ML18158A313

Safety Evaluation, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4 LAR-17-039

ML18158A313
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	07/10/2018
From:	Office of New Reactors
To:	City of Dalton, GA, Georgia Power Co, MEAG Power, Oglethorpe Power Corp, Southern Nuclear Operating Co
gleaves b/415-5848
Shared Package
ML18158A305	List: ML18158A306 ML18158A307 ML18158A308 ML18158A309 ML18158A310 ML18158A311 ML18158A312 ML18158A313
References
EPID L-2017-LLA-0376, LAR-17-039
Download: ML18158A313 (12)

Text

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 131 AND 130 TO THE COMBINED LICENSE NOS. NPF-91 AND NPF-92, RESPECTIVELY SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MEAG POWER SPVM, LLC MEAG POWER SPVJ, LLC MEAG POWER SPVP, LLC CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS.52-025 AND 52-026

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated November 3, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML17307A201), and supplemented by letter dated March 28, 2018, (ADAMS Accession No. ML18087A147), the Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) amend Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 3 and 4, Combined License (COL) Numbers NPF-91 and NPF-92, respectively. The LAR, designated LAR-17-039, Unqualified Service Level I Coatings Program, requested changes to plant-specific Tier 1, and associated COL Appendix C information, as well as plant-specific Tier 2 materials located in the plant-specific Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) related to changes that describe an administrative program to manage unqualified coatings in Service Level I areas of the VEGP Units 3 and 4 containment buildings.

The proposed changes would depart from plant-specific Tier 1 DCD material and associated Tier 2 DCD material incorporated into the UFSAR by adding an administrative program to manage a limited quantity of unqualified coatings in areas inside containment where the design specifies that a coating qualified as Service Level I1 (SL-I) must be used. The administrative 1 Regulatory Guide 1.54 defines Service Level I coatings as, coatingsused in areas inside the reactor containment where coating failure could adversely affect the operation of postaccident fluid systems and thereby impair safe shutdown.

program would follow American Society for Testing and Materials International (ASTM)

Standard D 7491-08, Standard Guide for Management of Non-Conforming Coatings in Coating Service Level I Areas of Nuclear Power Plants, to examine and manage instances of unqualified coating, as discussed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.54, Revision 2, Service Level I, II, III, and In-scope License Renewal Protective Coatings Applied to Nuclear Power Plants.

Coatings inside nuclear plant containments are a potential source of debris that may prevent proper operation of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and long-term cooling of the fuel. In addition to effects on debris, non-conforming coatings may affect other analyses such as heat conduction during accident conditions.

The addition of this administrative program requires modifying plant-specific Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.2.03.08c.x to allow evaluation and justification of non-conforming coatings in SL-I areas of the passive core cooling system (PXS) under certain conditions. Changing the ITAAC requires an exemption from Tier 1 information in the standard design incorporated by reference in Appendix D of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52. The licensee also proposed changes to Tier 2 information in the UFSAR to describe the program for managing potential non-conforming coatings and update the summary of how the coatings program conforms to guidance in RG 1.54, Revision 2.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1), SNC also requested an exemption from the provisions of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Design Certification Rule for the AP1000 Design,Section III.B, Scope and Contents. The requested exemption would allow a departure from the corresponding portions of the certified information in Tier 1 of the generic AP1000 DCD.2 In order to modify the UFSAR (the plant-specific design control document (PS-DCD)) Tier 1 information, the NRC must find the licensees exemption request included in its submittal for the LAR to be acceptable. The staffs review of the exemption requests, as well as the LAR, is included in this safety evaluation.

The supplement dated March 28, 2018, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on December 19, 2017 (82 FR 60223).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

SNC provided the following description of the requested changes:

The proposed change would revise the COLs by augmenting the acceptance criteria of ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.x in Table 2.2.3-4 of COL Appendix C to allow ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.x to be satisfied with a limited quantity of unqualified inorganic zinc coatings in Service Level I areas of the plant as administratively controlled under the Licensees quality assurance program. There is currently no flexibility within ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.x to enable dispositioning of coating nonconformances under the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B quality assurance program.

2 While the licensee describes the requested exemption as being from Section III.B of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, the entirety of the exemption pertains to proposed departures from Tier 1 information in the plant-specific design control document. In the remainder of this evaluation, the NRC will refer to the exemption as an exemption from Tier 1 information to match the language of Section VIII.A.4 of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, which specifically governs the granting of exemptions from Tier 1 information.

In order to provide the flexibility needed to close ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.x with a restricted quantity of unqualified coatings on the surfaces described, a change to ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.x in COL Appendix C (and plant-specific Tier 1) is proposed. The change would augment the acceptance criteria of ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.x to allow ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.x to be satisfied with a restricted quantity of unqualified inorganic zinc coatings on the surfaces described. The process for evaluating coating nonconformances and managing of unqualified coatings to be described in UFSAR Subsection 6.1.2.1.5 will provide the supporting documentation necessary to support the conclusion that the restricted quantity of unqualified coatings is acceptable for use and that ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.x can be closed.

Protective coatings are applied on carbon or low-alloy steel and concrete located inside the containment to protect against corrosion and enhance radionuclide decontamination. Protective coatings must be qualified and not impair safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC) during a design-basis accident (DBA). As discussed in the in the Introduction to this SE, the UFSAR describes the program for managing potential non-conforming coatings and update the summary of how the coatings program conforms to guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.54, Revision 2, Service Level I, II, III, and In-scope License Renewal Protective Coatings Applied to Nuclear Power Plants. The use of RG 1.54 for the AP1000 is based on the low post loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) fluid velocity and other design features of the AP1000.

However, conformance with the qualification practices in RG 1.54 varies with the type of coating and location in containment, as detailed in the AP1000 DCD and VEGP, Units 3 and 4 UFSAR.

The staff considered the following regulatory requirements in reviewing the LAR that included the proposed changes:

Appendix D,Section VIII.A.4 to 10 CFR Part 52 states that exemptions from Tier 1 information are governed by the requirements in 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1) and 10 CFR 52.98(f). It also states that the Commission will deny such a request if it finds that the design change will result in a significant decrease in the level of safety otherwise provided by the design.

Appendix D,Section VIII.B.5.a allows an applicant or licensee who references this appendix to depart from Tier 2 information, without prior NRC approval, unless the proposed departure involves a change to or departure from Tier 1 information, Tier 2* information, or the Technical Specifications, or requires a license amendment under paragraphs B.5.b or B.5.c of the section.

10 CFR 52.63(b)(1) allows the licensee who references a design certification rule to request NRC approval for an exemption from one or more elements of the certification information. The Commission may only grant such a request if it determines that the exemption will comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 52.7, which, in turn, points to the requirements listed in 10 CFR 50.12 for specific exemptions. In addition to the factors listed in 10 CFR 52.7, the Commission shall consider whether the special circumstances outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused by the exemption. Therefore, any exemption from the Tier 1 information certified by Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 must meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12, 52.7, and 52.63(b)(1).

10 CFR 52.98(f) requires NRC approval for any modification to, addition to, or deletion from the terms and conditions of a COL. These activities involve a change to COL Appendix C ITAAC information, with corresponding changes to the associated PS-DCD Tier 1 information.

Therefore, NRC approval is required prior to making the plant specific proposed changes in this license amendment request.

The specific NRC technical requirements applicable to LAR-17-039 are the general design criteria (GDC) in Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities. In particular, these technical requirements include the following GDC:

GDC 1, Quality standards and records, requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed, fabricated, erected, and tested to quality standards commensurate with the importance of safety functions to be performed.

GDC 4, Environmental and dynamic effects design basis, requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including LOCAs.

GDC 35, Emergency core cooling, requires that a system to provide abundant emergency core cooling shall be provided. The system safety function shall be to transfer heat from the reactor core following any loss of reactor coolant at a rate such that (1) fuel and clad damage that could interfere with continued effective core cooling is prevented and (2) clad metal-water reactor is limited to negligible amounts.

GDC 38, Containment heat removal, requires that a system to remove heat from the reactor containment shall be provided. They system safety function shall be to reduce rapidly, consistent with the functioning of other associated systems, the containment pressure and temperature following any LOCA and maintain them at acceptably low levels.

In addition, the staff reviewed the following specific NRC regulatory guidance documents applicable to LAR-17-039 related to this review:

RG 1.54, describes a method that the staff considers acceptable for selecting, applying, qualifying, inspecting, and maintaining protective coatings used in nuclear power plants.

Revised Guidance for Review of Final Licensee Responses to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors, dated March 28, 2008, Enclosure 2, Coatings Evaluation Guidance for NRC Review of Generic Letter 2004-02 Supplemental Responses Prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Component Integrity, provides information the staff needs to review supplemental responses to Generic Letter 2004-02 and describes acceptable technical assumptions in the area of protective coatings.

3.1 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

OF THE REQUESTED CHANGES The proposed changes would revise the VEGP Units 3 and 4 COLs to add an administrative program to manage a limited quantity of unqualified coatings in areas inside containment where the design specifies a coating qualified as SL-I be used.

The requested change requires a license amendment to modify the plant-specific ITAAC to allow evaluation and justification of unqualified coatings in SL-I areas of containment through an administrative program. The program would examine the non-conforming coatings for the effect on post-LOCA debris generation and any other related potential design and licensing limits.

Changing the ITAAC requires an exemption from information in Tier 1 of the generic AP1000 DCD incorporated by reference in Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 52. SNC also proposed changes to Tier 2 information in the UFSAR to describe the program for managing potential unqualified coatings and update the summary of how the coatings program conforms to RG 1.54.

The specific change descriptions provided in the LAR are as follows:

The acceptance criteria for ITAAC 2.2.03.08c.x would be changed in Table 2.2.3-4 in Appendix C of the COLs to allow a limited quantity of unqualified coatings in areas designated as requiring SL-I coatings.

Appendix 1A of the UFSAR, Conformance with Regulatory Guides, would be revised to:

o Change RG 1.54, Revision 1 conformance to take an additional exception to Position C.4 with respect to ASTM D 5962-96, and to state that ASTM D 7491-08 is applied.

o Change RG 1.54, Revision 1 conformance to state that programmatic and/or operational phases of coating nonconformance management comply with RG 1.54, Revision 2.

o Change RG 1.54, Revision 2 conformance to clarify that the exception to apply the recommendations of RG 1.54, Revision 2 is applicable to the management of non-conforming coatings in SL-I areas.

Section 6.1.2.1.5 of the UFSAR, Safety Evaluation, is revised by adding a new paragraph to describe the evaluation of non-conforming coatings and to explain that the total inventory of unqualified coatings in SL-I areas of containment will be restricted to the limits specified in Section 6.3.2.2.7.1 of the UFSAR.

Section 6.1.2.1.6 of the UFSAR, Quality Assurance Features, is revised to include a statement that unqualified coatings inside containment are managed in accordance with ASTM D 7491-08.

Section 6.1.4 of the UFSAR, References, is revised to include ASTM D 7491-08 as Reference 204.

Coatings in nuclear containments perform a variety of functions, including corrosion protection, heat transfer, and enhancement of radioactive decontamination. Coating debris could be generated directly by a LOCA jet or by longer term exposure to post-LOCA conditions (pressure, temperature, radiation). Pressurized water reactor recirculation sump screens and fuel assemblies are susceptible to debris blockage during DBAs which could impact the ability of the ECCS to function as designed. Therefore, managing coating debris is one aspect of addressing Generic Safety Issue 191 (GSI-191), Assessment of Debris Accumulation on PWR Sumps Performance, and long-term core cooling. For GSI-191 evaluations, the Zone of Influence (ZOI) for debris generation is defined according to the number of diameters (D) of the broken pipe. In general, qualified coatings outside the ZOI are assumed not to be a debris source unless they are degraded. The AP1000 design basis includes a ZOI of 4D for epoxy coatings and 10D for inorganic zinc (IOZ) coatings.

This LAR request is related to the debris generation concern and maintaining the coatings debris source term within the licensing basis. Section 6.3.2.2.7.1 of the AP1000 DCD establishes, based on strainer and fuel assembly testing, the limiting LOCA-generated coating debris quantity as 70 pounds for cold leg and direct vessel injection breaks. AP1000 licensees must track the amount of coating within a pipe break ZOI to ensure that the amount of coating debris remains within the limits in the DCD.

The coating Service Level I, II, and III definitions and associated quality assurance requirements are related mainly to the potential for debris that could contribute to blocking strainers and fuel.

ASTM D 5144, Standard Guide for Use of Protective Coating Standards in Nuclear Power Plants, lists the coating service level definitions and requirements. Coatings designated as SL-I must pass qualification tests under DBA conditions and are subject to an extensive quality assurance process as described in RG 1.54 and the associated industry standards. According to the Staff guidance in the report, NRC Staff Guidance Regarding Generic Letter 2004-02 Closure in the Area of Coatings Evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML080230462), these fully qualified coatings would be assumed to fail within the ZOI as a result of LOCA jet impingement but remain intact outside the ZOI. Coatings that are unqualified, or non-conforming with respect to the licensing basis requirements, would be assumed to fail both inside and outside the ZOI.

For this reason coatings inside containment are normally designated as SL-I.

Section 6.1.2.1.6 of the UFSAR states that RG 1.54 and ASTM D 5144 form the basis for the VEGP, Units 3 and 4 protective coatings program. Section 6.1.2.1.1 of the UFSAR, General, states that protective coatings provide corrosion protection for the containment pressure boundary and for other system components inside containment. Table 6.1-2 of the UFSAR, AP1000 Coated Surfaces, Containment Shell and Surfaces Inside Containment, notes that the inside surface of the containment shell (carbon steel) above the operating floor is coated with an IOZ coating for heat conduction and to inhibit corrosion. Table 6.1-2 notes that the inside surface of the containment shell (carbon steel) below the operating floor is coated with an IOZ with an epoxy top coat to inhibit corrosion and to enhance radioactive decontamination. Section 6.1.2.1.5 of the UFSAR states that the corrosion protection of the containment shell is a safety-related function. Table 6.1-2 notes that for coatings used on components inside containment, other than the containment shell, corrosion protection is not a safety-related function.

Therefore, the IOZ coating on the inside surface of the containment shell above the operating floor and the IOZ with an epoxy top coat on the inside surface of the containment shell below the operating floor are classified as SL-I. Footnote 6 to Table 6.1-2 also notes that IOZ coatings should be used on components inside containment that may be exposed to temperatures that are above the limits of epoxy coatings during normal operating conditions. Footnote 6 to Table 6.1-2 also notes that the IOZ coatings used in such applications are required to be SL-I to prevent detachment during a LOCA since such debris is not likely to settle out.

Section 6.1.2.1.6 of the UFSAR states that safety-related coatings meet the pertinent provisions of Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50. Section 6.1.2.1.6 of the UFSAR also states that the service level classification of coatings is consistent with the positions given in RG 1.54. Section 6.1.2.1.6 of the UFSAR states that the quality assurance program for SL-I coatings conforms to the requirements of American Society of Mechanical Engineers NQA-1-1983 as endorsed in RG 1.28, Quality Assurance Program Criteria (Design and Construction). Section 6.1.2.1.6 of the UFSAR states that SL-I coatings used in the AP1000 are tested for radiation tolerance and for performance under DBA conditions and where decontaminability is desired, the coatings are evaluated for decontaminability.

SNC proposed an administrative program to manage a limited quantity of unqualified coatings in areas inside containment where the design specifies a coating qualified as SL-I be used because it is likely that there will be some amount of IOZ or epoxy coating within containment where verification of meeting the SL-I requirements will not be possible. The ability to verify conformance with the requirements may not be possible because, for example, a coating is not accessible for inspection, an inspector or applicator certification was lapsed, or a dry film thickness measurement could not be taken on the full coating area. As discussed above in the introduction, the administrative program for non-conforming coatings follows the guidance in ASTM D 7491-08. When a non-conforming coating is identified, SNC will review its impact on GSI-191. SNC stated that they will provide a technical justification and perform a technical evaluation to determine whether the non-conforming coating will be approved for use or rejected, and if other unit-specific analyses are impacted by the nonconformance. A rejected non-conforming coating will undergo corrective action to qualify the coating, and an accepted non-conforming coating will be managed to ensure the coating debris limits and any related design and licensing requirements are met.

The licensee states in Section 4.1, Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria, in Enclosure 1 of the LAR that [t]he proposed changes will not adversely affect heat transfer through the containment vessel because nonconformances that would adversely affect heat transfer through and corrosion protection of the containment vessel would not be acceptable. Section 3, Technical Evaluation, in Enclosure 1 of the LAR states that a nonconformance adversely affecting the corrosion protection of an IOZ coating applied to SSCs inside containment, other than the containment vessel, is unlikely to be accepted. It further states in Section 3 in of the LAR that the technical justification for accepting a non-conforming coating must determine that the nonconformance would have no adverse impact on safety.

SNC stated that the proposed administrative program to manage a limited quantity of unqualified coatings in areas inside containment where the design specifies a coating qualified as SL-I be used is according to ASTM D 7491-08. SNCs proposed administrative program determines the amount of unqualified coatings, determines whether other unit-specific analyses are impacted by the unqualified coatings, documents information about each unqualified coating in a unit-specific tracking log (i.e., coating type, location, if the coating falls within the zone of influence, and basis for acceptance), updates the unit-specific tracking log with each change in non-conforming coatings (i.e., adding and removing non-conforming coatings), and monitors impacts on GSI-191.

As stated in RG 1.54, Revision 2, the staff finds the program described in ASTM D 7491-08 acceptable for managing non-conforming coatings in designated SL-I areas. ASTM D 7491-08 identifies unqualified SL-I coatings as a type of non-conforming coating. The basis for such a program is that some quantity of non-conforming coating is inevitable, and it may be an acceptable condition with respect to the licensing basis and operation of the plant, including the ECCS. Managing non-conforming coatings according to ASTM D 7491-08 requires identifying the design limit of non-conforming coatings, determining the amount of non-conforming coatings, managing the non-conforming coatings, and documenting non-conforming coating information.

During the review, the Staff identified the need for additional information regarding the tracking documents that would be used to ensure the potential coating debris is maintained within the licensing basis limits, the technical evaluation and tracking process for non-conformances and managing unqualified coatings, the process for assessing the effect of non-conformances on other design and licensing limits, and consistency with ASTM D 7491-08. Therefore, the staff performed an audit from April 10, 2018, to May 14, 2018, of SNCs documents related to their proposed administrative program to manage a limited quantity of unqualified coatings in areas inside containment where the design specifies a coating qualified as SL-I be used. Based on the review of the documents in the audit, the staff concluded that SNC provided enough detail about the program for the staff to complete its review. Additionally, the staff concluded that SNCs proposed administrative program is consistent with ASTM D 7491-08 and will ensure unqualified coatings in SL-I areas of containment will be restricted to the limits specified in Section 6.3.2.2.7.1 of the UFSAR. The staffs audit report can be found in ADAMS under Accession No. ML18142B482.

Based on the staffs review as discussed above, and the results from the audit, the staff finds that the administrative program to manage a limited quantity of unqualified coatings in areas inside containment where the design specifies a coating qualified as SL-I be used is consistent with ASTM D 7491-08 and will ensure that the licensing basis limit for coating debris fines is met, thereby maintaining the ability of the containment and the PXS to perform their design functions. The staff also finds that the program is consistent with ASTM D7491-08 with respect to ensuring other coatings-related design and licensing requirements are met. For these reasons, the staff finds that the proposed UFSAR amendment to add an administrative program to manage a limited quantity of unqualified coatings in areas inside containment where the design specifies a coating qualified as SL-I be used will not affect analysis results and related conclusions presented in the AP1000 DCD and VEGP, Units 3 and 4 UFSAR related to the containment and PXS designs. Based on these findings, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that the requirements of Appendix A (GDC 1, 4, 35, and 38) of 10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR 50.46(b)(5), 10 CFR 52.47(b)(1), and 10 CFR 52.80(a) will continue to be met.

Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes acceptable.

3.2 EVALUATION OF EXEMPTION The Tier 1 information for which a plant-specific departure and exemption is being requested includes changes that add an administrative program to manage a limited quantity of unqualified coatings in areas inside containment where the design specifies a coating qualified as SL-I be used. The non-conforming coating would be evaluated for its contribution to LOCA-generated debris to ensure the existing debris limits are not exceeded. The program would not increase the limits on coating debris in the certified design. As defined in Section II of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52, Tier 1 information includes ITAAC. Therefore, a licensee referencing Appendix D incorporates by reference all the ITAAC contained in the generic AP1000 DCD. These ITAAC, along with the plant-specific ITAAC, were enumerated in Appendix C of the COL at its issuance.

The regulations in Section III.B of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 require a holder of a COL referencing Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 to incorporate by reference and comply with the requirements of Appendix D, including certified information in Tier 1 of the generic AP1000 DCD. Exemptions from Tier 1 information are governed by the change process in Section VIII.A.4 of Appendix D of 10 CFR Part 52. Because the licensee has identified changes to plant-specific Tier 1 information, with corresponding changes to the associated COL Appendix C information resulting in the need for a departure, an exemption from the certified design information within plant-specific Tier 1 material is required to implement the LAR.

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1), an exemption from elements of the design as certified in the 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, design certification rule is requested for the involved Tier 1 information described and justified in LAR-17-039. This exemption is a permanent exemption limited in scope to the particular Tier 1 information specified.

As stated in Section VIII.A.4 of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52, an exemption from Tier 1 information is governed by the requirements of 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1) and 52.98(f). Additionally,Section VIII.A.4 of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 provides that the Commission will deny a request for an exemption from Tier 1 if it finds that the requested change will result in a significant decrease in the level of safety otherwise provided by the design. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1), the Commission may grant exemptions from one or more elements of the certification information, so long as the criteria given in 10 CFR 52.7, which, in turn, references 10 CFR 50.12, are met and that the special circumstances, which are defined by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), outweigh any potential decrease in safety due to reduced standardization.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.7, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52. As 10 CFR 52.7 further states, the Commissions consideration will be governed by 10 CFR 50.12, Specific exemptions, which states that an exemption may be granted when: (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) special circumstances are present. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) lists six circumstances for which an exemption may be granted. It is necessary for one of these bases to be present in order for the NRC to consider granting an exemption request. The licensee stated that the requested exemption meets the special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii). That subparagraph defines special circumstances as when [a]pplication of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The staffs analysis of these findings is presented below:

3.2.1 AUTHORIZED BY LAW The requested exemption would allow SNC to implement the amendment described above.

This is a permanent exemption limited in scope to particular Tier 1, Table 2.2.3-4 information.

Subsequent changes to Tier 1, Table 2.2.3-4, and corresponding changes to Appendix C, or any other Tier 1 information would be subject to the exemption process specified in Section VIII.A.4 of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 and the requirements of 10 CFR 52.63(b)(1). As stated above, 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section VIII.A.4 allows the NRC to grant exemptions from one or more elements of the Tier 1 information. The staff has determined that granting of SNCs proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commissions regulations. Therefore, as required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1), the exemption is authorized by law.

3.2.2 NO UNDUE RISK TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY As discussed above in the technical evaluation, the proposed changes comply with NRCs substantive safety regulations. Therefore, there is no undue risk to the public health and safety.

3.2.3 CONSISTENT WITH COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY The proposed exemption would allow changes as described above in the technical evaluation, thereby departing from the AP1000 certified (Tier 1) design information. The change does not alter or impede the design, function, or operation of any plant structures, systems, or components associated with the facilitys physical or cyber security and, therefore, does not affect any plant equipment that is necessary to maintain a safe and secure plant status. In addition, the changes have no impact on plant security or safeguards. Therefore, as required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(1), the staff finds that the common defense and security is not impacted by this exemption.

3.2.4 SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES Six special circumstances are described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2). Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), are present, in part, whenever application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of the Tier 1 information is to ensure that a licensee will safely construct and operate a plant based on the certified information found in the AP1000 DCD, which was incorporated by reference into the VEGP Units 3 and 4 licensing basis. The proposed changes described in the above technical evaluation do not impact the ability of any SSCs to perform their functions or negatively impact safety.

Special circumstances are present in the particular circumstances, discussed in LAR-17-039, because the application of the specified Tier 1 information is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The proposed changes add an administrative program to manage a limited quantity of unqualified coatings in areas inside containment where the design specifies a coating qualified as SL-I be used. This administrative program does not impact the ability of any SSC to perform their functions or negatively impact safety. This exemption request and associated revisions to the Tier 1 information and corresponding changes to COL Appendix C demonstrate that the applicable regulatory requirements will continue to be met.

Therefore, for the above reasons, the staff finds that the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) for the granting of an exemption from the Tier 1 information exist.

3.2.5 SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OUTWEIGH REDUCED STANDARDIZATION This exemption would allow the implementation of changes to Tier 1 information in the plant-specific DCD and corresponding changes to COL Appendix C that are being proposed in the LAR. The justification provided in LAR-17-039, the exemption request, and the associated licensing basis mark-ups demonstrate that there is a limited change from the standard information provided in the generic AP1000 DCD, and that information is unnecessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The key design functions of the containment vessel and the PXS associated with this request will continue to be maintained. Consequently, the safety impact that may result from any reduction in standardization is minimized, because the proposed design change does not result in a reduction in the level of safety. Based on the foregoing reasons, as required by 10 CFR Part 52.63(b)(1), the staff finds that the special circumstances outweigh any decrease in safety that may result from the reduction of standardization of the AP1000 design.

3.2.6 NO SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN SAFETY The exemption request proposes to depart from the certified design by allowing changes discussed above in the technical evaluation. The proposed administrative program to manage a limited quantity of unqualified coatings in areas inside containment where the design specifies a coating qualified as SL-I be used will continue to comply with coatings program requirements already described in the UFSAR. The changes for consistency will not impact the functional capabilities of this system. The proposed changes will not adversely affect the ability of the containment to perform its design functions, and the level of safety provided by the current systems and equipment therein is unchanged. Therefore, based on the foregoing reasons and as required by 10 CFR 52.7, 10 CFR 52.98(f), and 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D, Section VIII.A.4, the staff finds that granting the exemption would not result in a significant decrease in the level of safety otherwise provided by the design.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Georgia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on May 15, 2018. The State official had no comment.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (82 FR 60223) on December 19, 2017. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

Because the exemption is necessary to allow the changes proposed in the license amendment, and because the exemption does not authorize any activities other than those proposed in the license amendment, the environmental consideration for the exemption is identical to that of the license amendment. Accordingly, the exemption meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with the issuance of the exemption.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The staff has determined that pursuant to Section VIII.A.4 of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52, the exemption (1) is authorized by law, (2) presents no undue risk to the public health and safety, (3) is consistent with the common defense and security, (4) presents special circumstances, and (5) does not reduce the level of safety at the VEGP facility. Therefore, the staff grants the SNC an exemption from the Tier 1 information as requested.

The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed in Section 3.2 that there is reasonable assurance that: (1) the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. Therefore, the staff finds the changes proposed in this license amendment acceptable.

7.0 REFERENCES

1.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4, Request for License Amendment and Exemption: Unqualified Service Level I Coatings Program (LAR-17-039), dated November 3, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17307A201).

2.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 3 and 4, Supplement to Request for License Amendment and Exemption Regarding Unqualified Service Level 1 Coatings Program (LAR-17-039S1), dated March 28, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18087A147).

3.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Plan for the Regulatory Audit of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4, Protective Coatings Program, dated April 4, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18094B064).

4.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Summary for the Regulatory Audit of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Protective Coatings Program, dated May 31, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18142B482).

5.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Unqualified Service Level 1 Coatings Program, Final Request for Additional Information, dated March 1, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18060A396).

6.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 6 and Tier 1, Revision 5, March 12, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17172A218).

7.

AP1000 Design Control Document, Revision 19, June 13, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11171A500).

8.

Combined License NPF-91 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (ADAMS Accession No. ML14100A106).

9.

Combined License NPF-92 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 4, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (ADAMS Accession No. ML14100A135).

10. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the AP1000 Standard Design, NUREG-1793, Volume 1, Chapter 5, September 2004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML043450354).

11. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Service Level I, II, and III Protective Coatings Applied to Nuclear Power Plants, Regulatory Guide 1.54, Revision 2, October 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102230344).