ML18136A416

Summary Data Re VA Production of Electricity by Oil & Nuclear Power, Prepared for Governor J Dalton

ML18136A416
Person / Time
Site:	Surry, North Anna
Issue date:	11/26/1979
From:	Cole N COLE, N.M.
To:
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ML18136A417	List: ML18136A416 ML19291C242
References
NUDOCS 8001230203
Download: ML18136A416 (24)

Text

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SUMMARY

DAT.?i

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CONCERNING VIRGINIA'S PRODUCTION OF EL.ECTRICITY BY OIL A..~D NUCLEAR POWER FOR GOVERlmR JOHN DALTON CONTENTS.

PAGE A. Summary Data on VEPCO's Sources of 1-3 Elect=ical Production and Oil Usage B. Surr.mary Dat~ on:

0 Impacts on Virginia in 1979 Caused by 4 NRC Actions 0

Potential Impacts on Virginia in 1980 5 Caused by NRC Actions 0

Effect on VEPCO Consumers 6 C. Detailed:

0 Impacts Caused by North Anna II 7 Shutdown in 1979 0

Impact Potential of North Anna II 8 Shutdown in 1980 0

Impacts Caused by Surry I Shutdown 9 in 1979 0

Impact Potential of Surry II Extended 10 Shutdown in 1980 0

Details on Electrical Usage *11 0

Sum.~ary of Teledyne Engineering's 12 Evaluation of Piping at Surry I to Withstand Hypothetical Earthquake Loadings 0

Fuel Charges by Type of VEPCO Plant i3 D. Editorials Bv: ~- M. Cole, Jr.

November. 26, 1979

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e.- e VEPCO SOURCE OF ELECTRICJ..L GENERATION (PERCENT GENERATED IN VEPCO OWNED FACILITIES)

SOURCE . 1978 - 1979* 1$80.

. NUCLEAR

• 35. 3 % 23. 9 %

COAL 24.3 31.6

. 40.l OIL 37.0 HYDRO - COMB~ TURBINE 3.4 4.4 (A) . (B)

• FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1979.

-- JANUARY 1979 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1979 (A) THIS REPRESENTS 99.8 PERCENT OF THE TOT~.L OF ALL THE ELECTRICITY VEPCO SOLD. THE OTHER 0.2 PERCENT WAS PURCHASED BY VEPCO FROH OTHER UTILITIES.

(B) THIS REPRESENTS 82. 5 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL OF ALL THE ELECTRICITY VEPCO SOLD. THE OTHER 17.5 PERCENT WAS PURCHASED BY VEPCO FROM OTHER -UTILITIES.

e .e SOURCE OF ALL ELECTRICITY SOLD BY VEPCO -- PERCENT SOURCE .

I 1978 . 1979

• I 1980 I' I. VEPCO

. A. NUCLEAR 35. 3 % 19 ~ 7 %

B. COAL 24.2 26.1 C. OIL 36.9 33 D. HYDRO - COl*lB. TURBINE 3.4 3.7 E. TOTAL VEPCO 99.8 82.5 II. PURCHASE FROi<1 OTHEF. 0.2 17.5 UTILITIES (CO..Z,..L A.i.".;D OIL)

III. TOT.P-.L (I + II) 100.0% 100.0%

• FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1979

. e. e VEPCO OIL USE YEAR AVERAGE COST TOTAL PAYMENT

• MILLION OF BARRELS PER BARREL FOR FOREIGN OIL 1976 24 $11 $264 MILLION 1977 26 $13 $338 MILLION 1978 *25 $12.25 $306 MILLION 1979* '\,18 $16.07 $288 MILLION*

(A) 1980 ..

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• FIRST NINE MONTHS (A) ESTI,M.?I.TED TOTAL FO?.EIG:1 OIL WILL BE OVER $ 40 0 MILLION FOR ALL OF 1979

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e S UML'!ARY - .19 7 9 NRC ACTIONS HAVE CAUSED THE FOLLOWING IMPACTS ,,. IN VIRGINIA. IN 1979:

1. EXTRA BARRELS OF FOREIGN OIL IN VIRGINIA IN 1979

. A. SURRY I 4.43 MILLION

-* B. NORTH ANNA II 2.96 MILLION TOTAL I\, 7. 4 MILLION B~.RIIBLS -

2. COST FOR EXTRA FOREIGN OIL IN VIRGINIA IN 1979 SURRY I $ 80 MILLION B *. NORTH Ai.'1NA II $62 MILLION TOTAL $14 2 MILLION

3. INCREJl.SED COST OF ELECTRICITY PAID BY VIRGINIA CUSTO~lE:;S IN 1979*

A. SURRY I $63 MILLION B. NORTH ANNA II $49 MILLION TOTAL $112 MILLION

• FOREIGN OIL - NUCLEAR FUEL COST FOR ELECTRICITY

e SUM.l'-1ARY - 19 8 0 NRC ACTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL OF CAUSING THE FOLLOWING IMPACTS IN VIRGINIA IN 1980: ~

1. EXTRA BARRELS OF OIL IN VIRGINIA IN 1980 HONTHLY ll ALL OF 1980 A. SURRY II 590,000 "-2.4 MILLION*

B_. NORTH ANNA II 740,000 'v8.9 MILLION TOTAL 'vl.3 MILLION 'vll MILLION BARRELS/1980

• 2. COST FOR EXTR.~ FOREIGN OIL IN VIRGINIA IN 19 8 0 MONTHLY -I! ALL OF 1980 A. SURRY II $15 MILLION $59 MILLION*

@ $ 25/B~.RREL B. NORTH ANNA II $18.5 MILLION $222 MILLION

@_$25/BARREL TOTAL $ 33 MILLION $281 MILLIO~ IN 1980 MONTHLY

3. INCREASED COST OF ELECTRICITY PAID BY VIRGINIA CUSTOHERS MONTHLY l1 ALL OF 1980 A. SURRY II $12.5 MILLION $ 50 MILLION

• B. NORTH ANNA II $15 MILLION $183 MILLION TOTAL '\,$28 MILLION "'\,$233 MILLION

@ $25/BARR:SL

• ASSU:*lES SURRY II HAS TO REMAIN DOWN FOUR MONTHS DUE TO NRC REQUIRE!*1E~,TS.

e .. e ESTIMATE OF EFFECT ON VEPCO'S RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS

1. COST TO AVERAGE VEPCO RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER FOR NRC'S 1979 Al~D 19 80 ACTIONS (~ COST)

= 11,126 KW-HR/YR x

{$112 M + $233 M*]

37 x 10~ KW-HR/YR

= $104

2. COST TO AVERAGE NORTHERN VIRGINIA RESIDENTIAL CUSTOHER FOR NRC' S 1979 Al~D 1980 ACTIONS (t:.* COST)

= 12,431 !CT'1-HR/YR X

[$112 M + $233 M*]

37 x 10 9 KW-HR/YR

= $116

3. PERCENT OF TOTAL COST PAID BY NORTHE&.~ VIRGINIA FOR NRC'S 1979 AND 19SO ACTIONS (~ COST)

[$112 M + $233 M*] X 9 x 10 9 KW-HR/YR 37 x 10 9 KW-HR/YR

= $83 MILLION PAID BY NORTHERi.~ VIRGINIA ALSO THIS INCREASE WILL 11.LSO AFFECT:

0 WATER BILLS -- COST OF TREATING DRINKING w;..TER 0

SEW.?I..GE BILLS -- COST OF PREVENTING ENVIRO~:-lE~~TAL WATER POLLUTIQ:.;

• ASSUMES $25/BARREL

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1979

.. e NORTH ANNA II SHUTDOWN HAS ALREADY COST VIRGINIA SEPTEMBER 1979 THROUGH JANUARY 1980 cr:ouR i>10NTHS)

NORTH ANNA II -'."9 898 MW(e) C.F. 75,PERCENT A. REPL.;CE:--lENT OIL.

6 2.96 x 10 BARRELS OF OIL x "'$21/EARREL = "'$62 MILLION

• .B. . INCREASED ELECTRICAL COST (OIL - NUCLEAR COST) 491 x 10 6 KW-HR{e) x 4- x $0. 025/KW-HR = "'$49 MILLION MONTH t

@ $21/BARREL C.

• INCREJl.SE TO HOME OWNER IF ALL REPLACEMENT ELECTRICITY.

FROM OIL*

t::. = 1,000 : ; ~ : x $0~025/KW-HR x 4 MONTHS= $100/CUSTO:W!ER

• THIS ASSU!*1ES ALL THE ELECTRICITY INTO A HO.ME IS EITHER F?.0:-1 A NUCLEAR PLk.~T . OR A..1'1 OIL-FIRED STATION TO CLEARLY SHOW THE COST INCRE.?\SE OFKEEPING THE NUCLEAR PLANT SHUT DOWN. H, REALITY, THIS COST INCRE.;SE WILL BE SMEARED OR AVER:l\GED I~

WITH THE COST OF ALL FOR.MS OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AT VEPCO (e.g., COAL, EXISTING NUCLEAR, HYDRO, ETC.) AND THUS THE COST OF BUYING REPLACEMENT OIL WILL BE SME~.RED OVER ALL VEPCO CUST0!-1ERS ELECTRICAL BILLS; THEREFORE, AN INDIVIDUAL CUSTOHER WILL NOT SEE THIS HIGH AN INCREASE.

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NORTH AJ.~NA II -- 898 MW(e) C.F. OF 75 PERCENT A. COST OF REPLACEMENT OIL

$20/BARREL = $14.8 M/HONTH

1. 740,000 BAR.'!:l-.ELS /MONTH X $25/BARP-EL = $18.5 M/HONTH

$30/BARREL = $22.2 M/:*!ONTH

$20/BARREL = 178 M/YEAR

2. "'8,900,000 BARRELS/YEAR X $25/BARREL = 222 !-1/YEAR

$30/BARREL = 267 M/YE;..R B. Il*:CR.EASE OF ELECTRICITY COST (OIL - NUCLEAR COST)

1. 491 X 10 6 KW-HR(e)

MONTH x O. 0 310/KW-HR = '\.$15 MILL:o~;:-10:,:rr:-:

L@ $25/BARREL

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@ $25/BARREL

-OR-C. INCREJl..SE TO H0~1E OWNER IF 1'.LL ELECTRICITY FROM OIL*

INCREASE = 1,000 KW-HR(e) x $0.0310/KW-HR = $31/MON:'~

MONTH t

@ $25/BARIIBL

-OR-

$372/YEAR

• THIS ASSUHES ALL THE ELECTRICITY INTO A HO:*lE IS EITHER .:R0:*1 A NUCLE.i\R PLl-.NT OR AN OIL-?IRED STATION TO CLEARLY SEQ;*; ':'~E COST INCREASE O?KEEPING THE NUCLEAR PLANT SP.UT DQ\*:t~. I);

P-EALITY, THIS COST INCREASE 1*JILL BE SZ*1EAP2D OR AVE:L;GED IN WITH THE COST OF ALL FO:?.l*lS OF ENERGY PRODUCTIO~l. AT VEPCO (e.g., COAL, EXISTING NUCLEAR, HYDRO, ETC.) AND THUS TEE COST OF BUYING RE?Li\CE:*lENT OIL WILL BE SHEARED OVER ALL VE?CO CUST0:*1ERS ELECTRIC.;L BI::::..LS; THEREFORE, AN INDIVIDU.:..L CCST0)1SR WILL NOT SEE THIS HIGH AN INCREASE.

e 1979 SURRY I

.e 7-1/2 MONTH SHUTDOWN (EARLY MARCH 1979 TO END OF OCTOBER 1979)

SURRY I -- 775 !-!W(e) .@ .579¢/KW-HR C.F: of 70 PERCENT A. REPLACE:-1E~*iT OIL 590,000 BARRELS OF OIL x 7. 5* MONTHS x $18/BARREL = '\i$ 80 H MONTH +* -======-

AVERA.GE B.

• INCREASED ELECTRICAL COST (OIL - NUCLEAR COST) 396 x 10 6 KW-HR x $0.0213/KW-HR*x 7.5 MONTHS= "'$63 M MONTH .. L@ $18/BARREL

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C. INCREASE TO HOME OWNER IF ALL REPLACEMENT ELECTRICITY FROH OIL*

K1*l-HR (e) fl = 1,000. .MONTH x $0. 0213/KW-HR x 7. 5 MONTHS

= "'$1: 6 0/CUSTOHER

• THIS ASSUHES ~.LL THE ELECTRICITY INTO A HOME IS EITHER FRO)l A NUCLEAR PLANT OR AN OIL-FIRED STATION TO CLEARLY SHOW T::E COST INCREASE OF KEEPING THE NUCLEAR PLANT SHUT DOWN. I:-J REALITY, THIS COST INCREASE WILL BE S~lEARED OR AVER.A.GED IN WITH THE COST OF ALL FOru-1s OF ENERGY PRODUCTION AT VEPCO (e.g., COAL, EXISTING NUCLEAR, HYDRO, ETC.) AND THUS THE COST OF BUYH!G REPL.:..CEMENT OIL WILL BE SHEARED OVER ALL VE?CO CUSTO:*IBRS ELECTRICAL BILLS; THEREFORE, AL~ !(1DIVIDUAL CUSTO:*!ER WILL NOT SEE TH!S HIGH AN INCREAS:i::.

e 1980 .e KEEPING SURRY II SHUT DOWN n: 1980 JANUARY 1, 1980 THROUGH APRIL 1980 -- 775 MW(e) C.F. 70 PERCENT A. REPL.P,.CE:*1E~T OIL

$20/BARREL = 'v$47 MILLION B1-.RRELS 590,000 X 4 MO~THS X $25/BARREL = 'v$59 MILLION i*lONTH

• $30/BARREL = '\,$70 MILLION B. *INCREASED ELECTRICAL COST (OIL - NUCLEAR COST) 396 x 10 6 KW-HR x 4 MONTHS x $0.0314/KW-HR = '\,$50 MILLION MONTH L@ $25/BARREL C. INCREASE TO HOME m*mER IF ALL REPLACENENT ELECTRICITY FRO!*l OILX t,. = 1,000 KW-HR(e)

HONTH x 4 MONTHS x $0.0314/KW-HR = '\i$126/CUSTO:*!ER r

@ $25/BARREL

• THIS ASSUMES ALL THE ELECTRICITY INTO A HOl*IB IS EITHER FROM A NUCLE.AR ?Lr.NT OR AN OIL-FIRED STATION TO CLEARLY SHQ1;*7 THE COST INCREASE OF KEEPING THE NUCLEAR PLANT SHUT DOViN. IN REALITY, THIS COST INCREASE WILL BE SMEARED OR AVER.;GED IN WITH THE COST OF ALL FOR:*1S OF ENERGY PRODUCTION _AT VEPCO

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OF BUYING ?E?LACE:*U::!*;T OIL WILL BE SMEARED OVER .:..LL VEPCO CUSTO:*SRS ELECTRICAL BILLS; THEREFORE, AN INDIVIDt.i.:..L CUSTOHER WILL NOT SEE THIS HIGH .P-..1.~ INCREASE.

e .e DETAIL DATA OF ELECTRICAL USAGE

l. ELECTRICITY SOLD BY VEPCO A. TOTAL KW-HR(e) SOLD BY VEPCO

= 1\.,37 x 10 9 KH-HR/YR B. KW-HR(e) SOLD BY VEPCO IN NORTHER.."'t VIRGINIA 9

= '\i9 x 10 KW-HR/YR C. PERCENT VEPCO SALES IN NORTHER."'t VIRGINIA= 24 PERCENT

2. RESIDENTir.L us;;.GE A. AVERAGE FOR ENTIRE VEPCO SYSTE:1

= 11,126 KW-HR/YR B. AVER.-;GE FOR 1-iORTHER..'1 VIRGINIA CUSTOHER

= 12,431 l-.'W-HR/YR

-OR-1,036 KW-HR/MONTH

e .e INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF SURRY I A.J.',m II* s PIPING EARTHQU.:;Ks LOAwING PROBLEM "MY N.tl.HE IS DONALD F. LA."'1DERS. I AM SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES (TES) k.'-iD HAVE BEEN EHPLOYED BY TES SINCE NOVEHBER 19.61."

"I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY VEPCO TO TESTIFY ABOUT THE ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES USED IN THE DESIGN OF PIPING FOR SURRY UNITS 1 ~.ND 2 TO W!TEST.!l.:*m HYPOTE::'.:TICAL EARTHQUP..KE LOADING. THE WORK WAS .

PERFORHED BY S&W. II IN SU~1?-L~RY --

"B1'.SED ON !*!Y EXPER!E~;CE IN PIPING DESIGN JI.ND A.~Jl.LYSIS, I FEEL TH;.T THE ::RC ORDER TO SHU'!' DOt*:N SUR...qY 1. J..SD 2 w~.s INAPPROP?.IAT==

• .;1'1D NOT P2QU!RED. THE .i\LGE3Rl\IC sm,1!-lATION USED BY S&W AT TH:3 TIME OF THE DESIGN OF SURRY 1 Ai.~D 2 WAS BEING USED BY OTHERS IN THE INDUSTRY.

• THE REAL WOP.LO. EXPERIENCE OF PI?I~~G SYSTE!-!S IS . THAT THEY CAN WITHSTJ!.1-iD DYNJl.:.UC LOADING WELL BEYO}ID THAT FOR WHICH THEY WERE DESIG~:ED. IT IS THIS EXPERIE~CE 'WlHCH SHOULD rL~VE BEEN FACTORED INTO A.."'1Y DECISIONS CONCER..~ING SHUTDm:N.

e FUEL CO.ST OF ELECTP..I~T,.

• S:!NCE '.I'HESE ARE EXIST!~G PLA.~TS, THE m;r:1 REA!.

VARIABLE .AFFECTI:.G THE COST OF E!.ECTRICITY IS

6. o-- THE FUEL COST -- OTHER COSTS SUCH AS CAPITAL COST ~,o O?ERATiml AND MA."-:AG:E::-~:,T ARE FIX.ED.

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AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER M ON DAY, N Q VE ii! BER 2 6 ; .1 9 7 9

~ QUARTER of a nii!1io:n Canadfa.ns *.;*ere e*::acu- nearly 100 times the *rate of tl:eir LO!l*S!::oldng co-1..'i:i._ t . . . . . . .

.c-. a ea zror:i t:12:r ~cr:::2s two wre:-::s :::2:0 oecau~e oi workers*

a train derailment that re!eased C:eac.iv chlcrin~ ar.d People are naturally more ,r:lli=g to a.ccept the p;:ios1Zene i:!:J.s:::s. The story made iront-pa~e news 1or risks. of a ,;oluntary activity~speci::.ily one iro!!l one Ciay and was quic~:ly forgotten-which illustrates which they receive a direct a:-.d ob*,"io:1s benefit.-

the strange and often perplexing ways in *which so- than the risks of an inrnluD.t2.ry c::e. Eu: a l:.ger -s2.rt ciety respond.5 to the myriad risks of industri:::ilized of t:.e e::q:ilanation Iles i!J. a :!=~=:al -r~:::~ ~:):'!.:°m:::>-:-l.

lhing. Or.e c1:::i on!*: ir:::2:ine hov; bleak the future of Recently it h:is b~gun ro s=e.:1 as t~c..:1n ;::st a:-ou:

nu.ciear nower wcuid ce ii Z-50.vvO peo'Jle i::3.d had to everythL'1g is dangerous to yi:ur !l';lltt-nuc!ear **

be e,;ac!.!a:~d ~*r~:n tb~ vieiriJtv of a nuc!e:1r rea.ccc~r. power, che!!lical wastes, pes-.!c:des (',rh:c::i. Du?~nt Wl:at :iccotrn.t.S fer tte p!J.enomenon tb.::.t produces now advertises as "crcp p:-0,e,:-;.ic:1 cb.e::'..ic::.~"), oc:~-

yawns over cb.~!!lic:u accidents and inst:J.nt headlines pational haz2rds, antibiotics in a::..:.=al ieed, air pollu-about even the b.bt of a nuclear d:!.n;er? It is not just tion and on and on. Jt:.st abot:.~ ever::t:b=g see:::is a reaction to the ghostly qualities of radioactiYity, to cause cancer-what you de, v,hat yc:.i eat (or though that is a pa:t cf it R:i.dioacth*ity can kill you don't eat), where you live. Lri the i:.ca cf such a without your e*;er h::.\i..'1g seen, smelled, heard or felt. systems overload, it is d.iific:.:.lt to be .vezy ra-it. :Cut there :::.re 2\so* 1::1onv chemicals-c:1rbon mon- tional.

oxide, ior e:-:::.:::cie-that :ire colorlc::s. odorless. taste- Are the risks oi ordL'1:J.I1' lh"i:cg really bcreasing, less ::.r,.c. c!c:;.dJ::. :,.;or is the c!liierence simply th:it nu- or .i.re they mereiy beL.'1g .i.dvert:.sed better? The :in.*

clear energy is rel1th*e!y new* and unfamiliar. Com- swers aren't clear. We are rll:l!'J..ng out of er::pty rnerci:?.l nucle:1r power has been :?.round for two dee* space where wastes can be dur.:ped :md f o::-gotten.

ades now, and that is substanti:llly longer thJn, for in* We are :ilso able to .me.1sure tiny a:not:rit.s of chc:::::i*

st::.nce, people have recogriJzed the rel:J.tion.ship be- cals and tr:i.ces of po1Iution th:.t wot:ld have been un-tween chemic:t!s :rnd c:mcer. detect:i.ble or.ly a few ye~i.rs ago. Vle h::.ve ::. slightly Society, in other words, re::icts diif erently to risks better undcrst.:.ncilng of wb.icb. subst:.::ces ::.re lik:!y th::lt a matherr.atici:n would say were equ:illy grave. to be c:i.rcinc~enic, and a much i::::: ;-i:-cved Jppreci:i.-

,C'n::l, fer cx:.r.:':'l~. is ::.!most ccrt::i:-:!v r:;cre cbr:~er- ticn of how cJtJsely various p:irts o! tb.e e:r;:ronme.::t ous t!::.n nuclc:ir newer if the cor..r,ined ri,ks*of min- intcr:ict. In short, we :ire much ~ore :iw:i:-e oi ri.5ks in:::! accidents. bl:ic~: it.:~'.!. air nnlltitio:1. :icid :-:iin ::r:rJ tll:lt have been around ior some time. B:..:t it :n:ty :i.lso C,!rnan-djoxide t~!!'.*Jt.:~ :ire c.:01~~idercci. Bt.:t Jane be true th.:it, because of r.10re pro;,le, mere i;,dustri:i.l Fontl..1, ct .:il., h:ive yet to hold an :.;.nll--<:o:il rally. \Ve activity :ind declining n:i.tur::.l resourcrs. new ci:in-live h:ippily wi~h one technolo~y. the- autcrnobile, gcrs arc no\y being gcncr:::itcd :~tcr t~:.:i ever c,..

tho.t cause's 50,0:.o() deaths ::i ye:ir-:::in ~stronomical iiq- . fore.

• i:re. A.nd of course there is smotin!?. Th\: tic:ith r:i.te A ccntro.l theme of the !DS0s will be cr.~in'.; °,\1~

fl[ r.mokc>rs is r.oi:!:!c th:it of non-:.;mokcrs, rr;z::irct- the discrcp.:mcy between the tcchnic:!.l c:;i:.icity to li:ss of age. Ami sr.:okinc: JI.so incrc:.iscs the d:rn!?cr g~ner:itc, detect :J.!1d mc:isurc r:~ks, :rnd cur rr.!.!ch f ro:n a v:irj,:!tj' o~ other sources: Jsbestos work- more rud:r:1cnt:iry soci:ll .i.bili:i::s to co:.mcl, :iccc:::-

ers who smoke, for cx:unplc, ~ct Jun.~ cancer ot r.11,d:itc :ind r1:i.n:i.ge IJ1:;:n. I ':2

.. e e FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1979

. :u J ...: *.~**.

~

i(ennedy on* Rnergy- ~Vrong

~ EN. ED'\'VARD KE:-i:.'EDY'S energy policy invites there are now several million more cars on the road u attention. He's in favor of a mor:itoriurn on build- than a year ago, drhing and gasoline co~u:nption are L11grnore nuclear re.actors (cheers from the* audience). both signific:mtly below last year's le\*e!.s.

He's in favor o! re'ducint? A..'!lerican denendence on Consumption responds to price, not to automobile tc.~:?.n c:1 1sc:u:.ereci ao::,1ause1. He's in farer of con- efficiency. The ;n.:rpose of pushing up efficiency is to

~cfcontro!s on oil p*rices 1loud cheering!. But how keep people from being hurt as g~oline gets more

-co \*ou !it these various posi:ions to~ether? (Silence.) expensive. If you were driving the typical .~"'"!l.eric:m I :**Any prolon~ed O'.l!:!ear moratorium is ~oin!? to ~ car in 19i,3. getting about 13 miles to the gallon, you

£ dri-;e uo c:l ir::::ort.s. (Jr:.e .,.*ay to hoici tnem aown- t went a mile on three cents' wor:h of g.::.s. If you're the only way mat has act1.ially and demonstrably getting the same mileage today, you're payin 6 more wor1;ed-i..s to let orices rise. But lhe nuroose of con- than seven cents a mile. But if you're driving a typi*

trols is to keep prices dov,n. *

• cal new American car (2nd d:iving it carefully),

. Sen. Kennedy would prob::.bly ans**,1,-:r by citing the you're getting alor:g for about a nickel a :mile. A..>id if legi.slltion that he intrcduced last July for federal you switched to a subcompact that can go 35 miles on grants and lo:ans to encourage conservation. That's on a gallon, you are p:.:,ing the same three cents that the right tr~ck. But h1::-e we cc:-r.e to ,m uncor:;forta- you did in 1973.

ble fact. Co:1serv2tion ccern't orcduce much until Grecater efiiciency-that is. conser*:ation-holc!s p:-ices st.'.lrt upward. . down the cost of drh*ing despite a rising price of fuel.

. i .8.e expcric:ice wHh au\o!nobile fuel efficiency is a That also bolds down the amount of gasoline that the

• good ex~r.1p!e. The efficiency of American cars bas country uses, in turn holcJng down in:pom. But the been rising ste2.dily to r.-ieet the standards that Con- past six years' experience demonstrates iorcefully eress wisely imposed L'1 lS75.-But when g~oline prices that it works only as prices rise.

re.main const.:.nt, r:r.ore efficient cars only make it Sen. Kennedv is alto2ether rie:ht in S3.\*ing that the cbe2per to drh*e-and people react by drivin? more. country has to *cut its cfcDender.ce 0!1 foreit'n oil. The

~ Over the p.st decade there h:ise been two tL'11es, and best and fairest w:1y to co it is to impose a smf t:.x on only two, when the consum;ition of gasoiine in this gasoline and use the re\*enues to cut other t:1.xes. I..b.:!l.. i country dropped. Toe first was in 197-!. when the price ~eturns the money to America::s r:1t~er t!"'.:n ~_endin~ t shot UtJ';,ard in the oil crisis. Fer the next four ye:irs 1t or t to n~*on:~ 11.-:e. rr.r ex:1mp1e, tne r,rc~em 1rnm:m the price rose slowly. In re~ terms-adjusted ior ini!a-

• government. But the only presidential c:ind~d:ne tion-it ~ctu.:illy dec!.ined a lit~!e. Then c:i.rne the second with the cour:1.gc to suggest such a thing is a Republi*

• oil crisis and ~other big jl.!mp in the price. Althougb. c:m, R~p. John B. A..."l.derson of lllinois*

. * ..* i .

Ia.I

THURS D AY, NO VE MB ER 8 , l 9 7 9

• .. a TT. .

u_ranzum, oa,/ *Qzl- *., Wn vv nzcn.

• 1?

nr, F.E O'CTLOOK FOR :-..lJCLE.!..R power is, post- Fortum.tely, in most of the country, the need for Jl.. Kemeny, somber at best. But burning coal new generating pl.:ints is not i.1:nneci::.te. To.ere is ~e throws toxic gases into the atmosphere and, while -although not unlimited time-for reilection. It is t:.e techno!ogy can lower the risks to heaith, it c::mnot en- result, quite simp!y, of rising prices for pov,er. Before tir!?h* e!:::::ri::te t~o?~. Xatur2I gas is ne~ded for t~e first oil er.sis, sL"\ ye~s ago, con.sl.!Ir.pti:m of e!ectric higher uses than fi:~g u:ili,y boilers. As for oil, you power in th:.s coumry was ri..sL1g 7 percent a year-a have only to follow e*,e:ts in Iran to percei,;e that lt phencmenal rate at which the tau! 102.d doubles every has become the le:i.st cer::1in of all sources of energy. 10 yem-s. At that pace. utilities were under f erociot:.S Uranium, coal, gas r:.:.d oil: the country's four prin* pre.=sure to keep building plants and to ke-ep bu.ild.i::g cip:il ways of ger.eratir.~ e!ectricity each lies under a them constantly bigger.

shade,,,.. E~ch is. fo7 i~s 0,*.-:i !"!' ... ~<JT".;, d~n,:erm.!s. un- But in the past severcl years, the p~ttern b!S C~it::.i-r. er *:r.::*.-"1::;.~ riow coes the coumry avoid sharply changed. The lead is curremly rising less bein~ le!t i:: the a::.r;,*: ths.n 4 percent a year-hardly more than hli the The fim ~!"uth !S that there is no e!1tir;?]\' s:fo w:iv to p:e-19i3 rate. Tnat's why some companies hare, te:::-

eener~:~ r*:!:~~~~(*~~,* ...l..n:: 1a:gc po,.i,er s::tt1ori, re~ard- porarily, excess capacity. It's also wily a let of co::r;::i.-

l~s o." i':s t::-c.nnc!o,:;y, c:: ..i::~ \':1rh it sc::e de2ree of nias h:n*e cancelled some of their cons!ruct!on pl~.

d~mn,;:e to :::e rm*i:-c:-:.!'::?:1: ::.r:d !,Hne e!cmem ct r:sk For Dure!v econo::nic and financial re-2.Scns. ~::.lzs cf to r,:..:bl:c r:'"":::.lth. l(.s net a r.:~:::er oUL":.din~ a s:ue !:CiU* nuclear reactors had dropped off st:?rp!y *e\*en be-tjon-b.:t o: :ir.din~ the s:i.f es. a::!lo;i~ se\*eral choices. fore tbe Three 1Iile Island accident. Ctili,ies are now The secc:.d truth is that the choices have to be being pushed toward building smaller piant...o:-e::.sier m2de. The ide:i of at least a conditional moratc:-ium to locate and easier to manage sa.f ely.

on new rc::ctors see:::s to be gaining momentum in Low rates of increise in consumption ~ean e::.sier Con£!ress. F>:t if \*nu f:/'\:l't !i::e nu~l'?::r now;:,r. wh::t choices of power sources. A wise r1.:bl:c r.o!:c*: :er kir.ct- of r-:,*::,.,, r.n *;r.,1 \::*:-~*! The mo~t ,ffa1iabie aiter- po,.;*er ,.vi!l ir~~L:t on.a b:ll:nce ~:7°;.071~ f..:!:~~*:*:::. ::!:":C:5 nat1\"e 1s c,;::u-n*;t :'.,::*::-" :5 :1 cie:!th r:ite ?5soci::tP-d of ::c\.!rccs. ~*.-01c.ing tor:il re1i:mce on ::.~y one of

,,:jth t\.,-, !*r.:,*:,* II~-! r*r" er-:::. *t:1:n is a thou~ilt IOr Con- them. bUL wise public policy will al~o recogr1i::e tb.~t gress aLJd it.s consrnuem5 to !:e;,n in mind during the conservation. to hold down consumption, reduces the comin::: c!eb::tes on nuc!e~r r~::::ui:::icn. risk from all of them.

I5

AN INDEPENDE;.';T NEWSPAPER Uva. Ji. .I TTn' u.v l A TRULY C~EXPECTED result came out of the Kemeny Co=i~i.ssion's study of Th.re~ ::rue Is-

~ssigned and did it well. It .v,isely resisted strong pressures to reach a judgment on *whether commer-land. A groun th~t set out to i:lvesti~ate a technoiogy cial nuclear power should be encouraged or ter:rJ~

end'd up t:tii~iil.Z about peo~ie. Ille Kemeny report nated, rightly re:ognizL""lg that tr.is, as a much reached two prir:c:p1l conclusions. neither of which bro:idcr question in..-olving economi:, political, en-concerned rr.achL11c design, con:municatio~s net- ergy and environ.mental concerns. c:1;,. only be de-works, backup systems or any of the ether trappings cided as a matter cf DUblic po!icv. Ur.1t~e m~ny prer!-

o! nuclear tech::oiogy. In the commission's ov,-n ous pres1denti::.i commissions, this one held itself to-

.words, "It becar.:.e cle:i.r th:it the !'..1;:d1.menU! prob- gether and preserved a remark:i.ble .de;;ree oi u=a-lems are neoci--=-r~1:::.tea proui;:ms." wJry to the end. Its fin~l report couid serve as a The* concil!sio:-:. stressed in tae report is that the at- model o! the governr:1ent report-writer's art: it is con-titudes of the ~uclear Regulatory Co::imission and o! cise, clearly ,1r*ritten, free of double t:.lk or jargon ~nd the nuclear ind*1stry must undergo profound and eminentiy readable.

fundamental change. Toe ?,"RC retains too much of liniort:n:intely, the same cannot be said for its rn:l.in

.. the old promotional philosophy" of the Atomic En- recommendation: that the way to sol\'e the many ergy Comr:1i:::sion it replaced. and the nuclear in- problems the Kemeny study found in the ?\'uclcar dustry has shown itself in too m:my c:i.ses to be lax, Regulatory Co~:.:is5:cn is to dlsmaml-3 that :i.ge::i:::

poorly rnana;E-d ar..d not up to the demands of run- and re-create it with a single administrator inside the ning nucle1r power plants. executive branch. \"Vhile no one c:m C.1:ny the p:ir:1ly-The other princ!p:il conclusion gre*.i.* out of a second* sis that now grips the ~RC, the Keme:iy report i:i.ilcd by-second ar.alysis o! the Three ~lile Island accident, to ma~=e a convincing c:ise th:n the :r,rrc*s problems which showed th:lt the eauio!;lent worked auite weil could net be rcsol,*ed within its existing orgl:iization, but the opcrttors c:.td not. Ot the m:my !actors that thereby preserving the substantial :id*::mt:i.ges of COj*

caused tb.e o;:er:i.tor errors, the com.T.i.'5ion sin:;lcd tinuity, independent st:itus as a regul":ltory body :i.nd out one: O\'er tl.J.e years there has be-en an al::iost tot.11 di\*ersity o! \icws and backgrounos pro\'ided by a preoccupation \\ith equipment =i.nd a corresponding !ive-member commission.

failure to appreci:ne the role o! the human being in All in all. the Ki:~cny rc!Jort he-Idun a veno"* U~:it the nuclear system. Attention was p2.id to large for nucle:1r newer. lt Joo:,ed at th~ fact.3 *,,;ithout b::.1s.

break failures o! equipment that would b.:ippen \'ery and to it.~ own su,:,ris~ iounti. en11ir.t:1~m tit:it wtirk(*ci

!a.st and have dis2.strous consequences. T:r1ese acci- better th:i.n expected and a 11~1m::n s\*:-tc;:1 tl::;t dents could not be affected by rc:ictor cper:itors. How- worked r:mch. ~1.1ch w,lrse. lium:rn faiiin;s t:.1:-:1cJ ever, the comm:.ssicn found the much grcatt::r prob:i- up "wherever we 100,-t.:ci. but none of th('m could bl.lity o! "sr.~all brc:ik" equipment failures. which not be corrected if the ri:::;ht at~itcc.!e preniied would happen much more slowly :ind which could be amoni:: these who design. builc!. opcr::,.te :rnd rc£:ul:1.tc in!lucnccd by operator at.:tion. to pose the greater nucle:ir reactors. The needed ch:m~cs :ire in most d:i.ngcr. Bcc:i~se thcse.r£:~ponsiblc ior nuclear safety c:iscs o"bviou:; :ind rc::,.sor.:1bly easy to c::irry out. T:ic

• • "r0"""

had been "hypnotizt'd by equiri::1ent," they ignorcJ n~t'*(n" U ~I ~

1** tr~1*n,,-

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, ..._,~** l'*"~'O"<:

• • ,-1. , .. ,..,

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the hum:rn f:tt.:t..ir. and Three :,rnc ls!Jnd merely ii* ample. is J m:l)O!" ii:it!ill::!-St:rr*I~* ll::., 1, \\ ,*it \\ n::::1 lustr.'.ited the co::sc:qut.:'nc.:cs. thli C':JpaciI\" Of (:~;r ~U_t*1,*11.* t11 t*,*u, :* .. ' . *, lt~L l:.=.: rt...~

Dcf0re the dc*tJJ:e begins on th~ rrport"s +4 recom- pun 1s try;:1~ to ~:v. l:i uii.: -.\ l*,'..i.:, ul unc co:-ni:::s-mcnd::,.tions. it ~houid I.Jc 5;ii;.! th:it in th~ ~hart tim~ :il- sioncr. is to c:ill out to the system. :is lut.:dl:.; :is it c:m.

lottcd tu it tl!c Kc:~lcny Commls:i10n diJ the j0b it w:is "Sh:ipe up, sh:ip~ up. sh:ipe up."

lltl;VYrnhTirL1ID~tar Founded iD JS.Si l.._j MlJRRA Y J. GART. Edi:or

• • . *, '11,'U.!JA.1,1 P. loldl.WAL'(, ~pr,ry Ullor EDWtN l.t. YOOER JR.. UiroruJ Pa,~ Wror

• • t ,.***

......... THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1979

'.I'he Kemeny Commission's most importnnt in its bureaucratic ranks from the_ old d.'.?ys w:-.e:-i decision mny have been a negative one - the its predecessor agency. the Atomic Energy Com-decisior. nQt to c:ill for n l"!"lorntorium on the~ mission. was a promoter oi nuclear energy.

stn:ctrnn Di nucle~r riower ;ii:ints. Six members The ;\RC, proposes the commission, should be-of the commission - set up six months a~o by come a line executiv~ agency, responsi,;e to President Carter to in':es~ignte the Three ~!ile Ts- . presidential authority. There would be adr::::::s-land .iccident - wanted a moratorium. But they trati*;e advantages in that. Em there \\*0:1ld :::$0 failed to recruit a se\*enth vote. be the h.iznrd of nolitical o::i~:rl,c~:';:: o: tjc :;::-

It \\'.JS a close call. bllt r.one of the Commis- cl c:a :- r,o *,!:er ind ~~str~; t!!! Ger ~ !: */ *.: *:-i:::Z": ::t:! :-e sion's findir:.is e\*en S'.:££':?Sts .i d<!n2erous :lnw or:n0:1e::t 0; ::1.uciear nov.*e:- !!1 :te ~:=.::-..::= ~C:.:'3-;.

in the C!~r~:::it dc.~*1~n or ::i::.:lr:n!9 r.o*.::e~ :.'i:1nts.  ! te hem::ny Corum1:ss1on h~s not o!:.:rca L"1e unless 1t 1s tl1e co~ft:Si~~ urr~I~:i2:ru~~r nr nation a bll-blown nuclear po*,*:er pol:cy: nc:ie control-rC'*:~ ~oni:e,r~:-:2 c~*. *:ccs. f\at11er. says was Q.Sked for. Ultimately, the future of nucle.:lr the com::;i1s::;1on. " ..l..s :r:-:: e*::Gence c1ccumu!ated. power poses a political choice in the bro::c;st it become cle:ir th.it ~r,e :u:1d.:iri1entai urob:~2s sense. Presidential commissions are ill-cui::tied nre nconle-re!t!ted n:--cbl-=::-.s and ~ot ecu1n!:1e:1t to rr:.:.}~e such choices. * **

\ /e re:-nni~ nersnnded tr.~t n~!<:'le~~ ~!ri'.t:~~ ~~:,t 1

nroble.ns ... I~ is tt::mpt:ng to bl:ime machines when peopie err. But no construction mora- on::n~e fo;- :he 1ore~et:~i:'it fl!:~~:-::-:-~~~:!*::*~!

torium would solve "vecvle" uroblerns. com:-o::ent ci tte r::::tjon*s e~erT*: ~r':'-::-::::: 3'."!

What, then. are these "people-related prob- lon:: ~~ ~:-;: h:;::~:--ds can he !1:--:-:!:e-:. r: :l:~t ~s :::.so lems"? the co,.-.*ict1on oi ?resident CJr~er ~::-.c ConG~ss, One, s.ivs the corr.:nission. is that those who after cn:eful exar:iination of the Ke::::r1i* re:10:-t.

routinel:,; operate nucle.ir power pl:mts are it \Vill m.:ike no se::.se to s1;;2ther :::e *nl!~'.e::r undertrnined - in p.:in because trnini:-ig stand* power i:1-.lustr,; in o\*er~re2.:i:::10~ - wh1c:1 :s ards are set by plant operntors. not by a pubiic not to be cor:!t!sed with v:1.se :me t!fic:er.t r;;.;:~1-agency. The operntors of rrncle:!r plants ou;ht be lation. It wni!\d be ot!d to :et "e::,:-:-:*: :::('c-:1:::'.'*

viewed, lite air tr.:iffic controllers. as people in whose competence ar.d standards the public h.:is nt:c:*:~;- r,~~.::~r. *rne mn1n 1:1sult :o I1e:ti~Z1 a::d n large interest. In cn!!ir.g attention to that prob- so.let':.::: Th,ce .\fiie Is1.:ind. sa*:s the c:imrn!s~icn.

lem, the Kemeny Commission is entirely right. was *.. mentnl stress." It f:n2:- r.o '-irl":,d l*:-:,e agninst nucle~r no*,t_*er. ho,. :c:~:cr. ~~*;r ~!~'.* ::*;1 ..

1

. A second "people-related problem." according dcnce !~::t s:i:cl*\ . n:nr>l(!r::~ ::;--e !:*7"t:::=:**. :t~~:,. .

to the co::u::1ssion. is th.:it no one is systemati- lntied. one 01 the !\.l?!:l.:ny pn:1t:: s cx;*;::-ts.

c.:illy collecting nnd learning from the !es.sons of Prof. Thomns Pigford of the dcr:inr:;.ent of n!.!-

minor nuclear incidents. Three !\li!e Island cle:ir engi:1ecring at Berkeley, ch0se to renf:i::-:-:1 might h.ive been pre\'ented. or at any rate mini- without equivoc.:tion thnt "nothing lenrncd mized, if plant operntors hnJ been fully cogni- from this invcstig:.ition su~gcsts th.::t :l1e :rnclc:.:-

zant of the d~veloping probl::!m. But someone. it rower option should be cun:iiled or Jb~:..don::J seems. e\*en shut dov::1 t:-ie emergency core cool- as .:i result of th~ T:-.1i-:2 ..icci<lent."

ir."0 svster:1.

, The con:::~ission blames such A profe:ssor of r.uclc.:ir engineerin; is ~::s~1:-:-.ed blt:aderin; on a "mir.cset," a complacent as- to h.ive a \*cstl?d interest in his o,*:n s::b~,::c: . .!!:.d sumption tl1at the technology is so s.:ik. so well his co:1viction :my he discoun,cc.1 nccu:-u:::;::!y.

dcfcnc.kJ ir; depth, tbt ln::11:rn error tenticd to Still. ~1!1..'rt* !s snmcthin~! tn 1,1..* "~:1i,! fl ~::~n*.::!:::: 1 :"

be discountt:d. TllJt m1ml:iet 111.:t:ds ch:rn~ing. t II e s u f"\ * *** c t. l ' r 1:::; 1J e II t C ~1 rt 1: r a z, 1.1 C,. ; :1.: :* l.':,; .:5

• The commission's t!1ircJ m~jor "peopk-rc!Jtcd" stiou;u ::, 11.:ast hc:1r Pro:c*ssor Pi~tor;.!'s v:l*ws in problc:n is the strnct;m.' of tlie ~1:ck~1r RL*~nl,1- m1m! as tlli.:y silt tllc t:o::1m1ss1on*s i111J::~:_:-; fer tory Con::n:ss10n. l:s "rnlkg1:il" hah1!s :~t:'llLT,ite mcJsnrl.'S to str1:n~tlll..'ll thL' s;1kty fL'Con.l uf ti..:

too litth: ka.!1.:rs!i1p, i.:spi.:L*i,illy in a crisis. Thi.: nudl.1'::r :1ow1..*r inJustry. [\"t.'ll n!tt:r T!1:-ec :-.1::c commission n.:commi.:1H.ls n "rt:struct*unn~" of lsl,1nc.l, t!i,11 rcc:on.l i.s not :;11 b:1d :is to w:irr:-i::t the !\HC to q111ckL'l1 tkc1sion-m:i!-:in~. :lllJ to cont*!11s:n::s :11 v;iri:mcc witl! the thr*.:;;: o~ t;:~

cltminat't! th<.! \'<.:!itibi.:s of boosterism tl!.it linger comm1:-.s10::*s rcp*Jrt.

!1

In addition. the EPA. Ar~onne Na-tion:il LaboratOl"\'. O:ik Rid!'.!e N:llinnal

~boratorv, 8:?ttelle P:icii:c \'orthw,:,.::t Llbor:non*. nri\*:netv ow;:cd technic:11 consuaim: co~n:?nies and numerous n:ition:il :md i=-:t:::-n:nional scje:;;P'ic- or-gani::at:or:.s b:ive rnoce!s oi raci:o::ictiv-ity movement ;ind dcs::i~e that yield re-sults consistent with the ?'\"RC cal~ula-tions.

FRA2,ri: J. CO?\GEL, Le,sdtt, P~:etO,::a! I.:::;:i..:; Sect!o:i,

,** .. ,. a.e. ...i..:.e:, eoc.:ius1.o:i.

Washington "Are nuclear oiants unsafe?" asks Dick Brukenfe!d:Tl::.is is a nonsensical cuestion becat:se tbere is oi::.Jy one an*

s,ver. Oi course nucle::ir. plants arc un-safe: nuclear energy h;i.s cert:i.in risks ....

a.,d

• health costs. :cs ciO(- e*,*s:rv ot!:ler I am shocked tbt T.:e Pest wouk

~omce oi er:ers::.,.*. ir:::,uc;;:~ s.::i:.r . .Even publlih sucb. 2:1 i,rt>~::c:::ir,;-: 2r:ic:e.

e:-ier2*.* co~~er*,-~!1*J:1 c2.:1 i:~ 1.!-.SJie; the Strontium ~'J is a prcci.c: ot :c:.:C!"?:r ne*.v r.::o*.:,n~i.;:ed c:i.rs, re: cx~rr:pie, pro-  !~ion \\ith :i i!1l:"-liie c: ~ years a::.d t:: ..

vide less urotecticn i.'1 collisions tnan. : been found L11 rivers :1.ll ore: t~e wc:-:i: i~

did th:>.. - 01~ . . _ bi'='

• -:, c"-s _,.,..,,,,J. ;,.. view of *:

.,,1,

• PI~;,.,1,. ~

v.idely var:,t~ ccncent:-:t:-:::s. It is c:-.

our petrole~m r-rcbiems, this added _ tainly evaporated i..::l n:::!e:?.: e::-::p!:::~:.-

riSk is to be accept:>d. and rele~ed 2s p::.rtiC:es. b co::.,::..::

The ccr:-ect question .to ask of nu- since it is a solic. it i.5 e:-.7-:C:::d to s!.:ay ::*

clz~r energy is whe:h:>r its ri::ks are so a reactor uille:.s there is an accic;:;r:.~.

~!"eJt as to be i:::~~*.:r:; ::ie. , .-ne:i ccm- 1 orJy gases "l~k" to the~-

p:.rca ,*:nb. tl:e r:.::::s of the a1tern:i.tive Dick Brt:ker.feld cii£C!.!SSes C!:ii!r.S !:-

er:.ergy sources. Rl:ht nr,w we're ~':t- t!le cont:2.ry bt:t f::.!!5 :, r-r-::;t C'.!t ::- _.,:**

t!!;~ ~ \*cry ~1n*-* ~:-::i::-:~:~. i!1 lr~~. of t:-:a

!"~~-:-:s ~::~c~::2~~~ \~:!!:1 r::i. i:: ::u~:eJr en*

• jn::(8lns1stenc*,a. *,*,*ny ~=-~  ::.t~or=::::.

high leve!s ic'i.1~d ~O mil~s iror:i 2. re:':

er:,.' r~:11t,; r::::-:!::*r !:1:!n ce~e~a.1ng on tor to be attributed tc ~:e re1c:cr; :;-::*

cii contrc:.l~d by it.:::aucs? low ones ne1rby dis::m::d ~s e*:~de::c=.

....;.c:,: ~CK.-\y th:it little or none was e-r:-,:ued? E. :

Mr. Brukenfeld su:;;;em, ,te s::-0::ti:.1::*

is e!!lined ccnti:lu*ot:sl\". it *::o*..::c: ::::*:.

I ~t::t o!J;,;d *to one ol the chi~s l~r!:e conc~~t~:tir.:-:.s * ,:-:* ~:-:~ :5:: ....:

rr!ide h1,,,* D!~~: E~~!~7e!"'fe 1'4 i!' r,;<: ~

S!,01:.!lt.!C'l t:~ 1r::!l!*!i:e ~-J i::::*;;::._*,1*r-:'

• on **f~.llcut" tre::n nuc:e:1r power pi:.:it.5. - ,viii h.J:;~ t:--::: :::::~ c::*:*::-.!~:t r:*:,::-*: :*

He- c!:ii'.::ed th:it .. When told of .rJ~h 5tror.t!l!~ L t *1~-: r:-;:~-i.=5 oi s:ror:tit.:::: ~-

1 stromi:.:rn S-0 l~\*e!s being mo::i..itored *in to b3 are coi:.sis,en: wi:!:: :a!lct:t f,c::-.

milk a:id fish fro~ the :,re:: ne:ir Ll-ie old nuclear expio~ions :i.::d r.ot with r:.:.:-

three Ococee rc:;.ctar-s b South ~olina, clear power pl:,.m e::i:.;:or.s. E::1c.:

another EPA r:ic.1:i.ticn official re- ' power st:i.ticn issues det:ui::d re~cr~ 0'.

sDc-nd~d th:il the '.::..').mlllirem Ii.nut ao- , air :.nd w:,.ter rclc:,.~?;: t::.::;e rE'!'=~~,~

plies to 'pl:i!"'.nect tiisch:m:cs of r:idio:ic- sho,t..* nei:?1i~?~!e stro~!!~.:~~ ~-, r*.~!.'\:c:..:..:

tivc m:itcri:lis.' Ii do..."S r.ot apply, be s.1id,  :--1r. Bruk~nrc:d r;:~k,:.j s~r~Jus ct::.:~,~:.:

'to b:ick~round or fallout r:!cii:1.tion in the that the s:.iety c:,.!ci..:!:,.t:':\,..s :i:e t:~.:i.i :~,

~::ih,:-:-:~o,i~s ::i!]:;U::::iior 1:'!::ve~ities to viciJijty cf r. 1Jc!e:i.r power plants.' .. part on !:mlty d:ita. Th:.s needs c!e!.:!il~*!:

de!':'":!:!::~ t:--.~ l;~r:~s1~r of r:n:a:.c:tiv1ty I w:is the ::~!' . \ r:,r.::itin:, affiC'i~I rr,.. jUSi.i.ficJt~o:i :md rc;!*rre::c~. !'!E'!!h~:- c:

in t:-.*) e:n-J,('7'."."'.".*::::.. r'he C.S. i:.nnron- frr:-r-~~ y-, ;i~lr,"'). ~='"{! I ::.1~_.;t ~~*: n:~r '.1r Eri:~r!"!(!*\r1 ,,:;:;s t:*"H. :: .3!l ~i:-'(!,,.:~!fl ;!1 which :ire p,o\i.:!*~d. :-;or ~oes t~e ;i.c:~:~:i-mcr::~t }*'!"P~1~*.:::::-:1 .-\~::ncv :nd r;::1:1v tion seem rele\'ant to :::c- i:,sct:::.:lcn of::-

inc;, ...~""11 ~*.,-;-;; 1~* 1.*t.? pcr1orn1cd t~c1r 1 sum:r.lri:in~ my r~~pon.:=e Lo an 1:1qu1ry tribu:ion of s:.c::t,:i::: ~*J to 1:.:; sou.re::-.:.:_

• .n'"' **s*~.:

O ,,. .. *)l::~~~n - n~c..,,..,".~ ~rout1d

... ,1..: ****** 1o.- ~-*-*-**- -

• b? Cr:11!'.? Swic:!._ of the i::n-.-ironmc:ll:il is 0r.!'.* i"'.:*l:i::::-;-;~,:n~v.

opcr::.tin~ r.l!~i~~r fJC!lltit!$. K,...,~r' rif Policy l:::mtu!e i:i \\":i:;hington. D.C .. re- ~l.:. E:t::-:~:1~~!.i :T:::y h::.°'*e u:i ;::r:-t the~r stt:d~~ st::*:,:*5:~ !~:.t t~H:i r,: . *tlit.l r,:i:-tiir.::; r:ic::i.tion lc*,els rc>poncd io the r.1n;e of :..:nccrumty J~c*:.:t itze !r;i::1ct i:':

l~i7 O~ur:r*e ;'>;ui.:h~:ir ~iJ::on lt:ctiolu\.!i- nuclL p~:.r.~ on h~!:':J.:", C(:!r~::s**;~

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In f:;ct, cva!-.::!ce to ,:~:c ::1cic:ite~ tnJt c:il Enviror.:ncnt:d ~,1onitoring ltc*port. dC';"\'i nn~ do ~~-.: ~:"":*f,*.,:_ .... -~~ ~~~'"' t:~. *.

• the r\HC ~O<.!*~*!..S r***~: 1 *::~tv OVt.. re:::~im:?te  :.!y rL'~ponsc to .'.lr. S11 ;l'!(s cl:i im th:i t lhc c!osc to im.:J*,i..:~.:;. tl:t? btkr rc>non indic:itcd '"hinh J.,\*rlc; o! cn*:!rl~~:.;*,.~r.~:i:-r:~ 1?::t:("l:t . rf\*~**!1 1:,,:

1 1 l~!CH ..\!~D \T,1LS0::.

Ocnr:,,,~ \l:c!,**::r :-i;,:1nn w:1 ~ !11.,t l11s r-:,,,,!~,\.C.r c: r:-.~"*1** ..

~rt7 L~j !:~~:er.:,~~ JJ'::l~!")" C"c::!.,.~.

cl;ll:n \\':: ... i:!!-L" :tt1tt v;.:1:,; P:?:--t"*ll t'n :!n 11n*

prop,*r ::?:::*. -:~ 11; 11:,* rl':,:*~t. u:ily :C.l'l'* C1mbridge, ~fass.

ondanly t.:al l r,*: ,*r to tu!! sc:opc of

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