ML18136A452
| ML18136A452 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1979 |
| From: | Stallings C VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18136A451 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002040054 | |
| Download: ML18136A452 (4) | |
Text
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V1n<.HNlrA ELECTRIC AND Pow:ER COM:PANY R:rcUMOND,VIROINIA..23261 December 20, 1979
')
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Serial No. 990/112779 PO/RMT:baw Docket No. 50-280 50-281 License No. DPR-32 DPR-37 We have reviewed your letter of November 27, 1979 in reference to the inspection conducted at Surry Power Station Unit Nos. land 2 on October 17-19, 1979 and reported in IE Inspection Report Nos 50-280/79-61 and 50-281/79-80.
Our responses to the specific infractions are attached.
We have determined that no proprietary information is contained in the reports.
Accordingly, the Virginia Electric and Power Company has no objection to these inspection reports being made a matter of public disclosure.
Attachment cc:
Mr. Albert Schwencer
-,., r**..:.,,~.::.,. ~
Very truly yours, C. M. Stallings Vice President-Power Supply and Production Operations
RESPONSE TO IE INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-280/79-61 AND 50-281/79-80 NRC CCMMENT:
(Appendix A)
As required by Section 3.21.G of the Technical Specifications, all penetration fire barriers protecting safety-related areas shall be functional at all times.
In the event a penetration fire barrier becomes non-functional, a continuous fire watch must be established on at least one side of the affected penetration within one hour.
Contrary to the above, the fire door that controls the opening between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Switchgear rooms at the 9'-6" elevation was found inopera-tive due to a 4160 volt transformer being stored in door opening which would not permit the door to close in the event of a fire and a continuous fire watch had not been established.
1his is an infraction.
RESPONSE
The violation is correct as stated.
- l.
Corrective steps which have been taken.
- a.
Transformer has been removed.
- 2.
Corrective steps taken to avoid further infraction.
- a.
Memorandum from Station Manager sent to all plant superintendents and contractors to be aware not to block fire doors.
- b.
Area to be checked more frequently to ensure there are no obstructions.
- 3.
D2te.men full compliance will be achieved.
- a.
Full compliance has been achieved.
NRC c~rr:
(Appendix B)
A.
Section IV.E.5 of the Fire Protection System Review for Surry Power Station of July 1, 1977 states that the carbon dioxide fire protec-tion systems at the plant.meet the provisions of National Fire Protec-tion Association (NFPA) Standard 12, "Carbon Dioxide Systems".
Sections 1.8.3.4 and 1-9.1.3 of NFPA-12 require a manual control station for
~ actuation of the system to be located within the protected area.
The manual control station nrust be capable of activating the bank of carbon dioxide cylinders that are in service.
Contrary to the above, the manual activation control device for the combination automatic and manual actuated carbon dioxide system protecting the diesel fuel tank room at the service water intake structure is arranged to only activate the main bank of cylinders.
I 1
iiI!
Attachment page 2 NRC COMMENT (Appendix B) (continued)
RESPONSE
With the main bank of cylinders removed for recharge or repair, it is not possible to activate the reserve supply from the manual station within the fuel tank room.
This is a Deviation.
The violation is correct as stated.
- 1.
Corrective steps which have been taken.
- a.
Main bank of cylinders has been replaced negating need for reserve supply.
- 2.
Corrective steps taken to avo:i.d further deviation.
- a.
~.ain bank CO 2 bottles will remain in service until a design change can be made.
A design change has been submitted to insure activation capability of the reserve supply in the event the main bank is rendered inoperative.
- 3.
Date when full compliance will be achieved.
- a.
Full compliance has been achieved.
NRC C~NT:
(Appendix B)
B.
Section 9.10.1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) states that the fire protection systems and features for the plant. including
RESPONSE
fire b2rriers, will be designed to meet the standards of the National "Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The standard for the fire doors is NYPA-80, Fire Doors and Windows.
Section 516.b of NFPA-80-1968 Edition (Section 2-8.2 of the 1977 edition) requires all swinging type fire doors to be provided with approved positive latching devices.
Contrary to the above, the swinging type doors separating the three diesel generator rooms from the turbine building and the Unit 1 and 2 Switchgear rooms from the turbine building are not provided with positive acting latches to maintain these doors *in the closed position in the event of fire.
'Ihis discrepancy may also exist on other fire doors located throughout the plant, This is a deviation.
The violation is correct as stated.
- 1.
Corrective steps which have been taken.
- a.
Positive acting latches have been installed on the doors to the diesel generator room.
Other fire doors have been in-spect~~ and a latching mechanism installed as needed.
RESPONSE: (continued)
Attachment page 3
- 2.
Corrective steps to avoid further deviation.
- a.
Administrative controls will be provided to assure the effective-ness of other fire doors.
- 3.
Data when full compliance will be achieved.
- a.
Full compliance has been achieved *