containments and the liners of could be required. The commenters plans, a period of20 years could pass concrete containments (Class MC), was believe that a review of the operational before the first examinations would take the result of-a comment received on history of containment components place. Subsection IWL is based on a 5- § 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(E) of the proposed shows that the degradation is limited to year inspection interval. Adding the rule. The commenter believed that given the area in question and is not possible 10 years before update of the number of occurrences of corrosion* widespread. This makes the Section XI existing ISI plans, a period of 15 years in Class MC containments, the proposed requirements for additional could pass before the examinations were provision (which only addressed examinations burdensome and performed by plants that have not concrete containments) should be inappropriate for application to voluntarily adopted the provisions of expanded in the final rule to include containments. The NRC agrees and Regulatory Guide 1.35, Rev. 3. metal containments and the liners of revised the rule to permit the alternative Expediting implementation of the concrete containments. to the Section XI requirements for . containment examinations is considered The second modification, additional examinations.
- necessary because of the problems that § 50.55a(b)(2)(x)(B), was added to the The NRC believes that these have been identified at various plants, final rule to permit alternative lighting modifications improve the final rule and the need.to establish expeditiously a and resolution requirements for remote will improve the containment baseline for each facility, and the need visual examination of the containment. inspection program as set forth by to identify any existing degradation. Subsection IWE references the lighting Subsection IWE and Subsection IWL.
Paragraphs (g)(6)(ii)(B)(3J and and resolution requirements contained Some of the public comments cited (g)(6)(ii)(B)(4) each provide a in 1WA-2200. The lighting and failure data which have been mechanism for licensees to satisfy the resolution requirements contained in accumulated in recent years in support
- requirell!ents of the routine containment 1WA-2200 would on a practical basis of various NRC staff activities and examinations and the expedited preclude remote containment industry initiatives. Most of this data examination without duplication. examination. has been accumulated since the ASME Paragraph (g)(6)(ii)(B)(3) permits The third modification, committees developed these.
licensees to _avoid duplicating § 50.55a(b)(2)(x)(C), makes the subsections. Without the benefit of this 50-SC-201
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION recently accumulated operational data, *Addenda of Subsection IWE and *incorporated by reference into the NRC the ASME committees respor..sible for Subsection IWL as *the earliest ASME regulations for the first time.
developing Subsection IWE and Code version the NRC finds acceptable. Section 50.55a(g)(4) specifies the Subsection IWL modelled those This edition and addenda incorporate containment coinponents to which the subsections on other subsections of the concept ofbas.e*metal examinations ASME Code Class MC and Class CC Section XI and the experience gained and also provide a comprehensive set of inservice inspection classifications from application of those other niles for the examination of post-
- incorporated by reference in this rule subsections. With the additional tensioning systems. It should be noted will apply.
insights drawn from analysis of this new that the wording of t,his provision has Section 50.55a (g)(4)(v)(A), (v)(B), and. data, it is apparent that many aspects of been changed in the final rule In order (v)(C) specify the Subsection IWE and containments are unique compared to to make it consistent with other
- Subsection IWL rules for inservice components of other systems. Some of provisions in § 50.55a(b). inspection, repair, and replacement of
- the containment components which Section 50.55a(b)(2)(ix) specifies five
- metal and concrete containments. This were expected to experience modifications that must be implemented is consistent with the long-standing degradation, based on experience with when using Subsection IWL. Four of intent and ongoing application by NRC other systems, have proved not to be these issues are identified in Regulatory and licensees to utilize the rules of susceptible to the same type of Guide 1.35, Revision 3, but are not Section XI when performing inservice degradation. The ASME working groups currently addressed in Subsection IWL. inspection, repairs; and replacements of are considering these issues. However, Section 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(A) .requires that applicable components and their
- based on initial committee discussion, it . grease caps which are accessible must supports.
is anticipated that similar changes will be visually examined to detectgrease Small Business Regulatory Enforcement be made to Subsection IWE and leakage or grease cap deformation. Fairness Act *
- Subsection IWL, but the length of the Section 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(B) requires the ASME consensus process precludes the preparation of an Engineering In accordance with the Small .
- possibility of the changes being adopted Evaluation Report when consecutive Business Regulatory Enforcement into the ASME Code in the near term. surveillances indicate a trend of Fairness Act of 1996,the NRC has
- Hence, the NRC has determined to prestress loss to below the minimum determined that this action is not a adopt the 1992 Edition with the 1992 prestress requirements. Section major rule and has verified this Addenda of Subsection IWE and 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(C) requires an determination with the Office of Subsection IWL with the modifications evaluation to be performed for instances Information and Regulatory Affairs of of wire .failure and slip of wires in 0MB. . ..
which were previously discussed. anchorages. Section 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(D) Finding of No Significant Other Provision~ Contained in the Final addresses sampled sheathing filler
- Rule Environmental Impact grease and reportable conditions. A The following paragraph was comment was received on this provision The Gommission has determined contained in the proposed rule and has which resulted in an editorial change under the National Environmental not been discussed previously. This (this was discussed on page 12). Section Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the paragraph received comments which 50.55a(b)(2)(ix)(E) requires that Commission's regulations in subpart A resulted in the provision being dropped licensees evaluate the acceptability of of.10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not in the final rule. Section 50.55a(b)(2)(x) inaccessible areas of concrete a major Federal action that significantly was a provision in the proposed rule containments when conditions exist in affects the quality of the human intended to pr.ovide licensees with a accessible areas that suggest the environment and therefore an mechanism to merge the Subsection possibility of degradation in environmental impact statement is not IWE and Subsection IWL ISI program inaccessible areas. required.
- with their routine 120-month ISi Existing§ 50.55a(g), "Inservice This final rule is one part of a program. Those licensees who were near inspection requirements,'.' specifies the regulatory framework directed to* .
the end of their present 10-year ISi requirements for preservice and ensuring containment integrity. interval when the final rule becomes inservice examinations for Class 1 (Class Therefore, in tho general sense, this rule effective would have been given an 1 refers,to components of the reactor will have a positive .impact on the additional 2 years to submit their coolant pressure boundary), Class 2 environment. This rule incorporates by containment ISi program. Several (Class 2 quality standards are applied to reference into the NRG regulations commenters responded that due to the water- and steam-containing pressure requirements contained in *the ASME time constraints of having to develop vessels, heat exchangers (other than Code for the inservice inspection of the the containment ISi program and then turbines and condensers), storage tanks, containments of nuclear power plants. perform the required examinations piping, pumps, and valves that are part* The performance of containment
- within 5 years, the additional 2 years of the reactor coolant pressure boundary* examinations, as*set forth by the could not be utilized. Therefore, (e.g., systems designed for residual heat provisions of this final rule, for PWRs,
§ 50.55a(b)(2)(x) as it appeared in the removal and eme~ency core cooling)), Ice.Condensers, and BWR Mark Ils .and proposed rule has been deleted, and and Class 3 (Class 3 quality standards Ills is not expected to result in § 50.55a(b)(2)(x) in the final rule are applied to radioactive-waste- significant occupational l'adiation .
contains the modifications which were containing pressure. vessels, heat exposure (1.0 person-rems per year or added as a result of public comment on exchangers (other than turbines and 0.04 person-rems per unit averaged over the proposed rule. condensers), storage tanks, piping, 27 examinations each year). The above The provisions in this paragraph and pumps, and valves (not part of the categories of plants, for which the the following four paragraphs were reactor coolant pressure boundary)) occupational radiation exposure is . . contained in the proposed rula and have components and their supports. insignificant, represent the vast majority not changed due to comments. Section Subsection IWE (Class MC-metal of units (89). For BWR Mark I 50.55a(b)(2)(vi) incorporates a limitation containments) and Subsection IWL containments, the estimated specifying the 1992 Edition with 1992 (Class CC-concrete containments) are occupational radiation exposure which 50-SC-202
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION would be incurred, per year while to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Backfit Statement performing BWR Mark I containment (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These The NRC is amending its regulations .
examination is 29.4 person-rems per requirements were approved by the to incorporate by reference the 1992
.year or 4.2 person-rems per unit Office of Manageinent and Budget, *Edition with the 1992 Addenda of .
averaged over 7 examinations per year. approval number 3150--0011. Subsection IWE and Subsection IWL to However, the estimated occupational The public reporting burden for this assure that the critical areas of radiation exposure per unit does-not collection of information is estimated to containments are routinely inspected to
- provide an accurate representation of average 4,000 hours per response for detect defects that could compromise a the actual radiological exposure that development of an initial inservice containment's structural integrity. Based would be incurred by any one inspection plan;- and 8,000 hours per on a preponderance of reliable individual. 10 CFR 20.101, "Radiation response for the update of the plan and information, the NRC concludes that dose standards for individuals in periodic examinations, including the this rule is a compliance. backfit, and restricted areas" only permits a whole time for reviewing instructions, therefore a backfit.analysis is not body dose of 1.25 rem per calendar searching existing data sources, required pursuant to 10 CFR quarter. As a practical matter, licensees gathering and maintaining the data 50.109(a)(4)(i). A summary of.
carefully manage the exposure incurred needed, and completing and reviewing noncompliance is set forth below. The by any one individual by practicing and the collection of information. The documented evaluation required by applying "as low as reasonably estimate of 8,000.hours for plan update § 50.109(a)(4) to support this conclusion achievable" (ALARA) principles to and performing periodic examinations is available for inspection in the NRC protect the health and safety of is a 2,000 hour reduction from the Public Document Room, 2120 L Street personnel. In the performance of the estimate given in the proposed NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. examination of BWR Mark I rulemaking. This reduction results from Single copies of the analysis may be
- containments, this is accomplished'liy changes made in response to public obtained from Mr. W.E. Norris, Division having several individuals perform* the comment; A number of examinations of Engineering Technology. Office of examinations to "spread out" the have been modified or made optional Nuclear Regulatory Research*, U.S.
exposure. In this manner, no one
- greatly reducing the effort required to Nuclear Regulatory Commission, individual will suffer any significant comply with the requirements Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) health effects. It also must be kept in contained in the final rule. Send 415-6796,. . .
mind that-these containment comments on any aspect of this The rate of occurrence cif corrosion examinations are scheduled to occur at collection of information, including and degradation of containment the interval of once every 31/J years. suggestions for reducing the burden, to structures has been increasing at This provides licensees ample time for* the Information*and Records
- operating nuclear power plants. There
. planning. the examinations, and Management Branch (T-6 F33), IJ;S. have been 32 reported occurrences of scheduling personnel in accord with Nuclear Regulatory Commission, corrosion in metal containments *and the ALARA considerations. Therefore, the
- Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by liners of concrete containments. This is occupational radiation exposure is Internet electronic mail at approximately one-fourth of all insigntficant given the relatively low .
- BJSl@NRC.GOV; and to the Desk operating nuclear power plants. Only exposure on a unit basis and the Officer, Office of Information and . four of the 32 occurrences were detected licensees' programs for controlling the Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, . by current licensee containment impact of exposure for any one (3150-0011), Office of Management and inspection programs. Nine of these individual. Budget, Washington, DC 20503. occurrences were first identified by the
* . Actions required of applicants and NRC through its inspections or ,
licensees to implement containment Public Protection Notification examinations are of the same nature that structural audits. Eleven occurrences applicants and licensees have been The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, were detected by licensees after they performing for many years in other and a person is not required to respond were alerted to a degraded condition at . Section XI ISi programs. Extension of to, a collection of information unless it another site* or through activity other
.these actions to additional components, displays a currently valid 0MB control than containment inspection. There
- therefore, should not increase the number. have been 34 reported occurrences of potential for a negative environm11ntal Regulatory Flexibility Certification degradation of the concrete or of the*
impact. post-tensioning systems of concrete The environmental assessment and In accordance with the Regulatory containments. This is nearly one-half of finding of no significant impact on Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), these types of containments. It is clear which this determination is based are the Commission hereby certifies that . that current licensee containment available for inspection at the NRC this rule will not have a significant inspection programs have not.proved to Public Document Room, 2120 L Street economic impact on a substantial be adequate to detect the types of . NW .. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. number of small entities. This rule degradation which have been reported. Single copies of the environmental affects only the operation of nuclear Examples of degradation not found by assessment ap.d the finding of no power plants. The companies that own licensees, but initially detected at plants significant impact are available from Mr. these plants do not fall within the scope . through NRC inspections include: (1) W. E. Norris, Division of Engineering of the definition of "small entities" set* Corrosion of steel containment shells in Technology, Office of Nuclear
- forth in the* Regulatory Flexibility Act or the drywall sand cushion region,
- Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear the Small Business Size Standards set resulting in wall thickness reduction to Regulatory Commission, Washington, out in regulations issued by the Small below the minimum design thickness; DC 20555, telephone (301) 415-6796. Business Adminii;tration at 13 CFR part (2) corrosion of the torus of the steel 121. Since these companies are containment shell (wall thickness below Pape"".ork Reduction ActStatement dominant in their service areas, this rule minimum design thickness); (3)
This final rule amends information does not fall within the purview of the extensive *corrosion of the liner of a collection requirements that are subject Act. concrete containment with local 50-SC-203
PART 50
- STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION degradation at many locations to nuclear power plants, which is approximately half-depth; (4) grease documented in NUREG-1526, indicates leakage from the tendons of prestressed that most licensees assigned a low concrete containments; and (5) leaching priority to the monitoring of structures.
as well as excessive.cracking in concrete Several licensees incorrectly assumed containments. that many of their 'structures are None of the existing requirements for inherently reliable. This is true so long containment inspection provide specific as there is no degradation. However, the
- guidance on how to perform the degradation of structures can reduce necessary containment examinations. high margins of safety to a low or This.lack of guidance has resulted in a negligible margin of safety. As discussed large variation with regard to the earlier, such substantial containment performance and the effectiveness of degradations have been detected at a licensee containment examination large number of nuclear power plants, programs. Based on the results of and their detection to date can best be inspections and audits, and plant characterized as happenstance. The operational experiences, it is clear that final rule will provide for improved many licensee containment examination periodic examination of containment programs have not detected degradation structures assuring that the critical areas that could result in a compromise of of containment are periodically
. pressure-retaining capability. inspected to detect and take corrective Most of those occurrences were first action for. defects that could identified by ~e NRC through its compromise the containment's pressure- . 'inspections or audits of plant structures, retaining and leak-tight capability. The or by licensees while performing an NRC believes, therefore, that tho final unrelated activity or, after they were action can be justified es a cost-justified fllerted to a degraded condition at safety enhancement backfit, as well as a another site. In analyzing the reported compliance backfit.
containment degradation, it is apparent that all containments are subject to List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50. certain type(s) of degradation depending Antitrust, Classified information, on the design. Information gathered by Criminal Penalties, Fire protection, the staff indicates that many licensees Incorporation by reference, still have not reacted to this serious Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear safety concern and have not initiated power plants and reactors, Radiation comprehensive containment inservice . protection, Reactor siting criteria, inspection. As a result of the rate of .Reporting and recordkeeping occurrence of containment degradation, requirements. and the extent of containment For the reasons set out in the degradation, the NRC believes that there preamble and under the authority of the is a basis for reasonably concluding that Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, such degradation is widespread and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, affects virtually all plants. Because of as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 533, the NRC the serious degradation which has is..adopting the following amendments occurred, the belief that additional to 10 CFR part 50. occurrences of noncompliance with required minimum wall thicknesses and prestressing forces will be reported, and the high likelihood that some of those occurrences could result in loss of structural integrity and leak-tightness, the NRC has determined that imposition of these containment inservice inspection requirements under the compliance exception to 10 CFR 50.109(a)( 4)(i) is appropriate. The NRC believes that the final action would also result in a substantial safety increase and that the direct and indirect costs of implementation are justified in view of the significant safety benefit to 61 FR 65157 be gained. The NRC believes that the Published 12/11/96 inspections contained in Subsections Effective 1/10/97 IWE and IWL will improve significantly the ability to detect degradation and Reactor Site Criteria Including Seismic take timely action to correct degradation and Earthquake Engineering Criteria of containment structures. A review of for Nuclear Power Plants early implementation of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65) at nine See Part 100 Statements of Consideration 50-SC-204
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULES and REGULATIONS TITLE 10, CHAPTER 1, CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS-ENERGY ENVIRONMENTAL PRQTECTION REGULATIONS FOR fPAiffi DOMESTIC LICENSING AND RELATED REGULATORY FUNCTIONS L_!!__J STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION staff. These amendments are required not subject to the requirements.of the because of the assignment of new Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 telephone numbers fa conjunction with U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). the recent consolida lion of approximately one-half of the NRC's List of Subjects in.10 CFR Part 51 headquarters staff to its new location in . Administrative practice-and Rockville, Maryland. These amendments -_procedure, Environmental impact are being made to inform NRC licensees statement, Nuclear materials, Nuclear and members of the public of the new power-plants and reactors, Reporting telephone numbers. and recordkeeping requirements.
-EFFECTIVE DATE: April 25, 1~88. For the reasons set out in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: preamble and under the authority of the Donnie H. Grimsley, Director, Division
- Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, of Rules and Records, Office of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,
.Administration and Resources as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory is adopting the following amendments to 52 FR 8225
- Commission, Washington*. DC 20555, * .10 CFR Part 51.
Published 3/17/87 .Telephone: 301-492-7211. 53 FR 24018 Effective 7/14/87 Published 6/27/88 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March 28, 1988, the Office of the Effective 7/27/88 Licenses and Radiation Safety Requirements for Well Logging
- Executive Director for Operations and General Requirements for portions of the Office of Governmental Decommis_sioning Nuclear Facilities See Part 39 Statements of Consideration anp Public Affairs (GPA}-the Director of GPA and the Public Affairs staff- See Part 30. Statements of Consideration 52 FR 19303 Published 5/22/87 ; relocated at the agency's new office 53 FR 31651
- building in Rockville, Maryland. A Published 8/19/88 Domestic Licensing of Production and notice to that effect was published in the EffecUve 9/19/88 Utilization Facilities; Communications Federal Register on March 31, 1988 (53 Procedures Amendments; Correction Ucensing Requirements for the
** FR 10449). These amendments reflect the See Part 50 Statements of Consideration
- a111;ignment of new telephone numbr.rs
- Independent Storage of SpentNuclear to certain relocated agency personnel.. Fuel and High-Level Radioactive i52 FR 31601 Waste
'published 8/21/87 Because these amendments deal Effective 8/19/87 solely with the organization and See Part 72 Statements of Consideration relocation of agency personnel, the
. Statement of Organization and General notice and comment provisions of the 53 FR 43419 Information Published 10/27/88 Administrative Procedure Act d6 not EffecUve 10/27 /88
*See Part 1 Statements of Consideration apply. under 5 U.S.C. 553(b){A). These amendments.are effective *upon Relocation of NRC's Public Document 53 FR 13399 ' publication in the the Federal Register.
Published 4/25/88 Room; Other Minor Nomenclature
- Effective 4/25/88 '. Good cause exists to dispense with the Changes usual 30-day delay in the effective date, 10 CFR Part 51 because these amendments are of a See Part 1 Statements of Consideration minor and a"dministrative nature. 54 FR 15372 Revision of Telephone Numbers for Environmental Impact: Categorical .Published 4/18/89
- Environmental Inquiries Exclusion Effective 5/18/89 AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory The NRC has determined that this Commission. Early Site Permits; Standard Design final rule is the type of action described Certifications; and Combined Licenses ACTION: Final rule .. 'in categorical exclusion 10 CFR for Nuclear Power Reactors su~MARY: The Nuclear Regulatory . *51.2Z(c)(2). Therefore, neither an environmental impact statement nor an See Part 52 Statements of Consideration Commission [NRC) is emending its regulations pertaining*to environmental *. environmental assessment has been 54 FR27864 matters to indicate the revision of five prepared for this final rule. Published 7 /3/89 telephone numbers that enable
- Effective 8/2/89 Paperwork Reduction Act Statement prospective applicants or petitioners to consult with members of the NRC's This final rule contains no information NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic collection requirements and therefore is *Repositories for High-Level Waste See Part 60 Statements of Consideration 51-SC-1
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION 54 FR39767 Published 9/28/89 Comment period expires 12/27 /89. 10 CFR Part 51 Waste Confidence Decision Review AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Review and proposed revision of waste confidence decision.
SUMMARY
- On August 31, 1984, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a final decision on what has come to be known as its "Waste Confidence Proceeding." The purpose of that proceeding was "* *
- to assess generically the degree of assurance now available that radioactive waste can be safely disposed of, to determine when such disposal or offsite storage will be available and to determine whether radioactive waste can be safely stored onsite past the expiration of existing facility licenses until offsite disposal or storage is available." (49 FR 34658). The purpose of this notice is to present for public comment the proposed findings of a Commission review of that Decision.
The Commission noted in 1984 that its Waste Confidence Decision was unavoidably in the nature of a prediction, and committed to review its conclusions "* *
- should significant and pertinent unexpected events occur or at least every five years until a repository is available."
The Commission has reviewed its five findings and the rationale for them in light of developments since 1984. This proposed revised waste Confidence Decision supplements those 1984 51-SC-2
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION findings and the environmental analysis Finally, the Commission proposes to On June 27, 1977, NRC denied the supporting them. The Commission extend the cycle of its Waste NRDC petition. The Commission said proposes that the second and fourth Confidence reviews from every five that in issuing operating licenses, NRC findings in the Waste Confidence years to every ten until a repository must have assurance that wastes can be Decision be revised as follows: becomes available. In its 1984 Decision, safely handled and stored as they are Finding 2: The Commission finds the Commisson said that because its generated. It also said that it is not reasonable assurance that at least one conclusions were "*' *
- unavoidably in necessary for permanent disposal to be mined geologic repository will be the nature of a prediction," it would available if NRC could be confident that available within the first quarter of the review them "* *
- should significant permanent disposal could be twenty-first century, and that sufficient and unexpected events occur, or at least accomplished when necessary. NRC repository capacity will be available every five years until a repository * *
- added that Congress was aware of the within 30 years beyond the !incensed is available." As noted below, the relationship between nuclear reactor life for operation of any reactor to Commission now believes that operations and the radioactive waste dispose of the commercial high-level predictions of repository availability are disposal problem, and that NRC would radioactive waste and spent fuel best expressed in terms of decades not refrain from issuing reactor originating in such reactor and rather than years. To specify a year for operating licenses until the disposal generated up to that time. the expected availability of a repository problem was resolved. The Commission Finding 4: The Commission finds decades hence would misleadingly also stated that it"* *
- would not reasonable assurance that, if necessary, imply a degree of precision now continue to license reactors if it did not spent fuel generated in any reactor can unattainable. Accordingly, the have reasonable confidence that the be stored safely and without significant Commission proposes to change its wastes can and will in due course be environmental impacts for at least 30 original commitment in order to review disposed of safely."
years beyond the licensed life for its Waste Confidence Decision at least Also in November 1976, two utility operation (which may include the term every ten years. This would not, companies requested amendments to of a revised license] of that reactor at its however, disturb the Commission's their operating licenses to permit spent fuel storage basin, or at either original commitment to review its expansion in the capacity of this spent onsite or offsite independent spent fuel Decision whenever significant and nuclear fuel storage pools: Vermont storage installations. pertinent unexpected events occur. Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation for The Commission proposes to reaffirm DATES: The comment period expires the Vermont Yankee plant; and the remaining findings. Each finding, any December 27, 1989. Comments received Northern States Power Company for its proposed revisions, and the reasons for after this date will be considered if it is Prairie Island facility. In both cases, the revising or reaffirming them are set forth practical to do so, but assurance of utilities planned to increase storage in the body of the review below. consideration cannot be given except to capacity through closer spacing of spent The Commission also issued two comments received on or before this fuel assemblies in existing spent fuel companion rulemaking amendments at date. pools. The New England Coalition on the time it issued the 1984 Waste Nuclear Power and the Minnesota ADDRESSES: Mail written comments to: Confidence Decision. The Commission's Pollution Control Agency intervened. Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory reactor licensing rule, 10 CFR part 50, The NRC staff evaluated the requests Commission, Washington, DC 20555, was amended to require each licensed and found that the modifications would Attention: Docketing and Service reactor operator to submit, no later than not endanger public health and safety. Branch. Deliver comments to One White five years before expiration of the The staff did not consider any potential Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, operating license, plans for managing environmental effects of storage of spent Rockville, MD betweeen 7:30 a.m. and spent fuel at the reactor site until the fuel at the reactors beyond the dates of 4:15 p.m. weekdays. spent fuel is transferred to the expiration of their operating licenses. Department of Energy (DOE) for FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing disposal under the Nu.clear Waste Policy Rob MacDougall, Office of Nuclear Board Panel (ASLBP) adopted the staffs Act of 1982 (NWPA]. 10 CFR part 51, the Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. safety and environmental findings and rule defining NRC's responsibilities Nuclear Regulatory Commission, approved the license amendments for under the National Environmental Policy Washington, DC 20555, telephone (202) the two plants. It too did not consider Act (NEPA), was amended to provide 492-3401; or John Roberts, Office of the effects of at-reactor storage beyond that, in connection with the issuance or Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, the expiration of the facility opera ting amendment of a reactor operating U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, license. license or initial license for an Washington, DC 20555, telephone (202) The Board's decision was appealed to independent spent fuel storage 492--0608. the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal installation, no discussion of any SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Board (ASLAB). The ASLAB affirmed environmental impact of spent fuel the Licensing Board's decision, citing the storage is required for the period Background Commission's "* *
- reasonable following expiration of the license or In November 1976, the Natural confidence that wastes can and will in amendment applied for. Resources Defense Council (NRDCJ due course be disposed of safely * * *"
In keeping with the proposed revised petitioned NRC for a rulemaking to in the Commission's denial of the NRDC Findings 2 and 4, the Commission is determine whether radioactive wastes petition. The decision of the ASLAB was providing elsewhere in this issue of the generated in nuclear power reactor can appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Federal Register proposed conforming be subsequently disposed of without Appeals. amendments to its 10 CFR part 51 rule undue risk to the public health and On May 23, 1979 the Court declined to providing procedures of considering in safety. The NRDC also requested that stay or vacate the license amendments, licensing proceedings the environmental NRC not grant pending or furture but remanded to NRC the question of effects of extended onsite storage of requests for operating licenses until the "* *
- whether there is reasonable spent fuel. petitioned finding of safety was made. assurance that an offsite storage 51-SC-3
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION solution will be available by the years mined geologic repository is technically for, among other things, the development 2007-2009, the expiration of the plants' feasible. of a monitored retrievable storage operating licenses, and if not, whether (2) One or more mined geologic [MRS) facility and two repositories, one there is reasonable assurance that the repositories for commercial high-level by early 1998 and a second, if fuel can be safely stored at the reactor radioactive waste and spent fuel will be authorized by Congress, at a later date, sites beyond those dates." In its available by the years 2007-2009, and initially planned by DOE for 2006. For decision to remand to NRC, for sufficient repository capacity will be each repository, the Act required DOE consideration in either a generic available within 30 years beyond to conduct in-situ investigations of three rulemaking or an adjudicatory expiration of any reactor operating sites and recommend one from among proceeding, the Court observed that the license to dispose of existing them to the President and Congress for issues of storage and disposal of nuclear commercial high-level radioactive waste repository development. The NWPA waste were being considered by the and spent fuel originating in such also required DOE to recommend, from Commission in an ongoing generic reactor and generated up to that time. among alternative sites and designs, a proceeding known as the "S-3 (3) High-level radioactive waste and site and design for an MRS for spent fuel Proceeding" on the environmental spent fuel will be managed in a safe and high-level waste management impacts of uranium fuel cycle activities manner until sufficient repository before disposal. The Commission's to support the operation of a light water capacity is available to assure the safe licensing and regulatory authority over reactor, and that it was appropriate to disposal of all high-level radioactive both storage and disposal facilities was remand in light of a pending decision on waste and spent fuel. preserved by the Act. that proceeding and analysis. (4)' If necessary, spent fuel generated In the four years after enactment of On October 18, 1979, NRC announced in any reactor can be stored safely and the NWPA, DOE met a number of the that it was initiating a rulemaking' without significant environmental Act's early program requirements, but proceeding in response to the Appeals impacts for at least 30 years beyond the also encountered significant difficulties. Court remand and as a continuation of expiration of that reactor's operating It published a final Mission Plan for the the NRDC proceeding. Specifically, the license at that reactor's spent fuel overall NWPA program, and followed purpose of the proceeding was for the storage basin, or at either onsite or Commission "* *
- to reassess its offsite independent spent fuel storage with a Project Decision Schedule for degree of confidence that radioactive installations. DOE and other Federal agency actions.
It promulgated, with Commission wastes produced by nuclear facilities (5) Safe independent onsite or offsite will be safely disposed of, to determine spent fuel storage will be made concurrence, a set of guidelines for when any such disposal will be available if such storage capacity is repository siting and development. It available, and whether such wastes can needed. published draft and final environmental be safely stored until they are disposed On the day the Decision was issued, assessments for nine candidate of." the Commission also promulgated two repository sites, and recommended three The Commission recognized that the rulemaking amendments: (1) An for characterization. It completed and scope of this proceeding would be amendment to 10 CFR part 50, which submitted to Congress an environmental broader than the Court's instruction, required that no later than five years assessment, a program plan, and a which required the Commission to before expiration of reactor operating proposal with a site and design for an address only storage-related questions. licenses, the licensee must provide NRC MRS. All these actions followed The Commission believed, however, that with a written plan for management of extensive interactions with interested the primary public concern was the spent fuel onsite,. until title for the spent Federal agencies, State, Indian tribal, safety of waste disposal rather than the fuel is transferred to the DOE; and (2) an and local governments, and other availability of an off-site solution to the amendment to 10 CFR part 51 which organiza lions. In the course of these storage problem. The Commission also provided that environmental activities, however, DOE also slipped its committed itself to reassess its basis for consequences of spent fuel storage after schedule for operation of the first confidence that methods of safe expiration of facility licenses need not repository by five years, indefinitely permanent disposal for high-level waste be addressed in connection with postponed efforts toward a second would be available when needed. Thus, issuance of or amendment to a reactor repository, and had to halt further MRS the Commission chose as a matter of opera ting license. siting and development activities policy not to confine itself exclusively to In issuing the part 51 amendment, the pending Congressional authorization. the narrower issues in the court remand. Commission stated that although it had In December, 1987, Congress enacted In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, reasonable assurance that one or more the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments the Commission also stated that if the repositories would be available by 2007- Act (NWPAA). The NWPAA redirected proceeding led to a finding that safe off- 2009, it was possible that some spent the high-level waste program by site storage or disposal would be fuel would have to be stored beyond suspending site characterization available before expiration of facility those dates. The part 51 amendment activities for the first repository at sites operating licenses, NRC would was based on the Commission's finding other than the Yucca Mountain site, and promulgate a rule providing that the in the Waste Confidence Proceeding by suspending all site-specific activities impact of onsite storage of spent fuel that it had reasonable assurance that no with respect to a second repository. The after expiration of facility operating significant environmental impacts will Amendments Act also authorized and licenses need not be considered in result from storage of spent fuel for at set schedule and capacity limits on the individual licensing proceedings. least 30 years beyond expiration of MRS. The purpose of these limitations, The Waste Confidence Decision was reactor opera ting licenses. according to sponsors of the legislation, issued on August 31, 1984 (49 FR 34658). Enactment of the NWPA contributed was to assure that an MRS would not In the Decision, the Commission made significantly to the basis for the become a substitute for a geologic five findings. It found reasonable Commission's 1984 Decision and repository. assurance that: companion rulemakings. The Act Consistent with its commitment to (1) Safe disposal of high-level established a funding source and revisit its Waste Confidence conclusions radioactive waste and spent fuel in a process with milestones and schedules at least every five years, the 51-SC-4
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION Commission has undertaken the current Commission seeks comment on whether B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since review to assess the effect of these and it has identified all the issues relevant to the Commission's Original Decision on other developments since 1984 on the its proposed findings, and on whether its Finding 3: basis for each of its five findings. In this analyses of these issues supports the Responsibility for spent fuel storage beyond 1998; document, the Commission supplements conclusions and findings proposed. Delay in second repository; the basis for its earlier findings and the Table of Contents Potential for license renewals. environmental analysis of the 1984 Decision. The Commission proposes to I. First Commission Finding IV. Fourth Commission Finding amend its second finding, concerning the A. Issues Considered in Commission's 1984 A. Issues Considered in Commission's 1984 timing of initial availability and Decision on Finding 1: Decision on Finding 4: sufficient capacity of a repository, and 1. Identification of acceptable sites. Long-term integrity of spent fuel under
- 2. Development of effective waste water pool storage conditions; its fourth finding, concerning the packages: Structure and component safety for duration of safe spent fuel storage. [al Considerations in developing waste extended facility operation for storage; These proposed revisions are based on package. Safety of dry storage of spent fuel; the following considerations: [bl Effect of reprocessing on waste form Potential risks of accidents and acts of (1) The five-year slippage, from 1998 and waste package. sabotage of spent fuel storage facilities.
to 2003, in the DOE schedule for 3. Development of effective engineered B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since repository availability; barriers for isolating wastes from the the Commission's Original Decision on (2) The additional slip of at least 18 biosphere: Finding 4: months since January 1987 in the DOE [a) Backfill materials. Radiological and non-radiological schedule for the next step in the [bl Borehole and shaft sealants. consequences of extended spent fuel storage; B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since Potential delay in first repository, license repository program, the excavation of the Commission's Original Decision on renewals, delay in second repository; the exploratory shaft; Finding 1: Environmental assessment and finding of (3) The need to continue accounting 1. Termination of Multiple Site no significant impact of at-reactor storage for the possibility that the Yucca Characterization. beyond 30 years after reactor's licensed life Mountain site might be found unsuitable 2. Relevance to NRC's "S-3 Table" for operation. and that DOE would have to initiate proceeding. V. Fifth Commission Finding efforts to identify and characterize 3. International develoments in spent fuel disposal technology. A. Issues Considered in Commission's 1984 another site for the first repository; C. Conclusion on Finding 1. Decision on Finding 5: (4) The statutory suspension of site- Adequacy of NWPA for determining specific activities for the second II. Second Commission Finding responsibility for timely spent fuel storage; repository; A. Issues Considered in Commission's 1984 Spent fuel discharge projections; (5) DOE's estimate that site screening Decision on Finding 2: Industry commitment to implement away-for a second repository should start 1. Technical uncertainties: from-reactor storage. about 25 years before the start of waste [al Finding technically acceptable sites in a B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since acceptance; and timely fashion. the Commission's Original Decision on (6) Increased confidence in the safety [bl Timely development of waste packages Finding 5: and engineered barriers. Responsiblity for spent fuel storage beyond of extended spent fuel storage, either at 2. Institutional uncertainties: the reactor or at independent spent fuel 1998; (al Measures for dealing with Federal- Advances in technology for dry storage; storage installa lions. State-local concerns. Benefits of monitored retrievable storage The Commission is also proposing (bl Continuity of the management of the facility under NWPAA; elsewhere in this issue of the Federal waste program. License renewals; Register that 10 CFR § 51.23(a) be [cl DOE's schedule for repository Options for offsite storage under NWPAA. amended to confirm with the proposed development. revisions to Findings 2 and 4. B. Relevant Issues That Have Arisen since Original Finding 1 the Commission's Original Decision on Organization and Table of Contents Finding 2: The Commission finds reasonable
- 1. Potential delay under the program of assurance that safe disposal of high-In conducting this review, the level radioactive waste and spent fuel in Commission has addressed, for each of single site characterization.
- 2. Potential limitations on timing of a mined geologic repository is its 1984 Findings, two categories of availability of disposal capacity: technically feasible.
issues. The first category consists of the (al Impact of possible limited disposal issues the Commission considered in capacity at Yucca Mountain, indefinite Proposed Finding I making each Finding at the time of the suspension of second repository program. Same as above. initial Waste Confidence Decision. For [bl Impact of uncertainty in spent fuel these issues, the Commission is projections on need to consider second 1.A. Issues Considered in Commission's interested in whether its conclusions, or repository program. 1984 Decision on Finding 1 the Finding these conclusions support, 3. Impact of slippages in DOE program on availability of a repository when needed for 1.A.1. The Identification of Acceptable should be changed to address new or health and safety reasons. Sites foreseeable developments that have 4. Effect of NRC emphasis on completeness arisen since the first Waste Confidence and quality. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Decision. The second category of issues C. Conclusion on Finding 2. of 1982 (NWPAJ, the Department of consists of those the Commission III. Third Commission Finding Energy (DOE) had responsibility for believes should be added to the 1984 identifying candidate sites for a geologic issues in light of subsequent A. Issues Considered in Commission's 1984 repository and for repository Decision on Finding 3: developments. [To enable the reader to Licensee compliance with NRC regulations development. The first requirement follow more easily, the lengthy and license conditions; leading to recommendation of candidate discussions of Findings 1 and 2 have Safe management of spent fuel past sites was formal notification of States been organized to address each original expira lion of opera ting licenses; with one or more potentially acceptable and new issue under subheadings.) The Availability of DOE interim storage. sites for a repository within 90 days of 51-SC-5
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION enactment of the NWPA. In February site. This decision was not based on a meet NRC's technical criteria for 1983, the DOE identified nine potentially technical evaluation of the three isolating wastes. Sequential site acceptable sites for the first repository. recommended sites or a conclusion that characteriza lion does not necessarily Four of the sites were in bedded-salt the Hanford and Deaf Smith sites were preclude or hinder identification of an formations, three were in salt domes, not technically acceptable. According to acceptable site for a repository. NRC did one in volcanic tuff, and one in basalt. sponsors of the legi~lation, the principal express concern to Congress, on several The NWPA required that each site purpose of the requirement to suspend occasions during deliberations over the nomination be accompanied by an characterization at these sites was to
- proposed legislation, that sequential site environmental assessment (EA). In reduce costs. In effect, the NWPAA characterization could delay December 1984, DOE published Draft directed DOE to characterize candidate considerably the schedule for opening a EAs (DEAs) for each of the nine sites sites sequentially, if necessary, rather repository if the site undergoing identified as potentially acceptable and than simultaneously. If DOE determines characterization were found to be proposed the following sites for at any time that the Yucca Mountain site unlicenseable. NRC also indicated that nomination: The reference repository is unsuitable, DOE is to terminate all this potential for delay would have to be location at Hanford, WA; Yucca site characterization activities and considered by NRC in reevaluating the Mountain, NV; Deaf Smith County, TX; report to Congress its recommendations findings in its Waste Confidence Davis, Canyon, UT; and Richton Dome, for further actions. Decision. The impact of this redirection MS. In May 1986, DOE released Final The NRC staff has identified of the high-level waste program on the EAs (FEAs) for the five sites nominated. numerous issues regarding the Yucca Commission's Waste Confidence At that time, DOE recommended that Mountain site that may have a bearing findings is not on the ability to identify the Yucca Mountain, Hanford, and Deaf on the licenseability of that site. These technically acceptable sites, but on the Smith County sites undergo site issues will have to be resolved during timing of availability of technically characterization. The President site characterization. An example of a acceptable sites. Because approved the recommendation. site issue that may bear on the question characterization of multiple sites The NRC staff provided extensive of suitability is tectonic activity, the appears to be more directly related to comments on both the DEAs and the folding or faulting of the earth's crust. In the timing of repository availability than FEAs. NRC concerns on the FEAs the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, to the feasibility of geologic disposal, related primarily to DOE's failure to NRC noted that"* *
- the potential consideration of the above statement in recognize uncertainty inherent in the sites being investigated by DOE are in light of the NWPAA program redirection existing limited data bases for the regions of relative tectonic stability." will be discussed under Finding 2.
recommended sites, and the tendency of The authority for this statement came Another question bearing on whether DOE to present overly favorable or from the Position Statement of the U.S. technically acceptable sites can be optimistic conclusions. The primary Geological Survey (USGS). NRC has intent of the comments was to assist found is whether compliance with raised concerns regarding tectonic DOE in preparing high-quality Site Environmental Protection Agency (EPA] activity at the Yucca Mountain site in Characterization Plans (SCPs) for each environmental standards for disposal of the comments on the draft and final site, as required under the NWPA, EAs, and in the draft and final Point spent fuel and high-level waste can be before excavation of exploratory shafts. Papers on the Consultation Draft Site demonstrated. These standards, NRC concerns can only be addressed Characterization Plan. If it appears originally promulgated in final form in adequately through the site during site characterization that the September 1985, were vacated in July characterization process, because one of Yucca Mountain site will be unable to 1987, by the U.S. Court of Appeals, and the purposes of this process is to meet NRC requirements regarding remanded to EPA for further develop the data to evaluate the isolation of waste, DOE will have to consideration (see NRDCv. EPA, 824 F. significance of concerns relative to site suspend characterization at that site and 2d 1258). As originally promulgated, the suitability. report to Congress. standards set limits on releases of NRC did not identify any fundamental DOE's program of site screening in radioactive materials from the site into technical flaw or disqualifying factor different geologic media was consistent the accessible environment over a which it believed would render any of with section 112(a) of the NWPA, which 10,000-year period following disposal. the sites unsuitable for characterization. required that DOE recommend sites in They also required that there be less Further, NRC did not take a position on different geologic media to the extent than one chance in ten that the release the ranking of the sites in order of practicable. This strategy was to ensure limits will be exceeded in 10,000 years, preference, because this could be that if any one site were found and less than one chance in 1,000 that viewed as a prejudgment of licensing unsuitable for reasons that would render releases will exceed ten times the limits issues. NRC was not aware of any other sites in the same geologic medium over 10,000 years. reason that would indicate that any of unacceptable, alternate sites in different In past comments on draft and the candidate sites was unlicenseable. host rock types would be available. proposed EPA standards, and in related Nor has NRC made any such finding to NRC referred to this policy in its 1984 NRC rulemaking efforts, NRC has date with respect to any site identified Waste Confidence Decision, when it expressed concern that probabilistic as paten ti ally acceptable. said, in support of its argument on analyses should not be exclusively In March 1987, Congress began technical feasibility, that"* *
- DOE's relied on to demonstrate compliance drafting legislation to amend the program is providing information on site with EPA release limits. NRC's repository program. NRC provided characteristics at a sufficiently large comments said in part that"* * * [t]he comments on a number of these draft number and variety of sites and geologic numerical probabilities in [the amendments. In December 1987, the media to support the expectation that standards] would require a degree of NWPAA was enacted. In a major one or more technically acceptable sites precision which is unlikely to be departure from the initial intent of the will be identified. achievable in evaluating a real waste NWPA, the new law required that DOE NRC recognizes that simultaneous site disposal system." The comments went suspend site characterization activities characterization is not necessary to on to explain that"* *
- identification at sites other than the Yucca Mountain identify a repository site that would of the relevant processes and events 51-SC-6
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION affecting a particular site will require sites, the Commission concludes that Under the NWPAA, DOE was considerable judgment and will not be technically acceptable sites for a required to suspend site amenable to accurate quantification, by repository can be found. The characterization activities at sites other statistical analysis, of their probability Commission is confident that, given than the Yucca Mountain, NV site. of occurrence." NRC believed then, and adequate time and resources, such sites Consequently, DOE has narrowed the continues to believe, that it must make can be identified, evaluated, and range of waste package designs to a qualitative judgments about the data accepted or rejected on their merits, design tailored for unsaturated luff at and methodologies on which the even if no more than one site is the Yucca Mountain site. This aspect of numerical probabilities were based. undergoing site characterization. This the high-level waste program redirection In response to NRC concerns, EPA judgment does not rest on the may facilitate and expedite the waste incorporated language into its 1985 acceptability of the Yucca Mountain site package design process insofar as it standards that appeared to allow or any one future candidate site. enables DOE to concentrate its efforts flexibility to combine qualitative 1.A.2. The Development of Effective on developing a single design for a judgments with numerical probability Waste Packages single site instead of three designs for estimates in a way that might have sites in bedded salt, basalt, and made implementation of the EPA 1.A.2.a. Considerations in developing unsaturated tuff. standards practicable. The text of those waste packages. The NWPA required Currently, DOE is evaluating standards recognized that "proof of the NRC to promulgate technical uncertainties in waste package design future performance of a disposal system requirements and criteria to be applied related to waste form, container type, is not to be had in the ordinary sense of in licensing a repository for high-level and environment. The current the word" with the substantial radioactive waste. Under section 121 of conceptual design for the waste package uncertainties and very long performance the Act, these technical criteria must is based on several assumptions. the period involved. The 1985 standards provide for use of a system of multiple waste form is presumed to be ten-year-emphasized that a "reasonable barriers in the design of the repository old spent fuel or high-level waste in the expectation"-rather than absolute and such restrictions on the form of borosilicate glass in stainless-proof-is to be the test of compliance. retrievability of waste as NRC deems steel canisters. (In addition to spent fuel "What is required," the text of the appropriate. The system of multiple and high-level waste, the waste form barriers includes both engineered and standards said, "is a reasonable may include greater-than-Class C natural barriers. expectation, on the basis of the record (GTCC) low-level waste. This waste is The waste package is the first
- * *, that compliance * *
- will be not routinely acceptable for near-surface engineered barrier in the system of achieved." In an additional attempt to multiple barriers to radionuclide escape. disposal under NRC regulations for provide flexibility for implementation of The waste package is defined as the disposal of low-level wastes, but is the standards, EPA also provided that "waste form and any containers, acceptable for disposal in a repository numerical analyses of releases from a shielding, packing and other absorbent licensed for disposal of spent fuel and repository were to be incorporated into materials immediately surrounding an high-level wastes. This waste might an overall probability distribution only individual waste container." Before include such materials as sealed sources "to the extent practicable." This phrase sinking an exploratory shaft for site and activated metals from the appeared to allow some discretion for characterization, DOE is required to decommissioning of reactors and NRC to incorporate qualitative prepare an SCP including a description production facilities.)
considerations into its license decision- of the waste form or packaging proposed Six materials are being considered for making, rather than having to rely solely for use at the repository, and an fabrication of containers, including on numerical projections of repository explanation of the relationship between austenitic steel (3161), nickel-based performance. On the strength of these such waste form or packaging and the alloys (Alloy 825), pure copper (CDA and other EPA assurances, the geologic medium of the site. 102), copper-based alloys (aluminum-Commission did not object when the The multiple barrier approach to bronze, CDA-613, and 70--30 Cu-Ni, final standards were published in 1985. radioactive waste isolation in a geologic CDA-715), and a container with a metal Pursuant to the remand by the Federal repository is implemented in NRC outer shell and ceramic liner. The court in 1987, EPA is currently revising requirements by a number of reference container for the spent fuel its standards for disposal of spent fuel performance objectives and by detailed and high-level waste is a 1.0-cm thick and high-level waste. The court's siting and design criteria. The NRC cylinder to be made of American Iron decision directed that the remand focus performance objective for the waste and Steel Institute (AISI) 3041 stainless on the ground water and individual package requires substantially complete steel. This will be DOE's benchmark protection requirements of the containment for a period of not less than material, against which other materials standards. Although the EPA standards 300 years nor more than 1,000 years are to be compared. DOE currently are still undergoing development at this after permanent closure of the intends for spent fuel containers to be time, the Commission does not currently repository. The technical design criteria filled with an inert gas, such as argon, see a sufficient basis to withdraw its for the waste package require that before being welded closed. confidence in the feasibility of interaction of the waste package with The reference repository location is in evaluating compliance with such the environment not compromise the unsaturated luff of the Topopah standards. NRC staff will closely performance of the package, the Spring Formation underlyign Yucca monitor the development of underground facility, or the geologic Mountain. According to DOE, little free-repromulgated standards to assure that setting. Therefore, the waste package flowing water is thought to be present EPA methodologies for demonstrating design must take into account the there to contribute to corrosion of the compliance with them can be applied by complex site-specific interactions waste containers, although the degree of NRC to evaluate DOE's demonstration between host rock, waste package, and saturation in this luff is estimated to be of compliance. ground water that will affect waste 65+/-19 percent of the available void In sum, considering both past and package and overall repository space in the rock. DOE has current programs for characterizing performance. acknowledged, however, that the 51-SC-7
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION greatest uncertainties in assessing waste defense waste and a small amount of to which glass fracturing increases leach package performance at Yucca commercial reprocessed waste from the rate. Other factors influencing leach rate Mountain stem from difficulty in West Valley Demonstration Project. The are temperature, pH of the leaching characterizing and modeling the coupled decision to locate the defense high-level solution, formation of solid layers on the geochemical-hydrologic processes that waste in the repository for wastes from surface of the waste glass, irradiation, represent the interactions between the commercial power reactors resulted water volume, and chemistry. host rock, waste package, and ground from the requirement in Section 8 of the It is possible that renewed water. The final waste package design NWPA that the President evaluate the reprocessing of spent fuel from nuclear will depend on the results of site possibility of developing a defense- power reactors may result in a greater characterization and laboratory testing waste-only repository. In February 1985, proportion of reprocessed waste to to reduce uncertainty in predicting these DOE submitted a report to the President spent fuel than is currently anticipated. interactions in the reference repository recommending a combined commercial Although such a departure from the horizon. The final design will also be and defense repository. In April 1985, current plan to dispose of mostly shaped by research in understanding the the President agreed that no basis unreprocessed spent fuel in the degradation of candidate container appeared to exist for a defense-only repository does not appear likely at this materials, and the characteristics of the repository and directed DOE to dispose time, the Commission believes it is likely reference waste forms. of defense waste in the commercial important to recognize the possibility Regarding the state of technology for repository. that this situation could change. developing long-lived waste package About 8,750 MTHM of reprocessed The possibility of disposal of containers, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel high-level waste from defense facilities reprocessed waste as an alternative and Waste Management Company at Savannah River, SC, Hanford, WA, waste form to spent fuel assemblies was (SKB), the organization responsible for and Idaho Falls, ID will be available by recognized by the Commission in the radioactive waste disposal in Sweden, 2020 for disposal in the repository, 1984 Waste Confidence Decision. The has described a container for spent fuel according to the Draft 1988 Mission Plan Commission noted that the disposal of rods that consists of a 0.1-m thick Amendment. This waste will likely be waste from reprocessing had been copper canister surrounded by a solidified into a borosilicate glass studied for a longer time than the bentonite overpack. The design calls for matrix. About 640 MTHM of disposal of spent fuel. and that the pouring copper powder into the void reprocessed high-level waste will come possibility of reprocessing does not alter spaces in the canisters, compacting the from the West Valley Demonstration the technical feasibility of developing a powder using hot-isostatic pressing with Project, a facility for wastes from suitable waste package. The an inert gas, and sealing the canisters. discontinued commercial reprocessing Commission went on to say that there is SKB estimates that the copper canister of spent fuel at that site. This evidence that the disposal of waste package has a million-year reprocessed waste also will be reprocessed high-level waste may pose lifetime. (See also 1.B.3. below.) solidified, probably in a borosilicate fewer technical challenges than the As noted in NRC's Final Point Papers glass waste form. disposal of spent fuel. As long as DOE on the Consultation Draft Site Waste-form testing for the Yucca uses conservative assumptions and test Characterization Plan, the Commission Mountain site is focusing on both spent conditions for evaluating the does not expect absolute proof that 100 fuel and reprocessed high-level waste. performance of different waste forms percent of the waste packages will have The performance of the waste form in against NRC licensing requirements, the 100 percent containment for 300 to 1,000 providing the first barrier to Commission has no basis to change its years. Since that time, the NRC staff has radionuclide migration is being finding that there is reasonable completed its review of the December evaluated on the basis of the physical assurance that reprocessing does not 1988 Site Characterization Plan for and chemical environment of the waste reduce confidence in the technical Yucca Mountain. Although the form after disposal, the performance of feasibility of designing and building a Commission continues to have concerns the waste container, and the waste package that will meet NRC about DOE's waste package program, emplacement configuration. licensing requirements in a variety of nothing has occurred to diminish the A major limitation on glass waste- geologic media. Commission's confidence that as long as form testing is that the actual waste DOE establishes conservative objectives 1.A.3. The Development of Effective glasses to be disposed of are not Engineered Barriers for Isolating Wastes to guide a testing and design program, in available, and their exact composition tuff or in other geologic media if From the Biosphere will not be established until after further necessary, it is technically feasible to testing. Reference waste-glass 1.A.3.a. Backfill materials. At the time develop a waste package that meets the compositions are being used for studies of the 1984 Waste Confidence Decision, performance objective for substantially on the effect of variation in glass DOE was developing conceptual designs complete containment. composition on performance. (These for backfill in several geologic media. 1.A.2.b. Effect of reprocessing on glass compositions are designed by Most candidate sites at that time were waste form and waste package. The Savannah River Laboratory (SRL) for in saturated rock, and the conceptual Draft 1988 Mission Plan Amendment defense high-level waste, and by Pacific designs included backfilling or packing estimates that a total of about 77,800 Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for the around waste containers to prevent or metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of commercial high-level wastes to be delay ground water flow which could spent nuclear fuel and high-level vitrified under the West Valley enhance corrosion and radionuclide radioactive waste will be available for Demonstration Project Act.) The transport near the waste containers. The disposal by the year 2020. (This estimate reference compositions will be revised conceptual design for the engineered is based on a "no new orders" when better analyses of the composition barrier system at the Yucca Mountain assumption for commercial nuclear of the wastes at SRL and West Valley site has different parameters because reactors and a 40-year reactor lifetime.) are available. The test program will seek the site is unsaturated; instead of Of this 77,800 MTHM, about 9,400 to establish upper bounds on leaching of backfill or packing around the waste MTHM will consist of reprocessed important radionuclides, and the extent container, there is to be an air gap 51-SC-8
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION between sides of the waste canister and Commission contim;es to have When the repository is the host rock. confidence that backfill or packing decommissioned, NRC expects that Backfill material around the container materials can be developed as needed most, if not all, shafts, ramps, and is not required under NRC regulations for the underground facility and waste boreholes will probably have to be for the waste package. NRC regulations package to meet applicable NRC sealed to reduce the possibility that they require that"* *
- containment of high- licensing criteria and performance could provide preferential pathways for level waste within the waste packages objectives. ' radionuclide migration from the
[which includes the container] will be 1.A.3.b. Borehole and shaft seals. The underground facility to the acccessible substantially complete for a period to be engineered barrier system described environment. DOE estimates that as determined by the Commission * *
- above is limited to the waste package many as 350 shallow and 70 deep provided, that such period shall not be and the underground facility as defined exploratory boreholes may be emplaced less than 300 years nor more than 1000 in 10 CFR part 60. The undergound by the time site characterization has years after permanent closure of the facility refers to the underground been completed at the Yucca Mountain repository" (10 CFR 60.113(a)(l)(ii)(BJ), structure, including openings and site. Decommissioning may not occur for and that the entire engineered barrier backfill materials, but excluding shafts, up to 100 years after commencement of system meet the release rate boreholes. and their seals. Containment repository operations. Because the final performance objective of 1 part in and release-rate requirements are design for seals will likely have been 100,000 per year. specified for the engineered barrier modified from the initial license Backfill is also a component of the application design (LAD), DOE is system, but not for the borehole and borehole, shaft, and ramp seals, which viewing the seal LAD as serving two shaft seals. Seals are covered under 10 are not part of the engineered barrier primary functions. As set forth in DOE's CFR 60.112, the overall post-closure system or the underground facility. SCP for the Yucca Mountain candidate system performance objective for the Boreholes, shafts, and ramps must be site, the seal LAD is to establish that: (1) repository. Among other things, this "* *
- technology for constructing seals sealed when the repository is provision requires that shafts, boreholes is reasonably available;" and (2) "* *
- permanently closed. This aspect of and their seals be designed to assure there is reasonable assurance that seals backfilling is discussed below under "Development of sealants." Backfill may that release of radioactive materials lo have been designed so that, following also include crushed rock used to fill the accessible environment following permanent closure, they do not become openings such as drifts in the permanent closure conform to EPA's pathways that compromise the geologic underground facility. At the Yucca generally applicable standards for repository's ability to meet the post-Mountain candidate site, DOE currently radioactivity. Although the criteria for closure performance objectives."
plans to fill openings in the underground seals given in 10 CFR part 60 do not To establish the availability of facility at closure of the repository. specifically mention seals in ramps and technology for seal construction, DOE Backfilling is not planned before the underground facility, it is reasonable has identified at least 31 site properties repository closure because it is not to consider them together with borehole that need to be characterized in needed for structural support for the and shaft sealants, because the seals determining necessary seal openings, and it would make waste and drainage design in ramps and the characteristics. These properties include retrieval more difficult. At closure of the underground facility could also affect saturated hydraulic conductivity of facility, however, openings will be the overall system performance of the alluvium near shafts, the quantity of backfilled with coarse tuff excavated for geologic repository. water reaching the seals due to surface-the facility. In the conceptual design Construction of the exploratory shaft flooding events, and erosion potential in provided in the SCP, the selection of facility (ESF) will be the first major site the shaft vicinity. The SCP also coarse tuff as backfill material is based characterization activity. The ESF will discusses material properties that need on numerical simulations performed by consist of two vertical shafts, one for to be identified to determine sealing DOE which suggest that coarse luff testing and the other for support, and components such as initial and altered would be a more effective barrier to underground excavations for at-depth hydrologic properties of materials. capillary flow in the backfill matrix than testing. The repository surface facilities The SCP indicates that DOE is fine materials. will be connected to the underground planning to use crushed tuff and DOE's design for the engineered facility by two additional shafts (a men- cements in the sealing program at the barrier system submitted with the and-materials shaft and the Yucca Mountain candidate site. The license application will have to contain emplacement area exhaust shaft) and stated advantages of using luff include information sufficient for NRC to reach two ramps, a waste ramp for bringing minimizing degradation of seal material a favorable conclusion regarding the radioactive waste and spent fuel into and avoiding disruption of ambient overall system performance objective. the repository, and a luff ramp for ground-water chemistry. Backfill or packing around waste removing rock from the underground DOE's current design concept for containers is not required by NRC facility to a luff pile. In addition to these meeting the overall performance regulations if DOE can demonstrate that shafts and ramps, there will be objectives includes a combination of applicable performance objectives can exploratory boreholes for obtaining sealing and drainage. Seal requirements be met without it. If, on the basis of samples of rock, water, and gases in may be reduced in part by: (1) Limiting testing and experiments during site strata at varying depths. Exploratory the amount of surface water that may characterization, DOE decided that boreholes have the potential to provide enter boreholes, shafts, and ramps; (2) backfill would enhance engineered information on hydrologic properties of selecting borehole, shaft, and ramp barrier system performance, the design the Yucca Mountain site, with emphasis locations and orientiation that provide would have to reflect this conclusion. on movement of water in unsaturated long flow paths from the emplaced DOE has already conducted research on luff. Other properties which will be waste to the accessible environment a wide variety of candidate materials studied using exploratory boreholes are above the repository; and (3) for backfill around waste packages in a lithologic, structural, mechanical, and maintaining a sufficient rate of drainage variety of geologic media. The thermal properties of the host rock. below the repository horizon level so 51-SC-9
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION that water can be shunted past the nuclear waste were being considered by to explain the basis for and significance waste packages without contacting the Commission in an ongoing generic of the data in the table, it is unlikely that them. proceeding known as the "S-3" the revisions will have any impact on Although DOE's program is focusing Proceeding. the Commission's generic findings in the on seals for the Yucca Mountain The S--3 Proceeding was the Waste Confidence proceeding. Nor is it candidate site, the Commission finds no outgrowth of efforts to address likely that this reexamination of the basis for diminished confidence that an generically the NEPA requirement for an Waste Confidence findings will affect acceptable seal can be developed for evaluation of the environmental impact the S-3 rule; the Waste Confidence candidated sites in different geologic of operation of a light water reactor Proceeding is not intended to make media. The Commission finds no (LWR). Table S-3 assigned numerical quantitative judgments about the evidence to suggest that it can not values for environmental costs resulting environmental costs of waste disposal. continue to have reasonable assurance from uranium fuel cycle activities to Unless the Commission, in a future that borehold, shaft, ramp, and support one year of LWR operation. review of the Waste Confidence repository seals can be developed to NRC promulgated the S-3 rule in April decision, finds that it no longer has meet 10 CFR part 60 performance 1974. In July 1976, the U.S. Circuit Court confidence in the technical feasibility of objectives. of Appeals found that Table S--3 was disposal in a mined geologic repository, inadequately supported by the record the Commission will not consider it J.B. Relevant issues That Have Arisen regarding reprocessing of spent fuel and Since the Commission's Original necessary to review the S-3 rule when it radioactive waste management, in part reexamines its Waste Confidence Decision because the Commission, in reaching its findings in the future. 1.B.1 In support of its argument on assessment, had relied heavily on 1.B.3. To what extent do technical feasibility, the Commission testimony of NRC staff that the problem developments in spent fuel disposal stated in its 1984 Waste Confidence of waste disposal would be resolved. technology outside of the United States Decision that "* *
- DOE's program is When the U.S. Circuit Court of (e.g., Swedish waste package designs) providing information on site Appeals issued the remand on what enhance NRC's confidence in the characteristics at a sufficiently large were to become the "Waste Confidence" technical feasibility of disposal of high-number and variety of sites and geologic issues in May 1979, NRC had pending level waste and spent fuel?
media to support the expectation that before it the final amended S-3 rule. The Spent fuel disposal technology is the one or more technically acceptable sites Court regarded the resolution of the subject of extensive research will be identified." The NWPAA issue of waste disposal in the S-3 investigation in both Europe and North required, however, that DOE suspend proceeding as being related to the issue America. Advances in this technology site-specific site characterization raised by the petitioners in the appeals activities under the Nuclear Waste are being communicated to the NRC of the NRC decisions on the expansion staff both through bilateral agreements Policy Act of 1982 at all sites other than of spent fuel storage capacity. The Court the Yucca Mountain, NV site. and the presentation of research results said that the " * *
- disposition of the Under the NWPAA, the DOE program at international meetings.
S-3 proceeding, although it has a has been redirected to characterize somewhat different focus, may have a Outside the United States, studies of candidate repository sites in sequence bearing on the pending cases." spent fuel as a waste form are now rather than simultaneously. If the Yucca The Commission approved the final being conducted primarily in Canada Mountain site is found to be unsuitable, S-3 rule in July 1979. In October 1979, and Sweden, although both France and DOE must terminate site the Commission issued a Notice of West Germany have small programs in characteri;.mtion activities there and Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on the this area. The Swedish studies have provide Congress with a Waste Confidence issues in response to been mainly concerned with boiling recommendation for furture action, such the remand by the Court of Appeals. In water reactor (BWR) spent fuel, whereas as the charaterizaiton of another site. the NPRM, the Commission stated that the Canadian studies focus on spent fuel Because characterization of multiple the proceeding would " * *
- draw upon from that country's CANDU reactors, sites now appears to be more directly the record compiled in the Commission's which use unenriched uranium in a core related to the timing of repository recently concluded rulemaking on the immersed in "heavy" water made from availability than to the technical environmental impacts of the nuclear deuterium. BWR and CANDU fuel, like feasibility of geologic disposal as a fuel cycle, and that the record complied pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel, concept, consideration of the , herein will be available for use in the are uranium dioxide fuels clad in Commission's aforementioned 1984 general fuel cycle rule update discussed zircaloy. However, the burnup rates for statement in light of the NWPAA will be in that rulemaking." these three fuel types vary considerably.
discussed under Finding 2. In the final Table S-3 rule issued in Ongoing research studies on spent fuel 1.B.2. What is the relationship, if any 1979, the Commission had said that include: work on the characterization of of the "S-3 Proceeding" to the current " * *
- bedded salt sites can be found spent fuel as a waste form; the corrosion review of the Commission's 1984 Waste which will provide effective isolation of of spent fuel and its dissolution under Confidence Findings? Would the radioactive waste from the biosphere." oxidizing and reducing conditions; the planned revision of the S--3 rulemaking When the Commission issued the 1984 radiolysis of ground water in the near be affected if the Commission had to Waste Confidence Decision, part of the vicinity of the spent fuel, and its effects qualify its current confidence in the basis for the discussion of waste on the dissolution of the fuel; and the technical feasibility of safe disposal? management and disposal in the August development of models to predict the In its decision to remand to NRC the 1979 final S-3 rule had changed. For leaching of spent fuel over long time questions of whether safe offsite storage example, in 1984 the repository program periods. The results of this work are would be available to 2007-2009, or, if was proceeding under the NWPA, which steadily increasing our understanding of not, whether spent fuel could be safely required that DOE recommend three spent fuel as a waste form.
stored onsite past those dates, the U.S. sites for site characterization. High-level radioactive waste, whether Circuit Court of Appeals observed that Although NRC is preparing to amend it is spent reactor fuel or waste from the issues of storage and disposal of the S-3 Table, and add a new appendix reprocessing, must be enclosed in an 51-SC-10
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION outer canister as part of the waste and structurally-supported designs. In ground water. Thus, the waste form package. The canister surrounding the these designs, a thin outer shell is itself should function as an waste is expected to prevent the release supported by a particulate material immobilization agent to prevent any of radioactivity during its handling at packed around a steel internal structure significant release of radionuclides to the repository site before emplacement. that contains the spent fuel bundles. the biosphere over very long time After emplacement in the repository, it Several materials h~ve been identified periods. The two primary materials is expected to prevent the release of for the fabrication of the corrosion currently being considered for use as radioactivity for a specified period of resistant outer shell, including solidified waste forms are borosilicate time after the repository is closed, by commercially pure and low-alloy glass and SYNROC, a man-made providing a barrier to protect the waste titanium, high nickel-based alloys such titanate ceramic material. from coming into contact with the as Inconel 625, and pure copper. SYNROC was initially developed in ground water. Detailed designs have been produced for For practical reasons, canister Australia as an alternative material to all three types of supported shell materials may be divided into the canisters incorporating either a titanium borosilicate glass. It is composed following classes: (1) Completely or or nickel alloy shell less than 6-mm primarily of three minerals (hollandite, partially thermodynamically stable thick. A conceptual design has also been zirconolite, and perovskite) which materials such as copper; (2) passive produced for a copper-shell structurally- collectively have the capacity to accept materials such as stainless steel, supported canister and a metal-matrix the great majority of radioactive high-titanium, Hastelloy, Inconel, and container with a relatively thick (25-mm) level waste constituents into their aluminum; (3) corroding or sacrificial copper shell and a lead matrix material. crystal lattice strucuture. These three materials such as lead and steel; and (4) This last canister is intended to contain minerals, or closely related forms, occur non-metallic materials such as alumina 72 used CANDU fuel bundles in four naturally, and have been shown to have and titanium dioxide ceramics and layers of 18 bundles each. survived for many millions of years in a cement. Both the Canadian and Swedish wide range of natural environments. Sweden has been conducting an conceptual designs for the disposal of SYNROC has the property of being extensive canister research program spent fuel in canisters provide for extremely resistant to leaching by over the past several years. The main surrounding the canister with backfill ground water, particularly at canister of interest is copper, but material as part of the waste package temperatures above 100 degrees C. In titanium, carbon steel, and alumina and when it is emplaced in the repository. addition, the capacity of SYNROC to titanium dioxide are also being studied This backfill material would be packed immobilize high-level wastes is not as reasonable alternatives, should around the canister to retard the markedly impaired by high levels of unexpected problems be discovered movement of ground water and radiation damage. with using pure copper. radionuclides. Investigations of backfill The high leach-resistance of SYNROC The present Swedish canister design material at the Stripa mine in Sweden is a 100-mm thick copper container (as have shown that bentonite and silica at elevated temperatures increases the described previously in section A.2.a.), sand can be employed successfully as range of geologic environments in which which is claimed to provide backfill, both around the canister and in it may be used, such as deep geologic containment, in conjunction with an repository tunnels. A bentonite-silica repositories in both continental and appropriate backfill material, for a mixture is the recommended backfill marine environments. period on the order of one million years. material on the basis of its thermal and Research and development work on The critical factors for the isolation mechanical properties. Bentonite improving SYNROC production period for copper canisters are: (1) The backfills have been shown to produce technology is currently being done presence of corrosive substances such hydraulic conductivities that are very jointly in Australia and Japan. New as sulfphide ions in the ground water; (2) similar to the surrounding granite at methods of using metal alkoxides in the the possibility of these substances Stripa. Problems concerning the fabrication of SYNROC to obtain high reaching the canister surface; and (3) the variability of bentonite samples from homogeneity and lower leachability degree of inhomogeneity, or pitting, of different geographic locations can be have recently been developed in the resulting corrosion. Studies are eliminated if material from a single Australia. The Japanese have recently continuing to obtain more information source is used. The presence of sulfur developed a new method that uses on pitting corrosion of copper and on and some organic material, including titanium hydroxide, as a reducing agent techniques for welding thick-walled bacteria, in many bentonites poses some to produce SYNROC with a high density copper containers. problems related to microbially- and low leach rate. A pilot facility for Several conceptual designs for accelerated corrosion. Treatment with the production of non-radioactive canisters for the safe disposal of hydrogen peroxide may be used to SYNROC is not in operation in unreprocessed spent fuel have also been oxidize these organics. Heating the Australia, and a small pilot facility for developed in Canada. One canister bentonite to 400 degrees C can also be producing SYNROC with radioactive design option is the supported-shell, effective, although this may alter the constituents is being completed in metal-matrix concept, which involves crystal structure of the bentonite. Japan. packing the spent fuel bundles into a Many countries intend to dispose of thin corrosive-resistant shell and casting their high-level radioactive waste by On the basis of current information the remaining space with a low melting first converting the wastes into a solid, from the foreign studies just described point metal or alloy. Structural support vitrified form after reprocessing. Since on canisters, spent fuel as a waste form, for the shell would be provided by the the leaching of the waste form by backfill materials, and alternatives to resulting metal matrix. Lead is a circulating ground water after disposal borosilicate glass waste forms, the possible matrix material because of its is the most likely mechanism by which Commission concludes that there is no favorable casting properties, cost, and the radionuclides might be returned to basis for diminished confidence that an low melting point. the biosphere, the waste form must be acceptable waste package can be Other supported shell canister composed of a highly stable material developed for safe disposal of high-level concepts include the packed-particulate with an extremely low solubility in waste and spent fuel. 51-SC-11
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION J.C. Conclusion on Finding 1 radionuclides available for transport to candidate materials for backfill in a the accessible environment. variety of geologic media, and the The Commission has reexamined the Commission finds no basis to qualify its It is also technically feasible to basis for its First Finding in the 1984 past confidence that backfill materials separate from radioactive wastes the Waste Confidence Decision in light of can be developed, if needed, to meet radionuclides that constitute the subsequent program developments, and principal source of heat from the applicable NRC requirements. concludes that Finding 1 should be The current reference design for nuclides of greatest 1ong-term concern. reaffirmed. The former radionuclides, mainly fission sealing boreholes, shafts, ramps and the The technical feasibility of a products such as cesium-137 and underground facility at the Yucca repository rests initially on strontium-90, could then be stored for a Mountain candidate site employs identification of acceptable sites. At this period of years while the fission crushed luff and cement. Regardless of time, the Commission is not aware of products decay to the point where they the geologic medium of the candidate any evidence indicating that Yucca could be disposed of either in a manner site, DOE will have to show that the Mountain is not acceptable for site that does not require the degree of license application design meets NRC characterization. There are many confinement provided by a geologic post-closure performance objectives. outstanding questions regarding the repository, or in a repository with less The Commission continues to have licenseability of the site, however, and concern for thermal disturbance of the reasonable assurance that DOE's they must be answered satisfactorily in host rock's expected waste isolation program will lead to identification of order for NRC to issue a construction properties. Meantime, the longer-lived acceptable sealant materials for meeting authorization for that site. If data remaining radionuclides, such as these objectives. obtained during site characterization transuranic wastes with elements Overall, from its reexamination of indicate that the Yucca Mountain site is heavier than uranium, could be disposed issues related to the technical feasibility not suitable for a repository, DOE is of in a repository away from the fission of geologic disposal, the Commission required by the NWPAA to terminate products and without the high thermal concludes that there is reasonable site characterization activities and loadings that would otherwise have to assurance that safe disposal of high-report to Congress. Within six months of be considered in predicting the long- level waste and spent fuel in a mined that determination, DOE must make a term waste isolation performance of the geologic repository is technically recommendation to Congress for further geologic setting. France, Great Britain, feasible. action to assure the safe, permanent and Japan are currently pursuing this disposal of spent fuel and high-level Original Finding 2 waste management strategy or a variant waste. DOE could recommend, for of it. The Commission finds reasonable example, that Congress authorize site The Commission emphasizes here that assurance that one or more mined characterization at other sites. it does not believe that recycling geologic repositories for commercial Considering DOE's investigations of technolgies are required for the safety or high-level waste and spent fuel will be other potentially acceptable sites before feasibility of deep geologic disposal in available by the years 2007-2009, and its exclusive focus on Yucca Mountain, the United States. Other countries, such that sufficient repository capacity will the Commission has no reason to as Canada, the Federal Republic of be available within 30 years beyond believe that, given adequate time and Germany, and Sweden are pursuing expiration of any reactor operating program resources, a technically disposal strategies based on a similar license to dispose of existing acceptable site cannot be found. view. Reprocessing, if employed in its commercial high-level radioactive waste The technical feasibility of geologic current stage of development, would and spent fueld originating in that disposal also depends on the ability to result in additional exposures to reactor and generated up to that time. dev,elop effective engineered barriers, radiation and volumes of radioactive Proposed Finding 2 such as waste packages. DOE is wastes to be disposed of. For the currently evaluating six candidate purpose of finding reasonable assurance The Commission finds reasonable materials for waste containers, including in the technical feasibility of geologic assurance that at least one mined austenitic steel and copper- and nickel- disposal, however, it is worth noting geologic repository will be available based alloys, and is planning waste- that technology is currently available to within the first quarter of the twenty-form testing based on both spent fuel permit additional engineering control of first century, and that sufficient and high-level waste in borosilicate waste forms if, for reasons not now repository capacity will be available glass. On the basis of DOE's program, foreseen, such control were deemed within 30 years beyond the licensed life and results from Swedish investigations desirable at some future time. for operation of any reactor to dipose of of a copper waste container, the Meanwhile, the Commission continues the commercial high-level radioactive Commission is confident that, given a to have confidence that safe geologic waste and spent fuel originating in such range of waste forms and conserva live disposal is technically feasible for both reactor and generated up to that time. test conditions, the technology is spent fuel and high-level waste. 2.A. Issues Considered in Commission's available to design acceptable waste DOE's current reference design for the 1984 Decision on Finding 2 packages. waste package does not include backfill In addition to the materials testing for or packing around waste containers in 2.A.1. Finding Technically Acceptable the waste container and waste form, the emplacement boreholes. Neither is Sites in a Timely Fashion there may be additional measures that required under NRC rules so long as In order for the Commission to find can be taken to improve the DOE can show that applicable that any candidate site for a repository effectiveness of the engineered barriers. regulatory criteria and objectives will be is technically acceptable (that is, in It is known, for example, that the heat- met. An air gap between the container compliance with NRC licensing loading characteristics of the wastes and the host rock is currently one of the requirements], the site must undergo diminish with time. Also, the longer barriers in DOE's design for meeting the comprehensive site characterization to wastes are stored before disposal, the performance objective. DOE has assess its hydrologic, geologic, smaller will be the quantities of conducted investigations on a variety of geochemical, and rock mechanics 51-SC-12
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION properties. It is possible that a site may suitable if the 2007-2009 timeframe for Yucca Mountain site, or any other single be found unacceptable on the basis of repository availability in the si le designated for site characterization, early in-situ testing or other site Commission's 1984 Decision is to be is found to be unsuitable. Without characterization activities. It will not be met. Clearly, the Commission cannot be alternative sites undergoing possible, however, for the NRC staff to certain at this time that the Yucca simultaneous characterization or even take a position before a licensing board Mountain site will be acceptable. surface-based testing, DOE will have to that a site will meet NRC requirements Although Commission has no reason begin characterizing another site if the for construction authorization until the to believe that another technically site currently selected for results of all site characterization acceptable site can not be found if the characterization proves unsuitable. The activities are available. Even then, the Yucca Mountain site proves unsuitable, earlier a determination of unsuitability staff may conclude that the evidence several factors raise reasonable doubts can be made, the smaller the impact of from site characterization does not as to the availability of even one such a finding would be on the overall constitute reasonable assurance that repository by 2007-2009. These include: timing of repository availability. NRC performance objectives will be (1) The current reliance on a single site DOE has estimated conservatively met. Also, the results of the licensing with no concurrently available that it would required approximately 25 hearings on construction authorization alternatives; (2) the probability that site years to begin site screening for a cannot be predicted. If construction is characterization activities will not
- second repository, perform site authorized and when it is substantially proceed entirely without problems; and characterization, submit an EIS and complete, DOE is required to obtain, in (3) the history of schedular slippages license applications, and await addition to the construction since passage of the NWPA. For authorizations before the repository authorization permit, a*license to receive example, DOE's schedule for the first could be ready to receive waste. In its and possess waste at the geologic repository slipped five years (from 1998 June 1987 Mission Plan amendment, repository operations area in order to to 2003) between January 1983, when the DOE stated "It * *
- seems prudent to commence repository qperations. These NWPA was enacted, and January 1987, plan that site-specific screening leading considerations argue for maintaining the when the first Draft Mission Plan to the identification of potentially ready availability of alternatives sites if, Amendment was issued. The schedule acceptable sites should start about 25 after several years, site characterization for excavation of the exploratory shaft years before the start of waste or licensing activities bring to light for the Yucca Mountain site slipped by acceptance for disposal." DOE went on difficulties at the leading candidate site. more than three years since the issuance to say that it considered this estimate to In support of its argument on technical of the PDS in March 1986. DOE has cited be conservative because it does not feasibility, the Commission stated in its numerous reasons for past program account for expected schedular benefits 1984 Waste Confidence Decision that slippages, including the need for a from the first repository program,
"* *
- DOE's program is providing consultation process with States and including improvements in such areas as information on site characteristics at a Tribes, Congressional actions (e.g., the site screening, site characterization, and sufficiently large number and variety of barring of funds in the 1987 budget performance assessment techniques.
sites and geologic media to support the appropriation for drilling exploratory Although DOE's estimate was expectation that one or more technically shafts], and DOE's recognition that the permitted on the successful completion acceptable sites will be identified." At EIS and license application would of a program for the first of two the time, DOE was required under the require more technical information than repositories, schedular benefits from NWPA to characterize three candidate previously planned. ' improvements in the understanding of repository sites. Given this history of delays, and given waste isolation processes would still be The NWPAA had a major impact on its understanding of current available. The glass waste form from the DOE's repository program, however. developments, the Commission can not Defense Waste Processing Facility now Under the NWPAA, DOE was required be sure that current milestones for the under construction at Savannah River, to suspend site-specific activities at the repository program will be met, at least SC, for example, will be available for Hanford, WA and Deaf Smith County, in the foreseeable future. For example, testing under simulated repository TX sites, which had been approved by DOE has taken the position, with which conditions well before the turn of the the President for site characterization NRC agrees, that sinking of exploratory century under current DOE schedules, for the first repository. Redirection of shafts should not occur before it has a and improvements in the modelling of the repository program to single-site qualified quality assurance (QA] spent fuel behavior within waste characterization (or, if necessary, program in place. The Commission canisters can be applied in performance sequential site characterization if the believes that the aggressive, success- assessments largely irrespective of the Yucca Mountain site is found to be oriented schedule for this milestone has geology of a site. It may also be unsuitable] will permit DOE to not allowed for unexpected pertinent that when DOE made its 25-concentrate its efforts and resources on developments. Indeed, the effort to year estimate for the second repository information gathering at a single site, as develop an approvable QA program has program in mid-1987, the law at the time opposed to spreading out its efforts over in itself identified problems in design required the simultaneous a range of sites. The possible schedular control and other processes that must be characterization of three sites, so that benefits to single-site characterization, resolved in order to establish a fully- DOE could not proceed to develop one however, must be weighed for the qualified program that addresses all site for a repository until the completion purposes of this Finding against the applicable NRC licensing requirements. of characterization at the site that potential for additional delays in Thus, although the NWPAA is a clear required the most time. repository availability if the Yucca and strong reaffirmation of Although it is still possible for a Mountain site is found to be unsuitable. Congressional support for the timely repository to be available by 2007-2009 By focusing DOE site characterization development of a repository, the if the current schedule does not incur activities on Yucca Mountain, the Commission in this Waste Confidence major additional delays, the NWPAA has essentially made it review cannot ignore the potential for Commission does not believe it would necessary for that site to be found delay in repository availability if the be prudent to reaffirm the Agency's 1984 51-SC-13
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION finding of reasonable assurance that the the sake of conservatism that Yucca characterization and waste package 2007-2009 timetable will be met. As the Mountain would not be found suitable development work at sites other than Court of Appeals noted in remanding for repository development, it is the Yucca Mountain site. this isue to NRC, the ultimate reasonable to expect that DOE would be Although much of the work related to determination of whether a disposal able to reach this conclusion by the year waste form, materials, and performance facility will be available when needed 2000. This would leave 25 years for the assessment for the waste package can "* *
- can never rise above a attainment of repository operations at proceed independently of in-situ testing, prediction." The Commission is in the another site. the investigations related to waste position of having to reach a definitive 2.A.2. Timely Development of Waste package environment depend on the finding on events which are almost two Packages and Engineered Barriers schedule for this testing. DOE's current decades away. We believe that the schedule calls for completing the ACD institutional timescale for this question DOE's current conceptual design for for the waste package in 1992, and the can more realistically be framed in the waste package is discussed in the waste package LAD in 1994. The ability decades than in years. As the program SCP for the Yucca Mountain site. As to meet these dates will depend on proceeds into the next century, it will information is obtained from site whether DOE is able to resolve become easier for NRC to make more characterization activities and outstanding QA issues which have definitive assessments, if necessary, of laboratory studies, the conceptual impeded shaft sinking and in-situ the time a repository will be available. design will evolve in successive stages testing.
It should be noted here that the basis into the Advanced Conceptual Design In sum, the Commission is not aware for the 2007-2009 timeframe in the Court (ACDJ, the LAD, and the final of any scientific or technical problems remand on the "Waste Confidence" procurement and construction design. so difficult as to preclude development DOE has identified four areas of issues has changed in the past five of a waste package and engineered investigation related to the waste years. These dates no longer represent barrier for a repository at Yucca package LAD: (1) Waste package the expected dates of expiration of the Mountain to be available within the first environment; (2) waste form and Vermont Yankee and Prairie Island materials testing; (3) design, analysis, quarter of the twenty-first century. facilities. When the operating licenses fabrication, and prototype testing; and Moreover, even given the uncertainty were originally issued for nuclear power (4) performance assessment. Numerous regarding the ultimate finding of site reactors, license durations were uncertainties exist in each of these acceptability, and the uncertainty computed on the basis of a 40-year areas. DOE's testing program will concerning the range of site-related operating lifetime starting from the date attempt to reduce uncertainties in these parameters for which the engineered of the construction permit (CP) for the areas where possible. For example, in- facility and waste package will have to facility. For many facilities, five years or situ testing is expected to decrease be designed, the Commission finds more elapsed from the date of issuance significantly uncertainties regarding the reasonable assurance that waste of the CP until issuance of the operating repository host rock mass in which the package and engineered barrier license (OL). In response to requests waste packages will be emplaced. In the development can be completed on a from utilities, the NRC staff has agreed area of performance assessment, schedule that would permit repository to extend the dates of expiration of the however, where results of relatively operation within the first quarter of the OLs by computing the 40-year period of short-term testing of complex rock- twenty-first century. If necessary (that the license from the date of issuance of waste-ground water interactions must is, if Yucca Mountain were found the OL instead of from the date of the be extrapolated over as many as 10,000 unsuitable late in the program), DOE CP. The NRC staff has already changed years, it may be necessary to rely more could initiate site characterization and the expiration date for Prairie Island heavily on the use of simplifying develop waste packages and engineered Units 1 and 2 from the year 2008 to the assumptions and bounding conditions barriers at another site or sites and still years 2013 and 2014. The staff currently than in other areas of investigation. commence operation before the end of expects Vermont Yankee to request a As discussed under Finding 1, the the first quarter of that century. change in its current expiration date of Commission continues to have 2.A.3. Institutional Uncertainties December 11, 2007. On the basis of the reasonable assurance that waste date of issuance of the OL for Vermont packages and engineered barriers can 2.A.3.a. Measures for dealing with Yankee, it is eligible for extension of its be developed which will contribute to Federal-State-local concerns. In its 1984 operating license expiration to March meeting NRC performanfe objectives for Waste Confidence Decision, the 2012. Therefore, if the remand were to the repository. The timing of availability Commission found that the NWPA occur today, NRC would likely be of a complete and high quality waste should help to minimize the potential evaluating the availability of a package and engineered barrier LAD, that differences between the Federal repository by 2012-2014, as these years specifically their availability on a Government and States and Indian are expected to represent the timeframe schedule which would permit repository tribes will substantially disrupt or delay in which the OLs of the Vermont Yankee operation by 2007-2009, is more difficult the respository program. The and Prairie Island facilities are due to to assess at this time. In contrast with Commission noted that the NWPA expire. the technical feasibility issues discussed reduced uncertainties regarding the role In light of all these considerations, the under Finding 1, development of of affected States and tribes in Commission believes it can have acceptable waste packages and repository site selection and evaluation. reasonable assurance that at least one engineered barriers for a repository in The Commission also said that the repository will be available within the the 2007-2009 timeframe does depend on decision-making process set up by the first quarter of the twenty-first century. the overall acceptability of the Yucca NWPA provides a detailed, step-by-step This estimate is based on the time it site. If the site is found to be unsuitable, approach that builds in regulatory would take for DOE to proceed from site waste package and _engineered barrier involvement, which should also provide screening to repository operation at a development will have to begin for a confidence to States and tribes that the site other than Yucca Mountain, if this different site, because, under the program will proceed on a technically should prove necessary. Assuming for NWPAA, DOE may not carry out site sound and acceptable basis. Despite the 51-SC-14
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION expected and continuing State Administration of the Department of 503 of the NWPAA, the Nuclear Waste opposition to DOE siting activities, the Labor for technical support and Technical Review Board (NWTRBJ is to Commission has found no institutional oversight for shaft construction and evaluate the technical and scientific developments since that time that would other site characterization activities, validity of DOE activities under the fundamentally disturb its 1984 and with the Department of NWPAA, including site characterization conclusions on this point. Transportation to define the respective and activities related to packaging or NRC regulatory involvement, for responsibilities of the two agencies in transportation of spent fuel. The example, has indeed been built into the the waste disposal program. DOE also NWPAA also established the Office of process. DOE has continued its has interagency agreements with the Nuclear Waste Negotiator, who is to interactions with NRC regarding Bureau of Mines and the U.S. Geological seek to negotiate terms under which a repository program activities since the Survey of the Department of the Interior. State or Indian tribe would be willing to Commission's 1984 Waste Confidence DOE's efforts to address the concerns host a repository or MRS facility at a decision was issued. NRC provided of States, local governments, and Indian technically qualified site. Among the comments to DOE on major program tribes have met with mixed results. For duties of the Negotiator is consultation documents such as the Siting Guidelines example, DOE has not succeeded in with Federal agencies such as NRC on and the PDS as required by the NWPA, finalizing any consultation and the suitability of any potential site for and NRC concurred on those documents. cooperation (C&CJ agreements as site characteriza lion. NRC also reviewed and provided required under Section 117(c) of the At the time of this writing, the comments to DOE on the DEAs and NWPA, as amended. These agreements President has not appointed the FEAs. In the December 22, 1986 letter to were to help resolve State and Tribal Negotiator. On February 24, 1989 DOE on the FEAs, the NRC staff noted concerns about public health and safety, Congressman Morris K. Udall and that"* *
- significant efforts were environmental, and economic impacts of Senator J. Bennett Johnston requested made by DOE to respond to each of the a repository. Publication of the Siting that the President take action to appoint NRC staff major comments on the DEAs, Guidelines under section 112(a) of the an individual to this office. A Negotiator and in fact, many of these comments NWPA resulted in numerous lawsuits could contribute to the timely success of have been resolved." NRC provided challenging the validity of the the respository program by providing an comments to DOE on the 1987 Draft Guidelines. Similarly, the FEAs were alternative site to the Yucca Mountain Mission Plan Amendment, and DOE challenged in the Ninth Circuit by site that would still have to be techically responded to most of these comments in affected States and tribes. acceptable, but that would enjoy the the Final Mission Plan Amendment The NWPAA did not curtail financial advantage of reduced institutional provided to Congress on June 9, 1987. assistance to affected States and tribes, uncertainties resulting from opposition Since enactment of the NWPAA in except to redefine and redistribute it if to Sta le or affected Indian tribes.
December 1987, DOE-NRC interactions DOE and a State or tribe enter into a An additional measure which may have focused on the Yucca Mountain benefits agreement. The State of Nevada facilitate documentation and site. In January 1988, DOE issued the and affected local governments are communication of concerns related to a Consultation Draft Site Characterization currently receiving financial assistance. repository is the Licensing Support Plan (CDSCPJ for the Yucca Mountain DOE has attempted to negotiate an System (LSSJ. The LSS is to provide full site. The NRC staff provided comments agreement with the State of Nevada for text search capability of and easy in the form of draft and final "point monetary benefits under section 170 of access to documents related to the papers" on the CDSCP. The NRC the NWPAA. This section would licensing of the repository. Although the comments included several objections provide for payments of $10 million per primary purpose of the LSS is to related to: (1) The failure to recognize year before receipt of spent fuel. and $20 expedite NRC's review of the the range of alternative conceptual million per year after receipt of spent construction authorization application models of the Yucca Mountain site; (2) fuel until closure of the repository. for a repository, it will be an effective the status of the quality assurance (QA) These payments would be in addition to mechanism by which all LSS plans for site characterization activities; certain monetary benefits for which the participants, including the State and and (3) concerns related to the State is eligible under the NWPA, as local governments, can acquire early exploratory shaft facility. Although the amended. Also under a benefits access to documents relevant to a December 1988 SCP shows improvement agreement, a Review PaRel would be repository licensing decision. DOE has over the CDSCP, NRC continues to have constituted for the purpose of advising the responsibility for designing the LSS an objection involving the need for DOE on matters related to the and bearing the costs associated with it, implementing a baselined QA program repository, and for assisting in the and NRC will be responsible for before beginning site characterization presentation of State, tribal, and local implementing it. and an objection involving the need for perspectives to DOE. The beneficiary to Procedures for the use of the LSS are DOE to demonstrate the adequacy of a benefits agreement must waive its part of revisions to 10 CFR Part 2, NRC's both the ESF design and the design right to disapprove the recommendation Rules of Practice for the adjudicatory control process. DOE is committed to of the site for a repository and its rights proceeding on the application to receive having a qualified QA program in place to certain impact assistance under
- and possess waste at a repository.
before sinking the exploratory shaft at sections 116 and 118 of the NWPA, as These revisions were the result of a the Yucca Mountain site. amended. To date, the State of Nevada "negotiated rulemaking" process in DOE has also taken measures to has declined DOE's offer to negotiate a which affected parties meet to reach clarify and institutionalize the roles of benefits agreement. concensus on the proposed rule. The other Federal agencies in addition to The NWPAA introduced several new members of the negotiating committee NRC. In the Draft 1988 Mission Plan organizational entities to the repository included: DOE; NRC; State of Nevada; Amendment, DOE described program with responsibilities that may coalition of Nevada local governments; interactions with these agencies. DOE contribute to resolving concerns of coalition of industry groups; and a has a Memorandum of Understanding Federal, State, and local governments coalition of national environmental (MOU) with the Mine Safety and Health involved in the program. Under section groups. The coalition of industry groups 51-SC-15
PART 51 STATEMENTS OF CONSIDERATION dissented on the final text of the the radioactive waste disposal problem MRS. Congress did establish several proposed rule, but the negotiating would likely undergo further delays. The new entities for the purpose of advising process enabled NRC to produce a Commission responded that in the years DOE on matters related to the waste proposed rule reflecting the consensus since the Administration had proposed program, such as the NWTRB and the of most of the interested parties on an to dismantle DOE in September 1981, Review Panel, to be established if DOE important repository licensing issue. Congress had not aQted on the proposal. and a State or tribe enter into a benefits NRC is committed to safe disposal of The Commission further stated that even agreement under section 170 of the radioactive waste and the protection of if DOE were abolished, the nuclear NWPAA. Congress provided further public health and safety and the waste program would simply be indication of its intent that DOE environment. Any State with a transferred to another agency. The maintain management control of the candidate site for a repository should be Commission did not view the potential waste program for the foreseeable future assured that a repository will not be transfer in program management as in requiring, under section 161, that the licensed if it does not meet NRC criteria. resulting in a significant loss of Secretary* of DOE "* *
- report to the NRC has its own program for interaction momentum in the waste program. The President and to Congress on or after with the State of Nevada and affected commission also concluded that the January 1, 2007, but not later than units of local government, and will enactment of the NWPA, which gave January 1, 2010, on the need for a second continue to provide information to DOE lead responsibility for repository}}