Text

VEPCO North Anna Power Station & Surry Power Station Compliance W/10CFR50.49(b)(2)
	ML18130A395
Person / Time
Site:	Surry, North Anna, 05000000
Issue date:	11/10/1983
From:	Ganguly G, Gradin L, Leone R; NUCLEAR POWER SERVICES, INC.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML18130A396	List: ML18130A395; ML18141A252;
References
	NUDOCS 8312060245
	Download: ML18130A395 (128)
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{{#Wiki_filter:i. VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND., VntGINIA 23261 W. L. STBWAKT V:a:CB P2B8JDB1'T Ncc:a:.B.Ut OPBKATroJre Mr. Harold M. Denton~ Director December 1, 1983 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Lic~nsing U.S. Nu~lear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. c4 20555 Serial No. 668A PSE/PEC:jp Docket Nos.: 50.-280 50.-281 50-338 50-339 License Nos.: DPR-32 DPR-37 NPF-4 UPF-7 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT SURRY AND NORTH ANNA POWER STATIONS !. Gentlemen: I. As referenced in our letters dated May 20, 1983, Serial No. 085F for Surry Power Station and Serial No. llOD for North Anna Power Station, enclosed is Vepco*s response to 10 CFR50.49(b)(2). Enclosed are forty (40) copies of an initial report stating with reasonable assurance that no equipment falls into the 10CFR 50.49(b) (2) category at either. Surry or North Anna Power Stations. This report was prepared by an independent consultant, Nuclear Power Services. Any corrective actions required to qualify or replace equipment identified (o~ compliance will be completed on a schedule consistent with the requirements of

10CFR 50.49, paragraph (g).

In addition, all subsequent report findings will be made available to the NRC. Attachments fJ tc"f y:urs, .L~~ W. L. Stewart ,-- 03120602450~5a5gi0 PDR ADOC~ PDR p

a VIRGINIA ELEcrBIC AND POWER COMPANY TO Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation Page Two cc:

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, w/attachments Regional Administrator Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing Mr. James R. Miller, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing Mr. D. J. Burke, w/attachments NRC Resident Inspector Surry Power Station Mr. J. Don Neighbors, w/attachments NRC Project Manager - Surry Operating Reactors Branch No. Mailstop 438 7920 Norfolk Avenue USNRC Bethesda, Maryland 20014 Mr. M. B. Shymlock, w/attachments NRC Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station Mr. Leon B. Engle, w/attachments NRC Project Manager - North Anna Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Mails top 428 7920 Norfolk Avenue USNRC Bethesda, M~ryland 20014

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY NORTH ANNA POWER STATION & SURRY POWER STATION COMPLIANCE WITH 10CFR50.49(b) (2) Prepared by: Nuclear Power Services Secaucus, New Jersey 07094 Lawrence P. Grad in Project Manager Gobin Ganguly Project* Engineer Richard Leone Lead Engineer Prepared On Behalf Of: VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY Paul Conner VEPCO Task Leader Responsible for Project Coordination Release Date: November 1 O, 1983

la --~ ~ I&:; ce ABSTRACT Nuclear Power Services, Inc. has completed an initial and independent evaluation of the Virginia Electric and Power Company's (VEPCO) North Anna and Surry Power Station's safety-related electrical systems in re-sponse to 10CFR50.49(b)(2). Nuclear Power Services' (NPS) findings, based on data so far studied, indicates with reasonable assurance* that there is no "nonsafety electrical equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishmeht of safety functions specified in subparagraphs (i) through (iii) of paragraph (b) (1) of this section by safety-related equipment". Included herein is a poten-tial list of nonsafety electrical loads which are potentially located in harsh environments and which share a common safety system power source with safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown or accident mitigation. The review described in this report is continuing so as to provide complete assurance that each of the above power station's nonsafety electrical loads are in conformance with '(b)(2)'. Should any nonsafety loads be found, which falls in the category of '(b) (2)', a method to upgrade that particular nonsafety equipment wil I be applied or a design modification implemented, the "master safety-related equipment list" revised, and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission notified. This effort will be implemented and completed prior to the time limitation specified in 10CFR50.49(g), ie., 11 *** by the end of the second refueling outage after March 31, 1982 or by March 31, 1985, whichever is earlier." ii

i Title Title Abstract TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents List of Figures List of* Tables PART. I EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Purpose 11 Summary and Conclusions 111 Brief Synopsis of Systematic Approach IV Definition of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment PART II DETAILED DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION . V Background for Report Submittal VI Scope VI I Generic Review Process VI 11 Specific Review Methodology ii iii iiii ii iii 1

1.

3 3 4 4 5 6 IX General. Design Practice to Determine Significance 1 O of Impacts of Nonsafety Loads on Safety-related* Systems iii

i X TABLE OF CONTENTS

(con 1t)

General Auxiliary System Protection and Coordi'nation Criteria A. Design Objectives and General Characteristics of Proper Power System Design, Protection and Control 11 11 B. AC and DC Distribution System Protection .1 s and Coordination Criteria XI Design Features A. Description of. Class IE A. C. Power Distribution System for North Anna and Surry Power Station. B. Design Description of North Anna and Surry. Power Stations Safety-Related Electrical Power Distribution Systems

1.

North Anna Power Station Safety-Related Electrical Power Distribution System Description a), General Description b) 4160 V Auxiliary System

c)
480 V ~uxiliary System d) 120/240 VAC Power Distribution Syst~m e) 120 VAC Vital A.C. Power.

Distribution System f) 125 VDC Direct Current Pow-er* Distribution* System. iii ( 2) 17 17 18 18 19 21 22 22 24

.~ ** TAB LE OF CONTENTS (can't) XI Design Features (can't)

2.

Surry Power Station Safety-Related Electrical Power Distribution System Description a) General Description b) 4160 V Auxiliary System c) 480 V Auxiliary System d) 120/240 VAC Power Distribution System e) 120 VAC Vital A.C. Power Distribution System f) 125 VDC Direct Current Power Distribution System XI I Design Evaluation A. Introduction 8, North Anna Power Station

1.

4160 V Auxiliary System

2.

480 V Auxiliary System* i, 480 V Switchgear Susses ii, 480 V Motor Control Centers (MCC's) iii ( 3) 26 27 28 29 29 31 32 32 33 33 33 33 34

/---......) XII XIII XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS (can't) Design Evaluation (can't)

3.

120 VAC Vital Bus Distribution

4.

125 VDC Distribution System

c.

Surry Power Station

1.

4160 V Auxi I ia ry System

2.

480 V Auxiliary System

i.

480 V Switchgear Bu?ses System ii. 480 V Motor Control Centers (MCC 1s)

3.

J 20 VAC Vital Bus Distribution System

4.

1,25 VDC Distribution System D. Additional Assurance Documentation Reviewed List of Figures I,, XV* List of Tables iii ( 4) 38 39 40 40 41 41 42 43 43 45 46 . ii ii iii ii

XVI Appendices Appendix A Appendix 8 Appendix C Appendix D i Appendix E TABLE OF CONTENTS (con 1t) - Excerpt's from 1 OCFRSO. 49: Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (g) - List of References Bibliography of Technical Source Data - List of Specific and Significant VEPCO Docu-ments Reviewed Resumes of Key Leadershi'p of 1 OCFRSO. 49 (b)(2) Review Effort iii (5) 89 92 96 99 102

LIST OF FIGURES Figure Number Description 1 Independent Design Verification Process 2 . Methodology 3

4. 16 KV Bus & 4. 0 KV Motor Overcurrent Protection Criteria 4

480 V MCC Feeder Overcurrent Protection Criteria 5 480 V MCC Combination Motor Controller -- Motor Overcurrent Protection Criteria NORTH ANNA POWER STATl,ON FSAR Figure Reference Dwg. # - Rev. # NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 6 7 Main One Line Diagram 8.3-1 11715-FE-1A-13 8 9 10 11 480V One Line Diagram

8. 3-5 11715-FE-1 AF-8 Emergency (Swgr) Susses 1H, 1H1, 1J, & 1J1 480V One Line Diagram 8.3-11 11715-FE-12-11 Erner MCC 1 H 1-1 & 1 H 1-4 Emergency Swgr Room 480\\/ One Line Diagram 8.3~8 11715-FE-IR-i5 Emergency MCC 1J1-2 Cable Tunnel 480V One Line D.iagram 8.3-6 11715-FE-IP-20 MCC 182-1 182-3 Swgr Room

~ Erner MCC 1J1-1 Erner Swgr Room 480V One Line Diag. Erner MCC 8.3-9 11715-FE-IT-11 1H1-3 & 1J1-3 Serv WPP HSE, Erner MCC-1H1-1A & 1J1-1A Erner Gen 1 H & 1J 480V One Line Diagram Emergency 8.3-7 11715-FE-IQ-17 12 MCC-1H1-2 Cable Tunnel i iii Report Page No.

7 8 12 13 14 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

i Figure Number 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 LIST OF FIGURES (con't) Description 120V One Line Diagram Vital Bus - I 120V AC One Line Diagram Vital Bus - 11 120V AC One Line Diagram Vital Bus - 111 120V AC One Line Diagram Vital Bus - IV 120V AC & 125V DC One Line Diagram-Vital Power

12sv
DC One Line Diagram One Line Diagram Semi-Vital Buses*

SURRY POWER STATION Main One Line Diagram 4160V One Line Diag - Sh. 3 480V One Line Diagram Erner. Swgr. 1H1-1 & 1J1-1 480V One Line Diagram Sh. 9 480V One Line Diagram Sh. 2 480V One Line Diagram Sh. 6 480V One Line Dfagram Sh. 7 125V DC One Line Diagram Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Dist. Pnls. 1-1 & 1-111 Wiring Diagram Vital Bus Dist. Pnls. 1-11 & 1-IV FSAR Figure Reference Dwg. # - Rev.# NA 11715-FE-IAA-lO. NA . 11715-FE-1 AB-9 NA 11715-FE-IAC-9 NA 11715-FE-IAD-6 8.3-16 11715-FE-IAE-7 8.3-17 11715-FE-IE-11 NA 11715-FE-IW-14 8.1-1

11448-FE-lA-8 NA 11448-FE-1 D-1 O NA 11448-FE-IQ-3 NA 11448-FE-IP-8 NA 11448-FE-!F-10 NA 11448-FE-IL-16 NA 11448-FE-IM~l 7 NA 11448-FE-IG-7 8.4-1 11448-FE-llA-13 8.4-1 11448-FE-IIB-14
iiii ( 2)

Report Page No. 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62*

63.

64 65 66 67 68 69 70

LIST OF. FIGURES (can't) NORTH ANNA PLANT EXAMPLES OF TIME - CURRENT COORDINATION CURVES Figure Number 30 31 32 33 Description 480 V MCC 1Hl-1/ 480 V Bus 1 H Switchgear Feeder/ 480 V Transformer 1 H Secondary Switchgear Brkr. 480 V MCC 1H1-4/ 480 V Bus 1 H Switchgear Feeder/ 480 V Transformer 1 H Secondary Switchgear Brkr. 480 V MCC 1Jl-2S/ 480 V Bus 1J Switchgear Feeder/ 480 V Transformer 1J Secondary Switchgear Brkr

480 V MCC 1H1-2N/

480 V Bus 1 H Switchgear Feeder/ 480 V Transformer 1 H Secondary Switchgear Brkr. FSAR Figure Reference Dwg. # - Rev.# NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA SURRY PLANT EXAMPLES OF TIME -* CURRENT COORDINATION CURVES 34 35 36 480 V Bus 1H (1J) 175 HP Motor NA Switchgear Feeder 4160 V l 480 V Trfmr. 1H (1J) Secondary Switchgear B rkr. 480 V Bus NA 1 H ( 1J) 250 KW Pressurizer Htr. Switchgear Feeder 4160 V / 480 V Trfmr. Secondary Switchgear Brkr. 48o*v (Largest Loads) Motor Controller Overload Elements / . 480 V MCC 1 H 1-1 & 2 (1J 1-1 & 2)/ 480 V Bus 1J - 1 Switchgear Feeder NA iiii ( 3) NA NA NA Report Page No. 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

Table 1 Table 2 LIST OF TABLES North Anna Power Station Units 1 & 2: Nonsafety:..Related Loads Located in Harsh Environment and Connected to Safety Susses Surry Power Station Units l & 2: Nonsafety-Related Loads Loi:ated in Harsh Environment and Connected to Safety Susses ii iii 78 84

PART I EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

i

PART I EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

I. PURPOSE 11

The purpose of this report is to describe the Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) program and methods of identifying the equipment covered by 1 OCFRSO. 49 (b) (2), (see Appendix A for select-ed. excerpts).

It addresses nonsafety-related electrical equipment which are not required to function following a design basis accident, but whose failure in the resulting harsh environment must be review-ed to assure it does not affect safe reactor shutdown or accident mitigation. Summary and Conclusions This report describes the methodology and criteria, including the utilization of a systematic design review approach, for determining a potential list of nonsafety-related electrical equipment for North Anna and Surry Power Stations which are considered as 11important to safety 11 within the scope of 10CFRSO. 49. This 11Area Approach 11 review considers potential failure modes of the nonsafety-related equipment resulting from the impact of an accident and their conse-quence, if any, on the safety-related electrical equipment.

Finally, the report evaluates the design criteria utilized in electrical system design, whose implementation would preclude the potential failure of nonsafety-related electrical equipment affecting safety related equip'"'.'

ment. Demonstration is provided based on an initial assessment that the actual design meets-the intent of the established criteria. The preparation of the potential list is based on a systematic approach described in 11Specific Review Methodology 11-Section V r 11. The environmental impact on nonsafety-equipment due to an accident and the resulting effects, if any,

on safety systems have been assessed.

Due to similarity of design between Unit-1 and Unit-2 of each station, only Unit-1 drawings were evaluated to establish the list of non-safety load.s presented in Table 1 and 2. Unit-2 loads for each station that will be affected are considered to be the same as those listed for Unit-1. The detail design evaluation of North Anna and Surry safety-related electrical distribution systems, as described in Section XI I, further demonstrates that the potential impact on safety-related electrical power systems, due to the failure of nonsafety-related equipment sharing a common power source with the safety systems, are improb-able due to implementation of an electrical system design based on good engineering practice. Results of this review indicate that connection of nonsafety-related equipment to the safety-related equipment is controlled by properly selected protective devices that are coordinated to minimize the dis-turbances to safety-related systems. The review verified the design criteria utilized to implement design and installation, and concluded that the present design provides adequate assurance that design criteria in general has been met. However, VEPCO intends to con-tinue its review to provide additional assurance that specific equip-ment and circuits are designed and installed in accordance with the es tab I ished *criteria. In regard to the connection of nonsafety equipment to safety-related circuits, initial assessment indicates that these circuits were properly evaluated during the preparation of 'master list' equipment in re-sponse to IEB 79-01 B and NUREG-0588 requirements. A continuing review wil I be initiated to verify that no such circuits exist and if there are any, a method to upgrade the associated nonsafety equip-ment will be established in conformance to 1 OCFRSO. 49 (b) and pro-posed regulatory guide 1. 89, Rev. 1. The results of further review will be made available to NRC in accordance with 1 OCFRSO. 49 -- paragraph (g) schedule requirements. During this review, it was observed that certain electrical system, design

documents such as FSAR, drawings and purchase specifica-tions, have_ not yet been revised to reflect as-built conditions.

The test of the report is therefore, based on actual installed condition. VEPCO *is. document update -program is addressing the revision of design documents to reflect as-built conditions. Ill, BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF SYSTEMATIC APPROACH IV. The following step-by-step methodology and considerations were applied:

1)

Consideration of postulated events which could cause a failure of non~Class 1 E equipment resulting

in *unacceptable influence on the Class 1 E power system.

2)

Identification of the allowable limits for the -influences on the

3)

Class 1 E power system

Establishing a methodology to identify non-Class 1 E electrical equipment whose environmentally induced failure could cause unacceptable influences on the Class 1 E system.

4)

Identification of the design features required to maintain con di-tions within allowable* limits in the Class 1 E power system.

5)

Review electrical distribution system design descriptions and criteria for electrical protection systems, including identification of various operating modes of the Class 1 E power system.

6)

Analysis and evaluation of design to verify compliance with esta-blished criteria by independent initial review and sample audit of the actual design and installation tC> demonstrate, with reasonable assurance, that the above* criteria is implemented. DEFINITION OF SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT As defined in a footnote to 1 OCFRSO. 49 (b) ( 1), "safety-related elec-tric equipment" is the same as II Class I E11 equipment in IEEE 323-1974. Both terms are used in this report consistent with industry usage. PART II DETAILED DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION _J

PART II DETAILED DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION V. BACKGROUND FOR REPORT SUBMITTAL On January, 21, 1983 the USN RC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Re-search issued ( Federal Register/Vol. 48, No. 15) the final rule on 11 Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants" 1 OCFRSO. 49 which required that each holder or applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power plant, shall establish a program for qualifying the electric equipment important to safety. Specific direction was given to VEPCO by the N RC for North Anna and Surry Power Stations to 11discuss the methods used to identify the equipment covered by paragraph 1 OCFRSO. 49(b) (2) and to establish any qualification programs not previously described for such equipment". VEPCO responded by the required May 20, 1983 date( 4) (S) as follows: In response to

10CFR50, paragraph 50.49(b)(2),

VEPCO is developing criteria to address this equipment. It is anticipated that the equipment in this category, if any, and the methodology used to identify this equipment will be. provided to you on or before November 16, 1983. Additionally, any corrective actions required to qualify or replace equipment identified for compliance will be completed on a schedule consistent with the requirements of 10CFR Part 50, paragraph 50.49(9). VI. SCOPE The scope of this report preparation includes the analysis of the consequent effects on non-class IE equipment cause.d by various design basis events within the scope of 1 OCFRSO. 49 which may de-grade safety-related electrical equipment. As indicated in the rule ( 1 OCFRS0.. 49 (c) ) the II requirements for (i) dynamic and seismic qualification of electrical equipment important to

safety, (ii) protection of electric equipment important to safety against other natural phenomena and external events and (iii) environ-mental qualification of electrical equipment important to safety located in a mild environment, are not included within the scope II The electrical equipment of concern is defined to be any nonsafety-related ele.ctrical equipment whose failure under postulated harsh environmental conditions could prevent accomplishment of safety function specified for safety-related equipment in 1 OCFRSO. 49 (b) ( 1),

The. following nonsafety-related equipment, subject to a harsh e-nviron-ment, fall within the scope of 10CFRS0.49 (b)(2):

1.

Nonsafety-related equipment sharing a common power supply with the. safety-related equipment required for shutdown or mitigation of the postulated accident, which is not elec- .. trically protected from the circuits of concern by coordi-nated breakers, fuses or protective devices.

2.

Nonsafety-related equipment connected to circuits of safety-related equipment whose. spurious or inadvertent operation may adversely affect achieving the necessary safety func-tion. VI I GENERIC REVIEW PROCESS VEPCO's independent design verification. process to ensure that the design, in~tallation and evaluation presented in this report are, in fact verified, is in process. The design verification review and audit have begun with an indepen-dent consul.tant's review of project criteria and unique project imple-mentation methods. The next phase will be the design verification. of selected design provisions to validate the adequacy, accuracy, and completeness of the engineering methods used, The design verifica-tion process will include the resolution of the following questions: .} 0 0 0 0 0 0 Does design meet the criteria?

Is the design documentation adequate?

Have design inputs been correctly selected? Have appropriate standards been specified? Is the plant systems maintainable? Does design comply with the related regulatory requirement intent for North Anna and Surry Power Stations? o Is the technical analysis adequate? o Is the design c~ange control process adequate to retain qualification? The design verification process as presently conceived is illustrated

in Figure 1.

The next phase of the process will be a field verification of a selected installation as an audit of the effectiveness of the existing QA/QC program. The last and final stage is the modification of this initial report to be

reviewed by management" which will include corrective action recommenda-tions and presentation of the report to the regulatory agency.

The summary of the whole ( Design Verification Review and Audit) Methodo-logy is illustrated in Figure 2. VIII SPECIFIC REVIEW METHODOLOGY The. i:nethodology to determine the electrical equipment which is not required to p~rform a safety function. following a Design Basis Acci-dent,. but whose failure due to the harsh environment resulting from. the postulated accident may prevent the accomplishment of required safety functions, is based on a systematic 11Area Approach 1'. to locate all electrical equipment which are subjected to a harsh environment resulting from OBA and determining the interaction between this equipment and electrical equipment providing safety functions. .) INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROCESS SUPPORT ANALYSES AND i...-----1 .. CALCULATIONS SPECIFIC PLANT REQUIREMENTS (FSAR) OVERALL SYSTEM REQUIREMENT.$ SPECIFIC SYSTEM-

AND EQUIPMENT APPLICATION
REQUIREMENTS, SPECIFIC.SYSTEM AND EQUIPMENT DESIGN CHECKING DESIGN REVlEW, CHANGE CONTROL p

ADEQUATE DESIGN RECORDS' FIGURE 1 -7*- REGULA TJONS CODES STANDARDS (10CFRSO). _ 10 CFR 50.49 I

METHODOLOGY REQUIREMENT 1 OCFR 50.49 I PARA. (8) (2) I f G) I (2') I T © © APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS . *PLANT OESIGN CRITERIA ELECT. ONE CONTROL, INST. ENV. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ZONE REVIEW PROCESS CONCLUSION &. REQUIRED ACTION UFSAR'S & CALCULATION LINE OIAG'S I I IOENTIFY NON-SAFETY © EQUIPMENT CONNECTED TO SAFETY SUSSES + OET. EQUIP. LOCATION 0 HARSH OR MILO (GA's, EZO's)

t HARSH REVIEW ELECT. SYST.

PROT. CRITERIA

t.

REVIEW OF SAFETY SYSTEM IMPACT + © REVIEW OF PROCUREMENT DOCUMENT. (IE OR NON IE) t REVIEW OF CONTROL & INST CKTS FOR. DETRIMENTAL INTERLOCKS I COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED I NEEi) TO BE Q!JALIFIED I

OR REPLACED LEGEND:
GA's - General Arrangement Owgs.

EZD's - Environmental Zone DescriQtlons FIGURE 2 & DIAG'S MAPS NONE EXIST MILO ENVIRONMENT AOEQUATE NO-IMPACT CLASS IE ' I NONE EXIST l.J' I NO ITEMS EXIST I I ISSUE RESOLVED I I

The electrical equipment, which are required to perform a safety function or post-accident monitoring within the scope of the rule and can be affected from an environmentally induced failure, have been previously identified and submitted to the N RC in a comprehensive master list of equipment with VEPC0 1s IE Bulletin-79-01 B (90 day response) or in NU~EG-0588 *(North Anna Power Station - Unit 2) submittals * . Therefore, the methodology described herein is strictly related to electrical equipment not required to perform safety functions fol lowing an accident. The basic steps in this 11 Area. Approach" based methodology are as follows: a) Review of plant (North Anna and Surry Power Stations) one line diagrams, FSAR's and plant manuals

b)

Identify non safety related loads connected to safety related electrical busses, i.e., common power supply. c) . Determine if the nonsafety-related loads are subjected to the harsh environment resulting from OBA - including HELB outside the containmenL This determination is. based on review of plant general arrangement drawings and environ-. mental zone

description maps.

d) Determine if the environmentally induced failures in the equipment described in paragraph b) and c) above will not prevent proper performance of the required safety functions by safety-related equipment.

e)

Review of electrical protection system and plant design criteria to determine if the components identified in paragraph c) above (if any) are adequately protected in the f) event of any electrical fault or ari accident from damaging safety circuits (i.e., isolated promptly from the class* 1 E circuits). Review of component procurement documents to verify if the components identified in paragraph c) above, can withstand the environmental impact resulting from an accident. ,,---.-. **~ (. g) Review of control and interlocks associated with the specific component, and determine if special control features or administrative procedures are utilized to prevent the spec-ific nonsafety-related equipment from affecting the safety components. IX GENERAL DESIGN PRACTICE TO DETERMINE SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACTS OF N,ONSAFETY LOADS ON SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS Postulated events within the scope of 1 OCFRSO. 49 may result in a failure of non-Class lE equipment (loads) so as to effect the Class 1E power system. The most probable damaging failure can be an electri-cal fault, (phase to ground or phase to phase). In order to maintain the consequence of this failure within allowable limits, the fault currents may be inherently limited to levels below the pickup values of overcurrent relays protecting the main Class 1 E supply circuit breakers and/or because proper selective coordination has been applied. This eliminates the potential trip of the main Class 1 E supply circuit breakers and consequential loss of power to Class 1 E loads. X GENERAL AUXILIARY SYSTEM PROTECTION AND COORDINATION CRITERIA A. Design Obje<;:tives and General Characteristics of Proper Power Systems Design, Protection and Gontrol Some design objectives and general characteristics of acceptable power system design and protection are:

1)

The electrical protective device (circuit

breaker, overload element or fuse) for all nonsafety circuit

2)

. faults will cause the protective device to interrupt the fault current prior to initiation of a trip of any up-stream protective device (e.g., main circuit breaker, fuse, etc.) which would otherwise cause loss of power to a safety related load. The electrical power source will supply sufficient fault current and fault duration so as to ensure proper coordination between the pro-tective devices. The criteria for coordination for various voltag.e levels is shown on Figures 3 through

s.

The electrical protective device to the nonsafety-related load is automatically tripped by an accident derived signal generated in the same division as that to which the device is applied, provided that the time delay involved in generating the accident signal and tripping the protective device does not result in unacceptable degradation of safety function.

3)

The electrical protective device described in (1) and (2) above is procured, designed and installed to the same criteria for protective devices directly feeding safety-related loads.

4)

Input current limiters to the nonsafety-related load are provided that will limit the input current to an acceptable value, under faulted output conditions due to potential harsh environments. T'".~ME AT 0 I I I I I I I I I I MJ'IDR ---i FULL LOAD\\ Ct.J"RRENT I I I I r-- 120% OF I MJTOR FLA t MINIMUM RELJ:..Y LONG TIME UNIT (51) 120% OF BUS FtJLL LQl.J) T I I I I .MZ',.IN BKR. M:;)( BUS RATING OVERC.JR.~ I ~REI.PY ('I'YP)

t. T TIUP

).----J 1 4.16Kv BUS

0.z:.:r

,,.... '*~---... I I I MOIOR-1 Lca<ED ROIDR I Ct.J~ll."T :. I I. I I I I I I I I I L_ RELAY INST. u1'."'IT (50) 1 2 51 50/51 LO~G TIME UNIT (51) SdORT CIRCuTr '-CJRP.fil."T A'V.AIL.~BL2 MAXIMUM BUS I.DAD PLUS. STI\\RTir;"G LARGEST MYIOR I I l-- MA.XIMUM -~. I I Sr:CRT CIRC... 'IT I. I I I I I I I I L TtlO TIMES M'.YIOR LCC<D ROI'OR CL'RRD."'T },MPS (APPROX.) M -..'1oroR

!'.DTE:

ALL VALUES ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF GJOD PROIECTIVE***nEVICE CXX)RDINATION CRITERIA. SST -..1\\0'ICR SJ..FE ST?.ll TL.'1E FLA -,."P!DR Ft:"LL LOAD C'..;R°-.E1'."T AT --t"'O'IOR.Z:..CCELERJ..TINS TIME 'ID FL'LL SPEED

51 - TIME-0'1lERCGR'IBNT ItvERSE rnARACIERISTIC RELAYS
50/51 -

TIME - OV""ERCURRENT INVERSE rnARACTERISTIC RELAYS WI'IH INSTA!.'.'TANEOUS ELEMENT. 4.16KV BUS & 4.0KV MOTOR OVERCG~""T PROTECTION CRITERI.;. FIG.J"'RE 3

TIME 125~~ OF B,:)UIPMEl.."'T FUU. WAD JI.MPS (MIN.) \\ 120% OF MCC BUS W..TING 480V SWGR t~~ 480V MCC MOLDBD CASE BKR. LONG TIME EIEMENI' l I I I I I EQUIPMENT

.,_ :ruIL LOAD I

AMPS I I I I I I M)LDED CASE BKR.

rv!A.G. INST.

ELEMENI' (M) ~ SHORT TIME ELEMENI' ~/ I I~ I FI I /I _____ _ M.?1.XJMJM SEORI' CIRCJIT CURRENT AVAIL?..BLE -~ SYSTIN lHz APPROX. 0 !.EGEND: 'l 2!,-3TIME:sMC:CB~ RZI.TING (MINIMu'M) P TI-,:REE FH.~E DIRECT ACTING SERIES 'IRIP*DEVICE NOTE - +/- 10% 'IOILERA:."l'CE MJLDED C.Zl..SE BKR. '-~ r-* -. ~t *___j I J..M?S 'IM 'IHEPJ'.1.AL (LONG TIME) - M.?:..GNE.'11C ( INST.?.ffl1.NEQUS) ELEMENT AIL VAI1JES ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF C--OOD PROIECITJE DEVICE moRDINATION CRITERIA. 480V MCC FEEDERS OVER.CURRENT PRO'IECTION CRI'IE."ZLJ.. FIGURE 4

i' TIME 125~~ OF EQUIPME:t."T Ft.TLL LOAD Afl1PS (MIN) . /: I MO'IOR: FtJLL- : LOAD l C'..i"R-RE?:."T \\........... MOl'OR LOCKED R.OIDrt CORREN!' M:lI.DED CJ.BE BKR. MAG. INST. - ELEMEN1' (M) 120~~ OF M:C BUS RATING_ 480V SWGR. t '-... TRIP ---~ 480V MX I 'IRIP M)U)E:I) r----i ~..SE t I Brn. j)i. - - - -- - _, CX)~""IROLLER COt-J"TACTOR ~-~ ___ ~--j OVERLQ.]J) TIUP ELEME..'\\"TS !>'D'IOR f""t: C C ( C { C 6 I- - I I l.MJ.JCTMUM SHORT CL"\\CUIT

~"T AW..IL.~LE

J.::r SYSm1

-i --f T Hz A..PpRO:X. I I ~l ' ' ii' Ii < 1 a .. AM?S 0 'TI'lO TI.11.1ES. \\J - MOIOR LCaCED

2~-3 TIMES MCC BUS RO'IOR
ct.~"T R?..TIN3 (ML."'ID1"1JM)

MI:NIMt;"M (.a.PPROX. ) LEGEND NOTE P -'IHREE PHASE DIRECT ACTI~x; SERIES 'l'RIP DEVICE _+/- 10;, 'IOL.ER;..NCE ALL VALUES ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF C-COD - PROTECTIVE DEVICE -CCORDI~_TION CRI'IERIA. M -M?l.GNE'llC (INSTA..'."T.Zl..NEOUS) ELEME..~"T 480V MCC ca-.SIN7>-.TION MC'IOR C0~7IROT.T,'l:"RS-M)'IDR OVERctJRRENT PRO'IECTION CRITERI.Z\\. FIGCJRE 5

.~

5)

Placement of the protective device or input current limiters to the. nonsafety-related load in the plant surveillance maintenance program for a level of surveillance/ma:intenance equivalent to that used for devices feeding safety-related -loads.

6)

Place nonsafety-related loads on safety busses in areas not subject to the _potentially degrading influence of a harsh environment. 7} Provide sufficient impedance between each main Class 1 E supply circuit

breaker and the non-Class 1 E

8) connection point to prevent unacceptable degradation of the Class 1 E power. supply in the event of maximum possible fault at *the non-Class 1 E boundary without*

unacceptably degrading

bus voltage levels under. all bus configurations.

Assuring that nonsafety-related devices or components, whose failure or malfunction may prevent safety* related equipment to perform its required safety-function, are environmentally quaUfied against tbe harsh environment they are subjected to.

8.

AC and.DC Distribution.system Protection and Coordination Criteria The classical approach to design of Class 1 E power systems in nuclear power* plants has always been to minimize the potential *of failure in these systems. Various methods-within the realm of applicable regulatory and industry standards such* as protection and control systems,. redundancy, independence and.. separation, as well*. as* assurance of quality of equipment,. are extensively utilized to achieve this goal~ The primary function of the Class. 1 E electrkal system is to reliably supply power to those loads required. to* safeiy shut do~n-the r:-eactor, However, consider-ation for providing additional margin.for emergency condition' 'as well as protection of major equipment, personnel and. the limita-tions of certain* equipment design warrants that certain nonsafety.

loads be also connected to the safety system. Examples of these loads are the turbine-generator turning gear motor,

emergency A. C. lighting, fire protection, d-c emergency bearing oil pump drives, pressurizer heater (backup) groups, security systems, and plant communications.

Thus, the objective of an electrical protection system is to provide a selective, *Coordinated electrical distribution protection scheme by proper application of protective relays and trip de-vices. The function of the protective system, for al I postulated events, is to: o Detect the presence of abnormal system conditions. o Isolate only the faulted equipment. o Minimize damage to equipment and maintain service to the unaffected part of the system with minimum disturbance. o Prevent unacceptable influences in the Class 1 E power system due to faults in the non-Class 1 E power system. To accomplish the above function, the protective devices are designed to provide selectivity, sensitivity, high speed and reliability.* Selectivity is achieved by establishing protective zones for the system a~d selecting protective relays and devices which are capable of recognizing faults within their zone of separation. The protective relays and devices then operate to isolate the faulted equipment or the affected zone. Sensitivity of protection is assured by analyzing the system for various operating and associated fault conditions and applying sensitive protective device settings which enable the protective device to operate correctly under these faulted conditions for all distribution system configurations. High speed protection* is provided to minimize system disturbances and damage to equip-ment. ,e-\\ l Reliability is achieved by utilizing inherently reliable protective devices and establishing an appropriate maintenance and testing program for all protective relays. and devices. Coordinated protection for the safety-related power distribution system is achieved by proper selection of the operating characteristics and setting of each relay and device. In case of a fault, a relay or device protecting the

faulted equipment operates with high speed and isolates the faulted equipment.

The design of the Class 1 E power distribution system, together with the arrangement of the feeder circuits, ensures that faults on the nonsafety-related circuits or equipment will not cause unacceptable influence on the safety-related A. C. and D. C. distribution systems. Faults on the nonsafety circuits will be isolated by fast operation of the affected feeder protective device resulting in acceptable transient disturbances. A line to ground fault (which is the most likely mode of failure) on a nonsafety-related drcuit will have_ less effect on the safety-related system than a three phase or phase~to-phase fault since A. C. or D. C.

distribution system consist of high impedance grounding or ungrounded system, respectively, which minimize or do not allow the flow of high ground fault current.

The unlikely three phase or phase-to-phase faults on a nonsafety- -related circuit : will be cleared by the selective instantaneous operation of the branch protective device. XI DESIGN FEATURES. A. Description of Class IE A. C. Power Distribution System for North Anna and Su:rry Power Station. The Class 1 E A. C. power distribution system consists of. two separate and physically independent subsystems. Ea<:h subsystem can receive A. C. power from either of three sources: o Preferred off-site A. C, power supply o Normal power supply

through station service transformer (applicable only for North Anna Unit-1),

o Standby A. C~ power supply (diesel-generator) Each_ A~ C. power distribution subsystem supplies power to redundant Class 1 E -loads at 4. 16KV, 480V arid 120V voltage levels and some* selected non-Class 1 E loads. The potentially selected 1 OCFRSO. 49 (b) (2) non-Class lE loads are tabulated in Tables 1 and 2. B, Design Description of North Anna and Surry Power Station Safety-Related Electrical Power Distribution Systems

1)

North Anna Power Station Safety-Related Electrical Power Distribution System Description a) General Description The A~C.

power system for the. North Anna Power Station con-sists of various auxiliary power systems which provide reliable power to all auxiliary electrical*_ loads sufficient for start-up; operation and shutdown conditions.
The systems are
provided with
s.ufficient
power sources, switching

<.:apab,ility, circuit protection and redundancy to accomplish this reliability. The voltage.ratings of the A. C. power distribution system are. 4i60V,* 4.80V and 12.0/240\\/. -Figure-6, the.main cine line diagram for the North Anna.Power Station Unit -l, SQOW~ the connectio*n _'of the* offsite power sour.ce and main turbine generator. to. the safety..:..:related * ( 4160V) blisses. Detail of connection is described in North Anna Power Station FSAR Section 8, 3. l. 1. The. safety-relatecj on site power distribution system consists. of two (2) 4160V switchgear busses in two separate systems design-: ated as _1H1 and 1J1, The bus 1H1 is associated with train-A and bus 1J 1 is associated with train-8, The 4160V busses are electri- '

cally and physically separated. The 4160V busses are rated at 1200 Amp continuous serving emergency loads through air circuit breakers equipped to protect the loads from an overcurrent condition. Each 4160V switchgear bus feeds two (2) 480V switchgear busses 1 H and 1 H1. (or 1J and lJl). These busses are rated at 2000 Amp continuous with overcurrent devices to protect the loads. The 480V switchgear busses in turn.feed several 480V motor control centers and 240/120V power panels as well as large 480V motors. .The arrangement of 480V switchgear and motor control. centers and associated loads are shown in Figure - 7 through

12.

In addition to the A.C. distribution system described above, the power distribution system is provided with a Vital. A. C. ( 120V) power system and a 125V D. C. distribution system. The Vital A. C. system provides a highly reliable source of 120V A. C. for. safety:..related instruments and equipments~. The Vital A.C. power system is shown on Figures - 13 to 17 and 19, and is subsequently described in detail. The 125V D. C. power system provides a reliable source of power for instrumentation and control of safety and nonsafety-related equipment for. safe operation and shutdown of the plant. The 125V D. C. system is shown in* Figure - 18 and is descr.ibed in subsequent paragraphs. b) 4160V Auxiliary System The two 4160V emergency busses 1H1 arid 1J 1 supply power* to equipment essential for safe shutdown of the plant.

These two

"' ll '1!!!!! busses normally receive power from reserve service transformers through transfer busses F and D, respectively, which are the preferred sources. 4160V emergency busses are fed from two (2) preferred source feeder breakers. Upon loss of preferred source power to either of the emergency busses, an automatic transfer is initiated from the reserve station service transformer to its normal station service supply transformer. This transfer is initiated and completed during the interval between its associated diesel generator start signal and its designed closing time to the emergency bus. If the transfer is not completed in this interval, the transfer is aborted and the diesel generator is connected to the emergency bus as designed. A proposed modification to this arrangement will remove the automatic transfer of the emergency busses from their preferred offsite source to the respective normal station service busses prior to loading to the emergency diesel generator.

Instead, upon loss of offsite power, al I transfer wil I be to the emergency diesel generator.

Manual transfer capability between al I three sources will be retained. Unit-2 presently does not have feeders from station service busses to emergency busses. A proposed modification will install these offsite power feeders. Upon loss of offsite power, all emergency bus transfers will be to the emergency diesel genera-tors. Manual transfer capability between all three sources will be available. The 4160V emergency busses are of indoor, three phase, metal-clad construction with drawout magnetic air circuit breakers. The circuit breakers operate from 125V D. C. control power which is supplied by the safety-related 125V D. C. system. Each of the emergency busses is protected against bus faults and uncleared outgoing feeder faults. Three inverse time over-current relays, one in each phase, and one ground protective relay are located at the main and at each feeder breaker. Each of the feeder relays will trip its feeder breaker from its bus. The setting of the long time characteristic relay unit for bus feeder breakers permits starting of the largest motor in the system with the safety busses carrying the total connected load. The pickup current of the relay is selected high enough to avoid false operation due to overload. Outgoing feeders from busses 1H1 and 1J 1 are protected against feeder short circuit by three overcurrent relays having instantaneous and overcurrent element attachments. Additionally, feeder circuit to 4160V / 480V trans-former are protected by three overcurrent relays having instan-taneous and voltage restrained overcurrent elements. The setting of the phase inverse overcurrent elements feeding 480V switchgear busses allows the starting of the largest motor while its transformer is carrying maximum nameplate load minus that of the largest motor. The 4160V motor feeders are equipped with three (3) inverse time relays having long time and instantaneous characteristics. The long time unit provides protection against abnormal strarting current so as to prevent the motor from reaching its thermal limit. The instantaneous element provides protection against high locked rotor current (set at approxi-mately twice the motor rotor locked rotor current) while being below the maximum short circuit current available. In addition, the above emergency 4160V busses are each provided with three (3) undervoitage relays. These relays sense loss or degraded voltage at the bus and initiate tripping of the main supply and feeder breakers. Thus loads are shed from the emergency bus so that the diesel generator can then be connected to the emer-gency bus. c) 480V Auxiliary System The 480V auxiliary system receives power from the 4160V system through dry-type, three phase, indoor transformers. The 480V safety-related system consists of four ( 4) load centers, nine (9) motor control centers (MCC's), the safety and nonsafety-related loads and interconnection cables. Feeder circuit breakers are 480V A. C. 2000 Amp or 600 Amp frame size, metal-enclosed, drawout construction. Control power is fed from safety-related 125V D.C. batteries. Feeder circuit breakers are provided with direct acting magnetic trip devices having long time and short time elements. The setting of the long time and short time elements for the MCC feeders allows starting of the largest motor at its MCC while its bus is carrying maximum load. The motor feeders are provided with dir.ect-acting magnetic trip elements having long time and instantaneous characteristics. The long time element is set to trip the breaker during abnormal starting conditions, i.e., if the acceleration time of the motor exceeds the safe stall time (thermal limit). The instantaneous element trips the breaker from approximately twice locked rotor current up to the maximum short circuit available. The 480V MCC's are provided with molded case circuit breakers having a thermal magnetic characteristic, and having 22000 Amp interrupting rating for the main breaker and 14000 Amp symme-trical interrupting rating for branch circuit breakers.* Motor feeders are provided with combination circuit breakers and magnetic starters having thermal overload relays. The overload element opens the contactor on motor overload. The instant-aneous element of the molded case circuit breakers are set to protect against short circuit and higJ1 locked rotor current (approximately set at twice the locked rotor current). d) 120/240VAC Distribution System The 120i240VAC distribution panels are fed from emergency Motor Control Centers (MCC's) feeding nonsafety and safety loads. Each panel bus is provided with a main molded-case circuit breaker with thermal and magnetic trip elements. The branch circuit breakers are also of the molded-case type with thermal and magnetic trip elements. e) 120 A. C. Vital A. C. Power Distribution System The vital A. C. power system* consists of four separate vital bus panels, each fed independently from an associated 125V D. C. / 120V A. C..

single phase static inverter.

Each inverter's output is rated at 118V A.C. + 2%,-60 Hz+ t Hz. The inverters are connected to the batteries that are contin-uously float charged by the battery chargers; therefore, the effective power so_urces for the* inverters are. the 480V A. C. emergency busses. Should the effective power source to any battery charger fail, the inverter is automatically fed from its associated station battery Without disturbing the vital bus volt-age or frequency., Voltage regulating transformers fed from 480V A. C. emergency

. busses are provided to supply 118V A. C. + 2% to vital bus panels in the event either panel's respective inverter fails or. is undergoing maintenance.

For this purpose, manual bypass switches are provided to. transfer the load of vital bus panels from the inverters to the voltage regulating transformers. Four vital bus panels l-1, 1-11, 1-111, and* 1-IV. supply 120V A. C *. power. to the plant protection system channels I;

11, 111, and IV, respectively.

In addition-,. the vital bus panels i-1 and 1-111 supplyi2QV A.C. power to.the safety.system*trai~_s *A and B, respectively. Each vital. bus panel board is provided with a two pole 225

Amp: frame size. main. breaker* having *thermal. and magnetic trip elements.

The branch circuit breakers are single pble 1 OOAmp.frame size with instantaneous and thermal trip

elements.

i** I

i.

I - I f) 125 VDC Direct Current Power Distribution System The D. C. system is designed to provide a source of reliable continuous power for plant protection system control and instru-mentation and other loads for safe plant start-up, operation, and shutdown under normal and emergency conditions. The D.C. system consists of four 60 cell 125V batteries, each with its own battery charger -{plus two spare chargers),. D. C. load center and distribution switchboards. The 4 banks of batteries designated I, 11, 111, and IV, and their associated load centers and distribution panels* have been arrang-ed to feed the* respective loads in protection* channels I, 11,

111 and IV.

Additionally, Battery I and 111 supply power to safety train A and*. train B, respectively. The four redundant D. C. load centers. also feed certain essential nonsafety-related loads.* Each battery consists of s~ries..,.connected eel Is, ungrounded and designed for continuous duty. Each battery charger has a nominal output load current of 225 Amp at 132V D. C. and a maximum output current of.2*so Amp with an input of 480 ~. 15% V. A. C., three phase. The battery chargers have been sized to furnish.electric energy for the largest combined demands of the-* various. steady* state loads while restoring the battery from the minimum charged state to the fully charged state, irrespect.ive of the status of the plant during which these demands* occur. Each charger is equipped with a

D. C.

voltmeter and ammeter~ ground detection, and alternating current failure relays. Each battery distribution switchboard is N EMA

Class 1-1 metal clad, with a 2500 Amp, two-wire ungrounded main bus, and two-pole,. manually operated air circuit breakers.

Each switchboard_ is provided with a noninterrupting ground-testing system for i those loads being fed from breakers rated at* 100 Amp or less. Each switchboard provides the interconnection of the respective battery charger and battery to their particular loads. Because the D.C. System operates.ungrounded, at least two grounds are necessary to trip a feeder circuit breaker.

GrouncJ fault annunciation provides an opportunity to correct a fault condition before a second fault occurs.

Two lamps are provided on each distribution switchboard and main control board for ground detection indicating. The D. C~ System status is continuously_ displayed in the main control room and a periodic visual check is made of the_ status and equipment. A condition of low supply voltage, low output current, low output voltage, or ground.fault of a particular battery charger will activate an alarm on the main control. room board annunciator. DL1ring normal operation, the 125V D, C. load is fed from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. On loss of normal power to the battery chargers, the D, C. load is automatically fed from the station batteries. Each battery is rated and designed to operate al I required loads for 2 hours during which time standby generation power is expected to become available to supply required D. C. loads. through the battery chargers.

2.

SURRY POWER STATION "Safety-Related Electrical Power Distribution System Description a) General Description The A. C. power distribution system for the Surry Power Station consists of various auxiliary power systems which provide reliable power to all auxiliary electrical loads su_fficient for all starting, operating and shutdown conditions. The systems are provided with sufficient power sources, switchi"ng capability, circuit protection and redundancy to accomplish this reliability. The voltage ratings of the A. C. power system are 416ov*, 480V and 120/240V. The main one line diagram, Figure. 20, shows the connec-tion of offsite power source and main turbine generator to the sa_fety-related (4160V) buss.es. Detail of connection is described in Surry Power Station UFSAR Sections 8. 4 and 8. 5

The safety-related onsite power distribution. system consists of two (2) 4160V switchgear busses. in two separate systems designated as 1H1 and 1J 1,

The bus 11 1H 11 is associated with train-A and bus 11 IJ 11 is associated with train-:B. The 4160V

busses are electrically and physically separated.

The 4160V busses are rated 1200 Amp continuous serving emergency loads through air circuit breakers equipped to protect _the loads from overcurrent. Each 4160V switchgear busses feeds two (2) 480V switchgear busses 1 H and 1 H1 (or 1J and 1J1). These busses are rated at 1600 Amp continuous. Overcurrent devices are installed on both the mairi and feeder 480V

A. C.

switchgear

breakers for fault and overload protection, The 480V switchgear busses in turn feed several 480V motor control centers and 240 / 120V power panels as wel I a*s large 480V motors.

The arrangement of 480V switchgear and motor control centers and asso-ciated loads are shown in Figures 21 to 26. In addition to the A. C. distribution system described above, the power distribution system is provided with a Vital A. C. ( 120V) power system and a 125V D. C. distribution system. The Vital A. C. system provides a highly reliable source of 120V A. C. for safety related instruments and equipments. The vital A. C. power system is shown on Figures 28 and 29 and is described in detai I in a paragraph which follows. The 125V D.C. power system provides a reliable source of power for instrumentation and. control of safety and nonsafety-related equipment for safe operation and shutdown of the plant. The 125V D. C, system is shown in Figure 27 and is described in subsequent paragraphs. b) 4160V Auxiliary System The two 4160V emergency busses "I H" and "IJ" supply power to equipment essential for safe shutdown of the. plant.. These two bus-ses normally receive power. from reserve station. service transformers through transfer busses F and D respectively, which are the pre-ferred sources. 4160V emergency busses _are then fed through a feeder breaker in the emergency switchgear. The 4160V emergency busses are of indoor, three phase, metal-clad construction with drawout magnetic air circuit breakers. The circuit breakers operate-from 125V. D. C, control power which is supplied by the safety-related

12sv D. C. system.

Each of the emergency busses. is protected ag*ainst bus* faults *and

uncleared. outgoing ~eeder faults.

Three inverse.time overcurrent relays, one in each* phase and one

ground protective* relay, are located at the main and at each feeder breaker.. Each of* the feeder relays will trip its feeder breaker in the event of fault on the feeder circuit.

I The setting of the long time characteristic relay unit for bus feeder breaker permits starting of the largest motor in the system with the safety busses carrying the total connected load. The pickup current of the relay

is selected high enough to avoid false operation due to setpoint drifting while maintaining bus overload protection.

Outgoing feeders from busses II I H II and 11 1J 11 are protected against feeder short circuits by three overcurrent

relays having instantaneous and over-current element attachments.

The setting of the inverse overcurrent elements feeding 480V switchgear busses allows the starting of the largest motor while its transformer is carrying maximum nameplate load minus that of the largest motor. The motor feeders are equipped with three (3) inverse time relays having long time and instantaneous characteristics. The long time unit provides protection against abnormal starting current so as to prevent the motor from reaching its thermal limit. The instantaneous element provides protection against high locked rotor current (approximately set at twice the motor rotor locked rotor current) while being. below the maximum short circuit current available. In addition to. the above, emergency 4160V busses are each provided with three (3) underyoltage relays. These relays sense loss or degraded voltage at the bus, initiate tripping of the main supply breaker and initiate loading of the diesel generator to the e~ergency bus. c) 480V Auxiliary System The 480V. auxiliary system receives power from the 4160V system through dry-type, three phase, indoor transformers. The 480V safety-related system consists of four ( 4) power centers, eight (8) motor control centers (MCC's), the safety and nonsafety-related loads and interconnection cables. Feeder circuit breakers are 1600 Amp or 600 Amp frame size.

All breakers are of metal-enclosed, drawout construction.

Control power is fed from safety-related 125V D. C. batteries. Feeder circuit. breakers are provided with direct acting magnetic trip devices having long time and short time elements. The. setting of the long time and short time* elements for the MCC feeders al lows starting the largest motor at its MCC while its bus is carrying maximum load. The motor feeders are provided with direct-acting magnetic trip elements having long time and instantaneous characteristics. The long time element is set to trip the breaker during abnormal starting conditions, i.e., if the acceleration time of the motor exceeds the safe stal I time (thermal limit). The instantaneous element trips the breaker from approximately twice locked rotor current up to the maximum short circuit available. The 480V MCC's are provided with molded case circuit breakers having a thermal magnetic characteristic, and having 22000 Amp interrupting rating for the main breaker and 14000 Amp symmetrical interrupting rating for branch circuit breakers. Motor. feeders are provided with combination air circuit breakers and magnetic starters having thermal overload relays. The overload element opens the contactor on motor overload. The instantaneous element of the molded case circuit breakers are set to protect against short circuit and high locked rotor current (approximately set at twice the locked rotor current). d) 120/240VAC Distribution System The 120/240V A. C, distribution panels are fed from emergency MCC's feeding nonsafety and safety loads. Each panel bus is provided with a main molded case circuit breaker with thermal and magnetic trip elements. The branch circuit breakers are also of the molded case type with thermal and magnetic trip elements. e) 120 A. C. Vital A. C. Power Distribution System The vital A. C. power system consists of four separate vital bus panels - two of which (busses 11 and 111) are independently fed from an associated 10KVA 125V D.C./120V A.C. single phase static inver- "--~ ter. Each inverter's output is rated at 120V A. C..! GV, 60 Hz.! t Hz. The remaining two vital busses ( I and IV) are supplied by independent* 1 OKVA, sola voltage regulating transformers energized from separate 480 V A.C. emergency busses. The inverters are connected to the batteries that are continuously float charged by the battery chargers; therefore, the effective power sources for the inverters are the 480V A. C. emergency busses. Should the effective power source to any battery charger fail, the inverter is automatically fed from its associated station battery with-out disturbing the vital bus voltage or frequency. Voltage regulating transformers fed from 480V A. C. emergency busses are provided to supply 120V A. C. to vital bus panels* in the event either panel's respective inverter fails or is undergoing maintenance. For this purpose, manual bypass switches are* provided to transfer the load of vital bus panels from the inverters to the voltage regu-lating transformers. Similarity on loss of regulating transformer, inverters can supply power to loads on busses I or IV. The vital bus panels 1-1 and 1-111 supply 120V A.C. power to the safety system trains A while panels 1-11 and 1-IV supply power to safety system train B, respectively. All four vital bus panels i-1, 1-11, 1-11 I, and 1-IV supply 120V A. C. power to the protection system channels I, 11, 111, and IV, respectively. The main breaker for each vital bus -panelboard is a* two pole 225 Amp frame size breaker with thermal and magnetic trip elements. The branch circuit breakers are single pole 1 OOAmp frame size with instantaneous and thermal trip

setting.

The 120V, 60Hz output from each inverter and the sola regulating transformers is ungrounded. Instrumentation is provided to detect an accidental ground. A ground on one phase does not interrupt service and, with multiple channels, it is possible to correct the ground fa'ult without tripping the reactor or sacrificing protection. The vital bus battery chargers and inverters are assembled from high-quality components, conservatively designed for long life and continuous. operation. By avoiding the use of electromechanical devices, routine maintenance downtime is greatly reduced. There are no vacuum tubes or moving parts in the completely static vital bus supply system. Magnetic amplifiers, transistors, and silicon rectifiers are used to provide trouble-free operation. f) 125 VDC Direct Current Power Distribution The 125V DC batteries supply power for operation of turbine-genera-tor emergency auxiliaries, switchgear, annunciators, vital bus inver- . ters, and emergency lighting. It is therefore a source of reliable continuous power for plant pro-tection system control and instrumentation and other loads for safe plant start-up, operation, and shutdown under normal and emergency conditions. The D. C. system consists of two 60 eel I 125V batteries, each with two battery chargers, its own D. C. load center and distribution switch-boarqs. Normally, the two battery bus sections are operated independently, with the bus tie breaker open. Each charger supplies power for operation of equipment connected to that bus section and maintains a floating charge on its associated battery. The manually operated bus tie breaker provides for para I lel operation of the chargers and batter-ies or operation with either battery or charger out of service for* maintenance. The four static battery chargers (two per 125V D. C. bus) are ident-ical, each having an output of lOO Amp at 132V D. C. voltmeter, ammeter, ground detector, A. C. failure relay, and low charging current alarm relay. Loss of A. C. or low charging current is alarm-ed in the control room. Battery ground indicators are located in the control room. Battery voltage is indicated to the operator by annunicators . and continuously recorded on recorders located in the emergency switchgear room. The battery chargers are energized from emergency motor control centers. ---\\ / The battery distribution switchboards are NEJ\\.lA Class 11 metal-clad structures, each with a 125V, two-wire underground main bus, and two-pole manually operated air circu!t breakers. During normal operation, the 125V D.C. load is fed from the battery chargers with the batteries floating.* on the systems. The batteries are sized for-2 hour of operation during or after which it is expected that station power or emergency generation power will be available to energize the battery chargers. X 11 Design Evaluation A. Introduction A review of the North Anna and Surry Power Station one line dia-grams indicates that there exists certain non-Class IE _ loads connected to busses feeding the Class IE loads. A. review was then conducted to determine which* of these loads. are in an area subject to a design basis accident environment, in accordance with the. guidelines provided in Section VI I I-Specific Review Methodology. Tab.les 1 and 2 have been prepared based on this review and present a list of non-Class IE loads, as described above,. in North Anna and Surry Power Stations, respectively, whic_h are considered to be of concern. Review so far indicates that these loads are connected to the

Class IE busses through properly selected and coordinated circuit protective devices, such as circuit breakers.

The**criteria governing the selection of ratings and size*s of these breakers which forms the. bouridary-between safety and nonsafety circuits, is based ori reducing the affect on a Class IE system due to a fault occurring at these non-Class IE equipment. For example, the trip setting of the breaker closest to the device is selected to trip prior to the pick up setting of the main supply breaker. Typical analyses of each station's loads listed on Table 1 and 2 are provided below to demonstrate that the connection of these loads to Class IE busses are in accordance with criteria described in preceeding paragraphs and that the impact on the Class IE system remains within acceptable limits.,..--*

(. B. 1 ) North Anna Power Station: 4160V Auxiliary System: Review of Table-1 indicates that there is one non-Class 1 E 4160V

load, namely one Residual Heat Removal Pump 300H P Motor connected to each of the emergency switchgear buses-1 H and 1 J, which could be subjected to a potentially harsh environment due to an accident.

A review of the North Anna Power Station FSAR indicates that during a CDA/CLS signal the Residual Heat Removal Pump is automatically shed from its emergency bus. The tripping circuit is designed to prevent single failure, as the tie breaker feeding both RH R pump and component cooling pump is also tripped by a SIS. Additionally, the Residual Heat Removal pump is fed through a properly selected and coordinated circuit breaker, which will trip in the event of an electrical fault prior to the tripping of the main feeder breaker to its emergency bus. Based on the above discussion it is evident that the Class-1 E system can not be impacted due to an environmentally induced failure of a RHR pump motor caused by harsh environment resulting from an accident. It should be noted that 4160\\/ one line diagram Figure - 7 incorrectly indicates that RH R pumps are safety-related, which will be corrected in the continued review process undertaken by VEPCO.

2) 480V Auxiliary System:

i) Review of Table-1 indicates that the 480V emergency buses 1 H 1 and 1 J 1, each feeding two ( 2) non-Class 1 E loads-namely the Containment Recirculating Fan and Pressurizer Heater backup groups, which can be subjected to the impact of harsh environment resulting from an accident. A detailed review of the control circuitry for the Containment Recirculating Fan indicates that the breaker feeding these motors are tripped on a CDA/CLS signal. Therefore, these loads.. are e*ssential ly disconnected from the safety system during an acddent and cannot degrade the safety system. The pressurizer heater backup group control. panels are located in a area exposed to a mild environment.

However, these panels subfeed individual heaters located at poten-

. tially harsh *areas. The circuit feeding an individual group of heaters is again protected by

an individual circuit

. breaker at the panel having a lower trip rating than that of the feeder breaker at the control pa_nel~ It is therefore believed that. a fault in the circuit will trip the heater load breaker before it could trip the supply breaker from the bus. Chances of two (2) breakers failing to trip, ahd thus causing the 480V main supply breaker. to trip, is further minimized

due to proper.. coordination between the 480V
supply break.er. to the bus and the load breaker.

Typical coordination for these loads, as applicable in Surry Station, are provided in Figures 34 and 35. It is noted that Figure -. 8 incorrectly indicates that these loads are Class 1 E, which will be corrected in the continued *.. review process discussed* in this report. ii). 480V Motor Control Centers (MCC's) ~ Review of Table-1 indicates* that there are. several non-:-Class IE loads connec-ted to. various Class IE* MCC 1s. Typically these loads are for feeds to distribution panels, power supply for an in-strumentation system or power for motor operated valves. These circuits, except for MOV's, usually contribute a small amount of energy during an electrical fault condition. In addition. the distribution

panel
feeds are provided with a single phase transformer, whose impedance will further reduce
the available short circuit current.

For circuits ,I feeding -motor operated valves, the circuit breaker trip ratings are selected so that it will coordinate with the upstream breaker during a fault. Furthermore, a review of contrql circuitry for a typical motor operated valve indicates that the power supply circuit to the actuator is deenergized upon completion of valve_ strokes, which may range anywhere from 5 to 30 seconds. Therefore, even in_ case of a fault, the time the fault will remain in the system is sufficiently small so as to prevent exceeding - the inherent time_ delay al lowed in the coordination between the primary feeder breaker and the MCC bus breaker. The above indicates that an electrical fault in circuits or equipment shown on Table 1 is-of little significance. Good engineering practice requires that all load - breakers be properly coordinated. Initial assessment of North Anna Station indicates that MCC load breakers are properly coorc:Hnated to clear the fault with minimum impact to the o:ve_rall system. - Attached Figures 30 to 33 _ show the time current ~harac-teristics

and _ settings for subject MCC's and demonstrates

-that* applicable criteria stated in previous paragraphs are *

reasonably met.

The objective of these curves -is to show that the largest load in _the MCC (i.e., breaker with largest trip rating), which. will see the rilax-imum. _short circuit-overcurrent~ is co-ordinated with the primary breakers at the 480V switch- -- gear** feeding the MCC. Thereby, it is. then established that all other breakers with a_ trip rating below the largest one will trip prior to the -primary breaker. A brief discussion is presented below for each curve. l. ii I! I; Figure - 30 MCC 1H1-1 and MCC 1J1-1. MCC 1 H 1-1 is fed from 480V Switchgear Bus '1 H' through a 600 Amp drawout circuit breaker, !TE type K-600 having a 600 Amp, type OD-4 dual (long-time and short-time) over-current element ( 1-Figure-30). The long time element of this device is set at* the maximum continuous current rating of the circuit breaker, 600 Amp, and the minimum band is selected. The short time element should be set at minimum delay and at a trip setting slightly higher than the instantaneous trip setting of the largest breaker on the motor control centers. Curve 1 for the largest breaker on the MCC shows that the short time setting is to be set above 2400 Amp.. This is set at 2600 Amp minimum band (approximately 5 times. the long time setting). The sub-station transformer secondary breaker feeding the 480V switchgear bus is. shown on curve 3. Minimum usable settings are utilized, so that. this curve coordinates with the downstream 480V switchgear feeder breaker to its downstream MCC. The long time element is set at 120 percent of the coil rating. Curve 1 shows the largest feeder on MCC 1 H 1-1, which has a 200 Amp

trip, Klocker-ivloeller molded case circuit breaker, type NZMH9-250, ZM9-225-2400A.

It can be seen that curve 2 for 480V feeder breaker to MCC1 H-1, is. entirely behind the curve* 1. (the largest feeder) and will coordinate with all thermal magnetic breakers on the MCC. Curve 3 is coordinated with curve 2 so that in the.event of.a. MCC 'breaker failure' only the specific 480V breaker feeding the MCC will trip and not the substation transformer secondary breaker.

---~

Figure-31 MCC 1H1-4 MCC 1H1-4 is fed from 480V Switchgear Bus 11H 1 through a 600 Amp drawout circuit breaker type ITE, K-600 having a 600 Amp, type OD-4 dual (long time and_.short time) over-current element. The largest load in the MCC is the 60HP control room chiller which is therefore utilized for co,.. ordination purposes. through a 225 Amp This load is fed from the Iv1CC. frame size, 160 Amp trip rated, Klockner-Moeller molded case circuit

breaker, type:-

NZN.9-250/ZM9-225-2400, having thermal-magnetic trip ele-ments. Principles of setting these devices are similar to that described in Figure 4. It can be seen that curve 2 is behind curve 1, i.e., the largest size breaker at the MCC, and wi 11 therefore co-ordinate with all other thermal-magnetic breakers at the MCC. Figure-32 MCC 1J1-2N and MCC 1J1-2S and Figure-33 MCC 1H1-2N and MCC 1H1-2S The basis for these figures is similar to that described for Figures 30 and 31. Each 480V MCC feeder is coor_dinated with its largest MCC

load, thereby ensuring that the load breaker wi II trip before the feeder breaker.

For MCC-1J 1-2S, the largest load breaker considered is the 130. Amp trip rated, 225 Amp frame

size breaker for the control rod cooling fan, and for MCC 1 H1 "."2N; the largest load breaker considered is the 160 amp. trip -rated, 225
Amp frame size breaker for the i 00 HP spent
fuel pit pump.

These breakers are provided with an instantaneous element and a thermal overload element which coordinate with the motor starter protective equipment *

3)

The above discussion demonstrates that the protective devices at and below the* MCC 1s are adequately selected so that a failure of non-Class IE loads (i.e., loads described in Table 1) will cause the tripping of their upstream load breakers, and therefore will not degrade the Class IE power system. Furthermore, the chances of having a failure of the load breakers are considerably reduced as all breakers at the safety. related busses are procured under a strict quality assurance program in conformance with 1 OCFRSO, Appendix B, applicable to safety-related equipment located in the mild environment. 120VAC Vital Bus Power Distribution System Review of Table 1 indicates that a few non-Class 1 E loads which could be subjected to a harsh environment due to a design basis accident are connected to the same power supply source as those used for Class 1 E loads. Review so far indicates that only one of the four redundant 120V A. C. vital power busses fed directly from 125VDC/120VAC inverters, with arrangement for alternate power supply from 480 Volt motor control centers, could be adversely affected, The normal source of power supply to these busses are the inverters, which restrict the output power flow to 160% of their nominal rating. Therefore, in case there is a fault in the loads described in Table 1, the inverters are adequately protected. In the event of an inverter failure, the power would be automatically transferred to the normal A. C. power source from the connected 480V MCC through a 480/120V regulating transformer. The transformer provides sufficient impedance (approximately 2. 5%

at rated 1 O KVA base) so* as to reduce the amount of fault current available to its downstream system.

(\\

1 *. \\ j,, The above discussion demonstrates that environmentally induced failures of non-Class 1 E loads will not have sufficient capabililty to degrade the Class 1 E system to the point whereby performance of safety function can not be accomplished. It has, *however, been decided that a complete review of the North Anna. Power Station 120VAC Vital Power Distribution System will be initiated to further verify the adequacy of every

circuit, classification as safety or nonsafety-related.

not withstanding its Upon completion of this ~ review, its findings, including the need for modifications, if any, will be made available to NRC.

4) 125V D. C, Distribution System Review of Table 1 indicates that certain non-Class 1 E loads, con-sisting of the fire protection system and emergency lighting which can be influenced by design basis accident environment following an accident, are connected to the same power supply that is used by a Class 1 E system.

Emergency lighting circuits are energized only during the. time dura-tion between loss of offsite power and connection of the diesel gener-ator. Upon availability of diesel generator, these circuits are auto-matically disconnected. Therefore, chances of failure occurring at the same time are considered improbable. Other involved circuits are for the fire protection system which is energized in the event of a fire. Failure of these circuits during an accident condi,tion ~ while energized, is not considered a postulated event. However, _the 125V D. C. system, in general, is des_igned to limit the consequence of an electrical fault. The.D. C. system protection main and feeder breakers are of the molded case thermal magnetic breaker type. The upstream main (battery charger supply -breaker) molded case supply breaker will selectively coordinate, if the short circuit current value at the downstream thermal magnetic device is suffi- --- --- - -----------,-,.-,..,,,...... -..... ----~--~ ---...... ---*-*-****-----~-----*.. ---* *- -*-**.............,. - ****--**

(\\

i ciently less than the magnetic trip setting of the upstream breaker.

The magnetic element provides instantaneous tripping at 4 to 1 O times the thermal trip rating which is set at the factory (nonadjustable). Additionally, the occurrence of a short circuit on the branch circuit, which could also cause tripping of the main breaker, is unlikely due to the following reasons: o Battery shor! circuit current is believed to be substantially less than 1 O times the one minute rating. o Due to the 125V D.C. ungrounded system design, the chances of a short circuit occuring are improbable. o Bolted faults are virtually impossible except on first closing a supply breaker following maintenance. Even small values of fault resistance will substantially reduce the fault current. The above di~cussion indicates that design of each safety-related D. C. system is such that degradation of each Class 1 E D. C. electrical system due to the failure of one or more non-Class 1 E circuits is improbable. It has, however, been decided that a complete review of the North Anna Power Station D. C. system will be initiated to further verify the adequacy of every

circuit, not withstanding its classification as safety or nonsafety-related.

Upon completion of this review, its findings, including the need for modifications, if any, will be made available to NRC. C. SURRY POWER STATION

1) 4160V Auxiliary System Review of Table-2 indicates that there is one non-Class 1 E 4160V

load, namely one Residual Heat Removal Pump 300H P Motor connected to each of the emergency switchgear buses-1 H and 1 J, which could be subjected to a potentially harsh environment due to an accident.

,.Ge *i I It is expected that in the event of an electrical fault, resulting from an accident, the RHR pumps will be isolated prior to causing. an electrical disturbance to the safety-related busses. This expectation is based on a review of electrical system design and the determination that 4160V load breakers are properly coordinated with the supply breaker to the bus. Based on the above discussion it is evident that the Class-1 E system can not be impacted due to an environmentally induced failure of a RHR pump motor caused by harsh environment resulting from an accident.

2) 480V Auxiliary System i

480V Switchgear Susses.

Review of Table-2 indicates that 480V Emergency Susses 1 H and 1J feed non-Class 1E Containment Recirc. Fans 1-VS-F-1A and 1-VS-F-1 B, respectively, which are located in areas subject to harsh environment resulting from an accident. Each of these loads ( 125 HP) is fed from the emergency bus through a 600 Amp drawout circuit breaker, ITE type K-600, having a type OD-6 (long time and instantaneous) overcurrent element with a 200 Amp coi I rating. The feeder breaker to the 480V bus 1 H and 1 J from the 4160V bus 1 H and 1J, respectively, is a ITE type K 600 draw-out circuit breaker having a OD-4 dual (long time and short time) overcurrent element with 1600 amp coil rating. Figure 34 shows plots of time-current characteristic of these breakers. Curve 1 represents the load breaker. The instantaneous element is set at 2000 Amp at intermediate band (approximately 173% of motor locked rotor current) and the long time element is set at 120% of ful I load current. Curve 2 shows the feeder breaker to the bus, whose long i time element is set at 120% of coil rating at minimum band and whose short time element is set at 400% of coi I rating at maximum band, As can be seen in Figure 34, curve 2 is entirely behind curve 1 and wi II al low tripping of the load breaker prior to tripping of the main feeder breaker to the bus for fault at the load side. In addition to the above load, the emergency 480V switch-gear also feeds the non-Class 1 E pressurizer heater backup group control panel from each bus. Although located in a mild environment, this panel subfeeds individual heaters located at potentially harsh areas. However, as the circuit feeding an individual group of heaters is again protected by an individual circuit breaker at the* panel with a lower trip rating than that of the feeder breaker at the control panel, it is believed that a fault in the circuit will trip the heater load breaker before it could trip the supply breaker from the bus. Chances of two (2) breakers failing to trip and causing a trip of the 480V main supply breaker to the bus is further minimized due to proper coordination among the 480V supply breaker to the bus and load breaker as shown on Figure 35. The above discussion demonstrates that 480V emergency switch-gear busses are adequately designed to protect against a fault occuring at the non-Class 1 E equipment; ii.

4aov Motor Control Centers (MCC's).

Review of Table 2 indica-

tes that there are several non-Class 1 E loads connected to Class 1 E motor control centers, Each of these loads are protected by a carefully selected and coordinated breaker, Feeder breakers to each affected MCC (MCC-1H1-1, 1H2-1, 1J1-1 and 1J1-2) are provided with a draw-

).

3) out circuit breaker having a long time and short time element while the load breakers are molded case thermal magnetic type.

For motor loads, a combination breaker and starter is provided. The magnetic element. of the breaker protects against short circuit and abnormal.starting conditions, while the thermal overload device at the starter protects against the thermal overload of the motor. A typical coordination between load breaker with the largest trip rating at the MCC and its corresponding feeder breaker to the .. MCC at the 480V switchgear is shown in Fig 36. As shown on the curve, the feeder breaker to MCC is properly coordinated with the largest load breaker and thereby will co-ordinate with all other smaller rated breakers. Above coordination ensures that emergency MCC's are adequately protected against a fault at the connected nonsafety-related . equipment and therefore prevents a failure of the overall Class 1E system. 120VAC Vital Bus Distribution System There is no equipment of concern on 120VAC Vital Susses 1-1, 1-11, 1-111, 1-IV and likewise for Unit 2.

4) - 125V D. C. Distribution System Review of. Table* -

2 indicates that certain non-Class 1 E loads, such _as those involving the fire protection system and emergency lighting-and which can be influenced by design basis accident environment following an accident, are connected to the same power supply that is used for Class 1 E system. Emergency lighting circuits are energized only during the time dura-tion between loss of offsite power and connection of the diesel gener- /~ / 1 ators. Upon availability of the diesel generator, these circuits are automatically disconnected. Therefore, chances of failure occurring at the same time is considered improbable. Other involved circuits are for the fire protection system which is energized in the event of a fire. Failure of these circuits during an accident condition, while energized, is not considered a postulated event. However, the 125V D.C. system, in general, is designed to limit the consequence of an electrical fault. The D. C. system protection main and feeder breakers are of the molded case thermal magnetic breaker type. The upstream main (battery charger supply breaker) molded case breakers will

provide coordination if the short circuit current value is below the downstream thermal magnetic device rating and also is sufficiently less than the magnetic trip setting of the upstream breaker.

The magnetic element provides instantaneous tripping at 4 to 1 O times the thermal trip rating set at the factory (nonadjustable). Additionally, the occurence of. a branch feeder-located short circuit which would cause tripping of the main breaker is unlikely due to the following reasons: o Battery short circuit current is believed to be substantially less than 1 O times the one minute rating. o Due to the 125V D. C. ungrounded system design, the chances of a short circuit occuring are smal I. o Bolted faults are virtually impossible except on first closing a supply breaker following maintenance. Even small values of fault resistance will substantially reduce the fault current. The above discussion indicates that design of each safety related D. C. system is such that degradation of each class 1 E D. C. electrical system due to the failure of one or more non-class 1 E circuits is improbable. It has, however, been decided that a complete review of D. the Surry Power Station D.C. system will be initiated to further verify the adequacy of every circuit, not withstanding its classifi-cation as safety or non-safety related. Upon completion of this review, its findings, including the need for modifications, if any, wi II be made available to the NRC. Additional Assurance In addition, the initial design evaluation for both North Anna and Surry Power Stations demonstrates that the implementation of the applied design, operation and maintenance criteria, which follows, provide additional assurance that safety-related electrical systems are not degraded beyond their acceptable limit: a) In the event of* an accident signal (CDA/CLS), tripping of certain of the nonsafety-related loads is initiated-except for those required for prevention of damage to major plant equipment and equipment required to maintain safe operation such as emer-gency lighting. These breakers are tripped and locked out in the open position. Reclosure. of these breakers can only be accomplished manually under strict administrative control. b) All equipment which is part of the Class 1 E system are procured under the strict quality assurance criteria of the plant which conform to the requirement of 1 OCFRSO, Appendix 8. c) Controlled surveillance and maintenance methods, such as break-er test, accuracy measurement, and insulation test are utilized* to reduce the occurrence of. mat function in safety-related electrical systems. d) Plant monitoring and status indication provides sufficient early warning to plant operating personnel so that affected non-safety circuits are isolated prior to causing damage to the safety sys-tem. i X e) ~.~ For nonsafety related components, although quality assurance criteria were not applicable, good engineering and operating practice dictates application of a systematic procurement and maintenance process. For

example, cables (safety-related and non safety-related) are procured under the same strict quality control criteria.

Finally, the scope of this review has concentrated on electrical power system _interconnection. In addition, a review is being continued to assure that there are no nonsafety-related equipment connections to safety-related electrical control circuits such that any nonsafety-related equipment malfunction or inadvertent operation will effect the functional capability of the safety-related equipment. Examples of typical control circuits reviewed are the steam generator high level signal for feedwater isolation and the charging. pump lube oil pressure circuits. DOCUMENTATION REVIEWED The documentation reviewed on North Anna and Surry Power Stations included the updated FSARs, the I EB 79-01 B submittals (Surry

1 &2, North Anna 1 ) and NU REG 0588 Category 11 submittal ( North Anna 2), plant electrical specifications~ plant electrical one line diagrams, available short -circuit and coordination calculations, and physical arrangement drawings.

A specific list of the significant documents reviewed is included as/ or part of Appendices B and D and Figures 6 to 36

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1 Hl 1AF 480V - 1H1 1AF 480V - 1J1 1AF 480V - 1,J 1 Nonsafety Equipment Description RHR Pump 1-RH-P-lA RHR Pump 1-RH-P-1 B Main Stm. Inlet No. 2 Drain VV. MOV-SD100A N. Anna Unit Loe.- Elevation RC-217' RC-217 1 TB-2541 Pressurizer Htr. RC-264' 270KW (Backup Group) Contmt.' Recirc. Fan 1-HV-F-1 A Pressurizer Htr. 215KW (Backup Group) Con tmt. Reci re. Fan 1-HV-F-18 RC-292' RC-264 1 RC-292'

NOTE:

The classification of location. area for listed loads as "harsh" is based on consultant's independent and conservative judgement, as zone maps describing the non-essential areas of the North Anna Power Station are not available at this time. It is anticipated that the list will be reduced during the continuing evaluation. DWG# Safety-Related 11715-'- Bus No./ FE-Location IZ 480V MCC IHl-1 (Erner. SWGR.RM) IZ IZ IZ 12 IZ IZ IR IR lR 480V MCC I H 1-4 (Erner. SWGR. RM) 480V MCC IHl-4 (Erner. SWGR RM) 480V MCC IHl-4 (Erner. -SWGR RM) 480V MCC IHl-4 (Erner. SWGR Rfv\\) 480V MCC IH 1-4 (Erner. SWGR RM) 480V MCC IHl-4 (Erner. SWGR*RM) 480V MCC IJl-2N ( Cable Tunnel) 480V MCC IJ l-2S ( Cable Tunnel) 480V MCC IJ l-2S (Cable Tunnel) Table 1 (cont.) CKT No. C3 C2R C2L C3R OIL DIR C3L A2 K4 A4R Nonsafety Equipment Description Main Stm. Inlet No. 2 Drain VV. MOV-SDlOOB 480V P.ower Receptacle Radiation Monitor Fdr. Process Vent RAD Mon. RM - GW178 Vent Stack A Rad 1v\\on. RM - VG179 Vent Stack B Rad Mon. RM - VG180 Sernivital Bus Panel 1-EP-CB-16C Primary W. Standby PP 1-PG-P-028 N. Anna Unit Loe. - Elevation TB-254 1 SB-254 1 SB-254 1 SWGR-307 1 TB-303' TB-303' SB-260 1 FHB-249' Alternate Pwr. Supply SB-277 1 FDR. for SOV PN L. Inst. Dist. PNL. 480V PWR. Reep. SB-258 1

DWG# Safety-Related 11715-Bus No./ FE-Location IP IP IP IP 1Q 1Q 1Q 1Q 1Q 1 Q. .480V MCC IJ.1-1 (Erner. SWGR. RM) 480V MCC IJ 1-1 . (Erner. SWGR. RM) 480V MCC IJ 1-1 (Erner. SWGR. 'RM) 480V MCC 1J 1-1 (Erner, SWGR~ RM) 480V MCC IHl-2S ( Cable Tunnel) 480V MCC IHl-2S. ( Cable Tunnel) 480V MCC IHl-2S (Cabie Tunnel) 480V MCC I H 1-25 (Cable *Tunnel) ' 480V MCC IHl-25. (Cable Tunnel) 480V MCC IHl-25 (Cable Tunnel) .Table 1 (cont.) CKT No. E3 D2 A2L E2L Fl F2 Gi G2 H2 G3 Nonsafety Equipment Description Main Stm. Inlet No. 3 Drain VV. MOV-SD100C Main Stm. Inlet No. 4 Drain VV MOV-SDl OOD. 480V PWR. Reep. N. Anna Unit Loe. - Elevation TB-254'. TB.-254' SB-254 1 LTG. Transf. 1C1 SB-2771 Loop 1 A Bypass Stop RC-266 1 MOV-1585 Loop lA Hot Leg RC-266 1 Stop MOV-1590 Loop 1 C Bypass Stop RC-267' 1\\,tOV-1587 .

Loop 1 C Hot Leg Stop MOV-.1594. :

Loop IC Cold leg Stop. MOV-1595 Loop IA Cold Leg Stop MOV-1591 RC-267 1 RC-267' RC 266'

DWG#

Safety-Related 11715-Bus No./

FE-Location 1Q 1Q 1Q 1Q 1Q 1Q 1Q 1Q 480V MCC IHl-2S (Cable Tunnel) 480V MCC IHl-2S ( Cable Tunnel) 480V MCC IHl-2S (Cable Tunnel) 480V MCC I H l-2S ( Cable Tunnel) 480V MCC IHl-2S (Cable Tunnel) 480V MCC I H l-2S (Cable Tunnel) 120V Vital Bus Dist. Panel 1-11 120V Vital Bus Dist. Panel 1-11 Table 1 (cont.) CKT. No. H3 J1 P2R P2L M2R L2R 10 11 Nonsafety Equipment Description Loop I B Hot Leg Stop MOV-1592 Loop 18 Cold Leg Stop MOV-1593 I ncore Inst. Drive Assy "D" Fdr. 480V PWR Reep. HTR. Cab SKVA, 1PH, 480-120/240V RC & SFGD. TR-A 1-EP-CB-84A HTR. Cab. 480V Aux. Bid. Mtr Htr. cab 1-EP-CB-84F1 I ntraplant Comm. Gaitronies. - Aux. Bldg. lntraplant Comm. Gaitronics No. 2-Containment N. Anna Unit Loe. - Elevation RC-267 1 RC-267 1 RC-270 1 AB-264 1 QS-260 1 AB-260 1 SB-2541 SB-254 1

DWG# 11715-FE-1Q 1E 1E 1E 1E 1E 1E 1E 1E 1E 'fable 1 (cont.) Nonsafety Safety-Related Bus* No./ Location CKT Equipment No. Description 120V Vital Bus Dist. Panel 1-11 12 125V DC Dist. Cab 20 1-1 ( 1-EP-CB-12A) 125V DC Dist. Cab 4 1-1 l ( 1-EP-CB-128) 125V DC Dist. Cab 8 1-11 (1-EP-CB-128) 125V DC Dist. Cab 1 O 1-11 c1-ep...:cs-12B) 125V DC Dist. Cab 8 1-111 (1-EP-CB-12C) 125V DC Dist. Cab 22 1-111 ( 1-EP-CB-12C) 125V DC D.ist Cab. 5 . 1-IV( I-EP-c~.:.12DJ_ 125V DC Dist Cab... 6 1-IV ( I-EP-CB-12D) 125V DC Dist Cab. 1-IV (*I-EP-CB-12D) 3 lntraplant Comm. Gaitronics No. 1-Containment Fi re Prat System (CO2) Junction Box 1487 Dist. Cabinet I-EP-CB-01 Dist. Cabinet I-EP...;SS-09 Reactor Contmt. Emerg. Ltg. Pn I IERC1 Fire Prat. Syst. Sprinkler Fire Prat. Syst* (CO2) Fire Prot Sys {Deludge) Fire Prat Sys ( Sp.rinkler)

N.Anna.

Unit Loe.- Elevation SB-254 1 SB-2541 AB-297 1 58-254' AB-291' Rod Ctl. RM-285 1 SB-254 1 TB-272 1 TB-276' WH-272'

Table 1 (cont.} DWG# Safety-Related Nonsafety N. Anna 11715-Bus No./ CKT Equipment Unit Loe. - FE-Location No. Description Elevation lE 125V DC Dist Cab. 4 Fire Prot. Sys SB-272' 1-lV ( 1-EP-CB-12D} ( Spri n kier} 1E 125V DC Dist Cab. 15 Emerg. Ltg. AB-278' 1-IV ( 1-EP-CB-120} Table 2 Surry Power Station Units 1 (Unit - 2 Similar) NONSAFETY-RELATED LOADS LOCATED IN HARSH ENVIRONMENT AND CONNECTED TO SAFETY SUSSES DWG Safety Related

11448-Bus No./

FE-Location ID 4160V-IH ID 4160V-1J IQ 480V-1H1 IF 480V-1 H IF 480V-IH IF 480V-1 J 1F 480V-1 J CKT No. SH 11 15J11 14H12 14H-2 14H-8 14J-9 14J-7 Nonsafety

Equipment Description RHR Pump 1-RH-P-1A RHR Pump 1-RH-P-1 B Filter Ext~

1-VS-F-58A Pressurizer Fan Htr. 2SOKW (Back-Up-Group) Contmt. Recirc. Fan 1-VS-F-1A Pressurizer Htr. 200KW (Back-UP Group) Contmt. Recirc, Fan 1-VS-F-1 B

Surry. Unit Location -

Elevation RC-(-) .13 1-0 11 RC-(-) 13 1-0 11 AB.:...Roof RC-3'-6 11 RC-(-) 27'-0 11 RC-(-) 3'-6" RC-(-)27'

Table 2 (cont.) i DWG# Safety Related Nonsafety Surry Unit

11448-Bus No./

CKT Equipment Location - FE-Location No Description Elevation IL MCC1H1-1 Radiation Monitor DB (Bsmt.) FDR Duplex Cond PP IL MCClHl-1 GA Safeguard Area DB (Bsmt.) 1-HSP-3B IL MCClHl-1 - 801 lncore *inst. Drive RC "D" IL MCCl H2-1 2A Caustic lsol SFGD-MOV CS 103A 27 1-0 11 .I IL - MCCl H2-1 118 Cont. Rod Cool Fans RC-3 1-6 11 1-VS-F-60A 1-VS-F-GOC IL MC Cl H2-1 11 C Cont Rod Cool Fans RC-3 1-6 11 1-VS-F-GOA 1-VS-F-GOD IL MCC1 H2-1 11 A 1 FDR for 37-!r KVA (Not Cab HTR-2A2 Heat Available) Trace IL MC Cl H2-1 501 480V PWR (Not Reep Fdr & Aux - Available) Bldg Elev. Fdr Table 2 (cont.) .\\ DWG# Safety Related Non safety Surry Unit

11448-Bus No./

CKT Equipment Location - FE-Location No Description Elevation IL MCC1 H2-1 4C RCP Bypass RC-18 1-0 11 MOV 1585 IL MCC1 H2-1 SB RCP Bypass RC-18'-0" MOV 1587 IL MCC1 H2-1 9C RCP Inlet Stop RC-18'-0" MOV 1590 IL MCC1 H2-1 11 B RCP Outlet Stop RC-18'-0" MOY 1595 IL MCC1 H2-1 98 RCP Outlet Stop RC-18 1-0 11 MOY Stop 1591 IL MCC1 H2-1 11 C RCP Inlet Stop RC-18'-0" MOV 1594 IL MCC1 H2-1 7C Boric Acid AB-13'-0" Filter To Chrg PP MOY 1350 IL MCC1 H2-1 6D Hydrogen AB-13'-0" Recombiner 1M MCC1J1-1 78 RC Seal W Return AB-(-) Stop MOY 1381 To 21-0 11 Throw Over SE Table 2 (cont.) DWG Safety-Related Nonsafety Surry Unit

11448-Bus No./

CKT Equipment Location - FE-Location No. Description Elevation 1M MCC1J1-1 3A-1 Radiation Monitor (Not Fdr (Common Pnl) Available) (11548-FE-IM) IM MCC-1J1-2 l oc Cont Rod RC-3 1-6 11 Cool Fan l-VS-F-60C IM MCC-1J1-2 3E St. Gen Aux SFGD FD PP Htr. 1-FW-P-3A IM MCC-1J1-2 9D-1 lncore Inst. for RC Drive Assy "E" '*-.. _.,/ IM MCC-1J1-2 1A-1 H2A Tap Box 2 RC ( DC79-62-later) IM MCC-1J1-2 4D-2 Cont. Air RC . IM MCC-1J1-2 SC Reactor Coolant RC-18 1-4 11 PP Outlet Stop MOV 1592 IM MCC-1J1-2. 6C Reactor Coolant RC-18 1-4" PP Outlet Stop MOV 1593 IM MCC-1J1-2 8C Cont Rod Coo I Fan RC-3 1-6 11* 1-VS-F-60D & To Cont. Rod Cool '-.._/ Fan 1-VS-F-60F DWG Safety-Related

11448-Bus No./

CKT FE-IM IM lG 1G 1G 1G 1G 1G 1G Location MCC-1J1-2 MCC-1J1-2 125 VDC Dist. Cab 1A 125 VDC Dist. Cab 1A 125 VDC Dist. Cab 1A 125 voe Dist. Cab 18 125 voe Dist. Cab 18 125 voe Dist. Cab 18 12s voe Dist. Cab 18 No. 8A 9C Table 2 (cont.) Non safety Equipment Description Pressurizer Relief ISOV MOV 1536 Safeguard Supply HTG Vent Unit 1-VS-HV-4 Surry Unit Location - Elevation RC-58 1-0 11 (Not Available) CO2 Fire Prot. Sys (Not Available) Waste Disposal BO & (Not Available)

Boron Recovery B D Personnel Hatch
Reactor Contmt.

Erner. LTG Aux BLR. 1-HS-E-4A&4B Deline Ann Erner L_ TG Cab 1 E AB1 Personnel Hatch (LTG) Sprinkler Sys (Fire Prot) A8-45 1-10 11 SB-27 1-0 11 ( Not Avai !able) AB-45 1-10 11 (Not Available)

APPENDIX A APPENDIX A Excerpts from 10CFRS0.49-Paragrap.hs (a),(b),(c) and (g)

REFERENCE:

Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 15 / Friday, January 21, 1983 / Rules and Regulations, pg. 2733. SO. 49 Environmental qualification of electric equipment important to safety for nuclear power plants. (a) Each holder of or each appl-icant for a license to operate a nu-clear power plant shal I establish a program for qualifying the elec-trical equipment define_d in para-gragh (b) of this section. (b) Electric equipment important to safety covered by this section is: (1) Safety-related electric equip-ment3: This equipment is that re-lied upon to remain functional dur-ing and following design basis ev-ents to ensure (i) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boun-dary, (ii) the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and (iii) the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite expo-sures comparable to the 1 O CFR Part 100 guidelines. Design basis events are defined as conditions of nor-mal operation, including antic-ipated operational occurances, design basis accidents,

external events, and natural phenomena for which the plant must be designed to en-sure functions (i) through (iii) of this paragragh.

(2) Nonsafety-related electric equip-ment whose failure under postu-lated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplish-ment of safety functions specified in subparagraghs (i) through (iii) of paragragh (b) ( 1) of this sec-tion by the safety-related equip-ment. ( 3) Certain post-accident monitoring equipment. 4 (c) Requirements for (i) dynamic and seismic qualification of electric equipment important to safety, (ii) protection of electric equipment important to safety against other and extern a I environmental natural phenomena

events, and (iii).

qualification of electrical equipment important to safety located in a mild environment are not included within the scope of* this section.

APPENDIX A (can't) A mild environment is an environment that wou Id at no time be significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal plant operation, including anticipated operational occu ranees. (g) Each holder of an operating license issued prior to February 22, 1983, shall, by May 30, 1983, identify the electric equipment. important to safety within the scope of this section already qualified and submit a schedule for either the qualifications to the provisions of this section or for the replacement of the remaining electric equipment important to safety within the scope of this section. This schedule must establish a goal of final environmental qualification of the electrical equipment within the scope of this section by the end of the second refueling outage after March 31, 1982 or by March 31, 1985, whichever is earlier. The Di rector of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatory may grant requests for extensions of thi_s deadline to a date no later than November 30, 1985, for specific pieces of equipment if these requests are to be filed on a timely basis and demonstrate good cause for the extension, such as procurement lead

time, test complications, and installation problems.

In exceptional cases, the Commission itself may consider and grant extensions beyond November 30, 1985, for completion of environmental qualification. 3Safety-related electric equipment is referred to as "Class 1 E" equip-ment in IEEE 323-1974. Copies of this standard may be obtained from the Institute of Electrical and Elec-tronics Engineers, Inc. 345 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017. 4Specific guidance concerning the types of variables to be monitored is provided in Revision 2 of Regula-tory Guide 1. 97. "Instrumentation of Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and

Envi rans Conditions During and Following an Accident. 11 Copies of the Regulatoyr Guides can be ob-tained from Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Document Management

Branch, Washington, DC 20555

1
I '

/\\ * . APPENDIX B APPENDIX B List of References

1.

1 OCFRSO. 49 11 Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety".

2.

USNRC letter dated April 4, 1983, Steven A. Varga to W. L. Stewart 11 Clarification of Environmental Qualification Safety Evaluation Report 11 for Virginia Electric and Power Company, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.

3.

USNRC letter dated March 24, 1983, Robert A. Clark to W. L.

4.

s.

Stewart "Safety Evaluation for Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Equipment 11 for North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. VEPCO letter dated May 20, 1983, W. L. Stewart to Harold R. Denton "Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Electrical Equipment" for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and* 2

VEPCO letter dated May 20, 1983, W. L. Stewart. to Harold R. Denton "Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Equipment" for Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2.

6 ** USN RC letter dated April 8, 1983, Richard H. Vollmer and Roger Mattson for Darrell Eisenhut "Guidance For Licensees and License Applicants to demonstrate compliance with 1 OCFRSO. 49, Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants".

7.

IEEE Std-279-1971 11 Criteria for Protection System for Nuclear Power Generating Station".

a.

IEEE Std-308-1980 11Standard Criteria for Class IE Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Systems. 11

9.

APPENDIX B List of References (cont'd) IEEE Std-323-1974 11 IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Stations. 11

10.

IEEE Std-323A-1981 (Supplement to IEEE Std-323-1974) 11 IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Stations. 11

11.

IEEE Std-384-1981 11 Criteria for Independence of Class IE Equipment and Circuits. 11

12.

IEEE. Std-603-1980 11 Trial-use Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. 11

13.

IEEE Std-627-1980 11Standard Quality Assurance Program Requirements for the Design and Manufacture of Class IE Instrumentation and Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

14.

Reg. Guide 1.106, Rev-1, 1977 "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Vavles. 11

15.

Reg. Guide 1.118, Rev. -2, 1978 "Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems. 11

16.

Reg. Guide 1.32, Rev-2, 1977 11 Criteria for Safety-Related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants. 11

17.

Reg. Guide 1

47, Rev. -0, 1978 11 Bypassed and inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems. 11

18.

Reg. Guide 1.6, Rev.-0 1971 11 Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants. 11

19.

Reg. Guide 1. 63, Rev. -2, 1978 11 Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants. 11

20.

APPENDIX B List of References (cont'd) Reg. Guide 1. 75, Rev.-2, 1978 "Physical Independence of Electric Systems."

21.

Reg. Guide 1.89, Rev-0, 1974 (Proposed Rev-1 to Reg. Guide 1.89) "Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants. 11

22.

Reg. Guide

1. 93, Rev-0, 1974 11 Availability of Electric Power Sources. 11 APPENDIX C

~------ --

APPENDIX - C Bibliography of Technical Source Data

1.

IEEE Std. 242-1975-11 Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordin_; ation of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems 11 *

2.

ANSI/IEEE Std 399-1980 Recommended Practice for Power System Analysis.

3.

Beeman, D. L., Ed., 11 Industrial Power System Handbook II New York, McGraw-Hill, 1955.

4.

Robert N. Smeaton, Switchgear and Control Handbook, McGraw-Hill, 1977. 5

IEEE Transactions on Power Apparratus and Systems, PAS-92/#1 Paper No. T72232-2 110ptimal Application of Major Electrical Equipment to Generating Station Auxiliary Systems 11, January /February, 1973.

6.

IEEE Transactions on. Industrial Applications, 11 Total Motor Branch Circuit-Protection with Instantaneous Trip Type Circuit Breakers and High Fault Circuit Protectors (HFCP) 11, Vol.

1A11, No.

4, July/August, 1975.

7.

Technical paper F78 138-0 11An Approach to Associated Power Circuits 11 by E. J. Gough, E. I. Fabri, Bechtel Power Corporation, GM McHugh, Jr., Boston Edison

Company, Presented at the IEEE Power Engineering Society Winter Meeting, January 29 - February 3, 1978.

8.

Technical Paper A 78 046-5 "Electrical Aspects of Safety-Related Equipment in Nuclear Power Plants 11 by L. Rebenstein, Stone Webster Engineering Corporation, IEEE PES Winter Meeting January 27 to February 1, 1974 * /~./

9.

APPENDIX-C (can't.) Bibliography of Technical Source Data Conference Paper 71-CP652-PWR "Applications of Static Uninteruptible Power Supplies in Central Power Generating Stations" by L. C. Gonzalez and S. Cunninghis, Ebasco Services, Inc., IEEE Summer Meeting, July 18-23, 1971. 1 o. General Electric Publication No.* 2779D, "Application and Selection, Molded Case Circuit Breakers, February, 1973.

11.

General Electric Review, "Co-ordination of Protective Devices for Control-Power Circuits", by James R. Palmer, December 1949.

12.

"Co-ordinating Protection for Electrical Systems in Plants", Part I, by Ir.win

Lazar, Heyward-Robinson Co.,

Inc., Specifying

Engineer, April, 1976.

13.

Applied Protective

Relaying, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Newark, N.J.

APPENDIX D APPENDIX - D List of specific and significant VEPCO documents reviewed:

1.

North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - U FSAR, Chapter 3, 6, 7, and 8.

2.

Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - UFSAR, Chapter - 3, 6, 7, and

8.

3.

North Anna Power Station, Unit 1 - IE Bui letin 79-01 B, 90 day review.

4.

North Anna Power Station Unit 2 - NUREG-0588 review.

5.

Surry Power Station, Unit 4, IE Bui let in 79-01 B, 90 day review *

6.

Surry Power Station, Unit 2 IE Bui let in 79-01 B, 90 day review.

7.

North Anna Power Station, Unit 1, Response to Safety Evaluation Report.

8.

Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, Response to Safety Evaluation Report.

9.

VEPCO, North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Environmental Zone Description, Volume - 1.

1 O. VEPCO, Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Environmental Zone Description, Volume -1.

11.

Plant Manual, North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Volumes - 1 thru 12. -100-J

12.

13.

APPENDIX - D (con't) System Description and Logic Diagrams, Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2.

North Anna Power Station, Units. 1 and 2 -

Electrical One Line Diagrams.

14.

Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Electrical One Line Diagrams. 15, North Anna Power Station - Equipment Specification NAS 34 480V Unit Substation NAS - 46 4160V Metal Clad Switchgear NAS - 70 Battery Distribution Cabinets NAS 198 AC Distribution Panel NAS - 123 Motor Control Centers

16.

Surry Power Station, equipment specifications: NUS - 76 1+160V Metal Clad Switchgear NUS - 108 480V Low Voltage Metal Clad Switchgear NUS - 123 Lighting Unit Substations NUS - 262 Battery Distribution Switchgear boards NUS - 359 Motor Control Centers NUS - 9055 Low Voltage Motor Control Centers NUS - 9135 Panels boards Lighting and Power Distribution A&C 17, VEPCO, Nuclear Power Station, Quality Assurance Manual.

18.

North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, "Safety Related Electrical Schematics" NA-TR-1001, May 10, 1973.

19.

VEPCO Internal Memo: From N. B. Tweed Jr. to J. T. Emery, 11 480V Switchgear Setting Criteria", dated June 15, 1977. -101-

APPENDIX E Resumes of Key Leadership of 10CFRS0.49 (b)(2) Review Effort -102-

- '-.:,/ / LAWRENCE P. GRAD IN, P. E. PROJECT MANAGER EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

11/83 Mr. Gradin is a registered professional engineer with more than 17 years of experience in electrical, instrumentation and control, and related power engineering activities for fossil, nuclear, and advanced nuclear reactor power plants ( 14 years with nuclear power). His unique contributions to the nuclear industry include the creation, leadership, and development of the first: Solid state modular safety related heat tracing control system for nuclear power plants; Integrated plant security and fire detection system satisfying detailed USNRC criteria; Technology training program in Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Technology for the USNRC and industry; Equipment Qualification Program to pass a USNRC audit to the criteria established by the USN RC Orders in 1980. EXPERIENCE As Manager of Electrical, Instrumentation and Control, Mr. Gradin is responsible for all nuclear power related El&C activities at NPS. This encompasses a full range -of engineering and design activities, from selection of sensors, logic and control functions and equipment, control room reviews, through to and including the complete power supply systems in _utility, industrial and commercial facilities. Additionally, as Associate Director of the NPS Technical Institute, Mr. Gradin, in conjunction with the Institute Director, assures that the Institute technical training pro-grams and workshops are organized under responsible leadership, capable direction and qualified instrucfion. Representative programs are provided for the following disciplines: mechanical, electrical, civil, seismic, instru-. mentation and control and quality assurance. Mr. Gradin 1s membership in the IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee 1s Subcommittee 1, 11 General Plant Criteria" and Subcommittee 3, 110perations, Survei I lance, and Testing 11, plus selection as a leading lecturer in the Advanced Equipment Qualification seminar by IEEE for fal ! 1983 demonstrates industry recog-nition of his contribution. Equipment Qualification Program Manager success included direct manage-ment of a multi-discipline, multi-project engineering and scientific team which addressed equipment qualification on a generic and specific nuclear power plant basis. Accomplishments included the development, prepara-tion, review, presentation and ultimate acceptance by the USNRC of the nation's first successful EQ effort in response to NUREG 0588 Category I requirements, as well as successful response to I EB 79-01 B and NU REG 0588 Category 11 requirements. This effort included interpretation* of USN RC documents, methodology to determine radiation source terms, thermal and mechanical aging, preparation of computer based documentation packages, interface with industry groups such as Atomic Industrial Forum, Electric Power Research Institute, IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Commit-tee, etc. -103-

Lawrence P. Gradin, P. E. Page two* Mr. Gradin also led the development of a Nuclear Plant Equipment Data System which integrates Cable and Raceway Schedules, Instruments Lists, Valve Lists, Computer Aided Design, Radiation. Temperature and Humidity Zone Mapping, Generation of Equipment Qualification Component Evaluation Sheets and Life Cycle/Maintenance, Support of Fire Protection Zoning, Human Factors Engineering Control Room Equipment Listing, Safe Shutdown Lists, etc. Technical Training expertise and. past experience includes the preparation, supervision direction and presentation of high technology, continuing education technical training. Training experience includes training of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission utility, national laboratory and professional personnel from the international community. As a Former Supervising Engineer of Instrumentation and Control, Mr. Gradin was responsible for the direct supervision of Lead I &C Discipline Engineers and approximately twenty-five professionals for St. Lucie 1 & 2. Services included performing necessary upgrading and licensing procedures for the retrofit of a nu.clear plant and other I &C tasks (e.g. NU REG 0737, RG 1. 97, NU REG 700, Appendix II R11etc.) for both an. operating nuclear unit and a unit under construction. Other management Electrical, lnstru-. mentation and Control experience included serving as the Assistant Section

Manager of the Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control disciplines.

In this capacity, Mr. Gradin was responsible for the direct supervision of four Group Supervisors and approximately forty engineering personnel in electrical, instrumentation. and control engineering for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant. Electrical engineering experience included serving in senior level positions such as Principal Electrical Engineer and Lead Discipline Engineer for major nuclear power plants. Mr. Grad in was responsible for al I electrical engineering functions and direction of the Electrical/ Design team (approxi-mately 25 professionals) necessary to design these plants. As Senior On-,.Site Project Electrical Engineer at the St. Lucie #1, he was responsible for technical supervision of an on-site Electrical Engineering and Design Staff with regard to electrical general arrangement drawings, lighting drawings, sizing of electrical equipment, design of plant security systems, fire protection systems, equipment specification, purchasing. of electrical equipment, engineering estimates and manpower forecasts and. participation in meetings and hearings with NRC and ACRS. In addition, Mr. Gradin has served as a Lead Discipline Engineer on several fossil-fueled projects. EDUCATION New York Institute of Technology, B.S., Magna C1.,1m Laude, 1969. Mr. Gradin has also successfully completed NSSS Nuclear Reactor Tech-nology Courses, a certification program at the American Management Re-search Institute and Dale Carnegie, various nuclear energy, electrical design, and equipment qualification study groups, and several management courses at New York University. -104-

i.

\\

---~-

Lawrence P. Gradin, P.E

Page three LICENSES Professional Engineer:

New York and California PROFESSIONAL Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) - Sr. Member:

1)

Power Engineering Society ( Nuclear Power Engineering Committees SC-1, SC-3)

2)

Industrial Applications Society

3)

Instrumentation & Measurement Society

4)

Nuclear & Plasma Sciences Society

5)

Reliability Society

6)

Program Committee of New York and Long Island

Sections, Joint Power Engineering Society and Industrial Applications Society Chapter

7)

Former Working Group Member Electric Heat Tracing Commit-tee Instrument Society of America (ISA) - Sr. Member: Power Division American Nuclear Society: 1 )

2)

3)

Human Factors Division Nuclear Safety Division Power Division American Society of Industrial Underwriters Laboratory Open Atomic Industrial Forum Member Security Forum Environmental Qualification American Society for Engineering Education - Member:

1)

Continuing Professional Development

2)

Electrical Engineering

3)

Engineering Management

4)

Instrumentation

5)

Nuclear Engineering

6)

Relations with Industry HONORS New York State Regents Scholar Listed in 11 Who 1s Who in the East 11 Listed in 11 Who 1s Who in Frontier Science and Technology 11 PUBLICATIONS Subcommittee

1.

Principal

Author, 11 Electrical Technology for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems 11,

(An Engineering Seminar 1s Three Volume Text - First Edition - 1980, Second Edition - 1982). -105-

., _____ J Lawrence P. Gradin, P.E
Page four

2.

Principal Author, 11 USN RC Training Program - Electrical Training Course 11, Comprehensive Six Volume Text for USN RC Personnel, 1979

3.

11 Environmental Qualification - Use of Industry /Commercial Standards in Lieu of Surveillance Maintenance,". Nuclear Plant

Safety, March/April 1983.

4.

11 IEEE Advanced Equipment Qualification Seminar, Two Comprehen-sive Session Texts: (1) "Systems Engineering Approach to Equip-ment Qualification 11 (2) 11 Practical Use of Commercial Grade Equip-ment and Industrial Standards for Equipment Qualification. 11

5.

11 lndependent Design Verification and Quality Assurance Auditing for Nuclear Plants", Nuclear Plant Safety, November /December, 1983.

6.

"Usefullness of Commercial Electrical Standards for Qualified Life Determination 11, American Nuclear Society, 1983 Winter Me~ting. -106-

GOBIN GANGULY, P.E. PROJECT ENGINEER EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

11/83 Mr.

Ganguly is a registered professional engineer with more than fifteen

( 15} years of experience in electrical, instrumentation and control and related power engineering activities for fossil, nuclear and advanced nuclear reactor power* plants. Senior level

positions have included Lead, Principal or Project Engineer on new utility power plants, consultant in
major architect-engineering firm in equipment qualification, lead electrical engineer on breeder reactor development.

EXPERIENCE As Project Engineer and Assistant Project Manager, responsibilities include direct leadership of Equipment Qualification and RG 1. 97 effort at VEPCb for the North Anna and Surry Power Stations. Among responsibilities as Principal Electrical Engineer have been electrical engineering and design for a multi-unit pressurized water reactor Westing-house plant (each unit being 900 MWE). He was involved in all aspects of electrical engineering activities, and provided guidance to a team of 12 engineers and many electrical and wiring designers for design of the plant. Included in this assignment was project supervision for fire protec-tion, Appendix R, environmental qualification of electrical equipment, evaluations of N RC and industry positions on equipment qualification, FSAR preparation, incorporation of NU REG 0737 and Regulatory Guide 1. 97 requirements, and all related activities. Responsibilities as an Equipment.Qualification Engineer required direct participation in a major architect-engineering firm's corporate approach to equipment qualification on operating nuclear units, near term operating license (NTOL) plants and construction permit (CP) plants.Mr. Ganguly has demonstrated familiarity with IEB 79-01 B (DOR Guidelines), NU REG

0588, and recently promulgated 1 OCFR50. 49.

He acted as lead -107-

GOBIN GANGULY, P.E. Page Two in the development of a cost:-sensitive a_pproach to equipment qualification which maximizes use of commercial /industry standards and demonstrates equipment qualification in lieu of unnecessary testing. Mr. Ganguly posses-ses working level as well as leadership* knowledge of aging analysis methodo-logy, equipment safety categorization, preparation of. master I ists, and submittal to NRC. As Lead Engineer for oil to coal conversion projects, his responsibilities have ranged from initial preparation of proposal package for the overall project to development of initial plant design criteria, plant layout and cost benefit studies for major equipment ~uch as precipitators, coal. handling

system, etc.

Mr. Ganguly also functioned as Lead Electrical Engineer for engineering and design of the nation's first *. demonstration plant utilizing Breeder* Reactor Technology for -the U.S. Department of Energy. In that capacity, his responsibilities

included electrical system des_ign and development of plant one line diagrams and system design criteria, as well as determina-tion of equipment size and ratings with _associated design support.
He*

assumed supervision responsibility for the electrical engineers and design.* team. Special activities. have involved leading the* development of plant.data acquisition. and control systems utilizing multiplexing and microprocessor based technology for both. nuclear and non-,nuclear systems. He evaluated and implemented the regulatory requirements towards satisfying the Licen...; sing requirements, especially with regard to remote shutdown and indepen...; dence requirements, and also performed review of design change requests. -108-

i.

'-.._/ GOBIN GANGULY, P.E. Page Three Mr, Ganguly's work experience reflects full development of electrical system design (short circuit, voltage drop, relay coordination) studies and preparation of engineering drawings and associated equipment estimating, specifications and purchasing. His experience base encompasses meetings with N RC staff, response to NRC questions, and on-site Start-Up engineer-ing. Practical "hands-on" equipment and maintenance-oriented experience includ-es 1 O years of power plant* operation and maintenance activity, procedures development and actual direction as an Electrical Operation Engineer for a four (4) unit power plant, site assignments, relay maintenance/ setting, scheduled start-up

and shutdown activities for fossil and nuclear power plants.

EDUCATION Polytechnic Institute of New York, M. S. (Systems Engineering l ~ 1974 BS, Electrical Engineering. Other course work includes participation in various energy policy and issues study groups at Polytechnic Institute of New York, electrical distribu:;.. tion and coordination studies with General Electric~ and project management system workshops. LICENSE Professional Engineer, New York* -109-

I GOBIN GANGULY, P.E. Page Four PROFESSIONAL Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE):

1)

Power Engineering.Society*

2)

Industrial Applicatfons _Society

3)

Program Committee of N*ew York and. Long Island Sections, Joint Power Engineering. Society and lndustriai Applications Society Chapter * -110-

-.,_j l

. _____ )

RICHARD A. LEONE LEAD ENGINEER EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

11/83 Mr. Leone is a senior level engineer with more than 15 years of experience in electrical engineering for nuclear and fossil power plants. His experience has included nuclear related licensing activities in - risk assessment, as wet I qS, the classical engineering activities of electrical protection and design. EXPERIENCE As Risk Assessment Engineer - Nuclear Operations, Mr. Leone was respon-sible for reliability /availibility analysis of nuclear power plant systems and associated electrical, mechanical-and instrument and control sytems in response to N RC safety /risk assessment related requirements.

This work includes failure modes and effects analysis developement, fault tree con-struction and analysis,* failure data* base developement and reviewing system operating, test and maintenance practices.

Mr. Leone's project experience includes the Shearon Harris Emergency Load Sequencer Reliabi-lity Study, and participating-in the Waterford 3 and Shearon Harris Con-trol System Failure Studies and the Waterford 3 SOAR instrumented fault three effort. He also provided technical support to the department's engineering staff. As System Protection and Control Engineer, Mr. Leone designed and engineered numerous power related protection and control systems, includ-ing -early generator-turbine valve action initiation, single phase line fault tripping and reclosing, power line communication systems for control and protection, generating station distribution systems, bulk - transmission systems (765,500, 345, 138, and 69 KV) and automatic capacitor bank control. This work included system selection and conceptual design, relay settings, relay /fuse coordination, checking and approving project elemen- -111-

\\ RICHARD LEONE Page Two tary, wiring and field change drawings, and/or carrier reverse polarization analyses for. ~uch

subst~tions and plants as Cook Nuclear,
Rockport, Kammer, Muskingum River, and Tidd fossil plants, and Smith Mountain and Claytor hydroelectric generating stations.

Other significant assignments included participation in a six. week onsite investigation of. Cook's. plant. performance, and analysis of high horse power fluid coupling applications for large transmission system connected synchronous condensers and variable speed drives for induced draft fan use to ultra

large coal scrubbers.

Technical research, interviewing and writing ski I ls* were demonstrated in addition to training* less experienced and new engineers. As

Electrical Engineer/Power Engineer-Operations and Maintenance, Mr.

Leone participated in the design, engineering and construction of a major.* air and water pollution control p*roject and

a multi-fluid pumping installation~

He investigated chemical .process facilities' efficiency improvement

means, both for steam generation and utilization, and electricity distribution and use.

EDUCATION New Jersey Institute of Technology, S.S., Electrical Engineering, 1968. Illinois Institute of.Technology and Midwest College of Engineering: Graduate *. level courses in Nuclear. Rector

Control, Control

Theory, Advanced Mathematics* and Business (Contract) Law, 1968:...1970.

PROFESSIONAL Member of Electrical and Electronics. Engineers (IEEE) * -112-}}

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