ML18113A056
| ML18113A056 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee (DPR-036) |
| Issue date: | 04/02/2018 |
| From: | Jonathan Brown Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards |
| References | |
| OMY-18-013 | |
| Download: ML18113A056 (2) | |
Text
MAINE YANKEE 321 Old Ferry Road, Wiscasset, Maine 04578 ATTN: Document Control Desk Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 April 2, 2018 OMY-18-013 Re: 10 CPR 72.48(d)(2) 10 CPR 72.4 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Maine Yankee Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation NRC License No. DPR-36 {NRC Docket No. 50-309) 7 2- -
0 5 O
Subject:
10 CPR 72.48 Biennial Report In accordance with 10 CPR 72.48(d)(2), Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (Maine Yankee) is req~ired to subm~t to the NRC a brief description of any changes, tests or experiments made pursuant to 10 tFR: 72A8( c ), including a suqimary of the evaluation of each. This report covers the p'~rtha'frorh April r, 2016"to TV1arch'3'f;':20fs.Dtitit\\g thfii'tim~ fran1.'e,*a iO'CFR 72.4-8 Evaluatioi{ 'was 'dtindtfcted pursuant to 1 Q CFR 72.48( c ). The following is a summary of that evaluation(,_,.*.(i(;;_; ;.,; '--' v.-: ; r,;,_-.;* '//'. )*')
,i:*,_,,,."'),:: :,.,*;.,;. ii,'!*\\ :';i, *:::;;* 11 '..,: *.
- _r*
" I,. '
, I iJ' '
- r, () '.'. *,
J i 72.48 Evalu;Jti6n # 17':o 1 ** *,. i
( ' '
\\ :. :
- (t '.',/'.*.-:.IJ '.'.J
.,.:*. * :. ii*;;**:*:,.r _:\\,;"'( j*** ;'
)~_r
',(
This activity.installs stainless steel corrosion specimens in the inlet and outlet vents of four Verti~al. C_6hcrete Cask~/ ~t ~a!ij~,-y ~1?,ke~ to' ~e~~tmi¥,~
1ihe* s~sb 1~~~rbi/itt of canister ~ateri_a1s* ti.
Chlonde Induced Stress Corros10n Crackmg (CISCC): These specimens are not descnbed m the NAC-UMS Final Safet)i Analysis R~port (FSAR)'. Therefore, thciy 'are hot part of the original dry fuel storage system configuration. This activity:* 1) Is' bounded by both seismic and tornado design basis accidents; 2) Involves partial blockage that is well below the 50% air inlet blockage analyzed for the Off Normal Event; and 3) Is bounded by an approved NAC evaluation of installation of a larger vent obstruction not installed at Maine Yankee. Therefore, both the heat removal design function a:nd design basis accident sceha:tios are not i:n,,:alidated by placing these speci~ens in the inlet an& outlet vents'ahd the proposbd ictiori r~rhairt'sbounded by the design and'ii~erising'bases.. Th~ 'l'o CFit-72:48 Ev~iuatid~ *b~tablishes that th;is :Jctivity does not 'result in:
~*(.
.1\\:1 1
- Ji, :*;1**.
. *;~!'.;.J;..,*..,, ~*{ :... j *"\\*'
1 ~:*;:.,:.:*
._,.,r~*-
1:***11.-. !' :;**,~, *;*_,*.~ ;,_;* / '-~
More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously
'evMuated tn the:NAC"'.UMS FSAR.
More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a
,- ' **: * *
- _ * :s*y~tem, structure, o,: c_omponent (SSC) important to safety prev_iously evaluated in the
' * ' '* NAC~UMS'FSAR u*, :,.,,,; -*-- ; i~ (
- :\\':)"
_;_;~.. ',.,-,,,i., ::* '! * *,ij * *
- *. Motith'an a m1nil~~l 1~creis'e:ln'thi{d61i'sequences\\;f'a6 acbidenfprevfously evaluated ii1
-*_ - :*the N'A.c~UMs FsAR:
1* ;*,,.::,: :,
_I *:_.-_,.* -.-.':i*:i.-,... '
1
\\,.,,-_*,_*
1 1._-
1
- ,r1,.:,
- 1.~r*,.1:1*.*;r";,;Jr:".(.(J.
u
'.,,.1*-!.'::~\\*.~1n 1 1:
.1.:_
'.j"'
.l_,.\\:;,,.. *
.* :' l r :_::. ~.
.,., '.1,
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company OMY-18-013/April 2, 2018/Page 2 More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of a SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
Create a possibility for a malfunction of a SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
A design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the NAC-UMS FSAR being exceeded or altered.
A departure from a method of evaluation described in the NAC-UMS FSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses.
This letter contains no commitments.
If you have any questions regarding this submittal, pleas*e do not hesitate to contact me at (207) 882-1303.
Respectfully, I-5_ /fa tJVJ--__
- 01. Stanley Brown, P.E.
ISFSI Manager cc:
D. Lew, Acting NRC Region I Administrator R. Powell, Chief, Decommissioning Branch, NRC, Region I J. Nguyen, NRC Project Manager P. J. Dostie, SNSI, State of Maine J. Hyland, State of Maine
MAINE YANKEE 321 Old Ferry Road, Wiscasset, Maine 04578 ATTN: Document Control Desk Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 April 2, 2018 OMY-18-013 Re: 10 CPR 72.48(d)(2) 10 CPR 72.4 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Maine Yankee Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation NRC License No. DPR-36 {NRC Docket No. 50-309) 7 2- -
0 5 O
Subject:
10 CPR 72.48 Biennial Report In accordance with 10 CPR 72.48(d)(2), Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (Maine Yankee) is req~ired to subm~t to the NRC a brief description of any changes, tests or experiments made pursuant to 10 tFR: 72A8( c ), including a suqimary of the evaluation of each. This report covers the p'~rtha'frorh April r, 2016"to TV1arch'3'f;':20fs.Dtitit\\g thfii'tim~ fran1.'e,*a iO'CFR 72.4-8 Evaluatioi{ 'was 'dtindtfcted pursuant to 1 Q CFR 72.48( c ). The following is a summary of that evaluation(,_,.*.(i(;;_; ;.,; '--' v.-: ; r,;,_-.;* '//'. )*')
,i:*,_,,,."'),:: :,.,*;.,;. ii,'!*\\ :';i, *:::;;* 11 '..,: *.
- _r*
" I,. '
, I iJ' '
- r, () '.'. *,
J i 72.48 Evalu;Jti6n # 17':o 1 ** *,. i
( ' '
\\ :. :
- (t '.',/'.*.-:.IJ '.'.J
.,.:*. * :. ii*;;**:*:,.r _:\\,;"'( j*** ;'
)~_r
',(
This activity.installs stainless steel corrosion specimens in the inlet and outlet vents of four Verti~al. C_6hcrete Cask~/ ~t ~a!ij~,-y ~1?,ke~ to' ~e~~tmi¥,~
1ihe* s~sb 1~~~rbi/itt of canister ~ateri_a1s* ti.
Chlonde Induced Stress Corros10n Crackmg (CISCC): These specimens are not descnbed m the NAC-UMS Final Safet)i Analysis R~port (FSAR)'. Therefore, thciy 'are hot part of the original dry fuel storage system configuration. This activity:* 1) Is' bounded by both seismic and tornado design basis accidents; 2) Involves partial blockage that is well below the 50% air inlet blockage analyzed for the Off Normal Event; and 3) Is bounded by an approved NAC evaluation of installation of a larger vent obstruction not installed at Maine Yankee. Therefore, both the heat removal design function a:nd design basis accident sceha:tios are not i:n,,:alidated by placing these speci~ens in the inlet an& outlet vents'ahd the proposbd ictiori r~rhairt'sbounded by the design and'ii~erising'bases.. Th~ 'l'o CFit-72:48 Ev~iuatid~ *b~tablishes that th;is :Jctivity does not 'result in:
~*(.
.1\\:1 1
- Ji, :*;1**.
. *;~!'.;.J;..,*..,, ~*{ :... j *"\\*'
1 ~:*;:.,:.:*
._,.,r~*-
1:***11.-. !' :;**,~, *;*_,*.~ ;,_;* / '-~
More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously
'evMuated tn the:NAC"'.UMS FSAR.
More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a
,- ' **: * *
- _ * :s*y~tem, structure, o,: c_omponent (SSC) important to safety prev_iously evaluated in the
' * ' '* NAC~UMS'FSAR u*, :,.,,,; -*-- ; i~ (
- :\\':)"
_;_;~.. ',.,-,,,i., ::* '! * *,ij * *
- *. Motith'an a m1nil~~l 1~creis'e:ln'thi{d61i'sequences\\;f'a6 acbidenfprevfously evaluated ii1
-*_ - :*the N'A.c~UMs FsAR:
1* ;*,,.::,: :,
_I *:_.-_,.* -.-.':i*:i.-,... '
1
\\,.,,-_*,_*
1 1._-
1
- ,r1,.:,
- 1.~r*,.1:1*.*;r";,;Jr:".(.(J.
u
'.,,.1*-!.'::~\\*.~1n 1 1:
.1.:_
'.j"'
.l_,.\\:;,,.. *
.* :' l r :_::. ~.
.,., '.1,
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company OMY-18-013/April 2, 2018/Page 2 More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of a SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
Create a possibility for a malfunction of a SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
A design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the NAC-UMS FSAR being exceeded or altered.
A departure from a method of evaluation described in the NAC-UMS FSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses.
This letter contains no commitments.
If you have any questions regarding this submittal, pleas*e do not hesitate to contact me at (207) 882-1303.
Respectfully, I-5_ /fa tJVJ--__
- 01. Stanley Brown, P.E.
ISFSI Manager cc:
D. Lew, Acting NRC Region I Administrator R. Powell, Chief, Decommissioning Branch, NRC, Region I J. Nguyen, NRC Project Manager P. J. Dostie, SNSI, State of Maine J. Hyland, State of Maine