ML18139A387

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Responds to NRC Re Loss of Offsite Power.Review of History Reveals Two Partial Losses of Offsite Power Occurred
ML18139A387
Person / Time
Site: Surry, North Anna  
Issue date: 06/26/1980
From: Sylvia B
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To: Harold Denton, Varga S
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8007010422
Download: ML18139A387 (4)


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e RESPONSE TO "LOSS OF OFFSlTE PO\\v1ER SURVEY" Attachment Page 1

REFERENCE:

NRC letter dated May 9, 1980 from S. A. Varga -

Operating Reactors Branch No. 1.

A review of Surry's experiences has been performed which indicated two partial losses of offsite power have been experienced; there have been no complete losses of offsite power.

The following are the responses to the survey questions:

A.

Partial Loss of Offsite Power

1)

HOW MAJ.TI CIRCUITS TO THE OFFSITE NETWORK ARE NORMALLY AVAIL-ABLE AfID HOW MANY WERE LOST DURING THE EVENT?

CASE 1 -

There are two independent circuits from offsite trans-mission

  • network available to energize the 4160 VAC and 480 VAC emergency buses -

(two auto transformers which feed Bus 5 and Bus 6 respectively). Bus 5 was the only source lost, this resulted in a loss of two reserve station service transformers and a Unit l trip of the turbine and reactor.

CASE 2 -

Initial conditions same as Case 1, except between event dates an additional source was added, transformer.1f4, which was added to supply buses 5 and 6.

The entire Bus tf2 cleared itself as a result of a fault on the #2 auto-transformer.

The #4 transformer energized the 34. 5 Bus 116 automatically.

There was no effect on either operating unit.

2)

WHAT WAS THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT?

CASE 1 -

The Buses 5 and 6 were tied together through the T562 Breaker.

During testing on the LT-12 Breaker, the T562 breaker was mistakenly left in auto; it should have been in manual.

When the LT-12 breaker was closed with its disconnects open, the breaker logic required the T562 to open, thus de.:energizing the Bus #5.

Case 2 - Whiie closing the Hi side breaker of the tf2 auto trans-former returning lightning arrestors* to service, a ground fault occurred.

This opened all of the #1 auto transformer breakers.

Atta.

Page 2

3)

WHY DID THE OTHER LINES NOT FAIL WHEN SOME DID FAIL?

Case 1 - T~e event occurred as a result of breaker. logic - nothing failed.

Case 2 - The tripping scheme functioned as designed, protecting the reset of the distribution system.

4)

WAS ANY VOLTAGE INCREASE OR DECREASE EXPERIENCED JUST PRIOR TO OR DURING THE OUTAGES?

IF SO, PLEASE GIVE DETAILS:. LOWEST FREQUENCY REACHED, DECAY RATE, AFFECTS ON EQUIPMENT, OPERA-TION, ETC.

CASE 1 - None

.CASE 2 - None

6)

HOW LONG WAS POWER UNAVAILABLE FROM THE CIRCUIT?

CASE 1 - Approximately 45 minutes.

Case 2 - Power to the emergency buses ~as never interrupted.

7)

DATE OF EVENT CASE 1 - June 9, 1974.

CASE 2 - November 10, 1978 B.

For Losses of All Offsite Power:

NOTE:

There have been no such events at Surry.

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NORTH ANNA POWER STATION RESPONSE TO 11LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SURVEY'.'

Attachment Page 3 A thorough review of North Anna station records was conducted and. it has been determined that no occurrences of the type mentioned in the survey have occurred.