ML18153C372

Identifies Rescheduled & Planned Activities for Upcoming Facility Outage,Per 900813 Meeting W/Nrc.Outage Scheduled to Begin on 901005

ML18153C372
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	09/21/1990
From:	Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
90-569, NUDOCS 9010030059
Download: ML18153C372 (4)

Text

e e VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 September 21, 1990 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.90-569 Attention: Document Control Desk NO/CGL R2 Washington, D.C. 20555 Docket No. 50-280.

License No. DPR-32 Gentlemen:

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNIT 1 OUTAGE MODIFICATION ACTIVITIES On August 13, 1990, a meeting was held with the NRC to discuss the schedule and planned activities for the upcoming Surry Unit 1 outage. The outage is scheduled to begin on October 5, 1990 and is planned to be 60 days in duration. As discussed in the meeting, a number of activities for this outage are being rescheduled within our five year plan. Confirming the information presented during the August 13, 1990 meeting, this letter identifies those items and summarizes the reasons for rescheduling them.

RESCHEDULED ACTIVITIES Pressurizer Safety Valve Discharge Piping Supports The concern associated with this item is having adequately designed safety valve discharge piping supp9rts to accommodate water (i.e., loop seal) discharge from the safety valves. This issue is different and separate from the safety valve setpoint issue.

However, because the setpoint issue resolution may significantly impact piping support design requirements, resolution of the piping supports issue is being deferred.

Resolution of the piping support issue will be made in conjunction with, and implementation will follow, resolution of the safety valve setpoint issue. Our engineering organization is presently evaluating the use of a steam trim package on the safety valves with the loop seals drained to the surge line or pressurizer. We will continue to work with the Westinghouse Owners' Group in resolving the safety valve setpoint issue.

9010030059 9gg6~~80 PDR ADOCK O PNU p

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Control Room Design Review

• Controller and Switch Modifications

• Indicator, Recorder, and Controller Modifications

• EOG and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Replacements

• Flow Indication and Recorder Modifications

• Pressurizer Spray Valve Position Indication

• Status Light Modifications These items had been previously identified to correct human engineering deficiencies (HEDs) noted during the Control Room Design Review (CRDR).

These items are being rescheduled primarily to avoid excessive control room activity during the Surry Unit 1 outage, since Unit 2 will be operating and the Units 1 and 2 control rooms are shared. There will already be a significant amount of activity in the control room related to the air handling unit modifications being performed during this outage.

• Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve Replacement This item was originally stated as "improve operability of the main steam PORVs".

In a letter (Serial No. 89-7 43) dated December 14, 1989, we stated that we would address this issue by replacing the valves. Following further evaluation of the main steam atmospheric relief valve performance, it was determined that pilot valve stem and disc corrective maintenance was necessary. This corrective maintenance has restored valve operability. Therefore, replacement of the valves is not considered to be necessary at this time.

As indicated during the August 13, 1990 meeting, it is our intention to reassess a number of these CRDR items in view of operational experience and our operators' simulator performance. It is also our intention to close out the remaining outstanding CRDR items (either by completion or by some other disposition based on reassessment) by the end of 1994, which is consistent with our commitment for completion of the remaining CRDR actions.

RCP Thermal Barrier Component Cooling Modification The proposed modification involves the addition of qualified valves to automatically isolate containment in the event of a RCP thermal barrier rupture. The materials (i.e.,

valves) required for this modification cannot be procured to support this outage. These circumstances were separately discussed and agreed to during a June 28, 1990 meeting with the NRC.

Intake Canal Level Instrumentation As part of our assessment of canal inventory concerns, we committed to evaluate the installation of a safety related, continuous indication, level monitoring system. Such a modification was dependent upon qualification of a level indication transmitter. This evaluation has been completed. It has been determined that there is not a technically

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superior safety related sensing device for this application. Consequently, the existing non-safety related bubbler indication will not be replaced. A safety related Intake Canal Low Level Isolation Actuation System was previously installed to insure adequate canal inventory.

Recirculation Spray Instrumentation Recirculation spray instrumentation was discussed as a five year planned improvement during the August 13, 1990 meeting. This item, although not a Surry specific commitment, is being addressed as a result of a finding in the North Anna R. G. 1.97 inspection. This item remains open for Surry pending resolution at North Anna.

MATERIALS AVAILABILITY CONCERNS There are some commitment activities planned for the upcoming outage where materials availability concerns exist. As identified during the August 13, 1990 meeting, these activities are:

• ASME Section XI Instrumentation

• Motor Operated Valve/Operator Replacement

• Emergency Vent Dampers and Semi-Vital Bus Voltage Indications (R. G. 1.97)

In these cases, where materials become available to support this outage, the activities will be completed during this outage. If the activity is not completed during this outage, it will be accomplished either as a non-outage activity following this outage or during the next Surry Unit 1 refueling outage.

It is our intention to complete the remaining items discussed as outage activities during the August 13, 1990 meeting. If any additional commitment items have to be rescheduled due to materials unavailability or other reasons, we will advise you of those items as we become aware of them.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact us.

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. W. E. Holland NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station