ML18141A064

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Check Valve Installed Backwards in Instrument Air Line to PORV, AEOD Technical Review Rept
ML18141A064
Person / Time
Site: Surry 
Issue date: 06/15/1983
From: Zukor D
NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
To:
Shared Package
ML18141A063 List:
References
TASK-AE, TASK-T321 AEOD-T321, NUDOCS 8307290434
Download: ML18141A064 (1)


Text

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AEOD TECHNICAL REVIEW REPORT UNIT:

Surry Power Station, Unit 1 DOCKET NO.:

50-280 LICENSEE:

Virginia Electric & Power Co.

NSSS/AE:

Westinghouse/Stone and Webster TR REPORT NO. AE0D/T321 DATE: June 15, 1983 EVALUATOR/CONTACT:

D. Zukor

SUBJECT:

CHECK VALVE INSTALLED BACKWARDS IN INSTRUMENT AIR LINE TO THE PORV EVENT DATE:

Found February 11, 1983 (LER 83-003)

SUMMARY

During a design change done in 1979 the check valve in the instrument air line to one of the pressurizer PORV's (POV-1455C) was installed backwards due to personnel error.

DISCUSSION

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The air provides*a motive force to open the PORV.

The check valve should prevent accumulator air from bleeding back into the instrument air system

  • for the case where instrument air is lost and the accumulator is used as the backup air supply to operate the PORV.

By installing the check valve backwards, it became impossible to open the PORV using the instrument air systems. Although the.licensee indicated that emergency air bottles would be available, these would not appear to open the PORV either since the air would bleed down into the instrument air system through the improperly in-stalled check valve rather than to the PORV.

FINDINGS The faulty installation an~ the failure of final design testing to detect the error was due to a lack.of administrative or quality control in the final design testing stages.

The surveillance procedures may also be inadequate to show operability of the PORV for low-temperature onverpressure protection.

The licensee has indicated that controls have since been strengthened over plant modifications.

CONCLUSIONS This event may indicate a management deficiency which should be included in AEOD's comments for the upcoming SALP review. It may also indicate that.

the 1 i censee did not adequately consider that the incorrectly installed check valve may have rendered the emergency air,bottles ineffective. The adequacy of the survei 11 ance procedures w.i 11 be addressed in the ongoing case study involving pressure transients at low RCS temperature.

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