ML18113A056

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Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - 10 CPR 72.48 Biennial Report
ML18113A056
Person / Time
Site: Maine Yankee
Issue date: 04/02/2018
From: Jonathan Brown
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
References
OMY-18-013
Download: ML18113A056 (2)
v • d • e


Text

MAINE YANKEE 321 Old Ferry Road, Wiscasset, Maine 04578 April 2, 2018 OMY-18-013 Re: 10 CPR 72.48(d)(2) 10 CPR 72.4 ATTN: Document Control Desk Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Maine Yankee Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation NRC License No. DPR-36 {NRC Docket No. 50-309) 7 2- - 0 5 O

Subject:

10 CPR 72.48 Biennial Report In accordance with 10 CPR 72.48(d)(2), Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (Maine Yankee) is req~ired to subm~t to the NRC a brief description of any changes, tests or experiments made pursuant to 10 tFR: 72A8(c), including a suqimary of the evaluation of each. This report r,

covers the p'~rtha'frorh April 2016"to TV1arch'3'f;':20fs.Dtitit\g thfii'tim~ fran1.'e,*a iO'CFR 72.4-8 Evaluatioi{ 'was 'dtindtfcted pursuant to 1Q CFR 72.48(c). The following is a summary of that evaluation(,_, .*.(i(;;_; ;.,; '--' v.-: ; r,;,_-.;* ' / / ' . )*') ,i:*,_,,, ."') ,:: :, . ,*;.,;. i'i,'!*\ :';i, *:::;;* 11 '.. ,: *.

-* .. : :_r* " I , .' , I iJ' '  : r, () '.'. *, *. ' J i 72.48 Evalu;Jti6n # 17':o 1 ** *,. i ( ' ' \ :. :

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    .IJ '.'.J .,.:*. * :. ii*;;**:*:, .r _:\,;"'( j*** ;' )~_r ',(

This activity.installs stainless steel corrosion specimens in the inlet and outlet vents of four Verti~al. C_6hcrete Cask~/ ~t ~a!ij~,-y ~1?,ke~ to' ~e~~tmi¥,~ ihe* s~sb 1 1

~~~rbi/itt of canister ~ateri_a1s* ti.

Chlonde Induced Stress Corros10n Crackmg (CISCC): These specimens are not descnbed m the NAC-UMS Final Safet)i Analysis R~port (FSAR)'. Therefore, thciy 'are hot part of the original dry fuel storage system configuration. This activity:* 1) Is' bounded by both seismic and tornado design basis accidents; 2) Involves partial blockage that is well below the 50% air inlet blockage analyzed for the Off Normal Event; and 3) Is bounded by an approved NAC evaluation of installation of a larger vent obstruction not installed at Maine Yankee. Therefore, both the heat removal design function a:nd design basis accident sceha:tios are not i:n,,:alidated by placing these speci~ens in the inlet an& outlet vents'ahd the proposbd ictiori r~rhairt'sbounded by the design and'ii~erising'bases .. Th~ 'l'o CFit-72:48 Ev~iuatid~ *b~tablishes that th;is :Jctivity does not 'result in:

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1 1
  • Ji, :*;1**. . *;~!'.;.J;..,* .., ~*{ :... j *"\*' 1

~:*;:.,:.:* ._,. ,r~*- 1:***11.-. !'  :;**,~, *;*_,*.~ ;,_;* / '-~  :,: '.

  • More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously

'evMuated tn the:NAC"'.UMS FSAR.

  • More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a

,- ' **: * **_* :s*y~tem, structure, o,: c_omponent (SSC) important to safety prev_iously evaluated in the

' * ' '* NAC~UMS'FSAR u*, :, .,,,; -*-- ; i~ ( *.; -* *,, * :\':)" _;_;~ . . ' ,.,-,,,i., ::* '! * *,ij * * .- :.* '

- * . Motith'an am1nil~~l 1~creis'e:ln'thi{d61i'sequences\;f'a6 acbidenfprevfously evaluated ii1

-*_ - :*the N'A.c~UMs FsAR: 1

  • ;*,,.:: ,: :, _I *:_.-_,.* -.-.':i*:i.-,. . ' \,., -_*,_* 1._- :'.'.* - *: ,r1,.:, * *., , *-* - - :_.

1.~r*,.1:1*.*;r";,;Jr:".(.(J. '.,;;,: u '. ,,.1*-!.'::~\*.~1n 1 1: .,:: 1 1 1 .1.:_ '.j"' .l_,.\:;,,.. *

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Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company OMY-18-013/April 2, 2018/Page 2 More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of a SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.

Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.

  • Create a possibility for a malfunction of a SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
  • A design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the NAC-UMS FSAR being exceeded or altered.
  • A departure from a method of evaluation described in the NAC-UMS FSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses.

This letter contains no commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, pleas*e do not hesitate to contact me at (207) 882-1303.

Respectfully, I- 5_ /fa tJVJ--__

01. Stanley Brown, P.E.

ISFSI Manager cc: D. Lew, Acting NRC Region I Administrator R. Powell, Chief, Decommissioning Branch, NRC, Region I J. Nguyen, NRC Project Manager P. J. Dostie, SNSI, State of Maine J. Hyland, State of Maine

MAINE YANKEE 321 Old Ferry Road, Wiscasset, Maine 04578 April 2, 2018 OMY-18-013 Re: 10 CPR 72.48(d)(2) 10 CPR 72.4 ATTN: Document Control Desk Director, Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Maine Yankee Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation NRC License No. DPR-36 {NRC Docket No. 50-309) 7 2- - 0 5 O

Subject:

10 CPR 72.48 Biennial Report In accordance with 10 CPR 72.48(d)(2), Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (Maine Yankee) is req~ired to subm~t to the NRC a brief description of any changes, tests or experiments made pursuant to 10 tFR: 72A8(c), including a suqimary of the evaluation of each. This report r,

covers the p'~rtha'frorh April 2016"to TV1arch'3'f;':20fs.Dtitit\g thfii'tim~ fran1.'e,*a iO'CFR 72.4-8 Evaluatioi{ 'was 'dtindtfcted pursuant to 1Q CFR 72.48(c). The following is a summary of that evaluation(,_, .*.(i(;;_; ;.,; '--' v.-: ; r,;,_-.;* ' / / ' . )*') ,i:*,_,,, ."') ,:: :, . ,*;.,;. i'i,'!*\ :';i, *:::;;* 11 '.. ,: *.

-* .. : :_r* " I , .' , I iJ' '  : r, () '.'. *, *. ' J i 72.48 Evalu;Jti6n # 17':o 1 ** *,. i ( ' ' \ :. :

  • ,,.! * (t '.',/'.* .-
    .IJ '.'.J .,.:*. * :. ii*;;**:*:, .r _:\,;"'( j*** ;' )~_r ',(

This activity.installs stainless steel corrosion specimens in the inlet and outlet vents of four Verti~al. C_6hcrete Cask~/ ~t ~a!ij~,-y ~1?,ke~ to' ~e~~tmi¥,~ ihe* s~sb 1 1

~~~rbi/itt of canister ~ateri_a1s* ti.

Chlonde Induced Stress Corros10n Crackmg (CISCC): These specimens are not descnbed m the NAC-UMS Final Safet)i Analysis R~port (FSAR)'. Therefore, thciy 'are hot part of the original dry fuel storage system configuration. This activity:* 1) Is' bounded by both seismic and tornado design basis accidents; 2) Involves partial blockage that is well below the 50% air inlet blockage analyzed for the Off Normal Event; and 3) Is bounded by an approved NAC evaluation of installation of a larger vent obstruction not installed at Maine Yankee. Therefore, both the heat removal design function a:nd design basis accident sceha:tios are not i:n,,:alidated by placing these speci~ens in the inlet an& outlet vents'ahd the proposbd ictiori r~rhairt'sbounded by the design and'ii~erising'bases .. Th~ 'l'o CFit-72:48 Ev~iuatid~ *b~tablishes that th;is :Jctivity does not 'result in:

~*(. .1\
1 1
  • Ji, :*;1**. . *;~!'.;.J;..,* .., ~*{ :... j *"\*' 1

~:*;:.,:.:* ._,. ,r~*- 1:***11.-. !'  :;**,~, *;*_,*.~ ;,_;* / '-~  :,: '.

  • More than a minimal increase in the frequency of occurrence of an accident previously

'evMuated tn the:NAC"'.UMS FSAR.

  • More than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a

,- ' **: * **_* :s*y~tem, structure, o,: c_omponent (SSC) important to safety prev_iously evaluated in the

' * ' '* NAC~UMS'FSAR u*, :, .,,,; -*-- ; i~ ( *.; -* *,, * :\':)" _;_;~ . . ' ,.,-,,,i., ::* '! * *,ij * * .- :.* '

- * . Motith'an am1nil~~l 1~creis'e:ln'thi{d61i'sequences\;f'a6 acbidenfprevfously evaluated ii1

-*_ - :*the N'A.c~UMs FsAR: 1

  • ;*,,.:: ,: :, _I *:_.-_,.* -.-.':i*:i.-,. . ' \,., -_*,_* 1._- :'.'.* - *: ,r1,.:, * *., , *-* - - :_.

1.~r*,.1:1*.*;r";,;Jr:".(.(J. '.,;;,: u '. ,,.1*-!.'::~\*.~1n 1 1: .,:: 1 1 1 .1.:_ '.j"' .l_,.\:;,,.. *

.* :' l r :_:: . ~. **

,., . ., ., '.1 ,

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company OMY-18-013/April 2, 2018/Page 2 More than a minimal increase in the consequences of a malfunction of a SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.

Create a possibility for an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.

  • Create a possibility for a malfunction of a SSC important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the NAC-UMS FSAR.
  • A design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the NAC-UMS FSAR being exceeded or altered.
  • A departure from a method of evaluation described in the NAC-UMS FSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analyses.

This letter contains no commitments.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, pleas*e do not hesitate to contact me at (207) 882-1303.

Respectfully, I- 5_ /fa tJVJ--__

01. Stanley Brown, P.E.

ISFSI Manager cc: D. Lew, Acting NRC Region I Administrator R. Powell, Chief, Decommissioning Branch, NRC, Region I J. Nguyen, NRC Project Manager P. J. Dostie, SNSI, State of Maine J. Hyland, State of Maine

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