ML18139C197
| ML18139C197 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry, North Anna, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 01/03/1983 |
| From: | Stewart W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | Clark R, Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 724, NUDOCS 8301110604 | |
| Download: ML18139C197 (3) | |
Text
VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 W. L. STEWART V:rCE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS January 3, 1983 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:
Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Serial No. 724 NO/RMT:acm Docket Nos. 50-280 50-281 50-338 50-339 License Nos. DPR-32 DPR-37 NPF-4 NPF-7 We have reviewed your letter concerning our September 17, 1982 submittal for changes to our Surry and North Anna Security Training and Qualification Plans.
The enclosure to this letter contains our responses to your comments and is intended to provide all the necessary additional infcrmation in order for you to complete your review.
Should you require any additional information, please contact this office.
cc:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator Region II 8301110604
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PDR ADOCK 05000280
.F PDR Very truly yours,
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NRC COMMENT 1-1
RESPONSE
Section 1.1 Comment Confirm that memb~rs of the security forces shall have no felony convictions involving the use of weapons.
The intent of the change in Section 1.1.2, in no way decreases it's effect.
To state "no individual may have a felony or misdemeanor conviction that reflects on the individual's reliability" does definitely include the use of a weapon in the act of a felony.
NRC COMMENT 2-71
RESPONSE
Section Task 42 Comment Explain the use of security portable radios versus the dedicated intercom by individ-uals in the defensive positions.
The dedicated intercom in each defensive position allows contact with each DP with all conversation heard in each one at the same time to include the CAS and SAS.
Normal routine communications can be conducted at these locations without tie up of the radio net.
With the capability of using the public address system in connection with the intercom, the individual in the DP can com-municate with anyone entering his/her sector of responsibility.
When the portable radio is used all members of the security force become aware of the communications at the same time.
When the individual in the DP uses the portable radio he/she is able to communicate the present condition to all members immediately and make known when conditions change.
This is especially beneficial during a contingency situation.
The security intercom allows routine communications to those directly involved in the DP, CAS, and SAS without radio net tie up while the portable radio allows communications to all members when and if needed.
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NRC COMMENT Page 2-72
RESPONSE
Section Task 43 Comment Explain the difference between "response" team leader and "field" team leader.
The "response" team leader is the Security Shift Supervisor acting as the director of the Armed Response Force.
He is normally located in the SAS at time of direction.
The "field" team leader is the Security Assistant Shift Supervisor acting on the direction of the Security Shift Supervisor.
He would normally be in the field with the Armed Response Force keeping the director (Shift Supervisor) advised of all conditions and/or condition changes.
NRC COMMENT 2-73
RESPONSE
Section Task 44 Comment Provide a justification for deleting "hand and arm signals".
It has been our experience in conducting training to members of the security organization that during a contingency threat event, "hand and arm signals" are not practical.
The areas where contingency threats are the greatest, if the threat was in fact effected, do not allow sufficient room to observe these signals and would place the armed responder in great danger of exposure to the adversary.
These conditions are not like military movements where direction and observation can be controlled by one leader.
The armed responder is trained to react to special duties required of a threat contingency and uses the portable radio to maintain communications.
Contingency drills have shown the bad results of trying to use "hand and arm signals" in a confined area of equipment and with a limited number of personnel.