ML18179A179

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After Action Report/Improvement Plan, Exercise Date - April 4, 2018, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program
ML18179A179
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/06/2018
From:
US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18179A157 List:
References
Download: ML18179A179 (115)
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Text

Seabrook Station After Action Report/

Improvement Plan Exercise Date - April 4, 2018 Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Published Date: June 6, 2018

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station This page is intentionally blank.

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lmprovement Plan Seabrook Station Seabrook Station After Action Report/Improvement Plan Published Date: June 6, 2018 Contents Executive Summary Section 1: Exercise Overview 1.1 Exercise Details 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership 1.3 Participating Organizations Section 2: Exercise Design Summary 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design 2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities 2.3 Scenario Summary Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation 3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries 3.3.1 Massachusetts Jurisdictions 3.3. 1.1 Massachusetts State Emergency Operations Center 3 .3 .1 .2 MA Region I EOC 3 .3 .1.3 MA (SS) Joint Information Center 3 .3 .1.4 MA Emergency Operations Facility 3.3 .1.5 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-I 3.3. 1.6 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2 3.3. 1.6 MA 211 3.3 .2 Risk Jurisdictions 3.3.2.1 Amesbury Local EOC 3.3.2.2 Merrimac Local EOC 3.3.2.3 Newbury Local EOC 3.3.2.4 Newburyport Local EOC 1

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.2.5 Salisbury Local EOC 3.3.2 .6 West Newbury Local EOC 3.3.3 New Hampshire Jurisdictions 3.3.3 .1 NH State Emergency Operations Center 3.3.3.2 NH (SS) Emergency Operations Facility 3.3.3.3 NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-I 3.3.3.4NH (SS) Field Monitoring Team-2 3.3.3.5NH (SS) Incident Field Office 3.3.3.6 NH (SS) Joint Information Center 3.3.3 .7 NH 211 3.3.3.8 NH State Troop A 3.3.3.9 Rockingham County Dispatch Center 3 .3 .3 .10 NH State Emergency Operations Center Local Liaison 3.3.4 Risk Jurisdictions 3.3.4.1 Brentwood Local EOC 3.3.4.2 East Kingston Local EOC 3.3.4.3 Exeter Local EOC 3.3.4.4 Greenland Local EOC 3.3.4.5 Hampton Local EOC 3.3.4.6 Hampton Falls Local EOC 3.3.4.7 Kensington Local EOC 3.3.4.8 Kingston NH Local EOC 3.3.4.9 New Castle Local EOC 3.3.4.10 Newfields Local EOC 3.3.4.11 Newton Local EOC 3.3.4.12 North Hampton Local EOC 3.3.4.13 Portsmouth Local EOC 3.3.4.14 Rye Local EOC 3.3.4.15 Seabrook Local EOC 3.3.4.16 South Hampton Local EOC 3 .3 .4.17 Stratham Local EOC 2

Unclassified Rad iological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Out of Sequence: Special Facilities Brentwood:

A Place to Grow East Kingston:

Kid Logic Exeter:

Appleseed Day Care Exeter Day School Greenland:

Kaleidoscope Home Child Care (Day Care)

Newcastle:

Maude Trefethenen Elementary (SAU 50)

Newfields:

Newfields Elementary (SAU 16)

North Hampton:

North Hampton Elementary (SAU 21)

Portsmouth:

Agape Pre-School Early Learning Center at Temple Israel Great Bay Kids-PEASE Little Harbor Elementary (SAU 52)

Portsmouth Middle School (SAU 52)

Portsmouth/Seabrook/Hampton Head Start Programs Seacoast Community School Un la Kaya Davis Child Care Rye :

Rye Elementary (SAU 50)

Stratham:

Acorn School Bright Horizons at Timberland Stratham Memorial School (SAU 16) 3.3.5 Support Jurisdictions 3.3.6 Manchester Memorial High School Reception Center 3.3.7 State Transportation Staging Area 3

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station This page is intentionally blank.

4

Unclassified Radi ological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On April 4, 2018, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Preparedness Directorate, National Preparedness Division, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region I conducted an exercise in the 10-Mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone around the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station.

Interviews and out-of-sequence demonstrations for schools, other special facilities , and reception, monitoring, and decontamination centers (as outlined in this report) were conducted within 60 days of the exercise. The purpose of the exercise and out-of-sequence activities was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. This exercise was held in accordance with FEMA ' s policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.

DHS wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in the State of New Hampshire, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, local communities, and private and volunteer organizations that participated in this exercise.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.

Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation of the biennial exercise and the out-of-sequence activities.

The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were NO Level 1 Find ings; NO Level 2 Findings; NO Planning Issues identified as a result of this 2018 Plume Exercise.

The five (5) previous Planning Issues identified during the 2016 Plume Exercise were resolved during this exercise or during the Combined Functional Drills preceding this exercise.

5

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW 1.1 Exercise Details Exercise Name Seabrook Station Type of Exercise Plume Exercise Date April 4, 2018 Program Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Scenario Type Radiological Emergency 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership NextEra Energy Seabrook Station Seabrook, New Hampshire Steve Colman RAC Chair FEMA - Region One - REP Branch REP Branch Chief 99 High Street, Fifth Floor Boston, Massachusetts, 02110 617-832-4731 Steve.Colman@fema.dhs.gov 6

Unclassified Rad iological Emergency Prepared ness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station John Rice Senior Technological Hazards Specialist FEMA - Region One - REP Branch Senior Technological Hazards Specialist 99 High Street, Fifth Floor Boston, Massachusetts, 02110 617-956-7509 John.Rice2@fema.dhs.gov Barbara Thomas Site Specialist FEMA - Region One - REP Branch Technological Hazards Specialist 99 High Street, Fifth Floor Boston, Massachusetts, 02110 617-832-4703 Barbara. Thomas@fema.dhs.gov 7

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (RE P)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 1.3 Participating Organizations Agencies and organi zations of the fo llowing jurisdictions participated m the Seabrook Station exercise:

1.0 State of New Hampshire 1.1 Brentwood EOC

  • East Rockingham Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES)
  • Town of Brentwood Board of Selectmen
  • Town of Brentwood Departme nt of Public Works
  • Town of Brentwood Fire Department
  • Town of Brentwood Police Department 1.2 East Kingston
  • ARES
  • East K ingston Emergency Management Agency
  • East Kingston Fire Department
  • East Kingston Police Department
  • East Kingston Selectman 1.3 Exeter EOC
  • Exeter Hospital
  • Phillips Exeter Academy
  • Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)
  • Sau 16 School District
  • Town of Exeter, Board of Selectmen
  • Town of Exeter, Emergency Management
  • Town of Exeter, Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
  • Town of Exeter, Fire Department
  • Town of Exeter, IT Department
  • Town of Exeter, Police Department
  • Town of Exeter, Public Safety Dispatch Center
  • Town of Exeter, Public Works
  • Town of Exeter, Radiation Defense
  • Town of Exeter, Town Manager
  • Town of Exeter, Transportation Department 1.4 Greenland EOC
  • Emergency Management and Staff
  • Fire Department
  • Police Department
  • Department of Public Works 8

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 1.5 Hampton EOC

  • Town of Hampton Department of Health
  • Town of Hampton Emergency Management
  • Town of Hampton Emergency Medical Services
  • Town of Hampton Fire Department
  • Town of Hampton Police Department
  • Town of Hampton Public Works Department 1.6 Hampton Falls EOC
  • Hampton Falls Clerk's Office
  • Hampton Falls Emergency Management
  • Hampton Falls Fire Department
  • Hampton Falls Police Department
  • Hampton Falls Roads Department
  • Hampton Falls Selectmen
  • Hampton Falls Volunteer Fire Department
1. 7 IFO Portsmouth
  • Kensington Emergency Management Director
  • Kensington Police Department Chief
  • Kensington Volunteer Fire Department
  • School Administration Unit 16 (Kensington Elementary School) 1.9 Kingston EOC
  • Sanborn Regional School District
  • Town of Kingston Director of Public Works
  • Town of Kingston Fire Department
  • Town of Kingston Health Officer
  • Town of Kingston Police Department
  • Town of Kingston Selectmen 1.10 New Castle EOC
  • New Castle Volunteer Fire Department 1.11 New Hampshire Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
  • ARES
  • Newfields Emergency Management
  • Newfields Fire Department
  • Newfields Police Department 9

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lm provement Plan Seabrook Station 1.13 Newton EOC

  • ARES
  • Sanborn Regional School District
  • Town of Newton Board of Selectmen
  • Town of Newton Fire Department
  • Town of Newton Highway Department
  • Town of Newton Police Department
  • Town of Newton Town Clerk
  • Town of Newton Transportation Department 1.14 North Hampton EOC
  • North Hampton Emergency Management
  • North Hampton Fire Department
  • North Hampton Police Department
  • North Hampton Public Works
  • Town of North Hampton 1.15 Portsmouth EOC
  • City of Portsmouth- City Manager and Staff
  • City of Portsmouth Emergency Management
  • City of Portsmouth Fire Department
  • City of Portsmouth Health Department
  • City of Portsmouth Human Resource Department
  • City of Portsmouth Police Department
  • City of Portsmouth Public Works Department
  • City of Portsmouth School Department
  • City of Portsmouth Welfare Department
  • RACES 1.16 Rockingham Dispatch
  • Rockingham County Dispatch Center/Sheriffs Department 1.17 Rye EOC
  • Town of Rye Department of Public Works
  • Town of Rye Fire Department
  • Town of Rye Municipal Government
  • Town of Rye Police Department 1.18 Seabrook EOC
  • Code Enforcement
  • Communications Officer
  • Emergency Management Director and Staff
  • Fire Chief
  • Police Chief
  • Public Works
  • RACES 10

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lmprovement Plan Seabrook Station

  • Radiological Defense Officer
  • School Representative
  • The Board of Selectmen
  • Town Manager
  • Transportation Coordinator 1.19 SEOC
  • New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Emergency Services Unit
  • New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, Radiological Health
  • Town of South Hampton Board of Selectmen
  • Town of South Hampton Clerk
  • Town of South Hampton Department of Public Works
  • Town of South Hampton Fire Department 1.21 State Police Warning

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 1.22 Stratham EOC

  • Highway Agent
  • NH State EOC - Emergency Medical Services Representative
  • Stratham Police Department
  • Stratham Public Health Department
  • Stratham Selectman
  • Stratham Volunteer Fire Department
  • Stratham Volunteers 12

Uncl assified Radiological Emergency Prepared ness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lmprovement Plan Seabrook Station 2.0 Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2.1 Amesbury EOC

  • Amesbury Emergency Management Agency
  • Amesbury Fire Department
  • Amesbury Police Department
  • Amesbury Department of Public Works
  • Amesbury Communications
  • Amesbury Transportation Coordinator
  • Amesbury Radiological Officer 2.2 SEOC
  • American Red Cross
  • Mass 211
  • Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant 2.3 FMT #1
  • Massachusetts Department of Health Radiation Control Program 2.4 FMT #2
  • Massachusetts Department of Health Radiation Control Program 2.5MA211
  • N/a 2.6 MEMA Region I
  • American Red Cross
  • MA National Guard (MANG)
  • ACS 2.7 Merrimac EOC
  • Merrimac Emergency Management
  • Merrimac Fire Department
  • Merrimac Police Department
  • Merrimac Public Works Department 13

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 2.8 Newbury EOC

  • Newbury Fire Department
  • Newbury Highway Department
  • Newbury Police Department 2.9 Newburyport EOC
  • Newburyport Fire Department
  • Newburyport Police Department
  • Newburyport Harbormaster
  • Newburyport Department of Public Works
  • Newburyport Department of Health
  • Newburyport School District 2.10 Salisbury EOC
  • Salisbury Board of Selectman
  • Salisbury Department Of Public Works
  • Salisbury Emergency Management Agency
  • Salisbury Fire Department
  • Salisbury Police Department 2.11 West Newbury EOC
  • Town of West Newbury Bureau of Health
  • Town of West Newbury Department of Public Works
  • Town of West Newbury Emergency Management Agency
  • Town of West Newbury Fire Department
  • Town of West Newbury Municipal Official (acting)
  • Town of West Newbury Police Department
  • Town of West Newbury Highway Department
  • Town of West Newbury Council on Aging 14

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Im provement Plan Seabrook Station SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN

SUMMARY

2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design The FEMA Region I evaluated the exercise on April 4, 2018, to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERPs) and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving Seabrook Nuclear Power Station. The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (OROs) during a simulated radiological emergency in the HSEEP format.

2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities 2.3 Scenario Summary The exercise scenario was developed to evaluate the response of the exercise participants to a radiological emergency.

15

Unclassified Rad iological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functi onal entities that participated in the April 4, 2018 Plume Exercise, conducted to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station 10-Mile Emergency Planning Zone.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on its demonstration of criteria contained in the exercise evaluation areas as outlined in the federal Register, Volume 67, No. 80 "FEMA -

Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology" (April 25 , 2002).

Detailed information on the evaluation area criteria and the extent-of-play agreements for the drill are included as appendices to this report.

3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The matrix presented in the table on following pages presents the status of all exercise evaluation area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during the drill by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number, and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following letters:

M-Met Ll - Level 1 Finding L2 - Level 2 Finding P - Planning Issue N - Not Demonstrated NIA- Not Applicable Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise 16

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment 6bl and Vehicles 6cl 6d l 18

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

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U oclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers .and their Eq uipment 6bl and Vehicles Temporary Care of Evacuee_s_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-t-6_c_l-t----t--+--+-+--+-+--+---i--+--+-----i Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated rn*ured Individuals 6dl 20

Unc lassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lmprovement Plan Seabrook Station Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation DA TE: 201 8-04-04 u

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees 6al Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment 6bl and Vehicles Temporary Care of Evacuees 6cl Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals 6dl 22

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

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Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment 6bl and Vehicles Temoo rarv Care of Evacuees 6cl Transoortation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals 6dl 24

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/lmprovement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries 3.3.1 Commonwealth of Massachusetts Jurisdictions 3.3.1.1 Massachusetts State Emergency Operations Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.l , 1.c.l , 1.d.l , 1.e.l , 2.a. l , 2.b.l , 2.b.2, 2.c.l , 5.a.l , 5.b.1.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.1.2 MEMA Region I EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , 1.c.1 , 1.d.l, 1.e.l, 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED : None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.1.3 MA (SS) Joint Information Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: 1.a.l , 1.c.l , 1.d.l, 1.e.1 , 5.b.1.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 25

Unclassified Rad iological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Im provement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.1.4 MA (SS) Emergency Operations Facility In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: I.a.I , l.c.1 , 1.d.l , l.e.l , 2.a.1 , 2.b.l , 2.b.2, 3.a.l , 4.a.2
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLBED: None 3.3.1.5 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team - 1 In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , l.d.1 , l.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3 .
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.1.6 MA (SS) Field Monitoring Team - 2 In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , l.d.1 , 1.e.1 , 3.a.1 , 4.a.3.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 3.3.1.7 MA (SS) 211 In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: 1.d.1 , 1.e.l , 5.b.1.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None 26

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions 3.3.2.1 Amesbury Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: 1.a.1 , 1.c.1 , 1.d.l , 1.e.l , 3.a.l , 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.1 , 3.d.2, 5.a.1 ,

5.b.1.

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.2 Merrimac Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.1 , 1.c.1 , 1.d.1, 1.e.1 , 3.a.1, 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.l, 5.b.1.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.3 Newbury Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: 1.a.l , 1.b.1 , 1.c.l, 1.d.l , 1.e.l , 3.a.1, 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2, 27

Unclassified Rad iological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 5.a.l , 5.b.l.

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.4 Newburyport Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , l.c.l , l.d.l , l.e.l , 3.a.l , 3.c.l, 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2, 5.a.l, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED : None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.5 Salisbury Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , l.b.l , l.c.l , l.d.l , l.e.1 , 3.a.l, 3.c.l, 3.c.2, 3.d.l 3.d.2, 5.a.l , 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.6 West Newbury Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

28

U oclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

a. MET: I.a.I , l.c.l , l.d.l, l.e.l , 3.a.l , 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2, 5.a.l ,

5.b.l.

b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None f PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None
  • The following demonstrations were conducted out of sequence during May 15 to 17, 2017 Schools:

3.3.2. 7Amesbury Elementary School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.1 , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.8 Amesbury High School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.1 , 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 29

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Stat ion 3.3.2.9 Merrimac: Dr. FN Sweetsir School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.2
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLBED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.10 Newbury: The Governor's Academy In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.11 Newbury: Newbury Elementary School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.12 Newburyport: River Valley Charter School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

30

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

a. MET: l.a.l , 3.b.1 , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.13 Newburyport: DARE Family Service In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.14 Salisbury: Salisbury Elementary School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows :
a. MET: 1.a.l , 3.b.l, 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.2.15 West Newbury: Dr. John C. Page School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.l, 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None 31

Uocl assified Radiological Emergency Prepared ness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED : None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 3.3.2.16 West Newbury: Koinonia In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows :
a. MET: 1.a. l , 3.b.1 , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None
  • The following demonstrations were conducted out of sequence November 2, 2017 3.3.2.17 Lowell General Hospital In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: 3 .a.I , 6.a.l , 6.d.1
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 32

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Stat ion 3.3.3.1 NH State Emergency Operations Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows :

a. MET: l.a.l , l.c.l , l.d.1 , l.e.l , 2.a.l , 2.b.l , 2.b.2, 2.c.l , 3.d.1 , 3.d.2, 5.a.l , 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.3.2 NH (SS) Emergency Operations Facility In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.l , l.c. l, l.d.l , l.e.l , 2.a.l , 2.b.l , 2.b.2, 3.a.1 , 4.a.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.3.3 NH - (SS) Field Monitoring Team - 1 In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , l.d.l , l.e.l , 3.a.l , 4.a.3 .
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 33

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.3.4 NH - (SS) Field Monitoring Team - 2 In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: I.a.I , l.d.I , Le.I , 3.a.I , 4.a.3.
b. LEVEL I FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.3.5 NH (SS) Incident Field Office In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , l.c.I , l.d.l , l.e.I , 3.a.I, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL I FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None f PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED : None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.3.6 NH (SS) Joint Information Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , l.c.I , l.d.l , l.e.l, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL I FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None f PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 34

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.3.7 NH State Police Warning In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows :

a. MET: I.a.I , l.d.1 , I.e. I.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.3.8 NH Rockingham Dispatch In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , l.d.1 , l.e.l, 5.a.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.1 Risk Jurisdictions 3.3.4.2 Brentwood Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , l.c.1 , l.d.1 , l.e.1 , 3.a.1 , 3.b.1 , 3.c.1 , 3.c.2, 3.d.1 , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 35

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.4.3 East Kingston Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: I.a.I , l.c.l , l.d.l , l.e.l , 3.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 3.3.4.4 Exeter Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.l , l.c.l , l.d.l , l.e.1, 3.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.5 Greenland Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follow s:
a. MET: l.a.l , l.c. 1, l.d.l , l.e.l , 3.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 36

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook S talion 3.3.4.6 Hampton Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.l , l.c.l, l.d.1, l.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.l, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1 , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.7 Hampton Falls Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.1 , l.c.1, l.d.1 , l.e.l, 3.a. l , 3.b.1 , 3.c.l, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.8 Kensington Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.1, l.b.1 , l.c.l, l.d.1 , l.e.1 , 3.a.l, 3.b.l, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 37

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Re port/Improvement Plan Seabrook Stat ion 3.3.4.9 Kingston Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: I.a.I , l.c.1, l.d.1, l.e.1 , 3.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.10 New Castle Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows :
a. MET: l.a.l, l.c.l, l.d.l , l.e.l , 3.a.1 , 3.b.l , 3.c.1 , 3.c.2, 3.d.1 , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISS UES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED : None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.11 Newfields Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I, l.c.1 , l.d.l , l.e.l , 3.a.1 , 3.b.l , 3.c.1 , 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 38

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.4.12 Newton Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows :

a. MET: l.a.l , l.c.l , l.d.1 , l.e.l , 3.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.l, 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED : None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.13 North Hampton Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.l, l.c.l , l.d.l, l.e.l , 3.a.l , 3.b.1 , 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.14 Portsmouth Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , l.b.1, l.d.1, l.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.l , 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 39

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.4.15 Rye Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.l , l.c.1 , l.d.l , l.e.l , 3.a.1 , 3.b.1 , 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.16 Seabrook Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.l , l.c.1 , l.d.l , l.e.1 , 3.a.l , 3.b.1 , 3.c.1 , 3.c.2, 3.d.l , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.4.17 South Hampton Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.1 , l.c.l , l.d.l , l.e.1, 3.a.1 , 3.b.l , 3.c.l , 3.c.2, 3.d.1 , 3.d.2, 5.b.l.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED : None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 40

_J

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.4.18 Stratham Local EOC In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: 1.a.1 , 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1 , 3.a.l, 3.b.1 , 3.c.1 , 3.c.2, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.b.1.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None
  • The following demonstrations were conducted Out of Sequence October 30, 31 and November l, 2017 3.3.5 Support Jurisdictions 3.3.5.1 A Place to Grow In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: 1.a.1, 3.b.1 , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.2 Acorn School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows :
a. MET: 1.a.1 , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None 41

Unclassified Rad iological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station

f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED : None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.3 Agape Pre-School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , 3.b.I, 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL I FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.4 Appleseed Day Care In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL I FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.5 Bright Horizons In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I, 3.b.1 , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED : None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 42

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.6 Early Learning Center at Temple Israel In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED : None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 3.3.5.7 Exeter Day School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.l , 3.b.l, 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL l FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.8 Great Bay Kids-PEASE In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 43

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.9 Little Sprouts Day Care In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: I.a.I , 3.b.I , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL I FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.10 Kaleidoscope Home Child Care In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , 3.b.I, 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 3.3.5.11 Kid Logic In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria fo r this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 44

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.12 Little Harbor Elementary (SAU 52)

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.l, 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL I FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.13 Maude Trefethenen Elementary (SAU 50)

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.l , 3. b.1 , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL I FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: No ne
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 3.3.5.14 Newfields Elementary (SAU 16)

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: l.a.l , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL I FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 45

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvem ent Plan Seabrook Stat ion 3.3.5.15 North Hampton Elementary (SAU 21)

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows :

a. MET: I.a.I , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES : None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.16 Portsmouth Middle School (SAU 52)

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows :

a. MET: I.a.I , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.17 Portsmouth/Seabrook/Hampton Head Start Programs In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , 3. b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 46

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.18 Rye Elementary (SAU 50)

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: I.a.I , 3.b.l , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.5.19 Seacoast Community School In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: I.a.I , 3.b.1 , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None 3.3.5.20 Stratham Memorial School (SAU 16)

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: I.a.I , 3.b.1 , 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 47

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station 3.3.5.21 Unal Kaya Davis Child Care In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

a. MET: I.a.I , 3.b.1, 3.c.2.
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED : None
  • The following demonstrations were conducted Out of Sequence in 2017 3.3.6 Manchester Memorial High School Reception Center In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:
a. MET: l.a.1, l.c.1 , 1.d.1, 1.e.1 , 3.a.1 , 3.d.1 , 6.a.1 , 6.b.l
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS : None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS : None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 3.3.7 NH State Transportation Staging Area In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as fo llows:
a. MET: I.a.I , l.c.1 , 1.d.1, 1.e.1 , 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.c.2
b. LEVEL 1 FINDINGS: None
c. LEVEL 2 FINDINGS: None
d. PLAN ISSUES: None
e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED : None
g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None 48

Unclassified Rad iological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station SECTION 4: CONCLUSION The State and local organizations identified in this report all demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There were NO Level 1 Findings; NO Level 2 Findings and NO Planning Issues identified as a result of the April 4, 2018 Seabrook Station evaluated Plume Exercise.

49

Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan Seabrook Station APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN There were no performance issues identified as a result of the April 4, 2018 evaluated exercise.

We sincerely thank The State of New Hampshire and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and all participants for their dedication and excellent level of performance in having a successful exercise.

50

APPENDIX B: EXERCISE EXTENT of PLAY For the STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

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HOMELAND SECURITY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ENSURI NG SAFETY. PROTECTING COMMUNITIES.

Seabrook Station Exercise Cycle Plume Exposure Pathway Extent of Play ()(PA)

Evaluated: April 4, 2018

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Seabrook Station XP A 2018 1 Contents BACK.GROUND ...........................................................................................3 CALENDAR AND PLA YERS ..................................................................................... 3 FACILITIES ................................................................................................................................ 5 In Sequence .................... ........... .................. ............................. ... ................................................ .. 5 Out of Sequence ................... ......... ........... .............................................. .... ......... ............................ 5 EVALUATION AREA 1: Emergency Operations Management.....................................................7 Sub-element 1.a: Mobi lization .......... ........ ...... ..... ............. ................ .......................... ............. 7 Sub-element l .b: Facilities ..................... ....... ......... ......... ..... .......... .......................... ...... ............ 8 Sub-element l .c: Direction and Control .......... ... ............... ... ..... ................ ...................... ..... .. ... 8 Sub-element l .d : Communications Equipment... .. ....... ..................................... ............. ...... ...... 9 Sub-element 1.e: Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations ............................... ............. 9 EVALUATION AREA 2: Protective Action Decision-Making ...................................................... 10 Sub-element 2.a: Emergency Worker Exposure Control ............... ............. ............................. 10 Sub-element 2.b: Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency ..... 10 Sub-element 2.c : Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decision Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs ....... ............ .................. 11 EVALUATION AREA 3: Protective Action lmplementation ......................................................... 12 Sub-element 3.a: Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control ............ .......... ..... 12 Sub-element 3.b: Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the General Public .... .... .............. .. .. .................... ............. .... ... ........................... ..... ......................... 12 Sub-element 3.c: Implementation of Precautionary and/or Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs ......... .... .......... .................... ......... ... .. ...... ..... .... ..... ... 13 Sub-element 3.d: Implementation of Traffic and Access Control ....................................... .... .14 EVALUATION AREA 4: Field Measurement and Analysis ................................................ 16 Sub-element 4.a: Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses .... ........ ............. ......... ........ 16 EVALUATION AREA 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information ..................... 17 Sub-element 5.a: Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System ... ......... ................ 17 Sub-element 5.b: Subsequent Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media ............ .... ............. ..... ..... .... ......... ................ ... .......... ..... ..... .......................... .................. 17 EVALUATION AREA 6: Support Operation/Facilities ........................................................ 19 Sub-element 6.a: Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees ..................... 19 Sub-element 6.b: Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment ........ 19 Sub-element 6.d: Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals .... ..... 20

BACKGROUND This is the proposed 2018 Extent of Play Agreement (XPA) Criteria for the New Hampshire (NH) Offsite Response Organization (ORO) involved in the Plume Exercise Cycle for Seabrook Station (SS). No changes have been made to any criteria except as noted in the document.

This XP A covers all components and activities of the exercise cycle starting with a half-day Planning Workshop on March 13, 2017. A Planning Tabletop Exercise (TIX) has been scheduled for April 14, 2017.

The Exercise Cycle will culminate with the evaluated exercise on April 4, 2018. The Workshop and TIX directly supporting the Evaluated Exercise are currently planned to occur between July and December 2017.

Two Combined Functional Exercises (CFEs) will occur between December 2017 and February 2018. Out of Sequence (OOS) activities and exercises will be scheduled throughout the cycle, but the criteria utilized will be incorporated within this XP A and noted throughout the document, as appropriate.

This document does NOT identify all exercise areas to be discussed or exercised by the State and the rest of the ORO. The scenarios developed for and utilized in the drills and exercises will incorporate sufficient injects to provide *opportunities for all players to participate in response and recovery activities mindful of an all-hazards approach. Only items identified in this XPA will be subject to evaluation.

This is a NEW HAMPSHIRE ONLY document. The XPA for Massachusetts will be combined with this document by FEMA to form a comprehensive XPA for this exercise cycle.

CALENDAR AND PLAYERS /.

DATES PLACE PARTICIPANTS March 13, 2017 National Guard Invited: Selected NH and MA EPZ and Host Presentation Regional Training EOCs, ICP, personnel; SEOC Command & Discussionbased Registration: 8 am Center Concord, NH General Staff; ESFs Non-evaluated Program 8:30 am- l ,2,3,6,7,8,10, 11 , 12, 13; LL; JIC; RIMC; 12:30 pm Radijealth Unified Command; RHT A; AA; Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS and HSEM); FEMA; Seabrook Station; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Invited: SEOC NH, Command & General StaffICP, ESFs 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10, 11 ,12, 13; April 14, 2017 LL; JIC; RIMC; RadHealth Unified National Guard Command; RHTA; AA; Lab; EOF Registration: 8 am Regional Training Personnel Exercise 8:30 am-4 Center Concord, NH (both DPHS and HSEM); FEMA Region I; Planning pm Selected Local EOCs, Seabrook Station TIX Monitoring and Sampling Teams; Discussion based Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Non-evaluated

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Invited: Selected NH and MA EPZ and Host EOCs, ICP, personnel; SEOC Command &

September 20, 2017 General Staff; ESFs workshop l ,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, I 0,11,12, 13 ; LL; JIC; RIMC ; Presentation Registration: 8 am TBA RadHealth Unified Command; RHT A; AA; Discussion based Program 8:30 am- Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS and Non-evaluated 12:30 pm HSEM); FEMA: Seabrook Station; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard October 18, 2017 DES Portsmouth Invited: SEOC (NH, ME, MA); Command TIX Facility & Discussionbased Registration: 8 am General StaffICP, ESFs Non-evaluated Exercise 8:30 am-3 1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9, 10,11 ,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; pm RadHealth Unified Command; RHT A; AA; Lab; EOF Personnel (both DPHS and HSEM); FEMA Region I; Selected EPZ and Host EOCs, Seabrook Station; Monitoring Teams; Portsmouth Naval Shipyard November 29, 2017 SEOC NH and MA EPZ and Host EOC personnel; Combined EPZ and Host EOCs SEOC Command & General Staff; ICP, Functional EOF, JIC, ICP ESFs Exercise # 1 Monitoring Team l ,2,3,6,7,8, 10, l l , 12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; (CFE # 1) locations RadHealth Unified Command; RHT A; AA; EOF Personnel (both DPHS and HSEM);

Seabrook Station: Monitoring Teams NH and MA EPZ and Host EOC personnel; SEOC SEOC Command & General Staff; ICP, Combined EPZ and Host EOCs ESFs Functional EOF, JIC, ICP l,2,3,6,7,8,10,11,12,13; LL; JIC; RIMC; Exercise #2 Monitoring Team RadHealth Unified Command; RHT A; AA; (CFE #2) locations EOF Personnel (both DPHS and HSEM);

Seabrook Station February 14, 2018 NH and MA EPZ and Host EOC personnel; SEOC Command & General Staff; ICP, SEOC ESFs Participant EPZ and Host EOCs 1,2,3,6,7,8,1 0,l l ,12, 13; LL; JIC; RIMC; Brief EOF, JIC, ICP RadHealth Unified Command; RHT A; AA; EVALUATED Monitoring Team EOF Personnel (both DPHS and HSEM);

April 4, 2018 locations Seabrook Station FACILITIES The following will be involved in the Seabrook Station Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise Cycle in FY2018:

In Sequence

EPZ Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs): Brentwood, East Kingston, Exeter, Greenland, Hampton, Hampton Falls, Kensington, Kingston, New Castle, Newfields, Newton, North Hampton, Portsmouth, Rye, Seabrook, South Hampton, Stratham.

State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC): NH Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM)

      • Local Liaisons may be located at the Incident Field Office (IFO) for part or all of the Exercise Cycle Emergency Operations Facility (EOF): NH Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM)

NH Division of Public Health Services Radiological Health Section State Police Dispatch : State Warning Point Rockingham County Dispatch Center Public Inquiry: Public Inquiry Office Joint Information Center: For CFE # 1, a JIC may be established at the IPOC (SEOC). The JIC will otherwise be co-located with the NPP JIC.

Field Monitoring Teams: Monitoring Teams (FMTl & FMT2)

(Equipment checklist: OOS day before)

Dose Assessment Personnel and MTC: Will be located at the EOF Out of Sequence Schools:

Newfields Elementary - Newfields Stratham Memorial School - Stratham Memorial Elementary - Newton Lincoln Ackerman School - Hampton Falls North Hampton Elementary - North Hampton Maude Trefethen - New Castle Rye Elementary School - Rye Little Harbor Elementary - Portsmouth Portsmouth Middle School - Portsmouth Hampton Academy - Hampton Saint Patrick's School -

Portsmouth Licensed Child Care Facilities: Place to Grow - Brentwood Kid Logic - East Kingston Appleseed Day Care - Exeter Exeter Day School - Exeter Kaleidoscope Home Childcare - Greenland My First School - Hampton Hampton Head Start - Hampton Hampton Falls Child Care Center - Hampton Falls Kingston Children's Center - Kingston Imprints - North Hampton Agape Preschool - Portsmouth Chase Home for Children - Portsmouth Great Bay Kids PEASE - Portsmouth Seacoast Community School - Portsmouth The Early Learning Ctr. Temple Israel Preschool - Portsmouth

Children's House Montessori School - Rye Seabrook Head Start - Seabrook Acom School - Stratham Bright Horizons at Timberland - Stratham Debbie's Day Care - Stratham Residential Camps:

Lone Tree Scout Reservation - Kingston Long-term Care Facilities: (Nursing Homes)

The Woods at Riverwoods - Exeter The Boulders at Riverwoods - Exeter Clipper Harbor of Portsmouth - Portsmouth Reception Center(s):

Manchester Memorial High School - 3/ 15/1 7 (CFE #1); 4/11/17 (CFE #2); 6/1/17 (Evaluated)

Manchester EOC will also be activated and evaluated.

Dover Middle School - TBD, Dover EOC will also be activated and evaluated.

Rochester EOC will be evaluated in 2020.

MS-1 Hospital:

Wentworth-Douglass Hospital, Dover, NH NH State Police:

Troop A - Epping, NH State Transportation Staging Area:

Rockingham County Courthouse Brentwood, NH State of NH Radiological Laboratory:

29 Hazen Drive Concord, NH Evaluation Criteria Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates sub-element 1.d. 1, I .e.], 3.a, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 4.a.3, 4.b. J or 5.b. 1, 6.a. 1 and 6.b.1 unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an on the spot re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that same day.

Special Note: Due to the length of time from the submission of this Extent of Play and the Evaluated Exercise, some of the Special Facilities may be removed or adjusted.

EVALUATION AREA 1: Emergency Operations Management Sub-element 1.a: Mobilization This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- 1, which requires that OROs have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel, and activate and staff emergency facilities.

Criterion I.a.I: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, A.I.a, e; A.3, 4; C.J, 4, 6; D.4; E.l, 2; G.3.a; H.3, 4)

New Hampshire Extent of Play The notification process for state and local responders will be completed, and call down rosters will be

available to the FEMA Evaluator(s) upon request.

State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) - New Hampshire Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) SEOC emergency staff, the Unified Command (Division of Public Health Services Radiological Health Section [RadHealth]), the Emergency Support Function (ESF) Agencies staff, the State Public Information Line staff, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Liaison will be activated upon notification per procedures.

State Warning Point (SWP) remains activated on a 24-hour basis.

Incident Field Office (IFO) - For this exercise cycle the Local Liaisons will be located at the IFO at the Pease TradePort and will pre-stage. (10 mins/1 hour)

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - HSEM and RadHealth may be pre-staged. Dose Assessment personnel will also be located at the EOF. (10 mins /1 hour)

Joint Information Center (JIC) - The NH SS JIC may be pre-staged for CFE #2 and Evaluated Exercise.

(10 mins/1 hour). A JIC at the SEOC may be opened for CFE #1.

Field Monitoring Team (FMT) Personnel - Field Monitoring Teams will meet at DPHS RadioChemistry Lab in Concord where they will receive a briefing from the Lab Supervisor. They will then deploy to a designated staging area where they will contact the Monitoring Team Coordinator (MTC) and report readiness and location. They will receive a complete situation and mission brief. Field Monitoring Team personnel will use a compressed time: 10 mins/1 hour of normal travel response time.

EPZ and Host EOCs - Municipalities will activate their personnel for exercises per procedures. One person from each EOC will be pre-staged in order to open the facilities for the Controllers and Evaluators. The Dover EOC and Manchester EOC will be evaluated during the out of sequence reception center exercise.

The Rochester EOC will be evaluated in 2020.

Transportation Providers - Initial calls will be made to three transportation providers to verify the contact information and resources (drivers and vehicles) under the LOA. Information obtained will be available for review at ESF# l and ESF#7. Procedures within community' s EOC will provide input to the Local Liaisons as to potential transportation needs. ESF# l3 will be responsible to activate STSA per procedures (simulated). No vehicles or personnel will be mobilized during the CFEs or Evaluated Exercise.

State Transportation Staging Area (STSA) - The STSA will be evaluated out-of-sequence. The STSA will be pre-staged at 0800. Calls to/from locations not playing will be simulated. The STSA will be fully setup.

The STSA will dispatch one bus (represented by a vehicle) to certain communities, based on requests coming in through WebEOC.

Sub-element 1.b: Facilities This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which provides that Ojfsite Resp onse Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.

Criterion J.b.J: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REPJ, G.3.a; H.3; J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)

New Hampshire Extent of Play The EPZ Town of Kensington will have moved to a new EOC facility.

The newly refurbished Radiological Laboratory located in the lower Level of the DHHS Building, at 29 Hazen Drive in Concord will be evaluated during this exercise cycle out-of-sequence.

Sub-element 1.c: Direction and Control This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

Criterion J.c.J: Key personnel with leadership roles /or th e ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort/or which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/REP-1, A.J.d; A.2.a, b,* A.3; C.4, 6)

New Hampshire Extent of Play EPZ EOCs: If any communities are directed to evacuate, EOC personnel will demonstrate continuity of government through a discussion of logistics. Closing of the EOC and relocation to a facility outside the EPZ will be simu lated through discussion.

Resolve planning issue from Portsmouth 20 16: The Portsmouth EOC leadership did not adequately demonstrate direction and control of the emergency response. After receiving the notification of an Alert at 0812, the EMC did not review his job aid in a timely manner. This in tum, de layed ESF staff notifications and activation ofEOC for approximately 30-45 minutes. This also led to the initial two 300B forms being read almost an hour after they were sent out. In addition, when 300B #4 and #5 were received, some information was omitted during the EOC briefing, such as canceling- school activities, additional protective actions, and reception center status. The EMC and City Manager made a precautionary actions decision to order an early release of school children and nonessential personnel without thoroughly communicating and coordinating with the State to ensure that the public was notified. The EMC wasn't aware of certain EOC activities, fo r example, staff were receiving public inquiry calls and providing responses without the EMC's knowledge. There was not Job Aid for the PIO posi tion, which should be handling the public inquiry calls. Also, the EMC gave staff the option to leave during the exercise, if they wanted to get back to their regular jobs.

The Dover EOC will be evaluated during the out of sequence reception center exercise. The Manchester EOC will be evaluated out of sequence. The Rochester EOC will be evaluated in 2020. The STSA Manager will demonstrate direction and control of this faci lity.

Sub-element 1.d: Communications Equipment This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs establish and operate reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as contiguous governments within the EPZ, Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, EOCs, Incident Command Posts, and FMJ's.

Criterion J.d.l: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-J, F.1, 2)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Contact with any locations not playing will be simulated. Demonstration of operating communication systems wi ll be provided, as appropriate. The SEOC wi ll complete a communications test with the Dover EOC during the evaluated exercise.

STSA: Contact with locations not playing will be simulated. Radio and WebEOC communications will be demonstrated.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub -element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an on the spot re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to redemonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element l.e: E<1uipme11t am/ Smmlies to Support Operation.,*

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have emergency

equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (Kl), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H. 7, 1O; L 7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12,* K.3.a,* K.5.b)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Participating facilities will show that equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are adequate and sufficient to support the emergency response. Documentation of dosimetry inspection, dosimetry inventory and KI inventory will be available for review at RadHealth. Inventory is also maintained at RIMC.

STSA: The STSA will be setup per procedure to demonstrate adequacy of equipment and supplies to support operations.

Note: FEMA will provide copies of the Annual Letter of Certification to evaluators, as appropriate. Staging Area Dosimetry and KI will also take place during the OOS STSA exercise. Equipment for Reception Center activities will be demonstrated out-of-sequence.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an on the spot re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to redemonstrate the activity that same day.

EVALUATION AREA 2: Protective Action Decision-Making Sub-element 2.a: Emergency Worker Exposure Control This Sub -element is derived from NUR.EG-0654/FEMA -R.EP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the ORO 's plans/procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for specific missions.

Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. Th ese limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that take into consideration TEDE or organ-specific limits) identified in the ORO 's plans/procedures.

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of Kl, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6,f; K.3.a; K.4)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the SEOC by the Unified Command (HSEM, RadHealth) based upon information provided from the EOF. Dose Assessment staff located at the EOF will analyze utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the SEOC for their consideration in making the protective action decisions.

Radiological briefings will be provided to address exposure limits, procedures to replace those personnel approaching exposure limits and how permission to exceed limits is obtained. Emergency workers will also be briefed on when to take KI. Distribution of KI to emergency workers will be simulated. RadHealth will

authorize use of Kl for emergency workers when radiological conditions warrant its use.

Sub-clement 2.b: Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PAGs.

OROs must have the capability to choose, among a range ofprotective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency. OROs base these choices on PAGsfrom their plans/procedures or EPA 's Manual ofProtective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents and other criteria, such as plant conditions, licensee PARs, coordination ofprecautionary and/or protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs and incident command), availability of in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations, to include HAE incidents, the threat posed by the specific hostile action, the affiliated response, and the effect of an evacuation on the threat response effort, that create higher than normal risk from general population evacuation.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) are based on available information on plant conditions,fteld monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.JO and Supplement 3)

New Hampshire Extent of Play The SEOC decision-making team will evaluate the protective action recommendations of the State Dose Assessment Team and the utility and develop appropriate protective action decisions.

Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the SEOC by Unified Command and based upon information provided from the EOF and other appropriate sources.

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make precautionary and/or protective action decisions for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the SEOC based upon information provided by the EOF and recommendations from the Dose Assessment personnel who will analyze utility, field monitoring team and meteorological data provided at the EOF.

  • Sub-clement 2.c: Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decision Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to determine precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation, sheltering, and use ofKl, ifapplicable, for groups ofpersons with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, schools, licensed daycare centers, mobility impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals). The focus is on those groups ofpersons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are, or potentially will be, affected by a radiological release from a NP P.

Criterion 2.c.1: Precautionary and/or protective action decisions are made, as appropriate,for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e)

New Hampshire Extent of Play .

Protective action decisions, including those for individuals with disabilities and access/functional needs population groups, are demonstrated at the SEOC based upon information provided by RadHealth Dose Assessment Program staff at the EOF. HSEM and RadHealth staff will analyze utility, field monitoring team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the SEOC (Governor) for their consideration and implementation in making protective action decisions. Information on protective/precautionary actions is passed to special facilities (simulated) from the SEOC to the EPZ EOCs through the Local Liaisons. Policies and procedures utilized by Special Facilities are discussed through interviews during out-of-sequence interviews with a representative selection of special facilities within the EPZ.

EVALUATION AREA 3: Protective Action Implementation Sub-element 3.a: Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 , which requires that OROs have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; reading of direct-reading dosimetry by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess ofthe PAGs, *a nd the capability to provide Klfor emergency workers, always applying the "as low as reasonably achievable" principle as appropriate.

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OR Os maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of Kl to emergency workers. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.1 O.e; K.3.a, b; K.4)

New Hampshire Extent of Play EPZ EOCs and Reception Centers: Dosimetry packets will be issued to a minimum of two individuals who will be working inside each EPZ EOC by the local RADEF Officer. Actual distribution and ingestion of KI will not occur. Knowledge of the use of dosimetry through the Plume Phase and New Hampshire policiys on dosimetry will be demonstrated through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator and only with individuals issued dosimetry.

Resolve Planning Issue from SEOC 2016: During exercise it was discovered that the current forms in the State of New Hampshire, State Emergency Operations Plan, Radiological Emergency Response for Nuclear Facilities, Incident Annex - 2016, page 76, Form 135A, indicates, "I will take 130 milligrams (one dose) per day of the thyroid blocking agent as instructed." It appears the form used by the emergency worker was not the current revision.

STSA: The STSA RADEF Officer will prepare dosimetry packets and provide a briefing to support distribution to vehicle drivers and workers at the STSA.

Note : If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an on the spot re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to redemonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 3.b: Implementation of Kl Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the General Public This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 , which requires that OROs have the capability to provide KI for institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plans/procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to institutionalized individuals, providing KI to the general public is an ORO option and must be reflected as such in ORO plans/procedures. Provisions must include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means ofdistributing KI.

Criterion 3.b.l: Kl and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to recommend use of Kl be made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of Kl for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e,f)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Schools, child care, institutionalized and special facility staff who may administer KI will be interviewed out of sequence by the FEMA Evaluator.

EPZ EOCs, STSA, and Reception Centers: Actual distribution and ingestion of KI will not occur. Empty KI containers (small zip-lock bags) will be included in the dosimetry packets for emergency workers. As part of the demonstration by the RADEF Officer or individual charged by the facility to implement a KI Plan for the facility, the FEMA Evaluator will be briefed as if they were the recipient of the KI. The evaluator will check the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of KI distribution, and include forms and equipment to be used. Inventory is also maintained at RadHealth and RIMC.

Note : If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an on the spot re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to redemonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-clement 3.c: Implementation of Precautionary and/or Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. The focus is on those persons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from anNPP.

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions.

(NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-l, J.10.c, d, e, g)

New Hampshire Extent of Play All actual and simulated contacts must be logged.

EPZ EOCs: Calls will be simulated from local EOCs to special facilities and/or persons with disabilities or access/functional needs within their jurisdiction. The information is confidential and copies will not be

provided to the evaluator. Local Transportation Staging Areas (LTSA) procedures will be evaluated through interview.

Estimates on transportation needs will be made based upon enrollment or capacity figures on file and/or individuals who have self-identified transportation needs. ESF# l will simulate a call to the STSA at request of Unified Command at the SEOC to arrange for transportation assets. Requests may also come through Local Liaisons at the IFO. No ~ehicles* will be-~obilized: A board devel9ped ,on WebEOC will simulaJe tracking of the transportation assets. The STSA will be evaluated out-of-sequence.

STSA: The STSA will assign one bus to be dispatched to demonstrate implementation of protective actions for special populations. *

  • Local special facilities will be interviewed out-of-sequence where transportation arrangements will be discussed with the FEMA Evaluator.

Public Inquiry staff will demonstrate the capability to correctly operate the TTY will be demonstrated through the 800 number provided.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement precautionary and/or protective actions for schools.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Calls to schools outside with EPZ will be simulated and logged. Contact will be made through the EOCs.

EPZ EOCs: Initial notification will be simulated to all school, health care facilities and day care centers.

Long-term care facilities' administrators will make decisions for their residents after notification based upon health and safety considerations of their patients. Most schools and day cares have indicated an early release process to avoid evacuation decision-making.

EPZ Schools/Day Care Providers: Participating schools, day care providers and long term health care facilities in the EPZ communities will be visited out of sequence by a FEMA evaluator, who will interview key staff regarding their response plan .

Sub-element'3.d*:* Implem~ntation of Traffic,;md *Acces_s Co~trof* . ,*

This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 , which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans/procedures, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This Sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points, and removal of impedim ents to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.J: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.J, 4; J.10.g,j)

New Hampshire Extent of Play EPZ EOCs: EPZ EOCs will demonstrate the ability to direct and monitor traffic control operations within their jurisdictions through discussions and communications with the evaluator. At the EOCs, public works representative and the local police representative will participate in a discussion of procedures and resources available for traffic control. No personnel or equipment will be deployed to field locations. Each EPZ EOC will discuss impediment strategies through interview with FEMA. One town will selected to have the

information sent to the SEOC to be included by the JIC in press briefings.

ESFs # 1 and # 13 : Representatives from State Police (Troop A) and DOT will demonstrate/explain ACPs through interview at Troop A out-of-sequence. The traffic and access control personnel will not be deployed. The Dover EOC will be evaluated during the out of sequence reception center exercise.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an on the spot re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to redemonstrate the activity that same day.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.k)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Each EPZ EOC will demonstrate decision-making regarding rerouting of traffic following a traffic impediment by a controller inject or through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator. No personnel or equipment will be dispatched to the simulated accident scene. The implementation of an alternate evacuation route for the length of the scenario event will be covered by one (1 ) Local EPZ community (set to evacuate).

If the scenario does not lead to evacuation, the criteria shall be deemed complete if the ORO can describe to the Evaluator the actions they would take to overcome a major traffic impediment during an evacuation and how such actions would be communicated to the public and affected OROs.

For CFE #2 and the Evaluated exercise, there will be one inject provided by the controller in an EPZ community that will run the entire exercise. This information will need to be passed from the community to be announced in a media briefing and published in a press release from the JIC.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an on the spot re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to redemonstrate the activity that same day.

EVALUATION AREA 4: Field Measurements and Analyses Sub-element 4.a: Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that OROs have the capability to deploy FMTs with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 indicates that OROs must have the capability to use FMTs within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In an incident at an NP P, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although incident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an incident, it is important to collect field radiological data to help characterize any

radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such.field measurement efforts.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.J; H.12; I. 7, 8, 11; J.10.a)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Field Monitoring Teams are managed by the MTC who is located at the utility EOF. He will brief and dispatch a minimum of two teams to sampling locations as dictated by scenario play. Each Field Monitoring Team will collect two complete samples. RadHealth FMT personnel will prepare sample media, survey forms, and chain of custody documents as if they were being transferred to the lab for analysis. Actual transport of samples will be simulated. Monitoring Team equipment will be evaluated the day before the exercise. Controller injects will be specifically prepared, as appropriate, to allow Field Teams to be evaluated.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.J; H.12: I.8, 9; J.10.a)

New Hampshire Extent of Play A minimum of two Field Monitoring Teams (made up of three people) will each pick up a minimum of two complete samples each consisting of an ambient radiation measurement and an air sample. Charcoal filter cartridges may simulate use of silver zeolite filter media. Simulated cartridges will be prepared for transportation to the lab for analysis. Field data may be provided (OOS, ifnecessary) by Controllers to the Accident Assessment (Plume Tracking) Team to facilitate the accident assessment process during the exercise.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an on the spot re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to redemonstrate the activity that same day.

EVALUATION AREA 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information Sub-element 5.a: Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 , which requires that OROs have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in this Sub-element are further discussed in Section V, Part A of the RPM (January 2016), Alert and Notification Systems.

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a

minimum the elements required by current REP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Actions to demonstrate perfonnance of initial notification of the public will be perfonned up to the point of actual transmission of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) message. The EAS message wi ll be prepared by the PIO in the SEOC and transmitted/encoded by ESF#2. The State Primary EAS Station will be contacted only once and notified that activations of the EAS will be handled out of the SEOC. Actual activation of the EAS wi ll be simulated by SEOC staff.

Rockingham County Dispatch wi ll demonstrate the actions necessary to perfonn the siren activation up to the point of actually so unding the sirens. Siren so unding wi ll be simulated.

Criterion 5.a.3: Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system.

(NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-I, E.6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

New Hampshire Extent of Play This sub-element will covered through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator by ESF#2 in the SEOC. No actual notification on the backup system will be conducted.

Sub-element 5.b: Subsequent Emer~ency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-J , which requires that OROs have the capability to disseminate appropriate emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions, to the public. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l requires OROs to ensure that the capability exists for providing ieformation to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l also provides that a system must be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the public inquiry hotline.

Criterion 5.b.l: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Joint Information Center: Rumors and trends generated as a result of public inquiry calls to the Public Infonnation Line will be included in news bri efings by the PIO. A NH nc may be opened and coordinated at the SEOC. This JIC wi ll be connected to and directly communicate with the NPP's JIC and partner states through electronic means. (If the NPP's JIC is inaccessible to some individuals.)

Resolve issue from JIC in 20 16: The NH PIO Spokesperson (Spokesperson) was having difficulty receiving information from the State EOC. Both states' Spokespersons arrived at 08 57. Since the licensee JIC personnel was in place fo r quite some time before the states arrived, and the Alert EAS occurred over an hour prior to that, the Iicensee was ready to brief the media as soon as possible. The NH Spokesperson called the EOC several times and was not able to get an update from the state prior to the media briefing. Therefore, the Spokesperson was not able to brief any infonnation which resulted in many

questions from the press regarding NH's lack of response. This lack of information occurred several times throughout the day, including after the General Emergency (GE) was declared. The GE was declared at 1100. The licensee was ready to give a media briefing at 1115; however, the states were not ready to provide PAD information. The briefing was pushed back until 1120 and then 1125, and then 1135 and finally was held at 1140. During this 20 minutes of holding off the briefing, the NH Spokesperson tried calling the EOC repeatedly to obtain the necessary information. Because she was not able to get the information in time, she was not able to advise the residents of Seabrook and Hampton Falls of the need to evacuate and consider taking KI.

SEOC: Simcell personnel will make calls simulating members of the public to the Public Information Line.

This process will commence after the initial siren activation. Information on rumor trends recognized at the Public Information Line will be forwarded to the PIO at the SEOC.

Public Information Center: Staff assigned to the Public Inquiry Office will demonstrate the ability to handle inquiry calls. Handling at least two rumor trends will be demonstrated.

EPZ Towns: Simcell personnel will make at least one call to the EOCs simulating members of the public with inquiries. Each EOC will demonstrate the ability to properly handle these inquiries.

Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner. This will NOT be subject to specific time requirements.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorjly, the f'EMA EvaluatOI" will inform the participant and the Controller. After an on the spot re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA ,Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to redeinonstrate the activity th~t sa~e d~y. * * * *

  • EVALUATION AREA 6: Support Operation/Facilities Sub-element 6.a: Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-l, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, while minimizing contamination of the facility. OROs must also have the capability to identify and register evacuees at reception centers.

Criterion 6.a.J: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Manchester Memorial High School and Dover Middle School Reception Centers will be set up as reception, monitoring, and decontamination facilities with capabilities demonstrated out-of-sequence. The facilities will exhibit appropriate space and personnel for two registration stations, one special registration area, two messaging and one exiting station. Registration will be at one CFE and the evaluated exercise. Monitoring and decontamination activities will be established and demonstrated for at least eight evacuees and two emergency workers. Adequate space will be identified for evacuees' vehicles.

Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an on the spot re-training by the state or

local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to redemonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 6.b: Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l , which requires that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment, inclusive of vehicles.

Criterion 6.b.J: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1, K.5.a, b)

New Hampshire Extent of Play Monitoring and Decontamination Stations will be set up and demonstrated at the Reception Centers out-of-sequence. One portal monitor will be demonstrated. Twelve individuals (six representing evacuees and six representing emergency workers) will go through primary monitoring with controller injects establishing the number of individuals presenting themselves as contaminated and proceeding through secondary monitoring and decontamination. There will be a minimum of one female and one male with contamination.

During these activities, monitoring and decontamination equipment, instruments, record keeping, and routing will be demonstrated appropriately. Monitoring and decontamination procedures will be demonstrated on at least one ( 1) emergency response vehicle outside of the reception center.

Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated may be simulated and conducted by interview by the FEMA Evaluator. Note: If during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the participant and the Controller. After an on the spot re-training by the state or local organization, the FEMA Evaluator will provide the participant another opportunity to redemonstrate the activity that same day.

Sub-element 6.d: Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals This Sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l , which requires that OROs have the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical fa cilities with the capability to provide medical services.

Criterion 6.d.J: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.2,* H.10,* K.5.a, b; L.l, 4)

New Hampshire Extent of Play This sub-element will be demonstrated out of sequence at Wentworth-Douglass Hospital in Dover.

This page is intentionally blank MASSACHUSETTS EVALUATION AREAS AND EXTENT OF PLAY Overview The following organizations/locations will demonstrate in 2018:

State Emergency Operations Center L __ _

Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Massachusetts Department of Public Health Massachusetts State Police MassDOT Massachusetts National Guard Massachusetts Department of Mental Health Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth American Red Cross Federal Emergency Management Agency Region I NextEra Energy Seabrook Station Liaison MASS 211 Call Center Region I Emergency Operations Center Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency - Region I Massachusetts State Police - Troop A MassDOT Massachusetts Department of Mental Health American Red Cross Central Medical Emergency Direction (C-Med)

Region I EOC Volunteer Staff RACES Volunteer Staff Emergency Operations Facility Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency Massachusetts Department of Public Health/Radiation Control Program NextEra Energy Seabrook Station Radio logical Field Monitoring and Sampling Teams Massachusetts Department of Public Health/Radiation Control Program NextEra Energy Seabrook Station Joint Information Center Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency NextEra Energy Seabrook Station EAS Radio Station WBZ 1030 AM Risk Jurisdictions Amesbury EOC Merrimac EOC Newbury EOC Newburyport EOC Salisbury EOC West Newbury EOC The following demonstrations were conducted out of sequence during May 15 to 17, 2017:

Schools (Note:

  • Denotes KI participation):

Amesbury:

Amesbury Elementary School Amesbury High School Merrimac:

Dr. FN Sweetsir School Newbury:

The Governor's Academy Newbury Elementary School Newburyport:

River Valley Charter School DARE Family Services Salisbury Salisbury Elementary School W. Newbury:

Dr. John C Page School Koinonia The following organizations/locations will be demonstrated in 2017:

Lowell General Hospital - (Nov. 2, 2017)

Per FEMA Region I Memorandum dated, August 4, 2010, "On the Spot" corrections as outlined in Recommendation Initiative 1.5 - Correct Issues Immediately is approved/or the following criterion:

1.d.l, I.e.], 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 4.a.3, 4.b.l, 5.b.1, 6.a.1, and 6.b.J.

EVALUATION AREA 1: Emergency Operations Management

!Sub-element J.a - Mobilization Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate and staff emergency facilities .

Criterion J.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-J, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.J, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; G.3.a; H.3, 4)

Extent of Play Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an incident from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner and demonstrate the ability to maintain and staff 24-hour operations. Twenty-four hour operations can be demonstrated during the exercise via rosters or shift changes or otherwise in an actual activation. Local responders must demonstrate the ability to receive and/or initiate notification to the licensees or other respective emergency management organizations ofan incident in a timely manner, when they receive information from the licensee or alternate sources. Responsible OROs must demonstrate the activation offacilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel upon their arrival.

Activation offacilities and staff, including those associated with the JCS, must be completed in accordance with ORO plans/procedures. The location and contact information for facilities included in the incident command must be available to all appropriate responding agencies and the NPP after these facilities have been activated.

Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. This includes the staggered release of resources from an assembly area.

Additionally, pre-positioning of stafffor out-of-sequence demonstrations may be used in accordance with the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

The REP program does not evaluate Incident Command Post tactical operations (e.g., Law Enforcement hostile action suppression techniques), only coordination among the incident command, the utility, and all appropriate OROs, pursuant to plans/procedures.

Initial law enforcement,fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical response to the NPP site may impact the ability to staff REP functions. The ability to identify and request additional resources or identify compensatory measures must be demonstrated. Exercises must also address the role ofmutual aid in the incident, as appropriate. An integral part of the response to an HAE scenario at an NPP may also be within the auspices of the Federal Government (e.g., FBI, NRC, or DHS). Protocols for requesting Federal, State, local, and Tribal la"H; enforcement support must be demonstrated, as appropriate. Any resources must be on the ORO 's mobilization list so they can be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of- Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play State EOC-Massachusetts Emergency Management (MEMA) SEOC emergency staff, including the Emergency Support Function (ESF) Team staff (Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH),

Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT), Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (MDMH), Massachusetts State Police (MSP), Massachusetts Army National Guard (MANG), and American Red Cross (ARC), the State Public Information Line (Mass 211) staff, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Liaison will be pre-staged at TBD in the SEOC cafeteria, and upon notification, will report to the EOC, using a ten-minute per hour travel time. The notification process will be completed, and call down rosters will be shown to the FEMA Evaluator.

The MASS 211 Call Center will be activated for an event at Seabrook Station.

Region I EOC-MEMA Region I EOC staff and emergency volunteer staff will pre-staged at TBD outside the Region I EOC, and upon notification, will report to the Region I EOC, using a ten-minute per hour travel time (note: MEMA Region I staff who report prior to TBD will report at their normal reporting time). The notification process will be completed and call down rosters will be shown to the FEMA Evaluator.

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF}-MEMA and MDPH personnel will be pre-staged in the area of the EOF, using a ten minute per hour travel time.

Joint Information Center (TIC}-MEMA personnel will be pre-staged in the area of the nc, using a ten minute per hour travel time.

NIAT Field Monitoring Team Personnel-Field Team personnel will be pre-staged in the area of the Salisbury Fire Department. Upon notification, the Fie1d Tea.in will report to the Sali~b_ury Fire Department (muster location to pick up equipment and then dispatching into field via EOF instructions),

using a ten-minute per hour travel time.

Local EOCs--Local EOC emergency response staff w{n be pre-stag~l at TBD outside the *1o~*a1 EOC and upon notification, will report to the EOC, using a ten-minute per hour travel time.

!sub-element 1.b - Facilities Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have facilities to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1. b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. *

(NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-J, G.3.a; H.3; J.10.h; J.12; K.5.b)

(

Extent of Play Responsible OROs must demonstrate, no less than once every 8 years, the availability offacilities to support accomplishment of emergency operations (this includes all alternate and backup facilities).

Evaluations are typically performed for EOCs and JICs, as well as other facilities such as reception/relocation centers. Some of the areas evaluated within the facilities are adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, access to backup power, and/or alternate facility, if required

to support operations. Radio stations, laboratories, initial warning points and hospitals are not evaluated under 1.b.1.

In addition, facilities will be evaluated for this criterion during the first biennial exercise after any new or substantial changes in structure, equipm ent, or mission that affect key capabilities, as outlined in respective emergency plans/procedures. A substantial change is one that has a direct effect or impact on emergency response operations performed in those facilities. Examples of substantial changes include modifying the size or configuration of an emergency operations center, adding more function to a center, or changing the equipment available for use in a center.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of- Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play A new Salisbury Emergency Operations Center is located in the new Salisbury Police Department at 181 Beach Road, Salisbury, MA.

There is a new Newbury Emergency Operations Center still located in the Newbury Police Department at 25 High Street, Newbury, but it has moved across the hall from the original EOC.

Findings: NIA

!sub-element J.c - Direction and Control Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

Criterion J.c.J: Key personnel with leadership roles/or the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.J.d; A.2.a, b; A.3,* C.4, 6)

Extent of Play Leadership personnel must demonstrate the ability to carry out the essential management functions of the response effort (e.g., keeping staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.) Leadership must demonstrate the ability to prioritize resource tasking and replace/supplement resources (e.g. , through MOUs or other agreements) when faced with competing demands for finite resources. Any resources identified through LOAIMOUs must be on the ORO 's mobilization list so they may be contacted during an incident, if needed.

All activities must be performed based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play If a community is directed to evacuate, EOC personnel will demonstrate continuity of government through a discussion of logistics with the FEMA Evaluator. Closing of the local EOC and relocation will be simulated.

Findings: N/A

  • I *. ' .
  • Sub-element J.d - Communications Equipment Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) establish and operate reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as contiguous governm ents within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, emergency operations centers (EOC), Incident Command Posts and field monitoring teams.

Criterion J.d.l: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUllEG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2)

Extent of Play OROs must demonstrate that a primary system and at least one backup system for fixed facilities, is fully functional at all times. Communications systems are maintained and tested on a recurring basis throughout the assessment period and system status is available to all operators. Periodic test results and corrective actions are maintained on a real time basis. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed.

Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units are used as needed for transmission and receipt ofexercise messages. All facilities, FMJ's and incident command must have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent ofthe commercial telephone system.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROs must ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists.

Exercise scenarios may require the failure of a communications system and use ofan alternate system, as negotiated in the extent ofplay agreement.

A ll activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an .actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Contact with locations not playing will be simulated.

Masconomet Reception Center Staging Area Daycares Schools beyond initial call to the Superintendent's office Special Needs Findings: NIA Note: If, during the exerc;ise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

Sub-element J.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l , which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H. 7, JO; 1.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)

Extent of Play A particular facility 's equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with that facility's assigned role in the ORO 's emergency operations plans. Use of maps and other displays is encouraged.

For non-facility-based operations, the equipment and supplies must be sufficient and consistent with the assigned operational role. At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriated equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs) must be available, or their availability described.

Specific equipment and supplies that must be demonstrated under this criterion include Kl inventories, dosimetry, and monitoring equipment, as fo llows:

KI: Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability*to maintain inventories of Kl sufficient for use by:

(1) emergency workers; (2) institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and (3) where stipulated by the plans/procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make Kl available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans/procedures. The plans/procedures must include the forms to be used for documenting emergency worker ingestion ofKl, as well as a mechanism for identifying emergency workers that have declined Kl in advance. Consider carefally the placement of emergency workers that have declined Kl in advance.

ORO quantities of dosimetry and Kl available and storage locations(s) will be corifirmed by physical inspection at the storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the ALC submission, and/or verified during an SAV Available supplies ofKl must be within the expiration date indicated on Kl bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicating that the Kl supply remains potent, in accordance with US. Pharmacopoeia standards.9~

Dosimetry: Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers must be available for issuance to all emergency workers who will be dispatched to perform an ORO mission. In addition, OROs must demonstrate provisions to make dosimetry available to specialized response teams (e.g., civil support team, Special Weapons and Tactics Teams, urban search and rescue, bomb squads, HAZMAT, or other ancillary groups) as identified in plans/ procedures.

Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry must allow an individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO 's plans/ procedures.

Direct-reading dosimeters must be zeroed or operationally checked prior to issuance. The dosimeters must be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced when necessary. Civil Defense Victoreen Model 138s (CD V-l 38s) (0-200 mR), due to their documented history of electrical leakage SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17

problems, must be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced when necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SA V Operational checks and testing of electronic dosimeters must be in accordance with the manufacturer 's instructions and be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the ALC and/or through an SA V Monitoring Instruments: All instruments must be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer 's recommendations. Unmodified CDV- 700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendation must be calibrated annually. Modified CDV- 700 instruments must be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration must be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. In addition, instruments being used to measure activity must have a sticker-affixed to their sides indicating the effective range of the readings. The range of readings documentation specifies the acceptable range of readings that the meter should indicate when it is response-checked using a standard test source.

For FMI's, the instruments must be capable ofmeasuring gamma exposure rates and detecting beta radiation. These instruments must be capable ofmeasuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection/ exposure control of team members and detection of activity on air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans/ procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source must be used to verify proper operational response for each low-range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1Rlhr.) and for high-range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high-range instrument, a procedure must exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high-range instrument can make useful readings.

In areas where portal monitors are used, the OROs must set up and operationally check the monitor(s).

The monitor(s) must conform to the standards set forth in the Contamination Monitoring Standard for a Portal Monitor Used for Emergency Response, FEMA-REP-21 (March 1995) or in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.

Mutual Aid Resources: If the incoming resources arrive with their own equipment (i.e., monitors and/ or dosimetry), they will be evaluated by REP Program standards. FEMA will not inventory equipment that is not part of the REP Program. If an agency has a defined role in the REP Plan, they are subject to the planning process and standards, as well as the guidance of this Manual.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of- Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Participating facilities will demonstrate that equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are adequate and sufficient to support the emergency response. FEMA will provide copies of the Annual Letter of Certification to evaluators as documentation of quarterly inventory and operational checks.

Findin!!s: N/A Note: lf, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" trainjng by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

SEABROOK EOP Rev. I 11/13/17

EVALUATION AREA 2: Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decision-Making Sub-element 2.a- Emergency Worker Exposure Control Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-l, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in pla,ce, as specified in the ORO 's plans/procedures,. to authorize emergency,worker exposure limits to be exr;eecj.edfor specific missions.

  • Radiation exposure limits for emergenr;y .workers are. the ,:ecommended accumulate.ddose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be p~rmitted to incur during an einerger,zcy. These limits include any pre-established administrative rep~rting limits (that take into considerati~n Total Effective Dose Equivalent or organ-sp ecific limits) identified in the O!W 's p lans/procedures.

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-makingprocess, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6.f; K.3.a; K.4)

J.

Extent of Play ,

OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the p lume exposure pathway EPZ must demonstrate a capability to comply with emergency worker exposure limits based on their emergency plans/procedures.

Participating OROs must demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess ofpre-authorized levels and tb the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels. This would include providing KI and dosimetry in a timely manner to emergency workers dispatched onsite to support plant incident assessment and mitigating actions, in accordance with respective p lans/procedures.

As appropriate, OROs must demonstrate the capability to make d,ecisions on the distribution and administration ofKl as a protective measure for emergency workers, based on the ORO 's plan/ procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with (he established Protective Action Guides (PA Gs) for Kl administration. *

  • All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC based upon information provided from the EOF.

MDPH Radiation Control Program EOF staff will analyze utility, field team and meteorological date provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC for their consideration in making protective action decisions.

Findings: N/A SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17

Sub-element 2.b. - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions for the Plume Phase ofthe Emergency Intent This sub-element is derivedfrom NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 , which requires that Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to independently project integrated dose from projected or actual dose rates and compare these estimates to the PA Gs.

OR Os must have the capability to choose, among a range ofprotective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency. OROs base these choices on PA Gs from their plans/procedures or EPA 's Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents and other criteria, such as, plant conditions, licensee PARs, coordination ofprecautionary and/or protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs and incident command), availability of in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations, to include HAE incidents, the threat posed by the specific hostile action, the affiliated response and the effect of an evacuation on the threat response effort, that create higher than normal risk from general population evacuation.

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions,ji.eld monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of on'site and of/site environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.JO and Supplement 3)

Extent of Play During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification ofplant conditions that may warrant ojfsite protective actions, the ORO must demonstrate the capability to use appropriate means, described in the plan/procedures, to develop protective action recommendations (PAR) for decision-makers based on available information and recommendations provided from the licensee as well as and field monitoring data, if available. The ORO must also consider any release and meteorological data provided by the licensee.

The ORO must demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs must be appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation ofprojected dose must be demonstrated. Projected doses must be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs must be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged format.

When the licensee and ORO projected doses differ by more than a/actor of 10, the ORO and licensee must determine the source of the difference by discussing input data and assumptions used, using different models, or exploring possible reasons. Resolution of these differences must be incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The ORO must demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Demonstration will be in accordance with the NIA T Handbook. The MDPH Dose Assessment Coordinator at the EOF will independently verify dose projections performed by the Utility.

SEABROOK EOP Rev. J JJ/13/17

The State EOC decision-making team will evaluate the protective action recommendations of the NIAT Accident Assessment Team and develop appropriate protective action decisions.

Protective action recommendations will be made in accordance with the MARERP and NIA T Handbook.

Findings: N/A Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make precautionary and/or protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of Kl, if ORO policy).

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A-3; C-4, 6; D-4; J.9, 10.e,f, m)

Extent of Play Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) must have the capability to make both initial and subsequent precautionary and/or protective action decisions. OROs must demonstrate the capability to make initial precautionary and/or protective action decisions in a timely manner appropriate to the incident, based on information from the licensee, assessment ofplant status and potential or actual releases, other available information related to the incident, input from appropriate ORO authorities (e.g. Incident Command), and PARs from the utility and ORO staff In addition, a subsequent or alternate precautionary and/or protective action decision may be appropriate if various conditions (e.g. an HAE incident, weather, release timing and magnitude) pose undue risk to an evacuation, or if evacuation may disrupt the efforts to respond to a hostile action.

OROs must demonstrate the ability to obtain supplemental resources (e.g. mutual aid) necessary to implement a precautionary and/or protective action decision if local law enforcement, fire service, HAZMAT, and emergency medical resources are used to augment response to the NPP site or other key infrastructure.

Dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. In addition, incident command must provide input regarding considerations for subsequent PARs based on the magnitude of the ongoing threat, the response, and/or site conditions. The decision-makers must demonstrate the capability to change protective actions based on the combination of all these factors.

ff the ORO has determined that Kl will be used as a protective measure for the general public under offsite plans/procedures, then it must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration ofKl to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for Kl administration. The Kl decision-making process must involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff ff more than one ORO is involved in decision-making, all appropriate OROs must communicate and coordinate precautionary and/or protective action decisions with each other. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/ communicated with incident command. OR Os must demonstrate the capability to communicate the results ofdecisions to the affected locations.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17

Massachusetts Extent of Play Protective action decisions are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC based upon information provided by the EOF. MDPH Radiation Control Program staff will analyze the Utility, field monitoring and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC for their consideration in making protective action decisions.

Findings: N/A Sub-element 2.c - Precautionary and/or Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, which requires that Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to determine precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation, sheltering and use ofpotassium iodide (KI), if applicable, for groups ofpersons with disabilities and access/functional needs(e.g. , hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities , schools, licensed day care, mobility impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals). The focus is on those groups ofpersons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are, or potentially will be, affected by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant.

Criterion 2.c.J: Precautionary and/or Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate,for groups ofpersons with disabilities and access/functional needs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e)

Extent of Play Usually it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of PA Gs, except for incidents where there is a high-risk environmental condition or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or irifirm) are involved. In these cases, examples offactors must be considered include weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In addition, decisions must be coordinated/ communicated with the incident command. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the ORO must consider use of KI.

Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students.

Demonstration requires that the OROs actually contact public school systems/districts during the exercise.

The OR Os must demonstrate how the decision-making process takes those with disabilities and access/functional needs (e.g., nursing homes, correctional facilities, licensed day cares, mobility-impaired individuals, and transportation-dependent individuals) into account.

In accordance with plans/procedures, OR Os and/or officials ofpublic school systems/districts must demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. The decision-making process, including any preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, must consider the location of students at the time (e.g., whether the students are still at home, enroute to school, or at school).

SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17

Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prepare for contaminated patients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate hospitals in the EPZ that need to evacuate, or the facilities that are receiving these evacuees, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry to these hospitals/facilities. Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP program.

All activities associated must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play

. Protective action decisions, including those for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, are demonstrated at the Massachusetts State EOC based upon information provided by MDPH Radiation Control Program staff at the EOF. MDPH Radiation Control Program staff will analyze Utility, field team and meteorological data provided at the EOF to make a recommendation to the State EOC for their consideration in making protection action decisions .

Findings: N/ A Sub-element 2.d. -Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the means to assess the radiological consequences for the ingestion exposure pathway, relate them to the appropriate PA Gs, and make timely, appropriate proteetive action decisions to mitigate exposure from the ingestion pathway. During an accident at a nuclear power plant, a release of radioactive material may contaminate water supplies and agricultural products in the surrounding areas.

Any such contamination would likely occur during the plume phase of the accident and, depending on the nature of the release, could impact the ingestion pathway for weeks or years.

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the ORO's planning criteria.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; D.4; J.9, 11)

Extent of Play Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) are expected to takeprecautionary actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water andfood, in accordance with their respective p lans/ procedures. Often OROs initiate such actim;s based on criteria related to the facility's Emergency Classification Levels (ECL). Such actions may include recommendations to place milk animals on storedfeed and to use protected water supplies.

The ORO must use its procedures to assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water .

supplies, such as the development of a sampling plan.

  • The ORO 's assessment should include the evaluation ofthe radiological analyses of representative samples ofwater, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially impacted areas; characterization ofthe releases from the facility; and the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs must consider the use of agricultural and watershed data within the 50-mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food and water must then be compared to the appropriate ingestion PA Gs contained in the ORO's plan/procedures. The plans/ procedures contain PA Gs based on specific dose commitment criteria or on criteria as recommended by current Food and Drug Administration guidance. Timely and appropriate recommendations must be SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17

provided to the ORO decision-makers group for implementation decisions. OROs may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a given action on the resultant ingestion pathway dose commitments.

The ORO must demonstrate timely decisions to minimize radiological impacts from the ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other ieformation. Any such decisions must be communicated and, to the extent practical, coordinated with neighboring and local OROs. These decisions include tracking agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ. Demonstration ofplans and procedures which use traffic access control points to track agricultural products entering and leaving the EPZ may be conducted through interview. OROs should use Federal resources, as identified in the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex ofthe NRF and other resources (e.g. , compacts, nuclear insurers), as necessary. Evaluation ofthis criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Findings: NIA uh-element 2.e. - Radiolo ical Assessment and Decision Makin Concernin Post-Plume Phase elocation Re-en and Return Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l , which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to make decisions on post-plume relocation, re-entry, and return of the general public. These decisions are essential for the protection of the public from the direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe accident at a nuclear power plant.

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely post-plume phase relocation, re-entry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.JO; J.9; K.3.a; M.1)

Extent of Play Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in contaminated areas and compare these estimates with PA Gs; apply decision criteria for relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated, but where actual or projected doses are in excess ofrelocation PA Gs; and control access to evacuated and restricted areas. OROs will make decisions for relocating members of the evacuated public who lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PA Gs.

Determination ofareas to be restricted must be based on factors such as the mix of radionuclides in deposited materials, calculated exposure rates vs. the PA Gs, and analyses ofvegetation and soil.field samples.

Re-entry: Decisions must be made on the location of control points and policies regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks or missions.

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Examples ofcontrol procedures are the assignment of, or checking/or, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding the individual's objectives, locations expected to be visited and associated time frames; availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; and advice on areas to avoid. Control procedures also included monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; the implementation of decision criteria regarding decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records.

Responsible OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized re-entry of individuals into the restricted zone(s), based on established decision criteria. OROs must demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security purposes (e.g., police patrols), maintenance of essential services (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and other critical functions . They must demonstrate 1

the capability to use decision-making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by tlie public for various reasons, such as to maintain property (e.g., to care for farm animals or secure machinery for storage), or retrieve important possessions. Coordinated policies for access and exposure control must be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the restricted zone(s). OROs must demonstrate the capability to establish policies for provision ofdosimetry to all individuals allowed to re-enter the restricted zone(s). The extent that OROs need to develop policies on re-entry will be determined by scenario events.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase (i.e., permitting populations that were previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted basis). OROs must base their decisions on environmental data and political boundaries or physical/geological features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which members of the general public may return.

Return is permitted to the boundary of the restricted area(s) that is based on the relocation PAG.

Other factors that the ORO must consider in decision-making include conditions that permit the cancellation of the Emergency Classification Level and the relaxation of associated restrictive measures.

OROs must base return recommendations on measurements of radiation from ground deposition. OROs must have the capability to identify services and facilities that require restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate-term housing/or relocated persons.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Findings: N/A SEA BROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17

E VAL UA TION AREA 3: Protective Action Implementation Sub-element 3.a - Implementation o(Emergency Worker Exposure Control Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-J, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; the reading of direct-reading dosimetry by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each emergency worker; establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess ofprotective action guides, and the capability to provide Kl for emergency workers, always applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) principle as appropriate.

Criterion 3.a. 1: Th e OROs issue appropriate dosimetry , KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exp osure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate recordkeeping of the administration of KI to emergency workers. (NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-1, K.3. a, b; K. 4)

Extent of Play OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide emergency workers (including supplemental resources) with the appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, KI, and instructions on the use of these items. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent and maximum exposure limits, for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities contained in the ORO 's plans/procedures.

Each emergency worker must have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plans/procedures. If supplemental resources are used, they must be provided with just-in-time training to ensure basic knowledge of radiation exposure control. Emergency workers must demonstrate procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and manage radiological exposure control.

During a p lume phase exercise, emergency workers must demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker must report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans/procedures. OROs must demonstrate the actions described in the p lans/procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, authorize the worker to incur additional exposures, or to take other actions. If exercise play does not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators must interview at least two emergency workers to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in case authorization is needed, and at what exposure levels. Workers may use any available resources (e .g. , written procedures and/or co-workers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission. In such cases, adequate control of exposure can be affected achieved for all team members using one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate fixed facilities, (e.g., EOCs and communications center within the EPZ, reception centers, and counting laboratories)

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may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored using group dosimetry (i.e. ,

direct-reading dosimeters strategically placed in the work area). Each team member must still have his or her own permanent record dosimetry. Individuals authorized by the ORO to reenter an evacuated area during the plume (emergency) phase, must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.

OROs may have administrative limits lower than EPA-400-R-92-001 dose limits/or emergency workers performing various services (e.g. , lifesaving, protection of valuable property, all activities). ORO must ensure that the process used to seek authorizations for exceeding dose limits does not negatively impact the capability to respond to an incident where lifesaving and/or protection of valuable property may require an urgent response.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of Kl to emergency workers consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they did so. Ingestion of Kl recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of Kl shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using Kl for those advised to take it. Emergency workers must demonstrate basic knowledge ofprocedures for using Kl whether or not the scenario drives the implementation of Kl use. This can be accomplished by an interview with an evaluator.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play EPZ EOCs: Dosimetry packets will be issued to two emergency workers in each EPZ EOC. Actual distribution and ingestion of KI will not occur. Empty KI tablet containers (small zip-lock bags) will be included in the dosimetry packets for emergency workers. Knowledge of the use of dosimetry and KI will be demonstrated through an interview of these two individuals by the FEMA Evaluator.

Findings: N/A Note: If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

Sub-element 3.b - Implementation of.KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the General Public Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to provide Kl institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plans/procedures, to the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide Kl to institutionalized individuals, providing Kl to the general public is an ORO option and must be reflected in SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17

ORO 's plans/procedures. Provisions should include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the distribution of Kl.

Criterion 3.b.J: KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use ofKI is made. Appropriate record keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J. 10.e, j)

Extent of Play Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) must demonstrate the capability to make Kl available to institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plans/procedures, to members of the general public. OROs must demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of Kl consistent with decisions made. OROs must have the capability to develop and maintain lists of institutionalized individuals who have ingested Kl, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. Ingestion of Kl recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of Kl shall not be performed. OROs must demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate instructions on using Kl for those advised to take it.

If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, appropriate information must be provided to the public by the means of notification specified in the ORO 's plans/procedures.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Schools, day cares, and special facility staff who administer KI will be interviewed out-of-sequence by the FEMA Evaluator. The FEMA Evaluator will check the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of KI distribution.

Findings: N/A Note: If, during the exercise, a participant demon strates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

Sub-element 3.c-lmplementation of Precautionary and/or Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- J, which requires that Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement precautionary and/or protective action decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. The focus is on those p ersons with disabilities and access/functional needs that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant.

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Criterion 3.c.1: Precautionary and/or protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Extent of Play Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (i. e. , p rovide protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions to) persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, including hospitals/medical fac ilities, licensed day cares, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired and transp ortation dep endent individuals. OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs in accordance with plans/procedures.

Contact with p ersons with disabilities and access/functional needs and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent ofPlay. Some contacts with transportation providers must be actually contacted, as negotiated in the extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.

Since other agencies place requirements on hospitals to prep are for contaminated p atients, the REP Program has no need to evaluate hospitals in the EPZ that need to evacuate, or the f acilities that are receiving these evacuees, nor does the ORO have the responsibility to provide training or dosimetry to these hospitals/facilities. Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP program.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise sp ecified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Region I: Initial calls to Transportation Providers will be made to verify telephone number and contact person. Default numbers from the Resource Manual will be used to determine transportation requirements. No vehicles or personnel will be mobilized. A list of the Transportation Providers from the Resource Manual will be provided to the FEMA Evaluator.

Region I Special Needs Coordinator and staff will demonstrate all appropriate communications with EPZ community EOC staff and coordination of bed space assignment for evacuating nursing home patients and hospital patients, although actual evacuation of special facilities will not occur. Default numbers from the Resource Manual will be used.

EPZ EOCs: All special facilities (including Day Cares) will receive initial contact only to verify telephone number. Default numbers will be used from the Resource Manual for exercise play. Follow-up calls will be simulated and logged. Participating special facilities will be interviewed out of sequence by a FEMA Evaluator.

Day Care Centers: Participating facilities were visited out of sequence by a FEMA Evaluator, who interviewed key players (and ifthe site' s plan calls for KI, responsible staff). See page 2 of Extent of Play for list.

Local Transportation Coordinators will report to Region I the number of additional beds needed to accommodate patients from each participating facility that may be directed to evacuate; however, no SEABROOK EOP Rev. l 11/13/17

patients will actually be moved or be impacted in any way. Default numbers from the Resource Manual will be used to determine number of beds needed.

The list of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs will be shown to the FEMA evaluator; however, the information is confidential and copies will not be provided to the evaluator. All calls will be simulated and logged. If the list has a request for TTY notification, then the TTY will be demonstrated by contacting the Region I EOC, who will simulate making the TTY notification for the community.

Findings: N/A Criterion 3.c.2: OR Os/School officials implement precautionary/protective actions for schools.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)

Extent of Play School systems/districts (these include public and private schools, kindergartens, and preschools) must demonstrate the ability to implement p recautionary and/or protective action decisions for students. The demonstration must be made as follows: Each school system/district within the 10 mile EPZ must demonstrate implementation ofprotective actions. At least one school per affected system/district must participate in the demonstration. Canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering in place must be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the imp lemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process.

If accomplished through an interview, appropriate school personnel including decision-making officials (e.g., schools' superintendent/principals and transportation director/bus dispatchers), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) must be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the p lans/procedures, must be verified.

Officials of the school system(s) must demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OR Os for use in messriges to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

If a school facility has emergency plans as a condition of licensing, those plans may be submitted to FEMA review in p lace of demonstration or interview pursuant to the ORO 's plans/procedures as negotiated in the Extent ofPlay Agreement.

Additionally, hospital evacuation plans do not need to be reviewed or tested by the REP p rogram.

A ll activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Region I EOC: The MEMA Region I Special Needs Coordinator, in an interview with the FEMA Evaluator, will provide a list of schools located outside the EPZ with students who reside within the EPZ.

Calls to schools outside the EPZ will be simulated and logged.

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EPZ EOCs: Initial notifi cation will be made to all school superintendents only who will simulate contact each school per procedure. Default numbers for the Resource Manual will be used for exercise play.

Follow-up calls will be simulated and logged.

School Superintendents:

Amesbury School Superintendent Newburyport School Superintendent Pentucket School Superintendent Triton School Superintendent Schools: Participating facilities were visited out of sequence by a FEMA Evaluator in 2017, who interviewed key players (and if the site' s plan calls for KI, responsible staff). See page 2 of Extent of Play for list Findings: N/A Sub-element 3.d. - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, which requires that Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement protective action plans/procedures, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of trcif.fic and access control points and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

Criterion 3.d.l: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g,j)

Extent of Play OROs must demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with current conditions and protective action decisions (e.g. , evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs must demonstrate the cap ability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff must demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities, including verifying emergency worker identification and access authorization to the affected areas, as per the extent of play agreement. These capabilities may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the extent ofplay agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (e.g. , rail, water, and air traffic), they must demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies that have the needed authority, as agreed upon by the extent ofplay agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/p rocedures and comp leted as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

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Massachusetts Extent of Play EPZ EOCs: EOCs will demonstrate the ability to direct and monitor traffic control operations within their jurisdictions through discussions with the evaluator. The local EOC highway and/or Law Enforcement representative will participate in a discussion of procedures and resources available for traffic control. No personnel or equipment will be deployed to field locations.

Findings: N/A Note: If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, J.10.k)

Extent of Play OROs must demonstrate the capability to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuations. In demonstrating this capability, the impediment must remain in place during the evacuation long enough that re-routing of traffic is required and must also result in demonstration of decision-making and coordination with the JIC to communicate the alternate route to evacuees.

When, due to specifics of the scenario or jurisdiction, the impediment cannot be located on an evacuation route, it must be located so as to impact the evacuation. When not possible, actual dispatch of resources need not be physically demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Each EPZ Local EOC will demonstrate rerouting of traffic following a traffic impediment through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator. No personnel or equipment will be dispatched to the simulated accident scene. If an impediment is likely to cause lengthy rerouting of traffic along the evacuation route, the Local EOC will communicate this information to MEMA Region I in order for this information to be passed to the JIC. MA will demonstrate only one Local EOC will demonstrate the coordination with the JIC to communicate the alternate route to evacuees.

Findings: N/A Note: If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

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Sub-element 3.e - Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, which requires that OROs have the capability to implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by current Food and Drug Administration guidance, for the ingestion pathway EPZ (i.e. , the area within an approximate 5 0-mile radius of the nuclear power plant). This sub-element focuses on those actions required for implementation ofprotective actions.

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate information regarding water,food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone/or implementation ofprotective actions.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.l, 4; J.11)

Extent of Play Applicable OROs must demonstrate the capability to secure and use current information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing plants, and water supply intake points to implement protective actions within the EPZ. OROs use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g.,

compacts, nuclear insurers), if available. Evaluation ofthis criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions (ARCA): N/A Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, G.1; J.9, 11)

Extent of Play OROs must demonstrate the development of measures and strategies for implementation of ingestion exposure pathway EPZ protective actions by formulating protective action information for the general public and food producers and processors. Demonstration of this criterion includes either pre-distributed public information material in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ or the capability for the rapid reproduction and distribution of appropriate reproduction-ready information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses.

OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control, restrict or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors. Exercise play must include demonstration of communications and coordination among organizations to implement protective actions. Field play of implementation activities may be simulated. For example, communications and coordination with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ must be demonstrated, but actual communications with food producers and processors may be simulated.

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All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This criterion will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Findings: N/A Sub-element 3.f- Implementation ofPost-Plume Phase Relocation, Re-entry, and Return Decisions Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement plans, procedures, and decisions for post-plume phase relocation, re-entry, and return. Implementation of these decisions is essential for protecting the public from the direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe accident at a commercial nuclear power p lant.

Criterion 3.f.l: Decisions regarding controlled re-entry, relocation, and return of individuals during the post-plume phase are coordinated with appropriate organizations and implemented.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.7; J.JOJ; J.12; K.5.b; M.J, 3)

Extent of Play Relocation: OROs must demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions concerning relocation of individuals located in radiologically contaminated areas who were not previously evacuated.

Such individuals must be relocated to an area(s) where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PA Gs. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to provide for short- or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in area(s) that have residual radiation levels above the (first-, second-, and 50-year) PAGs.

Areas of consideration must include the capability of OROs to communicate with other OROs regarding timing ofactions, notification of the population ofprocedures for relocation, and the notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be able to return to their homes due to high levels ofcontamination. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to communicate instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions and intermediate-term housing/or relocated persons.

Re-entry : OROs must demonstrate the capability to control re-entry and exit of individuals who are authorized by the ORO to temporarily re-enter the restricted area during the post-plume (i.e., intermediate or late) phase to protect them from unnecessary radiation exposure. OROs must also demonstrate the capability to control exit of vehicles and equipment to control the spread ofcontamination outside the restricted area(s). Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members ofthe public who must reenter an evacuated area during the post-emergency phase must be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions. Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be established as appropriate.

Examples ofcontrol procedure subj ects are: (1) the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry for emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the individuals' objective(s),

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location(s) expected to be visited, and associated timeframes; (3) maps and plots ofradiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; (5) procedures for exit, including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; (6) decision criteria regarding contamination; (7) proper disposition ofemergency worker dosimetry; and (8)maintenance ofemergency worker radiation exposure records.

Return: OROs must demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of members ofthe public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs must demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services andfacilities that require restoration within a few days, and to identify the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples ofthese services andfacilities are medical and social services, utilities, roads, and schools.

Communications among OROs for relocation, re-entry, and return may be simulated. All simulated or actual contacts must be documented. These discussions may be accomplished in a group setting.

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex, and other resources (e.g. , compacts, nuclear insurers), as necessary, if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of F ederal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Thls sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Findings: N/A SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17

EVALUATION AREA 4: Field Measurement and Analysis Sub-element 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-J, which requires that Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to deploy field teams with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 indicates that OROs must have the capability to use field monitoring teams within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to detect airborne radio iodine in the presence of noble gases and to measure radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In an incident at a nuclear power plant, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although incident assessment methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large uncertainties. During an incident, it is important to collect field radiological data to help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts.

Criterion 4.a.J: Reserved Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; I. 7, 8, 11; J.10.a)

Extent of Play Responsible Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) must demonstrate the capability to brieffield monitoring teams on predicted plume location and direction, plume travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment. During an HAB incident, the field team management must keep the incident command ieformed offield monitoring teams' activities and location. Coordination with field monitoring teams and field monitoring may be demonstrated as out-of-sequence demonstrations, as negotiated in the extent ofplay agreement.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and support the adequacy of implemented protective actions, or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams must be directed to take measurements at such locations and times as necessary to provide sufficient information to characterize the plume and its impacts.

If the responsibility for obtaining peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OR Os, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by OROs monitoring teams. If the licensee field monitoring teams do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO 's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and coordination ofplume measurement information among all field monitoring teams (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential.

OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee), as necessary. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17

Massachusetts Extent of Play NIA T Field Teams are managed by the Field Team Coordinator who is located at the utility EOF.

He/she will brief and in conjunction with the utility and other state agencies, dispatch two teams to sampling locations in accordance with the NIAT Handbook, Section D.4, as dictated by scenario play. NIAT Field Team personnel will prepare one sample media and the report survey results on the appropriate survey forms to the Field Team Coordinator.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; L 8, 9; J.10.a)

Extent of Play Two or more field monitoring teams must demonstrate the capability to make and report measurements ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment team, or other appropriate authority. Field monitoring teams must also demonstrate the capability to obtain an air sample for measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates, and to provide the appropriate authority with field data pertaining to measurement. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the authority must consider the need/or expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form(s), to a radiological laboratory(ies) must be demonstrated.

OROs must share data in a timely manner with all other appropriate OROs. A ll methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies), will be in accordance with the ORO 's plans/procedures.

OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts or the licensee), as needed. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Two MA NIAT Field Teams will be dispatched from the Salisbury Fire Department (10 minutes to an hour) in accordance with the NIA T Handbook. Once, dispatched, only disposable gloves will be used for actual exercise play. Charcoal cartridges will be used instead of silver zeolite.

The NIAT Field Teams will collect one complete sample (monitoring and air sample) as specified by the procedures in Section D.4 of the NIAT Handbook.

Findings: N/A Note: If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17

Sub-element 4.b - Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l , which requires that OROs should have the capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and locations ofradiological hazards in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ and to support relocation, re-entry and return decisions. This sub-element focuses on the collecting environmental samples for laboratory analyses that are essential for decisions on protection ofthe public from contaminated food and water and direct radiation from deposited materials.

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams (2 or more) demonstrate the capability to make appropriate measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g.,food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 C.1; LB; J.11)

Extent of Play The ORO 's field monitoring teams must demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway and to support re-entry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and chain-of-custody form(s) for transfer to a laboratory(ies),

will be in accordance with the ORO 's plans/procedures.

The field monitoring teams and/or other sampling personnel must secure ingestion pathway samples from agricultural products and water. Samples in support of relocation and return must be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition.

OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g., compacts, the licensee, or nuclear insurers), as needed. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Findings: N/A Note: If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

SEABROOK EOP Rev. I 11/13/17

!sub-element 4.c- Laboratory Operations Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 , which requires that Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity in air, liquid, and environmental samples to support protective action decision-making.

Criterion 4.c.l: The laboratory is capable ofperforming required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.l, 3; J.11)

Extent of Play The laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging of information, preventing contamination of the laboratory(ies), preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (e.g., milk), and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff must demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

The laboratory(ies) must be appropriately equipped to provide, upon request, timely analyses of media of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions as anticipated by the ORO 's plans/procedures. The laboratory instrument calibrations must be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident should be as described in the plans/procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (e.g., transuranics or as a result of a terrorist event) or if warranted by incident circumstances. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.

The laboratory staff must be qualified in radioanalytical techniques and contamination control procedures.

OROs will use Federal resources as identified in the NRF Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex and other resources (e.g. , compacts, the licensee, nuclear insurers), as needed. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will not demonstrated during this exercise Findings: NIA EVALUATION AREA 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information Sub-element 5.a -Activation o{the Prompt Alert and Notification System Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-J, which requires that OROs have the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume pathway EPZ. Specific provisions addressed in SEABROOK EOP Rev. I 11 /13/17

this sub-element are further discussed in Section V, Part A ofthe REP manual, Alert and Notification Systems.

Exhibit 111-4: Evaluation Standards for Alert and Notification Systems Demonstration In a Timely Manner Within 45 Minutes Within a Reasonable Criteria: Time Primary Alert and Notification 5.a.l: .. .covering essentially J00% of the X JO-mile EPZ 5.a.4: .. .for FEMA-approved exception X areas Backup Alert and Notification for All Incidents 5.a.3: ... covering the X JO-mile EPZ Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current REP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6,7)

Extent of Play Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) must demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the JO-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, OROs must complete system activation for primary alert/notification and disseminate the information/instructions in a timely manner. For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. " If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message must be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages is not required. The procedures must be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation. The alert signal activation should be simulated, not performed. Evaluations of EAS broadcast stations may also be accomplished through SAVs.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis must be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system, including verification ofprovisions for backup power -or an alternate station.

The initial message must include at a minimum the following elements:

  • Identification of the ORO responsible and the official with authority for providing the alert signal and instructional message;
  • '" Identification of the commercial Nuclear Power Plant and a statement that an emergency exists there;
  • *
  • Reference to REP-specific emergency information (e.g., brochures, calendars, and/or information in telephone books) for use by the general public during an emergency; and SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17
  • A closing statement asking that the affected and potentially affected p opulations stay tuned f or additional iriformation, or that the population tune to another station/or additional iriformation.

If route alerting is demonstrated as a primary method of alert and notification, it must be done in accordance with the OROs plans/procedures and the extent ofplay agreement. OR Os must demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting in a timely manner (not subject to specific time requirements). At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) must vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as negotiated in the extent ofplay. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs must demonstrate any means ofprimary alert and notification included in their plans/procedures as negotiated in the extent of play agreement.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play The sounding of the sirens and broadcast of EAS/News Releases will be simulated. EAS/News Releases will be formulated and distributed by the Massachusetts State EOC. Activation of the EAS system will be coordinated with New Hampshire officials. Actions to demonstrate performance of initial notification of the public will be performed up to the point of actual transmission of the Emergency Alert System (EAS) message. The EAS message will be prepared/ encoded/issued by MEMA. EAS radio station WBZ ( 1030 AM) will be initially contacted and faxed a copy of a standard test message. WBZ will return the fax to the Public Affairs Officer to ensure receipt of fax. Broadcast ofEAS messages/News Releases will be simulated.

Findings: N/A Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED]

Criterion 5.a.3: Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play If the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s) or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function during the exercise, OROs must demonstrate backup means of alert and notification. Backup means of alert and notification will differ from facility to facility.

Backup alert and notification procedures that would be implemented in multiple stages must be structured such that the population closest to the plant (e.g., within 2 miles) is alerted and notified first.

The p opulations farth er away and downwind of any p otential radiological release would be covered sequentially (e.g. , 2 to 5 miles, followed by downwind 5 to 10 miles, and finally the remaining population as directed by authorities) . Top ography, population density, existing ORO resources, and timing will be considered in judging the acceptability of backup means of alert and notification.

SEABROOK EOP Rev. I 11/13/17

Although circumstances may not allow this for all situations, FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators attempt to establish backup means that will reach those in the plume exposure EPZ within a reasonable time offailure of the primary alert and notification system, with a recommended goal of 45 minutes. The backup alert message must, at a minimum, include: (]) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant; and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

When backup route alerting is demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast), as negotiated in the extent ofplay.

Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at an agreed-upon location.

OROs may demonstrate any means of backup alert and notification included in their plans/procedures as negotiated in the Extent-of-Play Agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the Extent-of- Play Agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Code Red is the backup notification system for Seabrook Station EPZ. Per procedure, Code Red will be used following the sounding of the siren. It will be simulated for the exercise.

Findings: N/A Criterion 5.a.4: Activities associated with FEMA- approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized of/site emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E. 6; Appendix, 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 5 to 10 miles from the nuclear power plant must demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s). FEMA and the NRC recommend that OROs and operators establish means that will reach those in approved exception areas within 45 minutes once the initial decision is made by authorized ojfsite emergency officials to notify the public of an incident. The exception area alert message must, at a minimum, include (]) a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and (2) instructions regarding where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route(s) must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years. A ll alert and notification activities along the route(s) must be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read fo r the evaluator, but not actually broadcasted) as negotiated in the extent ofplay. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location. For exception areas alerted by air/water craft, actual routes will be negotiated in the extent ofplay, but must be demonstrated no less than once every 8 years.

A ll activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/17

Massachusetts Extent of Play This criterion is not required by the Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

Sub-element 5.b - Subsequent Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-J, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to disseminate appropriate emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions, to the public. In addition, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 requires that OROs to ensure that the capability exists/or providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for use by the media during an emergency.

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 also provides that a 'system should be a~ailable for dealing with rumors. * '*

This system will hereafter be known as the public inquiry hotline.

Criterion 5.b.l: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c)

Extent of Play The responsible ORO personnel/representatives must demonstrate actions to provide emergency information and instructions to the public and media in a timely manner following the initial alert and notification (not subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. " If message dissemination is identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Message elements: The ORO must ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information must contain all necessary and applicable instructions (e.g., evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and persons with disabilities and access/functional needs, and public inquiry hotline telephone number) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided. The ORO must also be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs must demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion exposure pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information must be all-inclusive by including the four items specified under exercise Demonstration Criterion 5.a. J and previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. Information about any rerouting of evacuation routes due to impediments should also be included. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs must demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plans/procedures.

OROs must demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plans/procedures.

SEABROOK EOP Rev. I 11/13/ 17

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs must demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO 's plans/procedures.

Media information: OROs must demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the incident warrants. The OROs must demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and releases must be consistent with protective action decisions and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies ofpertinent emergency information (e.g., EAS messages and media releases) and media information kits must be available for dissemination to the media.

Public inquiry: OR Os must demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls received via the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff must demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source. Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, must be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

HAB considerations: The dissemination of information dealing with specific aspects ofNP P security capabilities, actual or perceived adversarial (terrorist) force or threat, and tactical law enforcement response must be coordinated/ communicated with appropriate security author'ities, e.g., law enforcement and NP P security agencies, in accordance with ORO plans/procedures.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Joint Information Center: Information generated as a result of incoming calls to the SEOC Public Information Line/MASS 211 Call Center will be included in news briefings. At least two rumor trends will be handled.

State EOC: Control cell personnel will make calls simulating members of the public. The MASS 211 Call Center will demonstrate the ability to handle public inquiry calls. Handling at least two rumor trends (three or more calls of the same nature) will be demonstrated. Two MASS 211 public information line operators each will respond to calls once the Public Alert and Notification System has been activated at Site Area Emergency or General Emergency at the State EOC.

EPZ Towns: Control cell personnel will make calls to the local EOCs simulating members of the public.

Each local EOC will demonstrate the community's emergency response and refer all other questions to MASS 211 Call Center.

Findings: N/A SEABROOK EOP Rev. 1 11/13/ 17

Note: If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

EVALUATION AREA 6: Support Operation/Facilities Sub-element 6.a - Monitoring, Decontamination and Registration o{Evacuees Intent This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees, while minimizing contamination of the facility. OROs must also have the capability to identify and register evacuees at reception centers.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees.

(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12)

Extent of Play Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees must be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the extent ofplay agreement.

OROs conducting this demonstration must have 1/3 of the resources (e.g., monitoring teams/instrumentation/portal monitors) available at the facility(ies) as necessary to monitor 20% of the population within a 12-hour period. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles.

Availability of resources can be demonstrated with valid documentation (e.g., MOU/LOA, etc.) reflecting how necessary equipment would be procured for the location. Plans/procedures must indicate provisions for service animals.

Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees must demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain, within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20% emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base. The monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored, per hour, by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate procedure. For demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities, a minimum of six individuals per monitoring station must be monitored per station using equipment and procedures specified in the plans/procedures. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be met.

OR Os must demonstration the capability to register evacuees upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the evacuee's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination (if any), or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any SEABROOK EOP Rev. I 11/13/17

evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO 's plans/procedures. All activities must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Decontamination ofevacuees may be simulated and conducted by interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex decontamination must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread ofcontamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs, and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-offareas) to separate uncontaminated evacuees, provide changes ofclothing for those with contaminated clothing; and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any evacuee found to be contaminated, procedures must be discussed concerning the handling ofpotential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

Individuals who have completed monitoring (and decontamination, if needed) must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet,form, etc.) indicating that they and their service animals and vehicles, where applicable, have been monitored, cleared, andfound to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger/action level or have been placed in a secure area until they can be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary.

In accordance with plans/procedures, individuals found to be clean cifter monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored. These individuals do not require confirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles held in a secure area or monitored and decontaminated (if applicable) and do require confirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or fre e from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Findings: N/A Note: If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-element unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

SEABROOK EOP Rev. I 11/13/17

ijub-element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicld Intent This sub-element is derived.from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment, inclusive of vehicles.

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.5.a, b)

Extent ofPlay The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to monitor emergency worker personnel and their equipment and vehicles for contamination in accordance with the Ojfsite Response Organizations (ORO) plans/procedures.

Specific attention must be given to equipment, including any vehicles that were in contact contamination. The monitoring staff must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination ofpersonnel, equipment, and vehicles, based on trigger/action levels and procedures stated in the OROs plans/procedures. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the 12-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of 2 emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. B efore using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination must be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures must be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles must be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with contaminated individuals must also be checked.

Decontamination of emergency workers may be simulated and conducted via interview. Provisions for separate showering and same-sex decontamination must be demonstrated or explained. The staff must demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. Provisions could include flo or coverings, signs and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped -off areas)to separate uncontaminated from potentially contaminated and uncontaminated individuals where applicable; provide changes of clothing for those with contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of emergency workers or facilities.

OR Os must demonstrate the capability to register emergency workers upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities. The activities for recording radiological monitoring and, ifnecessary, decontamination must include establishing a registration record consisting of the emergency worker's name, address, results of monitoring, and time ofdecontamination (if any),

or as otherwise designated in the plan and/or procedures. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

Monitoring activities shall not be simulated. Monitoring personnel must explain use of trigger/action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They must also explain the procedures for referring any emergency workers who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow-up in accordance with the ORO 's plans/procedures.

Decontamination capabilities and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be successfally decontaminated may be simulated and conducted by interview. Waste water from decontamination operations does not need to be collected.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise. \.

Findings: NI A Note: If, during the exercise, a participant demonstrates this sub-el ement unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator will inform the MEMA Controller. After an "on the spot" training by the local or State representative, the FEMA Evaluator will provide another opportunity to re-demonstrate the activity that day.

!sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care ofEvacuees Intent This sub-element is derived.from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, which requires that Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) to have the capability to establish relocation centers in host/support jurisdictions. The American Red Cross normally provides congregate care in support of OROs under existing letters ofagreement.

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.h, J.12)

Extent ofPlay The evaluator must conduct a walk-through ofthe center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with applicable guidance.

For planning purposes, OROs must plan for a sufficient number ofcongregate care centers in host/support jurisdictions based on their all-hazard sheltering experience and what is historically relevant for that particular area. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial dijferences between demonstration and simulation of this criterion, exercise demonstration expectations must be clearly specified in extent-ofp lay agreements.

Congregate care staff must also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees, service animals, and vehicles have been monitored for contamination, decontaminated as appropriate,' and registered before entering the facility.

Individuals arriving at congregate care facilities must have means (e.g., hand stamp, sticker, bracelet, form, etc.) indicating that they, and their service animal and vehicles, where applicable, have been placed in a secured area or monitored, cleared, and found to have no contamination or contamination below the trigger/action level.

In accordance with plans/procedures, individuals found to be clean after monitoring do not need to have their vehicle monitored.

These individuals do not need corifirmation that their vehicle is free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas.

However, those individuals who are found to be contaminated and are then decontaminated will have their vehicles held in a secure area until they can be monitored or decontaminated (if applicable) and do need corifirmation that their vehicle is being held in a secure area or free from contamination prior to entering the congregate care areas. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g. , cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility(ies) . However, availability ofsuch items must be verified by providing the evaluator a list ofsources with locations and estimates ofquantities.

A ll activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofp lay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play This sub-element will not be demonstrated during this exercise.

Findings: N/A Sub-element 6.d- Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Iniured Individuals Intent This sub-element is derived.from NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, which requires that O.ffsite Response Organizations (ORO) have the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical services.

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)

Extent ofPlay Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts must not delay urgent medical care for the victim. FEMA has determined that these capabilities have been enhanced and consistently demonstrated as adequate; therefore, o.ffsite medical services drills need only be evaluated biennially.

O.ffsite Response Organizations (ORO) must demonstrate the capability to monitor/decontaminate and transport contaminated, injured individuals to medical facilities.

An ambulance must be used for the response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended time, OR Os may use any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) to transport the victim to the medical facility. It is allowable for an ambulance to demonstrate up to the point of departure for the medical facility and then have a non-specialized vehicle transport the "victim(s)" to the medical facility. This option is used in areas where removing an ambulance from service to drive a great distance (over an hour) for a drill would not be in the best interests of the community.

Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility must be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used/or transport to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results, if available. In addition, the ambulance crew must demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport or enroute, or may be deferred to the medical facility. Contaminated injured individuals transported to medical facilities are monitored as soon as possible to assure that everyone (ambulance and medical facility) is aware of the medical and radiological status of the individual(s) . However, if an ambulance defers monitoring to the medical facility, then the ambulance crew presumes that the patient(s) is contaminated and demonstrate appropriate contamination controls until the patient(s) is monitored. Before using monitoring instruments, the monitor(s) must demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities must be completed as they

would be in an actual emergency. Appropriate contamination control measures must be demonstrated before and during transport and at the receiving medical facility.

The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Medical facilities are expected to have at least one trained physician and one trained nurse to perform and supervise treatment of contaminated injured individuals. Equipment and supplies must be available for the treatment of contaminated injured individuals.

The medical facility must demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual,follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and maintain records of all survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures for the collection and analysis of samples and decontamination of the individual must be demonstrated or described to the evaluator. Waste water from decontamination operations must be handled according to facility plans/procedures.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO 's plans/procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise specified in the extent ofplay agreement.

Massachusetts Extent of Play Lowell General Hospital will be demonstrated out of sequence on November 2, 2017

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