ML18139B937
| ML18139B937 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1982 |
| From: | Lanning W, Trehan N NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | Michelson C NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| References | |
| TASK-AE, TASK-E230 AEOD-E230, NUDOCS 8207150004 | |
| Download: ML18139B937 (3) | |
Text
OFFJr SURNAI
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JUL O 71982
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AE0D/E230 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Carlyle Michelson, Director FROM:
SUBJECT:
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data t>Jayne D. Lanning, ~ead En1gineer Reactor Systems
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Reactor Operations Analysis Branch, AEOO Narincler K. Trehan Reactor Systems 2 Reactor Operations Analysis Branch, AEOD i~ATER IN THE FUEL OIL TANK AT SURRY POWER STATION UNIT NO. 2 The purpose of this memorandum is to provide additional information to supplement the "quick look 11 evaluation performed by N. Trehan (memorandum from N. Trehan to C. Michelson, 11\\fater in the Fuel Oil Tank at Surry Pm-ier.
Station Unit No. 2,i* April 6, 1982).
!ac!<ground In LER 81-033/03L-O dated May 28, 1981, Surry reported that water from the fire suppression system was inadvertently added to the above ground diesel oil storage tank. Since this tank supplies diesel fuel to the underground, day and wall tanks for all diesel generators at the Surry site, the water represented a potential common mode failure for all the diesels.
Surry employs a fire suppression system, in addition to a weir~ to protect against a fire in the above ;'g-ound storage tank. The fire suppress ion system employs a foam suppressant which is mixed with water. The water flows from a fire hydrant through a manual valve in a 2~-inch pipe through a foam induction nozzle to a sparger inside the fuel tank..
The operation of the system requires.
the manual connection of the foam cannister to the nozzle and opening the manual valve and fire hydrant.
This system was specified for the Surry plant by VEPCO,as* an additional fire protection measure which was not required by the NRG. It was identified in the fire protection plan pureuant to 10 CFR 50.48. This system design is not enployed at VEPCO's North Anna plant or any other operating plants based on a sample survey.
The addition of v<1ater to the tank occurred \\-Jhen a hose was connected to the fire hydrant to test the reactor shield tank prior to its installation.
w *ch o id d a flow ath to the diesel 8207150004 820707 PDR ADOCK 05000281 F
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I NRC FORM 318 110/80) NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 1,USGP0:1980-329-824
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. i',:'.:,-..,.,,,,fuel storage tank:after,the hYdrao:I:. wa.s>openeq/:JJAftetf:;th~ wat,er JtacL,b~en :agded*:,
'to the storage tanlf, the*ta.nk\\11as *:*isolated aricl\\fueT*o:fl iJas,)drained unt-il the-.:..
sample showed negligible arnounts of water~
- However 0 the sample was not* taken from the lowest elevation of the tank which subsequently resulted in water accumulating in the underground and wall tanks.
Evaluation The licensee has implemented a number of corrective measures to prevent recurrence of a similar event and ensure the quality of the diesel fuel stored in the above ground tank. These include:
- 1. Administrative controls to restrict use of fire hydrant to only fire protect ion.
- 2. Monthly surveillance procedure to test the dfosel fuel oil above ground, underground, and day tanks for water. Additional surveillance testing is required if the fire hydrant has been opened.
- 3. The manual valve in the water supply piping is locked closed and tagged.
- 4.
A' drain 1 ine downstream of the foam induction nozzle is locked-open to indicate water leakage into the fire suppression system from the hydrant.
A daily surveillance requirement on the drainline has been added to the operator's log to detect leakage. Corrective action has been specified when leakage is detected.
- 5.
The surveillance procedure for the monthly test identifies the sample location by \\lalve number corresponding to the lowest elevation in the tank.
Findin_gs The event was primarily the result of inadequate administrative controls on the fire suppression system. Corrective measures have been implemented by the licensee to minimize recurrence. Since the fire suppression system must be manually actuated, it does not appear that an inadvertent actuation is credible without personnel error. This event has been identified as part of a generic concern addressing inadvertent actuations of fire protection systems _which will be the subject of a Power Reactor Events report. Since the fire suppression sys tern design is be 1 i eved u*n f que* to Surry, there does not appear to be any additional generic implications.
No further AEOD action is anticipated.
bee:
Central Files/,
PDR CHeltemes; AEOD Wlanning, AEOD NTrehan, AEOD cc: RMajors, ACRS 1~1 Wayne D. Lanning, Lead Engineer Reactor Systems 2, ROAB, AEOD
,~J Narinder K. Trehan Reactor Systems 2, ROAB, AEOD r.r1
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NRC FORM 318110/801 NRCM 0240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
-r, USGPO: 1980-329-824