ML18153A030
| ML18153A030 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1996 |
| From: | Ohanlon J VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 95-624A, NUDOCS 9607300144 | |
| Download: ML18153A030 (2) | |
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VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA ~3261 July 24, 1996 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Serial No.
95-624A NL&OS/GDM/BCB R3' Docket Nos.
50-280 50-281 License Nos.
DPR-32 DPR-37 Gentlemen:
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/95-20 AND 50-281/95-20 The subject NRG inspection report and enclosed Notice of Violation (NOV) described three violations regarding the response of operations personnel to a reduction in reactor coolant inventory and operations' control of outage work activities. Although these violations are not typical of operations performance, we recognize the need to thoroughly investigate each issue to identify the underlying causes.* In our response to the NOV, dated December 22, 1995 (Serial No.95-624), we discussed the identified causes and described the comprehensive corrective actions that had beeri implemented.
We also indicated that additional enhancements were planned to eliminate the weaknesses that had been identified by our review. These and other
- enhancements have been aggressively pursued and were implemented prior to the Spring 1996 Unit 2 refueling outage. These actions included:
Procedural changes to better integrate and control outage activities.
Revisions to our licensed operator and Shift Technical Advisor continuing training programs that 1) incorporated the use of a scaled mock-up of the standpipe/head vent configuration that visually depicts the specific conditions that led to the undetected loss of reactor coolant inventory event and 2) included simulator scenarios to allow operators to practice draindown to mid-nozzle evolutions.
The development of additional, more detailed, operations standards to communiCate in a clear. and consistent manner management's expectations for operations personnel performance. These standards address communications, reactivity management, conduct of control 960730014! 6t8bij~ao PDR AD0Cn PDR G
room activities, and outage "supercrew" (i.e., larger shift crew) responsibilities. Operations personnel received additional training on these standards.
Outage preparatory training to ensure that operations shift teams were.
familiar with the outage schedule, management expectations for shift team priorities, the basis for the relationships between important changes in plant status and subsequent outage activities, and the focus areas for the shift teams during transitions in plant status.
The implementation of a new work control process that significantly reduced the administrative burden placed on the operations shift crews, while maintaining their cognizance of plant equipment status.
The completed corrective actions described in our NOV response addressed the underlying causes of the violations and restored full regulatory compliance.
The completed enhancements described above further strengthened our programs by correcting identified weaknesses. We believe that these actions have been effective
. and are r~sponsible, in large part, for the successful completion of the recent Unit 2 refueling outage. The outage was well managed and properly executed with strong command and control of plant evolutions by operations personnel and effective outage planning.
If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact us.
Very truly yours,
~P.~
James P. O'Hanlon Senior Vice President - Nuclear cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. M. W. Branch NRG Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station