Text

Summary Data Re VA Production of Electricity by Oil & Nuclear Power, Prepared for Governor J Dalton
	ML18136A416
Person / Time
Site:	Surry, North Anna
Issue date:	11/26/1979
From:	Cole N; COLE, N.M.
To:	;
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ML18136A417	List: ML18136A416; ML19291C238; ML19291C242;
References
	NUDOCS 8001230203
	Download: ML18136A416 (24)
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SUMMARY

DAT.?i CONCERNING VIRGINIA'S PRODUCTION OF EL.ECTRICITY BY OIL A..~D NUCLEAR POWER FOR GOVERlmR JOHN DALTON CONTENTS.

Summary Data on VEPCO's Sources of Elect=ical Production and Oil Usage B.

Surr.mary Dat~ on:

0 0

0 Impacts on Virginia in 1979 Caused by NRC Actions Potential Impacts on Virginia in 1980 Caused by NRC Actions Effect on VEPCO Consumers C.

Detailed:

0 0

0 Impacts Caused by North Anna II Shutdown in 1979 Impact Potential of North Anna II Shutdown in 1980 Impacts Caused by Surry I Shutdown in 1979 Impact Potential of Surry II Extended Shutdown in 1980 Details on Electrical Usage Sum.~ary of Teledyne Engineering's Evaluation of Piping at Surry I to Withstand Hypothetical Earthquake Loadings Fuel Charges by Type of VEPCO Plant D.

Editorials PAGE 1-3 4

5 6

7 8

9 10

11 12 i3 Bv: --

~-

M. Cole, Jr.

November. 26, 1979

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e VEPCO SOURCE OF ELECTRICJ..L GENERATION (PERCENT GENERATED IN VEPCO OWNED FACILITIES)

SOURCE 1978

- 1979*

1$80.

. NUCLEAR

35. 3 %

23. 9 %

COAL 24.3 31.6 OIL 37.0 40.l HYDRO - COMB~ TURBINE 3.4 4.4 (A)

. (B)

FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1979.

-- JANUARY 1979 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1979 (A)

THIS REPRESENTS 99.8 PERCENT OF THE TOT~.L OF ALL THE ELECTRICITY VEPCO SOLD.

THE OTHER 0.2 PERCENT WAS PURCHASED BY VEPCO FROH OTHER UTILITIES.

(B)

THIS REPRESENTS 82. 5 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL OF ALL THE ELECTRICITY VEPCO SOLD.

THE OTHER 17.5 PERCENT WAS PURCHASED BY VEPCO FROM OTHER -UTILITIES.

1 -

e

.e SOURCE OF ALL ELECTRICITY SOLD BY VEPCO -- PERCENT SOURCE I

1978 1979

I 1980 I I.

VEPCO

. A.

NUCLEAR

35. 3 %

19 ~ 7 %

B.

COAL 24.2 26.1 C.

OIL 36.9 33 D.

HYDRO - COl*lB. TURBINE 3.4 3.7 E.

TOTAL VEPCO 99.8 82.5 II.

PURCHASE FROi<1 OTHEF.

0.2 17.5 UTILITIES (CO..Z,..L A.i.".;D OIL)

III.

TOT.P-.L (I + II) 100.0%

100.0%

FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1979 2 -

. e.

e VEPCO OIL USE YEAR

MILLION OF BARRELS AVERAGE COST TOTAL PAYMENT PER BARREL FOR FOREIGN OIL 1976 24

$11

$264 MILLION 1977 26

$13

$338 MILLION 1978

25

$12.25

$306 MILLION 1979*

'\\,18

$16.07

$288 MILLION*

(A) 1980

?

FIRST NINE MONTHS (A) ESTI,M.?I.TED TOTAL FO?.EIG:1 OIL WILL BE OVER $ 4 0 0 MILLION FOR ALL OF 1979 3 -

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e

e S UML'!ARY -

.19 7 9 NRC ACTIONS HAVE CAUSED THE FOLLOWING IMPACTS IN VIRGINIA. IN 1979:

1.

EXTRA BARRELS OF FOREIGN OIL IN VIRGINIA IN 1979

. A.

-* B.

SURRY I NORTH ANNA II TOTAL 4.43 MILLION 2.96 MILLION I\\, 7. 4 MILLION B~.RIIBLS -

2.

COST FOR EXTRA FOREIGN OIL IN VIRGINIA IN 1979

3.

SURRY I B *.

NORTH Ai.'1NA II TOTAL

$ 80 MILLION

$62 MILLION

$14 2 MILLION INCREJl.SED COST OF ELECTRICITY PAID BY VIRGINIA CUSTO~lE:;S IN 1979*

A.

B.

SURRY I NORTH ANNA II TOTAL

$63 MILLION

$49 MILLION

$112 MILLION

FOREIGN OIL -

NUCLEAR FUEL COST FOR ELECTRICITY 4 -

e SUM.l'-1ARY -

19 8 0 NRC ACTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL OF CAUSING THE FOLLOWING IMPACTS IN VIRGINIA IN 1980:

~

1.

EXTRA BARRELS OF OIL IN VIRGINIA IN 1980 A.

B_.

SURRY II NORTH ANNA II TOTAL HONTHLY ll ALL OF 1980 590,000 740,000

'vl.3 MILLION

"-2.4 MILLION*

'v8.9 MILLION

'vll MILLION BARRELS/1980

2.

COST FOR EXTR.~ FOREIGN OIL IN VIRGINIA IN 19 8 0 A.

SURRY II B.

NORTH ANNA II TOTAL MONTHLY

$15 MILLION

$18.5 MILLION

$ 33 MILLION MONTHLY

-I!

ALL OF 1980

$59 MILLION*

@ $ 25/B~.RREL

$222 MILLION

@ _$25/BARREL

$281 MILLIO~ IN 1980

3.

INCREASED COST OF ELECTRICITY PAID BY VIRGINIA CUSTOHERS MONTHLY l 1 ALL OF 1980 A.

SURRY II

$12.5 MILLION

$ 5 0 MILLION

B.

NORTH ANNA II

$15 MILLION

$183 MILLION TOTAL

'\\,$28 MILLION

"'\\,$233 MILLION

@ $25/BARR:SL

ASSU:*lES SURRY II HAS TO REMAIN DOWN FOUR MONTHS DUE TO NRC REQUIRE!*1E~,TS.

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e

.. e ESTIMATE OF EFFECT ON VEPCO'S RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS

1.

COST TO AVERAGE VEPCO RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER FOR NRC'S 1979 Al~D 19 80 ACTIONS (~ COST)

= 11,126 KW-HR/YR x

{$112 M +

$233 M*]

37 x 10~ KW-HR/YR

=

$104

2.

COST TO AVERAGE NORTHERN VIRGINIA RESIDENTIAL CUSTOHER FOR NRC' S 1979 Al~D 1980 ACTIONS (t:.* COST)

=

12,431 !CT'1-HR/YR X

[$112 M +

$233 M*]

37 x 10 9 KW-HR/YR

=

$116

3.

PERCENT OF TOTAL COST PAID BY NORTHE&.~ VIRGINIA FOR NRC'S 1979 AND 19SO ACTIONS (~ COST)

[$112 M +

9 x 109 KW-HR/YR

$233 M*]

X 37 x 109 KW-HR/YR

=

$83 MILLION PAID BY NORTHERi.~ VIRGINIA ALSO THIS INCREASE WILL 11.LSO AFFECT:

0 WATER BILLS -- COST OF TREATING DRINKING w;..TER 0

SEW.?I..GE BILLS -- COST OF PREVENTING ENVIRO~:-lE~~TAL WATER POLLUTIQ:.;

ASSUMES $25/BARREL 6 -

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()

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1979

.. e NORTH ANNA II SHUTDOWN HAS ALREADY COST VIRGINIA SEPTEMBER 1979 THROUGH JANUARY 1980 cr:ouR i>10NTHS)

NORTH ANNA II -'."9 898 MW(e)

C.F. 75,PERCENT A.

REPL.;CE:--lENT OIL.

2.96 x 10 6 BARRELS OF OIL x "'$21/EARREL = "'$62 MILLION

.B.

. INCREASED ELECTRICAL COST (OIL -

NUCLEAR COST) 491 x 106 KW-HR{e) x 4-x $0. 025/KW-HR = "'$49 MILLION MONTH t

@ $21/BARREL C.

INCREJl.SE TO HOME OWNER IF ALL REPLACEMENT ELECTRICITY.

FROM OIL*

t::.

=

1,000 :;~: x $0~025/KW-HR x 4 MONTHS= $100/CUSTO:W!ER

THIS ASSU!*1ES ALL THE ELECTRICITY INTO A HO.ME IS EITHER F?.0:-1 A NUCLEAR PLk.~T. OR A..1'1 OIL-FIRED STATION TO CLEARLY SHOW THE COST INCRE.?\\SE OFKEEPING THE NUCLEAR PLANT SHUT DOWN.

H, REALITY, THIS COST INCRE.;SE WILL BE SMEARED OR AVER:l\\GED I~

WITH THE COST OF ALL FOR.MS OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AT VEPCO (e.g., COAL, EXISTING NUCLEAR, HYDRO, ETC.) AND THUS THE COST OF BUYING REPLACEMENT OIL WILL BE SME~.RED OVER ALL VEPCO CUST0!-1ERS ELECTRICAL BILLS; THEREFORE, AN INDIVIDUAL CUSTOHER WILL NOT SEE THIS HIGH AN INCREASE.

7* -

1980 e*

NORTH AJ.~NA II -- 898 MW(e)

C.F. OF 75 PERCENT A.

COST OF REPLACEMENT OIL

$20/BARREL = $14.8 M/HONTH

1.

740,000 BAR.'!:l-.ELS /MONTH X

$25/BARP-EL = $18.5 M/HONTH

$30/BARREL = $22.2 M/:*!ONTH

$20/BARREL = 178 M/YEAR

2. "'8,900,000 BARRELS/YEAR X

$25/BARREL = 222 !-1/YEAR

$30/BARREL = 267 M/YE;..R B.

Il*:CR.EASE OF ELECTRICITY COST (OIL -

NUCLEAR COST)

1.

491 X 10 6 KW-HR(e)

MONTH x

O. 0 310/KW-HR = '\\.$15 MILL:o~;:-10:,:rr:-:

L@ $25/BARREL

/

i

-OR-

@ $25/BARREL C.

INCREJl..SE TO H0~1E OWNER IF 1'.LL ELECTRICITY FROM OIL*

INCREASE = 1,000 KW-HR(e) x $0.0310/KW-HR =

MONTH t

@ $25/BARIIBL

$31/MON:'~

-OR-

$372/YEAR

THIS ASSUHES ALL THE ELECTRICITY INTO A HO:*lE IS EITHER.:R0:*1 A NUCLE.i\\R PLl-.NT OR AN OIL-?IRED STATION TO CLEARLY SEQ;*; ':'~E COST INCREASE O?KEEPING THE NUCLEAR PLANT SP.UT DQ\\*:t~.

I);

P-EALITY, THIS COST INCREASE 1*JILL BE SZ*1EAP2D OR AVE:L;GED IN WITH THE COST OF ALL FO:?.l*lS OF ENERGY PRODUCTIO~l. AT VEPCO (e.g., COAL, EXISTING NUCLEAR, HYDRO, ETC.) AND THUS TEE COST OF BUYING RE?Li\\CE:*lENT OIL WILL BE SHEARED OVER ALL VE?CO CUST0:*1ERS ELECTRIC.;L BI::::..LS; THEREFORE, AN INDIVIDU.:..L CCST0)1SR WILL NOT SEE THIS HIGH AN INCREASE.

8 -

e 1979 SURRY I

.e 7-1/2 MONTH SHUTDOWN (EARLY MARCH 1979 TO END OF OCTOBER 1979)

SURRY I -- 775 !-!W(e).@.579¢/KW-HR C.F: of 70 PERCENT A.

REPLACE:-1E~*iT OIL 590,000 BARRELS OF OIL x 7. 5* MONTHS x $18/BARREL = '\\i$ 80 H MONTH

+*

-======-

AVERA.GE B.

INCREASED ELECTRICAL COST (OIL -

NUCLEAR COST) 396 x 10 6 KW-HR x $0.0213/KW-HR*x 7.5 MONTHS= "'$63 M MONTH

.. L@

======-

$18/BARREL C.

INCREASE TO HOME OWNER IF ALL REPLACEMENT ELECTRICITY FROH OIL*

K1*l-HR (e) fl = 1,000..MONTH x $0. 0213/KW-HR x 7. 5 MONTHS

= "'$1: 6 0/CUSTOHER

THIS ASSUHES ~.LL THE ELECTRICITY INTO A HOME IS EITHER FRO)l A NUCLEAR PLANT OR AN OIL-FIRED STATION TO CLEARLY SHOW T::E COST INCREASE OF KEEPING THE NUCLEAR PLANT SHUT DOWN.

I:-J REALITY, THIS COST INCREASE WILL BE S~lEARED OR AVER.A.GED IN WITH THE COST OF ALL FOru-1s OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AT VEPCO (e.g., COAL, EXISTING NUCLEAR, HYDRO, ETC.) AND THUS THE COST OF BUYH!G REPL.:..CEMENT OIL WILL BE SHEARED OVER ALL VE?CO CUSTO:*IBRS ELECTRICAL BILLS; THEREFORE, AL~ !(1DIVIDUAL CUSTO:*!ER WILL NOT SEE TH!S HIGH AN INCREAS:i::.

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e 1980

.e KEEPING SURRY II SHUT DOWN n: 1980 JANUARY 1, 1980 THROUGH APRIL 1980 -- 775 MW(e)

C.F. 70 PERCENT A.

REPL.P,.CE:*1E~T OIL

$20/BARREL = 'v$47 MILLION 590,000 B1-.RRELS 4 MO~THS

$25/BARREL

'v$59 MILLION X

X

=

i*lONTH

$30/BARREL = '\\,$70 MILLION B.

INCREASED ELECTRICAL COST (OIL -

NUCLEAR COST) 396 x 10 6 KW-HR x 4 MONTHS x $0.0314/KW-HR = '\\,$50 MILLION MONTH L@ $25/BARREL C.

INCREASE TO HOME m*mER IF ALL REPLACENENT ELECTRICITY FRO!*l OILX t,. = 1,000 KW-HR(e) x 4 MONTHS x $0.0314/KW-HR = '\\i$126/CUSTO:*!ER HONTH r

@ $25/BARREL

THIS ASSUMES ALL THE ELECTRICITY INTO A HOl*IB IS EITHER FROM A NUCLE.AR ?Lr.NT OR AN OIL-FIRED STATION TO CLEARLY SHQ1;*7 THE COST INCREASE OF KEEPING THE NUCLEAR PLANT SHUT DOViN.

IN REALITY, THIS COST INCREASE WILL BE SMEARED OR AVER.;GED IN WITH THE COST OF ALL FOR:*1S OF ENERGY PRODUCTION _AT VEPCO

(

Co.,. T l='VTSTI"'G '.\\ 1CT...,..R HYD"."lO pm,.,

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OF BUYING ?E?LACE:*U::!*;T OIL WILL BE SMEARED OVER.:..LL VEPCO CUSTO:*SRS ELECTRICAL BILLS; THEREFORE, AN INDIVIDt.i.:..L CUSTOHER WILL NOT SEE THIS HIGH.P-..1.~ INCREASE.

10 -

e

.e DETAIL DATA OF ELECTRICAL USAGE

l.

ELECTRICITY SOLD BY VEPCO A.

TOTAL KW-HR(e) SOLD BY VEPCO

=

1\\.,37 x 109 KH-HR/YR B.

KW-HR(e) SOLD BY VEPCO IN NORTHER.."'t VIRGINIA

= '\\i9 x 109 KW-HR/YR C.

PERCENT VEPCO SALES IN NORTHER."'t VIRGINIA= 24 PERCENT

2.

RESIDENTir.L us;;.GE A.

AVERAGE FOR ENTIRE VEPCO SYSTE:1

=

11,126 KW-HR/YR B.

AVER.-;GE FOR 1-iORTHER..'1 VIRGINIA CUSTOHER

=

12,431 l-.'W-HR/YR

-OR-1,036 KW-HR/MONTH 11 -*

e

.e INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF SURRY I A.J.',m II* s PIPING EARTHQU.:;Ks LOAwING PROBLEM "MY N.tl.HE IS DONALD F. LA."'1DERS.

I AM SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES (TES) k.'-iD HAVE BEEN EHPLOYED BY TES SINCE NOVEHBER 19.61."

"I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY VEPCO TO TESTIFY ABOUT THE ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES USED IN THE DESIGN OF PIPING FOR SURRY UNITS 1 ~.ND 2 TO W!TEST.!l.:*m HYPOTE::'.:TICAL EARTHQUP..KE LOADING.

THE WORK WAS PERFORHED BY S&W. II IN SU~1?-L~RY --

"B1'.SED ON !*!Y EXPER!E~;CE IN PIPING DESIGN JI.ND A.~Jl.LYSIS, I FEEL TH;.T THE ::RC ORDER TO SHU'!' DOt*:N SUR... qY 1. J..SD 2 w~.s INAPPROP?.IAT==

.;1'1D NOT P2QU!RED.

THE.i\\LGE3Rl\\IC sm,1!-lATION USED BY S&W AT TH:3 TIME OF THE DESIGN OF SURRY 1 Ai.~D 2 WAS BEING USED BY OTHERS IN THE INDUSTRY.

THE REAL WOP.LO. EXPERIENCE OF PI?I~~G SYSTE!-!S IS. THAT THEY CAN WITHSTJ!.1-iD DYNJl.:.UC LOADING WELL BEYO}ID THAT FOR WHICH THEY WERE DESIG~:ED.

IT IS THIS EXPERIE~CE 'WlHCH SHOULD rL~VE BEEN FACTORED INTO A.."'1Y DECISIONS CONCER..~ING SHUTDm:N.

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S:!NCE '.I'HESE ARE EXIST!~G PLA.~TS, THE m;r:1 REA!.

VARIABLE.AFFECTI:.G THE COST OF E!.ECTRICITY IS THE FUEL COST -- OTHER COSTS SUCH COST ~,o O?ERATiml AND MA."-:AG:E::-~:,T 1.51

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AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER M ON DAY, N Q VE ii! BER 2 6 ;.1 9 7 9

~ QUARTER of a nii!1io:n Canadfa.ns *.;*ere e*::acu-1..'i:i._

t..

.c-. a ea zror:i t:12:r ~cr:::2s two wre:-::s :::2:0 oecau~e oi a train derailment that re!eased C:eac.iv chlcrin~ ar.d p;:ios1Zene i:!:J.s:::s. The story made iront-pa~e news 1or one Ciay and was quic~:ly forgotten-which illustrates the strange and often perplexing ways in *which so-ciety respond.5 to the myriad risks of industri:::ilized lhing. Or.e c1:::i on!*: ir:::2:ine hov; bleak the future of nu.ciear nower wcuid ce ii Z-50.vvO peo'Jle i::3.d had to be e,;ac!.!a:~d ~*r~:n tb~ vieiriJtv of a nuc!e:1r rea.ccc~r.

Wl:at :iccotrn.t.S fer tte p!J.enomenon tb.::.t produces yawns over cb.~!!lic:u accidents and inst:J.nt headlines about even the b.bt of a nuclear d:!.n;er? It is not just a reaction to the ghostly qualities of radioactiYity, though that is a pa:t cf it R:i.dioacth*ity can kill you without your e*;er h::.\\i..'1g seen, smelled, heard or felt.

it. :Cut there :::.re 2\\so* 1::1onv chemicals-c:1rbon mon-oxide, ior e:-:::.:::cie-that :ire colorlc::s. odorless. taste-less ::.r,.c. c!c:;.dJ::. :,.;or is the c!liierence simply th:it nu-clear energy is rel1th*e!y new* and unfamiliar. Com-rnerci:?.l nucle:1r power has been :?.round for two dee*

ades now, and that is substanti:llly longer thJn, for in*

st::.nce, people have recogriJzed the rel:J.tion.ship be-tween chemic:t!s :rnd c:mcer.

Society, in other words, re::icts diif erently to risks th::lt a matherr.atici:n would say were equ:illy grave.

,C'n::l, fer cx:.r.:':'l~. is ::.!most ccrt::i:-:!v r:;cre cbr:~er-ous t!::.n nuclc:ir newer if the cor..r,ined ri,ks*of min-in:::! accidents. bl:ic~: it.:~'.!. air nnlltitio:1. :icid :-:iin ::r:rJ C,!rnan-djoxide t~!!'.*Jt.:~ :ire c.:01~~idercci. Bt.:t Jane Fontl..1, ct.:il., h:ive yet to hold an :.;.nll--<:o:il rally. \\Ve live h:ippily wi~h one technolo~y. the-autcrnobile, tho.t cause's 50,0:.o() deaths ::i ye:ir-:::in ~stronomical iiq-.

i:re. A.nd of course there is smotin!?. Th\\: tic:ith r:i.te fl[ r.mokc>rs is r.oi:!:!c th:it of non-:.;mokcrs, rr;z::irct-li:ss of age. Ami sr.:okinc: JI.so incrc:.iscs the d:rn!?cr f ro:n a v:irj,:!tj' o~ other sources: Jsbestos work-ers who smoke, for cx:unplc, ~ct Jun.~ cancer ot nearly 100 times the *rate of tl:eir LO!l*S!::oldng co-workers

People are naturally more,r:lli=g to a.ccept the risks. of a,;oluntary activity~speci::.ily one iro!!l which they receive a direct a:-.d ob*,"io:1s benefit.-

than the risks of an inrnluD.t2.ry c::e. Eu: a l:.ger -s2.rt of t:.e e::q:ilanation Iles i!J. a :!=~=:al -r~:::~ ~:):'!.:°m:::>-:-l.

Recently it h:is b~gun ro s=e.:1 as t~c..:1n ;::st a:-ou:

everythL'1g is dangerous to yi:ur !l';lltt-nuc!ear **

power, che!!lical wastes, pes-.!c:des (',rh:c::i. Du?~nt now advertises as "crcp p:-0,e,:-;.ic:1 cb.e::'..ic::.~"), oc:~-

pational haz2rds, antibiotics in a::..:.=al ieed, air pollu-tion and on and on. Jt:.st abot:.~ ever::t:b=g see:::is to cause cancer-what you de, v,hat yc:.i eat (or don't eat), where you live. Lri the i:.ca cf such a systems overload, it is d.iific:.:.lt to be. vezy ra-tional.

Are the risks oi ordL'1:J.I1' lh"i:cg really bcreasing, or.i.re they mereiy beL.'1g.i.dvert:.sed better? The :in.*

swers aren't clear. We are rll:l!'J..ng out of er::pty space where wastes can be dur.:ped :md f o::-gotten.

We are :ilso able to.me.1sure tiny a:not:rit.s of chc:::::i*

cals and tr:i.ces of po1Iution th:.t wot:ld have been un-detect:i.ble or.ly a few ye~i.rs ago. Vle h::.ve ::. slightly better undcrst.:.ncilng of wb.icb. subst:.::ces ::.re lik:!y to be c:i.rcinc~enic, and a much i::::: ;-i:-cved Jppreci:i.-

ticn of how cJtJsely various p:irts o! tb.e e:r;:ronme.::t intcr:ict. In short, we :ire much ~ore :iw:i:-e oi ri.5ks tll:lt have been around ior some time. B:..:t it :n:ty :i.lso be true th.:it, because of r.10re pro;,le, mere i;,dustri:i.l activity :ind declining n:i.tur::.l resourcrs. new ci:in-gcrs arc no\\y being gcncr:::itcd :~tcr t~:.:i ever c,..

fore.

A ccntro.l theme of the !DS0s will be cr.~in'.; °,\\1~

the discrcp.:mcy between the tcchnic:!.l c:;i:.icity to g~ner:itc, detect :J.!1d mc:isurc r:~ks, :rnd cur rr.!.!ch more rud:r:1cnt:iry soci:ll.i.bili:i::s to co:.mcl, :iccc:::-

r.11,d:itc :ind r1:i.n:i.ge IJ1:;:n.

I ':2

.. e e

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1979

. :u J... : *.~ **.

... ~..,.

i(ennedy on* Rnergy- ~Vrong

~ EN. ED'\\'VARD KE:-i:.'EDY'S energy policy invites u attention. He's in favor of a mor:itoriurn on build-L11grnore nuclear re.actors (cheers from the* audience).

He's in favor o! re'ducint? A.. '!lerican denendence on tc.~:?.n c:1 1sc:u:.ereci ao::,1ause1. He's in farer of con-

~cfcontro!s on oil p*rices 1loud cheering!. But how

-co \\*ou !it these various posi:ions to~ether? (Silence.)

I : **Any prolon~ed O'.l!:!ear moratorium is ~oin!? to ~

£ dri-;e uo c:l ir::::ort.s. (Jr:.e.,.*ay to hoici tnem aown-t the only way mat has act1.ially and demonstrably wor1;ed-i..s to let orices rise. But lhe nuroose of con-trols is to keep prices dov,n.

. Sen. Kennedy would prob::.bly ans**,1,-:r by citing the legi.slltion that he intrcduced last July for federal grants and lo:ans to encourage conservation. That's on the right tr~ck. But h1::-e we cc:-r.e to,m uncor:;forta-ble fact. Co:1serv2tion ccern't orcduce much until p:-ices st.'.lrt upward.

. i.8.e expcric:ice wHh au\\o!nobile fuel efficiency is a

good ex~r.1p!e. The efficiency of American cars bas been rising ste2.dily to r.-ieet the standards that Con-eress wisely imposed L'1 lS75.-But when g~oline prices re.main const.:.nt, r:r.ore efficient cars only make it cbe2per to drh*e-and people react by drivin? more.

~ Over the p.st decade there h:ise been two tL'11es, and only two, when the consum;ition of gasoiine in this country dropped. Toe first was in 197-!. when the price shot UtJ';,ard in the oil crisis. Fer the next four ye:irs the price rose slowly. In re~ terms-adjusted ior ini!a-tion-it ~ctu.:illy dec!.ined a lit~!e. Then c:i.rne the second

oil crisis and ~other big jl.!mp in the price. Althougb.

. *..* i.

there are now several million more cars on the road than a year ago, drhing and gasoline co~u:nption are both signific:mtly below last year's le\\*e!.s.

Consumption responds to price, not to automobile efficiency. The ;n.:rpose of pushing up efficiency is to keep people from being hurt as g~oline gets more expensive. If you were driving the typical.~"'"!l.eric:m car in 19i,3. getting about 13 miles to the gallon, you went a mile on three cents' wor:h of g.::.s. If you're getting the same mileage today, you're payin6 more than seven cents a mile. But if you're driving a typi*

cal new American car (2nd d:iving it carefully),

you're getting alor:g for about a nickel a :mile. A.. >id if you switched to a subcompact that can go 35 miles on a gallon, you are p:.:,ing the same three cents that you did in 1973.

Grecater efiiciency-that is. conser*:ation-holc!s down the cost of drh*ing despite a rising price of fuel.

That also bolds down the amount of gasoline that the country uses, in turn holcJng down in:pom. But the past six years' experience demonstrates iorcefully that it works only as prices rise.

Sen. Kennedv is alto2ether rie:ht in S3.\\*ing that the country has to *cut its cfcDender.ce 0!1 foreit'n oil. The best and fairest w:1y to co it is to impose a smf t:.x on gasoline and use the re\\*enues to cut other t:1.xes. I..b.:!l.. i

~eturns the money to America::s r:1t~er t!"'.:n ~_endin~ t 1t or t to n~*on:~ 11.-:e. rr.r ex:1mp1e, tne r,rc~em 1rnm:m

government. But the only presidential c:ind~d:ne with the cour:1.gc to suggest such a thing is a Republi*

c:m, R~p. John B. A..."l.derson of lllinois

I a.

I

THURS D A Y, NO VE MB ER 8, l 9 7 9 TT..

.. a / Q *.,

Wn

1 ?

u_ranzum, oa,

zl-vv nzcn.

nr, F.E O'CTLOOK FOR :-..lJCLE.!..R power is, post-Jl.. Kemeny, somber at best. But burning coal throws toxic gases into the atmosphere and, while techno!ogy can lower the risks to heaith, it c::mnot en-tir!?h* e!:::::ri::te t~o?~. Xatur2I gas is ne~ded for higher uses than fi:~g u:ili,y boilers. As for oil, you have only to follow e*,e:ts in Iran to percei,;e that lt has become the le:i.st cer::1in of all sources of energy.

Uranium, coal, gas r:.:.d oil: the country's four prin*

cip:il ways of ger.eratir.~ e!ectricity each lies under a shade,,,.. E~ch is. fo7 i~s 0,*.-:i !"!'... ~<JT".;, d~n,:erm.!s. un-C~it::.i-r. er *:r.::*.-"1::;.~ riow coes the coumry avoid bein~ le!t i:: the a::.r;,*:

The fim ~!"uth !S that there is no e!1tir;?]\\' s:fo w:iv to eener~:~ r*:!:~~~~(*~~,*...l..n:: 1a:gc po,.i,er s::tt1ori, re~ard-l~s o." i':s t::-c.nnc!o,:;y, c::.. i::~ \\':1rh it sc::e de2ree of d~mn,;:e to :::e rm*i:-c:-:.!'::?:1: ::.r:d !,Hne e!cmem ct r:sk to r,:..:bl:c r:'"":::.lth. l(.s net a r.:~:::er oUL":.din~ a s:ue !:CiU*

tjon-b.:t o: :ir.din~ the s:i.f es. a::!lo;i~ se\\*eral choices.

The secc:.d truth is that the choices have to be m2de. The ide:i of at least a conditional moratc:-ium on new rc::ctors see:::s to be gaining momentum in Con£!ress. F>:t if \\*nu f:/'\\:l't !i::e nu~l'?::r now;:,r. wh::t kir.ct-of r-:,*::,.,, r.n *;r.,1 \\::*:-~*! The mo~t,ffa1iabie aiter-nat1\\"e 1s c,;::u-n*;t :'.,::*::-" :5 :1 cie:!th r:ite ?5soci::tP-d

,,:jth t\\.,-, !*r.:,*:,* II~-! r*r" er-:::. *t:1:n is a thou~ilt IOr Con-gress aLJd it.s consrnuem5 to !:e;,n in mind during the comin::: c!eb::tes on nuc!e~r r~::::ui:::icn.

Fortum.tely, in most of the country, the need for new generating pl.:ints is not i.1:nneci::.te. To.ere is ~e

-although not unlimited time-for reilection. It is t:.e result, quite simp!y, of rising prices for pov,er. Before t~e first oil er.sis, sL"\\ ye~s ago, con.sl.!Ir.pti:m of e!ectric power in th:.s coumry was ri..sL1g 7 percent a year-a phencmenal rate at which the tau! 102.d doubles every 10 yem-s. At that pace. utilities were under f erociot:.S pre.=sure to keep building plants and to ke-ep bu.ild.i::g them constantly bigger.

But in the past severcl years, the p~ttern b!S sharply changed. The lead is curremly rising less ths.n 4 percent a year-hardly more than hli the p:e-19i3 rate. Tnat's why some companies hare, te:::-

porarily, excess capacity. It's also wily a let of co::r;::i.-

nias h:n*e cancelled some of their cons!ruct!on pl~.

For Dure!v econo::nic and financial re-2.Scns. ~::.lzs cf nuclear reactors had dropped off st:?rp!y *e\\*en be-fore tbe Three 1Iile Island accident. Ctili,ies are now being pushed toward building smaller piant...o:-e::.sier to locate and easier to manage sa.f ely.

Low rates of increise in consumption ~ean e::.sier choices of power sources. A wise r1.:bl:c r.o!:c*: :er po,.;*er,.vi!l ir~~L:t on.a b:ll:nce ~:7°;.071~ f..:!:~~*:*:::. ::!:":C:5 of ::c\\.!rccs. ~*.-01c.ing tor:il re1i:mce on ::.~y one of them. bUL wise public policy will al~o recogr1i::e tb.~t conservation. to hold down consumption, reduces the risk from all of them.

I5

AN INDEPENDE;.';T NEWSPAPER A

TRULY C~EXPECTED result came out of the Kemeny Co=i~i.ssion's study of Th.re~ ::rue Is-land. A groun th~t set out to i:lvesti~ate a technoiogy end'd up t:tii~iil.Z about peo~ie. Ille Kemeny report reached two prir:c:p1l conclusions. neither of which concerned rr.achL11c design, con:municatio~s net-works, backup systems or any of the ether trappings o! nuclear tech::oiogy. In the commission's ov,-n

.words, "It becar.:.e cle:i.r th:it the !'..1;:d1.menU! prob-lems are neoci--=-r~1:::.tea proui;:ms."

The* concil!sio:-:. stressed in tae report is that the at-titudes of the ~uclear Regulatory Co::imission and o!

the nuclear ind*1stry must undergo profound and fundamental change. Toe ?,"RC retains too much of

.. the old promotional philosophy" of the Atomic En-ergy Comr:1i:::sion it replaced. and the nuclear in-dustry has shown itself in too m:my c:i.ses to be lax, poorly rnana;E-d ar..d not up to the demands of run-ning nucle1r power plants.

The other princ!p:il conclusion gre*.i.* out of a second*

by-second ar.alysis o! the Three ~lile Island accident, which showed th:lt the eauio!;lent worked auite weil but the opcrttors c:.td not. Ot the m:my !actors that caused tb.e o;:er:i.tor errors, the com.T.i.'5ion sin:;lcd out one: O\\'er tl.J.e years there has be-en an al::iost tot.11 preoccupation \\\\ith equipment =i.nd a corresponding failure to appreci:ne the role o! the human being in the nuclear system. Attention was p2.id to large break failures o! equipment that would b.:ippen \\'ery

!a.st and have dis2.strous consequences. T:r1ese acci-dents could not be affected by rc:ictor cper:itors. How-ever, the comm:.ssicn found the much grcatt::r prob:i-bl.lity o! "sr.~all brc:ik" equipment failures. which would happen much more slowly :ind which could be in!lucnccd by operator at.:tion. to pose the greater d:i.ngcr. Bcc:i~se thcse.r£:~ponsiblc ior nuclear safety had been "hypnotizt'd by equiri::1ent," they ignorcJ the hum:rn f:tt.:t..ir. and Three :,rnc ls!Jnd merely ii*

lustr.'.ited the co::sc:qut.:'nc.:cs.

Dcf0re the dc*tJJ:e begins on th~ rrport"s +4 recom-mcnd::,.tions. it ~houid I.Jc 5;ii;.! th:it in th~ ~hart tim~ :il-lottcd tu it tl!c Kc:~lcny Commls:i10n diJ the j0b it w:is Uva

. Ji.

.I TTn' u.v l

~ssigned and did it well. It.v,isely resisted strong pressures to reach a judgment on *whether commer-cial nuclear power should be encouraged or ter:rJ~

nated, rightly re:ognizL""lg that tr.is, as a much bro:idcr question in..-olving economi:, political, en-ergy and environ.mental concerns. c:1;,. only be de-cided as a matter cf DUblic po!icv. Ur.1t~e m~ny prer!-

ous pres1denti::.i commissions, this one held itself to-gether and preserved a remark:i.ble.de;;ree oi u=a-wJry to the end. Its fin~l report couid serve as a model o! the governr:1ent report-writer's art: it is con-cise, clearly,1r*ritten, free of double t:.lk or jargon ~nd eminentiy readable.

liniort:n:intely, the same cannot be said for its rn:l.in recommendation: that the way to sol\\'e the many problems the Kemeny study found in the ?\\'uclcar Regulatory Co~:.:is5:cn is to dlsmaml-3 that :i.ge::i:::

and re-create it with a single administrator inside the executive branch. \\"Vhile no one c:m C.1:ny the p:ir:1ly-sis that now grips the ~RC, the Keme:iy report i:i.ilcd to ma~=e a convincing c:ise th:n the :r,rrc*s problems could net be rcsol,*ed within its existing orgl:iization, thereby preserving the substantial :id*::mt:i.ges of COj*

tinuity, independent st:itus as a regul":ltory body :i.nd di\\*ersity o! \\icws and backgrounos pro\\'ided by a

!ive-member commission.

All in all. the Ki:~cny rc!Jort he-Idun a veno"* U~:it for nucle:1r newer. lt Joo:,ed at th~ fact.3 *,,;ithout b::.1s.

and to it.~ own su,:,ris~ iounti. en11ir.t:1~m tit:it wtirk(*ci better th:i.n expected and a 11~1m::n s\\*:-tc;:1 tl::;t worked r:mch. ~1.1ch w,lrse. lium:rn faiiin;s t:.1:-:1cJ up "wherever we 100,-t.:ci. but none of th('m could not be corrected if the ri:::;ht at~itcc.!e preniied amoni:: these who design. builc!. opcr::,.te :rnd rc£:ul:1.tc nucle:ir reactors. The needed ch:m~cs :ire in most c:iscs o"bviou:; :ind rc::,.sor.:1bly easy to c::irry out. T:ic n~t'*(n" "r0"""1** tr~1*n,,- 1 rl****,,*tr,,. l*"~'O"<:,..,.., -t*

U

~I

~... .'

,1,

-U

,..._,~**

,-1.,.. ~

ample. is J m:l)O!" ii:it!ill::!-St:rr*I~* ll::., 1, \\\\,*it \\\\ n::::1 thli C':JpaciI\\" Of (:~;r ~U_t*1,*11.* t11 t*,*u, :*.. '.

, lt~L l:.=.: rt...~

pun 1s try;:1~ to ~:v. l:i uii.: -.\\ l*,'..i.:, ul unc co:-ni:::s-sioncr. is to c:ill out to the system. :is lut.:dl:.; :is it c:m.

"Sh:ipe up, sh:ip~ up. sh:ipe up."

lltl; VYrnhTirL1ID~tar l.._j Founded iD JS.Si MlJRRA Y J. GART. Edi:or

'11,'U.!JA.1,1 P. loldl.WAL'(, ~pr,ry Ullor EDWtN l.t. YOOER JR.. UiroruJ Pa,~ Wror

- t,.***

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1979

'.I'he Kemeny Commission's most importnnt decision mny have been a negative one -

the decisior. nQt to c:ill for n l"!"lorntorium on the~

stn:ctrnn Di nucle~r riower ;ii:ints. Six members of the commission -

set up six months a~o by President Carter to in':es~ignte the Three ~!ile Ts-.

land.iccident -

wanted a moratorium. But they failed to recruit a se\\*enth vote.

It \\\\'.JS a close call. bllt r.one of the Commis-sion's findir:.is e\\*en S'.:££':?Sts.i d<!n2erous :lnw in the C!~r~:::it dc.~*1~n or ::i::.:lr:n!9 r.o*.::e~ :.'i:1nts.

unless 1t 1s tl1e co~ft:Si~~ urr~I~:i2:ru~~r nr control-rC'*:~ ~oni:e,r~:-:2 c~*.. *:ccs. f\\at11er. says the com::;i1s::;1on. "..l..s :r:-:: e*::Gence c1ccumu!ated.

it become cle:ir th.it ~r,e :u:1d.:iri1entai urob:~2s nre nconle-re!t!ted n:--cbl-=::-.s and ~ot ecu1n!:1e:1t nroble.ns... I~ is tt::mpt:ng to bl:ime machines when peopie err. But no construction mora-torium would solve "vecvle" uroblerns.

What, then. are these "people-related prob-lems"?

One, s.ivs the corr.:nission. is that those who routinel:,; operate nucle.ir power pl:mts are undertrnined -

in p.:in because trnini:-ig stand*

ards are set by plant operntors. not by a pubiic agency. The operntors of rrncle:!r plants ou;ht be viewed, lite air tr.:iffic controllers. as people in whose competence ar.d standards the public h.:is n large interest. In cn!!ir.g attention to that prob-lem, the Kemeny Commission is entirely right.

. A second "people-related problem." according to the co::u::1ssion. is th.:it no one is systemati-c.:illy collecting nnd learning from the !es.sons of minor nuclear incidents. Three !\\li!e Island might h.ive been pre\\'ented. or at any rate mini-mized, if plant operntors hnJ been fully cogni-zant of the d~veloping probl::!m. But someone. it seems. e\\*en shut dov::1 t:-ie emergency core cool-ir." svster:1. The con:::~ission blames such 0

blt:aderin; on a "mir.cset," a complacent as-sumption tl1at the technology is so s.:ik. so well dcfcnc.kJ ir; depth, tbt ln::11:rn error tenticd to be discountt:d. TllJt m1ml:iet 111.:t:ds ch:rn~ing.

The commission's t!1ircJ m~jor "peopk-rc!Jtcd" problc:n is the strnct;m.. ' of tlie ~1:ck~1r RL*~nl,1-tory Con::n:ss10n. l:s "rnlkg1:il" hah1!s :~t:'llLT,ite too litth: ka.!1.:rs!i1p, i.:spi.:L*i,illy in a crisis. Thi.:

commission n.:commi.:1H.ls n "rt:struct*unn~" of the !\\HC to q111ckL'l1 tkc1sion-m:i!-:in~. :lllJ to cltminat't! th<.! \\'<.:!itibi.:s of boosterism tl!.it linger in its bureaucratic ranks from the_ old d.'.?ys w:-.e:-i its predecessor agency. the Atomic Energy Com-mission. was a promoter oi nuclear energy.

The ;\\RC, proposes the commission, should be-come a line executiv~ agency, responsi,;e to presidential authority. There would be adr::::::s-trati*;e advantages in that. Em there \\\\*0:1ld :::$0 be the h.iznrd of nolitical o::i~:rl,c~:';:: o: tjc :;::-

cl c:a :- r,o *,!:er ind ~~str~; t!!! Ger ~ !: */ *.: *:-i:::Z": ::t:! :-e or:n0:1e::t 0; ::1.uciear nov.*e:- !!1 :te ~:=.::-..::= ~C:.:'3-;.

! te hem::ny Corum1:ss1on h~s not o!:.:rca L"1e nation a bll-blown nuclear po*,*:er pol:cy: nc:ie was Q.Sked for. Ultimately, the future of nucle.:lr power poses a political choice in the bro::c;st sense. Presidential commissions are ill-cui::tied to rr:.:.}~e such choices.

\\ 1/e re:-nni~ nersnnded tr.~t n~!<:'le~~ ~!ri'.t:~~ ~~:,t on::n~e fo;- :he 1ore~et:~i:'it fl!:~~:-::-:-~~~:!*::*~!

com:-o::ent ci tte r::::tjon*s e~erT*: ~r':'-::-::::: 3'."!

lon:: ~~ ~:-;: h:;::~:--ds can he !1:--:-:!:e-:. r: :l:~t ~s :::.so the co,.-.*ict1on oi ?resident CJr~er ~::-.c ConG~ss, after cn:eful exar:iination of the Ke::::r1i* re:10:-t.

it \\Vill m.:ike no se::.se to s1;;2ther :::e *nl!~'.e::r power i:1-.lustr,; in o\\*er~re2.:i:::10~ -

wh1c:1 :s not to be cor:!t!sed with v:1.se :me t!fic:er.t r;;.;:~1-lation. It wni!\\d be ot!d to :et "e::,:-:-:*: :::('c-:1:::'.'*

nt:c:*:~;- r,~~.::~r. *rne mn1n 1:1sult :o I1e:ti~Z1 a::d so.let':.::: Th,ce.\\fiie Is1.:ind. sa*:s the c:imrn!s~icn.

was *.. mentnl stress." It f:n2:- r.o '-irl":,d l*:-:,e agninst nucle~r no*,t_*er. ho,.1:c:~:cr. ~~*;r ~!~'.* ::*;1..

dcnce !~::t s:i:cl*\\.. n:nr>l(!r::~ ::;--e !:*7"t:::=:**.. :t~~:,...

lntied. one 01 the !\\.l?!:l.:ny pn:1t:: s cx;*;::-ts.

Prof. Thomns Pigford of the dcr:inr:;.ent of n!.!-

cle:ir engi:1ecring at Berkeley, ch0se to renf:i::-:-:1 without equivoc.:tion thnt "nothing lenrncd from this invcstig:.ition su~gcsts th.::t :l1e :rnclc:.:-

rower option should be cun:iiled or Jb~:..don::J as.:i result of th~ T:-.1i-:2..icci<lent."

A profe:ssor of r.uclc.:ir engineerin; is ~::s~1:-:-.ed to h.ive a \\*cstl?d interest in his o,*:n s::b~,::c:..!!:.d his co:1viction :my he discoun,cc.1 nccu:-u:::;::!y.

Still. ~1!1..'rt* !s snmcthin~! tn 1,1..* "~:1i,! fl 1 :" ~::~n*.::!::::

t II e s u f"\\ * *** c t. l ' r 1:::; 1 J e II t C ~1 rt 1: r a z, 1.1 C,..; : 1.: :* l.':,;.:5 stiou;u ::, 11.:ast hc:1r Pro:c*ssor Pi~tor;.!'s v:l*ws in m1m! as tlli.:y silt tllc t:o::1m1ss1on*s i111J::~:_:-; fer mcJsnrl.'S to str1:n~tlll..'ll thL' s;1kty fL'Con.l uf ti..:

nudl.1'::r :1ow1..*r inJustry. [\\"t.'ll n!tt:r T!1:-ec :-.1::c lsl,1nc.l, t!i,11 rcc:on.l i.s not :;11 b:1d :is to w:irr:-i::t cont*!11s:n::s :11 v;iri:mcc witl! the thr*.:;;: o~ t;:~

comm1:-.s10::*s rcp*Jrt.

!1

~::ih,:-:-:~o,i~s ::i!]:;U::::iior 1:'!::ve~ities to de!':'":!:!::~ t:--.~ l;~r:~s1~r of r:n:a:.c:tiv1ty in t:-.*) e:n-J,('7'."."'.".*::::.. r'he C.S. i:.nnron-mcr::~t }*'!"P~1~*.:::::-:1.-\\~::ncv :nd r;::1:1v inc;,... ~""11 ~*.,-;-;; 1~*1 1.*t.? pcr1orn1cd t~c1r O*::.n'"' **s*~.:.. *)l::~~~n - n~c..,,..,".~ ~rout1d

...,1..: ****** 1o.-

~-*-*-**-

opcr::.tin~ r.l!~i~~r fJC!lltit!$. K,...,~r' rif the~r stt:d~~ st::*:,:*5:~ !~:.t t~H:i r,:.. *tlit.l In f:;ct, cva!-.::!ce to,:~:c ::1cic:ite~ tnJt the r\\HC ~O<.!*~*!..S r***~: 1*::~tv OVt.. re:::~im:?te lhc c!osc to im.:J*,i..:~.:;.

In addition. the EPA. Ar~onne Na-tion:il LaboratOl"\\'. O:ik Rid!'.!e N:llinnal

~boratorv, 8:?ttelle P:icii:c \\'orthw,:,.::t Llbor:non*. nri\\*:netv ow;:cd technic:11 consuaim: co~n:?nies and numerous n:ition:il :md i=-:t:::-n:nional scje:;;P'ic-or-gani::at:or:.s b:ive rnoce!s oi raci:o::ictiv-ity movement ;ind dcs::i~e that yield re-sults consistent with the ?'\\"RC cal~ula-tions.

Washington FRA2,ri: J. CO?\\GEL, Le,sdtt, P~:etO,::a! I.:::;:i..:; Sect!o:i,

,**..,. a.e....i..:.e:, eoc.:ius1.o:i.

"Are nuclear oiants unsafe?" asks Dick Brukenfe!d:Tl::.is is a nonsensical cuestion becat:se tbere is oi::.Jy one an*

s,ver. Oi course nucle::ir. plants arc un-safe: nuclear energy h;i.s cert:i.in risks a.,d

health costs. :cs ciO(- e*,*s:rv ot!:ler

~omce oi er:ers::.,.*. ir:::,uc;;:~ s.::i:.r..Even e:-ier2*..

co~~er*,-~!1*J:1 c2.:1 i:~ 1.!-.SJie; the ne*.v r.::o*.:,n~i.;:ed c:i.rs, re: cx~rr:pie, pro-vide less urotecticn i.'1 collisions tnan. :

did th:> 01~ bi'=' c"-s PI~;,.,1,. ;,.. view of *

.,,1,

_,.,..,,,,J. ~

our petrole~m r-rcbiems, this added _

riSk is to be accept:>d.

The ccr:-ect question.to ask of nu-clz~r energy is whe:h:>r its ri::ks are so

~!"eJt as to be i:::~~*.:r:; ::ie.,1.-ne:i ccm-p:.rca,*:nb. tl:e r:.::::s of the a1tern:i.tive er:.ergy sources. Rl:ht nr,w we're ~':t-t!!;~ ~ \\*cry ~1n*-* ~:-::i::-:~:~. i!1 lr~~. of t:-:a

!"~~-:-:s ~::~c~::2~~~ \\~:!!:1 r::i. i:: ::u~:eJr en*

er:,.' r~:11t,; r::::-:!::*r !:1:!n ce~e~a.1ng on cii contrc:.l~d by it.:::aucs?

.... ;.c:,: ~CK.-\\ y I ~t::t o!J;,;d

to one ol the chi~s rr!ide h1,,,* D!~~: E~~!~7e!"'fe1'4 i!' r,;<: ~

on **f~.llcut" tre::n nuc:e:1r power pi:.:it.5. -

He-c!:ii'.::ed th:it.. When told of.rJ~h stromi:.:rn S-0 l~\\*e!s being mo::i..itored *in milk a:id fish fro~ the :,re:: ne:ir Ll-ie three Ococee rc:;.ctar-s b South ~olina, another EPA r:ic.1:i.ticn official re- '

sDc-nd~d th:il the '.::..').mlllirem Ii.nut ao-,

plies to 'pl:i!"'.nect tiisch:m:cs of r:idio:ic-tivc m:itcri:lis.' Ii do..."S r.ot apply, be s.1id,

'to b:ick~round or fallout r:!cii:1.tion in the viciJijty cf r. 1Jc!e:i.r power plants.'..

I w:is the ::~!'.. \\ r:,r.::itin:, affiC'i~I rr,..

frr:-r-~~ y-, ;i~lr,"'). ~='"{! I ::.1~_.;t ~~*: n:~r '.1r Eri:~r!"!(!*\\r1,,:;:;s t:*"H. ::.3!l ~i:-'(!,,.:~!fl ;!1 sum:r.lri:in~ my r~~pon.:=e Lo an 1:1qu1ry b? Cr:11!'.? Swic:!._ of the i::n-.-ironmc:ll:il Policy l:::mtu!e i:i \\\\":i:;hington. D.C.. re-r,:i:-tiir.::; r:ic::i.tion lc*,els rc>poncd io the l~i7 O~ur:r*e ;'>;ui.:h~:ir ~iJ::on lt:ctiolu\\.!i-c:il Enviror.:ncnt:d ~,1onitoring ltc*port.

.!y rL'~ponsc to.'.lr. S11 ;l'!(s cl:i im th:i t tl:t? btkr rc>non indic:itcd '"hinh J.,\\*rlc; o! cn*:!rl~~:.;*,.~r.~:i:-r:~ 11?::t:("l:t.1rf\\*~**!1 1:,,:

Ocnr:,,,~ \\l:c!,**::r :-i;,:1nn w:1 ~ !11.,t l11s cl;ll:n \\\\'::... i:!!-L" :tt1tt v;.:1:,; P:?:--t"*ll t'n :!n 11n*

prop,*r ::?:::*. -:~ 11; 11:,* rl':,:*~t. u:ily :C.l'l'*

ondanly t.:al l r,*:,*r to tu!! sc:opc of

[P A's :!;;-m1liircm l!r?:it.

K1:::--:-;I:.1II T. DOCE;{

W:isbin;to:i I am shocked tbt T.:e Pest wouk publlih sucb. 2:1 i,rt>~::c:::ir,;-: 2r:ic:e.

Strontium ~'J is a prcci.c: ot :c:.:C!"?:r

!~ion \\\\ith :i i!1l:"-liie c: ~ years a::.d t::..

been found L11 rivers :1.ll ore: t~e wc:-:i: i~

v.idely var:,t~ ccncent:-:t:-:::s. It is c:-.

tainly evaporated i..::l n:::!e:?.: e::-::p!:::~:.-

and rele~ed 2s p::.rtiC:es. b co::.,::..::

since it is a solic. it i.5 e:-.7-:C:::d to s!.:ay ::*

a reactor uille:.s there is an accic;:;r:.~.

orJy gases "l~k" to the~-

Dick Brt:ker.feld cii£C!.!SSes C!:ii!r.S !:-

t!le cont:2.ry bt:t f::.!!5 :, r-r-::;t C'.!t ::- _.,:**

jn::(8lns1stenc*,a.

,*,*ny ~=-~ ::.t~or=::::.

high leve!s ic'i.1~d ~O mil~s iror:i 2. re:':

tor to be attributed tc ~:e re1c:cr; :;-::*

low ones ne1rby dis::m::d ~s e*:~de::c=.

th:it little or none was e-r:-,:ued? E. :

Mr. Brukenfeld su:;;;em,,te s::-0::ti:.1::*

is e!!lined ccnti:lu*ot:sl\\". it *::o*..::c: ::::*:.

l~r!:e conc~~t~:tir.:-:.s *,:-:*

~:-:~ :5::.... :

S!,01:.!lt.!C'l t:~ 1r::!l!*!i:e ~-J i::::*;;::._*,1*r-:' *

,viii h.J:;~ t:--::: :::::~ c::*:*::-.!~:t r:*:,::-*: :*

5tror.t!l!~ L1t *1~-: r:-;:~-i.=5 oi s:ror:tit.:::: ~-

to b3 are coi:.sis,en: wi:!:: :a!lct:t f,c::-.

old nuclear expio~ions :i.::d r.ot with r:.:.:-

clear power pl:,.m e::i:.;:or.s. E::1c.:

power st:i.ticn issues det:ui::d re~cr~ 0'.

air :.nd w:,.ter rclc:,.~?;: t::.::;e rE'!'=~~,~

sho,t..* nei:?1i~?~!e stro~!!~.:~~ ~-, r*.~!.'\\:c:..:..:

--1r. Bruk~nrc:d r;:~k,:.j s~r~Jus ct::.:~,~:.:

that the s:.iety c:,.!ci..:!:,.t:':\\,..s :i:e t:~.:i.i :~,

part on !:mlty d:ita. Th:.s needs c!e!.:!il~*!:

jUSi.i.ficJt~o:i :md rc;!*rre::c~. !'!E'!!h~:- c:

which :ire p,o\\i.:!*~d. :-;or ~oes t~e ;i.c:~:~:i-tion seem rele\\'ant to :::c-i:,sct:::.:lcn of::-

tribu:ion of s:.c::t,:i::: ~*J to 1:.:; sou.re::-.:.:_

is 0r.!'.* i"'.:*l:i::::-;-;~,:n~v.

~l.:. E:t::-:~:1~~!.i :T:::y h::.°'*e u:i ;::r:-t r.1n;e of :..:nccrumty J~c*:.:t itze !r;i::1ct i:':

nuclL 1

~

p~:.r.~ on h~!:':J.:", C(:!r~::s**;~

dC';"\\'i nn~ do ~~-.: ~:"":*f,*.,:_.... -~~ ~~~'"' t:~. *.

l~!CH..\\!~D \\T,1LS0::.

r-:,,,,!~,\\.C.r c: r:-.~"*1**..

~rt7 L~j !:~~:er.:,~~ JJ'::l~!")" C"c::!.,.~.

C1mbridge, ~fass.

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ML18136A416

Text

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